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– Editor
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Introductory Remarks

In August 1950, Leo Strauss wrote the “Restatement,” a reply to Alexandre Kojève’s and Eric Voegelin’s critical reviews of *On Tyranny* (1948), his first American book, in which he defended the classical view of the fundamental problems through a commentary on Xenophon’s *Hiero*. It was first published in French translation, in *De la tyrannie* (1954). A shorter English version was published in *What Is Political Philosophy?* (1959) and then in a new edition of *On Tyranny* (1961). The version from which the French translation was made has not been found again. However, the variations which appear in typescripts of the “Restatement” enabled the reconstruction

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This edition is meant to be used in Leo Strauss, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Bd. 5, *Über Tyrannis* (planned publication). I am grateful to Daniel Tanguay, who called my attention to some differences between the French and American editions of the “Restatement,” to Joseph Cropsey (Director of the Leo Strauss Estate) and Laurence Berns, who provided a copy of their typescripts, to Nathan Tarcov, who provided a copy of Allan Bloom’s typescript, to Victor Gourevitch for his comments on earlier versions of the editorial work, and to the University of Chicago Press for its permission to use the printed text of the “Restatement.” The research work has been achieved with the help of a grant from the École doctorale de philosophie (Université Paris I) and of a CIRCEM scholarship (Université d’Ottawa). I also thank the following institutions: Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris (Département des manuscrits occidentaux, Grande Réserve, Fonds Kojève, and Réserve des livres rares); Centre Alexandre Koyré, EHESS, Paris; École pratique des hautes études (Ve section, sciences religieuses), Paris; Fogelman Library, New School for Social Research, New York; Greenfield Library, St. John’s College, Annapolis, Md. (Jacob Klein Papers); Hoover Institution, Stanford University (Eric Voegelin Papers, Strauss-Voegelin correspondence, Box 37, Folder 1); Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center, Gumberg Library, Duquesne University (Erwin Straus Alcove); Special Collections Research Center of the University of Chicago Library (Leo Strauss Papers); Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen (Gerhard Krüger Nachlass).
of the original text, by comparing them with each other, and with the
French translation and the published English version. Kojève’s manuscript
of his review essay, “Tyrannie et Sagesse,” was also reduced in length and
published in two different versions. Various unpublished documents, which
come mainly from the Leo Strauss Papers and the Fonds Kojève, are here
used in order to throw some light on the genesis of the “Restatement” and
of “Tyrannie et Sagesse.” In addition, the recent discovery of new material
enabled the revision and completion of the Strauss-Kojève Correspondence.
A supplementary insight is obtained into the philosophical issues at stake,
which have also been discussed in the letters: man and nature, tyranny and
wisdom, the final State and the end of history.

Leo Strauss and Xenophon

The critique of modern philosophy in the light of classical
philosophy (i.e., for Strauss, the genuine philosophy) was a prominent theme
of discussion between Strauss and Voegelin in their correspondence dur-
ing the 1940’s and ’50’s.2 In his letter dated October 16, 1946 (op. cit., trans.
modified, p. 38), Strauss approached Voegelin regarding his On Tyranny: “In
case I see you, I would very much like to confer with you about a small inves-
tigation I completed over a year ago3 but have not been able to place over
here.4 It is the first attempt to interpret Xenophon’s dialogue on tyrants (the

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2 See Faith and Political Philosophy: The Correspondence between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, 1934–
1964 (trans. and ed. Peter Emberley and Barry Cooper (University Park: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1993), e.g. Strauss to Voegelin, 24.11.42, p. 6 f., Voegelin to Strauss, December 9, 1942, pp. 8-9,
Strauss to Voegelin, 9 May 1943, p. 17 f., October 11, 1943, p. 35, 25.8.50, p. 71 f., 10.12.50, p. 75, and
June 4, 1951, p. 89.

3 A version (seemingly close to the final one) of at least the first three chapters was already written
about two years before, as shown by Ludwig Edelstein’s thorough discussion of it in his letters to
Strauss dated 4.XII.44 and 28-30.XII.44 (handwritten in German, Leo Strauss Papers, Box 1, Folder
12).

4 Strauss mentioned some of his trials and failures in this regard in the same letter, loc. cit. He took
steps in order to find a publisher for his book as soon as 1945, as shown by Ernest Barker’s letter
to Strauss dated September 23, 1945 (Leo Strauss Papers, Box 1, Folder 4): Strauss’s intention to
publish in England his interpretation of the Hiero was said to be “a difficult issue,” for both material
(lack of paper due to post-war restrictions) and scholarly (lack of interest in Xenophon in England)
reasons. A letter of refusal from the Oxford University Press dated March 7, 1947, in which material
difficulties are put forward, is to be found in the Leo Strauss Papers (Box 3, Folder 16).—Kurt Riezler
advised Strauss “not to be disappointed by the difficulties your Hiero encounters. Your problem is the
American ignorance of the difficulty to write for an audience which simply does not know what for
you is a matter of course.” (Handwritten letter in English, July 15th, 1946, Leo Strauss Papers, Box 3,
Folder 7.)—The publication of the book was eventually secured thanks to financial help from Clara
H. Mayer, then dean of the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School for
Social Research, as shown by a letter from Max Ascoli dated August 31, 1948 (Leo Strauss Papers, Box
1, Folder 2).
It leads to results that do not interest the man in the street, but which are perhaps not completely indifferent: ancient political theory appears in a different light.” He stated his intention in achieving such a study in a letter to Julius Guttmann (the former Director of the Akademie für die Wissenschaft des Judentums, Berlin) dated May 20, 1949:

If my hunch is right, then Maimonides was a “philosopher” in a far more radical sense than is usually assumed today and really was almost always assumed, or at least was said. Here the question arises immediately of the extent to which one may responsibly expound this possibility publicly—a question that certainly makes the problem of esotericism immediately a timely or, as one says these days, an “existential” one. This was one of the reasons why I wanted to present the problem in principle of esotericism—or the problem of the relationship between thought and society—in corpore vili, thus with respect to some strategically favorable, non-Jewish object. I chose Xenophon, partly due to the connection with the problem of Socrates, partly because the assumption is that if even Xenophon, this seemingly harmless writer, then all the more… The little writing [On Tyranny] is a preliminary study. At some point I should like to finish the interpretation of Xenophon’s four Socratic writings.6

Strauss’s interest in Xenophon, however, was not simply subordinate. It first emerged in his letters to Jacob Klein dated 1938-1939: “Xenophon is my special favorite, because he had the courage to disguise himself as a fool and so to go through the millenniums—he is the biggest rascal that I know—I believe he does in his writings exactly what Socrates did in his life.”7 In his letter to Gershom Scholem dated September 6, 1972, Strauss wrote he asked his publisher “to send you my latest publications, which I consider as my best things. They deal with the Xenophontic Socrates. My admiration for Xenophon, now almost 40 years old, led a fellow who lives now in England—Richard Lichtheim’s son,8 I believe—not only to despise me as a hopeless

5 The commentaries on the Hiero which are listed in Donald R. Morrison, Bibliography of Editions, Translations and Commentary on Xenophon’s Socratic Writings, 1600–Present (Pittsburgh: Mathesis publ., 1988), pp. 96-97, are purely philological.
7 Letter to Klein, 16.2.1939, GS 3, p. 567. All translations are my own, unless otherwise indicated.—Cf. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, § 40.
reactionary, which I am indeed, but also as the victim of indoctrination through the humanistic gymnasium.”

Throughout the notes in *On Tyranny* are displayed some results of the close study of Xenophon's writings which Strauss achieved at the time he taught at the New School for Social Research: in the orientation of his rediscovery of the exoteric art of writing, he worked and lectured extensively on them, mainly on the *Education of Cyrus* and on the *Memorabilia*; to a lesser extent on the *Symposium* and on the *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians*, among others. Contrary to the general opinion of contemporary philologists, Strauss emphasized the philosophic significance of Xenophon's Socratic orientation:

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10 At the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social Research, according to the *New School Bulletin*, a treatment of the *Education of Cyrus* was scheduled in the basic courses Strauss gave on “Greek and Roman Political Philosophy” (Fall term 1938) and on “History of Political ideas” (Fall terms 1940-1943). Xenophon's economic treatises were to be read in his seminar on “The Origins of Economic Science” (Fall term 1940); this title is also the one of an interpretative essay on Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* on which he worked from fall 1940 (Leo Strauss Papers, Box 6, Folder 11). Xenophon's doctrine was to be referred to in his graduate course on “Absolutism and Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern” (Fall term 1941).—Strauss mentioned to Klein his work on “Xenophon-statistics” (18.8.39, *op. cit.*, p. 579): on a series of sheets, Strauss noted the occurrences of some Greek words. He used separated sheets for the following words: γραφεῖν (to write), ἔγω ἡμῖν (I, we), οἶδα (εἰπότομα) (I know), παίζειν (to play), ὁπλίται (to keep silent), ἀποκρύπτετον (to hide [middle]/ to be hidden), δήμος (people)… in the *Memorabilia* and in other writings by Xenophon (Leo Strauss Papers, Box 17, Folders 12-13). He also noted on several sheets some occurrences of numbers 7 and 4 in Xenophon (*ibid.*, Folder 12).

11 See Strauss to Klein, 27.11.1938, *op. cit.*, p. 559.—An undated essay (presumably written at some time between 1938 and 1942) on the *Education of Cyrus* is to be found in the Leo Strauss Papers, Box 6, Folder 11. An account of the *Education of Cyrus* was intended as a case-study of the classical art of writing in two papers planned by Strauss: Part II of “On the study of classical political philosophy” (Leo Strauss Papers, Box 6, Folder 6, dated 22-27.11 - 27.12.1938) begins by announcing “a brief discussion of the meaning” of this work, and then breaks off after three lines, in the middle of a sentence. Strauss devoted a series of notes to various themes in the *Cyropaedia*: swearing, the best constitution… (*ibid.*, Box 17, Folder 13). In the plan of the unwritten Part II of “Exoteric teaching” (written in December 1939), “Xenophon. Cyrus” appears among the items (see Heinrich Meier, *Die Denkbewegung von Leo Strauss* [Stuttgart/Weimar: J. B. Metzler, 1996], p. 15, n. 4).


14 Strauss's essay on this Xenophontic treatise, “The Spirit of Sparta and the Taste of Xenophon,” *Social Research*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (November 1939), pp. 502-36, is “the first publication in which Strauss put before the eyes the art of writing carefully in a concrete example” (Meier, *loc. cit.*). He delivered on May 3, 1939 at St. John's College, Annapolis (Md.) a public lecture with the same title, to which he referred in his letters to Klein dated 28.2.39, 10.3.39, 14.3.39, 13.4.39, and 9. Mai 1939 (*op. cit.*, pp. 566-71).

About Xenophon, I did not exaggerate, by Hera: he is quite a great man, not inferior to Thucydides and Herodotus himself. The so-called failures of his stories are exclusively the consequences of his supreme contempt for the ridiculous *erga* [actions] of the *kaloikagathoi* [gentlemen]. Besides, he says that to *all*, if only one takes the trouble to open one’s eyes or, as he calls it, if one does not satisfy oneself with *akouein* [hearsay], but if one wants to *see*. The sameness of Xenophon’s and of Plato’s Socrates is beyond any doubt: he is the same Socrates-Ulysses in both of them, the *teaching* too. The problem of the *Memorabilia* is identical to that of the *Republic*: the problematic relation between *dikaiosyne* [justice] and *aletheia* [truth], or between theoretical and practical life. Plato’s and Xenophon’s technique is largely identical: neither of them wrote under his own name: the author of the *Memorabilia* as well as of the *Anabasis* is not Xenophon, but an anonymous *ego*; in the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon is the unique *synôn* [companion] whom Socrates describes as “insane.” About *nê kiuna*, Xenophon proceeds in the following way: he makes Socrates tell a fable, in which a dog swears by Zeus. This example shows well, in the clearest way, which kind of dog is Xenophon. In short, he is quite marvelous and from now on my uncontested favorite.

Reviews and Replies

Strauss met Kojève (whose name was then still Koschevnikoff) in fall 1932 in Paris, at Alexandre Koyré’s home; from that time they kept alive an intellectual exchange. Strauss went to Paris, among other purposes,
in order to benefit from Koyré’s teaching: “The study of the relation of modern and medieval thinking has experienced a decisive advancement from the method of work of Gilson and his school. Hence, it would be very desirable to me if I could deepen my related studies under the direction of professors Gilson and Koyré at the École Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris.”

In his course on Hegel’s religious philosophy in 1932-1933, for which Strauss was registered as well as Kojève, Koyré spoke of Hegelian time: this was for Kojève “a revelation”; the Hegelian thesis which underlies Kojève’s interpretation was already brought out:

We have arrived at the result: “Geist ist Zeit.” (Hegel’s text!) Here is the key to the understanding of Hegel. Time and History can be included in the dialectical process and become an essential part of philosophy, because spirit is time (or in time, as Hegel says in the “Phenomenology”). […]

What is eternal, is the unity of past, of present and of future. This is thus time which is eternal, and not eternity outside time (cf. “the

Koschevnikoff.”). A manuscript (12 folios) of the translation which is closer to the original text than the published version, is to be found in the Fonds Kojève (box XIII).—Strauss’s project for studying together with Kojève the relations between Hegel and Hobbes, especially in Hegel’s early writings, was not carried out: cf. Strauss, PPH, p. 58 n. 1 (Hobbes’ and Hegel’s common anthropological ground is approached in ibid., pp. 57 f., 105 f., and 122-23) with Kojève to Strauss, November 2, 1936, op. cit., pp. 231 ff., and Strauss to Klein, 31. Dezember 1933, op. cit., p. 485.

23 Undated, four-page typescript in German which has been filed with the Rockefeller Foundation correspondence in the Leo Strauss Papers (Box 3, Folder 8): presumably a work plan which Strauss elaborated in 1932 in order to obtain the Rockefeller Grant.—Koyré was then known for his work in the field of the philosophy of religion, along the path opened by Étienne Gilson. He had become a director of studies at the EPHE in December 1931 (the summaries of the courses he gave there have been reprinted in Alexandre Koyré, De la mystique à la science: cours, conférences et documents 1922-1962, ed. Pietro Redondi, Paris: éd. de l’EHESS, 1986, pp. 20-55). Koyré reviewed Strauss’s Religionskritik Spinozas in the Revue d’histoire et de philosophie religieuses, Vol. 11 (Oct. /Nov. 1931), pp. 443-49 (the corrected proofs of this review are to be found in the Leo Strauss Papers, Box 26, Folder 4). This academic institution was described by Koyré in “L’École pratique des hautes études,” in Deutsch-französische Rundschau, Bd. IV, Heft 7 (1931), pp. 569-86.

24 No. 15631/212, 23 novembre 1932 (Registre d’inscription No. 10), with Strauss’s signature (Strauss’s nomination as a titular student is dated 1934 in the Registre des élèves titulaires de la section des sciences religieuses, 1). A summary of Koyré’s course, which dealt with the formation of Hegel’s thought and method from the Theologische Jugendschriften, the Jenenser Logik, and the Jenenser Realphilosophie, appears in the Annuaire de l’École pratique des hautes études (1933-1934), “Rapport sur l’exercice 1932-1933,” pp. 57-58; Kojève (Kojevnikof) is listed there among the titular students, and his active participation in the explanations is mentioned.

eternal moment” of tradition). One always opposed time and eternity; one conceived of eternity on the model of an immobile present. For H., eternity is not outside time; time is not a mobile image of eternity, but it is eternity; there is no other one.26

Kojève’s first course on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit in 1933-1934, for which Strauss was also registered,27 was meant to continue Koyré’s. In his last course (1938-1939), he explicitly elaborated his “Note sur l’éternité, le temps et le concept” from the article which Koyré has drawn from his own course on Hegel’s earlier writings: “a decisive article which is the source and basis of my interpretation of the Phänomenologie des G[eistes].”28 With the key statement “Geist ist Zeit” Kojève equated “Man is Time,” “Man is Desire for Recognition,” and eventually the “historical evolution which finally comes to the universal and homogeneous State and to the absolute Knowledge that reveals the complete Man achieved in and by this State. In short, to say that Man is Time, is to say all that Hegel says of Man in the PhG.”29 In his letter to Strauss dated June 22, 1946 (op. cit., p. 234), Kojève announced his bringing out a compendium of his Hegel course and transcripts of some lectures, which would include among others “the full text of the last course about wisdom.”

Fulfilling Kojève’s wish, Strauss gave him his opinion about the Introduction à la lecture de Hegel, in his letter dated August 22, 1948 (op. cit., p. 236, trans. modified): “Aside from Heidegger, probably hardly one

26  Fonds Kojève, box X, Kojève’s notes taken at Koyré’s course, 17/III.33, folio 1, verso, and fol. 2, recto (all the documents which are quoted from the Fonds Kojève have been written in French, unless otherwise indicated). A summary description of the Fonds appears in Hommage à Alexandre Kojève, op. cit., pp. 133-34.
27  No. 16052/206, 22 novembre 1933 (Registre d’inscription No. 11, EPHE, sciences religieuses), with Strauss’s signature. Details about Kojève’s famous seminar are provided by Michael S. Roth, Knowing and History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 94 ff.—Raymond Queneau’s notes, a summary of this course, and the two last lectures have been printed in ILH, pp. 37-56, 57-58, and 528-75.
29  ILH, p. 371 [139]. See the references given by Strauss in OT (2000), n. 59 p. 125.—In this regard, Kojève rejected Raymond Aron’s and Gaston Fessard’s conflicting positions, in an unpublished passage from the end of the second lecture of his last course (Fonds Kojève, box 11B, F/II/15 f.): without asserting the ideal of Wisdom, the desire of a philosophical understanding of history could not be fulfilled, which would be unacceptable for a philosopher. By referring History to an ideal already achieved in the past, by believing in “the reality of the Christian ideal of the God-Man,” one would deny the “possibility to refer History to the Wise Man,” to the “Man-God,” and therefore one would deny “the possibility of achieving wisdom”; but one cannot deny that.—According to Strauss, the way to wisdom, to the knowledge of the whole, remains an “uncompletable ascent”: cf. his letter to Voegelin, 10.12.50, op. cit., p. 75, with his letter to Kojève, May 28, 1957, op. cit., p. 279; NRH, p. 125; The City and Man (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 20 bottom. The ascent is enabled by the pre-philosophical glimpse from the given opinions into the truth: see below, p. 62, and NRH, p. 124.
of our contemporaries has written as comprehensive and at the same time as intelligent a book. In other words, no one has pleaded for modern thought in our time as brilliantly as you.” He raised two main objections: Kojève would not succeed in getting rid of the philosophy of nature (history would not be a self-sufficient standard for understanding the world and man), and the End-State as described by Kojève could not bring about a complete and true satisfaction to human beings, who are irrational:

The account as a whole arouses the impression that you regard Hegel’s philosophy as absolute knowledge, and reject the philosophy of nature together with its implications as a dogmatic and dispensable residue.30 One is therefore all the more surprised to find you admit that the probative force of the Hegelian argument (the circularity of the system) is absolutely dependent on the philosophy of nature (291 bottom [98 bottom]; 400, par. 3; 64). (Ibid., p. 237.)

Kojève’s rejection of Hegel’s metaphysics of Nature, and his affirmation of ontological dualism, can be traced back to Heidegger’s influence:

For Hegel, essence is not independent from existence. So man does not exist outside history. Hegel’s Phenomenology is therefore ‘existential’ as Heidegger’s. And it must serve as basis for an ontology. [This ontology, in the Logic, is in fact anthropological; it is therefore distorted when it interprets Nature. It is not universal, in spite of what Hegel thought: it is an ontology of Man (‘Spirit’) and not of Nature.]31

Kojève openly vindicated his hermeneutical violence: “[…] my work had not the character of a historical study; it mattered relatively little to me to know what Hegel himself meant in his book; I gave a course of philosophical anthropology using Hegelian texts, but saying only what I considered to be the truth and dropping what seemed to me to be, in Hegel, an error.”32

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30 See ILH, e.g. pp. 378 [146 f.], and 489 ff. [216 ff.].
31 ILH, p. 39 (the brackets appear in the original). In ILH, pp. 338n [102 n. 1] and 527n [259 n. 41], Kojève described Hegel and Heidegger as representatives of the true philosophic type. However, in ILH, pp. 485n ff. [213-15 n. 15], against Hegel’s “monistic error” (applying dialectical ontology to both Man and Nature), he took sides with Heidegger, who after Kant was the first who raised the problem of dualistic ontology (cf. the indication of this problem by Strauss in WPP, pp. 39 f.). In his “Note sur Hegel et Heidegger” (1936), ed. Bernard Hesbois, in Rue Descartes, Vol. 7 (juin 1993), pp. 37 f., Kojève approved (against Hegel) Heidegger’s “resolute acceptance of ontological dualism, of the essential and ontologically irreducible difference between human-being (Dasein) and natural-being (Vorhandensein).” On the other hand, he criticized what he held to be Heidegger’s attenuation of human active negation (ibid., pp. 38-40). See also below, p. 90 n. 5, and Strauss’s remarks on Heidegger’s historicist interpretation of φύσις in “The Problem of Socrates,” op. cit., pp. 326 ff.
According to Strauss, Kojève’s historicism would fail to grasp the fundamental aspirations of all the human beings:

The deduction of the desire for recognition is convincing if one presupposes that every philosophy consists in grasping the spirit of its time in thought, that is to say if one presupposes everything that is in discussion. Otherwise, that deduction is arbitrary. Why should self-consciousness and the striving for recognition not be understood as derivative from the zoon logon echon? […]

The recognition for which great men of action strive, is admiration. This recognition is not necessarily satisfied by the End-State. The fact that great deeds are impossible in the End-State, can lead precisely the best to a nihilistic denial of the End-State. […]

In any case, if not all human beings become wise, then it follows that for almost all human beings the end state is identical with the loss of their humanity-humaneness (490, 491 bottom, 492), and they can therefore not be rationally satisfied with it. […] If I had more time than I have, I could state more fully, and presumably more clearly why I am not convinced that the End State as you describe it, can be either the rational or the merely-factual satisfaction of human beings. For the sake of simplicity I refer today to Nietzsche’s “last men.”

As Strauss already implied in his 1932 review of Carl Schmitt, the problem raised by the possible world-state, and the kind of men who would rule it, has to be referred to the question of the nature of man, which modern thought claimed to decide definitively.

Strauss asked Kojève “whether you would be prepared to review my forthcoming small book, On Tyranny: An interpretation of Xen-
I don’t know anybody except you and Klein, who will understand what I am after (I belong to those who refuse to go through open doors, if one can just as well enter through a keyhole) [...]” (Ibid., p. 236.) Strauss’s dedication to this specific Xenophontic dialogue was his indirect way to reopen the quarrel between Ancients and Moderns: “It is precisely when trying to bring to light the deepest roots of modern political thought that one will find it to be very useful, not to say indispensable, to devote some attention to the Hiero,” “the only writing of the classical period which is explicitly devoted to the discussion of tyranny and its implications” and a writing which marks the point of closest contact between premodern science (which rests on the foundations laid by Socrates) and modern political science (which rests on the foundations laid by Machiavelli). Strauss reiterated his request in his letter dated December 6, 1948 (ibid., p. 248): “I am sending you under separate cover my study on Xenophon. Would it be possible for you to review it in Critique or, for that matter, in any other French periodical. I am very anxious to have a review by you because you are one of the three people who will have a full understanding of what I am driving at.”

Eric Voegelin, in his letter to Strauss dated January 14, 1949 (op. cit., p. 44), described On Tyranny as “excellent”: “It is a model of careful analysis of the inner coherence of a work; and the systematic problem you unravel is of greatest importance. [...] At the same time your book arrived, I was requested by Gurian to write a review for the Review of Politics. I have

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36 Several short, mainly descriptive reviews were published. Gregory Vlastos, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Oct. 1951), p. 593, contended that “the weakness of this work can be traced directly to his present addiction to the strange notion that a historical understanding of a historical thinker is somehow a philosophical liability.” However it may be, such a verdict can be traced to Vlastos’ opinion that Xenophon was an “upper-class Athenian,” a “retired colonel” with related prejudices: this opinion, which tends to override Xenophon’s Socratic discipleship, shapes Vlastos’ “historical method” (ibid., pp. 592-93). Cf. Strauss, “Persecution and the Art of Writing,” Social Research, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1941), p. 503 n. 21, with OT (2000), pp. 25 f.

37 Strauss asked to Klein (6.2.1948, op. cit., p. 597): “When do you write about De Tyrannide?” Klein’s answer (if any) has not been preserved. Klein’s reference to Wilhelm Nestle’s article on “Xenophon und die Sophistik,” in his letter to Strauss dated July 16, 1945 (ibid., p. 594), was likely made in relation to Strauss’s work on the Hiero.—Karl Löwith did not publish any review of this book (see Strauss to Kojève, April 28, 1954, op. cit., p. 263). Gadamer probably never wrote the review of Strauss’s book he hoped to do soon in Gnomon (postcard from Hans-Georg Gadamer dated 18/3 49, Leo Strauss Papers Box 1, Folder 14).

38 OT 2000, pp. 24, 23, and 25.—In Ex captivitate salus (Köln: Greven Verlag, 1950), alluding to his past experience, Carl Schmitt claimed (p. 66): “Plato was a collaborator of the Syracusean tyrants and he taught that even to the enemy, one must not refuse good advice.” Strauss’s distinction between different kinds of tyrants (see below, p. 41) sounds like an intransigent retort: the tyrant who cannot be educated is today the one who presents himself as the supreme teacher; his tyranny is enabled by modern thought and science (see below, p. 76).
done that immediately, and I attach for you a copy of it. I do not yet know if Gurian will bring it out in this form; maybe he will find it too long. But at least you see from it what I have to say in more detail to your problem.” To the “pertinent critique” in this “so sympathetic review,” Strauss answered that, though they agree in fact “that there is a fundamental difference between Machiavelli and Xenophon,” “you are right: my unexplained thoughts about this matter move in another direction than yours. Maybe I will dispute with you in print.” He first mentioned in his letter to Voegelin dated April 15, 1949 (ibid., p. 61) his plan to write a reply to Kojève’s and Voegelin’s criticisms about On Tyranny:

Yesterday I received a copy of the Review of Politics with your review of my work. It pleased me greatly to see that it was printed in toto. Your review, with a single exception, will be and remain the only one that contributes to the discussion. The exception is a review promised by Alexandre Kojève (the author of Introduction à l’étude de Hegel, an exceptional work—Gallimard 1947) in the journal Critique. […] As soon as Kojève’s review appears, I intend to write a critique of both your critiques. Gurian, who visited me two days ago, will leave me space in the Review of Politics.

Strauss restated his intention in his letter to Kojève dated May 13, 1949 (op. cit., p. 240, trans. modified): “I was very pleased to see in an earlier issue of Critique that you plan to review my Xenophon. Now I see on the back-cover of the April issue that your name has disappeared […]. Did you abandon your plan? I would regret it very much—among other things also because I should have used willingly your account as occasion of a dispute with you in an essay to which I wanted to devote the month of July.”

In his answer dated May 26 (ibid., p. 241), Kojève explained that his own paper was not complete yet and might be too long for Critique. He proposed then the publication of a French book which would comprise, together with his review essay, a translation of Xenophon’s Hiero and of Strauss’s study on this dialogue. Strauss agreed with this proposal (June 27,
1949, *ibid.*, p. 242). In his letter dated August 15, 1949, Kojève justified his delay in answering: “[…] I wanted first to fulfill your request, and give the manuscript a legible form. That was done only yesterday […] As for the article, I am rather dissatisfied with it. I had to write it in bits and pieces, and the structure is therefore very defective.” The removed parts of the text deal for example with the following themes: an alleged contradiction between the admission of the historical nature of human thought by Strauss (in *OT* 1948, p. 6) and his condemnation of historicism (*ibid.*, p. 7); a gradation, in consideration of the end each of them pursues (glory, knowledge, success…), from the “pagan aristocrat” to the “Socratic philosopher,” the “Christian religious,” the “bourgeois,” and eventually the “Hegelian philosopher,” i.e. the Wise Man; the four irreducible types of authority—Father, Chief, Master, and Judge—as described in Kojève’s then unpublished phenomenological analysis, *La notion de l’autorité*; the question whether the Wise Man is able, and will try, to advise the Tyrant, or to rule himself, and the examination of the Platonic, Epicurean, and Hegelian answers (the last solves the problem by discovering that it does not exist); Strauss’s distinction, which Kojève endorses, between the “trans-political justice” of the Wise Man and the “political justice” of the profane (especially the Tyrant); the “theistic” (pagan, Christian…) conception of Being as timeless, i.e. “achieved” from all eternity (“perfect” at once); the failure of the subjective criterion of “obviousness” compared to the objective criterion of experience (*Experiment*); the

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43 *Ibid.*, p. 243. His manuscript consists of 62 handwritten folios; it is dated 13/II.49 on its first folio. Kojève noted on the last folio “Vanves, 19/VI.49” and he signed it. He noted below “Reviewed on 10/VII.49 and reduced to 48 pages (including 5 notes)” and he signed it (Fonds Kojève, box XIII, blue folder *Tyrannie et Sagesse* 1949). The crossed-out parts do not occur in the typescript dated 8/VIII 49 (*ibid.*, red folder).—Kojève insisted on his dissatisfaction as to his essay in his letter to Strauss dated December 26, 1949 (*op. cit.*, p. 248): “(…) it is wide-ranging, and at the same time unclear. But I have neither the time nor the inclination to work on it more.” Yet Strauss found Kojève’s criticism “clear and meaningful” (January 18, 1950, *ibid.*, p. 249).


47 *Op. cit.*, fol. 17-23 (context: *OT* 2000, p. 147, par. 4; the original of ll. 3-6 has been added above the removed part in the manuscript). *Cf. ILH*, p. 289n [96 n. 8].

48 *Op. cit.*, fol. 30, footnote (context: *OT* 2000, p. 152 n. 3; the first three sentences remain, with a few changes).


50 *Op. cit.*, fol. 34, footnote (context: *OT* 2000, p. 155, par. 2; in the manuscript, a few lines have been crossed out at the end of the paragraph).
difference between “admiration” (which first refers to natural phenomena) and “recognition” (which refers to the value of human actions). 51

The first published version, in two parts, “L’action politique des philosophes,”52 was reduced even further.53 “Tyrannie et Sagesse,” as published in De la tyrannie (pp. 217-80), consists roughly of the version dated 10/VII.49, without its first paragraphs, but including the passages which Georges Bataille had deleted for the first publication.54 Kojève corrected a typed copy of his paper and sent it with his letter to Strauss dated August 15 (op. cit., p. 243), hoping “it is not too late, although you wanted to have it at the beginning of August.” Strauss reacted with enthusiasm (September 4, ibid., pp. 243 f.): “The mere fact that you invested as much work as you did, is the greatest compliment ever paid me. […] I have the firm intention, as soon as your work has appeared, to dispute with you with the utmost thoroughness and decisiveness coram publico. […] I am glad to see, once again, that we agree about what the genuine problems are […] . Besides I am glad that finally someone represents the modern position intelligently and en connaissance de cause—and without Heidegger’s cowardly vagueness.” Considering that the achievement of the project for a book (translation, selection from the notes, negotiation with a publisher) requires some time, Strauss advised Kojève to publish it immediately, while he himself would work out (“and in

53 To Georges Bataille (founder and editor of Critique), who asked him “can you send me the article you wrote for Critique?” (letter dated August 10, 1950, Fonds Kojève, box XX), Kojève answered: “Weil thinks the manuscript must be abridged. But I have not the time to do that. Do all the cuts you will judge useful.” (Letter dated 10/VIII 1950, Papiers Georges Bataille, Bibliothèque nationale de France, published in Textures [Bruxelles], No. 6, 1970, “A. Kojève, Lettres à Georges Bataille,” p. 67.) In his letter dated October 11, 1950, Bataille explained to Kojève: “I had eventually to resign myself to cut and publish in two fragments the article on the Tyranny. I really did all my best to avoid that but… I had nevertheless reduced it very much. I had not wanted to bother you with all these questions: I must say that the cuts were relatively easy to do in the sense that one had hardly any choice.” He reminded him of his former proposal to publish in his collection (at the Éditions de Minuit) the review essay on Strauss, together with “Hegel, Marx et le christianisme,” “both with a title such as Études hégéliennes with subtitles. Notice that to my mind the unity of both could be emphasized more, for instance by titling them Hegel et le communisme, which the foreword could justify in ten lines.” (Fonds Kojève, loc. cit.) In his letter to Bataille dated 19/X 50 (Papiers Georges Bataille, op. cit.), Kojève replied he had already signed with Gallimard for a publication together with the Strauss book.
54 See OT (2000), editorial note pp. 135-36. The sections of “Tyrannie et Sagesse” which correspond to OT (2000), pp. 135 par. 2—136 par. 3, 145, par. 1-2, 150 par. 5—154 par. 2, 154 par. 5—155 par. 2, 159 par. 2—162 par. 1, 174 par. 1-3, 175 par. 1 and 3—176 par. 3 (De la tyrannie, pp. 218 par. 2—219 par. 1, 231 par. 1, 239 par. 4—245 par. 2, 246 par. 2—247 par. 1, 253 par. 1—257 par. 1, 276 par. 1—277 par. 1, 277 par. 2—278 par. 1, 278 par. 3—280 par. 2), had been removed for the most part, as well as all the footnotes.
this connection include a series of other additions to On Tyranny”55) and publish his reply.56 As Kojève’s review essay was not yet out in August 1950, Strauss quoted it from the typed version that Kojève had sent to him, which differs from both published versions.57

The publication of Kojève’s paper was delayed, partly due to the difficulties in which Critique was then involved.58 Kojève’s later plan to publish his review in Les Temps Modernes did not succeed: Maurice Merleau-Ponty, editor of this journal and a former auditor of Kojève’s seminar, “refuses publication for substantive reasons, as is evident from his letter to Weil.”59 Merleau-Ponty indeed criticized the orientation (which would give free rein to universal tyranny) as well as the method of Kojève’s essay in a letter to an unnamed correspondent (Eric Weil):

Sunday 19 March, 1950

Dear friend,

I could achieve only today the reading of Kojève’s article60 that you have been so kind as to communicate to me. As I said to you the other day, the indirect form that Kojève gave to it (commentary of Strauss), which was most in conformity with Critique’s principles, would suit less the Temps Modernes. It has the inconvenience of imposing on Kojève’s theses meanders where he would be followed by only a few people (and the philosopher, as the article teaches, wants all the same to be recognized).

But there is a more serious difficulty. This meditation, just because it tells about Xenophon, Hiero, Simonides, Alexander, and Aristotle, whereas it aims at present history, relies, it seems to me, on a formalist

55 Op. cit., p. 244. No such additions to the text of 1948 were made.
56 In his letter dated January 18, 1950 (ibid., p. 249), Strauss expressed again his intention of “publishing the Afterword in an American journal.”—“As far as my Conclusion or Afterword is concerned, I intended to write it in August […] However, since I also have to attend to a number of other things, I would like to turn to the Afterword only once it is reasonably certain that the whole thing will be completed and come out in the academic year 1950-1951. Otherwise I would postpone the writing of the Afterword until next summer (1951). […] Is the version of your critique which you sent me, the definitive version? If it is not, I would have to wait until I have the definitive version.” (Strauss to Kojève, July 28, 1950, ibid., p. 252.) Kojève’s answer has not been preserved.
57 The revised typescript, which is based on the reduced version of the manuscript dated 10/VII.49, has been dated by hand 8/VIII 49 on its last page (Fonds Kojève, loc. cit.). Two variations from the published versions of Kojève’s text appeared in Strauss’s essay: see below, notes 216 and 278 to the “Restatement.”—Three typed sheets which contain the beginning of Kojève’s review essay are to be found in the Leo Strauss Papers (Box 27, Folder 1).
58 See Kojeve to Strauss, August 15 and October 10, 1949, op. cit., pp. 243 and 245.
59 Kojeve to Strauss, April 9, 1950, ibid., p. 250; see Kojeve to Strauss, December 26, 1949, ibid., p. 247.
60 This word has been circled with a pencil; a stroke points at the following words, which have been written at the top right of the page: Tyrannie et Sagesse
postulate, according to which there is an essence of tyranny, an essence of philosophy, imperishable like all the essences, and which reserves for tyranny efficiency, for philosophy (utopian) truth. Assuming this postulate, there is only to leave it to tyranny to take care of achieving universal power, and philosophy has only to put on hold its anticipations until universal power, at last established, provides for it the conditions of a true dialogue and of a true recognition. It seems to me that present questions, which have the right to attract us outside pure philosophy, come after Kojève’s formal theses. They consist for instance in knowing under which conditions a power or a state can be said to be universal: Kojève indicates well one of these conditions; this state will have to be homogeneous and will not include divisions into classes. But everybody is against classes or divisions of such kind, and repudiates them half-heartedly at least. One would have to say something of the content of this universal state and, consequently, of the kind of tyranny which leads to it (for, quite evidently, every tyranny does not lead to it). If one does not do that, it seems to me that one remains in abstraction, which is, according to Kojève, neither philosophy nor politics.

Probably I have misunderstood this text which I could not read with enough leisure to penetrate it well. If Kojève wished to condense his political ideas in a more direct form, it goes without saying that the Temps Modernes would be glad to publish a text which could contribute to the dialogue of philosophy and politics. This one makes on me the impression of being a quietus which is given, so nearly as to make no difference, to any politics which claims to be universalist. It replaces the dialogue philosophy-politics by a battle between different politics. I wonder if they need our permission to engage in battle…

Here is my impression, dear friend, I apologize to you and to Kojève for its cursoriness and I beg you to believe I am your friend.61

The criticism addressed to Kojève’s essay was mostly focused on his view favorable to tyranny.62 Alexandre Koyré epitomized it in a way, in a curt comment he gave later to Strauss:

I have read your answer to Kojève’s criticism of your book on tyranny (I didn’t read it in the original); I found you much too mild. Kojève’s paper, in my opinion, is pure sophistry and

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61 Handwritten letter in French dated March 19, 1950, with the printed heading of Les Temps Modernes (Fonds Kojève, box XX). The original pagination has been indicated in brackets. I thank Mrs. Merleau-Ponty for her permission to publish this letter.—As regards Merleau-Ponty’s own position at that time, see Michael S. Roth, op. cit., pp. 49 ff. He rejected Kojève’s conception of the end of history, which would amount to a denial of man’s liberty and unlimited progress: see Les aventures de la dialectique (Paris: Gallimard, 1955), pp. 9 ff.

62 See George Lichtheim (otherwise typically favorable to Kojève’s view), op. cit., p. 415.
even bad sophistry. Bad as it shows the untruth of the famous slogan: the recognition of man by man, which turns out to be the recognition of the tyrants by all men. Sophistry as it denies the obvious and consistently identifies quite different things. It is also quite dishonest.63

Strauss vindicated as follows his “mildness”:

As for my criticism of Kojève, I think I see quite well the playful element or the element of snobbism (épater la bourgeoisie) in Kojève’s position. Nevertheless, I am grateful to him that he did not reject my proposition as manifestly absurd. I mean I am grateful to him for his sincere willingness to discuss, in the middle of the twentieth century, the proposition that Xenophon might have known everything worth knowing about our tyrannies.64

Although tyranny is the explicit theme, the discussion relies on fundamental presuppositions which are not fully elaborated, as Strauss indicated at the end of his “Restatement.” They are dealt with to a certain extent in the correspondence:

From this response you will see that I take the classical teaching on tyranny as in principle completely sufficient. The longer section, which comes to terms with Kojève’s tract, “Tyrannie et Sagesse,” deals, admittedly, with general matters and will, I believe, make my premises clearer to you. They are very simple: philosophari necesse est, and philosophy is radically independent of faith—the root of our disagreement lies presumably in the second thesis. (Letter to Voegelin, 25.8.50, op. cit., pp. 71 f.)

Strauss also made clear his classical stance to Erwin Straus:

Re: Weber—You have of course rightly understood my remark about the greatest social scientist etc. […] As regards my answer, then it is the simple equation: \( R = V = H \) (reason is virtue is happiness). You see, it is not so much my, as the answer. I suppressed for the sake of simplicity the qualification that a bit of happiness in the usual sense (\( ευτυγχάνεται \)) is besides necessary. If I were rich, I would have made for you a typed copy of my defense of my writing on Xenophon against my Hegelian friend Kojevnikoff, in which defense I speak more openly

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63 Handwritten letter in English to Strauss, April 17.54 (Leo Strauss Papers, Box 1, Folder 8). Koyré draw a strike in the margin of his copy of DT, p. 305, l. 22 (see OT 2000, p. 190, l. 21).
64 Typed letter in English to Koyré, April 27, 1954, copy (Leo Strauss Papers, Box 4, Folder 11).—Strauss’s “mildness” did not preclude criticism: cf. e.g. his reference to Stalin (below, pp. 45 f.) with his letter to Kojève, September 28, 1950, op. cit., p. 257 (trans. modified): “But I cannot accept your suggestion to replace ‘good tyranny’ with another expression. It is naturally well-known to me that Stalin is comrade Stalin: you see how Xenophon is modern here too.” See also his few lines about Hitler and the good tyrant which are cited below, pp. 26 f.
than ever before. But the thing will appear soon in print in French translation along with the original writing and with Kojevnikoff’s critique. I will indulge myself to make it available to you.65

At Raymond Queneau’s request,66 Kojève wrote a blurb for the publisher, in which he displayed in his own way an outline of Strauss’s “classical” presupposition:

[In his private conversations, Strauss goes sometimes so far as to say that some centuries of “Platonic scholasticism” are currently necessary, just as the centuries of the Aristotelian Scholasticism were necessary in the Middle Ages. Certainly, this is only a joke, but it expresses extremely well the general orientation of his thought, and in particular, the spirit which animates his book on Tyranny. Overdoing a little, one could say that] for Strauss, everything which succeeds to the Classics is only decadence and confusion. In particular, the fundamental problems have been correctly put only by the Greeks. We must find them back among the Greeks if we want to solve them satisfactorily, in theory as well as in practice. […] in a Restatement, Strauss believes he can maintain all his “classical” positions with the mention, at the end, of the philosophical problem which serves as the basis of the discussion.67

Nevertheless, Strauss clearly asserts in the concluding paragraph of his reply that “philosophy in the strict and classical sense” rests on a presupposition which is not self-evident.68 Kojève declared himself to be “in full agreement

65 Handwritten letter in German dated 3.4.51 (Erwin Straus Alcove, Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center, Gumberg Library, Duquesne University, PA).—The central sentence in this quotation suggests that Strauss’s divergences from the text he commented on were intentional: see Victor Gourevitch, “Philosophy and Politics, I” in The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (Sep. 1968), pp. 61 ff. and part IV.

66 “My Dear Kojève, Thanks for the corrections, I have written them out on the proofs which Mrs. Kern has read (she had spotted anyway most of them). I am now put in charge of asking you for the blurb. I know this is a chore. If you could write—all the same—a short text to this end, it would do a great service to the people who are in charge of this job. They would need, for example, some biographical information regarding Strauss, etc.” (Handwritten letter dated February 10, 1954, Fonds Kojève, box XX, “Correspondance avec les éditeurs.”)

67 Typed text dated Paris, 16.2.1954, attached to Queneau’s letter dated February 10, 1954 (Fonds Kojève, box XX), with the handwritten note: “Prière d’insérer” pour Strauss, De la Tyrannie.—The portion at the beginning of the text which did not appear on the book has been indicated here into brackets.—By analogy with his account in the blurb, Kojève’s own achievement could be described as a Hegelian scholasticism (see above, n. 32). In the concluding paragraph of the “Restatement,” the French translation identifies the classical presupposition with Strauss’s own position: where the available manuscripts read “it presupposes” (referring to “philosophy in the strict and classical sense”), it renders “je présuppose” (i.e., “I presuppose”): cf. below, p. 77, par. 2, l. 7, with DT, p. 343, l. 5.

68 Cf. below, p. 56: “Therefore the philosopher ceases to be a philosopher <at the moment at which his ‘subjective certainty’ of the truth of a solution equals his awareness of the problems, or> at the moment at which the ‘subjective certainty’ of a solution becomes stronger than his awareness of the problematic character of that solution.”—Victor Gourevitch, “Philosophy and Politics, II” in The
with the conclusion” of the “Restatement” (September 19, 1950, op. cit., p. 255); he thereby admitted that he relies himself on a mere presupposition, i.e. he admitted at least that the absolute Knowledge has not been achieved. Strauss and Kojève concurred in the primacy of the philosophical querelle des anciens et des modernes.69

Strauss left it to Kojève “to decide whether you wish to add this reply and possibly a ‘final word,’ to be written by you, to the French edition.” (September 4, 1949, op. cit., p. 244, trans. modified.) Kojève answered that he “would very much welcome it if your reply to my criticism could also be reprinted” in the French edition.70 Sending his text to Kojève, Strauss stated his wish again: “Enclosed, the Afterword. I have called it Restatement, because I regard the problem as entirely open—‘Afterword’ would create the impression of an apparent finality—and, above all, because I would very much like you to answer.” (September 14, 1950, ibid., p. 254.) Yet Kojève declined the proposal of a “final word”: “Naturally, I would have much to say, but one also has to leave something for the reader: he should go on to think on his own.”71 He contented himself with a few considerations which echoed his Introduction:72 in the final State, which is “good” only as the last State, headed by the Tyrant-administrator, “historical” human beings will turn into “animals,” which are satisfied as “healthy” automata, or into “gods,” who “contemplate.” That is to say, not all human beings will become wise; there will be no real universal satisfaction (see ILH, pp. 278 ff. [83 ff.]). Strauss answered (September 28, 1950, op. cit., p. 257, trans. modified) that

Review of Metaphysics, Vol. XXII, No. 2 (Dec. 1968), p. 325, pointed out that “perhaps nothing is more characteristic of Strauss’s attempts to ‘restore’ classical political philosophy than the fact that he tends to challenge the moderns’ reasons for rejecting the teachings of the ancients far more insistently than he defends the reasons the ancients give for their teachings.” Consider also the affinity of some Straussian theses with Kantian (ibid., p. 300 n. 136) or Nietzschean (ibid., p. 306 n. 156) trends.—The “superficial” level of the discussion has been brought out by Strauss: “I was clear that many of your arguments were only exoteric, and I replied to them exoterically.” (Letter to Kojève, September 28, 1950, op. cit., p. 257, trans. modified.)

69 “About the Wise Man, the only fundamental possible divergence is that which remains between Plato and Hegel.” (ILH, p. 283 [89]; cf. ibid., p. 290 [97].) Cf. Strauss, “On Classical Political Philosophy,” Social Research, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1945), pp. 98 ff. (see Kojève to Strauss, April 8, 1947, op. cit., p. 235), with OT, Introduction. Speaking of “my friends Jacob Klein and Leo Strauss” in his “Préface à la Mise à jour...” (op. cit., p. 133), Kojève acknowledged: “Without them I would not have known what Platonism is. Now, without knowing it, one does not know what philosophy is.”

70 Kojève to Strauss, October 10, 1949, ibid., p. 245; see also Kojève to Strauss, December 26, 1949, ibid., p. 248.—Kojève gave his agreement to the inclusion of Strauss’s epilogue in the planned book in his letter to Raymond Queneau (Gallimard) dated June 24, 1954 (Fonds Kojève, box XX), and he announced the publication of his review in Critique.

71 September 19, 1950, ibid., p. 255; cf. p. 256. Kojève was willing to go on with the controversy by letter, Strauss preferred to “try it again in print.” (Letter to Kojève, February 22, 1951, ibid., p. 259.)

72 September 19, 1950, loc. cit.; cf. ILH, p. 434n f. [158 n. 6], 492n [220 n. 19], and p. 508n [238 n. 30].
“there is of course the question whether I have understood you or you me on all points. Thus, for example, I do not believe that your evidence in your letter to me is sufficient.”

The epistolary dispute went on during the following years. Having read Strauss’s Jerusalem lectures, Kojève raised again objections in his letter to Strauss dated July 1, 1957 (op. cit., pp. 290 f.). Below the last paragraph, on the last page of his copy of Strauss’s series of lectures “What Is Political Philosophy?” he summed up in the following lines his persistent disagreement, which he displayed in the numerous marginalia he noted throughout the text:

Leo STRAUSS

Strauss “skips” the lineage: Kant → Hegel → Marx.

And for a good reason! For the notion of the end of History not only removes from the notion of History its “contradictory” feature, but moreover nullifies all of Strauss’s “objections,” which are valid only against the (“contradictory”) pseudo-action of infinite “historical” evaluation!

Strauss retorted to Kojève’s letter that “we are poles apart. The root of the question is I suppose the same as it always was, that you are convinced of the truth of Hegel (Marx) and I am not. You have never given me an answer to my questions: a) was Nietzsche not right in describing the Hegelian-Marxian end as the ‘last man’? and b) what would you put into the place of Hegel’s philosophy of nature?” As to question b), Kojève had written:

Personally I think that the thinkers of Antiquity were right (against Hegel) when they admitted that the natural Being (the Cosmos) is eternally identical to itself and “perfect” at once. But I think with Hegel (and against the thinkers of Antiquity) that man creates himself in the course of history and “perfects” himself only at its end. Now, since man fits into Being and is part of it, the Hegelian reasoning relative to Truth remains valid: man can reach Wisdom only in participating in History.—One can, certainly, not accept this Hegelian way of seeing things. But one can avoid it only if one denies that the being of man creates itself as historical action. Now to deny it, is to deny that history

73 Fonds Kojève, box XII, 56-page typescript dated by hand 1955? on the top of its first page, and bearing the following parenthetic sentence at the bottom of its last page: (This text has not been edited by the Author).—Kojève heavily annotated Strauss’s first and third lectures. He repeatedly emphasized Strauss’s “theism” (i.e. “Platonism”) and neglect of Hegel and Marx, while he approved Strauss’s rejection of social sciences positivism.

has a **meaning**; to deny it, is to deny, as well, and just thereby, this something one calls **liberty** and consequently, to deny it, is to remove all genuine **meaning** to individual existence itself.\(^{75}\)

The Additional Note in the second edition of the *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*,\(^ {76}\) which contains the “supplement on Japan” that Strauss was “anxious to see” (letter to Kojève, October 4, 1962, *op. cit.*, p. 310) takes implicitly for granted Strauss’s objections against Kojève’s description of the final State. Besides humanity’s return to animality, which Kojève has come to consider as an already present certainty and not as a future possibility to be achieved,\(^ {77}\) his speculated “Japanese,” i.e. purely snobbish, post-historical human beings who would still play with the problems in separating “forms” from “contents”

\(^{75}\) Manuscript of “Tyrannie et Sagesse,” fol. 31 verso (Fonds Kojève, *loc. cit.*). Cf. *ILH*, pp. 378n f. [147 n. 36], 485n f. [212 f. n. 15], and 434n [158 n. 6].—See also Kojève to Strauss, October 29, 1953 (*op. cit.*, pp. 261-62), in answer to the sending of *NRH*: “Regarding the issue I can only keep repeating the same thing. If there is something like ‘human nature,’ then you are surely right in everything.” (*Ibid.*, p. 261.) Kojève does not deny that there is an “innate nature” in Man, but he contends it is only an “animal characteristic” that has nothing to do with liberty, which is negation of nature (*ILH*, pp. 492 [219 f.] and 494 [222]). However, if Man creates himself in the course of History by his work, i.e. by negating and transforming Nature, then the conception of natural Being as “perfect at once” and “eternally identical to itself” could hardly be held. It is significant that Kojève never wrote his planned update of Hegel’s philosophy of Nature (“Energo-logie”).

\(^{76}\) See *ILH*, “Note de la Seconde Édition,” pp. 436-37 [159-62]. In his letter to Kojève dated 13 octobre 1961, Queneau asked: “We reprint the *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*. As we need to reset the book entirely, if you wish to bring some modifications or to make corrections in it, nothing is easier. Please let me know rather quickly because it must go to the printer; I have kept it only to be completely sure of your intentions.” (Fonds Kojève, box XX.) A manuscript of this additional note, which bears a few corrections, is to be found in the Fonds Kojève, box XI, in a folder titled: “2e édition de l’*Introduction à la lecture de Hegel* Note additionnelle (Japon) (14.I.62).”

\(^{77}\) From a “militant” position, according to which Hegelian philosophy is not a “discursive revelation,” but a “project” to be achieved and proved by action (see his “Hegel, Marx et le christianisme,” *Critique*, No. 3-4, 1946, pp. 365-66—passage translated in Stanley Rosen, *Hermeneutics as Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 104), Kojève shifted to a “triumphant” and “ironic” position in his later works: see e.g. *ILH*, “Note de la Seconde Édition” and Michael S. Roth, *op. cit.*, pp. 139 ff.—In his letter dated April 17, 1959 (handwritten in English, Fonds Kojève, box XX), Allan Bloom objected: “Recent political events have weakened some of my conviction concerning the ultimate economic rationalization of our one world. I am sure that this has been the trend and that in modern thought there is nothing to oppose to the notion that there are no real political problems, that the rational science of supply and demand has taken the place of the ‘myths’ of morality and the state. But because we have no good reason not to accept this development, does not mean that we will and that the political issues will not stay with us in an utterly perverted and irrational form. […] I am told the party has more power than ever before and that there is no thought of a settlement with the West in any fundamental sense, as you predicted it. This is utterly unreasonable, I know; the regime of virtue and work demanded by K[hrushchev] can only endure on the constant artificial stimulation of external crisis. But who says he can’t do that indefinitely. I know your thought does not depend on one political event or another coming out the way you expected, but it has some connection as you have so often avowed. But this is wondering.”—The meaning of history as expounded by Kojève could be interpreted in a different way: see e.g. Spengler’s historicist account of the “Imperial Age” as the stage of a cyclic development, in every higher culture, in which “there are no more political problems” (*The Decline of the West*, trans. Charles F. Atkinson [London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928], Vol. II, p. 432.)
without transforming them, eventually come down to Nietzsche's last men: they will not be able anymore to perform any serious action according to "values that have social or political content." With the end of history as Kojève means it, i.e. with the end of the negating activity of man who creates himself, liberty and the sense of individual existence simply disappear.

THE “RESTATEMENT”: REVISIONS AND VARIATIONS

Strauss informed Voegelin about the project for a book in his letter dated August 8, 1950, and declared his interest in going on with their dialogue:

At the beginning of 1951, at Gallimard’s wish, a French translation of my Hiero book is to appear in the following form: 1) French translation of the Hiero; 2) my text omitting nearly all notes; 3) a sixty-page-long critique of my writing titled "La tyrannie et la sagesse," written by Alexandre Kojève [...]; 4) an anti-critique from me. I am just now writing the anti-critique. It seems to me needful to begin the discussion with an anti-critique of your review. [...] I can imagine that you would wish to riposte. Unfortunately, this cannot be done in the French publication. But perhaps one could persuade Gurian to print the English original, together with your riposte in the Review of Politics, after the French publication has appeared.

Voegelin was pleased that “the few good things that have been written today have not become lost”; he expressed his “greatest pleasure” as to the possible publishing of Strauss’s anti-critique in English, “accompagned by some

78 IlH, p. 437 [162]. Here Kojève is not so far from Georges Bataille’s conception of the Wise Man at the end of history (as he put it in his letter to Kojève dated 8 avril 1952, Fonds Kojève, loc. cit.), in which sovereignty (related to “the most human levels: laughing, eroticism, fighting, luxury”) would replace satisfaction.—In the interview with Gilles Lapouge, “Kojève: Les philosophes ne m’intéressent pas, je cherche des sages,” in La Quinzaine littéraire, No. 53 (1-15 juillet 1968), p. 19, Kojève specified that “if the human bases itself on negativity, the end of the discourse of history offers two ways, japanizing the West or americanizing Japan [...].”

79 The French book was published only four years later: “We finally have a proper translation of Strauss’s book, and of the Reply. And even of Xenophon. Thus we are going to put the book in production.” (Queneau to Kojève, February 20, 1953, Fonds Kojève, box XX.) “According to what Queneau says, La tyrannie, after numerous misfortunes (the translator disappeared with the book!) will probably come out in the spring.” (Letter in French from Eric de Dampierre, Leo Strauss Papers, Box 1, Folder 10.) “I have a surprising piece of news to announce to you, the Strauss is in production and you will receive soon the proofs of your contribution to this three-headed book.” (Queneau to Kojève, October 30, 1953.) “Strauss’s Tyrannie has just appeared in French.” (Letter in French from Alexandre Koyré to Hannah Arendt, Paris 17.IV.54, ed. Paola Zambelli in Nouvelles de la République des Lettres [Napoli], No. 1, 1997, p. 145.)

80 See Kojève to Strauss, May 26, October 10, December 26, 1949 and April 9, 1950, op. cit., pp. 241, 245, 247-48, and 250; Strauss to Kojève, September 4, 1949, January 18 and August 5, 1950, ibid., pp. 244, 249, and 253-54.—All the notes in On Tyranny were preserved.

Remarks from my part, in the *Review*” (August 21, 1950, *op. cit.*, p. 70). However, Strauss noted in his next letter to Voegelin (August 25, *ibid.*, p. 72): “With regard to the publication of the English original of my epilogue, now a new problem has arisen, insofar as the epilogue promises to run to forty printed pages. Gurian will likely not go along with it, and I must try to persuade Alvin Johnson that he too sometime may also publish a ruthless, reactionary utterance. I will keep you up to date.” The subject was not approached again in the correspondence. Voegelin did not publish any reply, and Strauss’s original text, which did not appear in *The Review of Politics*, came out nine years later in an abridged form.82

The “Restatement” was initially published in its most extended version in French translation, with the title “Mise au point,” in *De la tyrannie*.83 The Canadian philosopher George P. Grant was the first to point out publicly that some passages of the French version, which “bring out some of the implications in the controversy,” have been removed from the edition of the “Restatement” in the original language—especially the most outstanding of these passages, i.e. the concluding paragraph “in which his [Strauss’s] purposes are beautifully described.”84 Grant suggested that “perhaps it is not too rash to imply that Strauss did not include it [in the English version] because of the general lack of interest in metaphysical questions among English-speaking intellectuals” (*op. cit.*, p. 49 n. 12). However it may be, such an explanation could have been applied to other remaining passages, and does not obviously account for the removal of specific passages.85 Strauss may have deleted the long paragraph beginning “In order to prove…” (see below, pp. 51-52) in which he summarizes Kojève’s argument about true justice, and a passage on the relation between good social order and understanding of the good (see below, pp. 43-44), with the view to make easier the publication of his paper in *The Review of Politics*.

Grant’s wish (*op. cit.*, p. 66 n. 29) that Strauss would include the concluding paragraph in any reissue of his essay, was not satisfied by Strauss himself. None of these passages, which encompass several pages all

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82 “Restatement on Xenophon’s Hiero” in WPP, pp. 95-133.


85 See e.g. the removed parts which are indicated below, pp. 29, 37, 38, 39, and 62.—Strauss’s increasing reticence is noticeable when comparing some of his contemporary texts, i.e. “Fārābī’s Plato” with the Introduction of *Persecution and the Art of Writing*, or the two versions of the essay “Persecution and the Art of Writing.”
together, were included in any American editions, except for the concluding paragraph which was retranslated from the French in the posthumous edition of *On Tyranny* by Victor Gourevitch and Michael S. Roth. The original text of this paragraph was eventually restored from a copy belonging to Lawrence Berns in the latest republishing of *On Tyranny* by the same editors. This paragraph is to be found, as well as the other removed passages and many variants with the published versions, in two unpublished typescripts of the “Restatement.”

Allan Bloom’s typescript (hereafter: *AB*), undated, comprises 55 numbered pages (about 29 lines per page); “Allan Bloom” has been handwritten on the upper right corner of an unnumbered first page, and “Reply to Kojève by Leo Strauss” on the middle of that same page. Joseph Cropsey’s typescript (hereafter: *JC*) comprises 28 numbered pages (about 56 lines per page); the date 1950 has been typed on its first page, to the right of the title “Restatement.”

The present edition is intended to restore, with the help of the variations which occur in the typescripts, the original text on which the French translation was based: all the passages which appear in the translation but not in the American editions, have their source in one or the other typescript. The French translation, which is inaccurate in some places, can be a good guide where the typescripts are in discordance and the translation corresponds to one of them: in such cases, it is quoted below in the editorial

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86 The latest French edition by Marc de Launay and André Enegrê, *De la tyrannie* (Paris: Gallimard, 1997), was made from the pattern of the Gourevitch-Roth edition, and therefore does not contain the passages in question. The numerous mistakes which are to be found in the original translation have been corrected in part. The slip in the reference to the Hiero in “Tyranny et Sagesse” (*DT*, p. 228, par. 3, l. 6), which Victor Gourevitch indicated in “Philosophy and Politics, II,” *op. cit.*, p. 328 n. 1 (corrected in *OT* 1991, p. 143, par. 3, l. 5), has not been rectified (*DT* 1997, p. 159 par. 3 l. 5); this slip already appeared in the manuscript, fol. 12.

87 *OT* (2000), Preface p. viii and text p. 212 (this edition is otherwise identical to *OT* 1991). The editors speculate on the reason why Strauss omitted it, *ibid.*, p. xxii; however, assuming that the final hint about Heidegger did not seem qualified enough, it could have been removed without deleting the whole paragraph (see below, note 391 to the “Restatement”). The text was first published in Leo Strauss, *Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of Modernity*, ed. Kenneth H. Green (Albany [NY]: SUNY Press, 1997), Appendix 2, “Restatement on Xenophon’s Hiero [The Last Paragraph],” pp. 471-72.—A typed copy of the rediscovered concluding paragraph has been added to the Leo Strauss Papers (Box 22, Folder 1): “It is taken here from a copy of a typescript entitled Restatement (1950), given to me by Leo Strauss before it was printed. (Laurence Berns).”

88 Laurence Berns’ typescript (hereafter: *LB*) is a copy of the same (unavailable) source as Joseph Cropsey’s. Most of the handwritten additions and corrections have been entered in this source and reproduced as they were in the copies; some of the handwritten variations which appear in *JC* do not appear in *LB*. Laurence Berns entered with a black pen a few corrections and additions, which also appear in *JC*. The final sentence of the text does not appear in its entirety in *JC* (see below, note 488 to the “Restatement”). *LB* has been mentioned in the notes to the “Restatement” below only where the handwritten variations which appear on it diverge from *JC*.

89 Strauss alluded to that in his letter to Kojève dated April 28, 1954, *op. cit.*, p. 263.
notes. JC appears to be essentially an intermediate version between AB and WPP, whereas AB is closer to the French translation (AB is likely earlier than the typescript from which the French translation was made, which has not been found): the text of AB is clearly the basis for the translation in most of the cases of divergence between the typescripts; however, it cannot be the basis for the translation in a significant number of cases (the translation has there been based on the text which occurs in JC). Some portions of text occur in JC and in WPP, but neither in AB nor in the translation (see below, editorial notes 6, 11, 33, 123, 173, 187, and 234); some occur in AB as well as in the translation, but neither in JC nor in WPP (see below, editorial notes 93, 149, 189, 257, 291, 306, and 331); some which occur in JC, in WPP, and in the translation, do not occur in AB (see below, editorial notes 1, 2, 161, 267, 271, and 369). A few phrasings, which have no equivalent in the translation, occur only in AB. In his letter to Strauss dated September 19, 1950 (op. cit., p. 256), Kojève requested: “There is only one passage in your text I would ask you to alter or to strike: I refer to p. 13: ‘Kojève denies… (Hiero 11.11 and 11.14)’ The passage rests on a misunderstanding […]” Strauss replied (September 28, 1950): “As regards p. 13 of the Restatement (Hitler), I strike willingly the three sentences in the middle of the paragraph: ‘As shown by his reference… under his rule.’” The sentences he referred to do not occur in any published version, but they appear in AB (see below, editorial note 147):

As is shown by his reference to tyranny based on racial “ideas,” he does not seem to be averse to the suggestion that Hitler was a good

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90 The text of AB is clearly the basis for the translation in the cases of divergence which are mentioned below in the notes to the “Restatement” 4, 11, 12, 25, 63, 93, 99, 101, 103, 113, 124, 132, 142, 149, 188, 189, 207, 232, 234, 291, and 391. The text of AB might be the basis for the translation in the cases mentioned below in the notes to the “Restatement” 14, 26, 45, 61, 67, 218, 220, 241, and 254. The text of AB is not likely to be the basis for the translation in the cases mentioned below in the notes to the “Restatement” 1, 2, 12, 96, 131, 133, 161, 206, 208, 217, 243, 250, 267, 271, and 369.

91 Some handwritten corrections in JC have changed the reading of AB (or, in case the portion of text which has been crossed out is illegible, possibly another reading) into the reading of WPP: see below, notes to the “Restatement” 11, 12, 63, 93, 99, 101, 103, 113, 124, 131, 132, 133, 147, 149, 218, and 232. Some corrections in JC are not to be found in WPP: see below, notes to the “Restatement” 4, 14, and 61–62.

92 See below, notes 26 and 67 to the “Restatement.” There is in AB an indented line (new paragraph) which also appears in WPP, but neither in JC nor in the translation: see below, note 243 to the “Restatement.”

93 Op. cit., p. 257 (trans. modified). This sentence has been underlined with a felt pen, most probably by Kojève.—The pagination of the typescript which is referred to in both letters is not the same as in AB or in JC.

94 See Kojève, “Tyranny and Wisdom,” in OT (2000), p. 139, par. 2, l. 9 and context. He shows that he does not put all tyrannies on the same level in ibid., p. 170 ff., where he emphasizes the notion of the unity of mankind, created by great Ancient “tyrants,” as a decisive step toward the universal State.
tyrant in Xenophon’s sense. But it is of the essence of the good tyrant in Xenophon’s sense that under him gentlemen may live, and live happily. And all German gentlemen of whom I know, either left Germany after Hitler’s coming to power, or else they lived most miserably under his rule.

Other changes in the published versions are indicated in the notes of the present edition (only the first edition in which a given change occurs is mentioned),\textsuperscript{95} as well as the corrections and additions which have been made (almost all by hand in JC,\textsuperscript{96} mainly typed in AB) in the margins, between the lines, or by altering the typescripts. These corrections and additions, which are by the same hand (not the author’s), are integral parts of the text of the American editions.\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{95} A few words occur in WPP which do not appear in one or the other typescript, and which have no equivalent in the translation (see below, notes 126 and 146 to the “Restatement”).—The “Restatement” as it appears in OT (1963)—the English equivalent of De la tyrannie—and then in OT (1991/2000), is similar to the version which was published in WPP (only minor changes in orthography and punctuation are to be noticed: see below, notes to the “Restatement” 3, 22, 23, 34, 59, 60, 107, 134, 154, 155, 159, 168, 169, 179, 259, 273, 275, 281, 345, and 347). A misprint and a correction in OT (1991/2000) are indicated below, notes 371 and 274 to the “Restatement.”

\textsuperscript{96} Some portions of text which appear in AB and in all the editions have been added by hand in JC: see below, notes to the “Restatement” 8, 10, 21, 98, 130, 174, 190, 225, 227, 293, 313, 315, 317, 326, 360, and 368.

\textsuperscript{97} With the exception of handwritten portions in JC, in passages which occur in the French translation but not in the American editions (see below, notes to the “Restatement” 138, 145, 191, and 196).
Leo Strauss: “Restatement” (1950)¹

A social science that cannot speak of tyranny with the same confidence with which medicine speaks, for example,² of cancer, cannot understand social phenomena as what they are. It is therefore not scientific. Present day³ social science finds itself in this unenviable state.⁴ If it is true that present day social science is the inevitable product⁵ of⁶ modern philosophy, one is forced to think of the restoration of classical social science. <More particularly, if one wants to understand tyranny as what it is, one must have recourse in the first place to Xenophon’s Hiero.> Once we have learned again from the classics what tyranny is, we shall be enabled and forced⁷ to diagnose as tyrannies a number of contemporary regimes which appear in the guise of dictatorships. This diagnosis can only be the first step toward an exact analysis of present day tyranny, for present day tyranny is fundamentally different from the tyranny analyzed by the classics.

But is this not tantamount to admitting that the classics were wholly unfamiliar with tyranny in its contemporary form? Must one not therefore conclude that the classical concept of tyranny is too narrow and hence that the classical frame of reference must be radically⁸ modified, i.e., abandoned? In other words, is the attempt to restore classical social science not utopian since it <necessarily> implies that the classical,< or “pagan,”> orientation has not been made obsolete by the triumph of the Biblical⁹ orientation?

¹ AB: the title ”Restatement” does not occur.
² Cf. DT, p. 283, l. 3: “par exemple”—AB: “speaks, for example, of” → “speaks of”
³ OT (1963): spelled “present-day” in every instance.
⁴ Cf. DT, p. 283, ll. 6-7: “peu enviable”—JC: the end of a word beginning with ”unen” has been crossed out (”unenvia” remains legible); “durable” has been typed in the right margin, with a mark indicating that it should be inserted before the crossed part of the word.—WPP, p. 95, l. 4: “unenviable state”→ “condition”
⁵ WPP, p. 95, l. 5: “result”
⁶ Cf. DT, p. 283, ll. 8-9: “de la philosophie moderne”—JC: the words “modern social science or of” have been handwritten in the left margin, and inserted between “of” and “modern”—WPP, p. 95, l. 6: “of modern philosophy”→ “of modern social science and of modern philosophy”
⁷ WPP, p. 95, l. 9: “compelled”
⁸ JC: “biblical” has been handwritten at the end of the line. At the next line, the first word, ending by “ally” (the remaining being illegible), has been crossed out.
⁹ AB: the first letter of “biblical” has been corrected by hand to a capital letter.—JC: the first letter is not a capital letter
This seems to be the chief objection to which my study on the Hiero is exposed. At any rate, this is the gist of the two most serious criticisms of the study—criticisms which were written in complete independence of each other and their authors, Professor Eric Voegelin and M. Alexandre Kojève, have, so to speak, nothing in common. Before discussing their arguments, I must clarify my position.

The fact that there is a fundamental difference between classical tyranny and present day tyranny, or that the classics did not even dream of present day tyranny, is not a good or sufficient reason for abandoning the classical frame of reference. For that fact is perfectly compatible with the possibility that present day tyranny finds its place within the classical framework, i.e., that it cannot be understood adequately except within the classical framework. The difference between present day tyranny and classical tyranny has its root in the difference between the modern notion of philosophy or science and the classical notion of philosophy or science. Present day tyranny, in contradistinction to classical tyranny, is based on the unlimited progress in the “conquest of nature” which is made possible by modern science, as well as on the popularization or diffusion of philosophic or scientific knowledge. Both possibilities—the possibility of a science that issues in the conquest of nature and the possibility of the popularization of philosophy or science—were known to the classics. (Compare Xenophon, Memorabilia I 1.15 with Empedocles, fr. 111; Plato, Theaetetus 180c7-d5.) But the classics rejected them as “unnatural,” i.e., as destructive of humanity.

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10 JC: “the” has been handwritten at the end of the line.—WPP, p. 96, ll. 4-5: “on the” → “of Xenophon’s”
11 Cf. DT, p. 284, ll. 8-9: “deux critiques les plus sérieuses qu’elle a provoquées—qui”—JC: the following words have been handwritten in the right margin, next to a portion of sentence which has been crossed out and is illegible: “only criticisms of my study from which one could learn anything. These criticisms”—WPP, p. 96, par. 2, ll. 3-4: “two most serious criticisms of the study—criticisms which” → “only criticisms of my study from which one could learn anything. Those criticisms”
12 Cf. DT, p. 284, par. 2, ll. 5-6: “et dont les auteurs”—AB: “these”—JC: “their” has been handwritten above a word which has been crossed out and is illegible.
13 AB: no accent here; the accent has been handwritten on most occurrences of “Kojève” throughout the typescript.—JC: the accent has been handwritten on every occurrence of “Kojève” throughout the typescript.—LB: the accent does not appear on most occurrences of “Kojève”
14 Cf. DT, p. 284, par. 2, l. 9: “précise ma position”—AB: “clarify my own position”—JC: an illegible word has been crossed out after “my”—WPP, p. 96, par. 2, l. 7: “clarify my position” → “restate my contention”
15 AB: “the on popularisation” has been typed; a handwritten mark indicates that the order of the two first words should be reversed.
16 AB: “a popularisation”
17 JC: underlined by hand.
18 JC: underlined by hand.
They did not dream of present day tyranny because they regarded its basic presuppositions as so preposterous that they turned their imagination in entirely different directions. <To assert that present day tyranny cannot be understood adequately except within the classical frame of reference, means to assert that the classics were justified in their rejection of both unlimited technological progress and universal enlightenment.>

Voegelin, one of the leading contemporary historians of political thought, seems to contend (The Review of Politics, 1949, pp. 241-244) that the classical concept of tyranny is too narrow because it does not cover the phenomenon known as Cesarism: when calling a given regime tyrannical, we imply that “constitutional” government is a viable alternative to it; but Cesarism emerges only after “the final breakdown of the republican constitutional order”; hence, Cesarism or “post-constitutional” rule cannot be understood as a subdivision of tyranny in the classical sense of tyranny. There is no reason to quarrel with the view that genuine Cesarism is not tyranny, but this does not justify the conclusion that Cesarism is incomprehensible on the basis of classical political philosophy: Cesarism is still a subdivision of absolute monarchy as the classics understood it. If in a given situation “the republican constitutional order” has completely broken down, and there is no reasonable prospect of its restoration within all the foreseeable future, the establishment of permanent absolute rule cannot, as such, be justly blamed. It is, therefore, fundamentally different from the establishment of tyranny. Just blame could attach only to the manner in which that permanent absolute rule that is truly necessary is established and exercised; as Voegelin emphasizes, there are tyrannical as well as royal Cesars. One has only to read Coluccio Salutati’s defense of Cesar against the charge that he was a tyrant—a defense which in all essential points is conceived in the spirit of the classics—in order to see that the distinction between Cesarism and tyranny fits perfectly into the classical framework.

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19 JC: a final letter has been crossed out by hand.
20 WPP: spelled “Caesarism” in every instance.
21 JC: the words “a viable” have been handwritten at the end of the line. At the very beginning of the next line, one word (or several short words) has been crossed out and is illegible.
22 OT (1963), p. 191, l. 1: no comma after “hence”
23 OT (1963): spelled “postconstitutional” in every instance.
24 JC: the “n” of “on” has been handwritten.
25 Cf. DT, p. 286, ll. 2-3: “Il est, par conséquent”—JC and WPP p. 97, l. 11: “It is, therefore,” → “; therefore it is”
26 AB: “permanent absolute rule that is truly necessary” → “truly necessary permanent absolute rule”
27 WPP: spelled “Caesar” in every instance.
But the phenomenon of Cesarism is one thing; the current concept of Cesarism is another. The current concept of Cesarism is certainly incompatible with classical principles. The question thus arises whether the current concept of Cesarism or the classical concept is more nearly adequate. More particularly, the question concerns the validity of two implications of the current concept which Voegelin seems to regard as indispensable, and which originated in 19th century historicism. In the first place, he seems to believe that the difference between “the constitutional situation” and “the post-constitutional situation” is more fundamental than the difference between the good king or the good Cesar on the one hand, and the bad king or the bad Cesar on the other. But is not the difference between good and bad the most fundamental of all practical or political distinctions? Secondly, Voegelin seems to believe that “post-constitutional” rule is not per se inferior to “constitutional” rule. But is not “post-constitutional” rule justified by necessity or, as Voegelin says, by “historical necessity”? And is not the necessary essentially inferior to the noble or to what is choiceworthy for its own sake? Necessity excuses: what is justified by necessity is in need of excuse. The Cesar, as Voegelin conceives of him, is “the avenger of the misdeeds of a corrupt people.” Cesarism is then essentially related to a corrupt people, to a low level of political life, to a decline of society. It presupposes the decline, if not the extinction, of civic virtue or of public spirit, and it necessarily perpetuates the condition. Cesarism belongs to a degraded society, and it thrives on its degradation. Cesarism is just, whereas tyranny is unjust. But Cesarism is just in the way in which deserved punishment is just. It is as little choiceworthy for its own sake as is deserved punishment. Cato refused to see what his time demanded because he saw too clearly the degraded and degrading character of what his time demanded. It is much more important to realize the low level of Cesarism (for, to repeat, Cesarism cannot be divorced from the society which deserves Cesarism) than to realize that under certain conditions Cesarism is necessary and hence legitimate.

28 JC: the typescript reads “conception”; the final three letters have been crossed out by hand.
29 AB: “principles” has been typed above “concepts” which has been crossed out by typing.
30 Cf. above, note 28 to the “Restatement.”
31 JC: the “r” of “or” is a handwritten correction.
32 Cf. above, note 125 to the “Restatement.”
33 Cf. DT, p. 286, par. 2, l. 8: “de deux”—JC and WPP, p. 97, par. 2, l. 6: “of two” → “of the two”
34 OT (1963), p. 191, par. 2, l. 7: spelled “nineteenth.”
35 JC: the words “per se” have not been underlined.
36 JC: a crossing-out appears before this word.
37 AB: “perpetuated” has been corrected to “perpetuates” by typing.
38 WPP, p. 98, l. 5: “that”
39 AB: “to” has been crossed out by typing before “Cesarism”
While the classics were perfectly capable of doing justice to the merits of Cesarism, they were not particularly interested in elaborating a doctrine of Cesarism. Primarily concerned with the best regime, they paid less attention to “post-constitutional” rule or to late kingship, than to “pre-constitutional” rule, or to early kingship: rustic simplicity is a better soil for the good life than is sophisticated rottenness. But there was another reason which induced the classics to be almost silent about “post-constitutional” rule. To stress the fact that it is just to replace constitutional rule by absolute rule, if the common good requires that change, means to cast a doubt on the absolute sanctity of the established constitutional order. It means encouraging dangerous men to confuse the issue by bringing about a state of affairs in which the common good requires the establishment of their absolute rule. The true doctrine of the legitimacy of Cesarism is a dangerous doctrine. The true distinction between Cesarism and tyranny is too subtle for ordinary political use. It is better for the people to remain ignorant of that distinction and to regard the potential Cesar as a potential tyrant. No harm can come from this theoretical error which becomes a practical truth if the people have the mettle to act upon it. No harm can come from the political identification of Cesarism and tyranny: Cesar can take care of themselves.

The classics could easily have elaborated a doctrine of Cesarism or of late kingship if they had wanted, but they did not want to do it. Voegelin however contends that they were forced by their historical situation to grope for a doctrine of Cesarism, and that they failed to establish it. He tries to substantiate his contention by referring to Xenophon and to Plato. As for Plato, Voegelin was forced by considerations of space to limit himself to a summary reference to the royal ruler in the Statesman. As for Xenophon, he rightly asserts that it is not sufficient to oppose “the Cyropaedia as a mirror of the perfect king to the Hiero as a mirror of the tyrant,” since the perfect king Cyrus and the improved tyrant who is described by Simonides “look much more opposed to each other than they really are.” He explains this fact by suggesting that “both works fundamentally face the same historical

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40 WPP, p. 98, par. 2, l. 2: “interested in” → “concerned with”
41 WPP, p. 98, par. 2, l. 3: “Primarily” → “Since they were primarily”
42 JC: no comma after “rule”
43 AB: “soil” has been mistyped and corrected by hand.
44 WPP, p. 99, l. 3: “discover”
45 Cf. DT, p. 288, par. 2, l. 7: “de l’établir”—AB: “this”
46 JC: the capital letter of “Xenophon” is a handwritten correction.—LB: no correction.
47 Cf. DT, p. 288, par. 2, l. 10: “raisons”—AB: “consideration”
48 JC: underlined by hand.—LB: not underlined.
problem of the new (sc. post-constitutional) rulership,” and that one cannot solve this problem except by obliterating at the first stage the distinction between king and tyrant. To justify this explanation, he contends that “the very motivation of the Cyropaedia is the search for a stable rule that will make an end to the dreary overturning of democracies and tyrannies in the Hellenic polis.” This contention is not supported by what Xenophon says or indicates in regard to the intention of the Cyropaedia. Its explicit intention is to make intelligible Cyrus’ astonishing success in solving the problem of ruling human beings. Xenophon conceives of this problem as one that is eternal, or at any rate coeval with man. Like Plato in the Statesman, he does not make the slightest reference to the particular “historical” problem of stable rule in “the post-constitutional situation.” In particular, he does not refer to “the dreary overturning of democracies and tyrannies in the Hellenic polis”: he speaks of the frequent overturning of democracies, monarchies, and oligarchies and of the essential instability of all tyrannies. As for the implicit intention of the Cyropaedia, it is partly revealed by the remark, toward the end of the work, that “after Cyrus died, his sons immediately quarrelled, cities and nations immediately revolted, and all things turned to the worse.” If Xenophon was not a fool, he did not intend to present Cyrus’ regime as a model. He knew too well that the good order of society requires stability and continuity. (Compare the opening of the Cyropaedia with the parallel in the Agesilaus, 1.4.) He rather used Cyrus’ meteoric success and the way in which it was brought about as an example for making intelligible the nature of political things. The work which describes Cyrus’ whole life is entitled The Education of Cyrus: the education of Cyrus is the clue to his whole life, to his astonishing

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49 WPP, p. 99, l. 13: parenthesis → square brackets; “sc.” (abbreviation of scilicet) is underlined.
50 AB: the words “except by obliterating” have been handwritten above the line with a mark indicating that they should be inserted at this place.
51 JC: no comma after “explanation”
52 JC: underlined by hand.—LB: not underlined.
53 JC: no comma around “or indicates”
54 JC: “post” has been typed with a capital “P”
55 AB: not underlined.
56 AB: the “n” of “things” has been typed above the line, with a mark indicating that it should be inserted in this word.
57 AB: “the” has been typed above the line, with a mark indicating that it should be inserted at this place.
58 JC: after “4.” a second instance of “4.” has been handwritten (Xenophon’s Agesilaus is divided in chapters and paragraphs only).
59 OT (1963), p. 193, last line: comma after “work”
60 AB and OT (1963), p. 193, last line: comma after “life”
success, and hence to Xenophon’s intention. An extremely sketchy remark⁶¹ must here suffice. Xenophon’s Cyrus was the son of the king of Persia, and until he was about twelve years old he was educated according to the laws of the Persians. The laws and the⁶² policy of Xenophon’s Persians, however, are an idealized⁶³ version of the laws and polity of the Spartans. <This means that> the Persia in which Cyrus was raised was an aristocracy superior to <Lycurgus’> Sparta<, for Persian kingship was merely an improved version of Spartan kingship>. The political activity of Cyrus—his extraordinary success—consisted in transforming a stable and healthy aristocracy into an unstable “Oriental despotism” whose rottenness showed itself at the latest immediately after his death. The first step in this transformation <—prin-
cipiis obsta—> was a speech which Cyrus addressed to <the> Persian nobles and in which he convinced these gentlemen⁶⁴ that they ought to deviate from the habit of their ancestors by practicing virtue no longer for its own sake, but for the sake of its <external> rewards. The destruction of aristocracy begins, as one would expect, with the corruption of its principle. (Cyropæ-
dia 1 5.5-14; compare Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 1248b 38 ff., where the view of virtue which Xenophon’s Cyrus instills into the minds of the Persian gentlemen is described as the Spartan view.) The quick success of Cyrus’ first action forces the reader to wonder whether the Persian aristocracy was a genuine aristocracy; or more precisely, whether the gentleman in the political or social sense⁶⁵ is a true gentleman. This question is identical with the question which Plato answers explicitly in the negative in his story of Er. Plato⁶⁶ says⁶⁷ outright that a man who has lived in his former life in a well-
ordered regime, participating in virtue by habit and without philosophy, will choose for his next life “the greatest tyranny,” for “mostly people make their choice according to the habits of their former life” (Republic⁶⁸ 619b6-620a3).

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⁶¹ CF. DT, p. 290, ll. 11-12: “Une remarque très brève”—JC: the “n” of “An,” “extremely” and the “y” of “sketchy” have been crossed out by hand; “remark” does not appear (after these corrections, another word, which has been crossed out, is illegible). The words “very rough” have been handwritten in the left margin, with a mark indicating that it should be inserted at this place.—WPP, p. 100, l. 3: “An extremely sketchy remark” → “A very rough sketch”

⁶² AB: “and the policy” → “and policy”

⁶³ CF. DT, p. 290, l. 16: “idéalisée”—JC: “improved” has been handwritten in the left margin, with a mark of insertion before a word which has been crossed out (most probably “idealized”).—WPP, p. 100, l. 7: “improved”

⁶⁴ WPP, p. 100, l. 14: “these gentlemen” → “them”

⁶⁵ JC: “sense” has been handwritten at the end of the line.

⁶⁶ WPP, p. 100, l. 26: “Socrates”

⁶⁷ CF. DT, p. 291, l. 10: “il dit”—AB: “Plato says” → “There it is said”—JC: the words “Plato says” have been handwritten in the left margin next to several words which have been crossed out and are illegible (the last of these words is most probably to be read: “said”).

⁶⁸ AB: not underlined.
There is no adequate solution to the problem of virtue or happiness on the political or social plane. Still, while aristocracy is always on the verge of declining into oligarchy or something worse, it is the best possible political solution of the human problem. It must here suffice to note that Cyrus’ second step is the democratization of the army, and that the end of the process is a regime that might seem barely distinguishable from the least intolerable form of tyranny. But one must not overlook the essential difference between Cyrus’ rule and tyranny, a distinction that is never obliterated. Cyrus is and remains a legitimate ruler. He is born as the legitimate heir to the reigning king, a scion of an old royal house. He becomes the king of other nations through inheritance or marriage and through just conquest, for he enlarges the boundaries of Persia in the Roman manner: by defending the allies of Persia. The difference between Cyrus and a Hiero educated by Simonides is comparable to the difference between William III and Oliver Cromwell. A cursory comparison of the history of England with the history of certain other European nations suffices to show that this difference is not unimportant to the well-being of peoples. Xenophon did not even attempt to obliterate the distinction between the best tyrant and the king because he appreciated too well the charms, nay, the blessings of legitimacy. He expressed this appreciation by subscribing to the maxim (which must be reasonably understood and applied) that the just is identical with the legal.

Voegelin might reply that what is decisive is not Xenophon’s conscious intention, stated or implied, but the historical meaning of his work, the historical meaning of a work being determined by the historical situation as distinguished from the conscious intention of the author. Yet opposing the historical meaning of Xenophon’s work to his conscious intention implies that we are better judges of the situation in which Xenophon thought than Xenophon himself was. But we cannot be better judges of that situation if we do not have a clearer grasp than he had of the principles in whose light historical situations reveal their meaning. After the experience of our generation, the burden of proof would seem to rest on those who assert rather than on those who deny that we have progressed beyond the classics. And even if it were true that we could understand the classics better than

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69 AB: no comma after “Still”
70 JC: the underlining of the words “democratization of the army” has been crossed out. A notation by hand in the bottom of the page has been directed up to the underlining: “(not to be underlined).”
71 AB: “of”
72 Cf. DT, p. 292, l. 3: “entre Cyrus”—AB: “between Cyrus” → “between a Cyrus”
they understood themselves, we could become certain of our superiority only after understanding them exactly as they understood themselves. Otherwise we might mistake our superiority to our notion of the classics for superiority to the classics.

According to Voegelin, it was Machiavelli, as distinguished from the classics, who “achieved the theoretical creation of a concept of rulership in the post-constitutional situation,” and this achievement was due to the influence on Machiavelli of the Biblical tradition. He refers especially to Machiavelli’s remark about the profeti armati (Prince VI). The difficulty to which Voegelin’s contention is exposed is indicated by these two facts: he speaks on the one hand of “the apocalyptic [sc. hence thoroughly non-classical] aspects of the profeti armato in the Prince,” whereas on the other hand he says that Machiavelli claimed “for (the) paternity” of the profeti armato “besides Romulus, Moses and Theseus, precisely the Xenophontic Cyrus.” This amounts to an admission that certainly Machiavelli himself was not aware of any non-classical implication of his notion of profeti armati. There is nothing unclassical about Romulus, Theseus, and Xenophon’s Cyrus. It is true that Machiavelli adds Moses; but, after having made his bow to the Biblical interpretation of Moses, he speaks of Moses in exactly the same manner in which every classical political philosopher would have spoken of him; Moses was one of the greatest νομοθέται or κτίσται (fondatori: Discorsi I 9) who ever lived. <Machiavelli interprets Moses in the “pagan” manner.> When reading Voegelin’s statement on

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74 AB: “this” has been crossed out at the end of the line; a second instance has been typed at the beginning of the next line.
75 AB: the first letter of “biblical” has been corrected by hand to a capital letter.
76 WPP, p. 101, last line: “profeta armato” → “armed prophets”
77 WPP, p. 102, l. 2: “[sc. hence]” → “[hence”
78 Cf. DT, p. 293, par. 2, ll. 10-11: the portion of text has been put in parentheses—AB: the portion of text has been put between slash marks.—JC: the square brackets are handwritten corrections.—LB: parentheses without correction.
79 WPP, p. 102, l. 3: “profeta armato” → “armed prophet”
80 JC: “for” has been typed with a capital “F” which has been crossed out.—LB: the capital “F” has not been crossed out.
81 WPP, p. 102, l. 4: parenthesis → square brackets.
82 WPP, p. 102, l. 5: “profeta armato” → “armed prophet”
83 WPP, p. 102, l. 8: “profeti disarmati” → “armed prophets”
84 AB: “biblical”
85 WPP, p. 102, ll. 13-14: “νομοθέται” → “legislators” (Throughout the typescripts, all Greek words have been entered by hand.)
86 WPP, p. 102, l. 14: “κτίσται” → “founders”
87 JC: the two words are not underlined.
88 Cf. DT, p. 293, par. 2, l. 29: “« païenne »”—AB: no quotation marks around “pagan”
Interpretation

this subject, one receives the impression that in speaking of armed prophets, Machiavelli put the emphasis on “prophets” as distinguished from nonprophetic rulers like Cyrus, for example. But Machiavelli puts the emphasis not on “prophets,” but on “armed.” He opposes the armed prophets, among whom he counts Cyrus, Romulus, and Theseus as well as Moses, to unarmed prophets like Savonarola. He states the lesson which he intends to convey, with remarkable candor: “All armed prophets succeed and the unarmed ones come to ruin.” It is difficult to believe that in writing this sentence Machiavelli should have been completely oblivious of the most famous of all unarmed prophets (as well as of Muhammad). One certainly cannot understand Machiavelli’s remark on the profeti disarmati without taking into consideration what he says about the Cielo disarmato and “the effeminacy of the world” which, according to him, are due to Christianity. (Discorsi II 2, for the interpretation one has to consider ibid. III 1.)

The tradition which Machiavelli continues while radically modifying it, is not, as Voegelin suggests, that represented by Joachim of Floris, for example, but the one which we still call, with pardonable ignorance, the Averroistic tradition. Machiavelli declares that Savonarola, that unarmed prophet, was right in saying that the ruin of Italy was caused by “our sins,” “but our sins were not what he believed they were,” namely, religious sins, “but those which I have spoken of,” namely, political or military sins (Prince XII). In the same vein Maimonides declares that the ruin of the Jewish kingdom was caused by the “sins of our fathers,” namely, by their idolatry; but idolatry worked its effect in a perfectly natural manner: it led to astrology and thus induced the Jewish people to devote themselves to astrology instead of to the practice of the arts of war and the conquest of countries. But apart from all this, Voegelin does not give any indication of what the armed prophets have to do with “the post-constitutional situation.” Certainly Romulus, Theseus, and Moses were “pre-constitutional” rulers. Voegelin also refers to “Machiavelli’s
complete drawing of the savior prince in the *Vita di Castruccio Castracani*” which, he says, “is hardly thinkable without the standardized model of the *Life of Timur*.” Apart from the fact that I fail to see any connection between the Castruccio and the *Life of Timur* and between the *Life of Timur* and the Biblical tradition, the Castruccio is perhaps the most impressive document of Machiavelli’s longing for classical virtù as distinguished from, and opposed to, Biblical righteousness. <Machiavelli himself compares> Castruccio, that idealized condottiere who preferred in so single-minded a manner the life of the soldier to the life of the priest, to Philip of Macedon and to Scipio of Rome.

<As appears most clearly from the fifteenth chapter of the *Prince,* Machiavelli’s longing for classical virtù is only the reverse side of his rejection of classical political philosophy. He rejects classical political philosophy <because of its “utopian” character, i.e.,> because of its orientation by the perfection of the nature of man. <He rejects in particular the contemplative life. Realizing the connection between the contemplative life and moral virtue, he replaces moral virtue by political virtue or patriotism.> The abandonment of the contemplative ideal leads to a radical change in the character of wisdom: Machiavellian wisdom has no connection with moderation. Machiavelli separates wisdom from moderation. <The distinction between doctrines which are dangerous and doctrines which are not dangerous, loses its significance.> The ultimate reason why the Hiero comes so close to the *Prince* is that in the *Hiero* Xenophon experiments with a type of wisdom which comes relatively close to a wisdom divorced from moderation: Simonides seems to have an inordinate desire for the pleasures of the table. It is impossible to say how far the epoch-making change that was

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99 Cf. *DT*, p. 295, ll. 11-12: “je ne parviens pas à voir”—JC: the words “Voegelin has failed to show” have been handwritten in the right margin and inserted at this place, after a portion of sentence which has been crossed out and is illegible.—*WPP*, p. 103, l. 11: “I fail to see” → “Voegelin has failed to show”

100 *AB*: the accent has been entered by hand.—JC: spelled without accent.

101 Cf. *DT*, p. 295, l. 18: “Machiavel lui-même compare Castruccio”—JC: this sentence begins with “Castruccio” (as in *WPP*, p. 103, l. 16); before this word, a portion of sentence has been crossed out and is illegible.

102 *AB*: spelled “singleminded”—JC: “singlehanded” has been typed, and then changed by hand to “singleminded”

103 *JC*: the words “is compared by Machiavelli himself to” have been handwritten at the end of the line and in the right margin, after a crossing-out which follows “priest,”—*WPP*, p. 103, l. 18: “priest, to” → “priest, is compared by Machiavelli himself to”

104 Cf. *DT*, p. 295: a new paragraph begins thereafter.—JC: this paragraph and the next one form one paragraph.

105 Cf. above, note 100 to the “Restatement.”
effected by Machiavelli is due to the indirect influence of the Biblical tradition, before that change has been fully understood in itself.

The unique character of the Hiero does not disclose itself to cursory reading. It will not disclose itself to the tenth reading, however painstaking, if the reading is not productive of a change of orientation. This change was much easier to achieve for the 18th century reader than for the reader in our century who has been brought up on the brutal or sentimental literature of the last five generations. We are in need of a second education in order to accustom our eyes to the noble reserve and the calm grandeur of the classics. Xenophon, as it were, limited himself to cultivating exclusively that aspect of classical writing which is wholly foreign to the modern taste. No wonder that he is today despised or ignored. An unknown ancient critic, who must have been a man of uncommon discernment, called him most bashful. Those modern readers who are so fortunate as to have a natural preference for Jane Austen rather than for Dostoievski, in particular, have an easier access to Xenophon than others might have; to understand Xenophon, they have only to combine the love of philosophy with their natural preference. In the words of Xenophon, “it is both noble and just, and pious and more pleasant to remember the good things rather than the bad ones.” In the Hiero, Xenophon experimented with the pleasure that comes from remembering bad things, with a pleasure that admittedly is of doubtful morality and piety.

106 WPP, p. 103, par. 3, l. 1: “peculiar”
107 AB and OT (1963), p. 197, par. 3, ll. 4-5: spelled “eighteenth.”
108 AB: “of” has been corrected to “in” by typing.
109 WPP, p. 103, last line: “and”
110 WPP, p. 104, l. 2: “quiet”
111 Reference to a formula by Winckelmann, which occurs in the following passages of his Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst (Friedrichstadt: 1755): “Das allgemeine vorzügliche Kennzeichen der griechischen Meisterstücke ist endlich eine edle Einfalt, und eine stille Größe, sowohl in der Stellung als im Ausdruck.” (p. 19) “Die edle Einfalt und stille Größe der griechischen Statuen ist zugleich das wahre Kennzeichen der griechischen Schriften aus den besten Zeiten, der Schriften aus Sokrates’ Schule (…).” (p. 21)—italics added.
112 AB: no commas around “were”
113 Cf. DT, p. 296, par. 2, l. 13: “aspect”—JC: “character” has been handwritten just below a word which has been crossed out and is illegible (probably a “t” at the end of this word, and a “p” at the middle).—WPP, p. 104, l. 4: “character”
114 Cf. DT, p. 296, par. 2, l. 14: “goût”—JC and WPP, p. 104, l. 5: “reader”
116 JC: “These”
117 AB: spelled “Dostoyevsky” without comma after.
119 JC: an empty space of about five lines appears between this paragraph and the next one; a portion of text may have been erased.—LB: in the empty space, a series of dashes, which marks a separation,
For someone who is trying to form his taste or his mind by studying Xenophon, it is almost shocking to be suddenly confronted by the more than Machiavellian bluntness with which Kojève speaks of such terrible things as atheism and tyranny and takes them for granted. At least on one occasion he goes so far as to call “unpopular” certain measures which the very tyrant Hiero had declared to be criminal. He does not hesitate to proclaim that present day dictators are tyrants without regarding this in the least as an objection to their rule. As for reverence for legitimacy, he has none. But the nascent shock is absorbed by the realization, or rather the knowledge of long standing, that Kojève belongs to the very few who know how to think and who love to think. He does not belong to the many who today are unabashed atheists and more than Byzantine flatterers of tyrants for the same reason for which they would have been addicted to the grossest superstitions, both religious and legal, had they lived in an earlier age. In a word, Kojève is a philosopher and not an intellectual.

Since he is a philosopher, he knows that the philosopher is, in principle, more capable of ruling than other men and hence will be regarded by a tyrant like Hiero as a most dangerous competitor for tyrannical rule. It would not occur to him for a moment to compare the relationship between Hiero and Simonides with the relationship, say, between Stefan George or Thomas Mann and Hitler. For, to say nothing of considerations too obvious to be mentioned, he could not overlook the obvious fact that the hypothesis of the Hiero demanded a tyrant of whom it was at least imaginable that he could be taught. In particular, he knows without having to be reminded of the Seventh Letter that the difference between a philosopher who is a subject of tyrant and a philosopher who merely visits the tyrant is immaterial as far as the tyrant’s fear of philosophers is concerned: His attitude does not permit him to rest satisfied with the vulgar separation of theory from practice. He knows too well that there never was and there never will be reasonable security for sound practice except after theory has overcome the powerful obstacles to sound practice which originate in theoretical misconceptions of a certain kind. Finally, he brushes aside in sovereign
intercept the implicit claim of current thought\textsuperscript{126} to have solved the problems that were raised by the classics—a claim that is only implicit because current thought is unaware of the existence of those problems.

Yet while admitting and even stressing\textsuperscript{127} the absolute superiority\textsuperscript{128} of classical thought to current thought, Kojève rejects the classical solution of the basic\textsuperscript{129} problems. He regards unlimited technological progress and universal enlightenment as essential for the genuine satisfaction of what is human in man. He denies that present day social science is the inevitable outcome of modern philosophy. According to him, present day social science is merely the inevitable product of the inevitable\textsuperscript{130} decay of that modern philosophy which has refused to learn the decisive lesson from Hegel. He regards Hegel’s teaching as the genuine synthesis of Socratic and Machiavellian (or Hobbian) politics, which, as such, is superior to its component elements. In fact, he regards Hegel’s teaching as, in principle, the final teaching.

Kojève directs his criticism in the first place against the classical notion\textsuperscript{131} of tyranny. Xenophon reveals an important aspect\textsuperscript{132} of that view\textsuperscript{133} by making Hiero answer with silence to Simonides’ description of the good tyrant. As Kojève rightly judges, Hiero’s silence signifies that he will not attempt to put into practice Simonides’ proposals. Kojève suggests, at least provisionally, that this is the fault of Simonides, who did not tell Hiero what the first step is which the tyrant must take in order to transform bad tyranny into good tyranny. But would it not have been up to Hiero if he seriously desired to become a good tyrant, to ask Simonides about the first step? How does Kojève know that Simonides was not waiting in vain for this very question? Or perhaps Simonides has answered it already implicitly. Yet this defense of Simonides is insufficient. The question returns, for, as Kojève
again rightly observes, the attempt to realize Simonides’ vision of a good tyrant is confronted with an almost insurmountable difficulty. The only question which Hiero raises while Simonides discusses the improvement of tyranny, concerns the mercenaries. Hiero’s imperfect tyranny rests on the support of his mercenaries. The improvement of tyranny would require a shift of part of the power from the mercenaries to the citizens. By attempting such a shift, the tyrant would antagonize the mercenaries without being at all certain that he could regain by that concession, or by any concession, the confidence of the citizens. He would end by sitting between two chairs. Simonides seems to disregard this state of things and thus to reveal a poor understanding of Hiero’s situation or a lack of wisdom. To save Simonides’ reputation, one seems compelled to suggest that the poet himself did not believe in the viability of his improved tyranny, that he regarded the good tyranny as a utopia, or that he rejected tyranny as a hopelessly bad regime. But, Kojève continues, does this suggestion not imply that Simonides’ attempt to educate Hiero is futile? And a wise man does not attempt futile things.

This criticism may be said to be based on an insufficient appreciation of the value of utopias. The utopia in the strict sense describes the simply good social order. As such it merely makes explicit what is implied in every attempt at social improvement. For every attempt, however limited in scope, at improving a social order, presupposes some understanding of what the simply good social order is: every opinion that something is better than something else, implies an opinion of what is simply good, and every opinion about the good is guided by some understanding of the good. One must elaborate what is implied in every attempt at improvement, for otherwise one cannot prepare the substitution of true knowledge of the simply good social order for opinion about it. In order to be good, the utopian

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134 OT (1963), p. 200, l. 8: no comma after “tyranny”
135 JC: “opinion” has been inserted by hand.
136 AB: “opinion” has been typed above the line, with a mark indicating that it should be inserted at this place.
137 JC: no comma after “improvement”
138 Cf. DT, p. 300, par. 2, ll. 16-18: “préparer l’opinion à la substitution de la véritable connaissance du système social simplement bon”—JC: “prepare the substitution of true knowledge of the simply good social order for opinion about it” → “replace opinion about the simply good social order by knowledge of it” (the words “replace opinion about” have been handwritten in the left margin, with a mark indicating that they should be inserted at this place, before a portion of sentence which has been crossed out and is illegible; the words “by knowledge of it” have been handwritten in the left margin, and circled, with a stroke indicating they should be inserted at this place, before a portion of sentence which has been crossed out and is illegible).
order must be possible. But it is not necessary and\textsuperscript{139} even possible that it should be viable under all conditions. Being the simply good order, it will be possible only under the most favorable conditions. Generally speaking, its actualization is improbable.> There is no difficulty in enlarging the strict meaning of utopia in such a manner that one can speak of the utopia of the best tyranny. As Kojève emphasizes, under certain conditions the abolition of tyranny may be out of the question. The best one could hope for is that the tyranny be improved, i.e., that the tyrannical rule be exercised as little inhumanely or irrationally as possible. Every specific reform or improvement of which a sensible man could think, if reduced to its principle,\textsuperscript{140} forms part of the complete picture of the maximum improvement that is still compatible with the continued existence of tyranny, it being understood that the maximum improvement is possible only under the most favorable conditions. The maximum\textsuperscript{141} improvement of tyranny would require, above all, the shift of part of the power from the mercenaries to the citizens. Such a shift is not absolutely impossible, but its actualization is safe only in circumstances which man cannot create or which no sensible man would create (e.g., an extreme danger threatening equally the mercenaries and the citizens, like the danger of Syracuse being conquered, and all its inhabitants being put to the sword, by barbarians). A sensible man like Simonides would think that he had deserved well of his fellow men if he could induce the tyrant to act humanely or rationally within a small area, or perhaps even in a single instance, where, without his advice, the tyrant would have continued an inhuman or irrational practice. Xenophon indicates an example: Hiero’s participating at the Olympian and Pythian games. If Hiero followed Simonides’ advice to abandon this practice, he would improve his standing with his subjects and in the world at large, and he would indirectly benefit his subjects. Xenophon leaves it to the intelligence of his reader to replace that particular example by another one which the reader, on the basis of his particular experience, might consider to be more apt. The general lesson is to the effect that the wise man who happens to have a chance to influence a tyrant should use his influence for benefiting his fellow men. One may say that the lesson is trivial. It would be more accurate to say that it was trivial in former ages, for <the trouble of> today <is largely that> such little actions like that of Simonides

\textsuperscript{139}JC: an illegible word has been handwritten in the left margin, with a stroke pointing to the space between “and” and “even”

\textsuperscript{140}JC: before “principle” a word has been crossed out and is illegible.

\textsuperscript{141}JC: the last two letters of “maximum” are handwritten corrections. Between “maximum” and “improvement” a portion of sentence appears, which has been crossed out and is illegible.
are not taken seriously <enough> because modern men<sup>142</sup> are in the habit of expecting too much. What is <certainly> not trivial is what we learn from Xenophon about how the wise man has to proceed in his undertaking, which is beset with great difficulties and even with dangers.

Kojève denies our contention that the good tyranny is a utopia. To substantiate his denial, he mentions one example by name: the rule of Salazar. I have never been to Portugal,<sup>143</sup> but from all that I have heard about that country, I am inclined to believe that Kojève is right, except that I am not quite certain whether Salazar’s rule should not be called “post-constitutional” rather than tyrannical. Yet one swallow does not make a summer, and we never denied that good tyranny is possible<sup>144</sup> under very favorable circumstances. But Kojève contends that Salazar is not an exception. He thinks that <the existence of> circumstances favorable to good tyranny which was the exception in former ages, is the rule today: present day tyrannies are in the service of “ideas,” or, as we<sup>145</sup> would prefer to say, they are based on the diffusion of real or alleged science.<sup>146</sup> He contends that all present day tyrants are good tyrants in Xenophon’s sense.<sup>147</sup> Kojève<sup>148</sup> <also><sup>149</sup> alludes to Stalin. He notes in particular that the tyranny improved according to Simonides’ suggestions is characterized by Stakhanovistic emulation. But Stalin’s rule would live up to Simonides’ standards only if the introduction of Stakhanovistic emulation had been accompanied by a considerable decline in the use

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<sup>142</sup> Cf. DT, p. 302, l. 12: “les hommes modernes”—JC: “we” has been handwritten at the end of the line, after one or several words which have been crossed out and are illegible.—WPP, p. 107, l. 23: “modern men” → “we”

<sup>143</sup> AB: the capital letter of “Portugal” is a handwritten correction.

<sup>144</sup> JC: a word has been handwritten in the right margin and inserted in the text, then crossed out and made illegible.

<sup>145</sup> JC: “we” has been handwritten above the line and inserted before “be” which has been crossed out.

<sup>146</sup> WPP, p. 107, par. 2, l. 10: “which was the exception in former ages, is the rule today: present day tyrannies are in the service of “ideas”, or, as we would prefer to say, they are based on the diffusion of real or alleged science” → “are easily available today”

<sup>147</sup> AB: between this sentence and the next one, the following sentences (which do not have any equivalent in the French translation) appear: “As is shown by his reference to tyranny based on racial ‘ideas,’ he does not seem to be averse to the suggestion that Hitler was a good tyrant in Xenophon’s sense. But it is of the essence of the good tyrant in Xenophon’s sense that under him gentlemen may live, and live happily. And all German gentlemen of whom I know, either left Germany after Hitler’s coming to power, or else they lived most miserably under his rule.”—JC: after this period, about five lines have been erased. There are left only one or two words which have been crossed out at the beginning of the second line (probably ”he does”), the end of a word which has been crossed out at the end of the last line erased, and thereafter what may be the mark of a handwritten insertion.

<sup>148</sup> WPP, p. 107, last line: “He”

<sup>149</sup> Cf. DT, p. 302, last line: “également”—JC: after ”Kojève” a word has been crossed out and is illegible.
of the NKVD or of “labor” camps. Would Kojève go so far as to say that Stalin could travel outside of the Iron Curtain wherever he liked in order to see sights without having anything to fear? (Hiero 11.10 and 1.12.) Would Kojève go so far as to say that everyone living behind the Iron Curtain is an ally of Stalin, or that Stalin regards all citizens of Soviet Russia and the other “people’s democracies” as his comrades? (Hiero 11.11 and 11.14.)

However this may be, Kojève contends that present day tyranny, and perhaps even classical tyranny, cannot be understood on the basis of Xenophon’s principles, and that the classical frame of reference must be modified radically by the introduction of an element of Biblical origin. He argues as follows: Simonides maintains that honor is the supreme or sole goal of the tyrant in particular and of the highest type of human being (the Master) in general. This shows that the poet sees only half of the truth. The other half is supplied by the Biblical morality of Slaves or Workers. The actions of men, and hence also the actions of tyrants, can be, and frequently are prompted by desire for the pleasure deriving from the successful execution of their work, their projects, or their ideals. There is such a thing as devotion to one’s work, or to a cause, “conscientious” work, into which no thought of honor or glory enters. But this fact must not induce us to minimize hypocritically the essential contribution of the desire for honor or prestige to the completion of man. The desire for prestige, recognition or authority is the primary motive of all political struggles, and in particular of the struggle that leads a man to tyrannical power. It is perfectly unobjectionable for an aspiring statesman or a potential tyrant to try for no other reason than for the sake of his preferment to oust the incumbent ruler or rulers although he knows that he is in no way better equipped for the job than they are. There is no reason to find fault with such a course of action, for the desire for recognition necessarily transforms itself, in all cases which are of any consequence, into devotion to the work to be done or to a cause. The synthesis of the morality of Masters with the morality of Slaves is superior to its component elements.

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150 JC: the quotation marks have been crossed out after “camps” and handwritten after “labor”—LB: quotation marks after “camps” without correction.
152 AB: “Slaves” has been mistyped and corrected by hand.
153 JC: handwritten comma.
154 AB and OT (1963), p. 202, par. 2, l. 11: comma after “are”
<In answer to this objection, one has to say in the first place that> Simonides is very far from accepting the morality of Masters or from maintaining that honor is the supreme goal of the highest human type. In translating one of the crucial passages\(^{156}\) (the last sentence of Hiero 7.4), Kojève omits the qualifying δοκεῖ ("the pleasure deriving from honours seems to be...")\(^{157}\). Nor does he pay attention to the implication of the fact that Simonides declares the desire for honor to be the dominant\(^{158}\) passion of ἄνδρες (whom Kojève calls Masters) as distinguished from ἄνθροποι (whom he calls Slaves). For, according to Xenophon, and hence according to his Simonides, the ἄνήρ is by no means the highest human type. The highest human type is the wise man. \(^{159}\) Hegelian will have no difficulty in admitting that, since the wise man is distinguished from the Master,\(^{160}\) he will have something important\(^{161}\) in common with the Slave. This was certainly Xenophon's view. In the statement of the Master's principle, which he entrusted to Simonides, the poet cannot help admitting implicitly the unity of the human species which his statement explicitly denies. And the unity of the human species is thought to be more easily seen by the Slave than by the Master. One does not characterize Socrates adequately by calling him a Master. Xenophon contrasts him with Ischomachus,\(^{162}\) who is the prototype of the καλὸς τε καραθῶς ἄνήρ. Since the work and the knowledge which is best for the type represented by Ischomachus is agriculture and Socrates was not an agriculturist, Socrates was not a καλὸς τε καραθῶς ἄνήρ. As Lycon explicitly says, Socrates was\(^{163}\) a καλὸς τε καραθῶς ἄνθροπος\(^{164}\) (Symposium 9.1; Oeconomicus 6.8,1.2). In this context we may note that in the passage of the Hiero which deals with gentlemen living under a tyrant (10.3), Simonides characteristically omits ἄνδρες: καλοὶ τε καραθοὶ ἄνδρες could not live happily under a tyrant however good (compare Hiero 9.6 and 5.1-2). Xenon-
phon indicates his view most succinctly by failing to mention manliness in his two lists of Socrates’ virtues. He sees in Socrates’ military activity a sign not of his manliness, but of his justice (Memorabilia IV 4.1).

Since Xenophon or his Simonides did not believe that honor is the highest good, or since they did not accept the morality of Masters, there is no apparent need for supplementing their teaching by an element taken from the morality of Slaves or Workers. According to the classics, the highest good is a life devoted to wisdom or to virtue, honor being no more than a very pleasant, but secondary and dispensable reward. What Kojève calls the pleasure deriving from doing one’s work well or from realizing one’s projects or one’s ideals was called by the classics the pleasure deriving from virtuous or noble activity. The classical interpretation would seem to be truer to the facts. Kojève refers to the pleasure which a solitary child or a solitary painter may derive from executing his projects well. But one can easily imagine a solitary safecracker deriving pleasure from executing his project well, and without a thought of the external rewards (wealth or admiration of his competence) which he reaps. There are artists in all walks of life. It does make a difference what kind of a “job” is the source of disinterested pleasure: whether the job is criminal or innocent, whether it is mere play or serious, and so on. By thinking through this observation one arrives at the view that the highest kind of job, or the only job that is truly human, is noble or virtuous activity, or noble or virtuous work. If one is fond of this manner of looking at things, one may say that noble work is the synthesis effected by the classics between the morality of workless nobility and the morality of ignoble work.

165 AB: “to” is a typed correction.
166 Cf. OT (2000), n. 6 p. 118.
167 JC: “Socrates” has been mistyped and corrected by hand.—LB: mistyped and not corrected.
168 OT (1963), p. 204, l. 2: comma after “dispensable”
169 OT (1963), p. 204, l. 4: no comma after “ideals”
170 LB: “well” has been crossed out after “executing” (a stroke, drawn with Laurence Berns’ pen, indicates that “well” should be put at the end of the sentence).—JC: the word which has been crossed out before “executing” is illegible.
171 JC: “well” and the period have been handwritten after a typed period, at the end of the line.
172 AB: “a” has been typed above the line, with a mark indicating that it should be inserted at this place.
173 JC: “(cf. Plato, Meno 81d3 ff.)” has been handwritten, following the last line of the paragraph. This reference does not occur in the French translation (DT, p. 306); it appears in WPP, p. 110, par. 1, last line.—LB: the parenthetic, handwritten reference does not occur.
Simonides is therefore justified in saying that the desire for honor is the supreme\textsuperscript{174} motive of men who aspire to tyrannical power. Kojève seems to think that a man may aspire to tyrannical power chiefly because he is attracted by “objective” tasks of the highest order, by tasks whose performance requires tyrannical power, and that this motive will radically transform his desire for honor or\textsuperscript{175} recognition. The classics denied that this is possible. They were struck by the similarity between Kojève’s tyrant and the man who is more attracted to safecracking by its exciting problems than by its rewards. One cannot become a tyrant and remain a tyrant without stooping to do base things; hence, a self-respecting man will not aspire to tyrannical power. But, Kojève might object, this still does not prove that the tyrant is motivated chiefly or exclusively by a desire for honor or prestige. He may be motivated, e.g., by a misguided desire to benefit his fellow men. This defense would hold good if error in such matters were difficult to avoid. But it is easy to know that tyranny is base;\textsuperscript{176} we all learn as children that one must not give others bad examples and that one must not do base things for the sake of the good that may come out of them. The potential or actual tyrant does not know what every reasonably well-bred child knows, because he is blinded by passion. By what passion? The most charitable answer is that he is blinded by desire for honor or prestige.

Syntheses effect miracles. Kojève’s or Hegel’s synthesis of classical and\textsuperscript{177} Biblical morality effects the miracle of producing an amazingly lax morality out of two moralities both of which made very strict demands on self-restraint. Neither Biblical nor classical morality encourages us to try, solely for the sake of our preferment or our glory, to oust from their positions men who do the required work as well as we could. (Consider Aristotle, Politics 1271a10-19.) Neither Biblical nor classical morality encourages all statesmen to try to extend their authority over all men in order to achieve universal recognition. It does not seem to be sound that Kojève encourages others by his speech to a course of action to which he himself would never stoop in deed. If he did not suppress his better knowledge, it would be given him to see that there is no need for having recourse to a miracle in order to understand Hegel’s moral and political teaching. Hegel continued, and in a certain respect radicalized, the modern tradition that emancipated the pas-

\textsuperscript{174}JC: handwritten above the line, with a stroke indicating that it should be inserted at this place.—LB: the inserted word has been written with Laurence Berns’ pen.

\textsuperscript{175}JC: the “r” of “or” is a handwritten correction.—LB: “of”

\textsuperscript{176}Cf. DT, p. 307, l. 13: colon.—JC and WPP, p. 110, par. 2, l. 17: semicolon.

\textsuperscript{177}AB: “and” has been typed above “of” with a mark indicating that it should be inserted at this place.
sions and hence “competition.” That tradition was originated by Machiavelli and perfected by such men as Hobbes and Adam Smith. It came into being through a conscious break with the strict moral demands made by both the Bible and classical philosophy:178 those demands were explicitly rejected as too strict. Hegel’s moral or political teaching is indeed a synthesis: it is a synthesis of Socratic and Machiavellian or Hobbian politics. Kojève knows as well as anyone living that Hegel’s fundamental teaching regarding Master and Slave179 is based on Hobbes’ doctrine of the state of nature. If Hobbes’ doctrine of the state of nature is abandoned en pleine connaissance de cause, as indeed it should be abandoned,180 Hegel’s fundamental teaching will lose the evidence which it apparently still possesses for Kojève. Hegel’s teaching is much more sophisticated than Hobbes’, but it is as much a construction as the latter. Both doctrines construct human society by starting from the untrue assumption that man as man is thinkable as a being that lacks awareness of sacred181 restraints or as a being that is guided by nothing but a desire for recognition.

But Kojève is likely to become somewhat impatient with what, as I fear, he might call our Victorian or pre-Victorian niaiseries. He probably will maintain that the whole previous discussion is irrelevant because it is based on a182 dogmatic183 assumption. We assume indeed that the classical concept of tyranny is derived from an adequate184 analysis185 of the fundamental social phenomena. The classics understand tyranny as the opposite of the best regime, and they hold that the best regime is the rule of the best or aristocracy. But, Kojève argues, aristocracy is the rule of a minority over the majority of citizens or of adult residents of a given territory, a rule that rests, in the last resort, on force or terror. Would it then not be more proper to admit that aristocracy is a form of tyranny? Yet Kojève apparently thinks that force or terror are indispensable in every regime186 while he does not think that all regimes are equally good or bad and hence equally tyrannical.

180 JC: parenthesis around “as indeed it should be abandoned” instead of commas; a comma has been handwritten thereafter.
181 AB: “a” is a handwritten correction of “an”
182 AB: “dogmatic” has been handwritten above “irrelevant” which has been corrected by typing and then crossed out.
183 AB: “t” has been typed above the “t” of adequate; the final “e” of “adequate” has been handwritten.
184 AB: “analysis” has been handwritten in an empty place which has been left between the preceding and following words. “te analysis” has been typed above the superior line, and then crossed out.
185 WPP, p. 112, l. 13: comma after “regime”
If I understand him correctly, he is satisfied that “the universal and homogeneous state” is the simply best social order. Lest we get entangled in a verbal dissention, I shall state his view as follows: the only non-tyrannical regime is the universal and homogeneous state. In other words, the universal and homogeneous state is the only one which is essentially just; the aristocracy of the classics in particular is essentially unjust.

<In order to prove his contention, he proceeds somehow along the following lines. In opposition to Marxism, but in agreement with Stakhanovism, he assumes that the principle of justice is “From everyone according to his capacity, to everyone according to his merit.” A state is essentially just if, according to its living principle, there exists in it “equality of opportunity”, i.e., if every human being has the opportunity corresponding to his capacities, of deserving well of the whole, and receives the proper reward for his deserts or gets what is good for him. Since there is no good reason for assuming that the capacity for meritorious action is bound up with sex, beauty, race, country of origin, wealth and so on, discrimination on account of sex, ugliness and so on, is unjust. The only proper reward of service is honor, and therefore the only proper reward of outstanding service is great authority. But the greatest service can only be rendered by the wise, who alone are discerning enough to assign to everyone what he deserves or what is good for him. In a truly just or non-tyrannical state, complete control will therefore be in the hands of the wise, and the social hierarchy will correspond strictly to the hierarchy of merit, and of merit alone. This of course was what Plato meant in his Republic, which represents the closest
approach in classical thought to an understanding of the non-tyrannical state. But Plato’s best commonwealth, while in principle homogeneous, was obviously not universal. One had to be a born citizen, the son of a citizen father and a citizen mother, in order to have any claim to residence within its borders, to say nothing of claims to authority. That is to say, contrary to his intention, Plato did not demand the rule of the wise without qualification: he inconsistently demanded the rule of the indigenous wise. For no other reason than the one supplied by the general practice of mankind, i.e., for what he himself explicitly rejected as a bad reason, Plato qualified the rational principle of “absolute rule of the wise” by a consideration wholly unconnected with the only relevant or just consideration of merit or possible merit. Only a state which is not only homogeneous but universal as well, can be simply just or non-tyrannical. In fact, only the universal state can be truly homogeneous or “classless.”

To see the classical view in the proper light, let us make the assumption—that the wise do not desire to rule. The unwise are very unlikely to force the wise to rule over them. For the wise cannot rule as wise if they do not have absolute power or if they are in any way responsible to the unwise. No broil in which the unwise may find themselves could be great enough to induce them to surrender absolute control to the wise, whose first measure would probably be to expel everyone above the age of ten from the city (Plato, Republic 540d-541a). Hence, what pretends to be absolute rule of the wise will in fact be absolute rule of unwise men. But if this is the case, the universal state would seem to be impossible. For the universal state requires universal agreement regarding the fundamentals, and such agreement is possible only on the basis of genuine knowledge or of wisdom. Agreement based on opinion can never become universal agreement. Every faith that lays claim to universality, i.e., to be universally accepted, of necessity provokes a counter-faith which raises the same claim. The diffusion among the unwise of genuine knowledge that was acquired by the wise would be of no help, for through its diffusion or dilution, knowledge inevitably transforms

197 Cf. DT, p. 310, ll. 30-31: “de résider à l’intérieur de ses frontières, sans parler du droit”—JC: the words “to residence within its borders, to say nothing of claims” do not occur.

199 AB: spelled “class-less”

199 AB: “un-” has been typed; the other part of this word has been handwritten just after, at the end of the line.

200 AB: no comma after “case”

201 AB: “being”

202 AB: spelled “counterfaith”
itself into opinion, <or more precisely into> prejudice\textsuperscript{203} or mere belief. The utmost in the direction of universality that one could expect is, then, an absolute rule of unwise men who control about half of the globe, the other half being ruled by other unwise men. It is not obvious that the extinction of all independent states but two will be a blessing. But it is obvious that absolute rule of the unwise is less desirable than their limited rule: the unwise ought to rule under law. In addition, it is more probable that in a situation that is favorable to radical change, the citizen body will for once follow the advice of a wise man or a founding father by adopting a code of laws which he has elaborated, than that they will ever submit to perpetual and absolute rule of a succession of wise men. Yet laws must be applied or are in need of interpretation. The full authority under law should therefore be given to men who, thanks to their good upbringing, are capable of “completing” the laws (\textit{Memorabilia} IV 6.12) or of interpreting them equitably. “Constitutional” authority ought to be given to the equitable men (\textit{ēπεικεῖτες}), i.e., to gentlemen—preferably an urban patriciate which derives its income from the cultivation of its landed estates. It is true that it is at least partly a matter of accident—of\textsuperscript{204} the accident of birth—whether a given individual does or does not belong to the class of gentlemen and has thereby had an opportunity of being brought up in the proper manner. But in the absence of absolute rule of the wise on the one hand, and on the other hand of a degree of abundance which is possible only on the basis of unlimited technological progress with all its terrible hazards, the apparently just alternative to aristocracy open or disguised will be permanent revolution, i.e., permanent chaos in which life will be not only poor and short but brutish as well. It would not be difficult to show that the classical argument cannot be disposed of as easily as is now generally thought, and that liberal or constitutional democracy comes closer to what the classics demanded than any alternative that is viable in our age. In the last analysis, however, the classical argument derives its strength from the assumption that the wise do not desire to rule.

In discussing the fundamental issue which concerns the relation of wisdom to rule or to\textsuperscript{205} tyranny, Kojève starts from the observation that at least up to now there have been no wise men but at best men who strove for wisdom, i.e., philosophers. Since the philosopher is the man who devotes his whole life to the quest for wisdom, he has no time for political

\textsuperscript{203} \textit{AB}: comma after “prejudice”

\textsuperscript{204} \textit{AB}: “—of the” $\rightarrow$ “—the”

\textsuperscript{205} \textit{AB}: “or to tyranny” $\rightarrow$ “or tyranny”——\textit{JC}: the words “or to” have been handwritten, to replace a word which has been crossed out and is illegible.——\textit{LB}: “of”
activity of any kind: the philosopher cannot possibly desire to rule. His only
demand on the political men is that they leave him alone. He justifies his
demand by honestly declaring that his pursuit is purely theoretical and does
not interfere in any way with the political men. This simple solution pres-
ets itself at first glance as the strict consequence from the definition of the
philosopher. Yet a short reflection shows already that it suffers from a fatal
weakness. The philosopher cannot lead an absolutely solitary life because
legitimate “subjective certainty” and the “subjective certainty” of the lunatic
are indistinguishable. Genuine certainty must be “intersubjective.” The clas-
sics were fully aware of the essential weakness of the mind of the individual.
Hence their teaching about the philosophic life is a teaching about friendship
<(φιλία)>: the philosopher is as philosopher in need of friends. To be of ser-
vice to the philosopher in his philosophizing, the friends must be competent
men: they must themselves be actual or potential philosophers, i.e., mem-
bers of the natural “elite.” Friendship presupposes a measure of conscious
agreement. The things regarding which the philosophic friends must agree cannot be known or evident truths. For philosophy is not wisdom but quest
for wisdom. The things regarding which the philosophic friends agree will
then be opinions or prejudices. But there is necessarily a variety of opinions
or prejudices. Hence there will be a variety of groups of philosophic friends:
philosophy, as distinguished from wisdom, necessarily appears in the form
of philosophic schools or of sects. Friendship as the classics understood it<,>
offers then no solution to the problem of “subjective certainty.” Friend-
ship is bound to lead to, or to consist in, the cultivation and perpetuation of
common prejudices by a closely knit group of kindred spirits. It is therefore
incompatible with the idea of philosophy. The philosopher must leave the
closed and charmed circle of the “initiated” if he intends to remain a phi-
losopher. He must go out to the market place; the conflict with the political
men cannot be avoided. And this conflict by itself, to say nothing of its cause
or its effect, is a political action.

The whole history of philosophy testifies that the danger eloquently described by Kojève is inevitable. He is equally right in saying
that that danger cannot be avoided by abandoning the sect in favor of what
he regards as its modern substitute, the Republic of Letters. The Republic
of Letters indeed lacks the narrowness of the sect: it embraces men of all
philosophic persuasions. But precisely for this reason, the first article of the

206 AB: comma after “agree”
207 Cf. DT, p. 314, l. 26: “alors”—AB: “offers then no” → “offers no”
208 Cf. DT, p. 315, l. 3: “ce”—AB: “the”
constitution of the Republic of Letters stipulates that no philosophic persuasion must be taken too seriously or that every philosophic persuasion must be treated with as much respect as any other. The Republic of Letters is relativistic. Or if it tries to avoid this pitfall, it becomes eclectic. A certain vague middle line which is perhaps barely tolerable for the most easy going members of the different persuasions if they are in their drowsiest mood, is set up as The Truth or as Common Sense; the substantive and irrepressible conflicts are dismissed, as merely “semantic.” Whereas the sect is narrow because it is passionately concerned with the real issues, the Republic of Letters is comprehensive because it is indifferent to the real issues: it prefers agreement to truth or to the quest for truth. If we have to choose between the sect and the Republic of Letters, we must choose the sect. Nor will it do that we abandon the sect in favor of the party or more precisely—since a party which is not a mass party is still something like a sect—of the mass party. For the mass party is nothing but a sect with a disproportionately long tail. The “subjective certainty” of the members of the sect, and especially of the weaker brethren, may be increased if the tenets of the sect are repeated by millions of parrots instead of by a few dozens of human beings, but this obviously has no effect on the claim of the tenets in question to “objective truth.” Much as we loathe the snobbish silence or whispering of the sect, we loathe even more the savage noise of the loudspeakers of the mass party. The problem stated by Kojève is not then solved by dropping the distinction between those who are able and willing to think and those who are not. If we have to choose between the sect and the party, we must choose the sect.

But must we choose the sect? The decisive premise of Kojève’s argument is that philosophy “implies necessarily ‘subjective certainties’ which are not ‘objective truths’ or, in other words, which are prejudices.” But philosophy in the original meaning of the term is nothing but knowledge

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209 JC: the first “c” of “eclectic” has been inserted by hand.—LB: mistyped and not corrected.

210 WPP, p. 115, l. 7: comma after “line”

211 JC: the last two letters have been handwritten.—LB: “mere”

212 WPP, p. 115, l. 12: “true”

213 WPP, p. 115, l. 13: “true”

214 WPP, p. 115, l. 29: “have to” → “must”

215 JC: “the” has been typed, and then corrected to “that” by hand.—LB: “the”

of one’s ignorance. The “subjective certainty” that one does not know coincides217 with the “objective truth” of that certainty. But one cannot know that one does not know without knowing what one does not know. What Pascal said with anti-philosophic intent about the powerlessness218 of both dogmatism and skepticism,219 is <actually> the only possible justification of philosophy which as such is neither dogmatic nor skeptic, and still less “decisionist,” but zetetic (or skeptic220 in the original sense of the term). Philosophy as such is nothing but genuine awareness of the problems, i.e., of the fundamental and comprehensive problems. It is impossible to think about these problems without becoming inclined toward a solution, toward one or the other of the very few typical solutions. Yet as long as there is no wisdom but only quest for wisdom, the evidence of all solutions is necessarily smaller than the evidence of the problems. Therefore the philosopher ceases to be a philosopher <at the moment at which his “subjective certainty” of the truth of a solution equals his awareness of the problems, or> at the moment at which the “subjective certainty” of a solution becomes stronger than his awareness of the problematic character of that solution. At that moment the sectarian is born. The danger of succumbing to the attraction of solutions is essential to philosophy which, without incurring this danger, would degenerate into playing with the221 problems. But the philosopher does not necessarily succumb to this danger, as is shown by Socrates, who never belonged to a sect and never founded one. And even if the philosophic friends are compelled to be members of a sect or to found one, they are not necessarily members of one and the same sect: Amicus Plato.222

At this point we seem to get involved in a self-contradiction. For, if Socrates is the representative par excellence of the philosophic life, the philosopher cannot possibly be satisfied with a group of philosophic friends but has to go out to the market place where, as everyone knows, Socrates

217 Cf. DT, p. 316, par. 2, l. 9: “coïncide”—AB: “corresponds”
218 Cf. DT, p. 316, par. 2, l. 13: “impuissance” (the translation does not enable one here to decide between the typescripts).—JC: “impotent” has been handwritten in the right margin, with a stroke indicating that it should be inserted here, before a word which has been crossed out and is illegible.—LB: “powerlessness”—WPP, p. 115, last line: “impotence”
219 See Pensées, ed. Léon Brunschvicg, § 434.
220 Cf. DT, p. 316, par. 2, l. 18: no quotation marks around “sceptique”—AB: quotation marks around “skeptic”
221 AB: “the” has been typed above the line, with a slash mark indicating that it should be inserted at this place.
222 First words from a Latin sentence mainly inspired by Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1096a16-17: “Amicus Plato sed magis amica veritas.” (“Friend of Plato, but a greater friend of the truth.”)
spent much of his time. However, the same Socrates suggested that there is no essential difference between the city and the family, and the thesis of Friedrich Mentz, *Socrates nec officiosus maritus nec laudandus paterfamilias* (Leipzig 1716), is defensible: Xenophon goes so far as not to count the husband of Xanthippe among the married men (*Symposium*, in fine).

The difficulty cannot be discussed here except within the context of a limited exegetic problem. Xenophon indicates in the *Hiero* that the motivation of the philosophic life is the desire for being honored or admired by a small minority, and ultimately the desire for “self-admiration,” whereas the motivation of the political life is the desire for love <(ϕιλία)>, i.e., for being loved by human beings irrespective of their qualities. Kojève rejects this view altogether. He is of the opinion that the philosopher and the ruler or tyrant are equally motivated by the desire for satisfaction, i.e., for recognition (honor) and ultimately for universal recognition, and that neither of the two is motivated by a desire for love. A human being is loved because he is and regardless of what he does. Hence love is at home within the family rather than in the public spheres of politics and of philosophy. Kojève regards it as particularly unfortunate that Xenophon tries to establish a connection between the “tyrannical” desire and sexual desire. He is equally averse to the suggestion that whereas the tyrant is guided by the desire for recognition by others, the philosopher is concerned exclusively with “self-admiration”: the self-satisfied philosopher is as such not distinguishable from the self-satisfied lunatic. The philosopher is then necessarily concerned

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223 JC: “of”

224 Socrates, neither a dutiful husband, nor a praiseworthy father of the family. Strauss had already used this reference in his edition of Moses Mendelssohn’s *Phaedo*, in *Schriften zur Philosophie und Ästhetik*. III, 1 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1932), note to 21, 25—22, 8, p. 396.

225 JC: “the” has been handwritten above the line, with a mark indicating that it should be inserted here.—LB: “the” has been handwritten with Laurence Berns’ pen, with a mark indicating that it should be inserted here.

226 AB: no comma after “*Symposium*”

227 JC: the following words of the text have been handwritten in the left margin, with a stroke indicating that they should be inserted at this place: “the desire for ‘self-admiration,’ whereas the motivation of the political life is...”—LB: the following portion of sentence does not occur: “the desire for ‘self-admiration,’ whereas the motivation of the political life is”

228 AB: thereafter, six lines have been crossed out; the text of these lines has been typed again at the end of the paragraph: “The philosopher is then […] unless we gratuitously.” The four following lines of the text (from “for recognition” to “rather than in the public”) have been typed between these crossed out lines.

229 AB: the words “home within the” have been mistyped, and then handwritten correctly above the line.

with approval or admiration by others and he cannot help being pleased with it when he gets it. It is practically impossible to say whether the primary motive of the philosopher is the desire for admiration or the desire for the pleasures deriving from understanding. The very distinction has no practical meaning unless we gratuitously assume that there is an omniscient God who demands from men a pure heart.

What Xenophon indicated in the Hiero about the motivations of the two ways of life is admittedly incomplete. <It is shockingly incomplete.> How can any man in his senses ever have overlooked the role played by ambition in political life? How can a friend of Socrates ever have overlooked the role played by love in the philosophic life? Simonides’ speech on honor alone, to say nothing of Xenophon’s other writings, proves abundantly that what Xenophon indicates in the Hiero about the motivations of the two ways of life is deliberately incomplete. It is incomplete because it proceeds from a complete disregard of everything but what one may call the most fundamental difference between the philosopher and the ruler. To understand this difference, one must start from the desire which the philosopher and the ruler have in common with each other and indeed with all men. All men desire “satisfaction.” But satisfaction cannot be identified with recognition and even universal recognition. The classics identified satisfaction with happiness. The difference between the philosopher and the political man will then be a difference with respect to happiness. The philosopher’s dominating passion is the desire for truth, i.e., for knowledge of the eternal order, or the eternal cause or causes of the whole. As he looks up in search for the eternal order, all human things and all human concerns reveal themselves to him in all clarity as paltry and ephemeral, and no one can find solid happiness in what is paltry and ephemeral. He has then the same experience regarding all human things, nay, regarding man himself, which the man of high ambition has or has had regarding the low and narrow goals, or the cheap happiness, of the general run of men. The philosopher, being the man of the largest views, is the only man who can be truly described as possessing ἐγνατοπρέπεια (which is commonly rendered by “magnificence”) (Plato, Republic 486a). Or, as Xenophon indicates, the philosopher is the only man who is truly ambitious. Chiefly concerned

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231 JC: “ambition” has been mistyped and corrected by hand. —LB: mistyped and not corrected.
232 Cf. DT, p. 319, l. 31: “est”—JC: the words “he knows to be” have been handwritten in the left margin, with a stroke indicating that they should be inserted here to replace “is” which has been crossed out.—LB: no correction.—WPP, p. 118, l. 3: “is” → “he knows to be”
233 WPP, p. 118, l. 8: “properly”
with the eternal beings, or the “ideas,” and hence also with the “idea” of
man, he is as unconcerned as possible with individual and perishable human
beings and hence also with his own “individuality,” or his body, as well as
with the sum total of all individual human beings and their “historical” pro-
cession. He knows as little as possible about the way to the market place, to
say nothing of the market place itself, and he almost as little knows whether
his very neighbor is a human being or some animal.234 (Plato,235 Theaetetus
173c8-dl, 174b1-6). The political man must reject this attitude altogether.
He cannot tolerate this radical depreciation of man and of all human things
(Plato, Laws 804b5-c1). He could not devote himself to his work with all
his heart or without reservation if he did not attach absolute importance to
man and to human things. He must “care” for human beings as such. He is
essentially attached to human beings. This attachment is at the bottom of his
desire to rule human beings, or of his ambition. But to rule human beings
means to serve them. Certainly an attachment to beings which prompts one
to serve them may well be called love of them. Attachment to human beings
is not peculiar to the ruler; it is characteristic of all men as mere men.
The difference between the political man and the private man is that in the
case of the former, the attachment enervates all private concerns; the politi-
cal man is consumed by erotic desire, not for this or that human being, or
for a few, but for the large multitude, for the δῆμος (Plato, Gorgias 481d1-5,
513d7-8; Republic 573e6-7, 574e2, 575a1-2238) and in principle, for all
human beings. But erotic desire craves reciprocity: the political man
desires to be loved by all his subjects. The political man is characterized by
the concern with being loved by all human beings regardless of their quali-
ty. Kojève will have no difficulty in granting that the family man can be
characterized by “love” and the ruler by “honor.” But if, as we have seen, the
philosopher is related to the ruler in a way comparable to that in which the
ruler is related to the family man, there can be no difficulty in characterizing

234 Cf. DT, p. 320, l. 16: “un animal quelconque”—JC and WPP, p. 118, l. 19: “some animal” → “some
other animal”
235 JC: “Plato” has been mistyped and corrected by hand.—LB: mistyped and not corrected.
236 WPP, p. 118, l. 20: “way”
237 JC: “of” is a handwritten correction.—LB: “to”
238 JC: the second “5” of “575a1-2” has been handwritten above the line, with a mark indicating that it
should be inserted at this place.—LB: no correction.
239 WPP, p. 118, l. 35: comma after the closing parenthesis.
240 JC: no comma after “and”
241 JC: “But the erotic” → “But erotic”
242 JC: the “s” of “his” is missing.
243 DT, p. 321, l. 7: no new paragraph begins here.—JC: a mark has been handwritten after this
period.—LB: no mark.—AB and WPP, p. 119 l. 1: a new paragraph begins here.
the ruler, in contradistinction\textsuperscript{244} to the philosopher, by “love” and the philosopher by “honor.” Furthermore, prior to the coming of the universal state, the ruler is concerned with, and cares for, his own subjects as distinguished from the subjects of other rulers, just as the mother is concerned with, and cares for, her own children as distinguished from the children of other mothers; and the concern with, or care for, what is one’s own is what is frequently meant by “love.” The philosopher on the other hand is concerned with what can never become private or exclusive property. We cannot then accept Kojève’s doctrine regarding love. According to him, we love someone \textit{<“pour son être pur et simple, quel qu’il soit.”\textsuperscript{245} i.e.,> “because he is and independently of what he does.”\textsuperscript{246}} He refers to the mother who loves her son in spite of all his faults. But, to repeat, the mother loves her son, not because he is, but because he is her own, or because he has the quality of being her own. (Compare Plato, \textit{Republic 330c3-6}). \textit{<We love people because of how they are. There are lovable qualities, one of them being un je ne sais quoi, and we frequently become aware of those qualities by what the people concerned do—by a smile, for example.>}

But if the philosopher is radically detached from human beings as human beings, why does he communicate his knowledge, or his questionings, to others? Why was the same Socrates, who said that the philosopher does not even know the way to the market place, almost constantly in the market place? Why was the same Socrates, who said that the philosopher barely knows whether his neighbor is a human being, so well informed\textsuperscript{247} about so many trivial details regarding his neighbors? The philosopher’s radical detachment from human beings must then be compatible with an attachment to human beings. While trying to transcend humanity (for wisdom is divine) or while trying to make it his sole business to die and to be dead to all human things, the philosopher cannot help living as a human being who as such cannot be dead to human concerns, although his soul will not be in those\textsuperscript{248} concerns. The philosopher cannot devote his life to his own work if other people do not take care of the needs of his body. Philosophy is possible only in a society in which there is “division of labor.” The philosopher needs the services of other human beings and has to pay for

\textsuperscript{244} JC: spelled “contra-distinction”


\textsuperscript{247} AB: the typescript reads “informed”

\textsuperscript{248} WPP, p. 119, par. 2, l. 14: “these”
them with services of his own if he does not want to be reproved as a thief or fraud. But man’s need for other men’s services is founded on the fact that man is by nature a social animal or that the human individual is not self-sufficient. There is therefore a natural attachment of man to man which is prior to any calculation of mutual benefit. This natural attachment to human beings is weakened in the case of the philosopher by his attachment to the eternal beings. On the other hand, the philosopher is immune to the most common and the most powerful dissolver\textsuperscript{249} of man’s natural attachment to man, the desire to have more than one has already and in particular to have more than others have; for he\textsuperscript{250} has the greatest self-sufficiency which is\textsuperscript{251} humanly possible. Hence the philosopher will not hurt anyone. While he cannot help being more attached to his family and his city than to strangers, he is free from the delusions bred by collective egoisms; his benevolence or humanity extends to all human beings with whom he comes into contact. (Memorabilia I 2.60–61; 6.10; IV 8.11.) Since he fully realizes the limits set to all human action and all human planning (for what has come into being must perish again\textsuperscript{252}), he does not expect salvation or satisfaction from the establishment of the simply best social order. He will therefore not engage in revolutionary or subversive activity. But he will try to help his fellow man by mitigating, as far as in him lies, the evils which are inseparable from the human condition. (Plato, Theaetetus 176a5–b1; Seventh Letter 331c7–d5; Aristotle, Politics 1301a39–b2.) In particular, he will give advice to his city or to other rulers. Since all advice of this kind presupposes comprehensive reflections which as such are the business of the philosopher, he must first have become a political philosopher. After this preparation he will act as Simonides did when he talked to Hiero, or as Socrates did when he talked to Alcibiades, Critias, Charmides, Critobulus, the younger Pericles and others.

The attachment to human beings as human beings is not peculiar to the philosopher. As philosopher, he is attached to a particular type of human being, namely to actual or potential philosophers or to his friends. His attachment to his friends is deeper than his attachment to other human beings, even to his nearest and dearest, as Plato shows with almost shocking clarity in the Phaedo. The philosopher’s attachment to his friends

\textsuperscript{249} JC: spelled “dis-solvent”
\textsuperscript{250} Cf. DT, p. 323, l. 11: “car il”—AB: “for he” → “or he” (“or” has been handwritten, with a mark indicating that it should be inserted before “he”).
\textsuperscript{251} JC: “is” has been handwritten above the line with a mark indicating that it should be inserted at this place.
\textsuperscript{252} Plato, Republic, VIII.546a2.
Interpretation

is based in the first place on the need which arises from the deficiency of “subjective certainty.” Yet we see Socrates frequently engaged in conversations from which he cannot have benefited in any way and which are also not sufficiently explained by his human kindness. We are forced to admit that Socrates was motivated by his ἔρως. We shall try to explain what this means in a popular and hence unorthodox manner. The philosopher’s attempt to grasp the eternal order is necessarily an ascent from the perishable things which as such reflect the eternal order. Of all perishable things known to us, those which reflect that order in the highest degree, or which are most akin to that order, are the souls of men. But the souls of men reflect the eternal order in different degrees. A soul that is in good order or healthy reflects it to a higher degree than a soul that is chaotic or diseased. The philosopher who as such has had a glimpse of the eternal order (for such a glimpse is implied in any genuine awareness of the problems) is therefore particularly sensitive to the difference among human souls. In the first place, he alone knows what a healthy or well-ordered soul is. And secondly, precisely because he has had a glimpse of the eternal order, he cannot help being intensely pleased by the aspect of a healthy or well-ordered soul, and he cannot help being intensely pained by the aspect of a diseased or chaotic soul, without any regard to his own needs or benefits. Hence he cannot help being attached to men of well-ordered souls: he desires “to be together” with such men all the time. He admires such men not on account of any services which they may render to him but simply because they are what they are. On the other hand, he cannot help being repelled by ill-ordered souls. He avoids men of ill-ordered souls as much as he can, while trying of course not to offend them. Last but not least, he is highly sensitive to the promise of good or ill order, or of happiness or misery, which is held out by the souls of the young. Hence he cannot help desiring, without any regard to his own needs or benefits, that those among the young

253 AB: period after “benefited”
254 JC: “all the perishable” → “all perishable”
255 WPP, p. 121, l. 6: “in the highest degree” → “most”
256 AB: “order” has been mistyped, and then typed above the line and followed by the last words of the line: “are the souls of men. But”
257 Cf. DT, p. 324, par. 2, ll. 32-33: “(car ce coup d’œil est impliqué dans toute conscience réelle du problème)” — JC: between “order” and “is therefore” a portion of sentence has been crossed out and is illegible.
258 JC: the following words of the text have been handwritten in the right margin, with a stroke indicating that they should be inserted at this place: “healthy or well-ordered soul, and he cannot help being intensely pained by the aspect of a”
259 OT (1963), p. 215, l. 15: “without any regard” → “without regard”
260 AB: “of” has been typed twice.
whose souls are by nature fitted for it, acquire good order of their souls. But the good order of the soul is philosophizing. The philosopher therefore has the urge to educate potential philosophers simply because he cannot help loving well-ordered souls.

But did we not surreptitiously substitute the wise man for the philosopher? Does the philosopher of whom we have spoken not possess knowledge of many most important things? But philosophy, being knowledge of our ignorance regarding the most important things, is impossible without some knowledge regarding the most important things. By realizing that we are ignorant of the most important things, we realize at the same time that the most important thing for us, or the one thing needful, is quest for knowledge of the most important things, or philosophy. In other words, we realize that only by philosophizing can man’s soul become well-ordered. We know how ugly or deformed a boaster’s soul is; but everyone who thinks that he knows,262 while he really knows263 not, is a boaster. Still, observations of this kind do not prove the assumption, for example, that the well-ordered soul is more akin to the eternal order, or to the eternal cause or causes of the whole, than is the chaotic soul. And one does not have to make that assumption in order to be a philosopher,266 as is shown by Democritus and almost267 all Pre-Socratics,268 to say nothing of the moderns. If one does not make the assumption mentioned, one will be forced, it seems, to explain the philosopher’s desire to communicate his thoughts by his need for remedying the deficiency of “subjective certainty” or by his desire for recognition or by his human kindness. We must leave it open whether one can thus explain without being forced to use ad hoc hypotheses,270 the immediate pleasure which the philosopher experiences when he sees a well-ordered soul or the immediate pleasure which we experience when we observe signs of human nobility.

261 AB: “by” has been typed above the line, with a mark indicating that it should be inserted at this place.
262 AB: no comma after “knows”
263 WPP, p. 122, l. 5: “he really knows” → “in truth he does”
264 JC: handwritten comma.
265 JC: the last two letters have been handwritten.
266 WPP, p. 122, l. 10: comma after “that”
267 Cf. DT, p. 326, l. 16: “presque”—AB: “and almost all” → “and all”
268 WPP, p. 122, ll. 10-11: “and almost all Pre-socratics” → “and other pre-Socrates”
269 WPP, p. 122, l. 16: comma after “explain”
270 AB: no comma after “hypotheses”
We may\textsuperscript{271} have explained why the philosopher is urged, not in spite of but because of his radical detachment from human beings as such, to educate human beings of a certain kind. But cannot exactly the same be said of the tyrant or ruler? May a ruler not likewise be penetrated by a sense of the ultimate futility of all human causes? It is undeniable that detachment from human beings, or what is popularly known as the philosophic attitude toward\textsuperscript{272} all things which are exposed to the power of chance, is not a preserve of the philosopher. But a detachment from human concerns which is not constantly nourished by genuine attachment to eternal things, i.e., by philosophizing, is bound to wither or to degenerate into lifeless narrowness. The ruler too tries to educate human beings and he too is prompted by love of some kind. Xenophon indicates his view of the ruler’s love in the \textit{Education of Cyrus}, which is, at any rate at first glance, his description of the greatest ruler. Xenophon’s Cyrus is a cold or unerotic nature. That is to say, the ruler is not motivated by true or Socratic \textit{ἐρως} because he does not know what a well-ordered soul is. The ruler knows political virtue, and nothing prevents his being attracted by it; but political virtue, or the virtue of the non-philosopher,\textsuperscript{273} is a mutilated thing; therefore it cannot elicit more than a shadow or an imitation of true love. The ruler is in fact dominated by love based on need in the common meaning of need, or by mercenary love; for “all men by nature believe they love those things by which they believe they are benefited” (\textit{Oeconomicus} 20.29\textsuperscript{274}). In the language of Kojève, the ruler is concerned with human beings because he is concerned with being recognized by them. This explains incidentally why the indications of the \textit{Hiero} about love are so strikingly incomplete; the purpose of the work required the disregard of non-mercenary\textsuperscript{275} love just as it required that wisdom be kept in its ordinary ambiguity.

We cannot agree then with Kojève’s contention that the educative tendency of the ruler has the same character or scope as that of the philosopher. The ruler is essentially the ruler of all his subjects; his educative effort must therefore be directed toward all his subjects. If every educative effort is a kind of conversation, the ruler is forced by his position to converse with every subject. Socrates, however, is not compelled to converse

\textsuperscript{271} Cf. \textit{DT}, p. 326, par. 2, l. 1: “il se peut”—\textit{AB}: “We may have” \textsuperscript{272} AB: “towards”

\textsuperscript{272} \textit{OT} (1963), p. 216, par. 2, penultimate line: spelled “nonphilosopher”


\textsuperscript{274} \textit{OT} (1963), p. 217, penultimate line: spelled “nonmercenary”
with anyone except those with whom he likes to converse. If the ruler is concerned with universal recognition, he must be concerned with enlarging universally the class of competent judges of his merits. But Kojève does not seem to believe that all men are capable of becoming competent judges in political matters. He limits himself to contending that the number of men of philosophic competence is smaller than the number of men of political competence. Yet contrary to what he seems to say in the text of his essay as distinguished from his note number 5, many more men are capable of judging competently of the greatness of a ruler than of the greatness of a philosopher. This is the case not merely because a much greater intellectual effort is required for competent judgment of a philosophic achievement than for competent judgment of a political achievement. Rather is it true because philosophy requires liberation from the most potent natural charm whose undiminished power in no way obstructs political competence as the ruler understands political competence: from that charm that consists in unqualified attachment to human things as such. If the philosopher addresses himself, therefore, to a small minority, he is not acting on the basis of an a priori judgment. He is following the constant experience of all times and countries and, no doubt, the experience of Kojève himself. For try as one may to expel nature with a hayfork, it will always come back. The philosopher will certainly not be compelled, either by the need to remedy the deficiency of “subjective certainty” or by ambition, to strive for universal recognition. His friends alone suffice to remedy that deficiency, and no shortcomings in his friends can be remedied by having recourse to utterly incompetent people. And as for ambition, as a philosopher, he is free from it.

According to Kojève, one makes a gratuitous assumption in saying that the philosopher as such is free from ambition or from the

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276 Cf. DT, p. 328, ll. 18-19: “est plus petit”—JC: “not” has been handwritten above the line, with a mark indicating that it should be inserted before “smaller”—LB: no addition.—WPP, p. 123, par. 2, l. 13: “smaller” → “not smaller”

277 AB: a large space has been left between the preceding period and “Yet”

278 Cf. DT, p. 328, l. 22: “5”—JC and WPP, p. 123, par. 2, l. 16: “five”—However, in the context Strauss clearly refers to the content of note 6 (OT 2000, p. 162; DT, p. 257 n. 1—in DT the numbering of notes starts again on each new page). This note 6 is note 5 in Kojève’s manuscripts, while the note about Queneau (OT 2000, p. 155 n. 4; DT, p. 246 n. 1) does not occur in them.

279 JC: the typescript reads “it is” (a stroke indicates that the order should be reversed).

280 Cf. DT, p. 328, l. 29: “surtout”—JC: before “because” a few words have been crossed out and are illegible.—LB: before “because” the words “above all” have been crossed out.

281 OT (1963), p. 217, par. 2, l. 26: the words “a priori” are not italicized.—OT (1991), p. 203, l. 21: spelled “judgement”

282 AB: no comma after “philosopher”

283 Cf. DT, p. 329, par. 2, ll. 1-2: “supposition gratuite”—AB: “gratuitous or undemonstrable
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desire for recognition. Yet the philosopher as such is concerned with nothing but the quest for wisdom and kindling or nourishing the love of wisdom in those who are by nature capable of it. We do not have to pry into the heart of any one in order to know that, in so far\(^{284}\) as the philosopher, owing to the weakness of the flesh, becomes concerned with being recognized by others,\(^ {285}\) he ceases to be a philosopher. According to the strict view of the classics,<\(>,\(^ {286}\) he turns into a sophist. The concern with being recognized by others is perfectly compatible with, and in fact required by, the concern essential to the ruler who is the ruler of others. But concern with being recognized by others has no necessary connection with the quest for the eternal order. Therefore,\(^ {287}\) concern with recognition necessarily detracts from the singleness of purpose which is characteristic of the philosopher. It blurs his vision. This fact is not at variance with the other fact that high ambition is frequently a sign by which one can recognize the potential philosopher. But to the extent to which high ambition is not transformed into full devotion to the quest for wisdom, and to the pleasures which accompany that quest, he will not become an actual philosopher. One of the pleasures accompanying the quest for truth comes\(^ {288}\) from the awareness of progress in\(^ {289}\) that quest. Xenophon goes so far as to speak of the self-admiration of the philosopher. This self-admiration or self-satisfaction does not have to be confirmed by the admiration of others in order to be reasonable. If the philosopher, trying to remedy the deficiency of “subjective certainty,” engages in conversation with others and observes again and again that his interlocutors, as they themselves are forced to admit, involve themselves in self-contradictions or are unable to give any account of their questionable contentions, he will be reasonably confirmed in his estimate of himself without necessarily finding a single soul who admires him. (Consider Plato, Apology of Socrates 21d1-3.) The self-admiration of the philosopher is in this respect akin to “the good conscience” which as such does not require confirmation by others.

The quest for wisdom is inseparable from specific pleasures just as the quest for these pleasures is inseparable from the quest for wisdom. Thus it might seem possible to understand the quest for wisdom in

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\(^{284}\) JC and WPP, p. 124, par. 2, l. 7: “in so far” → “insofar”

\(^{285}\) AB: no comma after “others”

\(^{286}\) JC: no comma after “classics”

\(^{287}\) AB: no comma after “Therefore”

\(^{288}\) JC: before “comes” a word has been crossed out and is illegible. —LB: before “comes” “which” has been crossed out.

\(^{289}\) JC: the “n” of “in” is a handwritten correction.
terms of the quest for pleasure. That this is in fact possible is asserted by all hedonists. In the Hiero, Xenophon (or his Simonides) is forced to argue on the basis of the hedonistic thesis. Hence the argument of the Hiero implies the question whether the philosophic life can be understood in hedonistic terms. It implies the answer that it cannot be so understood because the rank of the various kinds of pleasure ultimately depends on the activities to which the pleasures are related. Neither the quantity nor the purity of the pleasures determines in the last resort the rank of human activities. The pleasures are essentially secondary; they cannot be understood but with reference to the activities. The question as to whether the activities or the pleasures are in themselves primary has nothing to do with the question as to whether someone who engages in an activity is prompted to do so primarily by the intrinsic value of the activity or by the pleasure which he expects to enjoy as a consequence of the activity. Kojève may be perfectly right in saying that the latter question does not permit a responsible answer and is unimportant from the point of view of philosophy. But that consideration is irrelevant to Xenophon’s argument, which is concerned exclusively with the former question.

While I must disagree with a considerable part of Kojève’s reasoning, I agree with his conclusion that the philosopher has to go to the market place, or in other words, that the conflict between the philosopher and the city is inevitable. The philosopher must go to the market place in order to fish there for potential philosophers. His attempt to convert young men to the philosophic life will necessarily be regarded by the city as an attempt to corrupt the young. The philosopher is therefore forced to defend himself, or rather to defend the cause of philosophy. He must therefore act upon the city or upon the ruler. Up to this point Kojève is in

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290 AB: comma after “Xenophon”
291 Cf. DT, p. 330, last line: “ou la préférence”—JC: “rank or the preferability of” → “rank of”
292 WPP, p. 125, par. 2, l. 10: “upon”
293 JC: the following words of the text have been handwritten at the top of the page and inserted at this place: “of the various kinds of pleasure ultimately depends on the rank”—LB: no addition.
294 Cf. DT, p. 331, l. 16: “permis”—AB: “admit”
295 JC and WPP, p. 125, par. 2, antepenultimate line: “the”
296 AB: this paragraph and the preceding one form one paragraph; “P” has been handwritten above the line, before “While”
297 AB: “of Kojève’s” has been typeset twice; the second instance has been crossed out.
298 JC: a final letter (most probably “s”) has been crossed out. —LB: “conclusions”
299 Cf. DT, p. 331, par. 2, ll. 7-8: “tentative”—JC and WPP, p. 125, par. 3, l. 6: “attempts”
300 Cf. DT, p. 331, par. 2, ll. 11-12: “de se défendre lui-même ou plutôt”—JC: “forced to defend himself, or rather to” → “forced to”
perfect agreement with the classics. But does the final\textsuperscript{301} consequence mean, as he maintains, that the philosopher must desire to determine or codetermine the politics of the city or of the rulers? Must the philosopher desire “to participate, in one way or another, in the total direction of public affairs, so that the State be organized and governed in such a manner that the philosopher’s philosophic pedagogy be possible and effectual”?\textsuperscript{302} Or must we conceive of\textsuperscript{303} philosophic politics, i.e., of the philosopher’s action on behalf of philosophy, in entirely different terms?

Contrary to what Kojève apparently implies,\textsuperscript{304} it seems to us that there is no necessary connection between the philosopher’s indispensable philosophic politics and the efforts which he might or might not make to contribute towards\textsuperscript{305} the establishment of the best regime. For philosophy and philosophic education are possible in all kinds of more or less imperfect regimes. One may illustrate this by an example taken from the eighth book of Plato’s \textit{Republic}. There Plato contends that the Spartan regime is superior to the Athenian, although he knows that the Athenian is more favorable than the Spartan regime to the possibility and the survival of <philosophy and>\textsuperscript{306} philosophic education (consider 557c6 and d4). It is true that it was in Athens that Socrates was compelled to drink the hemlock. But he was permitted to live and <to>\textsuperscript{307} engage in philosophic education until he was seventy: in Sparta he would have been exposed as an infant. Plato could not have decided, however provisionally, in favor of the Spartan regime, if the philosopher’s concern with a good political order were absolutely inseparable from the concern guiding his philosophic politics. In what then does philosophic politics consist? In satisfying the city that the philosophers are not atheists, that they do not desecrate everything sacred to the city, that they reverence what the city reverences, that they are not subversives, in short\textsuperscript{308} that they are not irresponsible adventurers but good\textsuperscript{309} citizens and even the best of citizens. This is the defense of philosophy which

\textsuperscript{301} Cf. \textit{DT}, p. 331, par. 2, l. 16: “finale”—AB: “the final consequence” → “the consequence”


\textsuperscript{303} JC: “of” has been handwritten above the line, with a mark indicating that it should be inserted before “the” which has been crossed out.—LB: “the”

\textsuperscript{304} \textit{OT} (1991), p. 205, par. 2, l. 1: no comma after “implies”

\textsuperscript{305} JC and \textit{WPP}, p. 126, par. 2, l. 4: “toward”

\textsuperscript{306} Cf. \textit{DT}, p. 332, par. 2, l. 14: “la philosophie et”—JC: “of philosophy and philosophic” → “of philosophic”

\textsuperscript{307} JC: “and to engage” → “and engage”

\textsuperscript{308} JC and \textit{WPP}, p. 126, par. 2, l. 22: comma after “short”

\textsuperscript{309} JC: “good” has been handwritten.—LB: “good” has been typed but faded.
was required always and everywhere, whatever the regime might have been. For, as the philosopher Montesquieu says, “dans tous les pays du monde, on veut de la morale” and “les hommes, fripons en détail, sont en gros de très honnêtes gens; ils aiment la morale.”<sup>310</sup> The connection between morality, citizenship and religion is so obvious that no word need be said about it.> This defense of philosophy before the tribunal of the city was achieved by Plato with a resounding success (Plutarch, <i>Nicias</i> ch. 23)<sup>311</sup> whose<sup>312</sup> effects have lasted down to the present throughout all ages except the darkest ones. What Plato did in the Greek city and for it was done in and for Rome by Cicero, whose political action on behalf of philosophy has nothing in common with his actions against Catilina and<sup>313</sup> for Pompey, for example. It was done in and for the Islamic world by Fārābī<sup>314</sup> and in and for Judaism by Maimonides. Contrary to what Kojève seems to suggest, the political action of the philosophers on behalf of philosophy has achieved full success. One sometimes wonders whether it has not been too successful.

Kojève, I said, fails to distinguish between philosophic politics and that<sup>315</sup> political action which the philosopher might undertake with a view to the establishment of<sup>316</sup> the best regime or to the<sup>317</sup> improvement of the actual order. He thus arrives at the conclusion that on the one hand the philosopher does not desire to rule, and on the other hand he must desire to rule, and that this contradiction involves a tragic conflict. The classics did not regard the conflict between philosophy and the city as tragic. Xenophon at any rate seems to<sup>318</sup> have viewed that conflict in the light of Socrates’ relation to Xanthippe. At least in this point there appears then something like an agreement between Xenophon and Pascal. For the classics, the conflict between philosophy and the city is as little tragic as the death of Socrates.

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<sup>310</sup> JC: the accents on “très” and “honnêtès” have been handwritten; no accent has been written on “détail”; the two quotations of Montesquieu are not underlined (the first is drawn from <i>De l’esprit des Lois</i>, “Avertissement de l’auteur,” and the second from <i>ibid.</i>, bk. XXV, ch. 2).

<sup>311</sup> JC and WPP, p. 126, penultimate line: a period occurs after the closing parenthesis.

<sup>312</sup> Cf. DT, p. 333, l. 14: “dott”—JC: “Its” has been handwritten above a period, before a word which has been crossed out and is illegible.—WPP, p. 126, penultimate line: “The”

<sup>313</sup> JC: handwritten under the line, with a mark of insertion.

<sup>314</sup> JC: the accents have been handwritten. The accent on the second “a” has been written under the letter (the word “and” has been handwritten just above, to be inserted in the superior line).

<sup>315</sup> JC: “that” has been handwritten above the line, with a mark indicating that it should be inserted at this place.

<sup>316</sup> WPP p. 127, par. 2, l. 3: “the establishment of” → “establishing”

<sup>317</sup> JC: the following words of the text have been handwritten in the right margin and inserted at this place: “the establishment of the best regime or to the”

<sup>318</sup> AB: another instance of “to” has been typed below this one, and then crossed out by typing.
Kojève’s argument continues as follows: Since the philosopher does not desire to rule because he has no time for ruling, but on the other hand is forced to rule, he has been satisfied with a compromise solution; with devoting a little time to giving advice to tyrants or rulers. Reading the chronicles, one receives the impression that this action of the philosophers has been wholly ineffectual—as ineffectual as Simonides’ action that consisted in his conversation with Hiero. This conclusion does not entitle one, however, to infer that the philosopher should abstain from mingling in politics, for the strong reason for mingling in politics remains in force. The problem of what the philosopher should do in regard to the city remains, therefore, an open question, the subject of an unfinishable discussion. But the problem which cannot be solved by the dialectics of discussion may well be solved by the higher dialectics of History. The philosophic study of our past shows that philosophy, far from being politically ineffectual, has radically revolutionized the character of political life. One is even entitled to say that philosophic ideas alone have had significant political effect. For what else is the whole political history of the world except a movement toward the universal and homogeneous state? The decisive stages in the movement were actions of tyrants or rulers (Alexander the Great and Napoleon, e.g.). But these tyrants or rulers were and are pupils of philosophers. Classical philosophy created the idea of the universal state. Modern philosophy, which is the secularized form of Christianity, created the idea of the universal and homogeneous state. On the other hand, the progress of philosophy and its eventual transmutation into wisdom requires the “active negation” of the previous political stages, i.e., requires the action of the tyrant: only when “all possible active (political) negations” have been effected and thus the final stage of the political development has been reached, can and will the quest for wisdom give way to wisdom.

I need not examine Kojève’s sketch of the history of the Western world. That sketch would seem to presuppose the truth of the thesis which it is meant to prove. Certainly the value of the conclusion which he draws from his sketch depends entirely on the truth of the assumption that the universal and homogeneous state is the simply best social

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319 JC: “into” has been handwritten after a word which has been crossed out and is illegible.
320 Cf. DT, p. 335, l. 7: “stades”—JC and WPP, p. 128, l. 10: “states”
321 AB: the closing parenthesis has been typed over a hyphen.
322 JC: the possessive “s” is missing.
323 JC: “which it is” → “which is” (a mark has been handwritten before “is”).
324 Cf. DT, p. 335, par. 2, l. 5: “son”—AB: “this”
order. The simply best social order, as he conceives of it, is the state in which every human being finds his full satisfaction. A human being finds his full satisfaction if his human dignity is universally recognized and if he enjoys “equality of opportunity,” i.e., the opportunity, corresponding to his capacities, of deserving well of the state or of the whole. Now if it were true that in the universal and homogeneous state, no one has any good reason for being dissatisfied with that state, or for negating it, it would not yet follow that everyone will in fact be satisfied with it and never think of actively negating it, for men do not always act reasonably. Does Kojève not underestimate the power of the passions? Does he not have an unfounded belief in the eventually rational effect of the movements instigated by the passions? In addition, men will have very good reasons for being dissatisfied with the universal and homogeneous state. To show this, I must have recourse to Kojève’s more extensive exposition in his Introduction à l’étude de Hegel. There are degrees of satisfaction. The satisfaction of the humble citizen, whose human dignity is universally recognized and who enjoys all opportunities that correspond to his humble capacities and achievements, is not comparable to the satisfaction of the Chief of State. Only the Chief of State is “really satisfied”: he alone is “truly free” (p. 146). Did Hegel not say something to the effect that the state in which <only> one man is free is the Oriental despotic state? Is the universal and homogeneous state then merely a planetary Oriental despotism? However this may be, there is no guarantee that the incumbent Chief of State deserves his position to a higher degree than others. Those others then have very good reason for dissatisfaction: a state which treats equal men unequally is not just. A change from the universal-homogeneous monarchy into a universal-homogeneous aristocracy would seem to be reasonable. But we cannot stop here. The universal and homogeneous state, being the synthesis of the Masters and

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325 Cf. DT, p. 335, par. 2, l. 18: “s’ensuivrait”—AB: “will”
326 JC: “not” has been handwritten in the left margin with a stroke indicating that it should be inserted at this place.—LB: “not” has been handwritten between the lines, with a mark indicating that it should be inserted at this place.
327 AB: “very” has been mistyped, crossed out and handwritten above.
328 AB: the accent on “étude” has been added by hand.—JC: no accent on “étude”—WPP, p. 128, par. 2, l. 22: “l’étude” → “la lecture”
329 Cf. DT, p. 336, par. 2, l. 7: semicolon after “satisfait”—JC and WPP, p. 129, l. 2: period after “satisfied”
330 JC and WPP, p. 129, l. 2: “He”
331 Cf. DT, p. 336, par. 2, l. 9: “un seul”—JC: “which only one” → ”which one”
332 JC: comma circled by hand; a slash mark has been handwritten in the left margin.
333 JC: tied to the next word and separated from it by a handwritten slash mark.
334 JC: the “i” is a handwritten correction.—LB: ”synthesis"
the Slaves, is the state of the working warrior or of the war-waging worker. In fact, all its members are warrior workers (pp. 114, 146). But if the state is universal and homogeneous, “wars and revolutions are henceforth impossible” (pp. 145, 561). Besides, work in the strict sense, namely the conquest or domestication of nature, is completed, for otherwise the universal and homogeneous state could not be the basis for wisdom (p. 301). Of course, work of a kind will still go on, but the citizens of the final state will work as little as possible, as Kojève notes with explicit reference to Marx (p. 435). To borrow an expression which someone used recently in the House of Lords on a similar occasion, the citizens of the final state are only so-called workers, workers by courtesy. “There is no longer fight nor work. History has come to its end. There is nothing more to do” (pp. 385, 114). This end of History would be most exhilarating but for the fact that, according to Kojève, it is the participation in bloody political struggles as well as in real work or, generally expressed, the negating action, which raises man above the brutes (pp. 490-492, 560, 378n). The state through which man is said to become reasonably satisfied is, then, the state in which the basis of man’s humanity withers away, or in which man loses his humanity. It is the state of Nietzsche’s “last man.” Kojève in fact confirms the classical view that unlimited technological progress and its accompaniment, which are indispensable conditions of the universal and homogeneous state, are destructive of humanity. It is perhaps possible to say that the universal and homogeneous state is fated to come. But it is certainly impossible to say that man can reasonably be satisfied with it. If the universal and homogeneous state is the goal of History, History is absolutely “tragic.” Its completion will reveal that the human problem, and hence in particular the problem of the relation of philosophy and politics, is insoluble. For centuries and centuries men have unconsciously done nothing but worked their way through infinite labors and struggles and agonies, yet ever again catching hope, toward the universal
and homogeneous state, and as soon as they have arrived at the end of their journey, they realize that through arriving at it they have destroyed their humanity and thus returned, as in a cycle, to the pre-human beginnings of History. Vanitas vanitatum. Recognitio recognitionum. Yet there is no reason for despair as long as human nature has not been conquered completely, i.e., as long as sun and man still generate man. There will always be men (ἄνδρες) who will revolt against a state which is destructive of humanity or in which there is no longer a possibility of action and of great deeds. They may be forced into a mere negation of the universal and homogeneous state, into a negation not enlightened by any positive goal, into a nihilistic negation. While perhaps doomed to failure, that nihilistic revolution may be the only action on behalf of man’s humanity, the only great and noble deed that is possible once the universal and homogeneous state has become inevitable. But no one can know whether it will fail or succeed. We still know too little about the workings of the universal and homogeneous state to say anything about where and when its corruption will start. What we do know is only that it will perish sooner or later (see Friedrich Engels’ Ludwig Feuerbach, ed. by Hans Hajek, p. 6).

Some may object that the successful revolt against the universal and homogeneous state could have no other effect than that the identical historical process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process—a new lease of life for man’s humanity—not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of the seasons, although we...

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346 AB: before “returned”, “destr” has been crossed out by typing.
347 OT (1963), p. 223, l. 37: spelled “prehuman”
348 JC: “moon” has been corrected to “man” by hand.—LB: “moon”
349 See Aristotle, Physics, II.2, 194b13.
350 Cf. DT, p. 338, l. 9: “d’action”—JC: “noble” has been handwritten in the left margin with a stroke indicating that it should be inserted between “of” and “action”—LB: “noble” has been handwritten in the left margin with Laurence Berns’ pen, with a stroke indicating that it should be inserted between “of” and “action”—WPP, p. 130, l. 15: “of action” → “of noble action”
351 AB: “once” has been typed in two separated parts, and then unified by hand.
352 AB: “universal” has been handwritten above “eternal” which has been crossed out.
353 Strauss quotes from this page of Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der deutschen klassischen Philosophie in NRH, p. 176 n. 10: “Nothing stands up to [the dialectical philosophy] but the uninterupted process of becoming and of passing away, of the ascent without end from the lower to the higher… We do not need here to go into the question whether this outlook agrees thoroughly with the present state of the science of nature, which foretells for the existence of Earth itself a possible end, and for its inhabitability a rather certain end, which thus recognizes for human history too not only an ascending, but also a descending branch. We find ourselves anyway still rather far from the turning point […].” (Italics added by Strauss.)
354 AB: “that” has been handwritten above the line, with a mark indicating that it should be inserted at this place.
know that winter will come again? Kojève does seem to leave an outlet for action in the universal and homogeneous state. In that state the risk of violent death is still involved in the struggle for political leadership (p. 146). But this opportunity for action can exist only for a tiny minority. And besides, is this not a hideous prospect: a state in which the last refuge of man’s humanity is political assassination in the particularly sordid form of the palace revolution. Warriors and workers of all countries, unite, while there is still time, to prevent the coming of “the realm of freedom.” Defend with might and main, if it needs to be defended, “the realm of necessity.”

But perhaps it is not war nor work but thinking that constitutes the humanity of man. Perhaps it is not recognition (which for many men may lose in its power to satisfy what it gains in universality) but wisdom that is the end of man. Perhaps the universal and homogeneous state is legitimated by the fact that its coming is the necessary and sufficient condition for the coming of wisdom: in the final state all human beings will be reasonably satisfied, they will be truly happy, because all will have acquired wisdom or are about to acquire it. “There is no longer fight nor work; History is completed; there is nothing more to do”. man is at last free from all drudgery and for the highest and most divine activity, for the contemplation of the unchangeable truth (Kojève, op. cit., p. 385). But if the final state is to satisfy the deepest longing of the human soul, every human being must be capable of becoming wise. The most relevant difference among human beings must have practically disappeared. We understand now why Kojève is so anxious to refute the classical view according to which only a minority of men are capable of the quest for wisdom. If the classics are right, only a few men will be truly happy in the universal and homogeneous state and hence only a few men will find their satisfaction in and through it. Kojève himself observes that the ordinary citizens of the final state are only “potentially satisfied” (p.146). The actual satisfaction of all human beings which allegedly is the goal of History, is impossible. It is for this reason, I suppose, that

355 DT, p. 338, penultimate line: “semble”—AB: “not seem”—JC: before “seem” a word (most probably “not”) has been crossed out.

356 AB: no comma after “besides”

357 Cf. DT, p. 339, l. 8: the sentence ends with a period.—JC and WPP, p. 131, l. 2: the sentence ends with an interrogative mark.

358 About the two Marxian formulae quoted by Strauss, see ILH, p. 435n [159n].

359 AB: “do” has been mistyped and corrected by hand.

360 JC: number “5”, closing parenthesis and period have been handwritten.

361 JC: a short, illegible word (or a few letters) has been crossed out before “But” at the very beginning of the line.

362 WPP, p. 131, par. 2, l. 23: comma after “beings”
the final social order, as Kojève conceives of it, is a State and not a stateless society: the State, or coercive government, cannot wither away because it is impossible that all human beings should ever become actually satisfied.

The classics thought that, owing to the weakness or dependence of human nature, universal happiness is impossible, and therefore they did not dream of a fulfillment of History and hence not of a meaning of History. They saw with their mind’s eye a society within which that happiness of which human nature is capable would be possible in the highest degree: that society is the best regime. But because they saw how limited man’s power is, they held that the actualization of the best regime depends on chance. Modern man, dissatisfied with utopias and scorning them, has tried to find a guarantee for the actualization of the best social order. In order to succeed, or rather in order to be able to believe that he could succeed, he had to lower the goal of man. One form in which this was done was to replace moral virtue by universal recognition, or to replace happiness by the satisfaction deriving from universal recognition. The classical solution is utopian in the sense that its actualization is improbable. The modern solution is utopian in the sense that its actualization is impossible. The classical solution supplies a stable standard by which to judge of any actual order. The modern solution eventually destroys the very idea of a standard that is independent of actual situations.

It seems reasonable to assume that only a few, if any, citizens of the universal and homogeneous state will be wise. But neither the wise men nor the philosophers will desire to rule. For this reason alone, to say nothing of others, the Chief of the universal and homogeneous state, or the Universal and Final Tyrant will be an unwise man, as Kojève seems to take for granted. To retain his power, he will be forced to suppress every activity which might lead people into doubt of the essential soundness of the universal and homogeneous state: he must suppress

363 AB: spelled “state-less”
364 JC: handwritten above the line with a mark of insertion.
365 AB: “hence not of” → “hence of”
367 AB: “power” and “is” have been typed as one word, and then separated by a handwritten slash mark; there is no comma after “is”
368 JC: the following words of the text have been handwritten in the right margin and inserted at this place, before a word which has been crossed out and is illegible: “improbable. The modern solution is utopian in the sense that its actualization is impossible.”
369 Cf. DT, p. 341, l. 6: “stable”—AB: “a stable standard” → “a standard”
370 AB: “lead” has been mistyped and corrected by hand.
philosophy as an attempt to corrupt the young. In particular he must in the interest of the homogeneity of his universal state forbid every teaching, every suggestion, that there are politically relevant natural differences among men which cannot be abolished or neutralized by progressing scientific technology. He must command his biologists to prove that every human being has, or will acquire, the capacity of becoming a philosopher or a tyrant. The philosophers in their turn will be forced to defend themselves or the cause of philosophy. They will be obliged, therefore, to try to act on the Tyrant. Everything seems to be a re-enactment of the age-old drama. But this time, the cause of philosophy is lost from the start. For the final tyrant presents himself as a philosopher, as the highest philosophic authority, as the supreme exegete of the only true philosophy, as the executor and hangman authorized by the only true philosophy. He claims therefore that he persecutes not philosophy but false philosophies. The experience is not altogether new for philosophers. If philosophers were confronted with claims of this kind in former ages, philosophy went underground. It accommodated itself in its explicit or exoteric teaching to the unfounded commands of rulers who believed they knew things which they did not know. Yet its very exoteric teaching undermined the commands or dogmas of the rulers in such a way as to guide the potential philosophers toward the eternal and unsolved problems. And since there was no universal state in existence, the philosophers could escape to other countries if life became unbearable in the tyrant’s dominions. From the universal tyrant, however, there is no escape. Thanks to the conquest of nature and to the completely unabashed substitution of suspicion and terror for law, the Universal and Final Tyrant has at his disposal practically unlimited means for ferreting out, and for extinguishing, the most modest efforts in the direction of independent

\footnotesize

571 OT (1991), p. 211, par. 2, l. 15: “being” is a misprint (“becoming” appears in all the typescripts and previous editions).
572 AB: “or a tyrant” → “or tyrant”
573 AB: “turns”
574 JC: thereafter, a sentence placed into brackets has been crossed out and is illegible.
575 AB: spelled “reenactment”
577 AB: the words “not philosophy” have been typed twice; the second occurrence of these words has been crossed out.
578 This sentence does not occur in DT, p. 342, l. 7.
579 AB: “on”
581 AB: “however” has been handwritten above the line, with a mark indicating that it should be inserted at this place.— OT (1991), p. 211, par. 2, l. 33: no commas around “however”
thought. Kojève would seem to be right although for the wrong reason: the coming of the universal and homogeneous state will be the end of philosophy on earth.

The utmost I can hope to have shown in taking issue with Kojève’s thesis regarding the relation of tyranny and wisdom is that Xenophon’s thesis regarding that grave subject is not only compatible with the idea of philosophy but required by it. This is very little. For the question arises immediately whether the idea of philosophy is not itself in need of legitimation. Philosophy in the strict and classical sense is quest for the eternal order or for the eternal cause or causes of all things. It presupposes then that there is an eternal and unchangeable order within which History takes place and which is not in any way affected by History. It presupposes in other words that any “realm of freedom” is no more than a dependent province within “the realm of necessity.” It presupposes, in the words of Kojève, that “Being is essentially immutable in itself and eternally identical with itself.” This presupposition is not self-evident. Kojève rejects it in favor of the view that “Being creates itself in the course of History,” or that the highest being is Society and History, or that eternity is nothing but the totality of historical, i.e., finite time. On the basis of the classical presupposition, a radical distinction must be made between the conditions of understanding and the sources of understanding, between the conditions of the existence and perpetuation of philosophy (societies of a certain kind, and so on) and the sources of philosophic insight. On the basis of Kojève’s presupposition, that distinction loses its crucial significance: social change or fate affects being, if it is not identical with Being, and hence affects truth. On the basis of Kojève’s presuppositions, unqualified attachment to human concerns becomes the source of philosophic understanding: man must be absolutely at home on earth, he must be absolutely a citizen of the earth, if not a citizen of a part of the inhabitable earth. On the basis of the classical presupposition, philosophy requires a radical detachment from human concerns:

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382 JC: the first two letters of “itself” have been handwritten.—LB: the first two letters of “itself” have been handwritten with Laurence Berns’ pen.
383 AB: “on”
384 “Tyranny and Wisdom,” op. cit., p. 151, par. 3, ll. 6-7 (“Tyrannie et Sagesse,” op. cit., p. 241, par. 3, ll. 9-11). The original of this quotation, as well as of the next one, occurs in paragraphs which Kojève added to the version of his essay included in DT.
386 AB: “affects” has been typed twice; the second instance has been crossed out by typing.
387 Cf. DT, p. 343, l. 30: “hypothèses”—AB: “presupposition”
388 JC: before “concerns” a word has been crossed out and is illegible.—LB: before “concerns” a second
man must not be absolutely at home on earth, he must be a citizen of the whole. In our discussion, the conflict between the two opposed basic presuppositions has barely been mentioned. But we have always been mindful of it. For we both apparently turned away from Being to Tyranny because we have seen that those who lacked the courage to face the issue\(^{389}\) of Tyranny, who therefore et humiliter serviebant et superbe dominabantur,\(^{390}\) were forced to evade the issue of Being as well, precisely because they did nothing but talk of Being.\(^{391}\)

\(^{389}\) AB: “courage” has been crossed out before “issue”; “issue” has been mistyped, crossed out and handwritten above.


\(^{391}\) Cf. *DT*, p. 344, last lines: “précisément parce qu’ils ne faisaient rien d’autre que de parler de l’Être.”—JC: the last period has been handwritten; a portion of text may have been erased thereafter. The words “precisely because they did nothing but talk of Being” do not appear.
Supplement to the Strauss-Kojève Correspondence

Additional Notes

The page numbers below refer to OT (2000), unless otherwise indicated.

To Strauss’s letter, December 17, 1932, p. 222, par. 2 (Musik-Feindschaft):1 “Strauss was not only a-musical, but anti-musical. With Settembrini in the Zauberberg,2 which he quoted jokingly and with approval on this point, he could have said that music was ‘politically suspect’ to him. In the essence of it which is foreign to logos, he scented a debauch of feelings which must lead to further excess.” (Letter in German from Hans Jonas to Rémi Brague dated 14.2.1985.)3

To Strauss’s undated letter (most probably the second week of February 1934), p. 224: Strauss’s candidacy for a professorship at the Hebrew University (Jerusalem) in 1934 has been dealt with at length in his correspondence with Gerhard Krüger (see GS 3, pp. 435, 436 f.), Jacob Klein (see ibid., pp. 482, 485, 486, 521, 522 f.), and Gershom Scholem (see ibid., pp. 703-12). Klein wrote to Strauss that Guttmann was to stay for only one year (9.IX.34, ibid., p. 521), however Guttmann kept his position at the Hebrew University.

Strauss likely referred to a visit he was about to pay to his former dissertation supervisor, Ernst Cassirer, who was then a research fellow at All Souls College, Oxford: “I was Saturday in Oxford at the home of the author of the history of the problem of knowledge.4 He made a rather miserable impression: typical réfugié.” (Strauss to Klein, 14. Februar 1934, GS 3, p. 493; cf. Strauss to Krüger, 3. Dezember 1933, ibid., p. 435, and Strauss to Klein, 25.IV.34, ibid., p. 501.)

All the footnotes are the work of the editor.

1 An undated, handwritten catalogue of Kojève’s record collection is to be found at the Bibliothèque nationale, Département de musique. Kojève possessed more than 600 records of religious and profane music from a wide range of times and places.

2 See Thomas Mann, Der Zauberberg (Berlin: S. Fisher, 1925), Bd. 1, ch. 4, ”Politisch verdächtig!” p. 193.

3 I thank Rémi Brague for having put this letter at my disposal.


Ibid., par. 3: The “Master of an Oxford College” was most probably Alexander D. Lindsay (1879-1952), Master of Balliol College (1924-1949), whom Strauss thanked at the end of his Preface to PPH (cf. Strauss to Klein, 9. April 1934, GS 3, pp. 496 ff., and 25.IV.34, ibid., p. 501).

Strauss wrote “Gilson” and not “Gibson” as printed: Étienne Gilson (1884-1978) knew very well John Laird, who invited him to the University of Aberdeen to give the Gifford lectures on “The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy” in 1931-1932 (Strauss read Gilson’s French book derived from these lectures, L’esprit de la philosophie médiévale, in which he saw “astonishing parallels” with Krüger’s ideas: see his letter to Krüger, 14. März 1933, GS 3, p. 427). Strauss attended Gilson’s courses on Saint Bernard and Scot Erigena at the Collège de France in Paris and found them “good, unusually good, very clear and at the same time very rigorous” (letter to Krüger, 7. Februar 1933, ibid., p. 427). Koyré wrote to Strauss (handwritten letter in English, no date, 1933, Leo Strauss Papers, Box 3, Folder 8): “You can write to Gilson and ask for a letter of introduction for Laird. He will, doubtlessly, send you one. Ask him to write to Laird directly.” (See also Strauss to Krüger, 3. Dezember 1933, GS 3, p. 435.) Strauss planned a trip to Aberdeen in order to meet Laird (see his letter to Krüger, 17. Juli 1933, ibid., p. 431). In a letter to Klein (9. April 1934, ibid., p. 495), he also mentioned Laird’s favorable judgment about his Hobbes paper.


5 See below in the Corrections, p. 94.
To Kojève’s letter, November 2, 1936, p. 231: Kojève’s copy of Strauss’s Hobbes book bears no annotation; the following dedication appears on the flyleaf:

Illmo Doctmo Alexandro Cojevio

prosperitatem Europae restoraturo

ferrum aciemque convenienter distribuenti

philosophiae Hegelianae amantissimo

caro amico

hoc opusculum auctor dedicat.

L. S.7

Ibid., p. 232, par. 2: Strauss has written below (in German): “work <Arbeit> is acknowledged by H<obbes>, yet not service <Dienst>”

Ibid., pp. 233-34: Kojève gave a course on “La Critique de la religion au xviii°: P. Bayle” in 1936-1937 at the École pratique des hautes études. The manuscript (88 folios) of this course is to be found in the Fonds Kojève (box XII): it consists of an introduction, a biography, and an interpretation of the Pensées diverses, of the Commentaire philosophique, and of the Dictionnaire.

In his letter to Klein dated 7.11.39 (GS 3, p. 585) Strauss cited an extract from a lost letter in French: “Three days ago, I received a letter dated 14.10 from Kojevnikoff. He asked for the following favor:

Klein, whose address I do not know, would certainly like to write to Miss Fiele. I remind him that she lives at No. 18 of Breitenbachplatz. If Klein writes to her, I would be very pleased if he sends her my regards.

As for me, I am in absolute ignorance of my fate. I have a “blue fascicule” with “reserved posting,” but I belong to the armed service, being a simple infantry soldier. I will certainly be recalled. But when—nobody knows. Besides, I have a grant of 12,000 francs and the wage of my library, so that my financial situation is assured. But it is difficult to work in these conditions.

6 Kojève’s library (about 800 philosophical books) is now located at the Bibliothèque nationale de France, Réserve des livres rares. See Marco Filoni, “La bibliothèque philosophique d’Alexandre Kojève,” in Hommage à Alexandre Kojève, op. cit., p. 105-32.

7 “To the most illustrious and learned Alexandre Kojève, being about to restore the prosperity of Europe, distributing conveniently iron and sword, great lover of Hegelian philosophy, dear friend, the author dedicates this opuscule.”
In his letter to Klein dated 30. Juli 1940 (ibid., p. 587), Strauss mentioned a letter he received from Koyré (who had to leave France and asked for a recommendation or at least an affidavit), who wrote that he had “no news from Kojevnikoff” (This undated letter in English is to be found in the Leo Strauss Papers, Box 2, Folder 8).

To Kojève’s letter, June 22, 1946, p. 234 f.: in his letter dated 16 juillet 1945, Jacob Klein wrote: “My Dear Kojève, do you remember one of our last conversations, it was in 1936 or 1937, I believe, more than a century ago, anyway? It was notably about the Weltgeist on horseback. What do you think about it now? Don’t you believe that it would be better to talk at leisure, without having recourse to these tools born from human infirmity which are feather and paper? And there we are at the center of the matter: do you want to spend a year in America, in a rather interesting environment, within the St. John’s College at Annapolis […] You will come as a visiting lecturer with few obligations as to the courses to teach […]” (Handwritten letter in French, signed copy, Jacob Klein Papers, Series 2, Box 15, Folder 38.)

To Kojève’s letter, April 8, 1947, p. 235 bottom: in his letter dated 28.II.47 (handwritten in German, Fonds Kojève, box XX), Karl Löwith proposed to review Kojève’s Introduction (he wrote he had been informed by Strauss about the book), while Kojève would review his Hegel bis Nietzsche. This proposal came to nothing.

To Strauss’ letter, 22.8.48, p. 236: “… open doors… keyhole” (this statement may be an allusion to Nietzsche’s poetic prelude to Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, § 42, “Grundsatz der Allzufeinen.”)

To Kojève’s letter, August 11, 1952, p. 261: Kojève gave two lectures with this title at the Collège de Philosophie (20-21/XII 51, 18h30-20h as indicated on the folder which contains the manuscript, Box XII). He derived from them an essay, “Le concept et le temps,” Deucalion, No. 5 (1955), pp. 11-20 (typed

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8 Klein was to give a lecture at the Institut d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences et des techniques (directed by Koyré, Gilson, Louis Massingham, and others) in Paris in May 1937 before going to London and then Cambridge, according to his letter to Gerhard Krüger dated 24. Oktober 1936 (Gerhard Krüger Nachlass, Mn 13). In a postcard to Klein in Russian dated 23-VII 37 (Jacob Klein Papers, Series 2, Box 3, Folder 38), Kojève provided information to go to his home. Kojève stayed in Berlin at least twice in the 1930’s: Fritz Heinemann alluded to disagreements about Hegel in a postcard to Kojevnikoff, Berlin, Charlottenburg, 27/9/34 (Archives Henry Corbin, EPHE). Helmut Kuhn wrote to Koschevnikoff c/o Georg Witt, Berlin, Charl.: “Please greet Mister Klein (I suppose that you will visit him) […]” (Postcard in German, postmark 21.VIII 1935, Fonds Kojève, Box XX). A result of such conversations is to be found in ILH, p. 517n f. [248 n. 33], in the interpretation of the Kirilov episode in Dostoyevsky’s The Possessed (Klein had translated from Russian into German a book by Aaron Z. Steinberg, Die Idee der Freiheit. Ein Dostojewskij-Buch, Luzern: Vita Nova, 1936).
copy, written 12/IV 52, corrected 12-16/ I 53, _loc. cit._). Kojève’s planned book, _Le concept, le temps et le discours. Essai d’une mise à jour du système du savoir hégélien_9 was an attempt to update the Hegelian System of Knowledge by paraphrasing Hegel’s _Enzyklopädie_. He worked from 1952 to 1960 at his eventually uncompleted _magnum opus_. From 12.X.52 to 17.II.53, he elaborated a historico-philosophical introduction (from Democritus to the twentieth-century physicists) to the “Energo-logie” (unwritten 1st Part, 2nd section of his planned “Exposé du Système du Savoir”); from 13.IX to 5.X.52, an “Onto-logie” (1st Part, 1st section of the “Exposé”).10

To Kojève’s letter, 11 April 1957, pp. 270 f.: the quotations from Sallustius in French have been drawn from Salluste le Philosophe, _Des Dieux et du Monde_ trans. Mario Meunier (Paris: éditions Véga, 1931). Kojève’s copy bears the reading date: 4.IV.57.


To Kojève’s letter, 10.24.57, pp. 294-99: in his letter dated 15.XII.57 (handwritten in French, Fonds Kojève, box XX), Koyré wrote the following lines, which have been surrounded by a red stroke (likely drawn by Kojève) with the mention “Marinus’ _Vita Procli_”: “I have greatly enjoyed the citations you sent me—but I did not find Rosán’s book in our library. Yes, as a glorification, it’s well done. I have sent your letter to Strauß who answered

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9 The book which has been posthumously published as _Le concept, le temps et le discours, op. cit._, comprises the first (psychological) and second (logical) introductions which Kojève wrote in 1953. Bernard Hesbois gives details about Kojève’s whole project, _ibid._, p. 9.

10 Fonds Kojève, box XIV. _Kant_ (Paris: Gallimard, 1973) was a part of the unpublished introduction to the “Energo-logie” which Kojève extracted later for a separate publication. Several versions of the introductions are to be found in the Fonds Kojève, boxes XIV-XVII.
me he is pleased that others than him eventually realize the existence of the ‘art of writing.’ I have no news from the third philosopher.”


To Kojève’s letter, 11.5.57, p. 301 bottom: in his letter dated October 26 (Fonds Kojève, box XX), Allan Bloom wrote he was “pleased to hear that you had doubts about my Othello thesis; that gives me the occasion to try to convince you. Hence I bombard you with another of my immortal pieces. This is only a first draught but I should love to hear your objections. It seems to me that Shakespearean interpretation went downhill since the Romantics (z. B. Goethe and Coleridge) took over interpretation; they had a complete contempt for the political framework in which the plays are always set and concentrated on ‘feelings’ of individuals with the result that the objective framework in which feelings take their meaning are forgotten. A moaning Hamlet is more important for them than the fact that this moaner is a Lutheran who wants to rule which is certainly most important for Shakespeare. A point that I should like to mention is that in Shakespeare place seems to have something to do with theme: the North, England, old Rome all have different problems connected with them. There is only another play which takes place in Venice, the Merchant of same; this is explicitly about the relation of Judaism and Christianity (Shylock stands always for law, Antonio for charity and mercy. Antonio is willing to die to save his friends from the old severity; he makes great promises on the basis of ships that are out to sea and never come in; he drives the moneylenders from the Rialto. The only thing that can bring the two together is the commercial spirit of Venice [voir Montesquieu]. If I ever do anything else on Shakespeare it will be on the Merchant.) It is, I understand, an old technique of religious criticism to take the characteristics ascribed to God and understand them in the human terms, the only possible source of their comprehenion. Jealousy as a phenomenon, I believe, is always the second Commandment (thou shalt have no other God than me; for thine God is a jealous God). It seems to me that the Iago character is the predecessor of the Devil in Paradise Lost, the spirit of negativity who is in his negating creating something new and better.”
In his letter dated November 29 (loc. cit.), Bloom commented on his reading of the Vita Isidori in German translation: “I gather you think it is a parody although you have told me nothing of your ideas concerning it. This seems perfectly possible although I couldn’t prove it. It is certainly funny; but I can’t say whether this is because it is a combination of unconsciousness borrowings from an older and deep esoteric tradition which reflects many truths and a mad mysticism or whether the writer was a conscious satirist. I would incline to the latter for it is certainly no ‘life’ of Isidorus unless the author wishes to say that Isidorus was a product of this unholy mixture. I suppose that you would have to follow the relations of religion to philosophy carefully throughout the book.”


Koyré wrote about it: “My dear friend, I have read with great pleasure and amusement your paper on Julian. I admit I am not entirely convinced or, more exactly (I savored the Stalinist note on the intolerance of truth—or dogma), I do not understand better than before. But, as Dirac12 says, this is a biographical fact, this is not an objection.

“It is possible that Julian was an atheist and that, like many atheists, he considered that there must be a religion for the people and that, in the situation in which he was—he and the empire—Christianity could not play this role. That, thereby, he tried to come back to paganism (the historically testified miracles—this is, besides, already in Cicero). But I do not understand, then, why he would let that appear a bit. Education?—on no account. So as to be forgiven by his cronies? This is Malraux’s.13 Besides, why he, a declared enemy of Christianity, would need to disguise the attack against enigmas by making believe he attacks the Cynics? Did he not have good reasons to hold it against the Cynics, [2] enemies of the State? Besides, was it not dangerous to reveal his real attitude without a disguise? He could have been understood by the theologians. (Contemporaries, above all the

12 Paul Dirac (1902-1984), English physicist and mathematician; his harsh reactions to misunderstanding were well-known.
13 André Malraux (1901-1976), French novelist.
enemies, understand usually what it is about. I mistrust a disguise which fools everybody.) But I have not read a text by Julian for more than thirty years.

“The passage on Dionysus reminds probably of the Trinitarian discussion of the time—there I think you are right. But why not say so? The passages on Alexander are very beautiful. But is it only about immortality? and not about an Alexandrine hubris? In this last case, one could not use these passages to justify the general belief in myths. I do not know either, as I did not read the texts, whether you are not going too fast from the critique of myths—nobody believes that Venus slep with Mars and that Vulcan caught them in his nets—to the rejection of all religion. After all a prayer addressed to Nous (even if it is not Sol Invictus) is also religious; if Nous is human reason, Julian’s sentence seems at first sight to be not ambiguous, but deprived of meaning. But once more, in order to answer these questions one should read Julian again; and one would perhaps find that you are right. Anyway it is very amusing and it compels one to reconsider the whole thing. I hope it will prove to be a bonus.” (Handwritten letter in French, 15.VIII.58, Fonds Kojève, box XX.)

Allan Bloom wrote: “My Dear Kojève, I have just read your Julian article again while going over the Greek and this time I am really quite impressed; this boy shows definite promise as an interpreter of classical texts. I was particularly touched by the grace of your concluding sentence. I do not believe that you come anywhere near proving the ‘Democritean’ character of Julian’s thought and your translation of ἐνυλόν as ‘matérielle’ seems to me at best questionable.\[14\] But it was not your end to give a complete interpretation of the meaning and intention of J’s works but to show that he continued a tradition the last remnants of which were more than two centuries dead. The question of the real intent of the speeches, beyond the preservation of philosophy, must remain open. I had hoped to read them this year but have never gotten around to it.

“I think what you have to say about myths is a real contribution and accords with my experience although I have never made it explicit to myself. The naive image that philosophy begins with the awareness of contradictions hides the real issue; one must find the real contradictions in

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15 A cross has been drawn with a pen before the line which begins here.

16 A cross has been drawn with a pen before the line which begins here.
order to move in anything but a void and the πόλις makes all the things which are contradictory appear to be unified and consistent; the problem is to break through the political and psychological barriers which prevent men [2] from seeing the contradictory character of their world. The myth is this unity and you have articulated this very well indeed.

“The translations are bad but do not appear on the basis of a superficial reading to miss any great subtleties of Greek. (I suspect that one would have to pay serious attention to the precise use of Greek terms throughout his work, which of course the translation does not do). I do not believe you will have to re-write anything; in general the Greek tends to strengthen your interpretation rather than weaken it, e. g. when it reads ‘… d’instruire à son sujet tout le monde, mais tout particulièrement ceux qui méritent de l’apprendre.’ (page 6)17 The Greek for tout le monde is κοίνη which means the πόλις and also public, and tout particulièrement is ἰδικῶς, which means ‘in private’ and is the word used to describe philosophy consistently by Socrates. If18 I translate the article into English, I shall make new translations; but I cannot translate Greek into French. We are still considering whether we should leave it in French or not; I prefer to leave it in French because there is some nice Kojève that would be difficult to render. I put this off for so long because the book is temporarily stalled and there was no rush.

“One further word, sometimes it seems to me, you rush too quickly into an interpretation, assured that the esoteric sense is clear. It is not that I fear that scholars will quibble with you, which they will, but rather that it seems that sometimes you fit him into a preconceived framework. In no instance do I [3] doubt that the surface does not suffice; but whether your interpretation goes more than a step of the way is not always clear; I often suspect his meaning may be more complicated. I shall give only one instance of what I mean. On pages 6 + 7 you cite a passage from Julian 170 a-c. It begins ‘Les anciens ont toujours cherché les causes des choses’19 and you leave out the expression, ‘soit sous la direction des dieux, soit par eux-mêmes.’ Later in the passage, he says ‘qu’ils la recherchent etc. eux-mêmes (this is not in the Greek) sous la direction des dieux.’ 20 The par eux-mêmes cf. the first statement is dropped. Then you say, c’est-à-dire, ici: de la raison, voire de la philosophie. Coming immediately after a passage where Julian has made

17 See Kojève, ibid., p. 99, par. 3, ll. 7-8.
18 A cross has been drawn with a pen before the line which begins here.
19 See Kojève, ibid., p. 99, par. 4, first line.
20 See ibid., the last two lines.
the distinction between the direction of the gods and that of reason, your statement seems unconvincing. I should not dare to interpret it myself, but I wonder if he doesn’t distinguish two types of philosophers, the one under the direction of the Gods being more political, adding something which the others do not have and which cannot strictly be reduced to reason.”

(Five-page handwritten letter in English, April 17, 1959, Fonds Kojève, box XX.)

To Kojève’s letter, p. 304 f.: on the flyleaf of his copy (reading date: 5/IV 59), Kojève noted:

272: Liberty = Meaning
245/247: Liberty ~Death (Suicide)
160: “reason” = personal authority! / System of Knowledge
166f: ~Hegel
189: ~Hegel (Christianism ~Esotericism); 206
225: aristocratic morality; 239f, 243, 251, 286, 282; but: 247f, 249f, 287
251f: ~Hegel (Primacy of Future)
253: ~Hegel (Man ≠ Nature); 279f, 297
255: ~Hegel (Good = Non-evil); 271, 279, 288, 290
284f 288: Intellectual ≠ Practitioner; but: 286, 288
294f: Intell. ≠ Philosopher

P. 298, Kojève has drawn a stroke along par. 1, ll 3-9 and noted in the margin: “cf. Kojève”

To Kojève’s letter, 4.6.61, p. 305 (cf. ibid., p. 308), par. 2: Kojève’s manuscript was published as Essai d’une histoire raisonnée de la philosophie païenne (Paris: Gallimard, 3 vols., 1968-1973). It consists of a fragment, elaborated in 1956-1960, of the uncompleted third, historical introduction (see Kojève to Strauss, June 8, 1956, op. cit., p. 265) to the “Exposé du Système du Savoir.”

To Strauss’s letter, January 30, 1962, pp. 305 f. and March 27, 1962, pp. 306 f.: Gadamer sent to Kojève the program of the Hegel meeting. In a letter dated 15.1.1963 (Fonds Kojève, box XX), he reminded Kojève of their first encounter in Paris: “Anyway the Hegel studies, which put me meanwhile somewhat more in contact with French colleagues, are in France very much linked with

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21 The sentence “I should… reason” has been marked with a brace; an interrogative mark has been written in the margin.
the incentive which has come from you, so that I would have renewed willingly our acquaintance of the year 1933 after now almost 30 years."

To Kojève’s letter, 3.29.62, p. 307 bottom: the manuscript dated 9/III 62 of Kojève’s lecture (57 folios, Fonds Kojève, box XII) bears the following mention: “Qu’est-ce que la dialectique?” Conférence au Collège philosophique (44, rue de Rennes, Paris) [Mercredi, 14/III 62, 18h15].—Kojève intended to communicate “the latest of all” his accounts of dialectic, from which he “completely and definitely understood what it is” (fol. 1): “Dialectic is a ‘quality’ or a ‘form;’ more precisely: a structure.” (Fol. 14.) “This is that—Dialectic. This is a structure; and everything which has this structure is dialectical. Everything which has not it, is not dialectical.—I have shown that this is not such or such isolated discourse, but the Discourse taken as a whole which has a dialectical structure (seeing that this structure [called “dialectics”] is deduced from the 3 Principles22 which determined it). If the Discourse (in its totality) “refers” to something which ‘corresponds’ to it—this something must be dialectical too.” (Fol. 56.)

To Strauss’s letter, November 16, 1962, p. 311: Kojève’s copy of Strauss’s Spinoza’s Critique of Religion (op. cit.) bears some underlining in the “Preface to the English translation.” A stroke has been drawn in the margin along the text of p. 31, the words “The present study” have been underlined.

To Strauss’s letter, June 3, 1965, p. 313, par. 3: Strauss mentioned his planned stay at the University of Hamburg in his letters to Klein, October 19, 1964 (GS 3, p. 603), to Löwith, 3. Juni 1964 (ibid., pp. 690-91), and to Klaus Oehler, 26. Juni 1964 (cited in ibid., pp. XXV n. 44). An invitation for the Summer Semester 1965 is dealt with in a series of letters (1963-1965, Leo Strauss Papers, Box 2, Folder 1) from Wilhelm Hennis (Seminar für Sozialwissenschaft) and a letter from the Dean of the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Hamburg, dated 21.1.64 (loc. cit.), which stated that Strauss was invited as “Gastprofessor für Philosophie.”

Ibid., par. 6: Hathaway, Hierarchy and the Definition of Order in the “Letters” of Pseudo-Dionysius (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1969), p. 35, at the end of his list of the principal conjectures for the identity of the pseudo-Dionysius: “in addition, A. Kojève, who has communicated to me his own conclusion that Damascius himself is the author.”

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22 The Aristotelian logical principles: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, which Kojève analyzed in his lecture.
Ibid., p. 314: Kojève’s copy of *The City and Man* bears the reading date: 26/ VII 64. Kojève has underlined passages especially in the Thucydides chapter. On the flyleaf, Kojève noted:

Dear Mister Kojevnikoff!

Nothing could have caused me a greater delight than your book, arrived yesterday, with the beautiful dedication. Warmest thanks. It was a benefaction for an old, ill, and lonely man—but it would have been even if I was in a better condition. I began at once to read the book, to marvel at your dialectical power and to enjoy the autobiographical asides, which people like us can indulge in. In particular your ascetic refusal to mention names from the profane vulgus pleased me.
As you could perhaps have inferred from a letter of one of the students here, I am now in California (not far from Los Angeles) and not any more in Chicago. However that may be, one plans here a big affair regarding “political philosophy,” to which you have been invited together with the other great people (Hannah Arendt, Klein, Voegelin etc.). It would be nice if we met each other again in this way.

I believe that I have sent you all my publications. [verso] A longer article about Lucretius should appear in a collection of essays. I work now on the Euthydemus, an Aristophanic treatment of the primary theme of your book, namely the possibility and necessity of philosophy.

Most cordially as ever

Your

Leo Strauss.

finally ‘fragmentary’ discourse has intrinsic validity only insofar it is ‘poetical.’ Now, the works of the Heidegger who has renounced his work, include without any doubt poems which are well worth the one that Parmenides’ Poem would have been, if it had not been ‘prolonged’ to the Hegelian System of Knowledge by a Plato, an Aristotle and a Kant followed by Hegel.”

6 [In English in the text:] “political philosophy”


Corrections

The new material (see above, n. 1 in “The Last Letter…”) which has been used here includes the originals of the following letters from Strauss which appear in the Strauss-Kojève Correspondence (OT 1991 and 2000): 17.XII.1933; 12 Jan 1934 (hitherto undated, pp. 222-23); January 16th, 1934, pp. 223-24; undated, p. 224; 9 April, 1934; 3 June 1934. The editor had to rely on poor photocopies of these letters (the originals were considered lost).

p. 221 (December 6), par. 1, l. 1: today a little moment this evening
p. 221, par. 1, l. 1: main business review

p. 222 (December 17, 1932): Strauss’s address should appear at the top of the letter:

17, Square Grangé Paris (13e), 17.XII.32
22 r. de la Glacière

Ibid. (address): 47 […] London 17 […] London W61

Ibid., l. 2: have the have now the
Ibid., l. 4: M<osaïc> Mosaic
Ibid., l. 5: E<nglish> English
Ibid., l. 6: <much> much, much
Ibid., l. 8: Office. Office here.
Ibid., l. 9: ha<ve> have
Ibid., l. 10: <Hoganer> Stoganer
Ibid., l. 10: red <…> red shawl

p. 223, par. 1, l. 1: b<ecome> become
p. 223, par. 1, l. 2: <as> as
p. 223, par. 1, l. 3: th<is> this
p. 223, par. 2, l. 1: ob<tain> shall get
p. 223, par. 2, l. 2: <so> so that <use it> work
p. 223, par. 2, l. 4: wo<rd> vowels
p. 223, par. 3, l. 1: would should
p. 223, par. 3, l. 1: happen<ing> happened

p. 223 (end of the letter): the following postscript appears on the original letter (the last sentence has been written in German):

1 German: Rezension.—See above, n. 22 p. 7-8.
2 Editorial addition.
P.S. The last French wine we drank was a white Bordeaux (at the déjeuner at Boulogne sur mer). It was very fine.

My wife sends her warmest greetings to you and Miss Basjo—she writes soon.

p. 223 (January 16th, 1934): the address (Dr. Kl. [...] Germany) and the reference (Heidegger [...] p. 12) have been underlined with a red pencil, most probably by Kojève.

p. 224 (P.S.): Atomist—it is quite

p. 224 (undated letter), par. 2: right away

p. 225, par. 3, l. 5: Gibson

p. 225, par. 3, l. 8: in which I <misuse Gibson’s so that I <do not> need Gilson’s

p. 226, par. 2, l. 2: “Arian” “Aryan”

p. 227, penultimate line: reconstruction

p. 228, par. 2, l. 2: thereafter with Galileo

p. 228, par. 2, l. 7: the philosopher

p. 228, par. 2, l. 11: virtue the virtue of the aristocracy

p. 228, par. 2, l. 13–par. 3, l. 4 should appear as follows:

(under Bacon’s influence), while he in principle acknowledges ancient, Aristotelian ethics, the emphasis shifts from the inquiry into virtue, the end, to the inquiry into application, into the means to the establishment of virtue. Hence history, which exhibits examples of moral life, becomes more important than philosophical morality, which gives only abstract precepts. So Hobbess’ historical studies in his “youth” period are explained radically. And so Hobbess’ later break with Aristotle becomes radically intelligible. For his later teaching is absolutely nothing else than the attempt to obtain the knowledge of the end from the knowledge of the means, i.e. of the human “nature” as it is now, i.e. of the ordinary, “average” human being.

The concrete form in which he did this, the passion with which he did it, is however only intelligible from the concrete criticism of that modified Aristotelian ethics, i.e. of the aristocratic virtue, a criticism that was already noticeable in the Essays.

p. 231 (November 2), par. 2, l. 4: after “ever,” a new paragraph begins.

p. 232, par. 1, l. 4: heaven

p. 232, par. 1, l. 9: creative

p. 232, par. 2, l. 5: services

3 A word (most probably: nicht) has been cut due to a hole punched in.
history

intuited

mathem<atical>

work

you

not a single

414a.

491 and 492

very

practical

publication

before

my

some

a reply

word” to

other

anything

you

publicity

delay getting the translation out

in case

in case

For example

For example

relativism

relativism”

II.11 and II.14

11.11 and 11.14

no

absolutely no

what

what

Thaetetus

Th<eaetetus>

by the way

by the way

Thaetetus

Theaetetus

not

not

this

this

alive

alive
p. 268, sec. 1, par. 1, l. 3: Antiphon “Antiphon”
p. 268, sec. 1, par. 1, l. 4: himself. himself!
p. 268, sec. 1, par. 1, l. 5: Thoeodorus/Euclides Thaeetetus/Eudoxus
p. 268, sec. 1, par. 3, l. 4: “synthetically” “symbolically”
p. 268, sec. 2, l. 1: Endoxus Eudoxus
p. 268, sec. 2, l. 3: an arch- a kind of
p. 268, sec. 3, par. 1, penultimate line: 4 Ecl. pol. Eclogae ph ysicae
p. 268, sec. 3, par. 2, l. 2: ordinal ordinal
p. 268, sec. 3, par. 2, l. 1: origine opificio
p. 268, sec. 3, par. 2, l. 1:5 Cohen Cohn
p. 269, par. 2, l. 1: (translated) (translated!)
p. 269, par. 2, l. 8: Burkhardt Burckhardt
p. 269, par. 2, l. 6:6 Isidor Isidorus
p. 270, par. 1, l. 3: Isidor Isidorus
p. 270, par. 2, l. 4:7 Theophrantus Theophrastus
p. 271, par. 1, l. 5:8 Magerians Mysians
p. 271, par. 2, l. 3: Isodorus Isidoros
p. 271, par. 5, l. 1:9 Hegesias Hegias
p. 272, par. 2, l. 2: <“Dia...”> “diadochus”
p. 272, par. 2, ll. 4-5 interlocutors auditors
p. 272, par. 2, l. 6: were not there failed
p. 273, par. 1, penultimate line: Plato Plato
p. 277, par. 4–278, par. 1: all the occurrences of “Theatetus” should be corrected to “Theaetetus” (various typing errors have been corrected silently by the editor in this letter, which has most probably not been typed by Strauss himself).
p. 280, par. 4, penultimate line: seriously seriously
p. 281, sec. 3, penultimate line: that that

6 Vita Isidori occurs in the original text, in this instance and in the next one.
7 In his copy of the translation (reading date: 6/IV 57), Kojève noted (in German) to “Asklepiodotos” (p. 68): “Perhaps a fictional personality, as symbol of Theophrastus”
8 See Strabo, Geography, 12.iv.4 and 12.viii.2.
9 “Hegesias” is to be read in Kojève’s letter; however, the context of the quotation indicates that Kojève refers here to Hegias, a pupil of Proclus and a colleague of Isidorus.
p. 281, sec. 3, last line: opinion
p. 281, sec. 4, l. 2: there
p. 282, par. 1, l. 2: everything
p. 282, par. 1, penultimate line: among kinds or species
p. 282, par. 1, last line: kinds or species
p. 282, par. 3, l. 5: man’s
p. 283, par. 2, ll. 7-8: forgotten
p. 283, par. 2, l. 10: Megara
p. 283, par. 3, l. 3: Thaetetus
p. 283, par. 3, l. 3: easiest
p. 284, par. 1, ll. 4-5: mixing of the kinds
p. 284, par. 1, l. 5: next (proximate) kind
p. 284, sec. 1, l. 1: hemos
p. 284, sec. 1, l. 3: “an sich”
p. 284, sec. 1, l. 4: a break
p. 284, sec. 1, l. 5: hemos
p. 284, sec. 2, l. 1: for us
p. 284, to the right of the diagram: Non-A
p. 286, l. 1: mesotos
p. 286, first line below the diagram: purely empirical
p. 286, par. between brackets, l. 3: precisely
p. 286, sec. 1, par. 1, l. 3: Parm<enides>
Aristotle,
Parm<enides>
Aristotle)
p. 287, par. 3, l. 2: Megeran
p. 287, par. 4, l. 4: Megarian
p. 287, last par., l.3 : privation.
neithertheless
p. 288, par. 1, penultimate line: nevertheless
p. 288, sec. 5, par. 1, l. 1: Theaetetus
p. 288, sec. 5, par. 1, l. 5: Th<etetus>
Th<etetus>
p. 288, sec. 5, last par., l. 1: mesotos
p. 288, sec. 5, last par., l. 5: mesotos
p. 289, par. 2, l. 6 (second instance): non-A
p. 289, par. 4, penultimate line: Speusippus
Speus<ippus> etc.
p. 290: the two diagrams should be inverted (the names Plato and Aristotle should stay at the same place).
p. 290, sec. 8, par. 1, l. 2 (first instance): man
p. 290, sec. 8, par. 1, l. 3: knowable knowable
p. 290, sec. 8, par. 1, l. 13: science science
p. 292, par. 1, l. 11: report reports
p. 293, par. 1, l. 6: Beauty beauty
p. 294, par. 1, l. 2: A<…> Nina
p. 295, par. 1, l. 7: portrait portrait
p. 295, sec. XIII, l. 1: <…> whipping boys
p. 298, par. 1, l. 2: Syrianus Syrianus
p. 299, last par., last line: “Marius” “Marinus”
p. 301, 1°, l. 1: Thaet<etus> Theaet<etus>
p. 301, 4°, l. 2: Thaetetus Theaetetus
p. 301, 4°, penultimate line: Thaet<etus> Theaet<etus>
p. 301, par. 6, last line: all all
p. 301, par. 7, l. 1: [Apud] [apud]
p. 301, par. 7, l. 2: “Marianus” “Marinus”
p. 301, par. 7, l. 3: “Marianus” “Marinus”
p. 301, par. 8, l. 1: Koyrè Koyré
p. 301, par. 9, last line: oral oral
p. 302, par. 1, l. 3: first first
p. 302, par. 1, last line: you you
p. 302 (date): 5.15.58 15/1 58
p. 302, last line: Betrayal (cf. Betrayal)
p. 303, l. 1: reference mark “4” refers in fact to endnote 5 (p. 324). At the beginning of the letter, “first-class” is in English in the text.
p. 303, par. 1, l. 9: “Kings” “kings”
p. 303, par. 2, l. 4: “Marianus” “Marinus”
p. 303, par. 2, l. 7: Vespasian Pergamian
p. 303, par. 2, antepenultimate line: not not
p. 305, par. 2, l. 2: them photocopied it microfilmed
p. 310 (date): October

10 The word “reports” has been written with a pencil in the left margin; a mark indicates where it should be inserted in the text.
11 15/I 58 is also the reading date Kojève noted in his copy of Strauss’s essay on Farabi.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ABBREVIATIONS


ILH  Alexandre Kojève, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel (Paris: Gallimard, 2nd ed. 1962). The translation by James H. Nichols, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (ed. Allan Bloom, New York: Basic Books, 1969), includes slightly under one half of the original volume (see Translator’s note, p. xiii). In the present “Introductory Remarks,” the page number in the translation has been indicated in brackets after the original pagination.


NRH  Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953).

OT (1948)  Leo Strauss, On Tyranny: An Interpretation of Xenophon’s Hiero (New York: Political Science Classics, 1948). With a Foreword by Alvin Johnson.


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1 Bloom mentioned his dealing with an American publisher about this book in his letter to Kojève dated April 17, 1959 (Fonds Kojève, box XX).

2 Strauss wrote to Allan Bloom (22 August 1961, typed copy, Leo Strauss Papers, Box 4, Folder 4): “I agree with your proposal regarding the book: Hiero, On Tyranny, Kojève and my Restatement. I do not plan to write a new Foreword and I believe Alvin Johnson’s Foreword could now be dropped.”

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