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ON THE EUTHYDEMUS

LEO STRAUSS

From the *Crito* we are led to the *Euthydemus* by the consideration that the *Euthydemus* contains the only other conversation between Socrates and Kriton. The two dialogues stand indeed at opposite poles. The *Euthydemus* is the most bantering, not to say frivolous and farcical dialogue while the *Crito* is the most solemn one: the *Crito* is the only dialogue in which there occurs almost a theophany. Yet there is a remarkable kinship between the two dialogues in regard to structure. In the *Euthydemus* Socrates' performed conversation with Kriton surrounds and interrupts the conversation, narrated by Socrates, between Socrates, Euthydemus and others. The only other dialogue which has a comparable structure is the *Crito* in which Socrates' performed conversation with Kriton surrounds the quasi-conversation, evoked by Socrates, between Socrates and the Laws of Athens.

The farcical character of the *Euthydemus* stands in a superficial contrast with the fact that Socrates praises therein the patently absurd and ridiculous "art" of Euthydemus, not only to Euthydemus' face, but in his absence when speaking to Kriton, as very great wisdom; he even expresses his desire to become a pupil of Euthydemus. Everyone will say, everyone has said that this is "that customary irony of Socrates."¹ But Kriton, the direct addressee of Socrates' report about his conversation with Euthydemus, does not say this. Was Kriton unaware of that irony? Was he impervious to it? Would thus the *Euthydemus* not reveal to us Kriton's most important limitation? Would it thus not throw light retroactively or in advance on the *Crito*?

I. The prologue: the initial conversation between Kriton and Socrates (271 a1-273 d8)

Kriton opens the dialogue by asking Socrates "Who was it, Socrates, with whom you conversed yesterday in the Lykeion?" Kriton is therefore responsible for the dialogue's taking place; the dialogue is as it were imposed on Socrates. Kriton's question "Who was . . ." reminds us of Socrates' "What is . . ." questions. Yet it is not philosophic but rather "anthropologic," i.e. belonging to the sphere of gossip, of ordinary curiosity. Kriton could hear and see that Socrates was conversing with someone, presumably a stranger, but a big crowd standing around Socrates and the man with whom he conversed prevented him from seeing everyone and hearing anything distinctly. Since the conversation in which Socrates was engaged is called philosophic by Socrates himself, we may say that Kriton's access to philosophy was blocked. He could see the man sitting next but one to Socrates on Socrates' right,

¹ *Republic* 337 a4-5.

and he could recognize the boy sitting between Socrates and that man; the boy reminded him of his son Kritoboulos who is more or less of the same age but the boy Kleinias had grown much lately and is beautiful and good to look at, while Kritoboulos is rather defective. We assume then that Kriton's initial question is inspired not by aimless curiosity but by paternal concern for Kritoboulos who gave him cause to worry. This assumption is borne out by the end of the dialogue.²

The stranger whom Kriton has seen was Euthydemos; he had not seen Euthydemos' brother Dionysodoros who had been sitting on Socrates' left. Kriton does not know either of them at all whereas Socrates has known them for quite some time. Kriton believes that they are sophists; he wishes to hear where they come from and what their wisdom is; he does not ask how much they charge.³ Socrates is not certain as to their place of origin but he knows that they have been tossed around quite a bit among Greeks. As for their wisdom, they are the greatest masters in doing battle, i.e. winning battles, that Socrates has ever seen. Not only can they fight in heavy armor and enable others to do the same; they are also proficient in doing battle before law courts and in teaching others to speak before law courts and to compose speeches to be delivered before law courts. Above all, they have made themselves masters in the battle of speeches simply: they can refute everything that is said at any time regardless of whether it is false or true. Socrates speaks of pay only when he speaks of the two brothers' ability to teach the art of fighting in heavy armor. The reason becomes clear at the end of his account: he declares to Kriton that he contemplates handing himself over to the two men for instruction in their art. They will of course demand pay for it and Socrates is poor. He must therefore persuade Kriton to participate in the venture. Kriton gives him an opportunity for doing this.

Kriton is not convinced that Socrates' thought is wise: Socrates seems to be too old for the venture. The situation here is the reverse of that in the *Crito* where Socrates uses his old age as a reason for declining the venture proposed by Kriton.⁴ Socrates replies that the two brothers themselves were already of advanced years when they took up that wisdom which he desires and which he now calls eristics. He grants that he and his hoped for teachers might become ridiculous to his boyish fellow pupils and that this must be prevented by all means since the two brothers are strangers. They might even refuse to accept Socrates as a pupil on this ground. But he has already an experience of how this difficulty can be overcome. He is also taking lessons in harp-playing together with boys; he got rid of the embarrassment caused to him and to the teacher by persuading some elderly men to become his fellow pupils. Socrates will therefore attempt to persuade some other elderly men – the combination of harp-playing and eristics is not suitable to most people – to become his fellow pupils at the two brothers'. He begins his attempt with

² cf. *Crito* 45 b4–6.

³ cf. *Apol. Socr.* 20 b7–8.

⁴ *Crito* 52 e2–4, 53 d7–e1.

Kriton: why does Kriton not go to school with him? As a bait they will take Kriton's sons to the two brothers. Kriton does not reject the proposal. He leaves the decision to Socrates. He surely does not show the eagerness he showed in the *Crito*.⁵ He wishes to hear first from Socrates what kind of wisdom they will learn if Socrates decides on handing himself and Kriton over to the two brothers. Socrates is only too willing to comply with Kriton's wish, i.e. to give a full and truthful, if not verbatim report, of yesterday's conversation.

According to some divine dispensation Socrates was sitting alone in the dressing room, in the place in which the conversation was to take place a little later, and was already about to leave. Then unexpectedly, when he had already got up, the customary sign, the *daimonion*, occurred to him, whereupon he naturally sat down again. According to its wont the *daimonion* had then warned Socrates against what he was about to do. In so doing however it rendered inevitable the conversation with Euthydemos and the others. The conversation was then imposed on Socrates by his *daimonion*. Yet, as the sequel shows, the conversation was the opposite of compulsory. The *daimonion* forbade him to leave the dressing room, as the Laws forbade him to leave the prison. By forbidding him to leave, the *daimonion* permitted, nay, sanctioned the conversation that followed. No other conversation presented by Plato has so high an origin. The high origin could be thought to explain why the *Euthydemus* is so extraordinarily rich in Socratic oaths.

Shortly after Socrates had sat down again, Euthydemos and Dionysodoros with a train of many pupils entered without taking notice of Socrates. A short while later Kleinias entered; he was followed by many lovers among whom Ktesippos stood out.⁶ Socrates confirms Kriton's remark that Kleinias had grown much; he would never himself have made that remark to Kriton. Kleinias did take notice of Socrates who was still sitting alone, and hurried to him at once. Kleinias had barely sat down at Socrates' side when Dionysodoros and Euthydemos after a short deliberation joined Kleinias and Socrates. Kleinias, who attracts so many lovers, attracts also Dionysodoros and Euthydemos with their crowd of pupils and is in turn attracted by Socrates. It is in this way that Kleinias' bipartite train, whose parts were joined only by chance, becomes in a manner the train of Socrates. But most obviously Kleinias is the center.

II. The first series of the two brothers' speeches (273 c1 – 278 e2)

Socrates introduced the two brothers to Kleinias as men wise not in the small things but in the great ones: they understand everything pertaining to war which is needful for the future good general; they can also enable a man to help himself in the law courts if someone wrongs him. One sees at once

⁵ 46 b1.

⁶ Socrates speaks of Ktesippos "being beautiful and good in regard to his nature" (273 a8). Kriton speaks of Kleinias being beautiful and good in regard to sight (271 b4–5). Kriton never speaks of "nature."

that the description of the two brothers' arts which Socrates had given to Kriton is already considerably colored by what he learned from them soon afterwards. We note only that when speaking to Kriton Socrates had not mentioned the two brothers' mastery of the art of generalship: Kriton is less likely to be an aspirant to that art than Kleinias, the grandson of Alkibiades; besides he had mentioned to Kriton that they teach their arts for pay and that they teach one how to compose speeches to be delivered by others before law courts: if Kleinias keeps his promise, he will not need a speech writer, to say nothing of becoming one. Socrates' introduction met with contempt and laughter on the part of the two brothers; they teach the things mentioned by Socrates no longer as serious but only as by-work; their serious claim now is that they believe to be able to transmit virtue better and more quickly than any other human being.

What they understand by virtue becomes clear from Socrates' report to Kriton about their newly acquired power: they can refute whatever is said, be it false or true and they can enable anyone within a short time to do the same. This power is necessarily identical with virtue if virtue is wisdom and if wisdom in the proper sense – knowledge of the most important things – is impossible. For in that case the highest superiority of a man to others in speeches is eristic superiority. The brothers' view of virtue entails that in particular the art of generalship is not virtue, at least not the highest virtue.

Socrates seemed to be deeply impressed by the claims of the brothers. He wondered where they found their new possession; the last time they visited Athens they were experts in fighting in armor only; Socrates is now silent on the expertise in forensic rhetoric. We assume that Socrates had heard of their new claims during their present visit but in introducing the brothers to Kleinias deliberately refrained from mentioning their highest claim in order to hear that claim stated in public by the brothers themselves. Be this as it may, he then declared that if they truly possess the knowledge, the science, which they claim to possess, he ought to treat them like gods; only gods, it seems, could conceivably give men virtue. But considering the magnitude of the claim they must forgive Socrates' unbelief. The brothers were willing and even eager to exhibit their wisdom: they were on the lookout for pupils. No fee will be demanded for the exhibition. Socrates in his turn vouched that all those present who lack that wisdom – he, Kleinias, Ktesippos and all the other lovers of Kleinias – wish to acquire it.

Ktesippos happened to sit rather far away from Kleinias; when Euthydemus talked to Socrates, he happened to obstruct Ktesippos' view of Kleinias; thereupon Ktesippos who wished both to see his beloved and to hear what would be said, jumped up and took his stand opposite Socrates and the three others sitting with him; the others – both Kleinias' lovers and the brothers' comrades – did the same. It was then in the first place Ktesippos' desire to prevent the obstruction of his view of his beloved that led to the blocking of Kriton's access to philosophy. (Kriton is not an erotic man). As a result of Ktesippos' action the lovers and the pupils together formed a semi-circular wall around those who are neither pupils nor lovers.

Socrates appealed to the brothers to exhibit their wisdom since everyone present – not only Kleinias' lovers but also the brothers' comrades – are eager to learn: the brothers have a very large public. His appeal was greeted with great eagerness by Ktesippos and all the others. Apparently the brothers did not respond immediately. They surely gave Socrates the opportunity to address them once more. He asked them now to gratify the others and for his sake to exhibit their wisdom. He thus indicated that his interest in the exhibition differs from the interest in it taken by the others. The peculiarity of his interest appears from the question that he addressed to the brothers: can they transmit virtue only to someone who is already convinced that he ought to learn from them or also to someone who is not yet convinced of it because he does not believe that virtue can be taught or that they are teachers of virtue? There are reasons for believing that Socrates was doubtful whether virtue can be taught. Certainly the brothers must be able to dispel that doubt; they must possess an art which proves the teachability of virtue. But, Socrates wondered, that art will not necessarily prove that the brothers are excellent teachers of virtue. Dionysodoros assured him that one and the same art dispels both doubts: the teachability of virtue stands or falls by the two brothers' teaching virtue most excellently.

Dionysodoros' reply encouraged Socrates to ask him whether the brothers would not be best, at least of all human beings living now, at urging people on toward love of wisdom (philosophy) and an active concern with virtue. He obviously assumed that virtue and wisdom are identical or at least inseparable. But it is not clear why he is concerned with exhortation. Perhaps he thinks that exhortation to virtue does not presuppose that the question regarding virtue's teachability be decided either way: even if virtue is acquired by means other than teaching, men must be encouraged to strive for it. On Dionysodoros' replying again in the affirmative Socrates asked the brothers to exhort Kleinias to philosophizing and to caring for virtue: he and Kleinias' lovers desire that the boy, the scion of a blessed house, should become as good as possible, and they fear that he might be corrupted. The youngest and most beloved member of the group is naturally in the greatest danger of being corrupted and therefore the fittest object of the brothers' exhortation to virtue. Far from warning Kleinias against the mischief which the two sophists might do to him, as he warns Hippokrates against Protagoras, Socrates hands him over to the two sophists for education in virtue or in order to prevent his corruption. This difference is not sufficiently explained by the facts that in the case of Kleinias the sophists are present and Socrates is courteous; perhaps Hippokrates is more corruptible than Kleinias. We must also not forget that Socrates tells the story of Hippokrates to a nameless comrade, while he tells the story of Kleinias to his old and familiar friend Kriton.

Euthydemos was not disturbed by Socrates' concern for Kleinias: he was not interested in Kleinias as Socrates is, with a view to the boy's virtue or incorruption; the only thing which is necessary according to Euthydemos is that the boy be willing to answer. (Euthydemos laid down no other condition than that laid down by Socrates on other occasions.) Socrates re-assured him

on that score. Before he goes on with his report, he expresses to Kriton his apprehension that his report might not do justice to the amazing wisdom of the brothers: like a poet he must call to his assistance not only Memory but the Muses as well. Just as the dialogue would never have taken place without the intervention of the *daimonion*, its narration too is not possible without super-human help. The narration is a kind of epic poem; it is in a way as poetic as the speech of the Laws in the *Crito*.

The questioning was begun by Euthydemos who asked Kleinias which human beings are learners, the wise or the unwise? Kleinias was embarrassed and turned to Socrates who encouraged him as well as he could. While Kleinias was still silent, Dionysodoros, whispering into Socrates' ear, predicted that whatever the boy would answer, he would be refuted. Kleinias answered that the wise are the learners and when he was cross-examined by Dionysodoros, he was forced to admit that the unwise are the learners. Both answers were refuted by the brothers. The refutation is possible because of the equivocity of "unwise" which may mean both "stupid" and "ignorant"; the human beings who learn are those who are intelligent and do not (yet) know. The character of the reasoning was not made clear by Socrates or anyone else present. Socrates merely reports that the refutations were greeted with noisy laughter by the brothers' pupils whom he now calls their lovers: from admiration to love there is only one more or less long step. On the other hand, Socrates and the other friends of Kleinias, while filled with admiration for the brothers, were depressed. We on our part can hardly fail to notice that each of the two *elenchoi* looks like a Socratic *elenchos*. We may also note that if the fallacy is disregarded, the two refutations prove either that neither the wise nor the unwise learn, i.e. that learning is impossible, hence presumably that wisdom proper is impossible, and hence that the only wisdom possible is eristics; or they prove that both the wise and the unwise learn, i.e. that wisdom is not only possible but even most easy to acquire: while being the best it is the cheapest, like water (304 b 1-4). The contradiction between the two implicit results leads us to the question as to whether wisdom is possible. The final result leads then beyond the brothers' wisdom.

There followed a second round similar to the first; Euthydemos addressed a question to Kleinias, Kleinias replied; Euthydemos refuted the reply and, on being cross-examined by Dionysodoros, Kleinias reasserted what he had answered first. Yet this time there was apparently no laughter and applause. Euthydemos was about to start a third round when he was stopped by Socrates. As he tells Kriton, he did not wish that Kleinias be still further discouraged. But we must not forget that Socrates was unable to stop the brothers earlier since their perfect teamwork had obviously taken him by surprise. In the speech by which he stopped them and which he addressed in the first place to Kleinias, he showed himself a changed man. Gone was the depression which he had felt before and very little remained of his admiration for the brothers. Someone might say that Socrates was never depressed and that he never admired the brothers. But why did he say "we were depressed" and "we admired Euthydemos"? Why did he then identify himself with

Kleinias' lovers and did no longer do so now? Socrates' narrative must be presumed to be coherent on all levels. The fact that the second round was hardly more than a repetition of the first surely contributed to the change. The full explanation however is that Socrates had understood in the meantime what the brothers were about. He explained this to Kleinias in an uninterrupted speech of unusual length: the two strangers have been doing to Kleinias what the Korybantes do to someone about to be initiated; it was a play, a prelude to the initiation into the sacred rites of sophistry; for one must learn first of all the right use of words, as Prodikos says; in accordance with this the strangers showed Kleinias his unawareness in this respect; but all this is play, enabling one at best to practise boyish pranks on people, for even if one has full knowledge of the right use of words, he will not know the things a bit better. Socrates comes close to saying to the brothers to their face that they have been practising boyish pranks on Kleinias. The strangers will of course from now on act seriously and fulfill their promise to exhibit their art of urging people on to virtue. Socrates turned next to the brothers themselves with the same reminder: they should show Kleinias in what manner one ought to be concerned with wisdom as well as with virtue. There are then various manners of urging on: although the brothers did not claim that their preceding speeches were serious and in particular that those speeches were protreptic, Dionysodoros at any rate had said that eristics and protreptics are one and the same art. What he meant can be inferred from what he and his brother did: if virtue is above all superiority in speeches or the ability to refute every speech, the mere exhibition of this ability will urge on every ambitious youth toward virtue. Socrates indicated his disagreement by declaring that he will give the brothers a doubtless poor specimen of what he understands by a protreptic speech. The protreptic speech will no longer belong to the prelude; it will be part and parcel of the sacred rites of "sophistry" in the wide sense of that term.

III. Socrates' protreptic speech I (278 e2-283 a4)

Now Socrates asked Kleinias to answer his questions. In contradistinction to the brothers he begins at the beginning. The brothers' tacit premise had been that their potential pupils are ambitious, that they are filled with the desire for what they regard as a great, if not the greatest, good. Socrates began his protreptic speech by inducing Kleinias to state that premise and to correct it.

He asked him first whether we human beings – all of us – do not wish to do or act well. He went on from there to propose a list of the good things which we need in order to do or act well. Since he did not suggest to Kleinias any alternative, and not only for this reason, one can say that his questions are leading; he surely wished to encourage Kleinias. Kleinias agreed with every point Socrates made. In this way it was established that first being rich, second being healthy, beautiful and the like, and finally noble birth, power and honor in one's city are good things. The order would be one of ascent for an ambi-

tious human being. Socrates did not ask Kleinias whether he thought the list is complete but he raised a question which would permit the answer that the list is complete. While he had divulged his own view in the former cases, he did not do so now. He asked the boy whether moderation, justice and courage are good things or not, adding that their being good could be disputed. It could be disputed on the ground that the only good things are those mentioned earlier and that the virtues are not necessarily needed for obtaining them. Nevertheless Kleinias replied that the three virtues are good. Only after Socrates had asked him whether wisdom belongs to the good things and had received an affirmative reply did he ask him whether in his view the list is complete; he thought that it is. Wisdom apparently belongs to another class of virtues than moderation, justice and courage. But then Socrates suddenly remembered the greatest of all goods, good fortune, which is universally and therefore of course also by Kleinias understood to be the greatest good. Yet with equal suddenness Socrates changed his mind by remembering that wisdom is good fortune, as even a child would know. But the child Kleinias did not know; he was astonished by Socrates' contention. Socrates made him agree with him by showing him that in all cases wisdom makes human beings fortunate. The cases which he mentioned are flute playing, letters, seafaring, generalship and medicine. In speaking of the central case he indicated most clearly that the wisdom in question does not always guarantee good luck. Kleinias who was not supposed to notice this, did not notice it. We have then reached the result that wisdom is, humanly speaking, omnipotent. In the words of Socrates, he and Kleinias eventually agreed together, he did not know how, that in the main a man who possesses wisdom does not in any way need good fortune in addition. But if this is so, what becomes of the goods of fortune in the wide sense, like wealth, health and political power which occupied so conspicuous a place in Socrates' list and which seemed to be indispensable for doing or acting well or for happiness? Socrates brought it about that Kleinias agreed to these propositions: we are happy on account of those goods only if they benefit us, and they benefit us only if we do not merely own them but use them; to convince Kleinias he used the examples of food and drink and then of a craftsman's (a carpenter's) tools and materials. (He implied that craftsmen using their tools and materials might act well but would not be happy.) Here the question arises whether we can use those goods if we do not own them and therefore whether a wise man who is poor or even a slave can be happy; in other words, the question arises whether good fortune is guaranteed by wisdom; needless to say, the question was not explicitly raised. Instead Socrates drew Kleinias' attention to the fact that the mere use of good things will not suffice for making a man happy; the use must be right use; while wrong use is bad, non-use is neither good nor bad; right use is brought about by knowledge. Knowledge then brings about the right use of the good things figuring in the beginning of the previous list. No possession whatever is of any benefit if its use is not guided by prudence, wisdom, intelligence; a man possessing little but using it intelligently is more benefitted than a man possessing much but using it without intelligence;

hence a man without intelligence is better off if he is deprived of the good things previously listed than if he possesses them, for instance, if he is poor rather than rich, weak rather than strong, obscure rather than honored.⁷ When Socrates asked next who would do less, a courageous and moderate man or a coward, and therewith which of the two is better off without intelligence, Kleinias replied “the coward”, i.e., the coward without intelligence is better off than the courageous man without intelligence; Socrates gave Kleinias no opportunity to decide whether the unintelligent man is better off if he is moderate or if he is immoderate. He gave him even less opportunity to decide whether the unintelligent man is better off if he is just or if he is unjust; judging by the analogy of the other cases the answer would have to be that he is better off if he is unjust. But this thought verges on the absurd. It is much better to say that justice seems to be the only good, the only virtue that is beneficent (on the whole) even if not guided by intelligence, perhaps because the laws which the just man obeys supply the lack of intelligence in the man himself.⁸ Accordingly Socrates’ abstraction from justice here would be tantamount to an abstraction from law; he surely is silent about the laws in the *Euthydemus* as distinguished from the *Crito*. Be this as it may, the ruthless questioning of what Aristotle would have called the moral virtues,⁹ served the purpose of bringing out the unique significance of wisdom: wisdom – and of course not honor or glory – is not only the greatest good; it is the sole good; only through the presence of wisdom and the guidance by it are the other goods good. This purpose is most appropriate in a speech meant to exhort to the practice of wisdom.

Socrates summarized the result of his preceding conversation with Kleinias and drew the conclusion to which Kleinias assented that every man must strive in every way to become as wise as possible. In particular he must beseech his lovers, nay, every human being to let him partake of wisdom, gladly doing every menial service which is not base in return. Kleinias wholeheartedly agreed. Only one difficulty remained: they had not investigated whether wisdom is teachable, let alone reached agreement on this point. Speaking in a more lively manner than ever before, Kleinias proclaimed his opinion that wisdom is teachable. This pleased Socrates since it saved him a long inquiry on this subject; he did not say that he and Kleinias have reached agreement on it. Socrates drew the final conclusion that since our happiness depends altogether on our wisdom and if virtue can be acquired by learning, learning, striving for wisdom, philosophizing is the one thing needful.¹⁰

⁷ Compare what Socrates explains to Kriton’s son Kritoboulos in the first chapter of the *Oeconomicus*.

⁸ That justice in contradistinction to courage and moderation cannot be misused is an important ingredient of the first paragraph of the text of Kant’s *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*. – Cf. *Republic* 491 b7–10 and *Meno* 88 a6–e4.

⁹ *Republic* 619 c7–d1 (and context).

¹⁰ Kleinias’ threefold use of “O Socrates” (280 d4, 282 c4, d3) is a very obvious example of that use of vocatives that is prompted by self-confidence.

The premise of the two brothers' speech was that wisdom proper is impossible and therefore that its place is properly taken by eristics. Socrates seemed to be uncertain whether wisdom is teachable; it is not clear whether that doubt affects the possibility of wisdom. Yet the reasoning addressed to Kleinias seems to imply that in order to be wise one must know all the arts, and this does not seem to be possible for any one man; thus wisdom would be impossible. Socrates and the brothers agree as to virtue proper being different from "moral virtue". But as is indicated by Socrates' reference to the honorable services which the beloved boy may do in order to acquire wisdom, Socrates admits that there is some awareness of the honorable which antedates the acquisition of wisdom. His doubt of the teachability of wisdom may be connected with what he intimated regarding the limited power of wisdom in regard to luck or chance; perhaps one must be particularly "wellborn" in order to learn wisdom.

Socrates was pleased with his success in urging Kleinias on toward philosophy. He apologized again to the brothers for the inadequacy of his protreptic speech and asked them to repeat as craftsmen what he had done as a layman or else to continue his exhibition by discussing with Kleinias whether he must acquire every branch of knowledge or whether one who wishes to be happy and a good man needs to acquire a single branch of knowledge only and what this branch is. He also reminded them again of how important it is to him and the others that Kleinias should become wise and good.

This was the turning point in the dialogue. Socrates brings this out by addressing Kriton and stating to him that he was watching with the greatest attention what would happen next and observing in what manner the brothers would lay hold on the speech and from where they would start their exhorting Kleinias toward wisdom and virtue.

IV. The central series of the brothers' speeches (283 a5-288 d4)

It could be thought to be a good omen that it was Dionysodoros, the brother remotest in years from boyhood, who started the conversation. Socrates' and the others' expectations to hear something extraordinary were not disappointed: the speech was extraordinary as an exhortation toward virtue. Dionysodoros no longer addressed Kleinias nor did he pay any regard to what Socrates had said. He asked Socrates and Kleinias' lovers whether they are serious in wishing Kleinias to become wise. Thinking that it was the brothers' disbelief in their seriousness that had induced them to proceed so playfully before and fearing a repetition, Socrates assured them emphatically of their seriousness. This is all that Dionysodoros needed for his refutative speech: desiring that Kleinias become wise means desiring that he cease to be the one he is now – that he cease to be – that he perish; fine friends and lovers you are! Whatever else might have to be said about this speech, as an exhortation to virtue it is indeed extraordinary. Dionysodoros' thesis could be understood as a most shameless admission of the worst crime imputed to

sophists: education in wisdom is corruption of the young (see 285 b1). Or did Dionysodoros think that his speech was protreptic since it refuted Socrates and Kleinias' lovers and thus enabled Kleinias to recognize the two brothers as the true teachers of wisdom? Was this the reason why he and his brother no longer addressed Kleinias himself?

We might have expected that Socrates would rebuke Dionysodoros for continuing with his boyish pranks. He failed to do so. This fact is of considerable importance for the understanding of the dialogue as a whole. The speeches of the brothers are obviously ridiculous and yet Socrates says to Kriton that he contemplates becoming their pupil and he even tries to induce Kriton to join him. Of the first series of speeches Socrates said in so many words that he could not take them seriously. His final judgment as stated to Kriton near the beginning of the dialogue makes sense only if at one point or another the conversation with the brothers had ceased to be playful and taken on a serious turn. We must watch to see how this change came about.

Did Socrates consider that philosophizing is learning to die? The obvious reason for his failure to rebuke Dionysodoros for his levity is that before he could say anything, Ktesippos vented his anger and indignation: Dionysodoros lied by imputing to him such an unholy wish. Euthydemos was not intimidated by Ktesippos' outburst; he asked him whether in his opinion it is possible to say a falsehood or to lie. Ktesippos replied of course in the affirmative. Euthydemos refuted him by starting from the fact that one can speak about, or say, only what is and not what is not; he led up to the explicit result that Dionysodoros must have said the truth when he drew the conclusion that angered Ktesippos. (If Euthydemos' reasoning were valid, all men would always think or say the truth whenever they think or speak; all men would be wise and there would be no need for wishing that Kleinias should become wise.) Ktesippos was not disconcerted by the refutation. He granted that Dionysodoros said somehow the things that are but not as they are. He tacitly presupposed that one can say the truth. It was this presupposition that was next questioned by Dionysodoros. (Dionysodoros' argument would lead to the conclusion that all men always think or say the untruth, i.e. that wisdom is impossible on the ground opposite to the one advanced by Euthydemos.) Ktesippos contended that gentlemen as well as other men speak the truth. Euthydemos rejoined: if the gentlemen say the truth, they speak ill of evil things and of evil human beings; do they also speak bigly of big men and hotly of hot men? Whereupon Ktesippos replied: they speak frigidly of the frigid and say of them that they frigidly converse. The brothers had no expedient left but for Dionysodoros to complain about abuse; Ktesippos rejected that complaint as unfounded since Dionysodoros had so rudely said that Ktesippos wished the perdition of those whom he cherishes most. This round ended then clearly with a defeat of the brothers: Ktesippos' manliness got the better of their wisdom. It was to be expected that the sophists would arouse sooner or later the susceptibilities of a hot-tempered young gentleman.

At this juncture Socrates was forced to intervene in order to prevent a conflagration. In order to appease Ktesippos, he was forced to speak to him

playfully: far from being able to blame the brothers for what could seem to be their continuing playfulness, the extreme seriousness of the situation that had arisen between Ktesippos and Dionysodoros forced him to become playful himself. He alluded to the fact that the issue was still merely verbal: the strangers insist on calling corruption what in ordinary parlance is called education to virtue and wisdom; if they know how to destroy human beings so as to make them good and sensible out of bad and senseless, let them destroy Kleinias and make him sensible and let them do the same to all of us; but if the young are afraid, let the strangers make their dangerous experiment on old Socrates. Therewith Socrates handed himself over to Dionysodoros to do to him whatever he pleased: Socrates' handing himself over to the sophists of which he speaks to Kriton as of being contemplated by him only, has already taken place to some extent the day before, and it took place then with a view to appeasing Ktesippos' wrath against the sophists.

Ktesippos, that generous youth, could not stay behind old Socrates and offered himself to the strangers for anything they might do to him provided their doings would end in him becoming altogether virtuous. He denied being angry at Dionysodoros: he only contradicted him. As if he had learned something from Prodikos, he pointed out that contradicting and abusing are two different things. The somewhat dangerous incident thus ended in perfect reconciliation between Ktesippos and Dionysodoros. We must not overlook the fact that Socrates established concord exclusively by influencing Ktesippos: the sophists were not angry. By speaking of contradicting, by taking it for granted that contradicting is possible, Ktesippos offered a flank to Dionysodoros. The fact that Dionysodoros and Ktesippos contradicted one another regarding contradicting was somehow noticed by Ktesippos. But Dionysodoros reduced him to silence. He did this by making use of the same point formerly used for showing the impossibility of lying; but the present case lacked the potential for anger or indignation which the former had.

Socrates was astonished by Dionysodoros' argument. As he told Dionysodoros, he was always astonished at that particular argument for he had heard it from many people and many times – Protagoras used it and even people before him. It astonished him because it is incompatible with the claim of the men who use it. If it is impossible to lie, to say or think a falsehood, all men are wise, and there is no need for teachers like the brothers. While Socrates expounded this argument, Euthydemos took the place of his brother. So it happened that it was Euthydemos, the wisest or cleverest of the brothers, whom Socrates decisively refuted. The decisive character of this event could easily remain unnoticed. Socrates did not put the slightest emphasis on his victory and as for Euthydemos having been reduced to silence we can only infer it from the fact that Dionysodoros took the word again immediately afterwards. He blamed Socrates for reminding the brothers of something which they had said earlier: their claim that they can refute what is said at any one time (272 b1) is to be taken quite literally. Eristics, mental wrestling, is a game which as such is constituted by certain arbitrary but inviolable rules. As appears from the sequel, another rule of this kind which Socrates unwittingly

tingly transgressed is that he who is questioned must not reply with questions of his own. Socrates bowed to this rule on the explicit ground that a man who is altogether wise regarding speeches determines reasonably whether to answer questions or not. Despite his compliance Socrates succeeded in refuting Dionysodoros and in fact the two brothers on fundamentally the same ground as before. This time Socrates put the proper emphasis on his victory. But this had the embarrassing consequence that Ktesippos became very abusive so that Socrates had to calm him again. The net result was therefore again that Socrates' refutation of the brothers could easily remain unnoticed.

Socrates calmed Ktesippos by a consideration that resembles the one by which he had encouraged Kleinias earlier. He spoke again of the brothers not being serious but on the other hand he studiously avoided the word "play" and derivatives from it. He spoke to Ktesippos of the brothers' witchcraft. Since the brothers imitated the Egyptian sophist Proteus, Ktesippos and Socrates ought to imitate Menelaos who forced Proteus to reveal his secret. Needless to say, Socrates will not use force. He proposed that he continue his protreptic speech: perhaps the brothers will from compassion with his serious endeavor be serious themselves.

V. Socrates' protreptic speech II (288 d5-290 e8)

Socrates asked Kleinias to remind him of where they left off but, without waiting for Kleinias' doing so, did the reminding himself: he had no faith in Kleinias' memory. Or did he have too great faith in it? They had finally agreed, he said, that one must philosophize. Strictly speaking they had not agreed on this since it followed from the premise, regarding which Socrates had suspended judgment, that wisdom is teachable. Be this as it may, philosophy is the acquisition of knowledge: of which knowledge? Not remembering their earlier discussion Kleinias regarded it as possible that kinds of knowledge which do not entail the good use of the knowledge concerned could be the desired knowledge. They agreed thereafter that they are in need of a kind of knowledge in which both the making (production) of something and the knowledge of how to use that something coincide. That knowledge as to how to make a thing which is not accompanied by knowledge of how to use it is insufficient for our happiness had become clear in the earlier exchange between Socrates and Kleinias; that knowledge of how to use a thing which is not accompanied by knowledge of how to make it or procure it is insufficient for our happiness was implicit in the earlier exchange; one could say that Socrates corrected in his second protreptic speech the defect of the first – the defect which consists in the abstraction from the power of chance. Using the criterion thus established they examined at Socrates' suggestion first the art of making speeches and then the art of generalship, i.e., the two arts of the brothers that are lower than eristics. Kleinias rejected the art of speech making on the ground that those who make (i.e. write) speeches to be delivered before courts of law and the like do not know how to use them: even regard-

ing speeches the art of making them and the art of using them are different. What is at least as important as this judgement is the amazing, the wholly new self-confidence with which it was made by young Kleinias. Socrates agreed with Kleinias' main point that the art of speech making does not make men happy but he claimed that he had had great expectations from it: it is a marvelous art, not far inferior to the art of the enchanters; it bewitches crowds as the enchanters bewitch snakes, tarantulas and the like. All the more impressive is Kleinias' firm verdict. (We must not forget however that "the art of making speeches" is an ambiguous expression: the art of making speeches that Socrates possesses is inseparable from the art of using them.) Socrates turned then to generalship as an art most likely to make its possessor happy. This proposal was again firmly rejected by Kleinias: generalship is an art of hunting but no art of hunting is an art of using; for instance, geometers, astronomers, and calculators do not make the figures which they use but find or discover them, and since they do not know how to use them, they hand their findings over to the dialecticians for use. For this remark Kleinias was praised by Socrates very highly – as highly as never before or after. Socrates did not say a word to the effect that if Kleinias' statement were unqualifiedly true, dialectics, being neither a hunting nor a productive art but only an art of using, could not possibly be the desired science. The ironical character of his high praise did therefore not become quite obvious. Kleinias, obviously encouraged, went on to say that the generals hand over their conquests to the political men. But since he said nothing to the effect that the political men produce or hunt what they know how to use, he seems to imply without being aware of it that the political (or kingly) art too is not the desired science either. Within the context of the discussion the defect of dialectics and of politics (to say nothing of speech writing) cannot but redound to the benefit of eristics. And that defect was due to the use of a criterion established by Socrates.

V. a. The central conversation between Socrates and Kriton (290 e1-293 a8)

Kriton suddenly interrupts Socrates' narrative. The reason for this is not that he is greatly concerned about the desired science but that he is concerned about his sons; Socrates' glowing report about Kleinias has reminded him of his domestic difficulty. But without Socrates' assistance or serious resistance he finds comfort in his unbelief; he is certain that Socrates' report about Kleinias' answers is a complete falsehood. He is then by no means incapable of becoming aware of Socrates' irony in any point. Socrates admits that Kleinias or even Ktesippos may not have given the clever answers that he ascribed to Kleinias but he insists on not having given them himself; he claims to have heard them perhaps from some higher being. Kriton's reaction to this claim is of the same force as if he had said in the *Crito* that not the laws but Socrates had made that impressive speech. Socrates provoked Kriton's intervention by his unfounded praise of Kleinias in order to put a stop to Kriton's

hesitation to send his sons to some teachers of wisdom. As a matter of fact Kriton now takes it for granted that youths not as advanced as Socrates' fictitious Kleinias might be benefited by becoming Euthydemus' pupils.

Kriton's interest is not exhausted by his interest in Kleinias; he is also interested in the subject matter of the conversation; he is interested to know the sequel of Socrates' protreptic conversation with Kleinias and especially whether they found the art they were looking for. Limiting himself to the most important, Socrates tells him what happened to them when they examined the kingly art which is the same as the political art; the term "kingly art" is perhaps preferred because it corresponds to the splendor, the claim of the art in question. The kingly art seemed to them the art which by ruling all other arts makes all things useful. Yet they were hard put to it to tell what the work of the kingly art is. At this point Kriton has become a participant in the conversation, as it were, at the side of Kleinias. (How would Kriton have reacted to Socrates' protreptic questions if he had been in the place of Kleinias?) While he knows quite well what the work of his art – the art of farming – is, he is as unable as Kleinias to tell what the work of the kingly art is or what good it transmits. But Socrates and Kleinias had agreed that there is no other good but some knowledge. This deprives such good things as freedom of the claim to be the work of the political art; in the light of the premises agreed upon by Socrates and Kleinias, freedom as such is neither good nor bad. (Hence it is better to speak of the kingly art.) It likewise follows that the kingly art must make the human beings wise, for only wisdom makes men happy. The kingly art is then an art which both "makes" (produces) something and guarantees the good use of that something. Kriton regards it as necessary to make clear that these things were agreed upon by Socrates and Kleinias: we do not know where Kriton stands. At any rate there is agreement between Socrates and Kriton as to the kingly art not transmitting all arts, for the products of all arts other than the kingly art are neither good nor bad. But in what will the kingly art make the human beings wise and good? Kriton knows that Socrates and Kleinias were in a great predicament: he is not affected by it and he has no suggestion to make as to how that predicament could be overcome. Socrates tells him that in his despair he called on the two brothers for help, urging them to be serious. Kriton is curious to hear whether Euthydemus helped Socrates and Kleinias: he has noticed the superiority of Euthydemus to Dionysodoros; he has become mildly interested in Euthydemus' wisdom.

Socrates' effort to determine the science which makes human beings happy has ended in complete failure. He has confirmed by deed the view of some of his critics that he was most excellent in exhorting men to virtue but not able to guide men to it:¹¹ he proved to be excellent in exhorting Kleinias to strive for that wisdom which makes human beings happy but was unable to tell what that wisdom is. Someone might say that the predicament arises solely

¹¹ Xenophon, *Memorabilia* I 4. 1 (Plato, *Clitopho* 410 b4 ff.).

from the almost complete disregard of dialectics: dialectics is obviously the desired art or science. But then one must explain why Socrates abstracted from dialectics. Looking at the result of his action, one will be inclined to say that the abstraction from dialectics redounds in the circumstances of the dialogue to the benefit of eristics. But why is eristics to be benefited?

VI. The final series of the brothers' speeches (293 a8-304 b5)

Euthydemus came to Socrates' assistance by putting Socrates' question on the broadest possible basis. Instead of continuing Socrates' questioning on the kingly art, he asked him whether there is anything which he does not know. In other words, he proved that Socrates possesses that science regarding which he and Kleinias were in a predicament for such a long time by proving that Socrates is omniscient. He proceeded as follows. Socrates admittedly knows some things, however trivial; he is therefore a knowing man; being a knowing man he cannot be a non-knowing man at the same time; hence he must know everything. Socrates raised no objection to this monstrous argument but he showed by deed that he had learned Euthydemus' art: he raised no objection because he had learned Euthydemus' art. Instead he tried to turn the tables on the brothers by compelling them to admit that they, nay, all human beings too know everything. Dionysodoros made this admission without any ado. If we still remember the kingly art, we might be inclined to say that on the basis of Dionysodoros' admission the kingly art is compatible with democracy. Socrates made sure that the brothers were serious in raising the claim to omniscience; as a consequence Dionysodoros here used his only oath. When Ktesippos became aware of the exorbitant character of Dionysodoros' claim, he demanded a massive proof: does each of the brothers know how many teeth the other has? The brothers refused to comply with this demand since they believed that he was poking fun at them: they did not appeal to the rules of eristics since they were eager to answer any questions regarding the many skills however lowly they possessed. Socrates intervened by appealing from Dionysodoros to Euthydemus. Euthydemus succeeded in keeping Socrates properly obedient to the rules of eristics despite his knowing that Euthydemus wished to entrap him in merely verbal snares, i.e. despite his realizing the unserious character of the proceedings, for he was already resolved on becoming the pupil of Euthydemus, of that master in the dialectical art: the true dialectics was completely forgotten.

Socrates asked Euthydemus to begin his questioning again from the start. Thereupon Euthydemus asked him whether he knows what he knows by means of something. Socrates replied: yes, by means of the soul. This reply was not in conformity with the rules of eristics, for he had not been asked by means of what he knows. When Euthydemus pointed this out to him, Socrates became properly apologetic which did not prevent him from making a similar mistake immediately afterward. Socrates presents himself to Kriton as acting the part of a rather slow pupil – of a Strepsiades as it were. Accord-

ingly, he was led to admit that he always knew all things: when he was a child, when he was born, when he was conceived, before heaven and earth had come into being. Socrates was being taught a caricature of the doctrine of recollection; it is a caricature of that doctrine especially since it is silent on the soul as well as on learning. Euthydemos concluded his argument by asserting that Socrates will also know everything in the future, if this is Euthydemos' pleasure. This is perfectly reasonable given his premises: only what he says (or thinks) is or will be, but since genuine wisdom is not possible, its place is taken by eristics so that only what is upheld by the master of that art is or will be.

Socrates next tried to entrap Euthydemos by asking him how he, Socrates, knows that the good men are unjust: if Euthydemos (we should remember the previous difficulty regarding justice) grants that Socrates knows it, he says something revolting; if he denies that Socrates knows it, he denies Socrates' omniscience which he had been at such great pains to establish. Dionysodoros walked into the trap by preferring the alternative that is not shocking; he was openly rebuked for this by his brother, so much so that he blushed. When Socrates thereupon asked Euthydemos whether his omniscient brother had not made a mistake, Dionysodoros quickly asked whether he, Dionysodoros, is Euthydemos' brother and thus forced him to answer this question and to forgo Euthydemos' answer to his own question. The brothers finally forced him to admit that he is fatherless. This gave Ktesippos an occasion to intervene. He tried to turn the tables by bringing up the question of the brothers' father. Yet Euthydemos gladly admitted that his father, being father, was a father of all men and all beasts while he himself as well as Ktesippos were the brothers of puppies and the like. Dionysodoros on his turn, proved to Ktesippos that by beating his dog who is a father and is his, he beats his father. (Socrates escaped the charge of father-beating only because he did not own a dog.) A somewhat insulting reply of Ktesippos led not to an intervention on the part of Socrates, but to Euthydemos telling Ktesippos that no human being needs many good things: the theme "father-beating" is followed by the theme "continence". Ktesippos refuted Euthydemos' first reasonable contention with the help of mythological examples. He defended the case for "having more" successfully also against Dionysodoros. The themes "father-beating" and "continence" remind us of the *Clouds* where Socrates is presented as a teacher of father-beating and as extremely continent. One is tempted to say that Socrates presents Euthydemos as a caricature of the Aristophanean Socrates. Socrates could not possibly have been the addressee of an argument in favor of continence, while Ktesippos was fitted for this role by his nature. Ktesippos was also successful in his ensuing argument with the brothers, so much so, that Kleinias was greatly pleased and laughed. As Socrates tells Kriton, he suspects that Ktesippos owed his success in the last argument to his having overheard the brothers discussing it among themselves, "for no other human being now living possesses such wisdom."

When Socrates asked Kleinias why he laughed about such serious and beautiful things, Dionysodoros asked Socrates whether he had ever seen a

beautiful thing. He thus introduced the great theme of the relation of the beautiful things to beauty itself; according to Socrates things are beautiful by the fact that some beauty is present with each of them. Dionysodoros refuted this view by referring to the fact that Socrates does not become Dionysodoros by Dionysodoros' being present with him and repeated his question in this more incisive manner: how can the different be different by the presence of the different with the different? While pretending to be surprised by Dionysodoros' predicament which Dionysodoros himself traced to the non-being of the beautiful itself, Socrates was already trying to imitate the wisdom of the brothers since he longed for it. He imitated that wisdom to his satisfaction and thus and only thus defended "the doctrine of ideas" but admitted of course that otherwise the brothers are excellent craftsmen of the dialectical art which as every art finishes off its peculiar work. This gave Dionysodoros an occasion to perform another of his verbal somersaults which Socrates praises as the peak of wisdom: "will this wisdom ever become my own?" This question or exclamation induced Dionysodoros to ask Socrates what he understands by his own. Somewhat rashly Socrates agreed that only those living beings are his own which he may sell, give away, or sacrifice to any of the gods. But what then is the status of Socrates' ancestral gods? Obviously Socrates may give them away, sell them, or sacrifice them to any of the gods he pleases. Socrates was knocked out and left speechless. Euthydemos had given him the knock out blow. The brothers acted like caricatures of Socrates' accusers: they did not seriously accuse him. Ktesippos who had tried to come to Socrates' help fell an easy victim to another of Dionysodoros' clowneries; he gave up the struggle with the words "the two men are unbeatable."

The whole show had ended with the complete victory of the brothers. This was the view not merely of Euthydemos' lovers but of the group around Kleinias and, above all, of Socrates as well: Socrates had never seen so wise human beings. Overwhelmed by their wisdom he turned to praising them. He praised them in the first place for their indifference to the many as well as to the great men who are thought to be something; only the few who resemble them like the brothers' speeches; all other men would be more ashamed to refute others with the help of speeches of this kind than to be refuted by them. This sense of shame has nothing to do with the awareness of unfair advantage, as appears from the second ground on which Socrates praises the brothers: their speeches are popular or populist and gentle; they reduce indeed everyone to silence by denying the obvious but they thus reduce themselves too to silence, so that their speeches cannot be resented. Finally, they have brought their art to such a perfection that anyone can learn it within a very short time. This fact, it is true, carries with it the inconvenience that a single public exhibition, which is meant to allure paying pupils, suffices for initiating people to their art; Socrates advised them therefore to abstain from public exhibitions. He concluded by asking the brothers to accept him and Kleinias as pupils.

Turning to Kriton, he encourages him to join him (and Kleinias) in going

to school at the brothers': the only condition laid down by them is a payment of a fee, not natural gifts nor youth; and what is especially important for Kriton, the brothers' instruction does not in any way interfere with one's money-making.

VII. The epilogue: the final conversation between Socrates and Kriton
(304 b6-307 c4)

Kriton politely declines Socrates' suggestion: he belongs to those who would rather be refuted by Euthydemian speeches than refute other men with their help. Aware of the difference of rank between himself and Socrates, he regards it as improper or ridiculous to rebuke him for his strange likes but he cannot abstain from telling him what he was told by somebody else. Quite by accident he met a man who had heard the exchange of speeches – a man with a high opinion of his wisdom and who is clever in regard to forensic speeches. That man had nothing but contempt for the brothers. Kriton defended the brothers' doings against him with the words "but philosophy is something graceful", i.e. he took it for granted that the brothers' speeches are philosophic. His nameless informer also disapproved of Socrates' absurd conduct toward the brothers; Kriton would have been ashamed of him. Kriton repeats his disagreement with the unqualified disapproval of the brothers' speeches but he feels that Socrates is to be blamed for publicly disputing with them.

Socrates is unable to reply properly to this detractor of philosophy before he knows to what kind of man he belongs. He learns from Kriton that he composes speeches to be delivered by orators proper. Men of this kind belong according to Prodikos and according to Socrates to the borderland between the philosophers and the politicians and regard themselves as superior to either; in order to be recognized universally as such, they denigrate the philosophers: the greatest threats to their renown are the masters of Euthydemian speeches. Socrates agrees with Kriton in describing Euthydemus' art as philosophy. The men in question regard themselves as supremely wise because they partake in the proper measure partly in philosophy and partly in political matters. Socrates' judgment on them is based on this principle: everything that is between two things and participates in both is inferior to the better and superior to the worse, if one of the two things is good and the other bad; if the two things are good and directed toward different ends the thing participating in both is inferior to both in usefulness for the ends in question; if the two things are bad and directed toward different ends, the thing participating on both is superior to both. Hence if both philosophy and political action are good but directed toward different ends, as the borderland people cannot help admitting, they are inferior to both the philosophers and the politicians. Socrates presupposes here that philosophy and the political art have different ends and hence are different arts; he tacitly repeats the radical distinction between dialectics and the kingly art. He asks that one not be angry with the detractors of philosophy; after all, they take

hold of something reasonable: they are aware of the radical difference between philosophy and politics.

Socrates has successfully vindicated Euthydemos and what he stands for. Kriton neither denies nor admits this. Instead he turns to the subject of his greatest and constant predicament: his two sons, and especially his oldest son Kritoboulos. Whenever he meets Socrates, he becomes aware of the paramount importance of education but he cannot find an educator worthy of the name. As a consequence, he does not know how to urge on Kritoboulos toward philosophy: he does not dream of asking Socrates to apply his protreptic skill to Kritoboulos nor does Socrates offer it. One could say that Socrates had candidly exhibited the limitation of his protreptic art; yet he had at least tried to apply it to Kleinias. A more plausible reason is that Kritoboulos' nature is less fit for the purpose than Kleinias' or, in other words, Socrates' *daimonion* holds him back in the case of Kritoboulos as distinguished from that of Kleinias.

Socrates reminds Kriton of a fact to be observed in regard to every pursuit, the fact that the good practitioners are rare; just as this is no reason for rejecting money-making or rhetoric, it is no reason for rejecting philosophy. One must carefully examine philosophy itself. If it seems to be a bad thing, Kriton must keep everyone, not only his sons, away from it; but in the opposite case the opposite course is to be taken.

We are still too much inclined to see the conflict between Socrates and "the sophists" in the light of the conflict between the thinkers of the Restoration and the thinkers who prepared the French Revolution or took its side. In the *Euthydemus* Socrates takes the side of the two brothers against Ktesippos and Kriton. Socrates was not the mortal enemy of the sophists nor were the sophists the mortal enemies of Socrates. According to Socrates, the greatest enemy of philosophy, the greatest sophist, is the political multitude (*Republic* 492a5-e6), i.e. the enactor of the Athenian laws.