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XENOPHON'S *ANABASIS*

LEO STRAUSS

Xenophon's *Anabasis* seems today to be regarded universally as his most beautiful book. I do not quarrel with this judgment. I merely wonder what its grounds are. The question is obviously reasonable; in the eighteenth century, quite a few judicious men would have assigned the highest place among Xenophon's writings to his *Memorabilia* rather than to his *Anabasis*. In other words, the fact that we judge the *Anabasis* to be Xenophon's most beautiful book does not yet prove that that judgment was shared by Xenophon. Before we can agree or disagree with the ruling opinion, we would have to know what the book meant for Xenophon, we would have to know the place and function of the book within the Corpus Xenophonum and therewith possibly the full beauty of the *Anabasis*. Perhaps we have answered our question unwittingly and thoughtlessly, if truthfully, by speaking of Xenophon's *Anabasis*, of Xenophon's ascent.

The authentic title of the book is "Cyrus' Ascent," i.e., the expedition of the younger Cyrus from the coastal plain to the interior of Asia. The title is misleading, for Cyrus' ascent came to its end in the battle of Kunaxa in which he was defeated and killed; the account of his ascent fills at most the first of the seven Books of the *Anabasis*. The title of the *Anabasis* is not the only misleading title of Xenophon's works: *The Education of Cyrus* deals with the whole life of the older Cyrus while his education is discussed only in the first Book; the *Memorabilia* contains what Xenophon remembers of Socrates' justice and not Xenophon's memorable experiences as such.

The *Anabasis* opens as follows: "Dareios and Parysatis had two sons born to them, of whom the elder was Artaxerxes and the younger Cyrus." The work begins as if it were devoted to a memorable incident in the royal family of Persia. This opening makes us see that Persia, apparently the strongest monarchy, was in fact a dyarchy in which the preference of the queen for her younger son had the gravest consequences. Yet while the *Anabasis* tells us a great deal about Persia, it tells us very little about the royal family of Persia; it cannot be said to be devoted to Persia, not even to the Persian-Greek conflict, except incidentally.

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* This manuscript was left by Leo Strauss in its handwritten form; the printed version was not seen or approved by him. The transcription presented certain difficulties, but great care was taken to assure the accuracy of the printed version.

The editors are very grateful to Joseph Cropsey for transcribing the original manuscript and to Jenny and Diskin Clay for the valuable assistance they gave him.
Perplexing and even misleading as the title and the opening of the *Anabasis* are, the identity of its author is no less enigmatic. When Xenophon recapitulates in his historical work, the *Hellenika*, with utmost brevity the events narrated in the *Anabasis*, he ascribes the account of those events to Themistogenes of Syracuse (III 1.1-2). Nothing is known about Themistogenes, not even regarding his ever having lived. One is entitled to assume that Themistogenes of Syracuse is a pseudonym for Xenophon of Athens. In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon speaks of his outstanding deeds and speeches only in the third person; he apparently wishes to preserve this kind of becoming anonymity as much as possible. Syracuse and Athens were the most outstanding commercial and naval powers of Greece; Xenophon might be thought to mean “slayer of strangers,” while Themistogenes is “the offspring of Right”; Themistogenes could seem to be a somehow idealized Xenophon. In the same context in which he mentions Themistogenes, he mentions the name of the Spartan admiral who was ordered by the ephors to assist Cyrus in his expedition; his name was Samios. When he mentions him in the *Anabasis* (I 4.2), Xenophon calls him Pythagoras. It would not be surprising if the author of the *Memorabilia*, when hearing the name “Samios” thought at once of the most famous Samian philosopher, Pythagoras.

In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon appears on the center of the stage only at the beginning of Book Three. Let us first see what we learn about him and his intention from the first two Books by observing certain peculiarities of his manner of writing. As can be expected, he will say everything necessary about the cause as well as the circumstances of Cyrus’ ascent, but it is not likely that he will forgo things worthy to be mentioned which came to his attention on the occasion of that ascent although they do not throw light on it directly. Still, it is doubtful whether what he says in particular about the fauna and flora of the countries through which he passed was not required by his interest in provisions for the army and concern with them.

In order to secure himself against disgrace and even mortal danger threatening him at the hands of his brother, the king, to whom he had become suspect, Cyrus resolved to make himself king; for this purpose he secretly assembled an army consisting of different contingents of Greek mercenaries, to say nothing of the Persian troops whose command had been entrusted to him by his brother. For his march inland he found a pretext which was plausible in the eyes of the king, but which did not fool the king’s loyal satrap Tissaphernes. Xenophon mentions as the most important stations of the way the cities which he describes by a standard formula that is susceptible of characteristic variations. The first cities mentioned are “inhabited, prosperous and large.” In the present context (I 2) the standard expression occurs three times, whereas the description of cities as “inhabited” with the omission of “prosperous and large” occurs five times; in one case the city in question is simply called “the last city of Phrygia.” What this procedure means becomes clear from the
description of Tarsos as a large and prosperous city; as is said immediately afterward, Tarsos was not inhabited, its inhabitants having fled at the approach of Cyrus’ army. In the case of the last city of Phrygia, one wonders whether it was not uninhabited even before the rumor of Cyrus’ approach reached it. This much is clear: the standard expression indicates the normal or optimal case; the variations indicate the various states of defectiveness. This has the consequence that Xenophon is not compelled to speak in many cases expressly of defects or that his general tone is less harsh, more gentle than it otherwise would be; he enables or compels himself to speak as much as possible in terms of praise rather than in terms of blame.

The inhabited, prosperous and large city is the first, in itself not important example of a practice of great importance. Let us think above all of the virtues. On a number of occasions Xenophon gives lists of virtues. Out of those lists one can easily construct a comprehensive list of all virtues which he regarded as such. In describing the character of a man who was not in all respects admirable but on the whole deserved praise, it is sufficient for Xenophon not to mention the virtues which the individual in question lacked; he does not have to speak explicitly of his blemish or blemishes. Here we mention only his silence on Cyrus’ piety in his eulogy of Cyrus (I 9).

The second Xenophontic device which must be discussed at this point is his use of legeTai (he, she, it is said to...). It makes a difference whether a human being is said to possess such and such qualities and whether he possesses them in fact. Artaxerxes and Cyrus are introduced as the sons of Dareios and Parysatis. When Xenophon speaks of the parents of the older Cyrus, in the Education of Cyrus (I 2.1), he says that Cyrus is said to be the son of Kambyses and that his mother is agreed upon to have been Mandanes. Was the paternity of Dareios known to a higher degree than was that of Kambyses? And in what way? And does this help to explain Parysatis’ preference for Cyrus? We do not know. We do not have to seek the reason why Cyrus was said to have had intercourse with Epyaxa, the wife of the king of the Kilikians (I 2.12). When Xenophon speaks of a city located near the river Marsyas, he says: “There Apollon is said to have flayed Marsyas after having defeated him when he challenged him to a contest regarding wisdom, and to have hung up his skin in the cave from which the sources (of the river Marsyas) issue....There Xerxes is said to have erected (magnificent buildings) when he returned from Greece after having been defeated in that battle” (I 2.8-9). Xenophon treats here a mythical and a non-mythical story as equally trustworthy or untrustworthy. The conflict between Apollon and Marsyas was foolishly provoked by Marsyas who received condign punishment; the conflict between Xerxes and the Greeks was foolishly provoked by Xerxes, who was of course much less severely punished: the object of the conflict between Xerxes and the Greeks was not wisdom. The parallel treatment of the two stories draws our attention
to the broad and in a sense comprehensive theme "gods and men." Yet this theme is not strictly comprehensive, let alone all-comprehensive, because of the equivocity of "gods." For instance, "The Syrians held the big and tame fishes of the river Chalus to be gods, and did not permit anyone to harm them, nor doves" (I 4.9): are these Syrian gods regarded as gods also by the Greeks? or are only those gods truly gods that are said by the Greeks to be gods? and are the latter regarded as gods by Xenophon in particular? There is surely a very important agreement in this matter between the Greeks and the Persians, in particular as regards sacrificing and swearing (I 8.16-17; II 2.9). The conflict between Greeks and Persians after Cyrus' death turns precisely on the question as to which of the two sides broke the solemnly sworn treaty. When addressing Tissaphernes, the Greek general Klearchos takes it for granted that they both agree as to the sanctity of oaths and its ground: the universal rule of the gods (II 5.7, 20-21, 39). When Cyrus' army succeeded in crossing the Euphrates River on foot, the event seemed to the people living in that place to be divine, and the river plainly to have retired before Cyrus as the man who was to be the king. The omen soon proved to be misleading, just as Cyrus' interpretation of the predictions of the Greek soothsayer proved to be wrong (I 4.18; I 7, 18-19).

The points which we have stated or indicated are brought together at the end of Book Two. Xenophon had narrated how most of the Greek generals (strategoi) and quite a few Greek captains (lochagoi) had been treacherously murdered by the Persians, and is now describing the characters of the murdered generals. One of these generals, the Thessalian Menon, proves to have been a man of unbelievable wickedness; not only was he a deceiver, liar, and perjurer; he prided himself on using these qualities and ridiculed those men who were foolish enough to become their victims. He was the one who in a critical situation determined his fellow Greeks to follow Cyrus against the king (I 4.13-17). He was a friend, and guest friend of Ariaios, the commander of Cyrus' Persian troops, who after Cyrus' death betrayed Cyrus' Greek contingent to the Persian king (II 1.5; 2.1; 4.15). Klearchos at any rate suspected that Menon was responsible for the betrayal to the Persians of his fellow officers, whereas Ariaios makes the already murdered Klearchos responsible while claiming that Menon and Proxenos, having denounced Klearchos' plotting, are greatly honored by the king (II 5.28, 38). Be this as it may, Xenophon concludes his statement on Menon as follows: "While Menon's fellow generals were killed for having campaigned against the king together with Cyrus, he was not killed although he had done the same things, but after the death of the other generals the king took revenge on him by killing him, not as Klearchos and the other generals who were beheaded, which is thought to be the quickest death, but, having been tortured alive for a year, is said to have met the end of an evil man" (II 6.29). The king of Persia punished most severely that Greek general whose crime, whose perjury, whose breach of solemnly sworn
oaths, was most beneficial to him; Menon was punished for his impiety, not by any god, but by the human beneficiary of his crime. But this "is said" to have been done. It suffices to note that whereas in the case of the other murdered generals Xenophon tells us how old they were when they died, he is silent on this point in the case of Menon. The implicit premise of the justice or highmindedness of the king of Persia is as credible as that of the gods' revenge of perjury. Through the quoted "he is said" sentence Xenophon is enabled to present things—all things, "the world"—as grander and better than they are (cf. Thucydides I 21.1) while indicating at the same time the difference between the naked truth and the adornment. He has succeeded, not indeed in mitigating his harsh condemnation of Menon—what useful purpose would have been served by such mitigation?—but nevertheless in speaking on the whole in terms of praise rather than in terms of blame.

With a slight exaggeration one may say that Book Two ends with Menon and Book Three begins with Xenophon taking the center of the stage. At any rate, the end of Book Two and the beginning of Book Three read as if they were meant to bring out the contrast between Menon and Xenophon, between the arch-villain and the hero. It remains to be seen whether Menon is truly the foil of Xenophon in the Anabasis.

In his first enumeration of the Greek contingents of Cyrus' army Xenophon mentions the generals of those contingents in this order: 1) Klearchos of Sparta, 2) Aristedpos the Thessalian, 3) Proxenos the Boiotian, 4) Sophainetos the Symphalian and Sokrates the Achaian (I 1.9-11); Menon is not mentioned here because he joined Cyrus' expedition after it had already begun its march inland (I 2.6). At any rate, the contingent led by Proxenos, and hence Proxenos, can well be said to occupy the central place in the initial enumeration. When describing the characters of the Greek generals at the end of Book Two, Xenophon speaks extensively only of three of them: Klearchos, Proxenos and Menon (II 6); Proxenos is again in the center. Why does Proxenos deserve that place?

Let us now see what we learn from the first two Books about Xenophon. It should go without saying that the "I" who is said to have said or written or thought something in the Anabasis (I 2.5; 9.22, 28; II 3.1; 6.6), unless this happens in a quotation from a speech explicitly ascribed to Xenophon, cannot be identified by anyone who has a decent respect for our author, with Xenophon, but only with Themistogenes of Syracuse. Xenophon himself occurs in these Books three times. In the first place he approaches Cyrus who is just passing by on horseback while surveying the two opposed armies and asks him whether he has any orders to give; Cyrus commands him to tell everyone that the sacrifices are favorable and that the entrails of the sacrificed beasts are fine. Xenophon was also fortunate enough to be able to satisfy Cyrus' curiosity regarding a similar point (I 8.15-17). This conversation is important, not so much because it takes place shortly before the fatal battle but because
it is the only exchange between Xenophon and Cyrus recorded by Xenophon, just as there is only one exchange between Xenophon and Socrates in the *Memorabilia*; the former concerns sacrifices, the latter concerns the dangers inherent in kissing handsome boys. When Xenophon occurs in the *Anabasis* for the second time, he is in the company of Proxenos (II 4.15); when he occurs for the third time, he is in the company of two other generals (II 5.37, 41). In the central case, Proxenos is again somehow in the center.

But we must not completely overlook an occasion on which Xenophon is indeed not mentioned by name yet may very well have been meant. After the battle of Kunaxa, when Cyrus was already dead but his Greek mercenaries were victorious, the king sent heralds to the Greeks, one of them being the Greek traitor Phalinus, with the request to give up their arms. The chief speaker for the Greeks was in fact the Athenian Theopompos, who explains to Phalinus that the only good things which they have are arms and virtue, but their virtue would not be of any avail without the arms; with the help of their arms they might even fight with the Persians about the Persians' good things. When Phalias heard this, he laughed and said, "You resemble a philosopher, young man, and speak gracefully" (II 1.13-14). Theopompos' thesis is identical to the one most familiar to us from Aristotle: virtue, and especially moral virtue, is in need of external equipment (*Eth. Nic.* 1178a 23-25, 1177a 27-34; compare *Mem.* I 6.10 and *Oec.* II 1-4). Why Xenophon should appear for a moment in the guise of a Theopompos ("God-sent") will become manifest soon.

After the murder of their generals and of many of their captains the Greeks were utterly disheartened, when they considered the situation in which they found themselves; only few of them could take food, kindled a fire, or went to their arms. In spite or because of this, all of them settled down to rest for the night—with one exception: "There was in the army a certain Xenophon from Athens who went with the expedition without being a general, a captain, or a soldier of any sort but Proxenos, being a guest-friend of his for a long time, had sent for him who was then at home. He promised him if he came to make him a friend of Cyrus whom Proxenos himself said he regarded as better for him than his fatherland." We begin now to understand why Proxenos is assigned a central place: he was the one who had suggested to Xenophon to join Cyrus' army (III 1.1-4). Proxenos was then not unqualifiedly attached to Boiotia or for that matter to Greece; he was to some extent uprooted. Apparently he had no doubt that Xenophon was not unqualifiedly attached to Athens or even to Greece, that he too was to some extent uprooted, although he does not state why this was the case. To whom or what was then Proxenos attached? From his very youth he desired to become a man capable of doing the great things and for this reason he took paid instruction from Gorgias of Leontini. After his intercourse with Gorgias he had come to believe that he was now
capable both to rule and, by being a friend of the first men, not to be inferior to them in requiting them for the benefits he received from them; in this state of mind he joined Cyrus. He believed to acquire through his actions with Cyrus a great name and great power and much money; but he was obviously concerned with acquiring those things only in just and noble ways. He was indeed able to rule gentlemen but he was unable to inspire the soldiers with awe and fear of himself; he obviously feared to become hated by the soldiers; he thought that it was sufficient for being and [being] regarded a good ruler that one praise him who acted well and not praise him who acted unjustly (II 6.16-20). Proxenos and Xenophon, in contradistinction to Menon and even to Klearchos, were amiable gentlemen. Proxenos seems to be more attracted to the noble acquisition of fame, great power and great wealth anywhere on earth than to his fatherland. Xenophon is clearly distinguished from Proxenos by the fact that he was tougher, wittier and wittier than the latter. One is tempted to trace this difference to the difference between their teachers, Gorgias and Socrates. But Gorgias was also the teacher of Menon. The difficulty cannot be disposed of by the assertion that Socrates was a philosopher and Gorgias a sophist, for how do we know that Gorgias was a sophist according to Xenophon or his Socrates? (cf. Plato, *Meno* 70a5-b2, 95b9-c8, 96d5-7; cf. *Gorgias* 465c1-5). This much however may safely be said, that this difference between Proxenos and Xenophon is likely to be connected with Xenophon's having been familiar with Socrates. Must we then understand Xenophon—the Xenophon presented in the *Anabasis*—in the light of Socrates?

When Xenophon had read the letter from Proxenos, he communicated with Socrates of Athens about the journey. (Socrates is called here "Socrates of Athens" because Xenophon of Athens is not the writer.) Xenophon was obviously aware of the gravity of the step which he contemplated and sought therefore the counsel of an older and wiser man. Socrates suspected that Xenophon might get into trouble with the city by becoming a friend of Cyrus, since Cyrus was thought to have warred zealously together with the Spartans against Athens in the Peloponnesian War. But of course he did not know. Nor did his *daimonion* give him any guidance, or if it did, it was not of any authority for the city, to say nothing of the fact that its verdict might be disputable (cf. Plato, *Theages* 128d8-e6). He therefore advised Xenophon to go to Delphi and to communicate with the god about the journey. Xenophon followed that advice and asked Apollon in Delphi to what god he should sacrifice and pray in order to make the contemplated journey in the most noble and best way and, after having performed noble actions, to return safely. Apollon told him to which gods he ought to sacrifice. Xenophon does not tell us why Apollon did not give him any guidance regarding the god or gods to whom he ought to pray. On his return to Athens, he reported at once to Socrates. Socrates was somewhat taken aback: instead of asking the god first whether it would be better for Xenophon to make the
journey or to stay at Athens, he had by himself decided to go and asked
the god only how he could make the journey in the most noble way.
Xenophon must have thought that the question as to whether becoming
a friend of Cyrus was in itself desirable, and in particular as to whether
the Athenians' reaction to this was worth considering, could be answered
by his own unassisted powers, but that no human being could know
whether the journey would be beneficial to Xenophon (cf. Mem. I 1.6-8;
cf. Hellen. VII 1.27). Perhaps Xenophon, as distinguished from Socrates,
was rash in underestimating the hostile reaction of the city of Athens to
his joining Cyrus. Socrates merely replied that after he had addressed
to Apollon the second or secondary question, he must do what the god
had commanded him to do. Therefore Xenophon sacrificed to the gods
whom Apollon had mentioned and left Athens (III 1.5-8): he is as silent
about prayers as Apollon.

The agreements as well as the disagreements between Xenophon and
Socrates regarding the oracle make it all the more necessary for us to
return to the question as to whether the Xenophon presented in the
Anabasis must be understood in the light of Socrates, in other words,
as to what precisely is the difference between the two men. Xenophon
was a man of action: he did the political things in the common sense
of the term, whereas Socrates did not; but Socrates taught his companions
the political things with the emphasis on strategy and tactics (Mem.
I 2.16-17; 6.15; III 1). What this difference means in simple practical
terms appears when we remember the three ends which Proxenos so
nobly pursued: a great name, great power and much wealth. Socrates,
we know, was very poor and in no way dissatisfied with this condition.
As to Xenophon, he returned from the expedition with Cyrus in very
comfortable circumstances (V 3.7-10). This proves that he exercised
successfully the economic art in the common sense of the expression.
But this implies that Xenophon, as distinguished from Socrates, was
desirous of wealth, of course only of nobly acquired moderate wealth.
In this respect he resembles Ischomachos who taught Socrates the
economic art, not exercised by Socrates, rather than Socrates; Xenophon
also makes us think of his contemporary and friend Kritoboulos whom
Socrates tried to teach the economic art, but in his case Xenophon leaves
it open whether Socrates had any success (cf. the Oeconomicus). We
hardly go too far by saying that the principle which individualizes
Xenophon in the Anabasis comes to sight by the contrast between him
and Socrates, and not by that between him and Proxenos, to say no
further word of Menon.

Cyrus deceived Xenophon as well as Proxenos about the purpose of
his expedition; he did not say a word to anyone about his plan to depose
or kill the king except to Klearchos, the most renowned general in his
employment. But after his army had come to Kilikia, everyone saw that
the expedition was aimed against the king. Yet most of the Greeks—
Xenophon being one of them—did not abandon Cyrus out of shame
before one another or before Cyrus. Xenophon was as disheartened as everyone else after the Persians' treachery but then he had during a short slumber a most astounding dream. He dreamed that a lightning had struck his father's house and had set it altogether on fire so that no one could escape. This dream was in one respect comforting: Xenophon seemed to see a great light coming from Zeus; but on the other hand, Zeus is a king and might show by a dream what was awaiting those who had dared to attack the king of Persia (III 1.9-12; cf. I 3.8, 13, 21; 6.5, 9; II 2.2-5). The dream brought Xenophon, and Xenophon alone, to his senses: he must do something, and at once. He gets up and calls first Proxenos' captains together. He addresses to them a speech which is quoted in full and in which he sets forth clearly and forcefully the dangers to which they are exposed as well as the great benefits accruing to the Greeks from the Persians' treachery: the Greeks are now no longer under an obligation to comply with the treaty; they may now justly take of the Persians' possessions whatever and however much they like. The judges of the contest are the gods, who will be on the side of the Greeks, as is reasonable to assume; for the oaths were broken by the Persians while they were strictly observed by the Greeks. Xenophon mentions in this speech the gods five times. He concludes the speech by promising the captains his full cooperation and even more than that: if they wish him to lead them, he will not use his youth as a pretext for declining the leadership. He is naturally elected to be their leader, i.e., the successor to Proxenos, with the unanimity of all who were in fact captains and even Greeks (III 1.12-26). This is the beginning of Xenophon's ascent: through a single speech, spoken at the right moment, and in the right way, he has become from a nobody a general.

Proxenos' captains next called together the generals and other high commanders who had survived the bloodbath, of all Greek contingents. Introduced by the oldest of Proxenos' captains, Xenophon is asked to say to this more stately assembly what he had said to Proxenos' captains; but he does not simply repeat himself. The second speech is again quoted in full. He puts now the emphasis on the fact that the salvation of the Greeks depends decisively on the mood and conduct of the commanders; they must act as the models for the soldiers. Therefore, the most urgent thing to do is to replace the murdered commanders; for everything, especially in war, depends on good order and discipline. In this speech, the gods are mentioned only once. The officers then proceed to the election of five new generals, one of these being Xenophon (III 1.32-47).

Shortly after that election, when the next day was about to begin to break, the commanders decided to call an assembly of the soldiers. The soldiers were first briefly addressed by the Spartan Cheirisophos and then by the Arcadian Kleanor, who had been assigned the central place in Xenophon's enumeration of the newly elected generals (III 1.47). Kleanor's speech is about twice as long as Cheirisophos' and is devoted to a rehearsal of the Persian treachery, about which Cheirisophos had
been silent. Accordingly, Cheirisophos refers only once to the gods, but Kleanor four times. Yet their speeches served only as preludes to the speech by which Xenophon addressed this most stately assembly before which he appeared in as stately an attire as he possibly could: he wished to be attired becomingly for victory as well as for death on the field of honor. When he mentioned the many fine hopes of salvation which they may have if they wage ruthless war against their enemies, a man sneezed. Thereupon all soldiers with one impulse made obeisance to the god (cf. Aristophanes, *Knights* 638-45). Xenophon grasped the opportunity thus offered with both hands or without any false shame; he interpreted the sneezing as an omen from Zeus the Savior and proposed that they vow to offer sacrifices to that god as soon as they come to a friendly land, but to make a vow also to offer sacrifices to the other gods according to every man’s ability. He put this proposal to a vote; it was unanimously adopted. Thereupon they made their vows and chanted. After this pious beginning, Xenophon began his speech by explaining what he meant by the many fine hopes of salvation which the Greeks have. They are based in the first place on their having kept the oaths sworn by the god in contrast to the perjury committed by the enemy; hence it is reasonable to assume that the gods will be opposed to the Persians and will be allies of the Greeks, and the gods can of course be of very great help if they wish. Xenophon arouses the Greeks’ hopes furthermore by reminding them of the deliverance of their ancestors with the gods’ help from the Persians in the Persian wars. Even Cyrus’ Greek contingents defeated the many more numerous Persians a few days ago with the gods’ help and then the prize was Cyrus’ kingly rule: but now the prize is the very salvation of the Greeks. Having arrived at this point, Xenophon ceases to mention the gods. As orator he had spoken of the gods in this third speech eleven times, whereas he had spoken of them in his first speech five times and in his central speech only once.

He turns next to purely human considerations or measures. In this connection he points out that if the Persians succeeded in preventing the Greeks from returning to Greece, the Greeks might very well settle down in the midst of Persia, so rich in all kinds of good things, not the least in beautiful and tall women and maidens. Could the vision of himself as founder of a city in some barbaric place be the second stage of his ascent? We recall that Proxenos’ invitation to join Cyrus could have implied his certainty as to the lukewarmness of Xenophon’s patriotism, not to say Xenophon’s lack of patriotism; this impression could seem to be reinforced by what Xenophon says now to the army. Be this as it may, the final and by no means the least important measures which he proposes to the army are the restoration and even strengthening of the commanders’ punitive powers, which must be supported by the active and zealous assistance of every member of the army; he demands that this proposal be put to the vote. He is strongly supported in this matter by the Spartan Cheirisophos and the proposal is thereupon unanimously
adopted. Finally Xenophon proposes that Cheirosophos be put in command of the van of the army on the march, and he and Timasion, the two youngest generals, in command of the rear. This proposal too is unanimously adopted. Xenophon has become quite informally, if not the commander of the whole army, at least its spiritus rector. After the most urgent matters have been settled, Xenophon reminds in particular those who desire wealth that they must try to be victorious; for the victors will both preserve what belongs to them and take what belongs to the defeated (III 2). The economic art as the art of increasing one’s wealth can be exercised by means of the military art (Oec. I 15).

The Persians next tried with very minor success to corrupt the Greek soldiers and even captains. They were more successful when they sent bowmen and slingers against the Greek rear guard, which suffered considerable losses and were unable to retaliate. Xenophon thought of a device which proved to be wholly useless. He was blamed by some of his fellow generals and accepted the blame in good grace. By analyzing what had happened more closely and by drawing on his knowledge of things military, which he surely had not acquired during the present campaign, he found a solution which promised to redress the Persians’ superiority in slingers and cavalry. Again his proposals were adopted.

In his speech to the soldiers Xenophon had explained to them that their fear of being cut off from the way to Greece by the big and deep rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, was unfounded: all rivers, even though they are impassable at a distance from their sources, become passable if one approaches their sources (III 2.22). He had failed to mention there that this solution brings up a new predicament: the predicament caused by mountain ranges, by the ascent. After having defeated the Persians, the Greeks reached the Tigris River at the deserted city of Larisa, originally Median, which could not be taken by the Persians at the time when they conquered Media, until a cloud concealed the sun and the inhabitants thereupon fled from the city. The Greeks came next to another originally Median city, which the Persians also could not take until Zeus horrified the inhabitants with thunder. (Shortly before making this remark Xenophon uses the expression legetai: are we to think that Zeus’ having caused the thunder is what was said as distinguished from what was known?) The Greeks continued their march while the Persians pursued them cautiously, especially after the Greeks had improved their tactical arrangements. Their situation improved in proportion as the country through which they had marched became more hilly, but whenever they had to descend from the hills to the plain, they suffered considerable losses. On one occasion there arose a difference of opinion between Cheirisophos and Xenophon which was soon amicably settled. The settlement required a strenuous uphill march, to which Xenophon, riding on horseback, encouraged the soldiers in question by a somewhat exaggerated promise. When one of the soldiers complained that the ascent was easy
for Xenophon who was on horseback, while he was marching on foot carrying his shield, Xenophon leaped down from his horse, pushed the complaining soldier out of his place, took away the shield from him and marched on with it as fast as he could, although he had on his cavalry breastplate in addition to the infantryman's shield. But the rest of the soldiers sided with Xenophon, and by their striking and abusing the complaining soldier, forced him to take back his shield and to march on (III 4). Xenophon was not a Proxenos.

Another difference of opinion between Cheirisophos and Xenophon arose when the Persians began to burn down the villages near the Tigris which were well supplied with victuals. Xenophon seemed to be well pleased with the spectacle: as long as there was a treaty between the Greeks and the Persians, the Greeks were obliged to abstain from doing harm to the king's country but now the Persians themselves admit by their actions that the country is no longer the king's: therefore we ought to stop the Persians' incendiaries. Cheirisophos, however, thought that the Greeks too should set about burning, for in this way the Persians would stop the sooner. Xenophon, who may have remembered his thought that if the worst came to the worst, the Greeks could settle down in the midst of the king's possessions, did not reply. However this may be, the officers were greatly disheartened. Yet after the interrogation of the prisoners the generals decided to march north through the mountainous land of the Karduchians—a difficult land inhabited by a warlike people but not subject to the Persian king. This decision proved to be the Greeks' salvation. While it was taken by "the generals," its seed had been planted, as we have seen, by Xenophon's speech to the soldiers (III 5).

Books Two to Five and Seven begin with summaries which state very briefly what had been narrated before (but cf. also VI 3.1). In none of these summaries or introductions is the name of Xenophon mentioned. He may have wished to counteract the not involuntary but inevitable self-praise conveyed through the narration of his deeds and speeches. The introduction to Book Four is by far the most extensive, about as long as the introductions to Books Two, Three, Five and Seven taken together. Book Four is the central book. By failing to supply Book Six with an introduction, Xenophon brings it about that Book Four is the central Book also among the Books supplied with introductions. Is the doubly central position of Book Four justified by its content?

The Karduchians were no friends, let alone allies, of the Persian king. This does not mean that they gave the Greeks a friendly reception. On the contrary, when the Greeks entered their land, they fled into the high mountains, taking their women and children with them, and inflicted as many losses on the Greeks as they could. In fact, during the seven days during which they marched through the Karduchians' land, they had to fight all the time and suffered more evils than the king and Tissaphernes altogether had inflicted on them while they marched through Persia (IV 3.2). The difficulties were considerably increased by the snow which
began to fall. Cheirisophos was now in sole command of the van and
Xenophon of the rear. Communication between the van and the rear
became very difficult especially since the rear was very hard-pressed
by the enemy and the forward march of the rear began to resemble a
flight. When Xenophon complained to Cheirisophos about his not having
waited for the rear, the Spartan had a good excuse but could not suggest
a solution; the solution was suggested by Xenophon, whose men had
taken two prisoners. By having one of them slaughtered within the sight
of the other, he induced the latter to help the Greeks to overcome the
obstacles caused by his countrymen and to act as the Greeks’ guide. The
march through the land of the Karduchians reveals again the bravery
and resourcefulness of the Greeks and especially of Xenophon. Despite
the savage fighting with the barbarians, under a treaty Xenophon
succeeded in recovering from them the Greek dead and burying those
dead in a most becoming manner.

From the difficult and dangerous mountains of the Karduchians they
descended to Armenia, which is lying in the plain and whose climate
seemed to offer in every respect a relief from the hardship suffered from
the former country and its inhabitants. Yet their entry into Armenia was
blocked by a river difficult to cross, and the crossing was resisted by an
army consisting of Persians and of Persian mercenaries, some of them
Armenians. In addition, the Karduchians reappeared in force in the rear
of the Greeks and likewise tried to prevent the Greeks’ crossing the river.
Thus the Greeks were again in great difficulties. In that situation
Xenophon had a dream—just as in the night after Kunaxa—but the
present dream was much less frightening, and when dawn came he
reported it to Cheirisophos together with its favorable interpretation of
Xenophontic origin. The good omen was confirmed by the sacrifices
offered in the presence of all generals which were all favorable from the
very beginning. Xenophon, who could always be easily approached by
the soldiers if they had to tell anything related to the war, was now told
by two young men that they had by accident discovered a ford. Xenophon
showed his gratitude to the gods for the dreams and the other helps in
the proper manner and informed Cheirisophos at once of the two young
men’s discovery of the ford. Before crossing the river, Cheirisophos put
a wreath upon his head and the soothsayers were offering sacrifices to
the river; these sacrifices too were favorable. In these circumstances it is
not surprising that the Greeks succeeded in their enterprise. Contrary to
what “Theopompos of Athens,” who resembled a philosopher, had said,
weapons and virtue were not the only good things within the power of
the Greeks (II 1.12-13); or, if you wish, the gods’ favor followed with
a kind of necessity the Greeks’ keeping their oaths. Yet if one wishes,
one may also say that one of the virtues by which Xenophon distin-
guished himself was his piety, provided one adds that his piety is hard
to distinguish from that combination of toughness, wittiness and willingness
which separated him from Proxenos and which revealed itself already
to some extent in the query addressed by him to the god in Delphi. It surely differs *toto caelo* from the piety of a Nikias.

After their entry into Armenia the Greeks marched through western Armenia, which was ruled by Tiribazos, a “friend” of the king of Persia. Tiribazos tried to conclude a treaty with the Greeks. Despite their two experiences with Tissaphernes and the king, the Greek generals accepted the offer. But this time they were cautious enough to prevent another Persian treachery. The Greeks were helped and hindered by heavy snowfall. Xenophon’s example showed them again a way out. Violations of the treaty had also been committed by some Greek soldiers who had wantonly burned down the houses in which they had been quartered; they were punished for their transgressions by having to live in poor quarters. Their further march through Armenia was again hampered by deep snow, and the north wind blowing full in their faces and freezing the men. Then one of the soothsayers told them to offer sacrifices to the wind; when this was done, it seemed quite clear to all that the violence of the storm abated (IV 5.4): “seeming quite clear to all” is more trustworthy than “what is said.” Owing to the snow many of the human beings began to suffer from ravenous hunger; Xenophon did not know what the trouble was but when he learned it from an experienced man, he did the necessary things with the desired result.

While the march through the land of the hostile Karduchians inflicted many hardships on the Greeks, the march through Armenia was gay and the reception by the natives was very kindly. This was due to a great extent to an Armenian village chief (*komarchos*) with whom Xenophon succeeded in establishing a most cordial relation within the shortest time. Provisions and especially an excellent wine were ample. When Xenophon came the next day in the company of the village chief to look after the soldiers, he found them feasting, cheerful and most hospitable. With the help of the village chief Xenophon and Cheirisophos found out that the horses bred there were meant as a tribute to the king. Xenophon took one of the colts for himself and gave his own rather old horse to the village chief for fattening up and sacrifice, for he heard that it was sacred to Helios. He also gave colts to the other high commanders. (The number of horses bred for the king in Armenia was seventeen; the daughter of the village chief had been married nine days before, and nine is the center of seventeen. [IV 5.24]—Gods are mentioned by Xenophon as orator in his first three speeches by which he established his ascendancy seventeen times: III 1.15-2.39).

Perhaps we are now in a position to answer the question as to why Book Four—or at least the account of the march through the land of the Karduchians and through Armenia—is located in the center of the *Anabasis*. We might add here that Book Four is the only Book of the *Anabasis* in which no formal oaths (like “by Zeus,” “by the gods,” and so on) occur. The march through the Karduchians’ country is the toughest and
Xenophon's Anabasis

the march through Armenia is characterized by descriptions of gaiety: the Karduchians and the Armenians are in a way the two poles. When we turn from the Anabasis to the Education of Cyrus (III 1.14 and 38-39), we find in the latter work and only there a kind of explanation of the distinction accorded to Armenia in the Anabasis. The son of the king of Armenia had a friend, a "sophist," who suffered the fate of Socrates because the king of Armenia was envious of his son’s admiring that "sophist" more than his own father and therefore accused that "sophist" of "corrupting" his son. Armenia seems to be the barbarian analogon to Athens. It is then not quite true that the Persian-Greek antagonism is of no or of only subordinate importance in the Anabasis.

From here we understand somewhat better than before the difference between Xenophon and Socrates. The Armenian analogon to Socrates is perfectly free from any desire for revenge with his pupil’s father. More generally stated, he does not believe that virtue consists in surpassing one’s friends in benefiting them, and in surpassing one’s enemies in harming them; he tacitly rejects the notion of virtue which Socrates tries to instill into the mind of Kritoboulos (Mem. II 6.35; II 3.14), the gentleman’s virtue, and which Cyrus is said to have possessed to an extremely high degree (Anabasis I 9.11,24,28; cf. ibid., V 5.20). The questionable character of this notion of virtue is pointed out not only by the Platonic Socrates (Rep. 335d11-12) but also by Xenophon’s two lists of Socrates’ virtues in which courage (manliness) does not occur and in which justice is identified with never harming anyone in the slightest (Mem. IV 8.11 and Apol. Soc. 15-18).

The ascent of Xenophon or rather his native ascendancy showed itself in the sole serious rift between him and Cheirisophos. He had given to Cheirisophos the village chief as guide. Since the Armenian did not quite act according to Cheirisophos’ wishes, the Spartan beat him without binding him; thereupon the Armenian ran away (IV 6.3). Proxenos would never have beaten the village chief; Cheirisophos beat him, just as Klearchos would have done, but failed to bind him; Xenophon would have beaten him if necessary but have taken the precaution of binding him; Xenophon keeps to the right mean.

When after some time their way was again blocked by hostile natives, Cheirisophos called together a council of generals. Two opposed proposals were made. Kleanor favored a straight attack on the barbarians’ strong position. Xenophon also was no less eager to overcome the obstacle but to do it with the minimum loss of lives; he proposes to achieve the goal in the easiest way: the enemy position should be taken not by means of a frontal attack but by means of a feint, of “stealing.” He appeals to the excellent training of the Spartan ruling class in stealing. After he has thus gained Cheirisophos’ good will, the Spartan replies equally good-naturedly that the Athenians are outstanding in stealing public money, as is shown by the fact that they prefer to have the best thieves for their rulers. Xenophon’s proposal is naturally adopted with
a minor modification suggested by Cheirisophos and leads to an entire success. In a similar incident shortly thereafter it was again in the first place Xenophon's shrewd calculation, as distinguished from Cheirisophos' simple aggressiveness, which overcame the obstacle to the Greeks' onward march that was caused by other barbarian tribes (IV 7.1-14). After some further strenuous efforts the Greeks came finally within sight of the sea. Xenophon, who was in command of the rear, was so to speak the last Greek who was vouchsafed this deeply moving and beautiful sight. But this did not minimize in the least the greatness of his achievement: it was his prudent counsel which had saved the Greeks from the king's and the other barbarians' attempts to destroy them.

If there could be any doubt about this, it would be disposed of by the grand, solemn and gay celebration which the Greeks staged after having arrived at the Greek city of Trapezus, located at the Black Sea in the land of [the] Kolchians. They stayed for about thirty days in Kolchis where they found ample provisions partly by plundering and partly by buying from the Trapezuntianes. Thereafter they prepared the sacrifices which they had vowed. They sacrificed to Zeus the Savior and to Heracles the Leader as well as to the other gods to whom they had made vows. Here Xenophon seems to disclose the identity of the gods to whom the god in Delphi had advised him to sacrifice prior to his departure and which he had disclosed previously only to Socrates (III 1.6-8).

Next the question arose of how the army should continue its progress toward Greece proper. There was universal agreement that the rest of the journey should be made by sea. Cheirisophos promised that if he were sent to the admiral in command of the Spartan navy, he would bring back the ships required for the purpose. This proposal was approved by the army. Xenophon alone, who was the least sanguine, uttered a warning. He told the soldiers what they would have to do and how they would have to behave until Cheirisophos' return, and in particular that they could not be certain that Cheirisophos' mission would succeed. But when he drew their attention to the fact that they might have to continue their way by land and hence that the cities situated along the sea ought to be directed to repair the road, the soldiers protested loudly: under no circumstances would they continue to march by land. Xenophon wisely refrained therefore from putting his proposal to the vote but achieved what he regarded as indispensable by persuading the cities to take care of the roads; in addition, of the detachments which disregarded Xenophon's injunctions, some were destroyed by enemy action.

After Cheirisophos' departure Xenophon was in fact the chief commander of the whole Greek army. The Trapezuntianes did not wish to get into trouble with the Kolchians for the sake of approvisioning the Greek army and therefore led that army against the Drilai, the most warlike of the peoples of the Pontos who inhabited territory difficult of access. The Greeks' light armed troops could not take the enemy stronghold and it was quite impossible for them to retreat. In this situation
Xenophon, asked for a decision, agreed with the view of the captains that an assault on the stronghold be made by the hoplites, for he put his reliance on the favorable sacrifices as interpreted by the soothsayers (V 2.9). The counsels of human prudence and the hints of the god proved to be in full agreement: the stronghold was taken by the hoplites. But this was not yet the end of the battle; an enemy reserve, apparently first observed by Xenophon, came to sight upon certain strong heights. That is to say: there was agreement between the view of the other commanders, and not of Xenophon in particular, and that of the soothsayers. The situation was as desperate as it was before Xenophon's intervention. Then quite unexpectedly and suddenly some god gave the Greeks a saving device: somebody—only god knows how and why—set a house on fire and this led to a panic on the part of the enemy; when Xenophon grasped the lesson supplied by chance, he gave orders that all houses, i.e., the whole city, be burned down. What was first called "some god," is now called "chance": deus sive casus. It is surely something different from human prudence or, from the point of view of the good pursuit of human prudence, something higher than human prudence which brought about the Greek victory (Mem. I 1.8). It was Xenophon's reliance on the superhuman, on the daimonion, which distinguished him from the other commanders and which showed itself with particular clarity after he had become in fact the commander-in-chief. One cannot help wondering how Xenophon's extraordinary piety went together with his extraordinary wiliness. As a human being he was surely less powerful than any god. But may he not have been wilier than any god? May not a slave be wilier than his master, however wily? Yet, the gods, in contradistinction to human beings, know everything (Mem. I 1.19, but compare Symposium 4.47); therefore, they will see through every human ruse. But is precisely the attribution of omniscience to the gods not part of a human ruse, of human flattering? The great difficulty which here remains in Xenophon or his Socrates is connected with the fact that according to him (or to them), the pious man is the man who knows the laws, or what is established by laws, regarding the gods, and that he never raises the question, "what is law?" (Mem. IV 6.4 and I 2.41-46). This difficulty cannot be resolved within the context of an interpretation of the Anabasis. It would be both simpler and less simple to say that Xenophon or his Socrates never raise the still more fundamental question, "what is a god?"

The Greeks were finally compelled to leave Trapezus by land. Only the least strong, led by the two oldest generals, were sent off by boat. Those who marched arrived on the third day in Kerasus, a Greek city on the sea where they stayed for ten days, made a review of the hoplites and counted them: 8,600 hoplites out of about 10,000 proved to have survived. Thereafter they distributed the money received from the sale of the booty. A tithe had been assigned to Apollo and to Artemis of Ephesus; each of the generals took his part to them in the place indi-
cated by the god. Xenophon specifies how he applied the portion entrusted to him in honor of Apollon. As for the portion to be given by him in honor of Artemis, he ran into some difficulty because in the meantime he had been exiled by the city of Athens—presumably because he was fighting on the side of the Spartans against his fatherland—but the Spartans settled him in Skillus where he bought a plot of land for Artemis according to Apollon’s oracular choice. The land was rich in beasts of chase; the hunting, to which the whole neighborhood was invited, took place in honor of the huntress-goddess. Xenophon had the temple to the goddess built as a replica of the Artemis-temple in Ephesus. It would indeed have been a shocking solecism if he had abandoned his piety or receded from its demands after his blessed return. His account of his life in Skillus is a fitting conclusion to his account of the supreme command which he exercised after Cheirisophos’ departure.

From Kerasus the Greeks proceeded by sea or by land to the mountains of the Mossynoikians. The Mossynoikians to whom they came first attempted to prevent them from passing through their territory, but Xenophon arranged an alliance with those Mossynoikians who were enemies of the former. The attack upon the enemy stronghold led to a disgraceful defeat not only of the allied barbarians but also of those Greeks who had of their own free will accompanied them for the sake of plunder. On the next day however, the whole Greek army, properly prepared by sacrifices which were favorable, attacked and was entirely successful. The Greeks were naturally well received by the allied Mossynoikians. Those people were regarded by the soldiers as the most barbarous men whom they had met on their march, the most remote from the Greek laws, for they did in public what others would do only when they are alone, and when they were alone they would act as if they were in the company of others—talking to themselves, laughing by themselves, dancing wherever they chanced to be, as if they were giving an exhibition to others (V 4.33-34). We were previously led to believe that the Karduchians and the Armenians were the two poles whom the Greeks came to know on their march. We see now that the Mossynoikoi are more alien to the Greeks than either the Karduchians or the Armenians. This does not mean, as goes without saying, that the Mossynoikians lived in a “state of nature”; they lived under laws as well as all other tribes. All men live under laws; to this extent, law is natural to man or law belongs to man’s nature. Yet it is nevertheless necessary to make a distinction between nature and law (cf. Oec. 7.29-30 and Hiero 3.9) and to preserve it. Some light falls on the seeming paradox if we observe the similarity of some traits of the most extreme barbarians with some traits of Socrates (cf. Symposium 2.18-19; cf. Plato, Symposium, 175a7-b3, c3-d2, 217b7-c7, 220c3-d5).

When the Greeks came to the land of the Tibarenians, the generals were tempted to attack their fortresses but they abstained from this since
the sacrifices were not favorable and all soothsayers agreed that the gods in no way permitted that war. So they marched peacefully through the Tibareniens' land until they came to Kotyora, a Greek city, a colony of the Sinopeans. There they stayed 45 days, in the first place sacrificing to the gods and each Greek tribe instituting processions and gymnastic contests. As for provisions, they had to take them by force, since no one sold them any. Thereupon the Sinopeans became frightened and sent an embassy to the army. The spokesman for the embassy was Hekatonymos, who was thought to be a clever speaker. He revealed his power of oratory by addressing to the Greek soldiers a few friendly words which were followed by a much more extensive and insulting threat to the effect that the Sinopeans might ally themselves with the Paphlagonians and anybody else against Xenophon's army. Xenophon disposed of the threat by not only contrasting the customs and actions of the Sinopeans with those of the Trapezuntians and even some of the barbarians through whose land they had passed, but by a much more effective counter-threat: the alliance with the Paphlagonians is at least as possible for Xenophon's army as for the Sinopeans. As a consequence of Xenophon's oratory Hekatonymos lost his standing among his fellow ambassadors and there was perfect harmony between the Sinopeans and the army. Xenophon had perfectly succeeded in defending the army against the charge of injustice; he had given a signal proof of his justice by presenting his possible recourse to war against Greeks in alliance with barbarians as an act of sheer self-defense.

Yet the harmony was not as perfect as it seemed at first. On the next day the generals called together an assembly of the soldiers and of the ambassadors from Sinope, in order to decide the question of whether the army should continue its journey by land or by sea; in either case they would need the help of the Sinopeans. Hekatonymos again made a speech. He asserted that to march through Paphlagonia was altogether impossible; the only way out was by sailing to Herakleia. Although the speaker was by no means trusted by all soldiers—some of them suspected him of being a secret friend of the king of the Paphlagonians—the soldiers voted to continue the journey by sea. Xenophon added this warning: the resolution is acceptable only if literally all soldiers will be embarked and accordingly if the necessary number of boats be provided. So new negotiations between the army and the Sinopeans became necessary. In this situation it occurred to Xenophon that, considering the magnitude of the Greeks' armed force in this out of the way region, it would be a resplendent thing if the soldiers were to increase the territory and power of Greece by founding a city. It would become a large city, considering the size of the army and the number of the people already settled in the region. Before talking to anyone, Xenophon sacrificed and consulted Cyrus' soothsayer. But that soothsayer was eager to return home—for he had his pockets filled with the money which Cyrus had given him for his true prophecy—and therefore betrayed to the army Xenophon's plan
which he traced solely to the latter's desire to preserve for himself a name and power.

Here we seem to have reached, and already surpassed, the peak of Xenophon’s ascent. Granted that the foundation of a great Greek city “in some barbaric place” (Plato, Republic 499c9) would have redounded to Xenophon’s name and power, was that name and power not amply deserved? Would his action not have been beneficial, not only to him but to Greece and hence to the human race? Had he not justly and piously performed anything, and more than anything, that one could expect from someone who had joined the expedition of Cyrus as a nobody and apparently for rather frivolous reasons? Xenophon was fit to the highest degree not only to be the supreme commander of the army but to become the founder of a city, worthy of the greatest honor during his life and especially after his death: the honors awarded to the founder of a city. But then, in the last moment, that highest and so well-deserved honor is snatched away from him not by any divine ill-will but by a greedy soothsayer. It goes without saying that the gods did not come to Xenophon’s assistance in that matter.

But perhaps we have not paid sufficient attention to the true difficulty. When the soldiers heard of Xenophon’s still undivulged plan to found a city far away from Greece, the majority disapproved of it. In an assembly of the soldiers a number of men attacked the plan. Xenophon however listened in silence. Timasion, who officially was Xenophon’s fellow commander of the rear (III 2.37-38), declared that one must not esteem anything more highly than Greece and hence not think of staying in the Pontos (V 6.22). Tacitly, perhaps unknowingly, Timasion was opposing Proxenos’ invitation addressed to Xenophon to join Cyrus’ expedition, for the invitation was based on the premise that it is perhaps right to regard Cyrus as better for oneself than one’s fatherland (III 11.4). Xenophon fails to reply to that grave, if implicit, charge: was the thought that one can esteem a barbarian prince or king more highly than one’s fatherland not an act of profound injustice, perhaps even the root of Xenophon’s injustice?

But, to repeat, Xenophon remained silent. Only when he was reproached for trying to persuade the soldiers privately and for sacrificing privately, instead of bringing the matter before the assembly, was he compelled to stand up and to speak. He begins by stating that, as they knew through their own seeing, he sacrifices as much as he can both regarding the soldiers and himself in order to achieve by speaking, thinking and doing what will be most noble and best both for the soldiers and himself. In other words, the soothsayer’s distinction or opposition between Xenophon’s and the soldiers’ interest is a vicious imputation. In the present case, Xenophon continues, he sacrificed solely in order to find out whether it would be better to speak to the soldiers and to do the required things or not to touch the matter at all (V 6.28). This means in plain English that he did not consult the sacrifices regarding
the advisability of his thinking about the founding of a city. The case resembles his conduct toward Proxenos' invitation to join Cyrus' expedition when Xenophon, deviating from Socrates' counsel, asked the god in Delphi not whether he should join that expedition but what he should do in the way of sacrifices and prayers in order to make the journey in the most noble manner (III 1.7). Yet there is this important difference between the two cases: in the case of Proxenos' invitation, Xenophon himself made the decision to join Cyrus' expedition; in the case of the founding of a city, he found out from the soothsayer the most important thing, namely, that the sacrifices were favorable: so that there was nothing wrong with thinking about the founding of a city. But thinking is one thing; speaking and doing are entirely different things. Xenophon was prevented from consulting the sacrifices regarding speaking and doing, not by unfavorable sacrifices or by his own decision, but by the very soothsayer. This happened in the following manner. The soothsayer had told Xenophon the truth about the sacrifices since he knew of Xenophon's thorough knowledge in this field of human endeavor; but he added of his own the warning that, as the sacrifice revealed, some fraud and plot against Xenophon was being prepared; for he knew—not indeed from the sacrifices—that he himself was plotting to slander Xenophon before the soldiers by asserting that Xenophon intended to found a city without having persuaded the army. Xenophon has thus succeeded perfectly in refuting the soothsayer's charge. But now, he goes on, given the opposition of the majority, he himself abandons his plan and proposes that anyone who leaves the army before the end of the journey be regarded as having committed a punishable offense. His proposal was unanimously adopted. This decision naturally displeased the soothsayer greatly, for he was eager to go home with his money at once. His lone protest did not have the slightest effect on the generals. The case was different with some more powerful members of the army who had conspired with the Greeks of the Pontos against Xenophon. A rumor was launched that Xenophon had not given up his plan to found a city. There was a mutinous spirit abroad so that Xenophon found it advisable to call together an assembly of the army.

It was very easy for him to show even to the meanest capacity the stupidity of believing that he could deceive the whole army about his alleged plan to found a city in Asia while the large majority, if not all except himself, were eager to return to Greece. Regardless of whether the imputation of that folly was due to one man or to more than one, it stemmed from envy, a natural consequence of the great honors awarded to him which were the natural consequences of his great merits. He had never prevented anyone from acquiring the same or greater merits: by speaking, fighting or being awake (V 7.10). The tripartition "speaking, fighting, being awake" takes the place of the tripartition "speaking, thinking, doing" (V 6.28) but fighting now takes the place which thinking occupied in the earlier discussion, because thinking was there central for
the reason given when we discussed that passage; "thinking" is now replaced by "being awake" since it is intended as "worrying," a special kind of thinking (merimnai, phrontizein). Xenophon is willing to cede his authority to anyone who shares his deserts but to a slight degree. This is the end of his defense. But he has an important point to add. The greatest danger that threatens the army does not come from a plan to found a city or similar things but from the lack of discipline in the army which has already led to terrible crimes, partly told to Xenophon now for the first time and as a whole told by him for the first time to the army; it will in the future inevitably lead to its destruction. Xenophon has turned from defense to attack, and this turn is entirely successful. The soldiers spontaneously move and resolve that henceforth those responsible for the crimes committed will be punished and that those who in the future will start illegal proceedings will be put on trial for their lives; the generals will be responsible for the proceedings against all crimes committed since Cyrus' death and the captains will form the jury. At Xenophon's advice and with the approval of the soothsayers, it is further enacted that the army be purified and the purification was performed.

This was not yet the end of Xenophon's defense turned into attack. It was resolved—Xenophon does not say at whose suggestion—that the generals themselves should be prosecuted for any offenses they might have committed. One of the generals accused of misconduct was Xenophon himself; he was accused by some of having beaten soldiers from hybris, i.e., without necessity. This means that at this time the difference between him and Proxenos becomes the theme. It was as easy for him to defend himself against the charge of acting against the soldiers from hybris as it was to defend himself against the charge that he would found a colony against the will of the army. In continuing he asks the soldiers to remember not only the harsh actions which he was compelled to perform for their benefit but also the kind ones. His speech ends with this memorable sentence: "It is noble as well as just and pious and more pleasant to remember the good things rather than the bad ones." It is pleasant to remember bad things after one has come safely through them, although even as regards the pleasures of memory the good things are preferable to the bad ones. At any rate, from every point of view there seems to be in the last analysis a harmony between the noble, the just, the pious and the pleasant. No wonder then that Xenophon speaks as much as possible in terms of praise rather than in terms of blame. It should go without saying that his audience complied with the advice with which he concluded his speech.

Xenophon's trial leads then to a complete acquittal. Perhaps nothing shows more clearly the difference between him and Socrates than the fact that Socrates' trial culminated in his capital punishment. But we must not forget that Xenophon's plan to found a city failed.
In Book Five there occurs a somewhat larger number of oaths pronounced by Xenophon himself than in all preceding Books.

The dissatisfaction of the army which led to Xenophon's accusation was not altogether unfounded. If we are not "excessively pious" (Herodotus II 37.1)—and nothing and no one forces us to be so—we may admit that Xenophon has indeed succeeded perfectly in vindicating his piety; but did he vindicate his justice? Did he meet the implicit charge that he esteemed something more highly than Greece? More than that: is full devotion to Greece the sole or even the highest ingredient of justice? Must one not, just as in the case of horses, prefer not the indigenous or homebred, the children of the fatherland, but the best human beings (Cyropaedia II 2.26. Dakyns ad loc. observes: "Xenophon's breadth of view: virtue is not confined to citizens, but we have the pick of the whole world. Cosmopolitan Hellenism.")? Xenophon has described an army, nay, a political society, which is constructed according to this highest standard in his Education of Cyrus. What then is the difference from the point of view of justice between the hero of The Education of Cyrus, the older Cyrus, and Xenophon? The older Cyrus achieved what he achieved partly by virtue of his descent, his inheritance: he was on both sides the heir of a long line of hereditary kings; Xenophon had no such advantages. Granted that from the highest point of view only knowledge of how to rule gives a man a right to rule—and not, for instance, inheritance (cf. Mem. III 9.10), does not knowledge of how to rule need some iron alloy, some crude and rough admixture in order to become legitimate, i.e., politically viable? Is, to use a favorite term of Burke, "prescription" not an indispensable ingredient of non-tyrannical government, of legitimacy? In a word, "justice" is an ambiguous term; it may mean the virtue of the man which consists in surpassing his friends in benefiting them and his enemies in harming them (Mem. II 6.35); but it may also mean the virtue of a Socrates whose justice consists in not harming anyone even in a little thing (ibid. IV 8.11). While Xenophon undoubtedly possessed the justice of a man, he can hardly be said to have possessed the justice of Socrates. This does not mean that his place is near to that of the older Cyrus. One fact settles this question to our full satisfaction: the enjoyment which Cyrus derived after his first battle from looking at the faces of the slain enemies was too much even for his own grandfather, the tyrannical king of Media, to bear (Cyrop. I 4.24); cruelty is indeed an indispensable ingredient of the military commander as such (Mem. III 1.6), but there is a great variety of degrees of cruelty. Xenophon stands somewhere in between the older Cyrus and Socrates. By this position he presents to us not a lack of decisiveness but the problem of justice: justice requires both the virtue of a man (and therefore the possible emancipation of cruelty) and the virtue of Socrates; the virtue of the man points to Socratic virtue and Socratic virtue requires as its foundation the virtue of the man; both kinds of virtue cannot coexist in their plenitude in one and the same human being. Xenophon may
have regarded himself as the closest approximation best known to himself to their coexistence in one and the same human being. (Cf. Strauss, Xenophon’s Socrates, 144.) Surely, Xenophon (does not equal Plato) presents himself in his difference from Socrates.

Shortly after Xenophon’s acquittal and the restoration of military discipline as well as the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Paphlagonians, from whom the Greeks had for a time partly procured their provisions through robbery, Cheirisophos returned from his mission to the Spartan admiral Anaxibios. He did not bring the boats which he had promised or hoped to bring but he brought words of praise and a promise from Anaxibios that if the army would succeed in getting out of the Pontos, he would employ them as mercenaries. This increased the soldiers’ hope for a speedy return to Greece and hence for possessions which they might take home. They thought that if they were to choose a single commander for the whole army, they would achieve their goal best because of the obvious advantages of monarchic rule (greater secrecy and dispatch and the like) for purposes of this kind. With this thought in mind they turned to Xenophon. The captains told him that the army wanted him to be sole commander and tried to persuade him to accept this position. He was not entirely adverse to the prospect of being sole, absolute ruler, not responsible to any one; he considered that this position would increase his honor among his friends and his name in Athens and perhaps he might do some good to the army. But when he considered how immanifest to every human being the future is, he saw that the exalted position offered him brought with it also the danger of his losing even the reputation which he had gained heretofore. Unable to make up his mind, he did what any sensible man confronted with such a dilemma would do; he communicated his difficulty to the god. He sacrificed two victims to Zeus the King. That god distinctly indicated to him that he should not strive for the position nor accept it if he were elected to it. The oracle was less clearly unfavorable. But instead of saying this directly, straightaway, Xenophon gives a brief survey of his earlier experiences with the omen related to his fate: his experience with his attempt to found a city and perhaps with his accusation throw a new light on the old omen. As for his consulting Zeus the King, this was the god who had been named to him by the Delphic oracle. Furthermore, he was the same god who, Xenophon believed, had shown him the dream when he set out to take care of the army together with others, i.e., after the murder of the generals; the dream was ambiguous (III 1.12) but originally Xenophon had taken it as rather a good omen. Finally, he remembered now that at the very beginning of his setting out from Ephesus to join Cyrus, a sitting eagle screamed upon his right; as a soothsayer explained to him, this omen was a great one, by no means befitting a nobody, indicating great fame but at the same time great toil, for birds are most apt to attack the sitting eagle; nor did that omen prognosticate the
acquisition of great wealth, for the flying eagle is more likely than the sitting one to take what it wants.

For a moment one is tempted to believe that not the plan to become the founder of a Greek city in the Pontos but the election to supreme command of the whole army, to "the monarchy" (VI 1.31), would have been the peak of Xenophon's ascent (cf. Cyropaedia VIII 2.28; Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1115a32). But can "monarchy" equal "foundation" in grandeur, in sacredness?

In an assembly of the soldiers all speakers said that one man should be elected commander of the whole army and after this proposal was approved Xenophon was proposed for that position. In order to prevent his election, which seemed to be imminent, he had to state the case against his election as clearly and as forcibly as he could. That case had been made in the required manner by the gods, but in his speech to the army he is to begin with silent on this theme; to begin with, he keeps his pious thought private, for himself. In his public speech, he speaks to begin with publicly, politically, as a political man. The reason seems to be this. He does not merely wish to prevent his own election but to give the army some guidance as to whom they should elect. As for that guidance he had no oracular indication. He had to make the decision himself—just as he had made the decision in Delphi as to whether or not he should accept Proxenos' invitation. Xenophon disapproves of the thought that the army would elect him as supreme commander when a Spartan was present and available; in the circumstances the election of Xenophon would be inexpedient both for the army and for Xenophon himself. As the Spartans have shown by their conduct in the late war, they will never permit leadership to go to a non-Spartan (cf. III 2.37). Xenophon assures the army that he will not be so foolish as to cause dissension if he is not elected: to rebel against the rulers while a war is going on means to rebel against one's own salvation. The seemingly casual observation of Xenophon regarding the Spartan preponderance and her concern with it must never be neglected; it helps to explain the partly true and partly alleged pro-Spartan bias of his writings. The immediate reaction to Xenophon's observation was indeed anti-Spartan; whether and to what extent that immediate reaction was intended by Xenophon perhaps as a warning to the irascible Spartan candidate against misuse of his power in case of his election it is impossible to say. The reference to the Peloponnesian War is also helpful and even more helpful for indicating the questionable character of fidelity to Greece as the sole or most important ingredient of justice. At any rate Xenophon is now compelled to counteract the effect of this seemingly pro-Spartan move. Swearing by all gods and goddesses he now states that the gods have stated to him in a manner which even a tyro in such matters could not misunderstand that he, Xenophon, must abstain from "the monarchy"; to accept that position would be bad for the army but in particular also for Xenophon (cf. Mem. I 1.8). It literally goes without saying that Cheirisophos is
elected sole and absolute commander. He gladly accepts the honor and confirms Xenophon's suspicion that the Athenian would have had a very hard time with the Spartans. The fact that the choice lay only between Xenophon and Cheirisophos shows that the struggle for hegemony within Greece was still the Spartan-Athenian struggle and therefore that the identification of justice with fidelity to Greece remained questionable.

Under Cheirisophos' command the Greeks sailed on the next day along the coast to Herakleia, a Greek city. But the soldiers still had to settle the question whether they could continue their journey from there by land or by sea. The question was inseparable from that of how to approvision the army. One of the men who had opposed Xenophon's plan to found a city proposed that they should demand money from the Herakleotai; should one not send Cheirisophos, the elected ruler, and perhaps even Xenophon to Herakleia for that purpose? Both leading men strongly opposed the use of violence against a friendly Greek city. The soldiers elected therefore a special embassy. But they met only firm resistance on the part of the Herakleotai. This led to a mutinous mood of the majority of the Greek soldiers who were Achaians and Arcadians and refused to be dictated to by a Spartan or an Athenian. They separated therefore from the minority and elected ten generals of their own. In this way, the command of Cheirisophos was terminated about a week after his election: an indication of the impermanence of the Spartan hegemony. One sees in retrospect how well the gods had advised Xenophon regarding the rejection of "the monarchy." He was displeased with the splitting up of the army—a splitting up which, he thought, endangered the safety of all its parts. But he was persuaded by Neon, the commander immediately subordinate to Cheirisophos of the latter's contingent (V 6.36), to join, together with Cheirisophos and his contingent, the force commanded by Klearchos, the Spartan commander at Byzantion. Xenophon gave in to Neon's advice perhaps because it agreed with the oracular indication of Herakles the Leader; surely that indication was not, as far as we know, supported by any calculation or guesswork on the part of Xenophon. But is this quite correct? Xenophon was contemplating leaving the army and sailing home, but when he sacrificed to Herakles the Leader and consulted him, the god indicated to him that he should stay with the soldiers. Whether or to what extent Herakles' indication or Xenophon's or Neon's purely human persuading determined Xenophon, it is impossible to say. Thus the whole army was split into three parts: the Arcadians and Achaians, the troops of Cheirisophos, and those of Xenophon. Each part went in a different way in the direction of Thrace.

The Arcadians (and Achaians) disembarked by night at Kalpe Harbor; they immediately proceeded to occupy the villages of the neighborhood which abounded in booty; in fact the Greeks took a lot of booty. But when the Thracians recovered from the unexpected attack, they killed a considerable number of their assailants and cut off the retreat of their
enemies. Cheirisophos, on the other hand, who had marched along the coast, arrived safely in Kalpe. Xenophon, the only Greek commander who had some cavalry, learned through his horsemen of the fate of the Arcadians. Thereupon he called his soldiers together and explained to them that their situation required that they save the Arcadians. Perhaps, he concluded, the god wishes to arrange things in this way that those who talked big are humbled whereas we, who begin with the gods, will have a more honorable fate. He made of course all the necessary arrangements. Timasion with the horses would be in the van; everything was to be done to create the impression that the troops relieving the besieged Arcadians were much more numerous than they in fact were; the first thing they did in the next morning was to pray to the gods. Eventually—be it through the wish of the god or through Xenophon’s counsel or through both—the three parts of the army were reunited in Kalpe, which is located in Asiatic Thrace. The region was very fertile and attractive, so much so that the suspicion arose that the soldiers had been brought hither owing to the scheming of some who wished to found a city (VI 4.7). Yet the majority of the soldiers had joined Cyrus’ expedition not from poverty at home but in order to make money in order to return to Greece loaded with riches. At any rate, after the failure of the Arcadians the whole army resolved that henceforth the proposal to split the army would be treated as a capital crime and that the generals elected by the whole army be restored to their power. The situation was further simplified by the death of Cheirisophos, who had taken a medicine for fever; his successor became Neon. In a way unforeseen by any human being Xenophon had thus become the “monarch,” while the plan to found a city remained as abortive as before. The question is however unresolved of how the political difficulty obstructing an Athenian’s monarchy in a period of Spartan hegemony can be overcome. As we shall see almost at once, it is resolved by an event which could be understood as an act of the god or Xenophon’s piety.

As Xenophon next explained to an assembly of the soldiers, the army had to continue its journey by land, since no boats were available, and they had to continue it at once, since they had no longer the necessary provisions. Yet the sacrifices were unfavorable. This renewed the suspicion that Xenophon had persuaded the soothsayer to give a false report about the sacrifices because he still planned to found a city. The sacrifices continued to be unfavorable, so that Xenophon refused to lead out the army for approvisioning itself. An attempt made by Neon to get provisions from the nearby barbarian villages ended in disaster. Eventually provisions arrived by ship from Herakleia. Xenophon arose early in order to sacrifice with a view to an expedition and now the sacrifices were favorable. A soothsayer saw at about this time another good omen and therefore urged Xenophon to start the expedition against the enemy (Persians and their Thracian allies). Never before had the resistance of the gods to intended actions of the Greek army been so sustained.
Needless to say, there were opportunities left to Xenophon to reveal his military and rhetorical skills. In the ensuing battle the Greeks were unmistakably victorious.

While the Greeks still waited for the arrival of Kleandros, they provisioned themselves from the nearby countryside, which abounded in almost all good things. Furthermore, the Greek cities brought things for sale to the camp. Again a rumor arose that a city was being founded and that there would be a harbor. Even the enemies tried to establish friendly relations with the new city which was alleged to be founded by Xenophon and turned to him with questions on this subject but he wisely remained in the background.

Eventually Kleandros arrived with two triremes but with no merchant ship. He arrived in the company of the Spartan Dexippus who had rather misbehaved in Trapezus. Thus it came to an ugly dissension between Kleandros and Agasias, one of the generals elected by the army. Despite all efforts of Xenophon and the other generals Kleandros took the side of Dexippus and declared that he would forbid every city to receive the Greek mercenaries, “for at that time the Spartans ruled all Greeks” (VI 6.9). Kleandros demanded the extradition of Agasias. But Agasias and Xenophon were friends. This precisely was the reason why Dexippus slandered Xenophon. The commanders called an assembly of the soldiers in which Xenophon explained to the army the gravity of the situation that had arisen: every single Spartan can accomplish in the Greek cities whatever he pleases. The conflict with Kleandros will make it impossible for the Greek mercenaries either to stay in Thrace or to sail home. The only thing to do is to submit to Spartan power. Xenophon himself, whom Dexippus had accused to Kleandros as responsible for Agasias’ quasi-rebellion, surrenders to Kleandros for adjudication and advises every other man who is accused to do the same. Agasias swears by the gods and goddesses that he acted entirely on his own initiative: he follows Xenophon’s example by also surrendering to Kleandros. Thanks to Xenophon’s intervention the whole conflict is peaceably settled: he saved not only himself but so to speak all his comrades in arms, not only from the Persians and other barbarians but from the Spartans as well.

The Spartan admiral Anaxibios was induced by the Persian satrap Pharnabazus to arrange for the removal of the Greek army from Asia since it seemed to constitute a threat to his province. Anaxibios promised the commanders to hire the army as mercenaries in case they crossed over to Europe. The only man who was unwilling to consider Anaxibios’ proposal was Xenophon, but he gave in when Anaxibios merely asked him to postpone his leaving the army until after the crossing. The soldiers next entered Byzantion but Anaxibios failed to give them the promised pay. On the other hand he wished to avail himself of the services of the mercenaries in a war with the Thracian Suthes in which he was engaged. He succeeded in persuading the mercenaries to leave the city until they became aware that they were to be cheated of their pay; then
they re-entered the city with the use of force. An ugly conflict threatened. Thinking not only of Byzantion and the army but also of himself, Xenophon intervened. When the soldiers saw him, they told him that here was his great chance: "You have a city, you have triremes, you have money, you have so many soldiers." He first attempted to quiet them down, and, after he had succeeded in this, called an assembly of the army and told them the following things: by avenging themselves on the Spartans for a deception attempted by a few Spartans and by plundering a wholly innocent city, they merely would make all Spartans and all allies of Sparta, i.e., all Greeks, their enemies; the experience of the Peloponnesian War has shown them all how mad their proceedings and intentions are; it will lead to a hopeless war between the small army of mercenaries and the whole power of Greece which is now under Spartan control; all justice is on the side of the Spartans, for it is unjust to take revenge on the Spartans for the deception attempted by a few Spartans and by plundering a wholly innocent city—the first Greek city which they occupied—while they never harmed a barbarian city; the mercenaries themselves will become exiled by their fatherland and hence their fatherlands' and even their kin's enemies. He urges them that being Greeks they obey those who rule the Greeks and thus try to obtain their rights. If they fail in this, they will at least avoid being deprived of Greece. On Xenophon's entreaty the army resolved to send to Anaxibios a properly submissive message. Xenophon knew both when to resist and when to give in. So it came to pass that ultimately through Persian treachery even those Greeks who were willing to esteem Cyrus more highly than Greece were compelled to restore Greece to her rightful place. But—to say nothing of the justice of Cyrus' expedition against his brother—this is not yet the end of the story.

Anaxibios' reply was none too gracious. This gave a Theban adventurer the opportunity to try to sabotage the arrangement which Xenophon had proposed. The next result however was that Xenophon by himself left Byzantion in the company of Kleandros. Thereafter there arose a dissension among the generals as to where the army should move; this led to a partial disintegration of the army—a result welcome to Pharnabazus and therefore also to Anaxibios. But Anaxibios was about to hand over the command of the Spartan navy to his successor and was therefore no longer courted by Pharnabazus. Therefore Anaxibios asked Xenophon to return to the army and to bring back to Asia by all means the bulk of Cyrus' mercenaries; the soldiers gave Xenophon a friendly reception, glad as they were to leave Thrace for Asia. Given the intra-Spartan jealousies, fidelity to Sparta and hence to Greece was not easy, if not altogether impossible.

In this situation Seuthes renewed an earlier attempt to win Xenophon over to his side. Kleonor and another general had already before wished to lead the army to Seuthes, who had won their favor with gifts, but Xenophon refused to give in to Seuthes' wish. The new Spartan comman-
der in Byzantion, Aristarchos, forbade the return of Cyrus’ mercenaries to Asia. Xenophon had to fear being betrayed by the Spartan commander or by the Persian satrap. He therefore consulted the god as to whether he should not attempt to lead the army to Seuthes. Anaxibios’ plot against Xenophon becoming now most manifest and the sacrifices being favorable, he decided that it was safe for him and for the army to join Seuthes. In their first meeting Xenophon and Seuthes stated what kind of help each expected to receive from the other; Xenophon was especially concerned with what kind of protection against the Spartans Seuthes would offer to the mercenaries. In an assembly of the soldiers Xenophon stated to them, before they made up their minds, what Aristarchos on the one hand and Seuthes on the other promised to them; he advised them to provision themselves forthwith from the villages from which they could safely do so. The majority of the soldiers thought that Seuthes’ proposal was preferable in the circumstances. Thus Cyrus’ mercenaries became Seuthes’ mercenaries. But it soon became clear that Seuthes was not quite honest. He had invited the commanders to a banquet but he expected to receive gifts from them and especially from Xenophon prior to the banquet. This was particularly awkward for Xenophon, who was practically penniless at the moment. Still, when his turn came, he had had already a drink which enabled him to find a graceful way out.

Xenophon and his Greeks kept their bargain with their Thracian allies faithfully; they did their best to help Seuthes in subjugating his Thracian enemies. Yet there was the exorbitant cold of the Thracian winter. Above all, Seuthes’ friend or agent Herakleides tried to cheat the Greek mercenaries of part of their pay. When found out by Xenophon, he incited Seuthes against him and attempted to induce the generals to defect from Xenophon. Xenophon began now to wonder whether it was wise to continue his alliance with Seuthes. In addition, as the pay for the soldiers was not forthcoming, they became very angry with Xenophon. At this moment, the Spartans Charminus and Polynikus sent by Thibron arrived and told the army that the Spartans were planning an expedition against Tissaphernes for which Cyrus’ former army was urgently needed. This gave Seuthes a splendid opportunity for getting rid of the mercenaries and his debts to them at the same time. In an assembly of the soldiers the two Spartan emissaries laid their proposal before the soldiers who were delighted with it, but one of the Arcadians got up straightaway to accuse Xenophon who allegedly was responsible for the mercenaries’ having joined Seuthes and received all the rich benefits of the soldiers’ toils from Seuthes; Xenophon deserves capital punishment. Xenophon’s ascent has finally led to the lowest descent. But ought one not also say that Xenophon’s apology, which refers to deeds and speeches well known to innumerable men, is infinitely easier and at the same time infinitely more effective than Socrates’? Seuthes made a last minute attempt to prevent Xenophon’s reconciliation with the Spartans by
calumniating the latter. But Zeus the King, whom Xenophon consulted, dispelled all suspicions.

There followed a somewhat ambiguous reconciliation between Xenophon and Seuthes and as its consequence the payment of the debt still owed to the mercenaries, and thereafter an unambiguous reconciliation between Xenophon and all mercenaries and between Xenophon and the Spartans. Xenophon eventually showed by deed that he esteemed Greece more highly than Cyrus and other barbarians (III 1.4). He failed to show that he esteemed his fatherland more highly than Cyrus or Sparta because the city of Athens had exiled him (V 3.7, V 6.22, VII 7.57), as he tells us, for reasons which he fails to tell us. Could Socrates' apprehension when he heard of Proxenos' invitation be vindicated by the Anabasis as a whole?

Xenophon begins at once to wage war against the Persians with a view to capturing booty. He was rather successful in this enterprise.

The density of references to god, of oaths and in particular of formal oaths pronounced by Xenophon himself is greater in Book VII than in all preceding Books.
A READING OF SOPHOCLES' ANTIGONE: I

SETH BENARDETE

1 (1). 1.1.* Antigone meets Ismene outside the gates of the royal palace. She usurps for the planning of her crime the place Creon had designated for his own meeting with the elders (33). As they converse without any chance of being overheard (19), they must be imagined to meet in semidarkness, before anyone has set out for work (cf. 253). The Chorus, at any rate, will greet the sun as though it has just come up (100); and it is still early enough for them to convene at the palace without attracting undue notice (164). In this semidarkness Antigone introduces the theme of the play with her manner of addressing Ismene. "O my very own sister's common head of Ismene." The "head of Ismene," which "common" characterizes, is not held in common.¹ Antigone appeals to that part of Ismene that most distinguishes her from everyone else (cf. O.C. 320-1, 555-6), and which makes her individually lovable (cf. 764), at the same time that she insists on the togetherness of Ismene and herself. The link between "head of Ismene" and "common" is supplied by ἀντάδελφον. Antigone recognizes Ismene's head as a sister's head, and not just because she loves some girl called Ismene, no matter what her genealogy, does she address her in this way. Antigone's love for Ismene as a person is mediated through Ismene's kinship with herself; and not only mediated through, but identified with, that kinship; for Ismene's head is ἀντάδελφον, nothing but a sister's. Ismene is herself

* The text used is Pearson's OCT except where otherwise indicated. I have myself, however, not always accepted his readings wherever I am silent, for if I did not see any connection between the reading chosen and my interpretation of the passage, I have passed over my own preference.

Each line or group of lines interpreted is given a section number, with the line numbers in parentheses after it. Each paragraph of every section is numbered as well for ease of cross-reference.

¹ Nauck recognized the peculiarity of κοινόν but not its significance: only if Ἰσμήνης κάρα were the same as Οἰδίπου τέκνον would κοινόν be in order. In κοινόν lurks the incest of Oedipus; cf. OT 261-2, OC 533, 535. It is no doubt accidental that the periphrasis 'head of X' occurs only in Sophocles' Oedipus plays (Euripides has it only thrice: Tr 661, Hc 676-7, Cy 438), but it seems more significant that in the vocative the phrase is restricted in classical poetry to Ant 1 and OT 40 (Oedipus), 950 (Iocasta), 1207 (Oedipus). Eur. Or 476 is very different: Ζηρός ὁμολέκτωρ κάρα (Tyndarus); cf. Or 1380. The normal usage is either the person's name in the vocative followed by "head" with a qualifying adjective or an adjective plus "head" by itself.
in being a sister. Only if Ismene acknowledges herself to be nothing but a sister to Antigone and Polynices will Antigone continue to love her. Ismene the individual, with such and such bodily characteristics, is loved because she belongs to the same family as Antigone. Her distinctiveness merely signifies for Antigone her membership in the family that Antigone loves unreservedly. Ismene can, therefore, be readily sacrificed for the sake of her family, particularly as the semidarkness in which she and Antigone meet partly conceals her distinctiveness along with the reasons for it.

1.2. One cannot help wondering, in light of the body, the soul, and the self that necessarily are of importance in a play about burial, whether Antigone's virtual identification of Ismene as her self with Ismene as a relation does not foreshadow Antigone's understanding of what is involved in her burying Polynices.

1.3. Antigone refers twice more to someone's head: Eteocles' and Polynices' (899, 915), each of whom she calls κασάγνητον κάρα. That Eteocles and Polynices are dead in no way changes Antigone's manner of address. Her brothers keep in death their individual loveableness.

1.4. αὐτάδελφος also occurs twice more, once by Antigone (503), and once by Haemon (696), and both times of Antigone's burying of Polynices. The substantival use of αὐτάδελφος indicates that Antigone dared to bury Polynices solely because he was her brother, and that Polynices the enemy of Thebes had no part in her daring (cf. § 15.3).

1.5. Words compounded with αὐτ— are particularly frequent in this play: 2 αὐθάδια (1028), αὐτάδελφος, αὐτογέννητος (864), αὐτόγνωτος (875), αὐτοκτονέο (56), αὐτόνομος (821), αὐτόπρεμος (714), αὐτονυγός (52), αὐτόφωρος (51), αὐτόχειρ (306, 900, 1315). Of these Antigone uses three: αὐτάδελφος of her three siblings, αὐτογέννητος of the incest of her mother, and αὐτόχειρ of her performing the funeral rites for her parents and brothers with her own hand.

2 (2-10). 2.1. Antigone's use of a verb of awareness (δισωτα) in talking about herself reveals her kinship with her father. She says that there is nothing painful, shameful, or dishonorable that she has not seen. She does not say, as Ismene's phrase (16-7) suggests that she could have, that she has full knowledge of every possible evil and suffers accordingly. She does not speak of suffering (* οὐ πέποινθ' instead of οὐκ δισωτ'). 3 If she had, she would have admitted that she shares in Ismene's sorrows, and that her suffering is not just her own. But in spite of κοινόν in the first line and her use of the dual for

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2 For the meaning of such compounds see F. Sommer, Zur Geschichte der griechischen Nominalkomposita, 83-6.

3 Cf. the imitation in Dio Cassius 62.3.2 (cited by Bruhn): τί μὲν γὰρ οὐ τῶν αἰσχρῶν, τί δ' οὐ τῶν ἄγλαστων ἐπεφώθαμεν; and El 761-3 (ὅν ὀποι' ἐγώ κακῶν), where seeing is opposed to hearing.
Ismene and herself (νος), she nevertheless distinguishes between Ismene’s evils and her own (τών σών τε κάμον). Their evils are distinct from the start (cf. 31-2).

2.2. Antigone distinguishes between the evils from Oedipus that Zeus has fully brought to completion for Ismene and herself, and those evils set in motion by their enemies (Creon) that are approaching their friends (Polynices). The evils that await Polynices do not belong to Antigone and Ismene, nor is Zeus the cause of them. There cannot be anything painful or disgraceful in Creon’s decree, since Zeus failed to inflict no evil that could possibly arise from Oedipus, and Antigone has seen every disgrace and pain there could be as already among the evils that are Ismene’s and her own. Antigone’s actions, however, evidently belie any separation between Polynices’ evils and her own (cf. 48); but she has to admit, even if only tacitly, that there is a difference between them, and that to count Polynices’ evils as her own is to enlarge the domain of her own (cf. 238, 437-9).

2.3. Antigone moves in this speech from the evils that because of their single origin in Oedipus belong jointly to Ismene and herself, the still living offspring of Oedipus, to the two sets of evils that she observes as belonging severally to Ismene and herself, and from these to evils (the only κακα without the article) that threaten Polynices. The central κακα, in separating Antigone’s and Ismene’s evils, point to Antigone’s subsequent shaking off of her living connection with Ismene and her joining her fate with the dead Polynices.

2.4. Antigone does not consider Creon’s decree as one of the evils that are from Oedipus. (She never again refers to Oedipus by name.) She is not aware of any connection between Polynices’ being deprived of burial and his being the son of Oedipus. She is able to keep them apart because she altogether disregards here and throughout the play the war that has just occurred. Her only reference to it is oblique: she calls Creon the general (8). By suppressing any direct mention of

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4 Boeckh’s reason for taking νος ἐτι ζώσαν as genitive rather than dative convinces me that it is dative: “denn der Zusatz ἐτι ζώσαν wäre nichtig, weil ihren, waren sie tod, nicht leicht Uebel begegnen konnten” (209); cf. 925-6.

5 So the scholium; Schneidewin-Nauck, Wolff-Bellermann, Müller; Jebb’s interpretation—the enemies are all the Argives left unburied—rests on a misunderstanding of 1080-3 (cf. § 55.5). The apparent redundancy of τών ἔχον κακα, to which J. H. Kells objects (BICS 1963, 40-53), if Antigone means that their enemies inflict evils, is only apparent; for Ismene does not know that Creon is their enemy, and Antigone would hardly admit that Zeus is their enemy, despite his having inflicted evils on them. In light, however, of 23 and 79 τών ἔχον should not be taken as a generalizing plural, any more than τῶν φίλους in light of 75 and 89 should be taken as referring exclusively to Polynices.

6 The importance of triads of every kind in Sophocles was cursorily treated by H. St. John Thackeray (Proc. British Academy XVI, 1931).
the war, she suppresses as well the rivalry of Eteocles and Polynices for the throne of Oedipus. Her silence about the war and the cause of the war thus leads to her silence about three things: that Polynices was killed in the war and did not just die in some miserable way (26); that Polynices attacked and Eteocles defended Thebes; and that Eteocles and Polynices killed one another. We learn of all this from Ismene, the Chorus, or Creon but never from Antigone. Antigone abstracts from everything except the fact that Polynices lies unburied.7

3 (11-17). 3.1. Ismene at once thinks of pleasure and happiness as well as of pain and disaster (13, 17). She does not speak of dishonor and shame. Creon, who thinks solely of honor and dishonor (cf. § 4.5)—he never uses ἀλεξος or any of its derivatives—stands at one extreme, and Ismene, who speaks solely of pleasure and pain, stands at the other, while Antigone, who speaks of and acts on both principles, occupies the center, where pain and pleasure, honor and dishonor, meet.

3.2. In spite of what Antigone says, Ismene does not preclude the possibility of a change for the better in her circumstances. But Antigone cannot conceive, especially with her knowledge of Creon’s decree, of an open future. That Ismene and herself are still alive (ἐτὶ ζῶσαι) does not carry with it any hope.

3.3. Ismene says that she and Antigone have been deprived of their two brothers. They are from now on without any brother (58). To have a brother means to have a living brother (cf. § 48.7). Death puts an end to any relationship that obtains on earth.8 Ismene can only refer to her brothers in the past tense (55; cf. § 1.3). Antigone must remind her that the corpse she is asked to help bury is her brother (not just her brother’s), even if she does not wish it to be (43-6).9

3.4. στεγέω occurs twice more. The Chorus ask Creon whether he will deprive his son of Antigone (574); and Creon says that Antigone will be deprived of her sojourn on earth (890). Death, then, in all three cases, seems to entail an unqualified loss (cf. 575). But Haemon is not totally deprived of his bride; the messenger, at any rate, says that he obtained in Hades’ house the marriage rites (1240-1). Haemon’s loss is thus (at least metaphorically) qualified. Ismene then might be mistaken as to whether she ceases to have her brothers with their death. The question of body, soul, and self would once again be decisive (cf. § 1.2). Antigone’s loss, however, of a sojourn on earth is absolute and does not admit of any qualifications (cf. §§ 46.6; 47.4).

7 Antigone reports that Creon intends to announce his decree to those who have no knowledge of it (33); she, no more perhaps than those from whom she heard it, has any suspicion of, or any interest in, the political reasons for Creon’s convocation of the Chorus.
8 Cf. Pl. Lgs. 959c2-dl.
9 Cf. schol. 45: καὶ μὴ προσθονίᾳ αὐτὸν εἶναι σὸν ἀδελφὸν ἀλλ' ἀλοντιοίς σαυτὴν τῆς συγγενείας ἐγὼ ἑαυτῷ τὸν ἐμὸν καὶ σὸν ἀδελφὸν.
4 (21-36). 4.1. Antigone’s presentation of Creon’s decree must be compared with Creon’s own presentation to the Chorus (194-201). Both begin the same way (’Ετεοκλέα μέν), but after that they diverge. Antigone replaces Creon’s explanation for his honoring Eteocles—he died fighting on behalf of his country and proved to be the best warrior—with what she ironically calls Creon’s just use of law and justice. She thereby suppresses any mention of the war and the city, about which it would have been difficult to be ironical. Antigone never casts doubt on patriotism. Creon hid Eteocles, she then says, below the earth endowed with honor among the dead below. Creon, however, says that he had ordered Eteocles to be hidden in a grave and sanctified with everything that goes below for the best dead. Antigone disregards all the rites that accord honor to Eteocles among the dead; but Creon connects or confuses through his mention of the rites the excellence of Eteocles in war with the excellence of Eteocles among the dead. Antigone must separate the honor of Eteocles among the dead from whatever honor he would have obtained if he had lived; but Creon must hold them together (cf. 209-10). The city must for him keep itself intact below. “Below” therefore cannot be more exactly determined; it is only an extension in depth of Thebes. For Antigone, however, who with Ismene (65) alone specifies that below means below the earth (cf. § 26.2), burial means a removal from Thebes and its concerns. The city is restricted to the surface of the earth.

4.2. The word for the dead below is the plural of the word for corpse, so much is it taken for granted that corpses are buried and so little does the language itself indicate what the condition might be of the buried dead.

4.3. Antigone says that Creon forbade the burial of Polynices’ corpse; Creon says that the burial of Polynices is forbidden. Antigone seems to separate Polynices from his corpse; Creon, in order to justify his vindictiveness, seems to identify them; but Antigone speaks of the haplessly dead corpse of Polynices, as though his corpse and not Polynices had suffered and died. It is not enough to say that she speaks by enallage, nor that there is a reminiscence of the Homeric expression νεκών κατατεθητόνων. If one unscrambles the phrase, the pathos and the point both equally disappear. She does not mean “the corpse of the haplessly killed Polynices,” for she is not out to vindicate Polynices’ death. Jebb’s translation, “the hapless corpse of Polynices” is right, but only if one adds that “hapless” properly refers to the living. Antigone

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10 Line 24 seems to be hopeless; but I should suggest, in light of Thucydides 5.18.4 (δίκαιων χρήσθων καὶ δροικίο), — χρήσθων δίκαιω καὶ νόμω — as Antigone’s parenthetical comment on ὄς λέγοντι σὸν δίκη. For the coordination of δίκαιον (δίκη) and νόμος see the passages collected by R. Hirzel, Themis, Dike und Verwandtés, 164 n.1.
must speak cathartically, for neither she nor anyone else in the play ever explains why, apart from the law, a corpse must be buried. No one says that there are living souls in Hades (cf. El. 841, 1418-9), whose admittance there depends on the burial of corpses here.\footnote{Cf. M. Pohlenz, \textit{Die Griechische Tragödie}, 195. Aeschines, in commenting on the law that absolves a son whose father has sold him for purposes of prostitution from taking care of his father but still enjoins him to bury him with the customary rites, says that this prevents the father from profiting while alive, and when dead, \textit{διὰ} δὲ \textit{μὲν} εὐθυγενεῖς \textit{οὐκ} αἰσθάνεται \textit{τῶν} εἰδότων, \textit{τιμᾶται} \textit{δὲ} \textit{οὐ} \textit{νόμος} \textit{kai} \textit{τὸ} \textit{θεῖον} (1.14).}

No one speaks of this kind of separation of body and soul (cf. El. 245-50). In the absence of any such account, Antigone attributes everything that belongs to Polynices to his corpse. His corpse is in and of itself the object of her care.

4.4. Antigone says \textit{καλόγαι}, as she had said \textit{ἐκνυψε} before, and Creon says \textit{κτειγίζειν}, as he had said \textit{ἄραγνίσαι} before. Antigone is vague where Creon is precise about the rites to be denied Polynices. She omits those aspects of ritual that are not connected with the mourner’s sorrow (cf. § 3.1). Both say \textit{μὴ δὲ} (τε) \textit{κοκύσαι} \textit{τίνα,} but whereas Creon says Polynices is to be left unburied, Antigone adds that he is to go unwept. Perhaps Creon omits the prohibition against weeping because, unlike ritual lamentation (\textit{κοκύσαι}), it is almost impossible to regulate (cf. H 427; Pl. Lgs. 959c7-960a2; Cicero \textit{in Pisonem} 8.18).

4.5. Antigone says the proclamation was made to the townspeople, Creon to this city (cf. 7). It seems to mark a great change in Antigone when she finally calls the Thebans citizens (806, cf. 79, 907, § 30.2).

4.6. Antigone says Polynices is to be left for the birds, Creon says for the birds and dogs; and according to the messenger, who is altogether truthful (1192-3), he was torn apart by dogs alone (1198, cf. 1017, § 17.3). Antigone says that Polynices’ corpse has been left to be for the birds as a sweet treasure-trove whenever they descry him to feed on at their pleasure.\footnote{For the feeling expressed in \textit{θηρανθῆς} see Eur. \textit{El.} 565; Pl. Lgs. 931a4-5; \textit{πατὴρ} \textit{οὖν} \textit{ὁ} \textit{νόμος} \textit{kai} \textit{μήτηρ} \textit{kai} \textit{τὸ} \textit{τοῦτον} \textit{πατής} \textit{η} \textit{μητήρ} \textit{ἐν} \textit{οἰκίᾳ} \textit{kεῖται} \textit{κεμῆλιοι} \textit{ἄπειροικότες} \textit{γῆς.}} Creon says that the body is to be left to be eaten by birds and dogs and seen disgraced in its mangling. For Creon the seeing is done by men, for Antigone by birds; hence Creon considers the disgrace and Antigone the pleasure. For Creon the eating of Polynices is like the burying of Eteocles: a manner of showing honor or dishonor for what the dead stood for. But for Antigone, who sympathetically enters into the birds’ perspective, the eating like the burying is a trait that belongs to the corpse itself. The sweet treasure-trove that is Polynices indicates the preciousness of Polynices even though dead.\footnote{Compare Philoctetes’ address to the birds no longer afraid of his bow:
can maintain his preciousness because she does not contemplate his consumption. He is an inexhaustible find for the birds. The corpse as corpse does not disgust her (cf. Pl. *Rep.* 439e7-440a, Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.4.24). On her second visit to the putrescent corpse, when the guards have retired to a hilltop to avoid its stench (411-2), she pays no attention to the stench.

4.7. Nonadverbial χάρις occurs twice more: the guard says he owes much gratitude to the gods for saving his life (331), and Creon asks Antigone how she can honor Polynices with a grace that his brother finds impious (514). The guard's χάρις is in exchange for a favor received, and the favor Antigone renders Polynices is at least partly in exchange for the loving reception she will receive after her death (cf. § 9.4); but the favor Polynices' corpse renders the birds is without reciprocity. Perhaps this selfless generosity of Polynices makes Antigone dwell so lovingly upon it, for in revealing a preciousness in his corpse that seems not to be in its nature to have, it cancels out any defects Polynices might have had when alive (cf. § 15.3). Antigone might thus regard the burial of Polynices as a way of showing favor to what in itself, even apart from the law, deserves to be favored. She might then come a second time in order to feed her eyes on the corpse that she thinks of as full of grace (cf. § 28.1).

4.8. For Antigone's calling Creon the good Creon, see § 17.5.

4.9. Antigone says that the punishment for disobedience is death by public stoning. Creon does not mention the punishment; and indeed, Antigone is not punished in that way (cf. §§ 14.1, 43.1).

5 (37-8). 5.1. Antigone lays down a challenge for Ismene, who is to show whether she was born noble or base from noble parents. Antigone disregards the incestuous marriage of her parents. They were noble, and nothing prevents their offspring from being noble; rather, it is to be expected that blood will tell.14 Not until her own death is very near does Antigone admit that the incest of her parents has been the source of the most painful concern for her (857-66).

6 (39-40). 6.1. Ismene calls Antigone daring (cf. 42, 47). ταλαίφρον occurs twice more, both times in Antigone's mouth of herself (866, 876).

She first calls herself ταλαίφρων because she was born from incestuous parents, and then because she is going to her death unwept for, without friends, and unmarried. Her origin and her fate equally constitute her wretchedness. Ismene calls Antigone ραταλαίφρων apparently because Antigone seems to believe that in the circumstances there is somehow room for their doing something that would reveal their nobility or baseness. Perhaps she implies as well that there is something strange for the offspring of an incestuous marriage to talk of nobility at all. Whom Antigone came from, what she dares to do, and what she suffers might be all of a piece. Her daring might have the same source as her wretchedness. She might be both daring and wretched by birth.

7 (41-8). 7.1. Antigone asks whether Ismene would help her in lifting up the corpse, plainly to wash and dress it, as would be customary (cf. 1201); but Ismene’s refusal to help compels her to abandon the thought of giving Polynices all the rites she gave Eteocles and her parents (901). Her failure, then, to stress the rites in reporting Creon’s decree seems to anticipate her failure to perform them.

7.2. Antigone tells Ismene that no prohibition can alter the fact that the corpse is their brother; and that as the corpse does not belong to the city, it cannot be concerned with the prohibition. Despite the special care Creon is taking, so that no one will be uninformed about his decree (31-5), only Antigone and Ismene willy-nilly are involved. If Antigone acts so as not to be convicted of treachery to her own, that cannot make her a traitor to the city.

7.3. Ismene asks Antigone whether Creon’s prohibition does not daunt her; and Antigone replies that as Creon has no share in her own, he cannot keep her from her own (cf. § 2.2). If Ismene had said, as she does later, that it is a prohibition of the citizens (79), would Antigone have given the same answer? She does not in the dispute that follows argue against Ismene’s identification of Creon and the citizens; indeed, she later accepts it (907). Whether the city is competent or not to determine who should receive burial proves not to be the issue between the two sisters.

8 (49-68). 8.1. Ismene’s speech is in three parts. The first gives an account of the fate of their father, mother, and brothers (49-57); the second matches that triad with three reasons for certain failure if they go against Creon’s decree (58-64); and the third gives the conclusion that Ismene has drawn for herself (65-8). What holds the three parts together is Ismene’s triple appeal to reasonableness and prudence: φρόνησον (49), ἐννοεῖν χρῆ (61), οὐκ ἔχει νοὺν οὖν ὁδένα (68). Her central thought, and what occupies the center of her speech, is that she and Antigone are the sole survivors of their family (cf. 548, 566). They alone can continue it. Antigone starts from the same premise but concludes differently. As they are the only living members of their family (3, cf. § 3.2), they must join them. Ismene sees the family
as a succession of generations—it is she who first mentions Haemon (568). Antigone sees their copresence in Hades (73-76; cf. 892-94, 897-99). Oedipus’ confusion of generations (53), so that succession is replaced by togetherness, finds its proper extension in Antigone’s refusal to think of any future apart from the dead. Her name, whose meaning—“generated in place of another”—bears witness to succession,\textsuperscript{15} proves to mean antigeneration.

8.2. Oedipus’ self-discovery of, and self-punishment for, his crimes, Jocasta’s suicide by hanging, and their sons’ mutual fratricide are balanced in the play by Creon’s acknowledgment of his crime, Eurydice’s suicide, and Haemon’s. The figure that links the two groups is Antigone, whose suicide by hanging recalls her mother’s, occasions those of Haemon and Eurydice, and brings home to Creon his crime.

8.3. The only historical present Ismene employs in this speech is to describe Jocasta’s suicide: Jocasta “treats life in a despiteful way.” Her outrage against life was due perhaps to a revulsion against generation. Her daughter, at any rate, embodies such a revulsion (cf. § 50.3).

8.4. Ismene gives a threefold account of what their transgression would consist in if they buried Polynices: “if we despite the law shall transgress the decree or powerful authority of tyrants.”\textsuperscript{16} Law, decree, and power seem to be identified. The confusion of law and decree tends to be a democratic assumption (cf. Th. 3.37.3-4; Arist. Pol. 1292a4-37);\textsuperscript{17} but the confusion of law and power is tyrannical. If, however, one follows Plato’s Thrasymachus, the identification of all three is a necessary consequence of asserting that justice is the advantage of the stronger. That Ismene is indifferent to the differences among them shows that she has no illusions about the foundations of the city.

8.5. There are two other reasons that, according to Ismene, should give Antigone pause. The first is that they were born women and hence are not fit to fight men; and the second is that they are ruled by those who are stronger, who may cause them to submit to still more painful things. Ismene does not reckon Creon’s decree as the most painful thing. Exile, slavery, or death, if imposed without their committing any crime, might be more painful. Their future can be better or worse (cf. § 3.2).

8.6. Antigone sets herself in opposition to Ismene’s understanding of law, nature, and strength. Against the city’s law she pleads a higher law; she shows herself, though not perhaps in Ismene’s sense, as strong as or stronger than Creon; and as to her being by nature a woman

\textsuperscript{15} Cf. Wilamowitz, \textit{Aischylos Interpretationen}, 92 n.3.

\textsuperscript{16} Schneidewin as an alternative gives the correct interpretation of the \( \delta \): “Doch kann Ismene auch meinen, nenn du es \( \psi \theta \rho \sigma \varepsilon \) oder \( \nu \sigma \alpha \tau \eta \), gesetzmäßige Verordnung oder Gebot des Machthabers.”

\textsuperscript{17} Cf. K. J. Dover, \textit{JHS} 1955, 17-20.
she is eloquently silent. She never uses the word γυνή, though it occurs eighteen times in the play, nor any of the following cognate words (whose frequencies are shown in parenthesis): γένος (7), γέγονοι (6), γενέα (3), γυνή (3), γέννημα (2), γόνος (2), γένεθλον (1). Only thrice does she use words compounded with the root γεν- : εὐγενῆς—the nobility to be tested of Ismene (38), αὐτογέννητος—the incest of her mother (864), and προγενῆς—the gods who are her ancestors (938). Between divine birth in the distant past and possible proof of being well-born in the immediate future lies the marriage of her mother with him to whom she had given birth. The suppression of that link between the future and the past is Antigone’s own name and nature as antigeneration, out of which comes the paradoxical ground of her actions. She as fully acknowledges consanguinity as she denies generation (cf. § 1.1). 18

8.7. Ismene is not impressed by the need to bury Polynices; for she believes that those beneath the earth will grant her pardon if, when she asks them, she cites the triple constraint of law, nature, and strength (cf. Th. 4.98.6). Ismene does not expect her argument to soften Antigone, but she does expect it to soften τοῦς ὑπὸ χθονὸς. Her appeal over the head of Antigone’s insurrection to Polynices and the nether gods forces Antigone to give the first of her three major defenses (69-77, 450-70, 905-15). If the obligation to bury one’s own is not absolute, Antigone is planning to do what is superfluous (περίσσα πράσασεν)

9 (69-77). 9.1. Antigone begins very severely. She will no longer accept Ismene’s help should Ismene later change her mind. If remorse overtake her, Antigone will not grant her pardon. We do not know as yet whether Antigone’s denial of repentance has the gods’ sanction; but that Creon’s remorse, which follows so quickly on his reiteration of his insurrection, does not alter the truth of Tiresias’ prophecy, would seem to confirm Antigone’s rejection of Ismene. One apparent defect in the plot of Antigone, that if Creon had submitted at once to Tiresias, the suicides of Antigone, Heamom, and Eurydice would have been averted, seems in fact to argue for the gods’ agreement with Antigone. As soon as Creon issues his decree he already is too late. The irrelevance of time makes known the eternal presence of the gods.

9.2. A story in Herodotus illustrates this (6.86). A Milesian who had heard of the justice of a Spartan and knew the stability of his country requested that he hold in safekeeping one-half of his wealth; but when the Milesians’ sons came much later to ask for the sum deposited,

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18 The strongest evidence of the genuineness of the ending of Aeschylus’ Septem (at least most of it) is the contrast between the Chorus of maidens and Antigone and Ismene as mature women; for Sophocles’ invention mainly consists in unsexing Antigone and giving her the attributes of Aeschylus’ Eteocles; see S. Benardete, Wiener Studien 1967, 22-30.
the Spartan denied that he had it; he decided, however, to ask the Delphic oracle what he should do, and the oracle threatened the complete disappearance of his race; whereupon the Spartan begged the god for pardon, to which the oracle replied: “To make trial of the god and to act are equivalent” (ἡ δὲ Ἡθὴ διδῆ τὸ παιρηθῆναι τὸν θεὸ καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι ἵσον δύνασθα). If the story seems to explain the inevitability of Creon’s punishment, it still remains doubtful whether Antigone justly extends the principle to include Ismene, whose constrained failure to comply with divine law is not the same as Creon’s wilful obstruction of it. This doubt is the first indication we have that Ismene stands next to Antigone as the most important figure in the play. That Antigone in her last speech tacitly denies her very existence only stresses her importance (941, cf. 599-600).

9.3. Antigone invokes the noble (καλόν), the dear (ψιλόν), and the holy (δαιόν) in her defense. Antigone does not say that once she has buried Polynices it is fair and noble for her to die or be killed, but that it is fair or noble in doing it (τοῦτο ποιώση) to die. Antigone borrows the language appropriate to the patriotic soldier whose dying on behalf of his country coincides with his fighting (cf. 194-5; Ai. 1310-12). With her task accomplished, it may be good, or as she later says, gainful, for her to die (461-4); but for it to be noble, there must be a necessary connection between the burial of one’s own and one’s own death. Antigone must imagine her act of burying as an act of fighting. What shows that she does so is her saying δαια πανουργήσασα. To do the holy things (δαια δεῖν) means to avoid committing any offense against the holy things—not to profane a holy place, for example; it does not mean to go out of one’s way to perform some pious deed (cf. 256, 1349).10 It is not enough, then, to translate Antigone’s phrase paradoxically as “by my criminal piety,” but one must be even more literal: “having stopped at nothing in the performance of holy things” (cf. 300-1). Antigone thus transforms the ordinariness of burying into something much more akin to the risking of one’s life in battle. Creon surely makes that transformation possible; but one wonders whether Antigone does not need Creon in order to be what she is.

9.4. It is not easy to say how Antigone understands the connection between her saying that it is noble to die in this way and that she will lie dear with him who is dear. Does this mutual dearness follow from the nobility of her death, her death simply, or her piety? Antigone seems to supply the missing connection herself: “since it is for a longer time that I must please those below than those here, for there I shall always

10 Cf. E. Fraenkel, Ag., vol. 2, 355; K. Latte, Kleine Schriften, 337. For the difference between Antigone’s phrase and δαια δεῖν see Thucydides 1.71.1, where the Corinthians distinguish the performance of justice from the abstention from hurting others; such a distinction does not normally exist in sacred matters; cf. Xen. Mem. 4.4.11.
lie.” The supposed connection, however, makes for a new perplexity. Antigone does not say that she must please those below because her act of piety will please them forever, but because she will lie with them forever. She combines the pious proposition that she please those below more because what they demand is holy with the hope that she will be in loving communion with them for a longer time. She omits from the pious proposition “more because what they demand is holy,” and replaces it by “for a longer time” that properly belongs to her hope. The holy thus turns into a means for making herself dear; but it can only be such a means through Creon’s decree. Creon is essential to Antigone’s obtaining something for herself in nobly devoting herself to another. The holy entirely resolves the usual tension between the noble and the dear.

9.5. The word φιλός is ambiguous. It can mean dear as a friend is dear, or it can mean dear as one’s own is dear. Antigone seems here to use the word in both meanings at once. She will lie with those who love her through what she does for them, and she will lie with those who already love her. She must first, to rejoin her own, acquire them as friends. Antigone proves her right to be by deed what she already is by birth. She reconstitutes the family as something into which one freely enters. The love of her own almost becomes a matter of choice. It is this to which Antigone partly owes her awesome uncanniness (376).

9.6. Antigone’s κείσομαι is as extraordinary as her δοσια πανομογνήσασα. She will not live but lie with Polynices; and “lie” suggests “lie dead and buried.” Antigone’s imagination does not go beyond the grave (cf. § 4.2). She does not animate the dead, but thinks of their state as no different from corpses (cf. § 4.3). If, however, one transposes the relation between Antigone and Polynices into a living one, Antigone then seems to be speaking the language of lovers: “I shall lie asleep, dear as I shall be, with him who is dear to me” (cf. Aesch. Ch. 894-5). Perhaps neither of these extremes exactly defines the way in which Antigone herself understands what she says, but it cannot be accidental that in her case the language of incest should coincide with the language of the grave.

9.7. Antigone mentions the gods last (Ismene never does) and the things they hold in honor. The noble, the dear, and the holy probably make up together τά τῶν θεῶν ἐνίμα; but if they are severally assigned to men, the dead, and the gods, one could say that Antigone’s nobility draws the eyes of men (cf. 502-4), her dearness elicits the love of the

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21 On its Homeric usage see E. Benveniste, Le vocabulaire des institutions i-e, vol. I, 335-53; but his assertion that φιλός never means one’s own cannot be taken as certain: πάτες is modified by φίλε but μητέρες by ἔμη.
dead, and her piety is confirmed by the gods' refusal to accept Creon's remorse. Punishment of the impious is the gods' reward for piety (cf. 927-8).

9.8. In Plato's *Euthyphro*, Socrates forced Euthyphro to choose between saying that the holy is holy because the gods love it, with the consequence that the holy loses its unity in the gods' contradictory affections, or that the gods love the holy because it is holy, with the consequence that the gods are dispensable guides for understanding what it is. Now in trying to understand Antigone we seem to be caught in a similar perplexity. Is it because the holy is holy that Antigone does what it commands, or because the holy just happens to be in accordance with what she wants to do that it looks as if she is obeying what it commands? We surely are not now in a position to justify our choosing either answer; but the parallel with *Euthyphro* indicates why in part Socrates and Euthyphro cannot arrive at a satisfactory definition of the holy. The dialogue wholly fails to consider the relation of the holy to the soul: προσθή never occurs. Antigone, on the other hand, is concerned with almost no other question. *Antigone* supplies what Plato thought it best to omit, and even perhaps in a way that Plato did mostly approve. Plato, indeed, may have omitted what he recognized the tragic poet alone could supply.

9.9. In the *Philebus*, Socrates lists seven occasions on which the soul by itself experiences a mixture of pleasure and pain: δεγγή, φόβος, πόθος, βοήθος, ἐρως, ζηλος, φθόνος (47el-2). Were it not for the central threnos, we should be inclined to call them all passions or affections of the soul. *Threnos*, however, is not an affection but the expression of an affection of the soul. It is, strictly speaking, the Greek equivalent to a dirge and, more generally, any kind of lamentation. In its general sense it can accompany any of the affections that Socrates lists; indeed, according to Socrates, comedy too is a kind of *threnos* (50b1-3, c5). In its strict sense, however, a *threnos* is the artful and conventional expression in song of the sorrow one has at a funeral; but no word in Greek or any other language that I know of names the unexpressed sorrow one has in the presence of death. That mourning for the dead is primarily the expression of that mourning (πενθος), that its expression is primarily artful and conventional, and that the occasion of its expression is primarily at a funeral all point to the possibility that certain aspects of the soul are necessarily and essentially linked with poetry and convention. As these aspects only come to light in poetry and convention, to divorce them from poetry and convention is to destroy them. And yet to leave them in (and to) poetry and convention veils the seeing of them as

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22 I owe this insight to Professor Leo Strauss.
24 Cf., e.g., Aeschines 3.77: πρὶν πενθήσαι καὶ τὰ νομιζόμενα ποιῆσαι.
they are in themselves. Only a very artful poet could, without destroying them, reveal them as they are in themselves.\textsuperscript{25}

10 (78-99). 10.1. The thirteen speeches that follow are mainly concerned with the feasibility of Antigone’s plan. Ismene says that she is by nature incapable of acting against the citizens, but that this does not imply that she holds in contempt τὰ τῶν θεῶν ἔντιμα. Her submission to Creon is not based on any agreement with Creon; as far as her intention goes, she is on Antigone’s side. According to Antigone, however, Ismene puts forward her natural inability in order to conceal her contempt for what the gods hold honorable. She herself will proceed to heap up a tomb for her dearest brother. Antigone’s language far outpaces her ability. The guard reports that the ground around Polynices’ corpse was unbroken (249-50); and the tumulus that Creon later has raised for Polynices is the work of many men (1203-4). Antigone might then be using loosely one of the many ways of saying that she will bury Polynices; but the intensity of her desire to carry out her conventional duty tends to restore to the casual usage of everyday its full meaning (cf. § 9.6). If she cannot in fact do what she plans to do, her ability is no greater than Ismene’s, and she must be judged solely on intention. It is unclear, moreover, whether she succeeds in even a minimal way in burying Polynices. If she did not finish the rites on her first attempt, she is prevented by the guards from doing so on the second; and if she did finish them on her first attempt, it is hard to understand why she returned (cf. § 25.4). There is a further difficulty. If the guards in sweeping away the dust she had sprinkled on Polynices’ corpse nullify her act of burial, as the need to bury him again implies, one must strictly say that Antigone’s plan fails. Ismene, then, would rightly insist on their own weakness. If those below look to intention and not to accomplishment (cf. §§ 9.1, 9.2), Ismene would be guaranteed as loving a reception as Antigone. Only if they demand that one attempt to do the impossible would she be inferior in their eyes to Antigone.

10.2. There is a still more terrible possibility: that those below will not even take into account Antigone’s daring but will condemn her along with Ismene for her failure. This possibility depends on how one understands the Athenians’ condemnation of their generals for failing to pick up the corpses after the battle of Arginusae. Although the Athenians later repented of their decision, one wonders why the generals’ defense did not at once convince them: that the onset of a storm foiled their attempt; or, as their advocate puts it, incapacity does not argue for treachery (Xen. \textit{Hell.} 1.7.33). What made them go against their own law, which laid it down that the accused should be tried individually?

\textsuperscript{25} It is revealing that Plato has his Athenian Stranger use the example of burial in order to illustrate the advantage a poet claims to have over a legislator in contradicting himself (cf. \textit{Lgs.} 719b12-e5).
If intention, then, does not suffice, nor incapacity be a plausible excuse, when one is dealing with holy things, but only the strictest conformity to the law is innocence, Antigone's superiority to Ismene would lack divine sanction. It would be closer to madness.

10.3. In Oedipus at Colonus, Oedipus profanes the sanctuary of the Eumenides; and after Theseus grants him Athens' protection, the Chorus ask that Oedipus purify himself for his violation. When the Chorus have carefully explained the ceremony, Oedipus turns to his two daughters and asks one of them to do it for him, since his lameness and blindness prevent him: "For I believe one soul is enough, if it be gracious there, to pay this debt even for ten thousand" (498-9). Ismene assumes the task and leaves; and the next thing we hear about her is that Creon's men have captured her (818-9). One may wonder then whether Ismene ever did get to purify her father. If one grants that she may not have, and discards the possibility of Oedipus' remaining to the end unpurified, Oedipus' intention to be purified would be equivalent to his purification. If such be the case, Ismene again would merit as much praise for holiness as Antigone. The extremes of Arginusae and Oedipus at Colonus show, if nothing else, how hard it is to understand what holds together the nobility and the piety of Antigone.

10.4. Ismene is afraid for Antigone, a fear that Antigone takes to be Ismene's fear for herself and the truth of her natural inability to act despite the citizens. She bids Ismene to keep upright her own fate. πότμος is usually not thought of as something over which mortals have control (cf. fr. 871), nor is it usual for it, without a qualifying adjective (cf. Tr. 88), to lose its ordinary sense of evil destiny or death; indeed, neither usage seems to occur anywhere else in the tragedians. Antigone uses πότμος twice more, once of the destiny that attends the house of Labdacus (860), and once of her own death for which no friend mourns (881). Antigone, then, might be doing more than taunting Ismene for her cowardice. Ismene need not fear for Antigone because her deed and its consequences are her fate and nothing can alter it (cf. 235-6); and Ismene is blind if she supposes that her fate is under her own control and not simply a part of the doom inherent in her family. If the first of these implications holds, Antigone would seemingly be choosing her own fate (cf. § 9.5); and if the second holds, Antigone would here betray her awareness that what she plans, does, and suffers is bound up with who she is and whence she came (cf. § 5.1).

10.5. Ismene begs Antigone not to tell anyone of her plan; and that she herself will do likewise, will show Antigone, she hopes, that she is willing to do as much as she can to further her plan; but Antigone scorns this counsel of prudence and bids her to denounce her to

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26 Pindar, however, has several instances of neutral πότμος, but none where it is even remotely under one's own control.
everyone. Antigone, then, does not have a plan; she only has an intention. Had Ismene taken her at her word, Antigone would have failed at her first attempt. She would not have done anything for Polynices. Antigone seems to regard it as essential that she be caught and as inessential that she succeed. One thus begins to understand what she meant by saying that for her to die in burying Polynices, or rather, as we must now translate, in trying to bury him, is noble (cf. § 9.3). That she will stop at nothing does not entail for her the use of craft. Even so, Antigone easily gets away with it, which cannot but amaze us, especially after hearing of Creon's preparations and listening to Ismene's plausible demurr.

10.6. Antigone's indifference to getting caught provokes Ismene into saying that she has a hot heart for cold things. In the context of the play, and in light of Odysseus' pun on ἐναλλία and ἐναλλαζός (v. 555), one cannot help but understand Ismene as saying that Antigone shows all the artless intensity of life itself in her devotion to the heartless coldness of the law about corpses and "dead souls" (cf. OC 621-2). Ismene now realizes that Antigone is not just fulfilling the requirements of a law, compliance with which, she might well think, does not have to dispense with cunning (cf. Her. 2.1218 ε). A cool head may strictly preclude a pious heart, but it surely does not check one from the performance of a holy rite. Antigone's reply as much as admits (ἐναλλία) the discrepancy between the subjective heat in her concern and its objective coldness; but she reconciles them by saying that she knows she is pleasing to those whom she most of all must please. Her gratifying of the dead mediates between the law and her passion, for the law seems to be the formulation of the duties of familial love. If one looks to the beneficiaries of the law, its coldness vanishes in their warmth.

10.7. Antigone says that she knows she is pleasing, not that she will be pleasing, to the dead. For the first time she uses the present tense in speaking of how the dead will regard her. Her use of the present tense can be understood in two ways: either her intention by itself, regardless of its accomplishment, is enough to please the dead, or, as Ismene takes it, the present tense reflects the vividness of Antigone's desire, for, as nothing can possibly frustrate her (πανοργήσασα), she imagines the deed already done. Ismene now thinks that the accomplishment alone can warrant Antigone's confidence in her pleasing the dead; and that depends on her ability, which is so much less than what is needed that only Antigone's love of the impossible can explain her readiness to try at all. Antigone does not deny the charge; she merely says that her efforts will come to an end whenever she loses her strength. Antigone seems to maintain that the attempt is all-important, and that she does not expect to succeed. Ismene then points to the utter unseemliness of hunting out the impossible; and at this suggestion that what

27 On the ellipse with ἐναλλαζός see A. D. Knox, CQ 1931, 208.
she is doing is ignoble, Antigone turns vindictive: Ismene is certain to earn the immediate hatred of Antigone and the lasting hatred of Polynices. The reward for Antigone’s attempt and the punishment for Ismene’s abstention equally depend on the same principle: those below love or hate in accordance with one’s willingness to go after the impossible. In loving those who try and fail, they love those who deliberately seek their own death. Ismene’s natural inability to commit suicide justifies her punishment.

10.8. Words with the stem μηχαν- occur seven times, used thrice by Ismene, thrice by the Chorus, and once, between the two triads, by Creon. Ismene says that (1) she is naturally without a μηχανή to act despite the citizens (79), (2) Antigone is in love with things that have no μηχανή (92), (3) it is unseemly to hunt out things that have no μηχανή (92); the Chorus say that (1) man prevails over the mountain-ranging beast by μηχαναί (349), (2) man contrives his escape from diseases that have no μηχανή (363), (3) man has in the μηχαναί of his art something wise beyond hope (365); and Creon says that there is no μηχανή for knowing a man’s ψυχή, φόνημα, and γνώμη before he is tested in public affairs (175). Ismene’s triad of impossibles is matched by the Chorus’ triad of possibles, for their “device-less diseases” means “seemingly device-less diseases.” The one strictly device-less occasion that confronts man is death (361-2). Antigone’s love, then, of the impossible is her love of death (cf. 220). Her hot heart for cold things is precisely this έρως τοῦ θανείν; and this έρως, in turn, spells out one consequence of the antigeneration of her name.

10.9. Antigone in her love of the impossible and man in his overcoming of the impossible seem to refute Creon’s assertion of the impossibility of knowing a man’s soul, temper, and judgment apart from the exercise of political rule; but if one takes him to mean by extension that only in confrontation with the city can man be known, Antigone’s artless defiance of the city and artful man’s neutrality to the city (365-70) suggest that Creon correctly understands the city as the indispensable touchstone of man. The city somehow stands between the daring for which only death is a limit and the daring for which only death is its goal. If, moreover, Antigone’s love of the impossible does not just accidentally express itself in an unrealizable attempt to obey the divine law, but there is some connection between them, the city would stand between the human that defies the impossible in one sense and the divine that demands the impossible in another. The city would owe both its existence and the precariousness of its existence to the impossible demanded by the gods and the impossible defied by man as man. As the city cannot be without both of these impossibles, so it cannot submit itself entirely to either of them. Antigone thus seems to be defending unreservedly one basis of the city that the city itself cannot afford to defend unreservedly.
10.10. In saying that she will not suffer anything as terrible as an ignoble death, Antigone comes close to forgetting her intention, for she implies without knowing it that the most terrible thing she could suffer would not be Polynices’ lack of burial (cf. §§ 2.2, 8.5). She transfers the nobility of her action to the nobility of her death, as if only her death could testify to the nobility of her action (cf. § 9.3). By ignoring Ismene’s suggestion that she practice a minimum of guile (if guile is not too strong a word for it), Antigone blurrs the issue between them. The alternative to a noble death is not an ignoble death but life (cf. 555); and life in one of two ways: either to abandon her intention entirely and ignobly live on, or make an attempt in such a way as not to get caught. Antigone rejects both ways, but she ironically calls the rejection of the first way her δοσβονία when it applies without any irony to her rejection of the second. Her lack of any plan guarantees her death even if it also guarantees her failure to carry out her intention.

10.11. Of the seven occurrences of πάσχειν, five are in the mouth of Antigone (96 bis, 236 [guard], 926, 928, 942, 995 [Creon]). She begins by ordering Ismene to let her suffer “this terrible thing,” and she ends by ordering the Chorus to see what she, who reverenced piety, suffers at the hands of what sort of men. Her scorn of suffering finally gives way to her indignation at her suffering. With πάθειν τὸ δεινὸν τοῦτο she ironically refers to her noble death (καλῶς θανεῖν); but if she can later be indignant at her suffering, its literal meaning must be the truth. καλῶς θανεῖν is not the equivalent of πάθειν τὸ δεινὸν τοῦτο, for death in itself does not admit of nobility, any more than nobility can be of any account (as Antigone knows and Creon does not) when one is dead (cf. § 4.1). One can show nobility in the action that precipitates one’s death, or if the action accompanies it, even in the dying itself (cf. § 9.3), but not otherwise (cf. Plato Phaedo 118a6-12). Because Antigone Pretends that her action and her death will be simultaneous, she can now hide from herself the knowledge of what it means for her to die (cf. 36). Her passionate obedience to the law about burial, which is in keeping with her vivid awareness of what it means to be dead (cf. § 4.5), perhaps even thrives on this self-delusion.

10.12. Ismene ends the stichomythia in the same way that Antigone had introduced it. Her ἀλλ’ ἐὰν δοκεῖ σοι echoes Antigone’s σοι δ’ ἐὰν δοκεῖ (76); but whereas Antigone’s apodosis accused Ismene of dishonoring what the gods hold in honor, Ismene’s apodosis tells Antigone to proceed, secure in the knowledge that she is dear to her friends (Polynices, herself, and their whole family). Ismene thus separates what Antigone must hold together. Ismene sees no connection between the dearness and the piety of Antigone (cf. § 10.3), for she does not think that madness can fit with piety, however painfully it can with dearness. She seems to forget that there is such a thing as divine madness.

11 (100-61). 11.1. The old men who make up the Chorus are
the measure of Antigone’s peculiar greatness, for she is the only suffering heroine in extant Greek tragedy who does not have a chorus of women to console her. Ismene is a token of what such a chorus would be like; hence it is plain before the Chorus enter that Antigone does not need the kind of consolation that only women could give. Antigone alone of Sophocles’ extant plays lacks the vocative plural of φίλος (cf. § 45.1).

11.2. As a hymn of patriotic thanksgiving the parodos could not be bettered; and the same appropriateness holds true for all that the Chorus sing. Man’s skillful daring, Antigone’s fatal madness, Love’s power, Antigone’s predecessors in suffering, Dionysus’ invocation, to each of these themes the Chorus give the perfect expression. Their individual perfection is partly due to the Chorus’ refusal to compromise with each theme. Each is in turn the whole truth; none is put within a horizon larger than itself. While the Chorus are thus as extreme in each case as Antigone or Creon consistently is, their continual shift in perspective makes them far more moderate than either can be. Their moderation does not arise from the steadiness with which they adhere to sober views, but exactly the contrary. The Chorus effortlessly move from the unlimited power to man (first stasimon) to the unlimited power of Eros (third stasimon), for they are totally persuaded of each at the moment, and they never give any thought to their reconciliation. Adaptability, in which moderation to a large extent consists, has never perhaps been so brilliantly parodied. The last words of the play, that moderation is the major component in happiness, are as true as they are empty in the mouth of the Chorus (cf. § 65.1). The Chorus’ lack of solidity, then, which paradoxically allows them to speak profoundly but thoughtlessly, makes it the right Chorus for Antigone, whose speeches accurately reflect her soul. The law Antigone obeys shines through Antigone. That her hot heart for cold things is not an accidental conjunction, the Chorus can never understand.

11.3. The threefold mention of Thebes (compare the threefold mention of her gates and γῆ) holds the parodos together: Thebes for which the sun has never shone more beautifully (102), Thebes joyous in answer to the joyful presence of Victory (149), and Thebes the all-night celebrant whose ruler will be Dionysus (153). The parodos moves from the night whose terrors the sun (note the threefold φανέρωσις, φάνωσις, ἐφάνωσις) has dispelled to the night that promises forgetfulness of them. As the first strophe thus corresponds to the last antistrophe, so the first of the anapaestic systems, which refers to Polynices, his quarrel with Eteocles, and his marshaled army, corresponds to the third, which describes the Argive panoplies left behind and the death of the two brothers; and the first antistrophe, which mentions Hephaestus and Ares, corresponds to the second strophe, which describes πυρρόσις Capaneus and Ares. The second anapaestic system, which is the center
of the parodos’ seven parts, is devoted to Zeus, whose lightning punishes the overboastful (cf. 1350-3). Within this “ring-composition” the parodos also moves from the war itself, over which the gods Hephaestus, Ares, and Zeus preside, to the victory and its aftermath, which the gods Zeus, Nike, and Bacchios determine, with Ἄρης δεξιόσεις effecting the transition from the first triad to the second. The first triad of Hephaestus, the fire of the enemy’s torches, Ares, the clatter of the enemy’s army in retreat, and Zeus the hurler of lightning against Capanecus, seems to receive in the second triad their equivalents for triumphant Thebes. The dancing Bacchios ἐλειλχθων is to lead replaces the thud of βαξχεῦν Capanecus’ fall (ἀντιτόπα γῆ); the renown Victory μεγαλόνυμος brings replaces the πάταγος Ἄρηος; and the trophy of brazen armor dedicated to Zeus the god of rout replaces the fire of Hephaestus, who is now to be thought of as χαλκεύς (cf. § 52.4).

11.4. The parodos’ movement from ἀκτίς ἀελὼν to χορὸς παννυχίως and ἐλειλχθων Βάκχιος parallels the movement of the play as a whole: from the time just before dawn to dawn (cf. § 1.1), to high noon, when a sudden dust storm heralds Antigone’s return to Polynices’ corpse (416), to Antigone’s departure from the light of the sun (808, 879),28 to the Chorus’ invocation of Dionysus as chorègos of the fire-breathing stars, in whose honor the frenzied Thyiads dance all night (1146-54). The Chorus seem to sense from the start the way in which the day will unfold; but they owe this prescience entirely to their absorption in the demands of the moment and not to any insight into the nature of things. They say everything in one way or another that has to be said about Antigone, even to the point of duplicating here the rhythm of the play; but they never understand anything of what they say. They are the mouthpiece of wisdom without being wise themselves. They thus allow Sophocles to be always invisible while being always present. If Antigone finally becomes entirely transparent, so that she can be read off as easily from her surface as from her depths (the first indication of which is the meaning of her name), Sophocles, on the other hand, remains throughout opaque, since every manifestation of his wisdom is cut off from its source. Perhaps, then, the ultimate conflict does not consist in that between Antigone and Creon, or even between the family and the city, but between Antigone and Sophocles, of whom one is always what she shows herself to be, and the other is never what he shows himself to be (cf. § 37.5).

11.5. The parodos has one trait of the kind one usually calls poetic that shows the Chorus’ astonishing virtuosity. It characterizes in eleven different ways the eleven different beings to which a noncollective proper name is or can be given. It seems to display every possible degree or mode of animation. (1) The sun hovers between being a signal for

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28 The metrical shape of 808-9 is the same as 100-2.
the Argives' flight and the cause of their flight: it is seen, sees, moves, and sets in motion; (2) Polynices becomes so fused with the metaphor of an eagle that the same sentence attributes to him what can only belong to the eagle; (3) Hephaestus seems to be nothing but a name for fire (cf. 1007, 1126); (4) Ares, however, is slightly more than the clatter of war, for πάταγος Ἄρεος is in apposition to ἀντιπάλων δυσχείρωμα δράκοντος ("not an overcoming of its opponent the serpent"),29 which through the story of the serpent's teeth (cf. 1124-5) galvanizes Ares into a higher degree of life than a personification can ever have; (5) Zeus is a fully living anthropomorphic god: he hates, hears, sees, and strikes down the wicked; (6) the anonymous Capaneus is something more than human: he is divinely inspired (βαχχευων) as he blows blasting winds of hatred against Thebes; (7) Ares like Polynices is fused with the metaphor of a trace horse, which in turn is fused with that of a charioteer and warrior, as though Ares were the moving spirit of πολνάματος Thebes (149); (8) Zeus who turns the tide of battle is the god whom one honors with trophies; (9) the miserable Polynices and Eteocles are entirely human, born from the same father and mother and sharing a common death; (10) Nike brings, feels, and shows her feelings of joy; (11) Bacchios who shakes the earth is the god to whom one prays to be present at the night-long dances. It is extremely difficult to arrange this series on any scale of being, for one does not know on what principle the scale should be based. If, however, one dares to test them against the consistently literal, the degree, that is, to which the Chorus themselves might subscribe to a literal reading of their language, the Chorus would admit perhaps that Polynices and Eteocles (9) are farthest removed from Polynices the eagle (2); the clatter of Ares (4) from Ares the trace horse, warrior, and charioteer (7); Zeus the god of rout (8) from Zeus the god of just punishment (5); Bacchic Capaneus (6) from Bacchios himself (11); piney Hephaestus (3) from the eye of the golden day (1), and the victory Capaneus strives to announce (133) from Nike who rejoices in the joy of Thebes (10). Now in a play whose unstated issue turns on the being of a corpse (cf. §§ 4.3, 9.6), it cannot but be relevant that we are presented at the start with such a variety of ways of being alive, from the poetic Polynices to the prosaic Polynices and Eteocles (with many shades between), especially if one recalls Antigone's ἥ δ' ἐμὴ νομὴ πάλαι τέθνηκεν (559-60), which plainly upsets any ordinary understanding of life and death (cf. § 44.2).30

11.6. To the Chorus Eteocles is politically negligible, so much so that they only refer to him anonymously, without even etymologizing

29 On χείρωμα see E. Fraenkel, Ag. 1326; here, Müller.
30 There are several other passages that confirm the significance of the ways in which the Chorus sing here: 487 (§ 29.3); 658-9 (§ 39.3); 854 (§ 46.7); 1007 (§ 52.4).
his name (cf. Aesch. Septem 829-31), and who along with his brother is pitiable (στυγεροίν) and nothing more; he surely does not seem to be one who, as Creon thinks, deserved the aristeia (cf. § 4.1). The Chorus, indeed, never allude to Eteocles again, any more then they do to Polynices, neither of whom holds any interest for them, once they cannot be the immediate cause of anything. Now that they are dead they are nothing (cf. § 3.2). The Chorus therefore do not speak here of Eteocles as the former ruler of Thebes; Creon is now the king, and their concern is only for what he will devise for the new situation (155-61). That Creon deliberately convoked them because he knew of their loyalty to the house of Laius (164-9) makes their silence all the stranger. What, however, somewhat accounts for their silence about Eteocles’ aristeia, if not for their silence about his rule, is that they ascribe the triumph of Thebes entirely to the gods.31 Human excellence has no place where Zeus and Ares directly participate in battle. To infer, however, from this that the Chorus hold human effectiveness to be severely limited by the gods would be mistaken, for the first stasimon recognizes no limit to man but death. The Chorus, then, have merely fragments of convictions, each of which lasts just as long as the occasion that provokes it (cf. § 11.2).

11.7. If the Chorus treat Polynices more fully than Eteocles, it is not out of any indignation at his treachery to his country, his impiety to the gods, or deliberate intent to commit fratricide (cf. 199-202), for they make all of the Argive army indiscriminately guilty of hybris, and only single out Capaneus for particular obloquy. The lacuna at 112 makes it uncertain, but it would seem that they do not regard Polynices with hatred. Polynices is simply the leader of the Argives, whose description thus easily passes into that of the whole army. Only the etymologizing of his name particularizes him and makes him somewhat responsible for the war. The Chorus’ mildness, then, about Polynices and their indifference to Eteocles together suggest that Creon has not chosen his supporters wisely. And if Creon cannot gauge correctly the temper of the Chorus, he seems bound to fall wildly short of the mark when he has to face Antigone.

12 (162-210). 12.1. Creon’s speech falls into three main parts: the legitimacy of his rule (162-74), the principles of his rule (175-91), and the first act of his rule (192-206), to which he adds a restatement of his principles (207-10). Although the theme of the speech is the polis, which occurs seven times, twice in each main part and once in the restatement (162, 167, 178, 191, 194, 203, 209), each part has its own triad on which it turns: the first part turns on the rule of Laius, Oedipus, and his two sons; the second on man’s ἀνήρ, φρόνημα, and

...\gamma\nu\omega\mu\eta, which only the exercise of political rule can reveal; and the third on Polynices' triple crime, against his country, its gods, and his brother (cf. § 27.1).

12.2. Jebb's mistranslation of the opening of Creon's speech brings out what one might otherwise have missed: "Sirs, the vessel of our State, after being tossed on wild waves, hath once more been safely steadied by the gods." Creon, however, says that the gods shook τὰ πόλεος and then righted them (cf. OC 394). He thus seems at once to absolve Polynices of any guilt for the war and deprive Eteocles of any credit for the victory. He goes much further than the Chorus did, who only assigned the victory to the gods, but left the guilt of the Argives intact (cf. § 11.6). Whatever reasoning led Creon to think that the gods were totally responsible (Oedipus' curse of his sons perhaps), his σείλασσες ὀφθωσαν compels one to reflect when he says four lines later, ἡνίων Οἰδίπους ὀφθον πόλιν. If Creon alludes to the plague, it would be equally true to say of Oedipus as of the gods that he shook the city and righted it again, for he both caused and removed the plague. If, as might seem more likely, Creon alludes to the Sphinx, one would have to say that the gods shook the city and Oedipus righted it. Creon, however, cannot be alluding to either possibility, for not only does the imperfect ὀφθον preclude them both but Creon does not recall Oedipus either because of his riddle solving or because of his discovery of his own crimes. Creon mentions Oedipus solely to establish the legitimacy of his own accession to the throne through his kinship with him, and hence his own right to demand the loyalty of the Chorus, who he knows were always loyal to the royal family. One now sees that Creon's temporal clause about Oedipus allows him to gloss over the irregularity of Oedipus' accession as well as the bearing of his crimes on his sons' succession. The balanced phrases τοῦτό μὲν-τοῦτ' ἀδθίς suggest that one is to insert mentally some form of line 166 after ὀφθον πόλιν, but, as Jebb remarks, this is impossible, as the καὶ of καὶ ἐνεῖ must link δύολεῖν' with ὀφθον. This grammatical peculiarity has the effect of suppressing any specific mention of the Chorus' loyalty to Oedipus; instead, Oedipus and his sons are lumped together in the phrase τοὺς κείνον παίδας, where κείνον refers to Laius as the father of Oedipus and Oedipus as the father of Polynices and Eteocles. Oedipus, then, is used simply as an indispensable transition between Laius and Oedipus' sons (cf. § 8.6). Creon is forced to adopt such involuted language because the Chorus could not have been loyal to Oedipus as the legitimate successor to Laius by birth, but only to Oedipus the solver of the riddle, whose reward was the throne of Laius and marriage to his own mother. One can easily imagine that as soon as Oedipus' crimes became known, and hence his legitimacy was ironically confirmed, the Chorus ceased to be loyal to him. κείνον should, but cannot, mean Oedipus and Jocasta, for only through his sister is Creon entitled to the kingship.
(cf. 486). Creon does everything he can to regularize the royal house without abandoning the truth entirely. He tries to pretend that succession is through the male line only, so that the Chorus will not remember, as if they could ever forget, that Polynices and Eteocles were the offspring of an incestuous marriage (cf. § 5.1). He wants the Chorus to understand τοὺς κείνων παιδας as meaning the descendants of Laius and Oedipus, but he cannot quite bring himself to say that the Chorus was loyal to Oedipus as Laius’ son, which alone would have given to τ.κ.π. the meaning he needs; nor can he, on the other hand, suppress all mention of Oedipus, for he still needs him to maintain the fiction of legitimately normal succession through three generations.

12.3. As Creon must here misrepresent the line of succession, he must mistakenly describe the Chorus’ loyalty to the successive occupants of the throne as loyalty to the royal family, which, as we saw, it could not have been. He takes their adaptability to circumstances for their firmness of principle (cf. § 11.7). He further does not seem to be aware that this attempt to bind the Chorus to him does not jibe with his attempt to be the spokesman for the city as a whole. If he calls the Chorus together because of their past loyalty to the royal house, he implies that the city has and had discordant elements within it, some of which are not and never have been loyal to the Labdacids (cf. 289-92). His first mention of the city thus gains in significance. τα πόλεος might be just a periphrasis for the city itself; but, if the city is not a whole, with a single common interest, τα πόλεος is indistinguishable from the present monarchical regime, and merely a euphemism for τα Λαβδακιδῶν θρόνων κατη. Later, in the anger of debate, Creon will have to admit as much and more (738), but now he cannot do so, for his title to rule must be unblemished; this, however, can be the case only if the royal house has consistently identified its interests with those of the city. Creon, then, has another reason for being so vague about Oedipus, as well as for implying Polynices’ innocence. Polynices, no less than his brother, is needed for Creon’s own succession. Their only crime is mutual fratricide, which, as Creon presents it, has nothing to do with the city and its troubles.

12.4. Creon distinguishes ψυχή, φρόνημα, and γνώμη from each other as follows: ψυχή is what one is most devoted to or loves, and how one ranks other things in relation to it; 52 φρόνημα is the temper of one’s devotion, whether it shows itself as intense or lax, savage or mild, firm or weak; and γνώμη is the reasons one has for one’s devotion and the consequences one draws from it. Creon illustrates this triad in two ways: first about any ruler, τῶν ἄριστων βουλευμάτων takes up γνώμη, δοσις...ἀπετατ...ἀλλ...'ἐχει expands φρόνημα, and μείζον'...νομίζει explains ψυχή; and then again about himself,
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oött ἀν...σωτηρίας is his φρόνημα, oött ἀν...ἐμαντῷ his ψυχή, and ἥδ...ποιούμεθα his γνώμη. Creon does not see the problem for the ruler as a question of either ψυχή or γνώμη—they are self-evident—but of φρόνημα, the way one acts on one’s judgment and on what one most loves. As the fatherland is to rank highest for both ruler and ruled and for the same reason, only the ruler has in addition to be courageous and speak out in warning against what threatens everyone’s ψυχή and γνώμη. This is why Creon calls his decree his φρόνημα (207). His decree, which is the political formulation of his ψυχή, is such an example of courage, for the whole city never was particularly loyal to the Labdacids. It does not think so highly of Eteocles or so little of Polynices as Creon must.

12.5. Creon calls his ψυχή, φρόνημα, and γνώμη his νόμοι because for him they mean his ἔννομος ψυχή, ἔννομον φρόνημα, and ἔννομος γνώμη. He therefore does not consider what relation obtains between the νόμοι of the soul and the νόμοι of the city, for he assumes that they are in perfect agreement. But such an agreement depends on the coincidence of the πόλις with the πάτρα and χθόν, with which he replaces it in formulating his ψυχή (182, 187). The difference between city and fatherland most plainly appears in Creon’s saying that Polynices wanted to destroy his fatherland (199), but Eteocles died on behalf of the city (194), though metrically he could have said *πατρας ὑπομαγχὼν. The city is whatever its present regime is, but the fatherland is thought to be prior to any regime and that which persists through all changes of regime. (The Chorus in the parados never mention πόλις.) Hatred of the fatherland is ipso nomine unpatriotic, but hatred of the regime is often thought to be the highest kind of patriotism. Now Creon is forced to identify the fatherland and the city because he employs two different arguments for establishing his right to rule, either one of which would suffice but which together are contradictory. Creon first proves the legality of his accession and then the probable excellence of his rule. The legality, however, turns on the regime, the house of the Labdacids, but the excellence turns on the fatherland. Creon wants the Chorus to remain loyal to the royal family and hence to himself, while he himself will show his perfect devotion to the city as fatherland. He thus appeals to the irrational loyalty of the Chorus, which he nevertheless must esteem, as he declares his own rational loyalty.33 By failing to prove, which he could not if he wanted to, that the Labdacids were consistently patriotic, Creon asks the Chorus to love a family more than their

33 Cf. Aristotle Ath. Pol. 28.5; L. Strauss, City and Man, 167. Creon’s confusion of fatherland and regime is shared by the commentators: “verissime Suernnian monuit Creontem non private in Polynicem odio haec imperare, sed quod boni civis et regis officium esse censeat iustum esse aequae adversus eos, qui amem patriam, atque qui ei se inimicos praebeant; neque in Antigonam severum esse odio quodam, sed quod sustinendum putat imperium suum” (Wunder, on 198 sqq.).
country, and the very family, besides, that his decree is designed in part to dishonor. His own loyalty, on the other hand, to the fatherland is rational, for the love that attaches the Chorus to the Labdacids or one countryman to another depends for its possibility on the country's freedom from enslavement. Creon could have avoided this contradiction if he had said that the Chorus had shown exceptional patriotism through three generations of kings, and that he expects their allegiance to him because he will show himself as patriotic as they have done in the past. Not only does the need to prove the legality of his accession prevent him from taking this approach, but he somehow senses as well that the love of a fellow countryman grips everyone far more deeply than love of country: he speaks of the Chorus' reverence for the Labdacids, but not of his own reverence for Thebes. The ψυχή that only the exercise of political rule reveals as undivided love of country is not the ψυχή of those who do not rule, whose love is necessarily divided between their φίλοι and the country that makes that love possible. Perhaps Creon, then, does not avoid the contradiction between the first and second parts of his speech out of pride in his unique ability to sacrifice his deeper feelings for the sake of his country (cf. § 38.1). His swearing of an oath here may indicate this pride (cf. § 19.3).

12.6. The phrase τοὺς φίλους ποιούμεθα (instead of *τ.φ. κεκτήμεθα) assumes that all φίλοι are a matter of choice, and no one is φίλος by necessity. One picks or drops a friend at will. One can therefore calculate whether such a friendship will come into conflict with love of country and act accordingly (cf. OC 607-15). Love of country, however, is far more deliberate, for it even begins in calculation. One has to figure out the need for it. Love of one's own, on the other hand, precedes all calculation and survives in spite of calculation (cf. 98-9): Antigone never speaks of her γνώμη (cf. § 4.3). Creon's silence, then, about the possible conflict between the love of one's own and of one's country shows how unprepared he is to confront Antigone. That Antigone, too, somehow regards the love of her own as a matter of choice is part of her strangeness (cf. § 9.5), and does not justify Creon's omission.

12.7. Creon's proclamation, which makes up the third part of his speech, is the brother (ἀδελφός) of the second part, in which he presented the laws by which he intends to magnify the city. It is a special case of the general laws of the country, which are in turn the laws that inform Creon's soul. Creon commits the democratic error of identifying decree and law on a completely nondemocratic basis (cf. § 8.4). But in what way is his decree the brother of his laws? His laws stated that he counts as nothing anyone who puts a friend before his fatherland,

34 The Chorus characterize Creon's convocation of themselves with an expression that recalls the technical phrase at Athens for an extraordinary assembly (160-1).
and that he himself would make no one a friend who was an enemy of his land. To bury Eteocles, then, must be an act of friendship, and to deprive Polynices of burial an act of enmity. Creon thus seems to equate honor with love and dishonor with hatred. He knows nothing of honor given without love, or dishonor without hatred. He does not understand reverence and awe as distinct from love. He does not understand that one can honor but not love someone at a distance and without ever seeing him (cf. § 1.1); and that contempt as easily squares with indifference — τοῦτον ὀδηγῶν λέγω — as with hatred (cf. 35). For Creon, then, to let Polynices be seen disgraced, the prey of birds and dogs, would disclose more his hatred than his dishonor; but just to order Eteocles to be buried, without performing the rites with his own hand (cf. 900), would be a mark of honor and not of love (cf. 524-5). Creon could, after all, without violating his patriotism, have prohibited the burial of Polynices in Theban territory, which was the Athenian punishment for treachery and sacrilegious theft (Xen. Hell. 1.7.22). That he goes out of his way to express his hatred for Polynices but not his love of Eteocles shows how imperfectly Creon understands his own equation of honor and love; an equation that seems to have arisen from his taking the laws of his soul for the laws of his country (cf. § 9.4). Creon is in speech as passionate as Antigone when it comes to the law: but the laws he obeys do not shine through him, for he simply is not up to the degree of intensity needed to bring about such a transparency (cf. §§ 10.6, 11.2). Perhaps, however, Creon’s failure to represent the law perfectly is due no less to his own inability than to the recalcitrance in the law itself to being perfectly represented. Only Antigone can show up Creon.

12.8. For the interpretation of 194-206 see § 4.6, and for 198-200, see § 19.2. Despite the fact that πολίς strictly means the ritualistic lamentations of women, neither Creon nor anyone else suspects that Polynices’ sisters might have tried to violate the prohibition. Creon seems to assume that women would perform their part in funeral rites only if there were men to prompt them. Precisely because it is ritualistic and therefore not a spontaneous expression of the heart, Creon regards it as inconceivable that any woman could be the originator of the plan to bury Polynices (cf. § 22.10).

12.9. Of the seven occurrences of πόλις in Creon’s speech, the first three concern, respectively, the gods, Oedipus, and any ruler (162, 167, 178), and the last three refer, respectively, to Eteocles, the whole city, and any loyal citizen (194, 203, 209); between the pair of triads stands Creon’s reference to himself (191). The first triad has to do with ruling (ἀρχωσαν, ἀρθον, εἴδονον), the second with obeying the city. Creon now sees no difficulty in his combining both. His enhance-

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ment \((αδικω)\) of the city is the same as his devotion to the city. In upholding the city, he is going to improve the city.\(^{36}\)

13 (211-14). 13.1. The Chorus distinguish between Creon’s pleasure \((δεσπει)\) with regard to Polynices and Eteocles and his power to make use of any and every law concerning the living and the dead. They barely suggest that his pleasure is not on the same level as law, and, even more tentatively, that there is a difference between the living and the dead. Creon has said that whoever is kindly disposed to Thebes will be honored alike alive or dead; the Chorus imply that personal pronouns in the nominative strictly apply to the living but not to the dead (cf. § 35.1). The dead cannot be subjects of active verbs. It is doubtful, then, whether one can speak of either the benevolence or the malevolence of the dead. Creon surely does not believe that Polynices, if left unburied, will be powerless to injure Thebes, for he does not employ the magic of maschalismos to ensure Polynices’ impotence; nor does he believe that Eteocles, if buried, will continue his support of Thebes. Eteocles, if publicly given a funeral and monument, can serve as a model of patriotism regardless of the city’s opinion about burial; but Polynices’ unburied corpse cannot serve as a warning against treachery unless the city supposes that burial is needed, and because a divine law commands it. Honor to the dead can share the same basis as honor to the living; but dishonor to the dead necessarily has a different basis from dishonor to the living. To bring dishonor into line with honor, Creon would have to prove that the gods have the same perspective as the city; and later he is forced to give such a proof (cf. § 19.2), but now he is entirely unaware of the difficulty.

13.2. This difficulty can be more exactly defined as follows. \(μίασμα\) occurs three times in the play, all in the mouth of Creon: first, of the mutual fratricide of Polynices and Eteocles (172, cf. § 12.3); next, of Antigone’s punishment by starvation, which Creon has worked out in such a way that the whole city might avoid pollution (776); and third, of Polynices’ corpse, whose devouring by the eagles of Zeus is not a pollution that he fears (1042). If fratricide makes the slayer unclean, the city should no more honor Eteocles than Polynices, unless one assumes that death automatically cleanses, an assumption that in turn would seem to weaken Creon’s case against Polynices, for his crime would cease to be punishable with his death. In order, then, for Creon to make a distinction between Polynices and Eteocles, he must regard fratricidal pollution as politically irrelevant: the gods of the city are not the gods of the family. Antigone’s punishment, however, is politically relevant, since failure to follow the proper rites would pollute the entire city. To avoid pollution, then, is not a matter of honor: Antigone as

\(^{36}\) Cf. Xen. Mem. 3.7.2; Lycurg. c. Leocrat. 76-7.
Antigone is not taken into account. Now in the case of Polynices Creon seems to have two ways open to him. If nonburial were a pollution like fratricide in being politically irrelevant, not to bury Polynices would not pollute the city but Antigone and Ismene only (cf. § 7.2); but then to honor Eteocles could not solely consist in his burial, for that in itself would be politically irrelevant too. To honor Eteocles would need some special ceremonies (cf. § 4.1), which would have nothing to do with burial as such, though they could accompany it, to distinguish him from Polynices. If, on the other hand, nonburial were a pollution like Antigone's punishment in being politically relevant, to allow Polynices' burial would not honor Polynices, any more than the burial of Eteocles would honor him. Creon chooses neither of these ways. He argues at once for the political relevance of burial, and hence to deprive Polynices of it is to dishonor him, and for the political irrelevance of nonburial, and hence the city cannot incur pollution if Polynices lies unburied. Creon tries to politicize burial, so that it is nothing but a question of honor or dishonor; but such a politicization requires that the gods be indistinguishable from the city, for if they are not, the gods could equally insist that the city bury Polynices to avoid pollution and honor Eteocles to glorify patriotism. Creon's politicization of burial will thus lead him to the divinization of the city.

14 (215-22). 14.1. Although Creon omitted from his formulation of the decree what the penalty is for its violation, the Chorus know that the penalty is death (cf. § 4.7). Do they assume that all crimes are capital crimes? Or that Creon would as a matter of course impose the death penalty? As they assume that the death penalty is an infallible deterrent, which automatically discharges them from the task Creon has asked them to perform, perhaps they imply that only such a penalty would prevent everyone from disobeying Creon's decree. They would thus agree with Ismene that suicide cannot be an obligation (cf. § 10.7). That disobedience, however, is suicidal follows only if Creon's preventive measures are perfect; and they can be perfect only if those whom Creon has appointed to guard Polynices' corpse cannot be corrupted or overwhelmed by force or deceit. To rule out the possibility of corruption would imply that the guards are either fanatically loyal to Creon or mortally afraid of him; to rule out the possibility of superior force, that the disaffected elements in Thebes are weak; and to rule out the possibility of deceit, either that Creon's guards cannot be gelled or that no one would think of using deceit to bury Polynices (cf. § 10.5). That nothing in the play contradicts the Chorus' assumptions shows again how easily their simplicity can pass for prescience (cf. § 11.4). Without any awareness of the possibilities they reject, they pick the one possibility—only a fool has the eros to die—that applies exclusively to Antigone (cf. § 10.8).

14.2. Creon, unlike the Chorus, does not believe that the death penalty is an infallible deterrent, but he believes that, though the hope
for gain can be stronger than the fear of death, no one can successfully commit a crime (cf. 313-4). Not the prevention but the detection of crime is infallible (cf. 494-5); and he too is not contradicted in the course of the play: Tiresias knows at once who is guilty of polluting the city's altars. Creon's first oath now yields its meaning: Ζεῦς ὁ πάνθος ἀδική τὰ (184) must hold if Creon can be certain that no crime goes undetected. That this should apply even to the present case shows the extent to which Creon relies on divine support for his decree. The gods must approve of his decree if it is guaranteed that whoever buries Polynices will come to light (cf. 327-8). Creon thus disregards the possibility that the gods could, in disapproving of his decree, still let its violator be known. His punishment could not have been what it was if Antigone had gone undetected. The gods, it seems, are at least as concerned with punishing Creon as with cleansing Thebes of pollution (cf. §§ 9.1, 9.7).

15 (223-43). 15.1. The first speech of the guard is strange. The fact that he is now before Creon seems to make the need to justify his delay superfluous. Creon can know of his tardiness only through his own admission; and Creon is keener on learning the news than on blaming the guard, whose uncalled-for self-defense only serves to exasperate Creon. To the guard the most important thing is his own situation (τὰμαυτοῖ). The crime in his eyes is scarcely a crime (247, 256), though he later expresses no repugnance at sacrilegiously sweeping off the dust from Polynices' corpse; indeed, he speaks of the good job he and his fellow guards did in laying the clammy body bare (409-10). If one supposes that those below pardoned him because he acted impiously under duress (cf. 1199-1200), Ismene's expectation of pardon for not helping Antigone seems to be reasonable (cf. § 9.2). The guard, then, recognizes the sacredness of burial, but not its obligatory character. He is, moreover, wholly indifferent, as a slave, to the political purpose Creon affects to find in his decree. Unmoved by the religious or the political issue, he lives solely between fear and hopelessness; so fearful that he not only confesses without reason to the imaginary crime of tardiness (a curious confirmation of Creon's belief that no crime goes undetected), but continually increases the likelihood of his punishment by the very speeches supposedly designed to assuage Creon's anger; and so hopeless that he believes Creon's failure to punish him for his innocence can only be due to the gods (330-1).

15.2. The guard is the first person in the play to treat the soul as something separate, for the soul, in Creon's understanding, is nothing but what one loves and honors the most (cf. § 12.4). If Creon had spoken of ψυχή, φρονήμα, and γνώμη as names for different aspects of men, nothing would have been lost of his meaning. With the guard, however, it is otherwise. He explains that his soul by much talking delayed his

37 On the guard see F.W. Schneidewin, Einleitung, 12.
coming, for he always took as a command whatever it said. The Loeb translation of soul here is "conscience." He thus assigns to his soul his own desire for self-preservation. (The guard, like the Chorus, assumes that death is the penalty for any crime.) He separates himself from his soul in order to save his own skin (cf. Xen. Cyrop. 6.1.31-41). Were it not for his soul, nothing would have kept him from breathlessly reporting the crime. His soul is guilty, he is innocent. His soul gave him two pieces of contradictory advice, neither of which he could follow without being checked by the other. The soul is not a reliable guide, for it is dominated by the fear of punishment. Only hope can make the guard come forward. The soul in fear offers hope as the way out of the impasse it itself has made; but the hope it offers is in fact resignation to fate (cf. 274); the guard, if punished, will be unjustly punished. Fate thus seems to be the discovery of the soul confronted with the inevitability of unjust punishment; and the soul itself as something separate seems to be the discovery of the fear that such a confrontation arouses. However this may be, the first interpretation we are given of the soul is that it is separate and weak, guilty perhaps but unpunishable, and prone to paralyzing calculations.

15.3. If the soul, in being separate, is separate from the body, could not Antigone have resorted to an argument like the guard's to justify the burial of Polynices? Polynices is guilty, but the guilt is of his soul, and by losing it, what remains of Polynices is unpunishable. His body, it is true, obeyed his soul; but his soul, by balancing the injustice he suffers in being deprived of his throne against the injustice he will commit if he attacks his country, may have first brought him to a standstill; and then, in order to condone his initial indignation, held out the hope that he would if he failed only suffer what was fated (cf. 170). He is thus absolved from the crime his soul made inevitable. The debate between Antigone and Polynices in Oedipus at Colonus, which proceeds on not dissimilar lines, shows how Antigone here could have made a case (1416-44). Antigone, however, has barred herself from resorting to any such argument. As she does not mention the war or the reasons for it (cf. § 2.4), she cannot make use of grounds that are in any way connected with it. She therefore cannot appeal to the innocence of Polynices' corpse, for its innocence would be bought at the price of her arguing on behalf of Polynices as individual, which she can never bring herself to do (cf. § 1.1). Her own arguments turn at different times on different things, but they never touch the individual Polynices, with his distinct virtues or defects (cf. § 4.1). She argues on the basis of the Polynices whom she loves, of the law in its generality, and of the Polynices

38 Cf. Ai. 1342-5; H. Grotius, de iure belli et pacis, II.19.11.6: "hinc est quod officium sepeliendi, non tam hominii, id est personae, quam humanitati, id est naturae humanae praestari dicitur."
who is her brother (cf. §§ 9, 27, 48), but never in a way that would ally her understanding with the guard’s understanding of the soul (cf. § 10.4).

16 (245-7). 16.1. The guard talks as if the corpse were properly buried, and no more needed to be done. If Antigone had poured libations (420-1), the thirstiness of the dust and the hardiness of the soil (250) must have wiped out any trace of them. The guard, then, either is thinking in terms of a passer-by (256), who did all that a nonrelative should do, or he is not scrupulously exact in his report, and the possible omission of some part of the ritual does not concern him; but the rest of his report is so circumstantial—it reads like a detective story’s presentation of a clueless crime—that one should rather conclude that the guard, no more than Creon or the Chorus, ever considers the possibility that Antigone and/or Ismene could be responsible.

16.2. As the guard says that someone sprinkled a light covering of dust on the corpse’s skin (no one else in the play mentions its skin), we learn that Polynices before was lying naked in the plain (cf. 410); a fact we should not have inferred from the parodos, which excluded Polynices’ armor from the panoplies dedicated to Zeus (141-3). The burial of a corpse, in any case, consists in the hiding from sight, not a body of flesh and bones, but its skin alone. Burial is, literally speaking, a superficial ceremony (cf. Her. 2.86.3-7). Nonburial, on the other hand, involves the entire body, all the boneless parts of which are liable to the devouring of dogs and birds. Burial does not avoid the threat of being eaten, for no provision, however flimsy, has to be made against worms (cf. Her. 3.16.4), but the threat of being (seen) naked and torn apart (258, 1198, cf. § 4.5). Burial conceals the looks and shape of man (255). It therefore poses at first, prior to the questions of body and soul, body and self, and self and soul, the question of skin and soul. It is a question that turns out only to look less profound than the others (cf. § 25.3).

17 (249-77). 17.1. The guard’s speech is in three parts: the discovery and description of the crime (249-58), the accusations of guilt and declarations of innocence among the guards (259-67), the casting of lots and the appointment of the guard (268-77). What holds the speech together are the three stages in the guards’ reaction: disagreeable surprise (254), just indignation, and fear (270). One can wonder, however, whether their indignation differs from their fear.

17.2. The first part again is in three subsections, the first of which gives the setting (249-52), the second the discovery and the guards’ reaction (253-54), and the last the state of the buried corpse (255-58). The impression of exactness that the guard conveys is primarily due to his dyadic phrasing: γενήδος πλήγμα—δικελλής ἐκβολή, στυφλός—χέρος, ἄροις—ἐπημαστημένη, ἱράνιστο—τυμβήκης, θηρός—κυνάν, ἔθθοντος—σπάσαντος. The first subsection shows how surprising it is that no one thinks at once of Polynices’ sisters, for the absence of carts and pickaxes suggests that men of the city were not involved. But its true
significant emerges only in light of the first stasimon: there is no trace of human skill (cf. § 23). The guard's own inference, on the other hand, that the casual means of burial is explicable in terms of someone who just passed by points to the difficulty in Creon's attempt to politicize burial (cf. § 13). If some non-Theban with no intention of violating Creon's decree—that no animal had yet discovered the corpse implies that it was buried soon after the Argives' rout, and perhaps even before the promulgation of the decree—felt obliged to bury the corpse, perhaps without even knowing whose it was, Creon has a much harder task than he imagines to prove that the dead belong exclusively to the city. In order to rule out the guard's inference, as he silently does, Creon has to suppose that the gods guarantee the prevention of the unintentional crime. As soon as Polynices fell, the gods must have erected a barrier of some sort around the corpse to forestall such a chance occurrence (cf. § 26.1). To eliminate chance and yet not invoke fate requires a belief in the unfailing agreement between what law prohibits and what cannot happen accidentally. Creon must partially adopt a belief of the Persians, who deny that any son ever killed his own mother or father, for one would always find on inquiry that the supposed son was either a bastard or supposititious (Her. 1.137.2). If Creon does subscribe to the Persians' belief, even after witnessing the suffering of Oedipus and Jocasta, his attempt to regularize the royal house would not, as it first appeared, have been prompted by self-interest alone (cf. § 12.2). He simply does not believe that those unintentional crimes of incest and patricide occurred. Fratricide is another matter (cf. 170, 200-1). Creon, then, understands his decree as a law that can neither be unintentionally violated nor go undetected (cf. § 14.2). It is almost a self-evident law, which scarcely needs to be promulgated (it is the brother of his soul's laws); and if promulgated, does not need to have the penalty for its transgression spelled out (cf. § 14.1). Creon wants to believe that no one will violate it, not because the death penalty will deter everyone, nor even because its violator will be caught, but because it cannot be done. He cannot, however, quite bring himself to believe it. His low estimate of men prevents him (221-2).

17.3. The guard opposes the wild beast to dogs (cf. 1081-2). Dogs, then, are domesticated animals, which belong to men living in cities. Antigone's failure to mention dogs as a possible threat to Polynices' corpse (cf. § 4.6) might imply that she cannot admit that man's friend could thus betray him. It might be a sign of how necessary and self-evident it is for her that the dear and the holy coincide (cf. §§ 9.4, 9.8). The corpse must be as precious as the man to those who love (cf. § 4.7).

17.4. Each guard grandly boasted to the others his own innocence and ignorance. They were all ready to lift up hot ingots in their hands, walk through fire, and swear by the gods. Of this triad, the play puts to the test only their swearing: the guard admits that his return belies
his oath (388-94). However this may be, the guards’ willingness to undergo two fiery ordeals gives us by implication the second interpretation of the soul (cf. § 15.2). The guards separate themselves as subject to bodily pain from their souls, or whatever one should call the repository of their knowledge of their innocence; and their innocence is so powerful that it can preserve them from any possible punishment. The body, then, is inviolable as long as the soul is guiltless (cf. Antiphon 5.93). Each guard seemed to lay claim to this belief in an effort not to be outdone by what another might say. As his peers could not force him to submit to the ordeal, it was a safe kind of boasting. The guard, in any case, when alone with himself, abandons the view that his soul has no limits to its power—he does not offer to prove his innocence—and replaces it with an abject submission to fate, which is the only way he sees to maintain the innocence of the punishable body and the unpunishable guilt of the soul. Collective μεγαλοψυχία yields to individual ἄθωμία (237). Belief in the gods’ providential care of innocence in this life turns into resignation in the face of an undeserved but fated death. The swearing of oaths turns into the soul’s speaking to oneself. It is not easy to say whether hope of worldly vindication or hopeless submissiveness represents the greater piety. The guard never suggests, as Antigone does, that the gods will vindicate him after his death (925-8). Antigone’s piety is not based on either worldly hope or fear (cf. 896-7).

17.5. The unlimited power of the soul puts all the guards into as much of an impasse as the vacillatory weakness of the soul later puts the guard (cf. 233, 268, 274). The soul then discovered fate as a way out; now the way out is through chance. The casting of lots condemns (καθαίρει) the guard. It seems to be the collective way of finding a scapegoat when confronted with collective innocence. The scapegoat, however, prefers to understand his election otherwise. Fearful of punishment, the guard answers the question, “Why me?” with “It is my fate.” Fate is more a comfort than involuntary self-sacrifice, which only ironically can be called good (275). Antigone’s willingness, on the other hand, to sacrifice herself forbids her from so invoking fate. She cannot thus console herself for her unjust punishment. And yet Antigone never calls her sacrifice good; indeed, the only time she uses the word, she too means it ironically: she calls Creon the good Creon (31). Creon alone uses “good” in its only other occurrence, without irony: whoever subordinates his private interests to the city remains in the stress of war a just and good comrade-in-arms (671). Could it then be that neither Antigone nor her sacrifice can be called good? That the city (Creon) has made ἀγαθός so exclusively its own that not even Antigone can appropriate it?39 It would be consistent with this that of the three occurrences of ἀγαθὸς

all are spoken by Creon (179, 197, 1114), and of the four of χρηστός, three are spoken by Creon, and Haemon uses the other to speak ungrudgingly of Creon’s good sense (299, 520, 635, 662). “Good” may be too worldly a word for Antigone, whose noble sacrifice is “good for nothing.” She surely does not help anyone or anything, for neither the law nor the dead has to be helped (cf. § 4.3). The very superfluousness that makes Antigone splendid would thus prevent her from being or doing good (cf. § 8.7). Only if Creon’s punishment, for which Antigone’s actions are indispensable (cf. § 14.2), is to be considered just would one be compelled to revise this conclusion.

18 (278-9). 18.1. It is not just the absence of clues that makes the Chorus think that the gods might have buried Polynices, but rather that, on their assumption that the death penalty is an infallible deterrent (cf. § 14.1), only immortal beings could have done it.

19 (280-314). 19.1. Creon’s speech consists of three parts: the first proves that the gods could not have buried Polynices (280-9a), the second reveals those truly responsible and how they managed it (289b-301), and the third threatens the guards unless they find the one guilty (302-14). Creon is far more certain that the guards have been bribed than that they did it (294, 306). He prefers, in any case, to believe in their active or passive complicity rather than in their carelessness (cf. § 14.1), which comes close to implying either the god’s concern for Polynices or the gods’ indifference to Creon’s decree (cf. § 17.2).

19.2. In arguing that to prohibit Polynices’ burial is the self-evident consequence of his soul’s laws, Creon says that Polynices wanted to burn to the ground the land of his father(s) and the gods of his race (or country), taste of common blood, and lead the rest of his city into slavery (199-202); but now, in order to prove that the gods could not have buried Polynices, he says that Polynices came to set fire to the columned temples, the votive offerings, and the earth of the gods and to scatter their laws. Creon drops the arguments based on fratricide and slavery, for the first is too private, and the second too political, for either to justify the gods’ horror at Polynices’ crime (cf. § 13.2). He replaces, moreover, γῆ πατρώα with γῆ ἐκεῖνω (i.e., θεῶν), and θεοὶ οἱ ἐγγενεῖς with νοοὶ and ἀναθήματα. He first argued for Polynices’ treachery against his own, whether it be his own land, gods, or brother; but now, in arguing for Polynices’ impiety, he consecrates the city and all that belongs to it to the gods. The first charge had Polynices firing the gods themselves, who, Creon pretended, do not differ from their statues; but the second has him firing what belongs to the gods, who are now wholly separate from the monuments of their worship. As one could readily think of the gods as willing to forgive their own, especially one who was unsuccessful, Creon has to heighten Polynices’ impiety to the point that forgiveness would be inconceivable; but this heightening has
the effect of making the attack on things a more serious crime than that on persons. The fact that the Chorus accept Creon's proof—the first stasimon presupposes it—gives us the first inkling that a corpse could be more sacred than a person (cf. 256). The ἔνεκος of Antigone (26) might differ as much from Creon's ἔνεκα (198) as Creon's ναὸι and ἀναθήματα do from his θεοί οί ἐγγενεῖς (cf. § 4.3). Polynices' corpse might have its significance for Antigone not despite but because it is more alien to her than either Polynices her brother (cf. § 3.3) or Polynices himself (cf. § 15.3).

19.3. As the gods could not have buried Polynices, which Creon takes to be the same as saying that they could not have honored him (cf. § 13.2), Creon declares that the true culprits are political enemies. Creon moves from the politicization of burial to the divinization of the city, and from there back to the purely political conflict, without indicating how Polynices' sacrilegiousness could ever be the rallying point of those who secretly murmur against him. To revolt against him is to revolt against the gods. Creon keeps his original identification of his regime with the fatherland (cf. § 12.5) at the same time that he has been compelled to replace the land of the ancestors with the land of the gods. As he cannot assume that the gods are the ancestors (cf. 938), for he has to deny every possible basis for the gods' forgiveness of Polynices, Creon implies that not only is he the legitimate heir to the throne, which in turn truly expresses the fatherland, but that he is the present regent for the distant gods (cf. 304). What plainly links his political legitimacy with his divinely appointed role are the laws of his soul, which are at once the test of statesmanship, the ground of the city, and the will of the gods. It is no wonder, then, that Creon swears so freely (184, 305, 758) and never deigns to refute Antigone's contention that divine law sanctions Polynices' burial (cf. § 29.1). He is the first to speak of mortals and human beings (295, 299).

19.4. Creon exemplifies the bad effect of money in three ways: it sacks cities, it expels men from their homes, and it perversely instructs the good wits of mortals in shameless deeds. The city and the family, Creon implies, are unqualifiedly good; only the wits (φρένες) can be either good or bad. Creon shows no awareness of an essential conflict between the city and the family (cf. § 12.6). Were is not for money they would always be in harmony. He furthermore suggests that, though money necessarily belongs to the city, which in itself is good, the city does not need money, which in itself is the source of all impiety. Money is the worst convention (νόμισμα) that ever grew (ἐβλαστε) among human beings. It owes its quasi-natural status to its universality. It is entirely conventional and yet universal. It therefore reminds one of burial rites, which equally seem to be conventional and yet universal; indeed, they seem to be even more closely connected, for they both have to do with what is
beneath the earth (cf. § 22.8): another name for Hades is Plouton (1200). In one decisive respect, however, Plouton the god of wealth and Plouton the god of the dead differ. The conventionality of coined money does not stand in the way of exchange between one currency and another; but the conventionality of burial rites forbids the discovery of equivalents between two different rites. Darius offered money to both Greeks and Indians if either were willing to follow the burial practices of the other (Her. 3.38.3-4). This difference has its ground in another difference. Any set of burial practices takes its character from what is held about the soul. No other practice, as far as I know, implies so much so directly. Coinage, on the other hand, carries with it no such implications. A god may be held to preside over the ways in which money is exchanged (cf. Od. 19. 395-8); but no god determines the values, let alone the use, of this or that piece of money. One can without sacrilege deface it, bury it, melt it, or even not use it; and when it is in use, it always remains neutral, whether the transaction be between one man and another, or even between man and god (Charon’s obol). But the corpse is never neutral. The gods and the soul have stamped it indelibly with themselves. Creon, however, treats the corpses of Polynices and Eteocles as if they were pieces of metal that could be coined at will in any denomination: Polynices’ corpse is in the old currency, which is now to be discontinued; Eteocles’ is in the new, which gives it a higher valuation. But Creon issues his new currency without altering the beliefs that alone can validate the change. Creon does not pretend to understand either the gods or the soul differently. He believes that the price (τιμή) he puts on each corpse is independent of such beliefs. He does not realize that the neutrality he thus assigns the corpse in itself entails a reassessment of both the gods and the soul (cf. § 13.2). His impiety is not a radical impiety.

19.5. Creon gives the third interpretation of the soul. He threatens the guards with torture leading to death, so that in the future they might know the limits of rightful gain and act accordingly. The torture is justified not so much as a punishment (for which death suffices) as an education. Creon is the first to mention Hades; and though it seems to be the equivalent of death, Creon must assume the existence of Hades as a place where the guards can practice the lesson they will have learned so painfully. The guards’ future reformation presupposes that under torture they will blurt out that which they and Creon already know; for the pain inflicted on the body opens up the truth hidden within (the soul) but does not distort it. The soul, then, which is too guileless

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40 For the connection between νόμος and νόμισμα see Dem. 24.212-4; esp. 213: εἰς τίνα [Σόλονα λέγεται] ὅτι αὐτὸς ἑγεῖται ἀρχαίοι καὶ κόιλος μὲν νόμισμα εἶναι τῶν ἱδίων συναλλαγμάτων εἰνεκα τοῖς ἱδίωταις εὐρημένοιν, τοῦτο δὲ νόμον νόμισμα τῆς πόλεως εἶναι.

41 On the pros and cons of torture in the orators see Wyse’s note on Isæus 8.12.1.
to invent a plausible lie, is tightly bound to the body, which is too weak to resist and through which it learns. The soul when subordinate to the body lacks both nobility and δεινότης. Creon thus assumes the inverse of the second interpretation of the soul, which held the soul to be separate from the body and yet strong enough to protect it from pain (cf. § 17.4). Both interpretations, however, share the view that bodily pain is the true touchstone of the soul, whether to prove its innocence or its guilty knowledge.

20 (315-22). 20.1. After Creon’s threats of torture, the guard presents a topology of the nonbodily pain that accompanies indignation. Indignation is of two kinds. One resides in the ears and reacts only to speeches, the other resides in the soul, or φρένος, and reacts only to deeds (cf. Her. 7.39.1). Creon, however, is unaware of this difference. He has confused the pain he feels at the report of the crime with the pain he feels at the criminal; and as the criminal is unknown, his indignation discovers the criminal in the reporter of the crime, the only person available. Creon’s instant suspicion that his political enemies bribed the guards is merely a gloss on this confusion. Indignation of the soul cannot be satisfied with the emptiness of “the criminal”; it must always vent itself on “this criminal”; but as it has no special sense by which it can detect him, it finds the guilty everywhere. The guard thus seems to give the obverse side of his interpretation of his own soul (cf. § 15.2). That interpretation showed the soul in self-induced fear and guilt prostrate before fate; this interpretation shows the soul in righteousness lashing out at everyone but itself. What holds the two together is the pain of frustration, whether born of its awareness of undeserved but unavoidable punishment, or born of its ignorance of those who deserve to be punished. The first kind of frustration reminds one of Odysseus confronted with Posidon’s wrath; the second of Achilles slaying Hector for a crime that is his own. The guard would thus be an ignoble Odysseus, who as cleverly talks his way out of danger; and Creon would be an ignoble Achilles, who also is forced to allow the burial of his enemy. Creon’s remorse, moreover, has as little effect on his subsequent punishment as Achilles’ atonement has on his fate.

20.2. It would not suffice, if one wished to paraphrase what the guard says, to have him say, “The criminal really makes you indignant, I am just a superficial irritant”; for if the guard means only that, he would not have to assign separate regions to Creon’s twofold pain, but merely discriminate between its two external sources. The guard, rather, means, “The criminal makes the real you indignant, I irritate your superficial self.” The soul thus stands for the true self, which is separate from the rest of oneself and scarcely communicates with it. In this sense, the guard reverses his former view of the soul’s paralyzing influence on the true self, which is subject to punishment for crimes it was wholly unwilling to commit. Creon accepts this identification
of the soul and the self, but he denies that it is something separate: "Not only did you commit the crime," he tells the guard, "but what is worse you betrayed your soul for money." Money seduced the guard into giving up his true self. Here for the first time soul keeps its primary meaning of life, but at the same time it bears a trace of Creon's first interpretation, which made it the same as what one should most love and honor (cf. § 12.4). Creon thus insists as much on the inseparability of body and soul—he alone uses σώμα as the equivalent of ἄνοσία (675)—as the guard does on their separateness; for the guard wants to deflect Creon's anger away from himself, but Creon wants to punish anyone who thwarts him in a way that leaves nothing of one's own unpunished or uncorrected.

20.3. The scene between Creon and the guard presents five interpretations of the soul. The soul is: (1) separate and weak (§ 15.2), (2) separate and strong (§ 17.4), (3) connected and weak (§ 19.5), (4) separate and oneself (§ 20.1), (5) connected and oneself (§ 20.2). What no one maintains is that the soul is connected and strong. Such an interpretation would have the soul rely on the gods as much as 2, but, unlike 3, be resistant to all bodily pain and, unlike 5, be contemptuous of life. One is therefore tempted to conclude that, as these traits exactly characterize Antigone, the ground for her devotion to Polynices' corpse, which is so great that she unnecessarily returns to it (cf. § 10.1), lies in her living this paradoxical interpretation of the soul (cf. 95). Whether this is the true ground of her actions, or at best only a fragment of the true ground, only Antigone's two remaining defenses can properly determine (cf. §§ 27, 48).

21 (323-31). 21.1. The guard is no longer afraid. In spite of Creon's reiteration of his threats that, unless the guards discover the culprits, they will be punished, he does not take him seriously. Not his diligence, spurred on by fear, but pure chance will decide whether the culprit will be found. The guard thus moves from expressing his own resignation to fate, with which he had entered, to expressing the indifference of chance, with which he leaves (cf. § 17.5). The guard, then, has exaggerated either his initial fearfulness or his final lack of concern; and as he later indicates that he did take Creon seriously (390-1, 408, 413-4, 437-40), one must say that his relief at not being punished at once makes him veer to the opposite extreme. He acknowledges that he neither hoped for his escape nor judged it probable; for it was ultimately due, not to his own verbal dexterity, but to the gods. The gods do not intervene on behalf of the innocent in the spectacular way of the ordeal (cf. § 17.4), but in the way of events turning out better than one hopelessly feared they would. The providential gods thus seem to be the discovery of the soul cheated of the future its own fears had devised. The debt, at any rate, which the guard believes he owes to the gods opens the way to our understanding why the first stasimon's
implicit assertion that the gods do not stand as a limit to man is necessarily connected with man's artfulness in overcoming the seemingly impossible, equipped as he is with a wisdom beyond hope (366; cf. § 10.8).

The first stasimon, however, shows man in his limitlessness only by suppressing any mention of his soul (cf. § 11.2), the significance of which clearly emerges if one compares the first stasimon of Aeschylus' *Choephoroi*. The guard therefore is just as necessary as the first stasimon for the full understanding of man. That the soul comes to light in the element of the ridiculous, while art comes to light with the greatest solemnity, although art has seemingly nothing to do with the play's action and soul everything, illustrates the way in which man's competence always outstrips his self-knowledge. It is a great but almost unavoidable error for us to give more weight to the first stasimon than to the guard and his speeches.

22 (332-75). 22.1. The first stasimon presupposes the correctness of Creon's proof that the gods did not bury Polynices (cf. § 19.2), from which the Chorus silently concluded that men of great daring and skill were involved in perpetrating so clueless a crime. Man's *panopoeia*, which according to Creon constitutes man's impiety and *hybris* (300-1, 309), is now given the morally neutral name of *deinvotηcs*, for which the Chorus, in charting the extent of man's stopping-at-nothing, do not try to account. Creon had given the love of base gain (money) as the cause of man's criminality; but the Chorus do not, as one might expect, replace that cause with the neutral love of gain. Neither some ulterior end nor a Prometheus explains man's inventive daring. It is an irreducible part of man.

22.2. The stasimon presents man's uncanny awesomeness as consisting of four aspects, to each of which it devotes a strophe: man's restlessness, man's superiority to, and mastery of, all other living beings, man's devising and understanding, and man's freedom, which leaves to him the choice of following the good or the bad. Each strophe thus has its own characteristic set of verbs. The first begins with *πέλει,*, which retains its original sense of motion and is echoed at the strophe's end by the cognate *πολεύων*; and these two verbs frame the rest: *χωρεί, περών, ἀποτράβεται, ἱλλομένων*. The first antistrophe is likewise all of a piece: *ἀμφιβαλών, ἀγρεί, κρατεί*, and Schoene's plausible *δχμάζεται*. The second strophe in turn has: *ἐδιδάξατο, ὅπορος ἐπ' οὐδὲν ἐμχετα, ἣμπέρφασται*; and the second antistrophe contrasts man's freedom with his sociality: *παρείων, παρέστιος, γένοιτο, ἱσον φρονών*. Throughout the stasimon the prepositions, compounded or uncompounded, carry the notion of man's confronting, outflanking, and rising above every challenge, even those that threaten to swamp him: *πέραν, περι-, ὅπρ', ὅπερτάταν, ἁπο- (first strophe), ἀμφι-, περι- (first antistrophe), ὅπρ-, ἐπ', ἐμμ- (second strophe), ὑπέρ, ἐπ' (second antistrophe).

22.3. The stasimon seems to progress from showing man's mastery
of the inanimate sea and earth (first strophe), to his mastery of animals (first antistrophe), and from there to his relation to himself as one who contrives the means for his own self-preservation (second strophe), which then leads by contrast to his relation with others, the city and the gods (second antistrophe). This schematization is open to the difficulty, of which the Chorus are scarcely aware, that the unwearyed earth, which man tries to wear out, is a goddess, and the highest of the gods besides; which should place her as such in the second antistrophe, where the Chorus speak of the earth's laws, and how the city stands high.\footnote{For the meaning of ἰδέαις, see F. Sommer, \textit{op. cit.}, 174.} \textit{Man's} violation of the highest god, which, the Chorus recognize, illustrates man's \textit{δεινότης}, does not fit with their later assumption that the arts are only wilfully but not essentially subversive of the city, its gods and laws. For all the narrowness of Creon's belief that money accounts for all of man's \textit{πανοφύλα}, he understands better than the Chorus its essential impiety. The Chorus do not see that art, as the breaking of apparent limits, whether it be in allowing man's passage across the dividing sea (i.e., traveling to other cities) or in its ignoring the surface of the earth as man's proper place, points to the city not only as the unwilling harbinger of crime but as itself founded on crime. The descendants of Cain, who offered God the first fruits of the land, which God did not find acceptable, discovered the arts and founded the first city. However unaware the Chorus are that the city can only be high at the expense of the highest of the gods, the Chorus do see that the city cannot be, as Creon assumes, unqualifiedly good (cf. § 19.4); for man's \textit{δεινότης} partly consists in his teaching himself \textit{ἀστυνόμοι δρυαί}, which are evidently not the same as man's submission to the laws of the land. Although the city must rest on both the arts and the gods (their laws), its two supports are not in harmony with one another (cf. § 10.9):\footnote{Cf. Arist. \textit{Politica} 1328b11-3.} for the city, which serves through the arts man's need or desire to preserve himself, does not as such necessarily find the gods useful.

22.4. The Chorus list nine ways in which man's \textit{δεινότης} is revealed: (1) sailing, (2) farming, (3) hunting, (4) taming, (5) speaking, (6) thinking, (7) \textit{ἀστυνόμοι δρυαί}, (8) housing, (9) medicine. The first four have to do with man's relation to non-men, the last five with his relation to himself and other men. One is therefore inclined to say that self-taught speech is central because it separates men from non-men. And yet there are the gods and their \textit{ἐνοθοχος δίκα}. Oaths and prayers prevent the limiting of speech to man's hearing, and divine laws prevent its limitation to man speaking with man. What, then, does the play itself teach us about them? Leaving aside Creon's three vain oaths (184, 305, 758), we have the testimony of the guard, who suggests that mortals should never swear, "for the afterthought belies one's judgment"
(388-94). If a change in circumstances sanctions one's right to depart from what one has sworn to, oaths could not be a way of ensuring truthfulness, in which justice has so large a share (cf. Her. 1.138.1).\textsuperscript{44} The guard would thus unwittingly confirm the Chorus' attribution of speech to man's own discovery (cf. § 17.4), were it not that divine law, to which Antigone appeals, contradicts it. But even apart from the speech of the gods, which is divine law, one cannot forget that Tiresias first suspects that Creon has violated divine law through hearing the barbaric sound of birds (1001-2). The light-witted birds speak more wisely than men. The Chorus do not recognize ornithoscopy or any other kind of divination as showing the limits of man's unaided resourcefulness. The future is wholly open to man as man (360-1). If speech, then, is entirely a human invention, and oaths, prayers, and omens are not ways of communication between gods and men, it remains mysterious how the Chorus would unite man's inventiveness and divine law in the city. The Chorus seem to take their actual coexistence in the city as a proof of the moral neutrality of man's inventiveness, despite the implication in their own description of it that denies it any such neutrality. By starting from Creon's proof that the gods could not have buried Polynices, the Chorus have drifted into a view that completely cuts off the gods from men.

22.5. Aeschylus' Prometheus also lists nine discoveries as his own: (1) housing, (2) astronomy, (3) numbers, (4) letters, (5) taming, (6) sailing, (7) medicine, (8) divination, (9) metallurgy (\textit{PV} 450-504).\textsuperscript{45} The first stasimon most strikingly differs from this list by the absence in it of anything above or below the earth: neither astronomy nor metallurgy, neither divination nor numbers. Apart from the slight penetration of the earth that ploughing involves, the stasimon restricts man's \textit{δεινώσεις} to the surface of the earth. The different ways in which Prometheus and the Chorus treat housing also point to the stasimon's deliberate exclusion of \textit{τὰ οὐδένας}. Prometheus says that men first lived in sunless caves, and he taught them to build out in the open houses that face the sun; the Chorus imply that men first lived under the open sky, exposed to frost and rain, and men taught themselves how to avoid them, but whether by building houses or retiring to caves is unclear. No light, natural or artificial, illuminates the horizontal plane on which man lives and moves. Man's daring is exercised in a closed world. His daring is without aspiration. There is no sense here of man's openness to things beyond himself, only of the inability of things to resist man. One therefore suspects that what permits the Chorus to regard man's daring as morally neutral is, besides their silence about what motivates it, just this closedness of the human world. Man crosses the sea not to trade with, conquer, or look at other men (cf. α3, Her. 3.139.1); he merely outbraves it, as

\textsuperscript{44} Cf. S. Benardete, \textit{AGON} 1967, 160-1.

though he were at play with the elements. Like an engine idling, whose gears have to be engaged before it does any work, man's daring has to be seen in the perspective of the city and the gods before it moves toward a good or evil end. Its terribleness is partly due no doubt to this idling; but at the same time the Chorus have thereby drained it of its essential recalcitrance to being harmonized with the city and the gods. Man is more terrible than even the Chorus believe.

22.6. The stasimon directly refers to man thrice, twice by name, and once by the neuter demonstrative pronoun: as ἀνθρωπος there is nothing more uncanny, as ἀνήρ he is περιφραδής, and as τοῦτο he crosses the sea and wears out the earth. Anteon man, which exactly characterizes man as artisan, stands furthest removed from man under the sway of Eros (cf. § 21.1). Antigone, then, for all her artlessness, shares something in common with him (cf. § 10.8). If the law that provokes her daring needs the antigeneration of her name and nature, it must somehow be related to the arts that make manifest man's daring, which equally rests on his unerotic nature. How they are related one cannot now say; but the Chorus are not as far off in their conjecture as to the character of the culprit as they later imagine (cf. § 23.1). The stasimon is relevant to Antigone in more than a negative way.

22.7. The stasimon mentions gods thrice, twice by name, and once collectively and anonymously: Earth, Hades, θεόν ἄντρως ὀλίκα. Earth is the highest of the gods, Hades is the only god or thing from which man cannot escape (note the triplet φεύγειν, φεύξειν, φυγάζειν), and the gods are those whose justice men swear by as a guarantee of their own. Both men and gods in Homer swear by Earth, and men swear as well by the sun, rivers, and Zeus, and the gods by Ouranos, sea, and Styx (I 276-80, Σ 271-4, Ο 36-8). For the Chorus the sea is not divine, but merely an obstacle to man; Earth, though divine, is continually outraged by man; and the sun and sky are conspicuous by their absence. Their absence, moreover, seems to be deliberately referred to, for Earth is called the highest of the gods. ὑπέρτατος first occurs in Hesiod: Ζεὸς ψιβρωμένης, ὃς ὑπέρτατα δόματα ναῦει (OD 8). Pindar invokes Zeus himself as the highest in connection with his thunderbolts (O. 4.1); Euripides has someone call Eros the highest of all gods (fr. 269.2); and Aristophanes has the birds call Pisthetairos, once he has usurped Zeus' throne, the highest of the gods (Av. 1765). It is not uncommon, however, for "highest" to have entirely lost its literal sense of above the earth; but when combined with Earth this sense is incongruously restored to it.

46 On τοῦτο see Schneidewin; P. Friedlander, Hermes 1934, 59.
48 When ὑπέρτατος is not to be literally understood, the object it qualifies is something the gods have raised to the top (cf. 684, 1138; Ph 402, 1347; OC 105). Are we to understand that the gods hold Earth to be the highest?
Chorus call the Earth highest, perhaps, as a result of an impossible compromise between its true owner, Zeus, to whom the Chorus deny any limiting power over man, and its omission, the consequence of which would have been that man as man has nothing to reverence or look up to. As that is far too radical for the Chorus, they attribute the epithet to Earth, the only god whose presence in the midst of men they believe cannot be denied. Everything divine, which the stasimon's theme forbids the Chorus to mention (in accordance with their brand of moderation [cf. § 11.2]), is compressed into the Earth. One has only to compare the second strophe of the second stasimon to see what is properly highest, unaging, and unwearied. Earth, in any case, is the only god who survives in the dominion of horizontal man (cf. § 46.7).

22.8. Earth as a goddess has so far perplexed our understanding of the stasimon in two ways, both of which pertain to the difficulty of reconciling the violation of the earth with the city, its oaths, and laws. There is, moreover, a third difficulty around which the whole play revolves. The stasimon acknowledges Hades as the only limit man cannot by any means breach or bypass: immortality is not such a means. It cannot be accidental, therefore, that the stasimon suggests that we put together man's violation of the earth, to whose surface his daring is otherwise restricted, with man's only limitation, which as a place is somewhere below the earth (cf. § 4.1). Its omission of mining now seems to be of some importance (cf. § 19.4). The wholly inviolable part of the earth would thus be Hades, whose masters are Plouton and Hecate (1199-1200); and they in turn are the gods in whose custody the laws and customs of burial reside (451). Not death in itself but Hades and his laws would constitute the true limitation of man, for the death of individuals cannot prevent one generation of men from passing on the fruits of its δεινότης to the next. The human world is not as closed to the gods as the stasimon makes out. The Chorus, however, are no more aware of this than they are of the other difficulties Earth makes for them. They do not understand the import of calling a neuter this. They confusedly move from a class-characteristic of man, limitlessness, to a limitation that though equally universal applies to each man in a way that does not interfere with man's limitlessness. The consequence of thus treating the class as an individual is that nothing then stands between and hence connects the city and man as man. The laws of the land (χθόν) are not in the Chorus' understanding the laws of Earth (Γαῖς), i.e., the laws of burial (cf. 382). Antigone therefore is a necessary corrective to the stasimon itself, for she provides the sacred bond between the land and the earth. It is through Hades that the particular and the universal come together.

22.9. In a way reminiscent of the parodos, which displayed various degrees of personification (cf. § 11.5), the play as a whole seems to give

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49 For the impiety of mining see Pliny *NH* 33.1-3.
an exhaustive list of the ways in which the earth can be understood. Of the twenty-one occurrences of γῆ, χθόν, χώρα, the first refers to the dead below the earth (24), the middle to earth as a goddess (338), and the last to the tumulus of native soil Creon's servants erected for Polynices' remains (1203). Burial rites, in allowing for the sense of earth as stuff to coincide with that of earth as country, appears to be the unifying core of earth's divergent meanings. Somewhere between the earth (24, 65) and the earth's hard and unyielding surface, which either the goddess Earth or the earth in itself comprehends, lies the city, whether it be identified with the regime, the fatherland (the place where one's ancestors are buried), or the possession of the gods (110, 113, 155, 187, 199, 287, 368, 518, 736, 739, 806, 937, 1162, 1163). As the surface of the earth, moreover, no less than its depths, is linked through dust with burial (247, 256, 409, 429, 602), the city and Hades are never far apart. The roots of the city, however, do not all reach to Hades, for it is also founded on the violation of the earth; and only this passage in the play alludes to earth as the mother of all growing things (cf. 419, 1201-2). That the dead Eurydice can be called παμμήτωρ of Haemon's corpse (1282), though παμμήτωρ suggests the earth (Aesch. PV 90), seems to point again to the same abstraction from what earth primarily connotes. It is this abstraction, which is of a piece with the ignoring of Ismene's existence (cf. § 9.2), that allows Antigone as anti-generation to represent the laws of earth and hence of the city.

22.10. Of the nine manifestations of man's δεινότητς only the seventh, ἀστυνόμοι ὀργαῖ, is not at once intelligible. What further emphasizes its anomalousness is that all the rest seem to be paired: sailing-farming, hunting-taming, speaking-thinking, housing-medicine. A way to its meaning is given, however, if one contrasts speaking and wind-swift thinking with the dumb fishes (cf. Aj. 1297) and light-witted birds men capture. It would then stand opposed to the savagery of land animals (θηρῶν ἄγρίων ἔθη) and would mean man's self-domestication, the training of his temper without the aid of the gods. Such a self-limitation for the sake of living together on the part of a being that otherwise recognizes no limits the Chorus regard as uncanny; but this very claim that civility or decency results from man's own laws makes one think of burial. The ἀστυνόμοι of Athens were charged with the task of seeing to it that all dung was dumped farther than ten stades from the city's wall; and they themselves picked up anyone who died in the streets (Arist. Ath. Pol. 50). One is thus reminded of Heraclitus' saying, νέκυες γὰρ κοπρίων ἐξαλητότεροι (fr. 96). Even if a Socrates can laughingly agree with this precept (cf. Pl. Phaedo 115a3-5), the city does not treat corpses as it treats dung; and the difference of treatment must lie in the fact that some laws and customs of decency are not self-taught. The Chorus have simply not reflected on the connection between domestication and piety, on the ἀστυνόμοι θεοὶ behind the ἀστυνόμοι ὀργαῖ, for they
understand piety only when it has decayed into habit and "good form."  

The original meaning of ὀσίας ἱερα altogether eludes them (cf. Eur. IT 1461, Eubulus fr. 110.2, Ephippus fr. 15.4, Wyse at Isae. 7.38). They therefore can call Antigone, just after she has defended the divine law of burial, savage and from a savage father (471-2).

22.11. The triad of φθέγμα, φρόνημα, and ἀστυνόμοι ὑγαί, which man has taught himself, remind one of Creon's triad of ψωχή, φρόνημα, and γνώμη, which only the exercise of political rule can reveal (cf. § 12.4). The triads cannot be matched one-to-one, for Creon's γνώμη embraces the Chorus' φθέγμα and φρόνημα while their ἀστυνόμοι ὑγαί is a partial combination of his ψωχή and φρόνημα. The Chorus thus expand what Creon regards as the easiest aspect of ruling, and they contract into ἀστυνόμοι ὑγαί what Creon analyzes more carefully. For the Chorus, man's boldness is extrapoliical and astonishingly sacrificed in town life; for Creon, the courage of the ruler in abiding by the best deliberations is the ultimate test of his excellence. Creon, then, would correctly assert that for knowing a man rule is indispensable, for man's ὑγαί cannot be as mild as the Chorus believe. His ὑγαί must still retain enough savagery to defend his country. He must value his country more than his life. Despite the war that Thebes has just endured, and perhaps even because of it, the Chorus do not reckon the πόλεις—πατρίς, as opposed to the ἀστυ, as constituting a part of man's δεινότης. They place it aside as the haven of all that is good and noble because they fail to consider its connection with the soul, a connection that even Creon somewhat understands.

22.12. The ordinary punctuation of line 360 makes παντοπόρος no different from ἀπορος κτλ.; but without the colon it says that man, resourcefully resourceless, comes to nothing in the future (cf. El. 1000, fr. 871.8).  
This is surely not what the Chorus mean, but as an unwitting portrayal of Antigone it could not be bettered: completely artless, but infinitely resourceful, Antigone goes to death (cf. §§ 9.3, 10.5). For the Chorus, man's δεινότης consists in the gap between his daring and his apparent limitations, before which daring these limitations collapse. The one limitation that is equally apparent and real is death; but Antigone shows her πανορογία within the area that death seems to circumscribe for itself. She does not show that it too is only apparent; she breaks only the

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50 The guards' willingness to go through fire (πῦς διέβασεν) as a proof of their innocence well illustrates (and perhaps is meant to illustrate) the original force of a custom that later decayed into a manner of expression, as in Xen. Symp. 4.16: διὰ πυὸς λέγα (cf. K. Latte, Heiliges Recht, 5-6, n. 2).

51 ἀπ' οδὸν ἐξελέγκται could be distinguished from ἐπὶ μὴν ὑμᾶν ἢ as meaning that man comes to nothing of any account for all his resourcefulness, resourceless as be ultimately is (cf. El 245, 1129); but it is not to be insisted upon (cf. Ai. 1231; El 1166): καταβανὸν δὲ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος καὶ σκλά· τὸ μὴν εἰς οδὸν ἔστει (Eur. fr. 536).
limits that Ismene thinks are insuperable: law, nature, and power (cf. § 8.6). Antigone does not get around death, she sides with it against life. Death is brought within the realm of the δυνατά, though it seems to be recalcitrant to exploitation, through the unwritten law. Antigone's devotion to the law leads to her accepting the conditions of death itself: ἔκει γάρ αἰεὶ νεῖσομαι. Death is not the limit but the goal. If one thus misreads the Chorus' meaning, one must face the question of why Antigone should lurk behind a colon. What is the Chorus looking at when they pause between παντοπόρος and ἀπορός? Man's flight from death results in his daring confrontation with everything that threatens death. With his infinite resources man expands the horizon of possibility. He thus pushes to the periphery what originally was at the center and puts off into the future what remains right in front of him. The colon, then, between παντοπόρος and ἀπορός is grounded in the displacement of the horizon that man's artfulness has brought about. The Chorus' silence represents the barrier that man himself has made there, and before which the Chorus stand in awe. Man's artfulness, however, does not exhaust his daring, which necessarily precedes it, and which in itself does not have to issue in it. Man's daring is not just morally neutral when it is art; it is neutral to art as well. The Chorus' omission of the cause of man's daring points to what it is before it has committed itself to art. The alternative to such a commitment would be Antigone's to the divine law of burial, in which there is not a displacement but a rearticulation of man's original horizon, so that the domain of Hecate and Hades comes to occupy the place of death and nothingness. As Antigone recovers the horizon that the gods once imposed on man (cf. 456-7), man's daring as radical piety turns out to be not only neutral but hostile to art: art is the perversion of man's original daring. Art is not at first morally neutral and then free to choose the good or the bad; it is from the start unholy, and the difference between its subsequent morality and immorality is, strictly speaking, illusory. Creon's mistake of identifying decree with law reflects a necessary mistake of the city itself, for the city cannot dispense with art; and therefore it must condone its essential unholiness while it punishes the accidental manifestations of its misuse. The city must blink in the glare that Antigone casts on this original compromise of the city. Antigone, therefore, has to be replaced by Tiresias in order for the city to forget once again what Antigone reminds it of (cf. § 51).

22.13. The Chorus seem to enforce their punctuation of line 360 through the corresponding line in the antistrophe, where ὑψιστός stands to παντοπόρος as ἀπόλις to ἀπορός. The city is high if man weaves into (παρέχεισσον) his artfulness his country's laws and the sworn-by justice of the gods;\(^{52}\) but there is no city for him if thanks to his daring he

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\(^{52}\) This is the only possible meaning of the mss. reading, with τέχνη the easily supplied antecedent for the παρ- (cf. παρατάκτω), which is how Hermann understood it; but it is difficult. The closest parallel I could find is Pl. Lgs. 823a4-5:
embraces the ignoble.\textsuperscript{53} The misreading, however, of line 360 suggests that here too one should repunctuate the line to read that whoever out of daring allies himself with immorality, for him the city is high and there is no city. This two-edged immorality looks like Antigone's. It would consist in her daringly reminding the city of one of its divine sanctions at the same time and for the same reason that the city is of no account to her (cf. § 2.4). This characterization of Antigone remains true even if one agrees with Antigone that what she does is noble (cf. § 9.4), for her morality undermines the city no less than her immorality. As the gods, moreover, are the source of Antigone's double relation to the city, one is reminded of Creon's saying that the gods shook and set upright again the city (cf. § 12.2). The city uneasily exists between the gods who support it and the same gods who cannot sanction its unpurifiable impiety. Just as Antigone, then, in herself nullifies the Chorus' silence between \textit{παντοπόρος} and \textit{ἀπορος}, so Antigone and the gods nullify their silence between \textit{ὁφιστολις} and \textit{ἀπολις}. But if one asks what the Chorus think justifies their silence between these two words, the answer can only be a hope or prayer for man's submissiveness to the city: \textit{μὴν ἕμοι παρέστιος γένοιτο}. When the Chorus call Earth the highest of the gods, it is not just a blunder but a necessary blunder, for the city must rest on something outside of man; and if the city alone determines the good and the noble, that something can only be Earth, whose ambiguity as itself or one's country conceals the violence it suffers in becoming one's own. The Chorus, then, are compelled to point to the crime of the city in praising the city; and this in turn necessarily arises from their mistake as to the character of the culprit. Their belief that only man's artfulness can account for the success with which Creon's decree was violated justifies the seeming irrelevance of the stasimon; but what justifies its relevance is that this mistake of the Chorus is the city's crime. Man's omnicompetence is man's criminality (\textit{πανομογια}).

22.14. The Chorus end with the hope that the culprit not belong to their own hearth; but their hearth is each one's separate hearth and not some collective hearth of the city. The private measures the depth of their revulsion against a public crime. The culprit is automatically without a city, but he is not thereby automatically without a hearth shared with others. His isolation is only completed by a hope, a hope

\textsuperscript{53} Böckh (237) does put \textit{ὁφιστολις} together with \textit{ἀπολις} ("Auf des Staates Höh' ist staatlos, wem das Edle fern wohnt"), but only by taking \textit{παρελιφων} as the equivalent of \textit{παραβαίνων}; he therefore does not recognize that his interpretation is contrary to what the Chorus intend.
that the Chorus employ to slide over the difference between the family and the city. If servants, relations, or friends of Antigone had comprised the Chorus, the presence of the arrested Antigone, after the expression of such a hope, would be poignant; but as it is, Antigone and the Chorus have in common only their Theban citizenship (cf. § 11.1). No one, however, mentions the πόλεις in the whole of the following scene; indeed, not until Creon confronts Haemon does it recur (656).  

23 (376-83). 23.1. Prometheus’ gifts of fire and the arts were accompanied by his settling in men blind hopes, which deprived them of seeing death as the fate in front of them (PV 248). The human being who has no arts, is wholly without hope, and sees death before her is Antigone (cf. §§ 3.2, 10.5, 10.8). Antigone is pre-Promethean man. She thus stands outside of everything that the Chorus have just mentioned to illustrate man’s δεινότης and the Chorus acknowledge this by calling her a δαιμόνιον τέφας (one must reject Platt’s τὸ δέ), where δαιμόνιον fully restores to τέφας the “religious nuance” that all neutrals in -ας originally had. Antigone is a more than human monstrum. Whenever τέφας refers to a living being and not an event, either that being is monstrous in shape or origin (Io or Helen), i.e., composed of parts that do not belong together, or the gods are its immediate source (cf. Tr. 1098, Aesch. Suppl. 570, Eur. Hel. 255-60, Hipp. 1214, Pl. Crat. 394d5). Antigone is the only nonvisibly monstrous and wholly human being that is ever called a τέφας. Why, then, do the Chorus do it? Their association of daughter with father suggests that her incestuous origin partly accounts for her monstrousness. She is, besides, δεινόν in herself, not through her success but her failure in breaking any of the apparent limits set for man. Man’s φρόνημα was for the Chorus an aspect of his δεινότης but now they are confronted with Antigone’s ἀφροσύνη. It had not occurred to them that human irrationality, which belongs to rationality as much as silence does to sound, could also be terrible (cf. §§ 10.12, 21.1). In the guise of irrationality the divine makes known its intrusion into the unlimited world of the first stasimon. The gods are not an outer limit that always recedes before man’s daring; they are within even from the start. Human transgression is as nothing compared with divine possession. The particularizing τὸ δέ is the gods’ answer to the generalizing τοῦτο of the Chorus. With her hot heart for cold things, her love of death, and her antigeneration, Antigone shows that the union of the divine and the human, which (the Chorus thought) the city harmonized, is essentially monstrous.

55 Cf. P. Chantraine, Formation des noms grecs, 422; E. Risch, Wortbildung der homerischen Sprache, 80. δαιμόνιον τέφας occurs in Bacchylides 16.35 (Snell) of Nessus’ gift to Deianeira.
Although Othello contains much talk about birth, delivery, adoption, grandchildren, and the relations between parents and their offspring, neither the hero nor the villain in Shakespeare's play fathers any children. This is especially interesting since the play's single source, Cinthio's *Hecatommithi*, draws attention to the villain's child at a critical moment in the action; Cinthio also makes clear the heroine's great affection for the child. Shakespeare's *Othello* is a play about people who, in different ways, misperceive human nature. Their views distort their relations with their community and their attitudes towards love, sex, and childbirth, for men come together in political societies and families as no other animals do. A community is held together not only by voluntary ties between contemporaries but by natural ties between generations. Therefore, marriage and the family are needed for coherent and enduring civil life. Shakespeare's plays repeatedly stress the relationship between "courtship" and the "court" because, as the song says in *As You Like It*, ""Tis Hymen peoples every town" (V, iv, 143).\(^1\)

Iago and Othello both have extreme views of human love and human sexuality. Iago reduces men to beasts, who live to satisfy temporary desires without concern for the future. To Iago, love is mere lust, and human procreation is no different from animal breeding. Othello raises men—or, at least, himself and his bride—to near-divinity. He thinks of himself as constant and unchanging like the permanent features of the universe. For him, human love is totally spiritual, a meeting of minds or souls. Human bodies, which produce human children, seem almost superfluous.

Iago and Othello also resemble each other in that they both remain essentially outside the political community in which the events occur. Iago is a native Venetian who will fully isolate himself from the community and in the end leaves nothing behind him. His attitudes towards love, childbearing, possessions, and reputation are related to his desire to separate himself from his fellow citizens and to impose his will upon them. Othello is an outsider too. He is a foreign son who has rejected his own origins and, gradually, has grafted himself to the Venetian community—by defending it as a military commander, by converting to

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its Christian religion, and, at the start of the play, by marrying one of its most esteemed daughters. Othello's attempt to become an adopted son in this city fails primarily because he thinks of himself as more than human. His attitudes towards love, childbirth, possessions, and reputation, like Iago's, are influenced by his view of his position in the state. Despite his noble aspirations, or perhaps because of them, he dies leaving behind him little more than the vile Iago does. Both cases suggest some connections between human citizenship and human generation.

I: Iago

Cinthio's Ensign "fell passionately in love with Desdemona."² Because she did not return this "passion" and appeared, instead, to love the Captain, the Ensign's love "now changed into the bitterest hate,"³ and he directed all his efforts toward destroying her, the Captain, and the Moor. Shakespeare's Iago insists that all passions can be controlled by the will. He is constant in his determination to destroy his victims and never turns from his initial purpose, even when discovery is imminent. His prototype's passion is transferred to a silly courtier who loves Desdemona and whose weakness shows Iago's self-control and his ability to impose his will on others. Iago's emphasis on the will and on self-sufficiency permits him to recognize only two kinds of "love"—sensual lust and self-love. Both involve the use of another person for one's own purposes, and neither produces recognized, legitimate offspring to survive the "lover."

With Roderigo, whom he thoroughly confuses in the course of the play, Iago speaks of the relationship between lust and love. Using the language of parent and offspring, he claims "love to be a sect or scion" (I, iii, 327-28) of lust, thus characteristically reversing the conventional romantic view. In satisfying this lust, or sensual passion not born of love, men resemble beasts which seek others to relieve themselves. Sex that is not the product of the full human love which Iago debases will not generate fully human products. Since lust, unlike love, does not preserve lasting family relations, the products which live after it has burned itself out are either unwanted or disregarded. Since it seeks to be satisfied immediately and does not involve long-term commitments which are sanctioned by the community, bestial lust does not form the kernel of lasting social life. It breeds scions who are not conscious of their relations to their ancestry or their posterity. Human love produces children, families, political orders, and traditions.

Iago's description of the "mating" of Othello and Desdemona in scene 1 is calculated to alarm a city elder who cares deeply about the

³ Ibid., p. 174.
family line that will survive him. According to Iago, the products of this lascivious elopement will be, not Venetian heirs to Brabantio, but the breed of a Barbary horse, “courser” and “gnett.” The joining of Othello and Desdemona immediately transforms them into beasts, a ram and ewe. These beasts compose, in turn, “the beast with two backs,” which lasts only as long as their supposed lust does. Brabantio responds with horror to Iago’s description of sex outside family and political contexts and calls for his “kinsmen” and his “brother.” He is confident that the Signory will deal justly with him, for Venice is a law-abiding community whose stability is founded on interwoven ties of kinship.

Iago’s lack of belief in human ties beyond the temporary ones of lust is indicated, in part, by his allusions to children throughout the play. He assures Roderigo, and later hints to his General, that Desdemona will tire of Othello as soon as their lusts are sated. Sure that they have nothing else in common, and unable to fathom their spiritual relationship, he forgets that couples in a place like Venice raise children to live after them, to populate the city, and to be honored in it. In Iago’s diatribe against women (II, i), he has only contempt for them as mothers. The “fair and foolish” woman has a child, as he cynically teaches, “For even her folly helped her to an heir” (II, i, 135). According to him, the paragon whom Desdemona describes is good for nothing but “to suckle fools and chronicle small beer” (II, i, 168). Iago repeatedly associates fruitfulness with lechery. Thus Desdemona is “framed as fruitful/ As the free elements” (II, iii, 341-42), and Cassio’s injuries in act V are the “fruits of whoring” (V, i, 116). This association is picked up by Othello throughout the later scenes of the play.

The other notion of love which Iago understands is self-love. The only sincere admiration which he expresses in the play is for those servants who serve their masters in order to serve themselves, who profess love for others but really love only themselves. Like the lust discussed above, Iago’s professed “love” for Emilia, Roderigo, Cassio, or Othello is always intended to satisfy some purpose of his own. He “lusts” after revenge or destruction and his love never goes beyond himself. Although his language throughout abounds in images of marriage, devotion, and love, these terms are always perverted by him.

Iago’s extreme self-love, or egoism, precludes not only a sincere relationship with other individuals but also with the community as a whole. Three times we see him break the peace and quiet of orderly settlements, once crying “mutiny” where there is none. In Venice he

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4 As we shall see, mothers of families are oddly absent, not only from Iago’s view, but from the whole play. Granville-Barker says that “The three [Desdemona, Emilia, Bianca] provide the play with something like a pattern of womankind—motherhood and old age omitted,” but sees no significance in the omissions. See Harley Granville-Barker, Prefaces to Shakespeare (Princeton, N.J., 1965), IV, p. 238.

8 A. C. Bradley, Shakespearean Tragedy (Cleveland, O., 1961), p. 178.
urges Roderigo to rouse Brabantio and to expose Othello, to

Proclaim him in the streets, incense her kinsmen, poison his delight,
And though he in a fertile, climate dwell,
Plague him with flies [I, i, 65-68].

Iago’s desire to poison the “fertile climate” is immediately followed by his urgings to give the alarm.

As when, by night and negligence, the fire
Is spied in populous cities [I, i, 73-74].

For Iago, “people swarm in cities like flies in a hot damp climate.”
In act IV he assures Othello that “There’s many a beast [cuckold] then in a populous city, / And many a civil monster” (IV, i, 65-66), again linking community fertility with lechery. Brabantio, on the other hand, thinks the disturbers of the peace are acting as if they were in a “grange,” a farm in an unpopulated rural area. Iago is the self-professed enemy of those who come together in love to populate the city to which they belong. His goal is either to poison their fertility or to associate it with bestial lust.

Ironically, Iago depicts his sterile devotion to himself in images of fruitfulness:

Our bodies are our gardens, to the which our
wills are gardeners; so that if we will plant
nettles or sow lettuce, set hyssop and weed up
thyme, supply it with one gender of herbs or
distract it with many—either to have it sterile
with idleness or manured with industry—why,
the power and corrigible authority of this lies
in our wills [I, iii, 315-21].

He makes things grow by manuring “with industry.” In place of love and care, he exercises his will. His self-serving relations with others are also expressed in the language of love and fertility. To his “friend” Roderigo, he urges that they “be conjunctive in our revenge against him [Othello]” (I, iii, 363), and chides him for expecting to reap fruits from this union too soon:

Though other things grow fair against the sun,
Yet fruits that blossom first will first be ripe [II, iii, 376-77].

Finally, in the process by which he destroys his “friend” Othello, he plays the part of wooer and devoted lover, and he cultivates the seed of jealousy which undoes him.

By depriving his Ensign of the attractive three-year-old daughter of Cinthio’s story, Shakespeare calls attention to Iago’s perverted and sterile notions of love. But, in a sense, Shakespeare’s Iago does generate:

I have't! It is engendered! Hell and night
Must bring this monstrous birth to the world's light [I, iii, 398-99].

Just what is fathered by Shakespeare's Ensign? The product of Iago's inverted self-love is not an enduring child but a merely temporary persona in his plot: "honest Iago." Stanislavsky speaks of the actor's creativity and the birth of a dramatic character. Similarly, Granville-Barker, in his discussion of Iago as an actor, remarks that: "the career of a character in a play from its imagining to its presenting on stage has something in common with the begetting and birth of a child." But, as he says earlier, Iago is an egoist who loves his own art only because it "is still a part of him." This points to the impossibility of a man like Iago begetting and loving anything which would not remain part of himself.

The dramatic character, "honest Iago," which Iago fathers, is clearly a "monstrous birth." Also monstrous is the whole plan in which he destroys a nobler man than himself. Instead of perpetuating himself in the form of a child, Iago fathers a plan which results in his own destruction. Sigurd Burckhardt refers to Iago's tragic plot as "art for art's sake" and judges it a sterile triumph. Although Iago delivers his plan perfectly, there are frequent reminders in the play that he is not capable of producing an offspring that is healthy. In his exchange with Desdemona (II, i) he has difficulty delivering his verdict on women:

But my Muse labors,
And thus she is delivered [II, i, 125-26].

To his cynical summary, Desdemona replies, "O most lame and impotent conclusion" (II, i, 159). When he testifies about Cassio's brawl he is warned by Montano to "deliver" a true account. He hypocritically attempts to make nothing of the events which he can be said to have "fathered." Many readers believe that Iago is sexually inadequate, either homosexual or impotent. Shakespeare clearly meant him to be morally sterile.

There is yet another sense in which one can understand Iago's imagery of birth. For, in addition to fathering and bringing to light his monstrous plan, he serves as some kind of midwife to another unnatural monster which, as Emilia says, is "begot upon itself, born on itself" (III, iv, 161). This, of course, is the "green-eyed monster jealousy." Iago may not actually plant the seed in Othello, but he is the agent that brings it swiftly to term: "There are many events in the womb of time, which will be delivered" (I, iii, 365-66).

8 Granville-Barker, Prefaces, p. 223.
9 Ibid., p. 221.
Iago's childlessness is appropriate because he lives totally in the present and totally for himself. If he has any sense of belonging, it is to "the tribe of hell" (I, iii, 353). His greatest satisfaction derives from manipulating others according to his will. Like some of Shakespeare's other tyrants, his energies are devoted to the activity of present tyranny, rather than to securing his work for the future. Richard III, Macbeth, and Lady Macbeth are also childless child-killers who disrupt the relations between parents and their children. Iago's childlessness is thus related to his disregard for the city he lives in and for its future. He exemplifies, in reverse, what Shakespeare's contemporary Francis Bacon recognized: "it were great reason that those that have children should have greatest care of future times; unto which they knew they must transmit their dearest pledges."  

Iago's peculiar present-mindedness, indicated by his isolated egoism and his childlessness, is reinforced by other attitudes which distinguish him from ordinary men in political communities. Normal men who know they will die generally care to leave behind them, in addition to children, property for their children to inherit. Brabantio is, perhaps, one of these ordinary men. Iago refers to "heirs" only twice in the play, neither time in the ordinary sense of the word. In the first scene he complains that the appointment was made unfairly "and not by old gradation, where each second / Stood heir to th' first" (I, i, 34-35). Roderigo does not notice that Iago also violated this principle of "inheritance" by sending petitioners for himself. The other reference is his quip about foolish women and their "folly that leads them to an heir." Iago's attitudes towards property are usually thoroughly antisocial. As Robert Heilman shows in his discussion of Iago as "Economic Man," he is a petty "thief in the night" who steals both literally and metaphorically from Roderigo, Desdemona, Cassio, and Othello. Although he is so materialistic, he is, once again, amazingly present-minded about his money. Since he enjoys manipulating others, he enjoys stealing in order to control them, hence his famous linking of "sport" and "profit." If he shows no concern with children to inherit his money, he also shows no concern for preserving it for himself. Heilman sees in Iago's "economics" the same disregard for the future which I have been discussing:

11 I owe this point to Professor Michael Platt of Dartmouth College, who also suggests the connection between childlessness and disregard for lasting fame in these political tyrants. See my discussion of Iago and reputation below.

12 Francis Bacon, "Of Marriage and the Single Life," Essays (New York, 1966), p. 22. He qualifies this here and in "Of Parents and Children," saying that single, childless men, if they are inclined, are more likely to produce great public works, while married men are impeded by their wives and children. See also Pericles' Funeral Oration in Thucydides' The Peloponnesian War for the effect of parenthood on political deliberation.

As a figure on the exchange, Iago seems to be the winner taking all and making his victims "poor indeed." . . . However . . . Iago uses only a short-term economics. . . . Iago has a good rational grasp of how to influence people, and the vulgar streak of the profiteer; but in the failure of imagination, he is reckless of his own coming impoverishment . . . he's a gambler; when resentful malice begins to run wild, it can no longer calculate the end; like the gambling spirit, it contains something of the suicidal.14

Finally, Iago is chillingly unconcerned about the future in his attitudes towards reputation. The man who loves only himself admires only those who "do themselves homage." Like the inverted "love" discussed above, this inverted "homage" dies when the man himself dies. The homage that endures is what Cassio calls "the immortal part of myself," his reputation. Without reputation "what remains is bestial" (II, iii, 262-63). It does not father children who proudly remember their parents, and it has no responsible place in an enduring political community. Iago speaks eloquently or cynically about the worth of reputation, according to his aims in manipulating others. But for his own reputation, he cares not at all, except in so far as it is also useful for those aims. Perhaps this explains his refusal to speak at the end of the play. Iago embraces his isolation, now imposed on him by the community he has rejected, and refuses to leave a story to live beyond him: "What you know, you know. From this time forth I never will speak word" (V, ii, 299-300). As we shall see below, the man who would be part of the community cares about the reputation which survives him.

Iago, who thinks little of his fellow citizens or of the future, and who has no noble expectations for himself or for others, excuses any behavior on the grounds that "men are men" (II, iii, 240). On the one occasion when he comes together with other men to celebrate a community victory (II, iii), he is secretly plotting to destroy them. He jubilantly sums up his outlook in the song he sings:

And let me the canakin clink, clink;
And let me the canakin clink.
A soldier's a man;
O man's life's but a span,
Why then, let a soldier drink (II, iii, 66-70).

II. Othello and Desdemona

Brabantio is wrong to accuse Othello of having won Desdemona through the use of "magic," "drugs or minerals," or other "arts inhibited and out of warrant." But, in a sense, he rightly associates Othello with the superhuman. For Othello has rejected the common human limits of family, place, changing passions, and, in a strange way, even the body. When he allies himself with Venice, he continues to disregard these limits which, for most men, are not voluntarily chosen. Othello's

14 Ibid.
vulnerability derives largely from his position in Venice and from his superhuman requirements for himself and for Desdemona.\(^\text{15}\)

Othello can attempt to become an adopted son of Venice only because he has cut himself off from his natural origins. Cinthio, in *The Hecatommithi*, says almost nothing about the Moor's background or his attitude towards it. Shakespeare, however, repeatedly calls attention to Othello's past in presenting his present and his future. Othello's confidence in himself seems to derive vaguely from the fact that he is descended from "men of royal siege" (I, ii, 20). But he has never boasted of this to the Venetians, and never mentions it again. He refers twice to his parents but has separated them from any human family or political context. Instead, he mythologizes them and associates them, as Brabantio does him, with magic, "mummy," and an Egyptian "charmer." It is difficult to conceive of Othello with his mother or father at any specific moment. Furthermore, the handkerchief myth indicates a certain family propensity, or, at least, anxiety on Othello's part about such a propensity, for wandering away from the home. The kerchief was needed to tie Othello's father to his wife and, presumably, to his son.\(^\text{16}\) In addition to peculiarities with respect to his birth, Othello apparently did not grow up as ordinary men do. He has been, in his own words, "unhoused," and, since the age of seven, has been engaged in military battles. Finally, Othello's accounts of his past are peculiar in that he usually describes himself battling alone against a generalized "foe," or as a unique human being among "anthropophagi" and "monsters" who dwell in "anters vast and deserts idle." These empty, sterile spaces remind one of the "grange" which Brabantio contrasts with populous Venice and of the cave-dwelling, unpoltical, "monsters" in the Cyclops episode of *The Odyssey*. As Granville-Barker has remarked, this world in which Othello found life's meaning "is a world in which one lives alone."\(^\text{17}\)

By putting himself in the service of Venice, Othello has not simply abandoned his past; he has committed himself to destroying that which produced him. He proves his Christian allegiance to Venice by fighting against Turks and other infidels. But even after he has his "unhoused free condition / Put into circumscription" (I, ii, 25-26) by marrying into the populous Venetian community, Othello continues to view himself

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\(^{15}\) Readers familiar with Alan Bloom's "Cosmopolitan Man" in *Shakespeare's Politics* (New York, 1964) will recognize that parts of the following discussion owe much to Bloom's point of view. Auden, Heilman, and, less interestingly, Lawrence Lerner, in "The Machiavel and the Moor" (*Essays in Criticism* 9 [1959]: 339-60), also discuss the "political" foundations of Othello's sexual passion.

\(^{16}\) Many readers have noticed that the handkerchief was supposed to ensure against male infidelity. They interpret Othello's outbursts as projections of anxiety about his own shortcomings as a lover. See, for example, Heilman, *Magic in the Web*, pp. 211-14.

\(^{17}\) Granville-Barker, *Prefaces*, p. 236.
as a man alone. Many readers have seen instances of extreme egoism in his public and domestic conduct. By the end of the play, Othello once more sees himself as the sole human inhabitant of the vast spaces of the universe, among the heavens, seas, moon, and "chaste stars."

It is ironic and appropriate that Othello, who has changed his entire life and allegiance, views himself as almost superhumanly unchangeable and enduring. His conversion to Christianity has supported this view. No longer associated with a two-hundred-year-old sibyl and "mummy," which preserved dead bodies forever, Othello now finds in Christianity another kind of immortality—that of his "perfect soul." In contrast to Iago, whose materialistic present-mindedness leads him either to pervert the notion of the soul18 or to use it to manipulate others who believe, Othello frequently and reverently refers to his soul and its future. When he realizes that he has murdered his innocent wife he anticipates with horror the unending agony his soul will suffer in hell (V, ii, 270-77).19

Othello's view of his own permanence is also indicated in his attitude towards his steadfastness. Like Iago, he denies, from the beginning, that he might lose his self-control and submit to passion. Unlike Cinthio's Moor, who is at least "troubled" and "melancholy" before he develops his jealous passion, Othello appears untroubled and constant in his behavior. Iago's first description of him tells how Othello refused to change his mind about the appointment. With Brabantio, Iago, the Signory, and even after the Cassio brawl, the General is in complete control of himself.20 Iago, who prides himself on his own constant will, appears in different guises—although always "honest"—to different people, in order to be constant to himself. His great project can be seen as an attempt to deprive the Moor of his "constant, loving, noble nature" (II, i, 289). He tells Roderigo that "these Moors are changeable in their wills" and convinces him that Desdemona "must change for youth" (I, iii, 330ff.). When he first insinuates that Othello has cause to be suspicious, the "constant" Moor replies:

Why? Why is this?
Think'st thou I'd make a life of jealousy,
To follow still the changes of the Moon
With fresh suspicions? No! [III, iii, 177-80].

Soon, however, Iago realizes that the General is "moved" and that "the Moor already changes with my poison" (III, iii, 322). By the next act, we watch in horror as Othello vacillates between his former trust and his new "knowledge." His rigid self-control, once shaken, breaks down completely. As Emilia remarks, "Here's a change indeed" (IV, ii, 105).

18 See Heilman, Magic in the Web, p. 266.
19 See n. 38 below.
20 Othello's behavior after the brawl should not be wild and passionate. Actors must be careful to show the strain of maintaining rigid control without losing it.
Lodovico, who recalls Othello's former steadiness and control, is assured by Iago that "he is much changed" (IV, i, 268).

Although Iago is successful, there is a sense in which Othello never abandons his desire to be superhumanly resistant to change. Like the heavenly bodies he so often mentions, he must follow a relentless and regular course, unaffected by human desires and acts. He now compares himself to the sea, which resembles them in this respect. Once sure of his wife's infidelity, he emphasizes his constant determination to be avenged. When Iago invidiously counsels patience and suggests that his "mind may change," Othello absolutely denies the possibility:

Never, Iago. Like to the Pontic Sea,
Whose icy current and compulsive course
Nev'r keeps retiring ebb, but keeps due on
To the Propontic and the Hellespont,
Even so my bloody thought, with violent pace,
Shall nev'r look back . . . [III, iii, 450-55].

At the end he refuses to change his plan to murder Desdemona that night: "Being done, there is no pause" (V, ii, 83).

Othello's insistence on an almost superhuman self-control with regard to his emotions extends to his attitude about the nature of his and Desdemona's love, which he regards as overwhelmingly spiritual. This may be necessary to divorce himself from the Venetian stereotype of the "lusty" Moor, but his preoccupations with the spiritual side of love do seem excessive. Shakespeare's Moor is older than Cinthio's and claims that "the young affects" in him are not only less pressing than in younger men, but that they are "defunct." Seemingly undisturbed that his military duties interrupt the physical consummation of his spiritual love, he accepts his departure for Cyprus on his wedding night "with all my heart" (I, iii, 274). He married Desdemona for the "pity" with which she responded to his experiences, and finally asks that she be permitted to accompany him, not because he wants to enjoy her body, or even to be near it, but "to be free and bounteous to her mind" (I, iii, 260). In a man whose language is permeated with sensual imagery,\(^2\) it is surprising to find none of it attached to Desdemona until after he suspects her of cuckolding him. Surely this indicates some inner strain.\(^\)\(^2\)2

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\(^2\) One must account for the passages in which Othello does refer positively to his physical relationship with his wife. As I have argued, they are most striking in their rarity. But more must be said. On the first occasion Othello kisses his wife when he arrives at Cyprus. (He refers to the "music" their kisses make as "discords.") On the second, he bids her to come to bed as the victory celebration begins: "The purchase made, the fruits are to ensue, / That profit's yet to come 'tween me and you" (II, iii, 9-10). Heilman explains the first passage by noting Othello's selfish concern with his own happiness and his joyful self-confidence at
Othello finds his feminine image of unchanging spiritual perfection in the lovely Desdemona. She seems to have fallen in love with him despite his “visage,” which was eclipsed by his mind and speech. (In act IV she finds Lodovico attractive, not physically as Emilia does, but because “he speaks well” [IV, iii, 38].) She wants to live with him to share the dangerous and romantic conditions which inspired her love. She refers to her wedding bed only when she thinks of interceding for Cassio (III, iii, 29), and when she has premonitions of her early death (IV, ii, 104). Many characters refer to Desdemona’s innocent, unworldly, even “divine” qualities. Cassio associates her with the purity of Eden; she is

One that excels the quirks of blazoning pens,
And in th’ essential vesture of creation
Does tire the ingener [II, i, 63-65].

Only Iago is cynical. He tells Cassio that Othello’s desire for his wife will make him obey her as a “god” (II, iii, 345ff.), and assures him that this lady of “so blessed a disposition” (II, iii, 320) will certainly sue for his reappointment. But his personal opinion is more directly expressed to Roderigo, who sincerely thinks her “blessed” and later compares her to a “votarist” (IV, ii, 186):

“Blessed fig’s-end! The wine she drinks
is made of grapes. If she had been
blessed, she would never have loved the
Moor. Blessed pudding!” [II, i, 251-53].

Desdemona’s innocence of evil and her attitude towards love make her seem not quite part of the world of ordinary men and women. At one point she must remind herself not to expect too much of them:

Nay, we must think men are not gods,
Nor of them look for such observancy
As fits the bridal [III, iv, 148-50].

Unlike Iago, who accepts that “men are men” because he expects so little from them, she persists in thinking that imperfect human beings can be improved. Thus, she petitions heaven to send her “such uses,” “Not

this point. Thus, he relaxes and expresses the desires and pleasures of ordinary men (Magic in the Web, p. 175). The second passage oddly refers to the consummation of their love in economic terms. Othello also kisses Desdemona when he dies: “I kissed thee ere I kill’d thee. No way but this / Killing myself to die upon a kiss” (V, ii, 354-55). One unusual feature of the second and third references to physical relations is that both are expressed in rhyming couplets. Othello is explicitly distinguished by his ornate, expansive language, and he uses couplets only five times during the entire play. On the other hand, conventional men like Brabantio and the Duke, and a man who wants to appear conventional, like Iago, frequently speak in them. Othello’s rare use of couplets at these moments in the play calls attention to the unusualness of what he is saying. Only here does this superhuman man, who, with disastrous consequences, ignores civil conventions and formalities, speak in the conventional cadences of an ordinary citizen.
to pick bad from bad, but by bad mend” (IV, iii, 107-8). Othello expects
the same permanence and constancy from Desdemona that he demands in
himself. When he thinks he has been cuckolded, he emphasizes the
inconstancy of her behavior. In Venice he had assured Brabantio of his
faith in her unchanging loyalty: “My life upon her faith” (I, iii, 289). In
Cyprus he calls Desdemona back after striking her, and assures Lodovico
that:

You did wish that I would make her turn.
Sir, she can turn, and turn, and yet go on
And turn again [IV, i, 252-54].

Shakespeare seems to suggest that she really is unlike other people who
last only as long as the mortal bodies that house their immortal souls. In
life she is repeatedly compared to immortal or unchanging, insensible
things like jewels, chrysolite, or alabaster monuments.23 In her eerie last
words she seems to speak from beyond the grave24 and, at the end of the
play, Shakespeare avoids calling attention to her dead body. Wrongly
accused of being false, it does not even have to be removed from
the stage.25

Brabantio, like Iago, is unable to comprehend a relationship which is
utterly devoid of sensual attractions. To his coarse mind this is not a
natural human relationship.26 Although we recognize his limitations and
are deeply moved by the fineness of this love affair, we must see that
there is some truth to Brabantio’s point of view, for changelessness and
bodilessness are not human. Like Iago, Othello fails to admit the com-
posite nature of man. Iago denies the value of spiritual love and
transforms all men into monsters. Othello condemns physical desire as
beastly and glorifies the youth he spent fighting monsters. Like Cassio,
who loses “the immortal part” of himself “to be now a sensible man,
by and by a fool, and presently a beast!” (II, iii, 304-5), and like
Roderigo, the fool whom Iago urges to be a man and then turns into
a beast, Othello, too, is reduced by Iago’s urgings to be a man from
something more than human, to the agent of a “monstrous act” (V, ii,
187), to a “Fool! Fool! Fool!” (V, ii, 319). The man who refuses to
recognize the animal in himself is, at last, more monstrous than the
ordinary human being: “Lilies that fester smell far worse than weeds”
(Sonnet 94). Ironically, Othello’s perfect spiritual marriage begins at the
Sagittary, the inn whose centaur sign—part man, part beast—points out
what Othello refuses to recognize about the nature of man.27

24 Heilman says she becomes a saint (Magic in the Web, pp. 214-18).
25 See appendices for contrasts of other Shakespearean heroines with Desdemona.
26 Bloom, Shakespeare’s Politics, p. 41.
27 The centaur is part man, part horse. In I, i, Iago specifically calls Othello
a “Barbary horse” who will sire “gennets” (Spanish horses) and “coursers” (war
horses).
As we have seen, however, accepting the centaur as an emblem for human nature may raise other problems. If men renounce their aspirations to God-like perfection—the Othello view—what is to keep them from sinking to the ways of beasts, in the Iago view? Shakespeare does not offer an answer in this play. But one might begin to consider the problem by recognizing that Othello's self-elevation eliminates anything higher than himself, and thus precludes the possibility of worship and its effects on human behavior.

Othello is a mercenary soldier who, in addition to being useful to a society which is mercantile rather than military, is also exotic and attractive. Venice is willing to pay him, to respect his position, and to obey him in military matters, but, as the play shows, her citizens do not fully accept him as one of themselves. Brabantio, although he has entertained Othello in his home for the last nine months, has had anxious dreams about his daughter and the Moor. His outbursts, which repeatedly emphasize the difference between his countrymen and the black warrior, indicate his limited acceptance of the General. The Duke is also a father and admits that Othello's tale might have won his daughter too (I, ii, 170). But his sententious comfort after the Signory hears Desdemona indicates some sympathy for Brabantio's point of view. He calls the marriage a "mangled matter" and refers to Brabantio as the "robbed" and Othello as the "thief." In Cyprus, the greetings of Lodovico are official and formal, rather than warm and personal, as one might expect to a newly married couple. Venice seems to view the marriage by which Othello seeks to tie himself permanently to the state less as the gain of an adopted son than as the loss of a natural daughter.

Brabantio describes Desdemona's rebellion as a "treason of the blood" (I, i, 166). He means that she has married without her father's permission, but his anger is especially violent because she has betrayed her "blood" by marrying a foreigner. Her defense before the Signory ignores this second reason for his anger and speaks only of a woman's divided duties to her father and any husband. Her mother, to whom she compares herself, was presumably a Venetian who married a Venetian. Her defense also puts her in a position something like Othello's with respect to her

28 See I, iii, 315-18: "Ere I would say I would drown myself for the love of a guinea hen, I would change my humanity with a baboon."
29 See Bloom, Shakespeare's Politics; Auden, "Joker"; and Lerner, "Machiavel."
30 I, iii, 83. Othello says he has been engaged in action until nine months ago. Since then he has been idle in Venice, spending at least some of his time visiting Brabantio. During this period he has wooed Desdemona and decided to join the Venetian community by marrying her; during this time he has decided to become an adopted son. Is not nine months an appropriate term to precede a "second birth"?
31 See Heilman, Magic in the Web, p. 261. Auden suggests that the Signory upholds the marriage because it cannot afford to alienate its best general during the Cyprus crisis ("Joker," p. 264).
past. She expected her duty to be divided between the past and the future. But as Brabantio's refusal to have anything more to do with her shows, the marriage will require a more complete split than she thought. In Cyprus she realizes this:

If haply you my father do suspect
An instrument of this your calling back,
Lay not your blame on me. If you have lost him,
I have lost him too [IV, ii, 43-46].

Finally Brabantio condemns such a marriage because it destroys the reasons for having children by generating them: "Who would be a father?" (I, i, 161), he cries. If one's "blood" is to be adulterated, he "had rather to adopt a child than to get it" (I, iii, 189). Fortunately, Desdemona dies before she can hear that she has been the cause of her father's death. Before he kills this child of Venice Othello exclaims, "would thou hadst never been born" (IV, ii, 68).

If Othello and Desdemona fail in their capacities as "children" of the Venetian community, Shakespeare also raises some doubt about them as potential parents. The extreme spirituality of the relationship and the emphasis on their own permanence prevents us from thinking of them as father and mother. Cinthio's couple have been happily married for some time before they go to Cyprus, and his Disdemona is represented as extremely fond of the Ensign's child. It is easy to imagine that Cinthio's Moor, who is said to have been "vanquished by her beauty" (emphasis added) as well as by her character, and his Disdemona eventually will have children. Shakespeare seems deliberately to avoid this suggestion. The action occurs in the first few days of marriage. Desdemona is portrayed as almost sexless and speaks of herself as a child (IV, ii, 109-12). Othello is older than Cinthio's Moor, and one might expect this adopted son to be eager to become a city father in order to secure his union with Venice. In the early scenes there is no suggestion of this. Later, like Iago, he consistently associates procreation or fruitfulness exclusively with lust or with animal sex. Therefore, his wife's "moist hand" argues "fruitfulness and liberal heart" (III, iv, 38). In the "brothel" scene he orders Emilia, the "madam," to "leave procréants alone and shut the door" (IV, ii, 29). Emphasizing again his cut-off origins, he agonizes over the thought that Desdemona, "the fountain from which my current runs / Or else dries up," is to be kept "as a cistern for foul toads / To knot and gender in" (IV, ii, 58-61). Shortly after, he thinks that she is as "honest" "as summer flies are in the shambles, / That quicken even with blowing" (IV, ii, 65-66). Othello sees cuckoldry as the curse of all mortal men from the moment they are born:

'Tis destiny unshunnable, like death.  
Even then this forked plaque is fated to us  
When we do quicken [III, iii, 274-76].

32 Except for the one passage discussed in n. 22.
The problem is that he does not recognize that human mortality necessitates "fruitful" sexual activity between lawful and pure lovers as well as lustful or guilty ones. Othello's high spirituality, which, when questioned, erupts into deep sexual horror, seems to preclude the possibility of human children in a human society as much as do Iago's low animal attitudes. His marriage bed, which should produce new life to succeed him, is a place of death. For Othello, love's too-spiritual ecstasy—"death"—leads directly to literal death. Like Iago, Othello is delivered only of a monster, the green-eyed one, "begot upon itself, born on itself."

This discussion of Othello's childlessness has been based on metaphorical expressions of his attitudes towards himself, Desdemona, and his love. But Shakespeare makes it clear that other people are thinking about the probable offspring of this unusual marriage. The main problem, of course, is that these children would be black in fair Venice. There are usually difficulties attending the children of marriages which disregard the political contexts in which they occur. Although Othello and Desdemona are married, Shakespeare avoids references to conventional formalities (the ceremony, a ring) which would indicate society's recognition of the union. One need only look at the products of other Shakespearean love affairs which disregard political or social conventions to spot difficulties. They are either politically ignored, as in Antony and Cleopatra, or ostracized bastards, as in Titus Andronicus, King John, Much Ado, or King Lear.

The problems surrounding Othello's perpetuation of himself in children are emphasized, like those of Iago, by his attitude to material possessions. The "heirloom" which Othello retains from his own ancestors is the cause of his undoing. He has kept the handkerchief as an exotic totem, while rejecting the life it came from, and it appropriately destroys his new alliance. At the end of the play, Othello realizes that he has thrown away the one "heirloom" he did receive from the family he married into, Brabantio's "jewel," the "pearl" which Othello recognized as "richer than all his tribe." Finally, as the Venetians prepare to return to their city, Lodovico disposes of Othello's estate:

33 See Heilman, Magic in the Web, pp. 187-93.
34 Burckhardt, Shakespearean Meanings, p. 274.
35 Romeo and Juliet are social equals of similar backgrounds who are separated by a political barrier which is condemned in the play. These lovers are quite different from Desdemona and Othello. Their attraction is extremely sensual, they yearn for physical union, and Juliet is said to be old enough to be a mother. I am not speaking here of "political" marriages (like that of Henry V) whose offspring are expected to unite separate nations.
36 Aaron, the type of lustful Moor from whose image Othello so seeks to separate himself, has a fantastic plan to make his bastard king. The plan is doomed from the start.
Gratiano, keep the house,  
And seize upon the fortunes of the Moor,  
For they succeed on you [V, ii, 362-64].

Othello's end is, again, peculiarly final, since the inheritance which, in ordinary circumstances, would pass to the next generation here reverts to the preceding one, to Desdemona's uncle, the brother for whom Brabantio called on the night she eloped.

Othello's desire to extend himself beyond human limits and his inability to perpetuate himself as ordinary men do make reputation of the utmost value to him. He is like Achilles, who sacrifices potential prosperity, wife, children, and old age in his homeland for the promise of everlasting glory based on his military reputation, and who, at one point, even imagines himself in a world devoid of all comrades but Patroclus.  

Like Cassio, Othello believes that reputation is the "immortal part" of himself. Iago manipulates him by associating reputation with the valuable and unchanging:

Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,  
Is the immediate jewel of their souls [III, iii, 155-56].

Knowing that a bad reputation, as well as a good one, is immortal, Othello despairs at the contempt his alleged cuckolding will bring on him:

But, alas, to make me  
The fixed figure for the time of scorn  
To point his slow and moving finger at [IV, ii, 52-54].

He makes the same extreme demands on his reputation as he does on his love. It is no accident that his "name, that was as fresh / As Dian's visage" (III, iii, 383) is described in the same chaste—and sterile—terms (Diana) as his love.  

37 Homer *The Iliad* IX.393-416, XVI.97-100.  

38 One might ask why a man who believes in the immortality of his soul should care so much for his earthly reputation, a question which may be like the infamous one about Lady Macbeth, but Othello's behavior and Shakespeare's detail seem to warrant them. Although Othello disregards the usual material signs of continuity and emphasizes his lasting soul, there are signs that, for a person of his experience, the notion of an everlasting soul is too ethereal. He attempts to preserve his reputation much as his shadowy forebears may have attempted to preserve their bodies. His allusions to an Egyptian, a sybil, and "mummy" suggest that the Islam of the North Africans among whom he spent his childhood was a thin veneer over a pagan faith in magic and amulets. Perhaps this is why Christianity, with its spiritual emphasis, would appeal to him. But again, one might wonder why he allied himself to Christians rather than to Moslems, who also believe in the soul's immortality. The Venetians in the play emphasize not their Christian theology but their Christian manners. Othello seems attracted to them mainly because they are a civilized and self-controlled people, in contrast to the passionate and sensual Moslems. Thus his Christianity may not be as orthodox as he thinks, and his emphasis on his everlasting soul may not preclude the desire for an enduring reputation.
Although he leaves nothing tangible behind him as a result of his brief and failed attempt to assimilate, Othello dies as he lived, willing to Venice's posterity, if not his own, a lasting picture of himself. Unlike Achilles, who knows the poets will sing of his exploits, Othello must be his own poet.\(^39\) Too grand for human society, unable to limit himself to the institutions and conventions which make possible enduring family and city life, Othello seeks throughout the play to perpetuate himself as an individual in the legends he tells. By the last act he speaks distantly of himself in the third person and presents at his death a fixed tableau for the memory of his witnesses. Unlike Iago, who refuses to explain himself and who remains, for others, "not what I am," Othello begs his audience to "speak of me as I am" and tells them one last story about himself.\(^40\)

**Appendices**

In examining Shakespeare's plays we are often fortunate to have other plays against which we can check our interpretations. I began by noticing how different Desdemona is from other innocent, marriageable maidens in Shakespeare, and found several strong confirmations of my thesis about Shakespeare's interest in the relations between love, generation, and political communities.

*The Merchant of Venice* examines some of the problems raised by *Othello*. The two marriages in this second Venetian play bring the union between Desdemona and Othello into relief.\(^41\)

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\(^39\) As both the actor and poet of his actions, Othello more resembles Odysseus, another great general, some of whose adventures, as noted above, are similar to those of Shakespeare's Moor. But Odysseus is a supremely politic man whose words and deeds are calculated. Throughout his travels he remembers who he is, resisting conversion and even marriage and refusing to be used by foreigners. It is no accident that he maintains some distance from the heroic exploits of his comrades, and that he returns home to his kingdom and his wife, to his father, and, most important, to his son.

\(^40\) As many readers have seen, the poet Othello lacks the insight of the poet Shakespeare, especially about himself. Othello's creator wrote love poetry as grand and as spiritual as Othello's, and he knew that there could be no such poetry were there no difference between human and animal sexuality. But he also knew that the attempt to live unremittingly on the highest spiritual level would lead, in ordinary circumstances, only to tragedy. Is this why he expressed such notions in a private and literary form, the sonnet, but qualified them repeatedly in the public works which depict the choices and actions of human beings in social and political situations? With this question we may end. Trying to answer it would be to begin another long discussion.

\(^41\) See Alan Bloom, "Christian and Jew," *Shakespeare's Politics*, and Sigurd Burckhardt, "The Gentle Bond," *Shakespearean Meanings*, for views similar to mine on these two marriages.
“Amorous” Jessica lacks Desdemona’s ethereal fineness, but her situation is similar. She forsakes her family bonds “to seal love’s bonds” (II, vi, 6)\(^2\) by eloping in a gondola at night with a man of different origins. This happens at a time when her father has been dealing with her husband’s friends and, like Brabantio, has had anxious dreams of foreboding. Like Desdemona’s “treason of the blood,” Jessica’s marriage requires the rejection of her ancestors:

But though I am a daughter to his blood,
I am not to his manners [II, iii, 18-19].

Shylock decides to exact a pound of Antonio’s “flesh” in part because he thinks that Antonio helped his “own flesh and blood to rebel” (III, i, 32). Unlike Desdemona, who perceives a duty divided between her father and her new husband, Jessica coldly forsakes her father for

Lorenzo, certain, and my love indeed,
For who love I so much? [II, vi, 29-30].

Later we hear that she has squandered the family money which she has stolen, as well as an heirloom, her mother’s ring. Like the socially unsanctioned marriage of Desdemona and her Moor, the ceremony which unites Jessica and Lorenzo is never specifically referred to. They are attended by Launcelot, who mistreats his own father and fathers bastards himself. He jokes that Jessica may be a bastard and not “the Jew’s daughter.” She replies that she “shall be saved by my husband” (III, v, 18), again emphasizing her rejection of her origins.

Although fair Venice is not able to accept black Othello and, as a result, loses Desdemona, it is possible to believe that it might be easier for Christian Venice to absorb a Jewish adopted daughter. However, there are indications that Lorenzo’s and Jessica’s future will be as overcast as that of the marriage discussed above would have been. Many have noticed that their lovely talk about lovers in the night describes love affairs with tragic ends. Two of these were, interestingly, matches between foreigners and a third was opposed by parents.\(^3\) Finally, one cannot help thinking of the difficulties which they will encounter in Venice, if for no other reason than that they have broken the law by stealing. Perhaps this is why Shakespeare leads them (and leaves them when everyone else goes to the trial in Venice) to the protected and private paradise of Belmont.

Although there has been much discussion of the limitations of the marriage between Portia and Bassanio, it is clear that it is a more viable match than either Jessica’s sordid elopement or Desdemona’s saintly one. It follows, at least in spirit, the will of Portia’s father and it pairs her with an appropriate man of her own background. She objects to a proud

\(^2\) All references to *The Merchant of Venice* are to the Signet edition, ed. Kenneth Myrick (New York, 1965).

\(^3\) Bloom, “Christian and Jew,” p. 34.
black Moroccan, largely on the grounds of his “complexion,” and to several other foreigners. But she is eager to marry Bassanio, “a Venetian, a scholar and a soldier” (I, ii, 112), who visited Belmont when her father was alive, and thus must have had his approval. It is clear that she does not marry only for “fancy,” which is “bred in the eyes,” but for spiritual love as well. However, although she is described as a “goddess,” she lacks the ethereal qualities which raise the “divine Desdemona” above the human community. She supervises a valuable estate and dons a man’s clothes to participate in the political business of Venice. Unlike Desdemona, she enjoys a bawdy joke with her waiting woman and, later, with her husband and friends. Finally, unlike Jessica and Desdemona, she will bear children. Her husband’s friend, Gratiano, who ends the play with sexual joking, and his wife, Nerissa, offer to “play with them [Portia and Bassanio] the first boy for a thousand ducats” (III, ii, 214). The products of these marriages will be equally comfortable in Venice and in Belmont.

Othello is often compared with Leontes in The Winter’s Tale, the man whose morbid and unfounded jealousy is not complicated by a treacherous advisor, or anxiety about his foreignness. Leontes and Shakespeare’s other conventionally jealous men differ from Othello in that, while they are horrified by their wives’ supposed infidelity, they do not view all sex and procreation as animal activities. Leontes never expects himself to live up to superhuman standards, and his supposed cuckolding does not reduce him, in his own eyes, to a beast. Aside from his personal agony, the main result of Leontes’ jealous rage is political. He endangers his country by depriving it of heirs. But this self-induced childlessness is the result of poor judgment and temper, and is not, like Othello’s, related to his peculiar position in society. Shakespeare shows this by making him salvagable. His wise wife and her friends save his heirs and teach him to repent so that he can return to his position as a secure political leader.

The difference between Leontes’ jealousy and Othello’s can be seen by comparing their wrongly accused wives. Hermione is a warm sensual woman who is pregnant and gives birth during the play. There is repeated reference to her children and how they have inherited the features of their parents. Unlike Desdemona, whose saintly chastity is described in terms of cold stone (“monumental alabaster”), by the end of The Winter’s Tale, Hermione, the statue (“dear stone”) in a chapel, comes to life as a wife and mother.

Perdita and Florizel also bring into focus the overspiritual sterility of Desdemona and Othello. The marriage in this “Winter’s Tale,” a play about renewal and regeneration, is at first opposed by a parent on the grounds that the lovers’ differing backgrounds are not compatible. When it becomes clear that their fathers were brought up like brothers, the marriage is welcomed. The insistence on premarital chastity for these passionate young lovers is necessary so that, when they marry, they can inherit the throne and continue their parents’ line. But Perdita’s temporary
home emphasizes for the audience her earthy, fruitful side. E. M. W. Tillyard contrasts her fertility with Iago's destructive power instinct, but we should also compare her with Desdemona, who is also strikingly sterile. Perdita cares for the "ewes" to whom Iago nastily compares Desdemona, and lives gracefully among the animals with whom Othello fears to have anything in common. Desdemona is purer and holier than Perdita, but her purity will not produce another like her. Frank Kermode comments on the conclusion of the play:

At one masterly moment Perdita herself stands like a statue beside the supposed statue of her mother, to remind us that created things work their own perfection and continuance in time, as well as suffer under it. And in the end the play seems to say (I borrow the language of Yeats) that "whatever is begotten, born, and dies" is nobler than "monuments of unaging intellect"—and also, when truly considered, more truly lasting.

Maybe not "nobler," but certainly more appropriate for human beings in human communities. For Othello and Desdemona are tragically noble in that they show how human yearnings for superhuman permanence and spirituality sometimes interfere with human life.

As the chess tableau in The Tempest reveals, Prospero planned to wed Miranda to a husband like her. Unlike Desdemona, Miranda has a Prospero to advise and guide her. In connection with the discussion of Othello above, it is important to note that Prospero, who now has political wisdom, also provides for children to succeed her. While Miranda is as "perfect and so peerless" as Desdemona, her chastity is to be preserved only so that she will be properly fertile within the confines of a social order. Thus, Prospero exclaims, "Heavens rain grace / On that which breeds between 'em!" (III, i, 74). The Juno-Ceres masque is designed to secure the fertility of the couple, "that they may prosperous be / And honored in their issue" (IV, i, 103). This kind of language and theme is strikingly absent from the marriage in Othello.

Caliban's loyalty to his mother is an aberration in this beast-man, who would "people" "this isle with Calibans" (I, ii, 350) by indiscriminate sex or rape. When the young couple and all their kin return to the court at the end of the play, Caliban, appropriately, is left alone on the island. As Othello shows, human coupling in a human community must be neither excessively spiritual nor excessively sensual.

47 All references to The Tempest are to the Signet edition, ed. Robert Langbaum (New York, 1964).
THE LAW OF NATURE
IN THE CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH:
HOBBES' ARGUMENT FOR CIVIL AUTHORITY *

ROBERT C. GRADY II

I

The distinction between civil authority and religious authority has been a source of controversy within the Western political tradition. The final authority of God found in Judaio-Christian teaching, for example, makes conflict between the individual believer and the claims of political authority inevitable. Although arguments for limitations on civil authority identify two legitimate spheres of power, God's and the state's, as in St. Paul's dictum that Christians owe obedience to the state, what is crucial to the notion that one renders to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's is the presupposition that God has ordained the powers that be and thus acquires obedience to Himself by requiring obedience to Caesar: "For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation."1 Within this framework, whatever political action is taken for both rulers and ruled is to be taken ultimately under the standard ordained by God, if not as a direct result of God's command. As far as any final claims on individuals by political authority are concerned, such a distinction identifying two legitimate spheres of power is otiose; the judgment of secular political authority must always be prepared to be supplanted by a judgment which is spiritual.

The dual spheres isolating that which is Caesar's from that which is God's are well established in explications of the Western political tradition.2 That this dualism is problematic, affecting the scope of the political and subordinating civil authority to religious authority, is recognized in

* The author thanks George J. Graham, Jr., and Avery Leiserson, Vanderbilt University, for criticism of an earlier draft of this paper, and the Earhart Foundation for financial support covering part of the research for the paper.

1 Romans 13:1-2. "Render therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honour to whom honour." Romans 13:7.

the concern of political philosophers with Machiavelli’s effort to remove politics from ecclesiastical domination, to free politics from its previous dependence upon religious norms regarding social justice.³ Indeed, since the rationale justifying political authority is characterized by voluntarism, more is involved than simply the separation of equal claimants to authority, one civil and one religious, into different sectors on the same plane. In this “voluntarist” view of authority, political authority receives its legitimacy from a specific source, the consent given by those who “authorize” it. Justice is dependent upon the consent of the individuals affected; authoritative action is taken on the basis of what is perceived to be feasible and necessary to maintain the rationale for authorization or consent. In contrast, proponents of classical political philosophy support the position that political authority is authoritative or legitimate because of the character or justness of its rule.⁴ This involves the possibility of achieving a just political order independent of the claims or criteria established through individual consent but from which individuals cannot withdraw their obligations without rejecting their common humanity. Based on a rationale for seeking the just political order, it is also an attempt to moderate the excesses of justifying authority on consent alone, which might be only a reflection of the composite of habits learned under the conventions of a particular regime, good or bad. As should be apparent in comparing this position with the criterion noted by St. Paul, what is central to the classical position on political authority is the defining characteristic of the Christian position regarding spiritual authority whereby civil authorities and the temporal representatives of God are both ordained by God’s grace.⁵

³ For the identification of the problem as arising through Machiavelli’s attempt to recast the political, see Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1953), ch. 5, pp. 176-80; Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision (Boston, 1960), ch. 7.

⁴ The distinction has been stated aptly by Jouvenel as one between the “source” of the laws and the “content” of the laws. See Bertrand de Jouvenel, Sovereignty, trans. J. F. Huntington (Chicago, 1957), ch. 2, pp. 29-30, 35-36, ch. 6, ch. 11, pp. 190-98, ch. 12, pp. 200ff. (Much of this section draws upon Jouvenel’s analysis.) See also Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (Cleveland, O., 1963), ch. 3, pp. 92-93ff., 104ff., 120-28; Strauss, Natural Right, chs. 3-5; Eric Voegelin, Plato (Baton Rouge, La., 1966), ch. 2; cf. Wolin, Politics and Vision, pp. 307-9.

⁵ Cf. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1134b-55a: “What is just in the political sense can be subdivided into what is just by nature and what is just by convention. What is by nature just has the same force everywhere and does not depend on what we regard or do not regard as just. In what is just by convention, on the other hand, it makes originally no difference whether it is fixed one way or another. . . What is just not by nature but by human enactment is no more the same everywhere than constitutions are. Yet there is only one constitution that is by nature the best everywhere.” See also the distinction between identifying by rational principle what is common and justifying by individual claim what is
From the perspective of the voluntarist view of political authority, the tension found in the separation of the political and the religious occurs precisely because it is possible for the religious world to reinstate its pre-eminence over the political on the basis of the ultimate justness of its standard, as contrasted with the voluntarist institutionalization of a form of rule which can be claimed to be erroneous in the face of natural law (or of revelation). The possibility of reinstating the pre-eminence of religious authority over civil authority involves, in effect, the possibility of challenging the voluntarist view of political authority by that perspective in which assent is the derivative, not the source, of political justice.

Given this picture of the dual spheres and the challenge it raises against voluntarist political authority, it is reasonable to presume that proponents of the voluntarist view would seek to develop a final solution to the tension existing between the two spheres and not merely a settlement recognizing the claims of each as viable and authoritative within their respective realms. To be effective, this solution would go beyond a mere separation and arrive at, indeed, come full circle to, the subordination of religious authority to political authority. This approach is possible only upon demonstrating why the status and meaning of God's Law of Nature must be conditional upon political necessity, the authoritative action for which is justified through individual consent. By construing religious authority as conditional upon the limitations imposed by a voluntarist political authority, spiritual claims cannot be used to threaten the validity of political authority as long as it can claim the final standard (which is not the same, e.g., as divine sanction) for its actions. The problem for advocates of the supremacy of political authority is to identify why political authority is valid as against spiritual authority.

The certification of the validity of voluntarist political authority is established by Thomas Hobbes, who proceeds not merely by attacking ecclesiastical authority as an irrelevant claimant for external standards but by rejecting monarchical divine right arguments, which merely reinforce at the highest political level the antagonism between temporal and

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6 From the standpoint of political necessity, it is crucial to subordinate church to state; indeed, whoever appoints religious authorities controls them. See Plamenatz, *Man and Society*, pp. 54-56, 58-60, 61-62, 77-88, esp. pp. 78, 82-83. More than this is apparent, however; whoever determines what is and what is not seditious determines the actual role of religion in that society. Hobbes' recognition of the first point is identified in the next footnote; his application of both points is spelled out in sections III-VI of this paper.
spiritual standards.\(^7\) While Hobbes does make an overt appeal to religious standards—the divine law of God—in order to consolidate the rule of his civil sovereign, and while this appeal is crucial for relatively new interpretations of Hobbes, this paper shows that the appeal is symbolic only. In effect, Hobbes makes God's Law of Nature merely political—a law with "higher law" appeal, useful in generating popular consensus, but a law grounded in political necessity. Nevertheless, although Hobbes' explication of the law of nature is consistent with voluntarist political authority, the position of Hobbes implies that the sovereign must do more than merely establish his legitimacy.

II

The voluntarism of Hobbes (the covenant and authorization of sovereignty) alongside his "Christian Commonwealth" have left him open to diverse interpretations. Although he has been labeled as the first theorist to suggest the possibility of a politics founded upon atheism, a view not inconsistent with his voluntarism, he also has been interpreted as presenting a viable argument for a Christian politics based upon the moral law of nature.\(^8\) This last position deserves brief attention.

Relatively recent and innovative interpretations of Hobbes have him presenting a moral argument for the Christian Commonwealth, a position juxtaposed to more traditional views of Hobbes presenting a secular theory of politics based on his scientific determinism or egoistic psychology.\(^9\) The first of these new interpretations involves the claim that there


\(^9\) Many disputes exist over the status of Hobbes' politics and its relationship to a mechanistic cosmology, an observationally derived egoistic psychology, and a moral law of nature. See W. H. Greenleaf, "Hobbes: The Problem of Interpretation," in Hobbes and Rousseau, ed. Maurice Cranston and Richard S. Peters (Garden City, N.Y., 1972), pp. 5-36, for a classification of interpretations into three types: the "traditional case," the "natural-law case," and the "individualist case." Within this schema, the traditional and the individualist interpretations can
is a dichotomy between Hobbes the moralist and Hobbes the scientific philosopher, and that his political doctrine is a moral doctrine of reciprocity resting upon a strict deontology. A variation of this is the claim that, notwithstanding Hobbes' inconsistencies, a more logically coherent interpretation can be taken from his text when one reads the state of nature as a condition in which the necessary validating conditions of sufficient security for keeping morally obligatory covenants are absent. The upshot of these interpretations is that man in the state of nature lives under moral duties as ascribed by God, that the covenant establishing the sovereign follows the recognition of these duties, and that the role of the sovereign in the Christian Commonwealth is defined by God's Law of Nature, to which the sovereign is responsible. Although unorthodox in comparison with the traditional readings, these new interpretations have the effect of placing Hobbes directly in the center of the Christian natural law tradition as against the tradition of positive jurisprudence.

In defense of the traditional interpretations, it does not suffice simply to note the negative response as the "devil of Malmesbury" that Hobbes received from many of his contemporaries: evidence exists that he was indeed well received by many others sharing his perspective. Nor can the argument prevail that this new position does not stand historically, i.e., that, given the context within which Hobbes wrote and his intentions, one can do away with the problem of the meaning of God within Hobbes' text, and give the status of God a "logically coherent" interpretation. With regard to the last point, secondary analyses have justified...
the proposition that the Christian politics thesis does indeed fail to square with the body of Hobbes' text. Others have argued that it cannot be supported by the analytic framework encompassing his works. Hobbes' account of the Christian Commonwealth must stand, then, merely as a polemic designed to weaken the criticisms by his contemporaries who advocated a Christian politics or, to take a more severe view, to subvert Christian politics while using its own terms. Moreover, claims that a more coherent ethical doctrine can be rendered from within Hobbes' egoistic or mechanistic facade and claims that Hobbes is not less incoherent and inconsistent than Locke seem incredible; these interpretations are highly implausible when read in the context of the Hobbes who is one of political philosophy's great systematizers and who takes great care to follow the distinctions he develops between absurdity and mere error. Yet these interpretations do force attention upon the role of God in the Christian Commonwealth, a question which occupies, for example, nearly one-half of Leviathan. In contrasting this with Hobbes' account of the voluntarist origin of political authority, it cannot plausibly be assumed that he is being merely paradoxical and ironic.

III

Whether Hobbes justifies and establishes the political order on the basis of God's Law of Nature or whether he justifies and establishes it through the voluntarist creation of the sovereign based on man's subjective estimate of what is to be gained or lost with or without order can only be ascertained on the basis of his explication of the state of nature. Even if the Law of Nature as God's law is inoperative in the state of nature, however, it would still be possible to assert that God's law does operate within the political order justified by the voluntarist authorization of the sovereign. Thus it would be necessary to examine his explication of the Law of Nature as it would appear to operate


16 Hobbes, Leviathan, IV (19-25), V (27-30), VII (40-41), VIII (51-52); Elements, i, IV, 10-11, V, 10-14, XIII, 3, 9; also Civic, II, n. 1, XVIII, 4. Hereafter, references to the Hobbes texts omit the author's name; references to the chapters in Civic omitted in the Lamprecht edition (chs. 4, 11, 16-17) are to the Molesworth edition of The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, II.
within the Commonwealth. The first problem is examined in the present section; the second, in the two following sections.

Certainly the state of nature is the hypothetical limiting condition wherein an account can be made of man as he would live and act toward his claims and his duties when stripped of the artificial constraints of positive civil law. And here man's relationship to moral duty and to God exists, at most, in an unrecognized and unrecognizable state, and his relationship to other persons, at best, in a suspended state. Although he can recognize the Law of Nature in foro interno, it is unrecognized in practice or in foro externo. For the Law of Nature as it operates in foro interno is "improperly" called "law": it is a conclusion or theorem concerning preservation and not a dictate of one who commands by right. The Law of Nature is not "law proper" until it is "the speech of him who by right commands somewhat to others to be done or omitted."\[^7\] More important, however, is the proposition that the Law of Nature itself is not independent in origin from the Right of Nature but, indeed, a necessary consequence of the Right of Nature. While virtue and justice within the political order consist in obeying the law, in the state of nature "the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have no place... Force, and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues." Moreover, one's "duty" in foro interno consists in maximizing one's claim, as far as is compatible with one's own felicity, to the Right of Nature, the "right to every thing."\[^18\] Man recognizes the necessity of making the Law of Nature operational in foro externo because the consequence of maximizing his claims, the state of war, also affects the rationale behind his claims: "The passions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them."\[^19\] Peace is ensured only where it is

\[^7\] Cive, III, 33. Also ibid., III, 27-28, VI, 4, XIV, 1, 6-8; Leviathan, XV (103-5), XVII (109), XXVI (172); Elements, i, XVII, 10, ii, I, 6, X, 4. On laws of nature in foro interno as theorems and aphorisms dictated by reason for the pursuit of success (felicity), see Leviathan, V (29-30), XV (104-5).

\[^18\] Ibid., XIII (83-84), XIV (84-86), for the respective quotations; XV (104); Cive, I, 7-10, 14-15, II, 1-2, III, 27n., 29, V, 1, XIV, 3, 14; Elements, i, XIV, 6-10, 13-14, XV, 1, XVII, 10-11, 14, XIX, 1-2. On virtue and justice in the context of society, see Leviathan, IV (20), XXVI (174), XXVII-XXVIII; Cive, XIV; and cf. Leviathan, XV (104-5), Cive, III, 31, and Elements, i, XVII, 14-15, with Leviathan, XV (93-98), Cive, III, 1-6, and Elements, i, XVI, 1-5. On felicity as maximizing human activity, see Leviathan, VI (39), VIII (46), XI (63); Elements, i, VII, 7, XIV, 12; Cive, I, 13.

\[^19\] Leviathan, XIII (84). Also ibid., XI; Cive, I, esp. 2-3; Elements, i, XIV, esp. 2-5. Note that this does not have Hobbes limit the rationale for society to the fear of violent or untimely death, as has been well established (see Strauss, Natural Right, pp. 180-81, 184-88, and Political Philosophy of Hobbes, pp. 15-29, 56-58, 66-67, 98-107, 113-28, 155, n. 2; Oakeshott, Leviathan, pp. xxx-xxxiv et passim). That is, it is plausible that the explicit motivations of different men may
maintained by some force which rests upon the right of command. With these reasons established through the state of nature construct, Hobbes can demonstrate why political order can be justified upon voluntary action. Political authority exists because man creates it to fill the vacuum of interpersonal duty existing in the state of nature. It is justified not through the recognition of natural duty but because of the “known natural inclinations of mankind,” i.e., his passions.

Hobbes' analysis of the institution of sovereignty through the process of authorization follows the establishment of this rationale. Although significant in itself and crucial to an understanding of representation, it is not germane to this context because it is only necessary to identify, within the rationale for his thesis that political authority is created by consent, the point that such consent does not derive from natural duty.

differ according to the context. What is crucial is that all of these are based on passion. Nevertheless, the proposition that the fear of death is the ultimate motivation is implicit. For if the essence of man is felicity, and if the operative right to all things involves the potential denial of felicity, the conclusion follows in terms of the extreme case. In this regard it is important to recognize that Hobbes indeed is utilizing the extreme case. This is the function of his state of nature construct. Moreover, the fear of death motivation explains much as regards his social context because the role of an absolute, self-perpetuating (artificially eternal) sovereign would be unnecessary if only questions of "more or less" felicity and not the denial of felicity were concerned.

20 Leviathan, rev. and concl. (465-66); also Cive, preface to the reader (11), III, 29. Cf. Leviathan, introduction (6); Elements, i, V, 14; cf. Cive, epistle dedicatory (2).

21 Hobbes' recognition that most sovereigns are established by conquest or acquisition and not by institution (Leviathan, XX [129-30, 132-33]; cf. XX [136]) underscores the proposition that his explanations of the state of nature and of authorization indicate not how “most men” are justified in giving obedience to the sovereign but why all men can justifiably obey. This is an important point because if sovereignty were justified on grounds other than man's "natural inclinations," e.g., on the basis of duty to God's Law of Nature, then individuals could establish reasons for disobeying the sovereign (e.g., an infidel monarch) other than his failure to secure them from the state of war. On the sovereign's failure to preclude the state of war as the only rationale for disobedience, see ibid., XXI (144-45), XXVIII (207-8), XXIX, XXX (219-20); Cive, VII, 18, XII, XIII, 2; Elements, ii, VIII, IX, 1. Actually, it is not a question of disobedience but a question of acting within the bounds of the state of nature because the sovereign's failure to avoid the state of war indicates his forfeiture of sovereignty, i.e., his failure as sovereign. (The other possible exception is the right to resist the death penalty, but this presupposes the subject's prior invalidation of the covenant whereupon he reinstates the state of war with the sovereign; see Leviathan, XIV [91-92], XXI [139, 142-43], XXVIII [205, 208]; Cive, VI, 13, VII, 14, XIV, 21-22.) Hobbes' point that tyranny is sovereignty "misliked" (Leviathan, XIX [121], rev. and concl. [463]; Cive, VII, 2-4; cf. Leviathan, XXIX [214], XLVI [447]; Cive, XII, 3; Elements, ii, VIII, 4, 10) would be not only inconsistent but irrelevant.
The crucial question remains: given Hobbes' sovereign, what is the role of God and thus of duty under His Law of Nature when the sufficient condition for peace (i.e., for the cessation of the state of war) is established?

IV

The preceding examination of Hobbes' explication of the state of nature stands or falls upon the premise that the state of nature does serve as the rationale for the existence of the political order. If we follow this direction in analyzing Hobbes' position, it is clear that the state of nature is not an account of man's obligation to be sociable. Much less is it an account of the ethical rules man would live under were he stripped of positive law; i.e., it is not an account of how moral duty operates in the hypothetical limiting condition of the state of nature, within which one can imagine how man would act if freed of mere conventional restraints. But however accurate this assessment might be, is it not possible that Hobbes' account of the state of nature is an account of how man will live if he fails to recognize God's law? That is, is it not plausible to read Hobbes' account of God's rule in the social context as an account of the ethical or God-given moral obligation which exists once certain minimal needs are met and once the operation of drives which are primarily animal have been contained? If so, this would still allow one to speak of God's law in a context in which certain validating conditions are met, and to point to the potential results of failing to meet these conditions—basically the position of Warrender. In effect, one should read Hobbes' account of the political order, the Christian Commonwealth, before one reads his state of nature account because the first will explain the meaning of the state of nature.

Whether this proposition is correct depends indeed on the role Hobbes assigns God and His Law of Nature in the context of the established Commonwealth. For if Hobbes' account of God and of His Law of Nature within the Commonwealth is consistent with his state of nature explication as previously outlined, then the assumption that the state of nature supplies the rationale for the political order is correct. The contention here is that Hobbes establishes the civil supremacy of the sovereign by making an overt but purely symbolic appeal to God's power. Using this appeal, Hobbes can consolidate a political order which is designed to protect claimed natural rights (i.e., to avert untimely death, which would preclude these natural rights) and which is justified.

through consent made possible by man's "known natural inclinations." To support this contention, it is necessary to establish the meaning of the Law of Nature, i.e., of God's law, within the context of an artificially created political organization, and to draw out the implications of a voluntarist justificatory argument for political authority which utilizes the notion of a law of nature.

Hobbes divides law proper or law as command into two categories, natural or divine and positive or human. The first is recognized by reason and is purported to be the creation and command of God. The second is man-made, specified in a given context and dependent on deductions from the first. How law proper, as it operates in foro externo, can be instituted depends upon identifying the eternal cause and His power. How it functions depends on who, in the final analysis, holds "the true doctrine of the laws of nature, . . . the true moral philosophy."22

It can justifiably be asserted that the account of man's discovery of God and the rationale provided for God's role represent the logical culmination of Hobbes' account of political reasoning or theorizing. Theoretical or philosophical knowledge of politics is necessary to produce the conclusions or theorems of the Law of Nature. By philosophy Hobbes means "the knowledge acquired by reasoning, from the manner of the generation of any thing, to the properties: or from the properties, to some possible way of generation of the same; to the end to be able to produce, as far as matter, and human force permit, such effects, as human life requireth."23 The significance of reason lies in the universality of its application and the eternal truth of its results. Although meanings are contextually determined, the method of reasoning remains the same; and the results are true, immutable, and eternal. Thus though particular aims and causes of reason change, the validity of the results does not; only the applications vary with the context—for example, as civil laws vary with time and place. Since the meanings of things are designated or "signified," truth has to do not with something in itself but with the use and consequences of speech, i.e., with the proper application of method. False inferences are not merely erroneous but absurd, senseless. Properly applied, reasoning develops general conclusions or rules which function as theorems or aphorisms. The test for truth lies in the results of a prediction, based on the conclusion, or of an application of the rules.24

22 Leviathan, XV (104). Also ibid., XXVI (172, 174, 186-88); Cive, III, 31-32, IV, VI, 9, XIV, 4-10, 14; Elements, i, XVII, 14-15, XVIII, ii, I, 10, X, 6-8.
23 Leviathan, XLVI (435, emphasis removed from original). See ibid., V (25-27, 29-30), VII (40), VIII (esp. 42ff. and 46), IX (53); Elements, i, V, 8-12, VI, 1-4. X, esp. 4; also Cive, II, n. 1. Reason is distinct from prudence, which is conjecture based on experience, a capacity men have in common with animals. See Leviathan, III (15-16), V (30), VIII (45), IX (53), XLVI (435-36); Elements, i, IV, 5-11, esp. 10.
24 See Leviathan, II (13), III (13-15), IV (19-24), V (25-30), VII (40), VIII
Yet reasoning would not be possible without curiosity, from which all philosophy originates through man's "desire to know why, and how, ... such as is in no living creature but man: so that man is distinguished not only by his reason, but also by this singular passion from other animals; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of sense, by predominance, take away the care of knowing causes." The desire to know spurs man's reasoning; the desire for continual success, or felicity, directs reason to identify whatever can secure success. Only through reasoning can one understand the Law of Nature, the dictate of reason based on knowledge of the "known natural inclinations of mankind," as the condition necessary for peace. And only through reasoning can one infer that the authorization of the sovereign produces the sufficient condition for peace. Since right reason alone can identify causes for known effects and produce predicted effects without error—i.e., since the proper application of the philosophical or scientific method is the key to success, to the secure life of the Commonwealth as against the tentative life of the state of nature—the identification through reason of the existence and status of nature's cause and benefactor is the final expression of Hobbes' position. Indeed the proposition, noted earlier, that to many of his contemporaries his conclusions could only be ironic at best and blasphemous at worst underscores just how far-reaching and pervasive are his intentions and his success.

It is through the identification of God as prime mover that the full significance of reason is indicated. Here Hobbes identifies the "kingdom of God by nature" as it is realized through reason. The origin of religion and the profession that God exists arise from man's curiosity about causes and his fear and ignorance of the unknown. The desire to know allows one to conclude that if there are causes of other causes there is ultimately a first cause. The first cause, as creator of all causes, must be infinite and eternal. As such, God is the creator and commander of the Law of Nature. And since He is the infinite and eternal cause of all causes, He must be omnipotent. In the face of His omnipotence

(51-52), IX, also XV (103-4), XLVI (435-36); Elements, i, IV, 2, V, 5-6, 8-14, VI, 1-4, XIII, 2-3, 9. Also i, XVII, 11, and Cive, epistle dedicatory (5-6), preface to the reader (16-17), II, n. 1, III, 27-29, XVIII, 4.

26 Leviathan, VI (35). See ibid., introduction (6), III (14-15), VIII (46), also XII (69), XLVI (436); Elements, i, IV, 4-5, IX, 18, X.

20 See Leviathan, VI (39), VIII (46), XI (63); Elements, i, VII, 7.

27 Leviathan, III (17), IV (18), VI (35), XI (68-69), XII (69-73ff.), XXXI, rev. and concl. (465); Cive, XV; Elements, i, XI, 2. Cf. Oakeshott, Leviathan, pp. xx-xxi, xxvii, n. 1. In Cive, Hobbes argues that, although knowledge of God's existence is a product of reason, atheism is an error punishable "immediately by God . . . or by kings constituted under God" and not an injustice punishable by a civil sovereign per se: Cive, XIV, 19 and n. In the context of Leviathan and Elements, atheism is not error, a product of prudence, but absurdity, a result of fallacious reasoning (see nn. 16 and 23). But in either context, and under either
man is obliged or bound to God as He dictates the Law of Nature. Unable to resist, man is the property of God:

The right of nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those that break his laws, is to be derived, not from his creating them, as if he required obedience as of gratitude for his benefits; but from his *irresistible power*. . . . *(T)o show how [this] right may arise from nature, requires no more, but to show in what case it is never taken away. . . . To those therefore whose power is irresistible, the dominion [right of possession] of all men adhereth naturally by their excellence of power; and consequently it is from that power, that the kingdom over men, and the right of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth naturally to God almighty; not as Creator, and gracious; but as omnipotent.28

But additionally Hobbes presents the "kingdom of God by prophecy," which is God's civil sovereignty over a specific people, Christians and Jews. God reveals to his prophets a body of doctrine upon which the people covenant, through these mediators with God, for their security and governance. The covenant grants God supreme power, and the people become his property by right of civil omnipotence exercised through the civil sovereign who authorizes the ministers and the teachings of God's word.29 Although Hobbes is a professing Christian, he recogni-
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izes religion as an anthropological phenomenon. He realizes the political uses of religion and fears its misuse at the hands of "vain philosophers."

Whether the kingdom of God by prophecy represents an attempt to employ a recognizable body of doctrine (the scriptures) in behalf of his doctrine, whether this is an attempt to legitimate his doctrine in the eyes of Christians or to discredit the Christian doctrines of others, are questions regarding Hobbes' polemical intent which are beyond the scope of this essay. What is important is that the effect of this kingdom appears to be the same as the effect of the kingdom of God by nature, insofar as the subject and the sovereign are concerned. In short, the Law of Nature as law proper can be construed as originating through two sources, immediately from God and mediated through His prophets, but politically speaking it comes to the same thing, the sovereignty of omnipotent God over all men. Hobbes' argument at this point, then, is not either theory or polemic. It is both. As polemic, it justifies the supremacy of the civil sovereign over the earthly church and the supremacy of God over both. As theory, it represents a logical extension of the method of reasoning. But Hobbes' argument goes further and allows him to make divine law at once supreme and merely political, an assertion which requires further justification and elaboration.

ii, VI-VII. Note that sovereignty by covenant becomes sovereignty by right of possession or power ("dominion"), which is the same right as that in the kingdom of God by nature. This is identical to civil sovereignty because the authorization of the artificial sovereign leaves him free to act in his natural capacity, i.e., to act on his natural right to exercise power. See Leviathan, XVI (106), XVII (112), XVIII (118-20), XIX (esp. 122-23, 125-29), XX (esp. 129-33), XXI (140, 142), XXVIII (202-3); also cf. Cive, V, 9, 11, VI, 6-7, 13-14, 18, 20, X, 18; Elements, i, XIX, 10, ii, I, 13-19.

30 Leviathan, epistle dedicatory (2), I (8), II (12-13), IV (18, 21-22), VIII (51-52), XI (69), XII (73, 77-80), XXXVI (282-85), XLIII (396), iv, XLIV-XLVII; vide XLIV (397). Indeed Hobbes' fears override civil disorder or anarchy as his chief concern, for he finds vain philosophy and its absurd reasoning to be the ultimate cause of civil disorder.

31 Cf. Lamprecht, Cive, pp. xviii-xix; Tönies, Elements, pp. x-xi. Although his sovereign is directly under God, Hobbes is not arguing the divine right of kings. That is compatible with a supreme church and a divinely ordained sovereign; Hobbes' sovereign is the interpreter of revelations, not their recipient. He is well aware of the negative reception of his doctrine: Leviathan, epistle dedicatory (2); Cive, preface to the reader (17).


To avoid both these rocks [of offending the Divine Majesty and transgressing the commandments of the commonwealth], it is necessary to know what are the laws divine. And seeing knowledge of all law, dependeth on the knowledge of
In principle, the kingdom of God by nature is inclusive of the kingdom of God by prophecy, of which there may be as many as there are prophets, so that it would appear that there are only two categories where individual obligation to God and to civil sovereignty are problematic: in the natural kingdom, a Christian subject living under an infidel sovereign; in the prophetic kingdom, a Christian state (and sovereign) with some infidel subjects in it. Yet these cases are not limiting. The relationship between Christian subjects and sovereign in a Christian state is indeed most problematic if in principle (not to mention, if in fact) the natural kingdom is inclusive of the prophetic kingdom. In effect, by the logic of Hobbes' argument the obligatory character of both kingdoms would appear to be unified under the standard for obligation in the natural kingdom, and this obligation would appear to be reduced to a matter contingent upon individual judgment or individual conscience, which anyone can employ to understand the dictates of God's "natural" Law of Nature. Although individual conscience, if based on right reason and not absurd reasoning, requires following the dictates of God's Law of Nature, the apparent unification of the obligatory character of both kingdoms would result in a dichotomy between the doctrine of the sovereign and the opinion of the subject with respect to the prophetic kingdom that is vouched for by the sovereign. For if individual conscience is the criterion for obligation, individuals may claim to pre-empt sovereign judgment regarding civil affairs and religious teachings in this kingdom. Barring further qualification, Hobbes would appear to be accepting the traditional dualism, and the inherent tension therein, between church and state. But he is not. For Hobbes, the disorderly potential of this dichotomy can be solved only by establishing the supremacy of the civil sovereign with respect to both subjects and the "true moral philosophy" or doctrine of God. Hobbes does this in two steps. He raises the question of what conditions are necessary for salvation, the rationale behind the use of individual conscience, as the question which does produce the dichotomy but which also supports belief in the doctrine of God. He then answers his question by arguing that only the sovereign can vouch for the conditions for salvation contained in the true moral philosophy.

The unification of the obligations in the kingdoms is a consequence of asking what is necessary for salvation in the kingdom of God, and

the sovereign power, I shall say something in that which followeth, of the KINGDOM OF GOD.

To avoid both these rocks, it is necessary to know the divine laws. Now because the knowledge of the laws depends on the knowledge of the [natural] kingdom, we must in what follows speak somewhat concerning the kingdom of God.
of comparing the requirements of each kingdom as described in the preceding section. For salvation, it is necessary to obey the civil law and believe in Christ. Obedience to civil law is a part of the natural kingdom because the civil law contains God's Law of Nature. Both obedience to law and belief in Christ are a part of the prophetic kingdom because Christ is ordained by prophecy and commands obedience to the civil sovereign. In a state in which the sovereign is an infidel and the subject is Christian, the subject must obey the law and maintain his belief internally. The subject thus exists in the natural kingdom. In a Christian state, the Christian subject must obey the law and profess his belief in accord with the doctrine of the sovereign. He is in the prophetic kingdom.\textsuperscript{38}

In the natural kingdom, it is unlikely that an infidel sovereign will punish a Christian subject for his belief. Likewise, in the prophetic kingdom, a Christian sovereign is to refrain from punishing an infidel subject who is in error but is not subversive because he obeys the law.\textsuperscript{34} But toward a Christian subject, a Christian sovereign may appear to err with respect to God's Law. Though a Christian subject may obey and openly profess belief according to the sovereign's dictate, in conscience he instead follows his own internal belief about God and His words concerning His son. He may therefore follow his belief concerning the legitimacy of the civil laws: "if the command be such as cannot be obeyed without being damned to eternal death; then it were madness to obey it, and the council of our Saviour takes place... Fear not those that kill the body, but cannot kill the soul."\textsuperscript{38} Within the context of the prophetic kingdom, then, the existence of this condition represents action by the subject based on the kingdom of God by nature. The important point is that the subject obeys his conscience. If he obeys the sovereign in the prophetic kingdom, he obeys not because of the sovereign's dictate but because of the dictate of his conscience, which is grounded in the natural kingdom. In effect, while the prophetic kingdom, the teachings for which are authorized by the sovereign, is overtly consistent with the natural kingdom of God, in actuality it is subsumed under the natural kingdom insofar as the subject's criteria for his civil actions are concerned. There is a relationship only of coincidence between the conscience of the individual and the sovereign's legal supremacy and between the individual's opinions and the sovereign's doctrine concerning belief in Christ. Were these relationships allowed to persist, a pandora's box would be opened for the authority of the sovereign with regard to enforcing the civil obligations of the subject. Either all sovereigns and all subjects must be Christians.

\textsuperscript{33} Leviathan, XXXI (233), XLII (327-28), XLIII (384-95), XLVI (448); Cive, XVIII, 1-11; Elements, ii, VI, 5-14.

\textsuperscript{34} Leviathan, XXXVII (291), XLII (327-28), XLIII (394-95); Cive, XVIII, 13 et seq., XV, 18; Elements, ii, VI, 5 et seq.

\textsuperscript{35} Leviathan, XLIII (384); also Cive, XVIII, I. Cf. Leviathan, XXII (149) and XLV (427-28).
under God—in which case the subject's political obligation would be accidental or coincidental but not necessary—or something must be introduced to create a specifically political obligation applicable to all typologies of sovereign-subject relationships.

If the unification of the obligatory character of the kingdoms goes unrecognized, if individual responsibility to God is not reconciled with the civil sovereign's supremacy over the individual, and if the opinions of the former are not correlated with the doctrine of the latter, Hobbes' profession of faith, on the one hand, and his doctrine of civil supremacy, on the other, appear at least silly and muddled, if not inconsistent and contradictory. The consistency of the hypothesized causal relationships at the heart of Hobbes' category of reason, which is fundamental to his construction of the Commonwealth, is therefore for naught. The resolution of these dichotomies leads one to believe that Hobbes' theory is not so much Christian as it is political and consequently, for Christians of his day, a polemic, but for serious readers of his text it is the extension of his category of reasoning to its logical limits.

To establish a political authority applicable in all contexts in which the civil sovereign is the sufficient condition for peace, Hobbes introduces a way to unify the obligations of the kingdoms. It is best described as a response to the problem of salvation. Based on the description of both kingdoms, where both sovereign and subjects are Christian it is a requirement of the combined kingdoms that the individual obey the sovereign both in law and in religious doctrine concerning beliefs. The sovereign under God is the supreme interpreter of God's doctrine and of what worship is given God. He is the supreme interpreter by virtue of God's infinitude in the natural kingdom and of His revelation to prophets in the prophetic kingdom. Since mere men neither understand infinity nor receive direct revelation, they would appear to be obliged to follow the requirement of the kingdoms. There is to be a unity, following God's command as interpreted by the sovereign, between the individual's beliefs and opinions and the sovereign's legal and doctrinal supremacy. As long as this unity stands, there is no uncertainty as to whether there will be peace. Thus God appears as the all-sufficient reason for peace. But God as such is not; even in His omnipotence He chooses not to exercise His

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86 Ibid., III (17), VII (41-42), XI (68-69), XII (69-71), XV (96), XVIII (114), XXI (134-35), XXVI (180, 186-88), XXIX (211-12), XXX (221), XXXI (235-41), XXXIII (242-43), XXXIII (246-47ff., 254-55), XXXVI (283-85), XXXVII (290-91), XXXIX (305-6), XL-XLI (esp. 339, 360), XLIII (385-86, 393-95), XLV (424-25), cf. XVI (106-7), XXXVI (272-75); Cive, VI, 11n., XI, XII, 2, XIV, 19, XV, 8-18, XVI, XVII, esp. 10-28, XVIII, esp. 1-4, 13-14; Elements, i, XI, 2-12, ii, VI, esp. 10-14, VII, esp. 10-11. The necessity of a judge for competing doctrines follows also from the account of the state of nature: see Leviathan, V (26), and the first citations in n. 17.
power to enforce His Law of Nature, for He also promises eternal life in return for obedience, worship, and belief. As soon as the question of eternal salvation arises, if there are any infidels involved or if the sovereign errs, the unity is destroyed or is preserved only by coincidence, for man is to "fear not those that kill the body, but cannot kill the soul." Contrary to conclusions appropriate to the state of nature rationale, damnation, not untimely death, must be the *summum malum* as matters stand. It is in response to this that Hobbes offers his solution: *eternal salvation is nothing more, but nothing less, than felicity, that is, the felicity of this life*. To be specific, there is no "eternal" life, for that was lost with Original Sin. There is only hope of felicity—"to be saved from all the evil and calamities that sin hath brought upon us." Only upon the Second Coming of Christ will there be something more than felicity; and then the sovereign will be irrelevant, displaced by Christ. Eternal salvation upon the Second Coming is therefore the *summum bonum*. But *until that time the sovereign is the sole and all-sufficient requisite capable of enforcing the Law of Nature to produce the conditions for peace. And in the interim, i.e., the present, men do know how to attain felicity, for the Law of Nature has a general rule knowable by all which makes it easy to keep: "Do not that to another, which thou wouldst not have done to thyself." The negative warning of this rule contrasts with the positive norm in the New Testament wording of the Golden Rule. It is not strange in this context that Hobbes should refer to the "positive" Golden Rule merely as the "words of our Saviour," who has not yet returned; the negative rule is "the indubitable everlasting law of God," that is, the rule vouched for by the sovereign. The "divine law" is supreme, but supreme because it is merely political.

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87 Hobbes says that God actually does not have power sufficient to enforce His law because the understanding of infinitude and the receiving of direct revelation are beyond mere men. Only the civil sovereign can enforce the Law of Nature because he is God's earthly representative. Hobbes therefore says, in effect, that omnipotent God is not omnipotent, although if eternal salvation involves more than earthly felicity God has no reason to exercise His omnipotence on earth. This implies that Hobbes is not quite serious about God. See the next footnote for citations underscoring this proposition in the text and n. 40 for the status of Hobbes' intent.

88 For the quotation, see *Leviathan*, XXXVIII (300), and cf. XXXV (266-67). On the problem of God's "failure" to exercise His omnipotence and Hobbes' response, see *ibid.*, XV (96), XXXVIII (291-96, 300-304), XLII (327-28), XLI (passim, esp. 384-85, 394-95), XLIV (404-5, 409-12); *I dear*, XIII, 5, XV, 18, XVIII passim, esp. 1, 13-14. Cf. *Elements*, ii, VI, 5 et seq., with ii, IX, 2.

89 *Leviathan*, XV (103).

40 *ibid.*, XLII (328). Either Hobbes uses the Second Coming as a ruse and a canard, and the sovereign de facto pre-empts God and religious salvation, or there is a strong implication that the felicity of this life is always problematic, perhaps wretched. On the status in Hobbes' text of the Second Coming, see *ibid.*, XXXVIII (295-96, 301-3), XLI (319-20).
VI

The distinction between God's two kingdoms appears initially to be a concession to the proposition that subjects can individually determine what is necessary to fulfill their duties to God, irrespective of civil dictate. Indeed, by going further and unifying the obligations of the two kingdoms without qualification, Hobbes would appear to suggest the possibility that the civil sovereign is in the same position as his subjects, as both must give the derivatives of their faith in God precedence over matters of civil concern. But precisely this maneuver allows him to present the qualification which precludes the use of individual conscience to determine whether duty is owed God or the civil sovereign.

By identifying eternal salvation as earthly felicity, subjects can understand that the criteria of the natural kingdom are contained in the conditions for peace and order necessary to political salvation as stated in the public doctrine of the prophetic kingdom. Since the "true moral philosophy" is the doctrine of salvation, i.e., of felicity, and since mere men cannot understand God's infinitude or receive direct revelation, the sovereign stands as the supreme interpreter of God's will. Under God's Law of Nature he must ensure felicity and thereby command worship and doctrinal belief. Although obedience is an intersubjective category and belief is essentially an internal category, related to the conscience, the extent to which one obeys reflects the direction of his belief. With respect to subjects, the major problem the sovereign faces is how to maximize civil obedience, since without obedience subjects reinstate the state of war between themselves and their sovereign. The extent of civil obedience corresponds with the extent to which there is belief in God's doctrine. Meeting the felicitous expectations of the believers should provide the conditions for and support belief, so that the sovereign can maximize obedience when the moral doctrine taught corresponds with the assurance that felicity can be attained.41 The worship and belief attendant upon the felicity of this life produce the support or consensus necessary for achieving the aims of the Law of Nature, peace vouchcd for by the sovereign.

This guarantee that the Law of Nature can be enforced is possible only as long as its sufficient condition can be met. As the sufficient condition for peace, the sovereign maintains peace as the supreme interpreter of the Law of Nature. Men living in the state of nature have conflict because there is no final arbiter among the conflicting claims which each one adduces as necessary to his survival. With a Commonwealth, the sovereign alone finds this condition only in international relations where God's Law of Nature is unenforceable and sovereigns face each other in the "posture of gladiators."42 Thus if reasoning can

41 Cf. ibid., XXX; Cive, XIII; Elements, ii, IX.
42 See Leviathan, V (26), on the incumbent conflict in the absence of a final judge, a proposition operating both in the state of nature and in society under
produce certain rules necessary for peace, nothing the sovereign's reason dictates can be contrary to this end. The sovereign's will is God's will; and since God does not choose to exercise His power, the sovereign is omnipotent not only in matters of civil obedience but also in matters of divine will.

On this point, the implication of Hobbes' analysis is that the sufficient condition for peace can exist in a variety of contexts and under a variety of "gods." In addition, a paradox Hobbes presents is now clarified. Although at one point he labels atheism absurdity, a product of fallacious reasoning, and innocuous, he declares elsewhere that "they therefore that believe there is a God that governeth the world, and hath given precepts, and propounded rewards, and punishments to mankind, are God's subjects; all the rest, are to be understood as enemies." Since the sovereign's will is God's will, non-believers are not simply God's enemies; they are the sovereign's enemies. The appeal to the divine has the utility not only of legitimizing the sovereign's actions to his obedient subjects but also of providing him with a peaceful means of placating dissidents without threatening their security. Those who proceed beyond dissent and fallaciously reason contrary to the sufficient condition for peace become punishable, and necessarily so, according to reason. For if the sovereign does ensure the conditions for felicity, men who disobey act contrary to their own interests as men. Disobedience resulting from fallacious reasoning requires punishment, as the punishment of the wicked is required.44 The

the Law of Nature (see above, n. 17). On the relations between sovereigns in international relations, see Leviathan, XIII (83); Cive, epistle dedicatory (1-2). If God were omnipotent and irresistible and if sovereigns were to obey His Law of Nature, the validating conditions necessary to recognize the moral duty of the Law of Nature in foro externo would be present in the international order; i.e., disparate sovereigns would utilize right reason and come to common conclusions necessary to the development of an international consensus. But the conclusions of reasoning and the duties of the Law of Nature are no more common and binding than they are for men as men in the state of nature.

43 Leviathan, XXXI (233). On atheism as innocuous error but error as no excuse, see the citations in n. 27.

44 Leviathan, VIII (47), XXVII (190-97); Cive, XIII, 3, XIV, 16-23; Elements, i, XV, 10. Fallacious reasoning in this respect, the denial of felicity, can only be referred to as "madness." See Leviathan, VIII (47-48). Although the sovereign's action is based on his interpretation of the Law of Nature, if he does err through absurd or fallacious reasoning he can always reject the claims of dissidents and disobedients on the grounds that they gave him his authority, that his actions are their actions, and that they are therefore to blame. This, however, is a proposition for the question of representation and is beyond the present context. See ibid., XVI (106-80), XVIII (113-14), XXI (141-43), XXIV (162), XXVI (173), XXVII (197); Cive, III, 29, VI, 13-14, 20, VII, 12, 14; Elements, i, XVII, 11, ii, VIII, 6. Note, however, Hobbes' claim that sovereign error cannot be used to invalidate the covenant: Leviathan, XXI (144), XXII (147), XXVI (181), XXVIII (207-8), XXIX (209-310ff.), XLVII (454-55); Cive, XII, XIII, 2; Elements, i, XIII,
sovereign's supremacy over his subject is as the relationship of war to deviant behavior.

The possible existence of internal enemies to the sovereign, however, expands the problem of maximizing obedience, especially since peace can exist in a variety of contexts and under a variety of "gods." If men are motivated primarily by their desire for peace and security as the requisite for felicity, then one may assume the possibility of their disobedience or revolt whenever they foresee a greater likelihood of keeping their security and of achieving their felicity through changing the regime. Whether their reasoning is fallacious or correct is essentially irrelevant because the premises from which they infer their conclusions are derived from the conditions of their own experience. Consequently, to maximize obedience Hobbes' sovereign must apply the Law of Nature through his civil law in such a way that it does not allow one segment of society to raise the question of whether its security is threatened by another. The sovereign's public teaching of God's doctrine must be applicable to all parties within the Commonwealth for whom the possibility of attaining felicity would leave no other grounds for disobedience. Insofar as he provides the conditions for felicity, he promotes the consensus through the belief in God's doctrine which is necessary to maximize obedience. The public doctrine of the "true moral philosophy" becomes the basic symbol of the regime in proportion to its correspondence with the felicitous expectations of the subjects. The extent to which felicity is attained throughout the Commonwealth as vouched for in the public doctrine is the basis for maximum obedience to the sovereign. If the doctrine does not correspond with the felicity attainable, subjects cannot reasonably be expected to conclude that it is God's doctrine which is at fault.45

The sovereign's position characterizes the problem for voluntarist political authority: having established the legitimate regime, how might that regime provide the good political order? Replacing the first question of whether the regime is just with that of whether it is legitimate, voluntarist political authority raises the possibility of establishing the regime which is merely legitimate.46 In this case, political justice can be

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9, ii, IX, 1. Indeed, since subject disobedience institutes the state of war between the fallaciously reasoning disobedient one and the sovereign, one could go so far as to say that disobedient ones make themselves expendable.

45 Sovereign action which does not promote felicity would be seen as the sovereign's transgression of God's doctrine. Hence, subversive doctrine directed against the "true moral philosophy" would be seen as abetted by the sovereign. See Leviathan, XXI (139) and XLVII (454-55, at 454): "For without their [sovereigns'] authority there could at first no seditious doctrine have been publicly preached." As noted above, n. 30, to Hobbes sovereign failure in this respect is more dangerous than allowing conflict in society.

identified only with those subjective claims which are manifested at a
given time in the process of legitimizing the regime through the consent
made feasible by the "known natural inclinations of mankind." The
nexus of the problem for Hobbes' sovereign—for voluntarist political
authority as epitomized by its primary antecedent, Hobbes—is to fulfill
the proposition just noted. That is, the sovereign must apply the Law
of Nature so that no one segment of society feels threatened by another
because of the relatively disproportionate benefits attained by one at the
expense of the other. And it is crucial to recognize that this proposition
follows from the logic of Hobbes' text: i.e., his sovereign has more to do
than to preside over the merely legitimate regime, as is evidenced by his
description of the sovereign's role as sufficient condition for "eternal
salvation" (earthly felicity). Rather than identifying political justice only
with the subjective claims that can be dominant at any given time—as
such, claims which take on the character of faction—the task facing the
regime is to realize the means whereby it may make adjustments among
the various interests within its purview. By providing the good political
life for all parties concerned in terms of their own subjective perceptions,
the regime can develop a long-range stability and thereby maintain the
consensus for its continued legitimacy. This is, primarily, the problem
of distributive justice.47

Hobbes intended to revolutionize the grounds for political theory, as
he was quite ready to proclaim.48 And he succeeded. Because the sovereign
is established by the only process Hobbes understands to be viable—by
the consent of individuals possessed of common natural rights and based
upon their "known natural inclinations"—he makes well known the
proposition that the criteria for public doctrine are established only
through popular will. It is therefore possible to infer that Hobbes' explication of the status of God's Law of Nature is concerned only with
the "show of truth" and not with "truth" itself, as has been established
in the case of Locke. But this would be true only to the extent that
Hobbes' presentation of the public doctrine of the "true moral philosophy"

47 Cf. Plato Republic 338c-44d, 358b-59b, 543a-76b, and Gorgias 482c-86d,
with Republic 421c-45b and Aristotle Politics 1314a-b, 1316b-23a. The implication
in this position is that Hobbes' argument for representation is more complete than
a narrow authorization account. On that position and its consequences, see, respect-
In contrast to the basis of the representative's sovereignty, the ongoing operations
of Hobbes' sovereign qua representative have received relatively scant attention.
On one aspect, see the interesting account in Dudley Jackson, "Thomas Hobbes'
Theory of Taxation," Political Studies 21 (1973):175-82. Indeed, the proper counter-
point to Hobbes on this score would be the sovereign majority of Locke as
developed in Willmore Kendall, John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority-Rule
(Urbana, Ill., 1965).

48 Leviathan, introduction (6), XX (136), XXXI (220-21), XXXI (241), rev. and
concl. (460, 465-66); Cive, preface to the reader (10, 15-18); Elements, ii, VIII, 13.
Interpretation
does not contain elements of truth. And this, of course, is not the case. The one complements the other. Popular will is necessary for establishing the criteria for public doctrine because the criteria are found in the "known natural inclinations of mankind." But the very nature of these "natural inclinations" means that the popular will is self-destructive without the guidance and security vouched for by the sovereign, who gathers these viable and justified inclinations into a public doctrine. Hobbes' argument isolates the criteria for political action as those which can be publicly identified, stated, and implemented through the sovereign's interpretation of political necessity, the civil law, while utilizing the "elements of truth" in the public doctrine of God's will as a source of support for the sovereign's action.

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