Interpretation

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T. A. M. Fontaine's Account of Ibn Daud's
The Exalted Faith (Ha'Emunah HaRamah)

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1. INTRODUCTION

T. A. M. Fontaine's recent book *In Defense of Judaism: Abraham Ibn Daud* (1990) provides a comprehensive exploration of the purpose of a treatise that has often been overlooked in the history of Arabic and Jewish philosophy.[1] Although Fontaine calls Ibn Daud a "less than great thinker" (p. 1), she also claims that "the obscurity into which the work has fallen is undeserved and regrettable" (p. 3). She says that Ibn Daud was "overshadowed" by Maimonides. *The Exalted Faith* seems to have been written in A. D. 1160–61 in Toledo. Maimonides was approximately twenty-five at the time, and it is generally thought that the only treatise which he might possibly have completed by this time was the *Treatise on the Art of Logic*.[2] Maimonides certainly becomes the center of attention shortly after Ibn Daud's time. Fontaine does not assert that Ibn Daud achieves the intellectual acumen of Maimonides, nor that he has had or should have had more influence than is attested. Her articulated reasons for her exposition of this treatise are threefold. First, the overshadowing of Ibn Daud by Maimonides is not a sufficient justification for ignoring his work. Second, G. D. Cohen's Hebrew edition, English translation, and analysis of Ibn Daud's *The Book of Tradition (Sefer Ha-Qabbalah)* provides an invaluable

study of one of the two books written by Ibn Daud, but there is also a need to examine the purpose of his philosophic defense of religion.³ Although Fontaine does not explicate the relation between Ibn Daud's two writings, a detailed examination of *The Exalted Faith* is a necessary first step. Third, *The Exalted Faith* can be regarded as a "counterpart" which is diametrically opposed to Judah Halevi's *Kuzari* (p. 2). The *Kuzari* was written a generation before Ibn Daud by a well-respected Jewish poet, and the book is a sustained criticism of the merits of philosophy. Thus Fontaine seeks to evaluate the extent to which the book is an answer to Halevi's *Kuzari*.

Fontaine argues that Ibn Daud's purpose in writing *The Exalted Faith* is to provide a philosophical justification for the teaching that man's actions are not determined by God but rather that the will is free to obey or disobey the commandments. The book is addressed to a friend who had asked Ibn Daud whether actions are determined or free. According to Fontaine, Ibn Daud argues that "the inconsistency that arises if we assume that everything is determined by God is greater and more difficult to resolve than the inconsistency that the doctrine of free will implies" (p. 7). According to Ibn Daud, the philosophical sciences often lead individuals into confusion because these individuals are not able to reconcile the apparent antinomy between science and religion.

Ibn Daud seeks to articulate a philosophic account which reveals the reconciliation between these two sources of knowledge. The title of the treatise is an initial indication of its purpose. It is often thought that the original Arabic title was *Al-'Aqidah Al-Rafi'ah*, which came to be translated as either *Ha-'Emunah Ha-Ramah* or *Ha-'Emunah Ha-Nissa'ah*.⁴ Its purpose is to defend the most exalted religion. He uses a metaphor to explicate the relation between philosophy and religion. They are like two lamps, the lamp of religion is in the right hand and the lamp of philosophy is in the left. Many people are not able to hold these two lamps at the same time. When the lamp of philosophy starts burning, the lamp of religion goes out. Ibn Daud seeks to show the compatibility of these two lamps. According to Fontaine, however, the argument to show the harmony of religion and philosophy is not the central task of Ibn Daud's book, as other commentators, such as Julius Guttmann, G. D. Cohen, and H. Simon, suggest. She summarizes her argument in chapter 12, the final chapter of her book, and in doing so judiciously selects a quotation from *The Exalted Faith* which confirms her point. She writes: "Or, as Ibn Daud himself puts it when he eventually embarks on his treatment of the freedom of the will and the themes associated with it: 'This problem is the first in thought and the last in action; it is the chapter for which we have written the book'" (p. 239. ER II.6, p. 93, ll. 22–24).⁵

Apart from this invaluable statement of Ibn Daud, the strength of Fontaine's argument rests in her exposition of the *structure* of the treatise. She explains the structure as a series of steps in which Ibn Daud presents Aristotelian physics and metaphysics to the point at which he can examine the nature of human

conduct (pp. 239–43). When Ibn Daud turns to an exposition of human actions, he draws upon his account of physical science to argue for (1) the existence of the 'possible' as a logical category and for (2) the freedom of the will (p. 243). Although Fontaine admits that his exposition of the steps in this structure involves Ibn Daud in details which are not absolutely necessary for the argument and which give the book the appearance of a compendium of philosophy, she maintains that "the various themes are arranged, as I have said, in a special way, and behind that order lies a particular purpose" (p. 244).

Fontaine recognizes that for Ibn Daud a defense of Judaism requires a defense of both the *possibility* of efficacious actions and the necessity of virtuous actions. She notes: "In his introduction Ibn Daud announces that the purpose of his philosophical reflections is practical philosophy, i.e. action" (p. 250). Fontaine says later in the same paragraph:

> The ultimate goal of his argument really *is* action. We have seen that the many questions that he addresses finally lead to the question of the freedom of the will. It is this very question that constitutes the frontier land between theoretical and practical philosophy. It is this point that marks the crossing-point between philosophy and religion, which is why agreement between the two forms of knowledge at this point is essential. If it were to become apparent that as regards the freedom of the will either philosophy or religion is unable to arrive at a positive conclusion, agreement on other points would no longer be necessary, for what is the point of a religious life if it is not the result of a choice freely made? If we are to lead a life that is religious in a meaningful way, proving the freedom of the will is an absolute *sine qua non*. To be able to offer such proof, Ibn Daud feels that he is also obliged to demonstrate that agreement also exists on all other points leading to this core problem, which is why his philosophical expositions all close with a series of quotations from the Bible offered in evidence. Certainly he has a practical goal (and for that reason it is to some extent possible to regard the whole of his philosophy, including the theoretical parts, as practical philosophy)." (Pp. 250–51)

According to Fontaine, Ibn Daud's recognition of the legal and political nature of Judaism is manifest in *The Exalted Faith*. His lifeline to biblical and rabbinic religion is secure.

The purpose of this study is to offer a critical evaluation of Fontaine's presentation of the purpose of Ibn Daud's treatise. Criticism is always a sorting out, a judgement of arguments made well and of those which are incomplete. I will be essentially limited to an evaluation of the coherence of Fontaine's reading of the text rather than engaging extensively in a primary study of Ibn Daud's book. I will evaluate her work under five headings: (1) the structure of the treatise, (2) the sources of the treatise, (3) Aristotelian and Platonic science and biblical creation, (4) on the soul, and (5) Law (Torah) and political philosophy.

2. THE STRUCTURE OF THE TREATISE

Fontaine's book is written as a series of chapters which comment on Ibn Daud's chapters in their respective order. She usually studies either several of his chapters in one of hers or devotes one of her chapters to one of Ibn Daud's. In one instance, Ibn Daud's chapter II.6, she devotes two chapters to this chapter which presents the argument for the freedom of the will. On only one occasion does she depart from this orderly presentation. She chooses to discuss I.8 along with II.4 because both chapters are Ibn Daud's account of heavenly spheres and intelligences. It is usually a valuable procedure to follow the sequence of a text under inquiry with considerable faithfulness. Fontaine is to be commended in placing herself as a commentator rather than as an innovator who engages in the process of rearranging the order of presentation of the text. Whatever is lost in flair of presentation is more than compensated in orderly exposition. Her central argument is that the *structure* of Ibn Daud's book, that is, the order of his philosophic arguments, forms a necessary sequence. The presentation of this sequence of proofs is found in her final chapter, chapter 12, "Recapitulations and Conclusions." In this chapter the summary is in fact presented twice. The first summary of the structure begins on page 240 and extends to the top of page 244. The second summary occurs—almost unwittingly, since she previously claims her recapitulation of his argument has concluded—on the bottom of page 244 and continues to the top of page 245.

When we examine the first summary we are disappointed at the vagueness with which she delineates a number of steps in Ibn Daud's argument. Let us examine two examples. First, when she presents the steps in the arguments between I.1–5, she proceeds in I.1–2 with a summary of Aristotle's account of substance, accident and form, and in I.3–5, with a discussion of motion and infinity. She begins the discussion of I.3–5 with the following statement: "Form, as Ibn Daud explains in the subsequent chapters on motion and infinity (ER I.3–5), is of divine origin" (p. 240). We are immediately presented with the question of the origin of form. Does "divine" here mean the Aristotelian First Cause, an intermediary, or the God of Abraham? While this concern is appropriate, it is necessary to determine whether it is a step in Ibn Daud's argument and, if it is a step, whether he accomplishes his task or not. Aristotle's physics is derived from arguments based on the eternity of substance, form, and matter. What is Ibn Daud's account regarding the creation of the world? She also says: "In these chapters he also prepares his later proof for the existence of God" (p. 240). What is the link between the Aristotelian doctrine of form and the proof for the existence of God? How did the Aristotelian account of form make all this possible? A careful exposition of the steps is necessary if the structure is used as an argument to identify the central purpose of the book. Secondly, in regard to I.6–7, an extensive discussion by Ibn Daud on the soul, she says: "the concepts of form and matter come into the discussion of the relation between

soul and body." But form and matter do more than "come into discussion." Form is incorporeal, thus, according to Aristotle, the form of the body is an incorporeal soul. If the Aristotelian distinction between form and matter is used to account for the relation between body and soul, as it is in Aristotle's *De Anima,* then the proof of the existence of form and matter necessarily precedes an account of the soul. The sequence of Ibn Daud's argument appears to proceed in this manner. A complication emerges, however, inasmuch as Ibn Daud seems to prefer other formulations of the relation between body and soul than Aristotle's definition that the soul is the form of the body. At a later point in Fontaine's book, she comments on Ibn Daud's position on this matter (pp. 60–61). She does not review the alternatives on the issue in this summary. Nonetheless, an exposition of the structure of his argument requires a precise exposition of each proof in its proper place.

Her second summary (pp. 244–45) is more concise, and she follows Ibn Daud's argument more carefully. A summation of the argument proceeds as follows. The problem of free will and determinism cannot be answered unless (1) we know what can and cannot proceed from God, which requires (2) a priori arguments for the existence and unity of God, which requires (3) a defense of the notion of singular incorporeal substances, which requires (4) an argument regarding the motion of the spheres, which requires (5) an argument that the motion of the soul is different than the motion of a body, which requires (6) an argument to show that nothing can move itself, which requires (7) a presentation of the concepts of substance, accident, matter, and form. I have presented the sequence as more obvious and deliberate than is found in Fontaine's paragraph, although the outline is hers. If there is a structure to the book, then it must follow this sequence, and Fontaine needs to note in each chapter of her exposition that the structure is present. Moreover, if the structure is indeed present, an evaluation of Ibn Daud's treatise requires that we scrutinize the sufficiency of each argument in its proper order.

Ibn Daud himself gives us a summary of the *structure* of his argument in the introductory Abstract (*kelal*) to the book (ER Abstract, p. 3, ll.6–35). He insists that there is a correct order of presentation of his subject. He traces each step in the argument back to the syllogism necessary for its proof. Thus, in this summary he presents the arguments in the reverse order in which they will appear in the treatise. In this section Ibn Daud states repeatedly his sense of a necessary order of argumentation. He says, "and a satisfactory answer could not be given to it until after we understand the attributes and actions of God"; and "one cannot know the truth about his attributes and his actions until he first introduces a proof of his existence"; and "this could not be affirmed until we had proved that there are incorporeal substances which are called angels"; and "from the necessity that we prove that it is not possible for there to be in existence actual ordered infinite existents; and so on. Thus Ibn Daud perceives that his argument follows a *necessary* order. We should expect in his treatise a

sequence of demonstrations leading to his conclusion. Immediately following this summary, however, Ibn Daud qualifies his procedure in a decisive way. He states that, in contrast to Ibn Gabirol in *Fons Vitae* whose discourse contains excesses, he writes with precise discourse which is free from excess and is a true demonstration. Then he says that he does not trouble himself with the introduction of the demonstrative syllogism (*ha-heqesh ha-mophthi*) that accompanies each subject. The subjects are not introduced in the order of a classical syllogism (*seder ha-heqesh ha-mophthi*). He says that if the masters of logic (*ba'ale ha-higgayon*) wish, they can formulate their understanding of the middle term of the syllogism. He thus warns us that not all parts of the subject are explained.[6]

Ibn Daud claims that the reason the treatise is written in this way is that he has a particular reader in view. The treatise is written for someone who has departed from the grades of the masses and who is confused regarding the relation between choice and necessity. Moreover, the reader is someone who wishes to know the Israelite faith. Ibn Daud promises a more complete discussion after he introduces the truths concerning substances and accidents, that is, after a summary of Aristotle's *Categories*. The intended reader is someone who has not arrived at the appreciation of the harmony between religion and philosophy.

The identification of an intended reader is confirmed by other comments in the treatise. In the preamble to the introductory Abstract, Ibn Daud mentions that in the Abstract he will discuss what grades of the sons of man (*madregot bene 'adam*) will receive benefit (*to'elet*) from the treatise. Later in the Abstract Ibn Daud writes:

> Behold it is clear that the subject of this speculation is political philosophy (*philosophiya' ma'asit*), in religion there are traditions, and in true philosophy clear demonstrations. Concerning the benefit of this treatise, behold, I recommend to every man who is innocent with an absolute innocence (*'ish tam betaklit ha-temimut*), who, when they are asked concerning the inquiry of necessity and free will (*darush ha-hekreah ve-ha-behirah*), or inquiries which are like it—in order that there will be no anxiety concerning them—that they will think that man (*ben 'adam*) cannot understand these inquiries and his heart will not be troubled within him for his ignorance. He should not yield himself to examine this treatise nor anything whose purpose is the purpose of this book. Rather, it is proper that he should remain in his innocence and his tradition because the purpose of political philosophy is action. And the wise ones in religious wisdom who are also philosophers do not need to read our treatise because their science is more sufficient than our treatise. But perhaps someone will begin to understand and he will be perplexed concerning what he has received through tradition and what is true in what is disturbing, then this treatise will greatly benefit him. We offered him many of the ways of wisdom and we established religion upon its foundation. (ER Abstract, p. 4, ll.4–15, translation mine)[7]

The subtle movement of this passage makes us wonder whether Ibn Daud is truly saying that this type of innocence is good. The word *tam* is equivocal, meaning either a true goodness (Job 1:1) or naivete (I Kings 22:34 and Genesis 25:27, although the latter reference is to the contrast between Esau's knowledge of the art of hunting and Jacob's lack of such knowledge, Jacob's *tam*. The author must be ironic in saying that Jacob has *tam*; Jacob is innocent of the particular art of hunting, but he is not innocent of all craft. This irony foreshadows the development of the story.). A translation of the passage is very difficult. I hope that one day we will have an Arabic version available to us. Ibn Daud says that the treatise is not written for the innocent who possess an absolute innocence, those who are not troubled with the inquiry regarding necessity and free will, nor is it written for the true philosopher who knows science well. He appears to deflect the attention of the innocent away from the treatise, even to dissuade them from the study of philosophy. Right action can be learned from tradition. The innocent do not need to read this book. Nor does a true philosopher need to read it because his science will be more sufficient than what is found therein.

Chapter 2 provides further confirmation of the deliberateness of Ibn Daud's selection of a reader. In this case Ibn Daud claims that Scripture itself only alludes to scientific truths, while its literal sense satisfies the masses.

> We say that in the books of prophecy there is no clear explanation of what is understood in true philosophy so that the understanding of the people who are the masses of men would not be slow. Rather the books of the prophets make allusions and arouse the unique individual to understand the secret meanings of those allusions. Thus, that individual knows that wisdom is included in the books of prophecy, while the masses are satisfied with their literal sense. (ER I.2 p. 12, ll.9–12)

Although Ibn Daud does not in this context say that Scripture is written for his addressee, his comments reveal that he understands Scripture to be aware of a wide range of competences in its readers. As a corollary, Scripture may address different people in different ways, or certain parts of Scripture may be written more for certain types of readers than other parts, or there may be other possible ways in which Scripture is addressed to the different types of readers which we have not identified here. In the course of his treatise Ibn Daud will explain that Scripture does not explain but simply alludes to all that is found in true philosophy. This view of the Tanach is especially confirmed in ER I.8 (p. 43, ll.23–40). This passage is an exposition of the account of the chariot (*ma'aseh merkabah*) in Ezekiel 1 and 10. After several cryptic references to verses in this passage, Ibn Daud says that anyone who understands these things will know that he did not explain the texts of Ezekiel. Ibn Daud follows a Talmudic injunction against a public explanation of the account of the chariot. He says that our ancestors (*qadmonenu*) prevented us from revealing the hidden meanings of

Ezekiel, quoting the passage from Mo'ed Hagigah II.1. The account of the chariot can only be revealed in the presence of one student, and even in the presence of this exceptional student only the chapter headings are to be revealed to him. From Ibn Daud's argument we know that he thought that at least certain written documents, including the sacred words of Scripture and his own treatise, are composed with a certain addressee in mind.

These and other comments in Ibn Daud's treatise reveal its introductory or protreptic nature. It seeks to deepen the student's appreciation of certain philosophical questions and in doing so it establishes religious science upon its true foundation. As an introductory treatise we do not know the degree to which it introduces philosophical demonstrations only as reports or traditions rather than supplying fully the steps in the demonstration. An introductory philosophy textbook, one designed for the reader who is accustomed to accepting tradition, will be most in need of receiving philosophy by way of report rather than demonstration. Thus unless it is shown that at each step a demonstrative argument is presented, we cannot be sure that the *structure* of the treatise is demonstrative. The treatise presents a nice summary of at least certain parts of Aristotelian natural science. Ibn Daud's arguments in I.4 against the existence of an actual, numbered, ordered and infinite series of entities are demonstrative. But there is also good reason to argue that Ibn Daud did not intend the treatise to be demonstrative at all points. Fontaine seems to imply that the structure is based on a series of philosophical proofs, although, as we have noted, she does not delineate precisely the steps in this structure. This first and central argument for the existence of a *structure* to Ibn Daud's argument remains to be elucidated.

Finally, in order to confirm the seriousness with which Ibn Daud may be deliberately supplying only a partial philosophical demonstration, it is necessary to be aware of the philosophic tradition which precedes, is contemporaneous, and continues after him. The protreptic presentation of philosophy combined with a reticence to write final and complete treatises is known in Greek philosophy from antiquity. Cicero distinguishes between Aristotle's 'esoteric' works and 'commentaries.' The esoteric works were intended primarily for inside the Lyceum and were, as in the case of the *Poetics,* incomplete. These treatises were called by later commentators,—although apparently not by Aristotle—'*acroamatic*' works.[8] Alcinous' (A. D. 2d century) *The Handbook of Philosophy* reveals an intention to write only a partial presentation. In the thirty-sixth and final chapter of the handbook, Alcinous writes:

> So much, then, will suffice as an introduction to the study of the doctrines of Plato. Some of what has been said has been presented in proper order; other parts, perhaps, somewhat randomly and out of order. But at any rate what has been expounded here gives one the capability to examine and discover subsequently all the remainder of his doctrines.[9]

The good student is encouraged to proceed independently rather than expect all demonstrations to be found in this handbook. At the beginning of the *Eisagoge* Porphyry (died circa A. D. 305) remarks:

> I shall make for you a concise review of this traditional teaching as befits an introduction and try to recount what our predecessors said. I shall avoid the deeper issues and in a few words try to explain the simpler notions. For example, I shall put aside the investigation of certain profound questions concerning genera and species, since such an undertaking requires more detailed examination.[10]

Porphyry writes an 'introduction,' an *eisagoge*, which avoids certain questions, at least in this particular treatise. The treatise is addressed to one Chrysaorius, a Roman senator who was unable to make any sense of Aristotle's *Categories.*

This partial presentation of philosophy is also known among the Arabs. G. C. Anawati distinguishes exoteric and esoteric passages in Ibn Sina. The exoteric passages are made to the public and therefore are incapable of attack from Muslim orthodoxy; the esoteric passages present potentially controversial themes more subtly. D. M. Dunlop remarks briefly on Ibn Bajjah's references to Alfarabi's commentary on Porphyry's *Eisagoge;* Ibn Bajjah's comments reveal that he is aware of the issue in both Porphyry and Alfarabi. There is also a tradition of aphoristic writing amongst the *falasifa.* Alfarabi writes the *Aphorisms of the Statesman* and *Introductory Sections (fūṣul) on Logic.* Maimonides too writes *Medical Aphorisms.* He explains that the purpose of aphorisms is to provide the scientist with a host of ideas which need to be remembered, but aphoristic texts do not seek to be comprehensive and sufficient nor do they contain axioms or syllogisms. Ibn Tufayl, who died in A. D. 1185, also addresses his book *Hayy the Son of Yaqzan* to a "noble, sincere and affectionate brother" who does not understand the secrets of illuminative or oriental philosophy (*'ishraqiyya*). Ibn Tufayl also warns that his exposition will not be complete, partly due to the difficulty of the subject and partly due to the necessity that the student discover secrets on his own. Finally, Ibn Daud's addressee is remarkably similar to Maimonides' addressee described in the Epistle Dedicatory in the *Guide of the Perplexed.*[11] The *Guide* is written for Rabbi Joseph, a partially and imperfectly educated student. Rabbi Joseph is perplexed but does not understand philosophy sufficiently to overcome his perplexity. He is neither completely innocent nor a master of philosophy.

To be sure, these examples of introductory, partial, or aphoristic philosophic texts vary in their degree of presentation, in their selection of literary forms to achieve their presentation, and perhaps in their respective purposes in partial presentations. They nevertheless attest to persistent aspects of Greek and Arabic philosophy. Ibn Daud's comment that his work does not present complete syllogisms is one example of a reasonably well attested manner of doing philoso-

phy. The reason for his comment remains unexplored in Fontaine's book. In certain respects Ibn Daud's treatise is more demonstrative than other literary forms in the tradition. Ibn Daud's *The Exalted Faith* is a book, a *sepher* or treatise; he calls both Aristotle's *Categories* (ER Abstract, p. 3, 1.40) and this work a *sepher* (ER Introduction, p. 1, 1.4). Furthermore, in ER I.4, a chapter on quantity, Ibn Daud's presentation of the philosophic and mathematical arguments against the notion of the existence of an actual infinity serve as a paradigm of demonstrative philosophy. Thus, his treatise, in certain places, needs to be distinguished from the purposes of aphoristic literary forms. His movement toward a full presentation of subjects is characteristic of Aristotle's treatises, although we have noted that even Aristotle's treatises are *acroamatic*. Ibn Daud is certainly aware of various partial presentations of philosophy, but the degree to which Ibn Daud moves in the direction of complete exposition in comparison to the aphoristic genres marks his commitment to demonstration and to a recovery of Aristotle's intentions.

Nonetheless, if Fontaine wishes to argue that the *structure* of Ibn Daud's treatise is a series of demonstrative arguments, it is necessary for her both to show the actual sequence and to account for Ibn Daud's deliberate identification of an addressee who is not a master of logic.[12]

It is not only necessary to reflect upon the complex interplay that exists between demonstrative syllogisms and rhetorical presentations throughout the sequence of the three books, but there is another division with which the treatise is composed. There is a second abstract at the beginning of ER II.5. There are thus two, but only two, abstracts in the book. The effect of this second abstract, although placed in the middle of Book II, is to create a new beginning; we are required to reflect upon the first abstract and what change is beginning here. The first abstract introduces the principles of natural and metaphysical science. The second abstract introduces 'tradition.' This second division in the treatise examines knowledge that is obtained by way of perception, that is by the perceptions of others as they are transmitted by traditions, especially the prophets. ER II.5 is an account of prophecy. The rest of Ibn Daud's treatise is a defense of the details of the traditions of Scripture and Talmud and a defense of political philosophy. With the creation of this second structure, Ibn Daud reminds us of the difference between the proofs of philosophy and the proofs of tradition.[13]

These reflections on the structure of the argument in the treatise introduce us to Ibn Daud's formulation of the purpose of his treatise. Ibn Daud says at the end of the introductory abstract that the subject of his treatise is political or practical philosophy; it is political philosophy which determines the veracity of traditions in religious law, and it is political philosophy as well which determines what is demonstrative in philosophy itself (ER I Abstract, p. 4, ll.4–5). According to this passage the true science of religion and also the magisterial science, the science of sciences, is political philosophy. This identification of

religion and political philosophy is found also in Maimonides' *Treatise on Logic*. He writes:

> The sages of the peoples of antiquity made rules and regulations, according to their various degrees of perfection, for the government of their subjects. These are called *nomoi*; and by them, the peoples were governed. On all these matters, the philosophers have many books which have been translated into Arabic. Perhaps those that have not been translated, are even more numerous. But in these times we do not need all these laws and *nomoi;* for divine laws govern human conduct.[14]

Maimonides' comments here are subtle, but it seems that he replaces the *nomoi* with religion and in so doing suggests that the purpose of religion is political. Ibn Daud does the same in the passage we have examined. The inquiry into the true nature of religion and a defense of Judaism is the subject of political philosophy. (Maimonides and Ibn Daud appear to be in agreement that political philosophy is an architectonic rather than ancillary science.) Religion is essentially a political entity. Fontaine is correct in her judgement that Ibn Daud provides an account of the soul which gives a central place to virtuous actions and therefore to religion. Ibn Daud's interest in political philosophy is confirmed at the beginning of Book III, where he states that the purpose of practical philosophy is happiness (ER III, p. 98, ll.19–20). Political philosophy cultivates governance of the individual, of the home and of the state; these political teachings are found in the most perfect way possible in the Torah.[15]

Ibn Daud modifies this formulation slightly in the next passage of the abstract, however. After quoting Deuteronomy 4:6, Ibn Daud says that it is not the law that is marvelous in the eyes of Israel's neighbours because revealed laws (*ha-miṣvot ha-shimi'ot*) are not intended for the other nations, and political actions (*ha-hanahagot ha-mediniyyot*) and ethical virtues (*ma'alot ha-midot*) are available to everyone of intellect. (He does not explain this notion of "natural" justice further at this point.) What is marvelous are the principles of the Israelite faith (*shorshe ha-'emunah ha-yisra'elit*). Thus Ibn Daud's treatise seeks to identify and defend principles. The point of contact in his treatise between natural science, which is presented in ER I.1–ER II.4, and tradition, which is presented in ER II.5 and perhaps to the end in ER III.2, are principles. The principles of natural science are harmonious with the principles of religion. Biblical interpretation will finally be devoted to an enucleation of these principles.

3. THE SOURCES OF THE TREATISE

The examination of the "sources" of a book is a necessary, though easily abused, procedure. The delineation of sources is actually an exposition of an author's predecessors; the concatenation of these predecessors constitutes a tra-

dition from which an author writes. This tradition contains a set of conventions of the way subjects are presented and in what languages. An author relies upon certain previous formulations more than others, and the identification of these lines of transmission and imitation often elucidates what a particular writer is saying. The pejorative criticism of a writer because he has "sources" is in itself insufficient. What is more difficult to examine, but more worthy of attention, is the complex interplay that exists in a writer between the previously formulated conventions of a tradition and the particular variations found in his writings. Ibn Daud belongs to a philosophic tradition which does not strive for innovation. The reasons for this are complex. Let us reflect on only one. Demonstrative proofs are like problems in mathematics. Mathematics represents the pristine form of necessary argumentation. A particular student of mathematics does not for the most part seek to be innovative with a mathematical theorem, but rather he strives to do each step according to a pattern and to arrive at the one correct answer. Ibn Daud is seeking to some extent to produce demonstrative proofs in *The Exalted Faith*; he does not see innovation as a virtue, nor does he see "borrowing," that is, being able to follow an argument and reproduce it through a series of problems, as a weakness. Mathematicians *discover* math formulae which they then make public, but the formulae are not "theirs." It would be unusual to say of anyone that he "invented" or "created" the equation $2 \times 2 = 4$.[16]

Fontaine's book reveals an extensive command of the tradition from which Ibn Daud writes. She conducts her examination of sources either at the level of precise wording, so that she can show that Ibn Daud was reading a particular document, or at the level of ideas. Each of Fontaine's chapters contains a discussion of his possible sources for each topic; in philosophy, these sources are the Greek and Arab philosophers, and in religion, the Bible and the Talmud and the interpretations of these in various representatives of Rabbinic and Karaite Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Of the Greek philosophers she argues that "Aristotle is the one whose presence is most keenly felt in ER," and she maintains that "the Aristotelian element weighs heavier in his work than in that of his predecessors" (p. 254). Of the Arab writers Ibn Daud has been mostly dependent upon Alfarabi, Ibn Sina, and Al-Ghazali, and of these Ibn Sina is most influential. Her argument here is not particularly controversial, and her detailed examination confirms what was hitherto argued. She admits that there are "Neoplatonic" elements, introduced primarily through Ibn Sina and interpretations of Rabbinical writings, and thus Ibn Daud's Aristotelianism is not free from "Neoplatonism" (pp. 255–56). She argues that Ibn Daud's account of emanation is presented in exactly the same way as it is in Alfarabi and Ibn Sina (p. 255).

The most frequent term used in her inquiry into Ibn Daud's sources is "borrowed" (see pp. 17, 25, 27, 69, 147 passim). Although Ibn Daud is an avid student of previous writers, the term "borrowed" suggests a facile reiteration of

the contributions of others. If, however, we remember that the ability to pro-
duce a demonstration is comparable to doing a problem in mathematics prop-
erly, and that the desire for innovation and creativity does not dominate writers
in this Arabic philosophical tradition, then Fontaine's understanding of "bor-
rowing" is problematic. Fontaine could have made a better case for Ibn Daud's
intellectual training than she does. His book is not a collection of borrowed
words and ideas, but a sustained presentation of a series of philosophical *aporia*
and demonstrations, and an examination of the ways in which philosophy eluci-
dates Judaism. To be precise, my criticism of Fontaine here is a matter of
presentation rather than of her command of the Greek, Jewish, and Muslim
predecessors of Ibn Daud. There are numerous parallels which she elucidates
between Ibn Daud and other writers, either concerning precise points of lan-
guage or concerning ideas.

The way in which the philosophic traditions are represented in the study of
an author is vital. This task remains, in any inquiry into either the achievement
of a particular author or into the history of philosophy, a monumental challenge.
How does Fontaine depict this tradition, and how does her representation shape
her account of Ibn Daud? Let us examine her evaluation of the "influences" in
the tradition, and then look at two examples.

Fontaine regards Ibn Daud as marking a new beginning in Jewish philoso-
phy. She writes in summation: "As regards Greek authors we can be quite sure
that Ibn Daud's knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy exceeded that of any of
his predecessors" (p. 253). The identification of the predecessors in this context
is vague. I assume that she primarily means Jewish predecessors, since she
maintains that both Alfarabi and Ibn Sina are capable advocates of Aristotelian
philosophy. This understanding of her intentions is confirmed in the following
statement: "His [Ibn Daud's] originality lies chiefly in the fact that he tries to
transplant the system of ideas of the *falasifa* into Jewish soil and make it bear
fruit there" (p. 269). In consistency with this evaluation of Ibn Daud, she argues
that Ibn Daud's Arabic philosophic predecessors, Al-Kindi, Alfarabi, and Ibn
Sina, are essentially Aristotelian (pp. 252–74). She writes: "Just as he [Aris-
totle] was to many another medieval thinker, to Ibn Daud Aristotle was *the*
authority, what Ibn Daud, indeed, called 'head of the philosophers'" (p. 254).

She also judges that there is a secondary element of Neoplatonism in Ibn
Daud's treatise. She says: "That the Neoplatonist influence on Ibn Daud must
be attributed to the *falasifa* is clear, for example, from the fact that, like Ibn
Sina, his psychology is only tinged with Neoplatonism by fits and starts, while
all the time the starting points are pure Aristotle" (p. 255). She later suggests
that the inconsistencies in his thought are due to Neoplatonism:

> To some extent these "unevennesses" can be explained by the fact that Ibn Daud's
> Aristotelianism is still largely coloured by Neoplatonic elements. As I have already
> observed, Aristotle gets further with him than he did with earlier Jewish thinkers,

but, as his thinking on matter illustrates, this does not lead to any radical break with Neoplatonism. (P. 272)

What either Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism means in this context is, of course, the essential *aporia*. If the term "Neoplatonism" were avoided, it would be necessary to explicate the teachings of those writers who are associated with this movement. The unevennesses in Fontaine's comments represent her own equivocal evaluation of what predecessors are most central to Ibn Daud's treatise. Furthermore, in making an inquiry into this issue it is necessary to determine which theme will be considered the most decisive. We will have opportunity to reflect further on the nature of Ibn Daud's predecessors in the successive sections, but let us examine one passage, a typical passage, in Fontaine's work which illustrates the complexity of thought in Ibn Daud's predecessors.

In chapter 2 Fontaine examines Ibn Daud's notions of substance and accident. She claims, as might be expected, that Ibn Daud uses Aristotle's definitions of substance and accident. She also judges, and rightly so, that the formulations of Aristotle's definitions are taken from the *falasifa*, from Alfarabi and Ibn Sina. She is particularly impressed by Ibn Daud's reliance upon Alfarabi's commentary on the categories of Aristotle. She begins her examination of Ibn Daud's sources of the categories by disagreeing with Jacob Guttmann's comments that his treatment of the categories is *"fast wortgetreu Aristotelisch"* (p. 16).[17] She criticizes his phrase because she says that the "order" of discussion of the categories is different in Aristotle and Ibn Daud and also that Aristotle "glosses over" the last five categories, while Ibn Daud discusses them. She concludes that Ibn Daud may have had an Arabic translation of an Aristotelian text, but that he also may have had other sources. But neither the order of treatment nor a fuller discussion of Aristotle is actually proof that Ibn Daud disagrees with Aristotle's definitions of substance and accident, and this finally is what matters in this discussion.[18]

Secondly, she argues that the Hebrew spelling of the word 'category' presupposes the Arabic spelling in Alfarabi's treatise and also that several of Ibn Daud's definitions are borrowed from Alfarabi. She traces the differences between Alfarabi and Ibn Daud to a possible source, that of Ibn Sina. Again, what matters here is not source hunting for the copying of phrases, but the definitions of substance and accident. It is possible that Alfarabi, Ibn Sina, and Ibn Daud have precisely the same account of substance even though slight variations occur in the definitions. Fontaine should concentrate more completely on the philosophical issue. Further, in order to illustrate the degree of difficulty of recreating the thought of predecessors, it is necessary only to consider the number and the subtlety of Alfarabi's logical treatises. Fontaine's account of Alfarabi's view of being is confined to one of his works, "Al-Farabi's paraphrase

of the Categories of Aristotle." Alfarabi wrote a series of logical works which must be considered in Alfarabi's account of Aristotelian physics.[19] In regard to subtlety in these treatises, it is necessary to note that, despite Alfarabi's agreement with Aristotle on certain points, there is nothing comparable in them to the presentation of the categories as found in ER I.1.

4. ARISTOTELIAN AND PLATONIC SCIENCE AND BIBLICAL CREATION

There is widespread agreement that Ibn Daud's treatise is the first substantial Aristotelian treatise in Jewish thought. While Fontaine identifies a number of what she calls "Neoplatonic" elements, she judges that for Ibn Daud Aristotle is "*the* authority" (p. 254). Her view is summed up in the sentence quoted in the last section which ends with the comment that his "starting points are pure Aristotle" (p. 255). This degree of Aristotelianism in the work is by no means clear, however. In chapter 11 of her study, Fontaine gives substantial credit to Plato for Ibn Daud's accounts of the tripartite division of the soul and of ethics. Even the use of the category "Neoplatonic" is problematic. E. K. Rowson recently criticizes the use because "Muslim philosophers had never heard of Neoplatonism"; it is a term used in modern scholarship which may not accurately represent numerous authors. In Fontaine's exposition, the separation of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic encourages, as is often the case, both a strong separation of the intentions of Aristotle and Plato and the affirmation that Aristotle is a more capable advocate of biblical religion than Plato and his interpreters. But if we wish to continue a heuristic inquiry of these concerns, we thus need to be aware of possible limitations of our procedure. If there are elements from Plotinus or Porphyry or Alfarabi, they can be identified by individual author. I will thus avoid the term 'Neoplatonic' as much as possible.[20]

An inquiry into (1) the degree of purity of Ibn Daud's Aristotelianism and (2) the compatibility of Ibn Daud's natural science and biblical account of creation entails a discussion of the origin of nature in Ibn Daud's treatise. Fontaine uses the word "emanation" frequently to describe this relation. She introduces the term in her discussion of places in her book, most extensively in her chapter on the heavenly spheres and intelligences, chapter 7 (pp. 110–36). This chapter presents her most decisive statement on Ibn Daud's view. She defers to her formulation in chapter 7 in later discussions. Note for example, in chapter 9, which is her examination of God's knowledge of events and governance of the world as a whole and his governance of particulars, a chapter which raises many of the central issues of the entire treatise, she refers to her formulation of Ibn Daud's position in chapter 7 (pp. 172–73). In an examination of chapter 7, we indeed find her key discussion of 'emanation.' She summarizes Ibn Daud's position as follows:

All these vaguenesses and contradictions arise from the fact that Ibn Daud makes no clear statement regarding the question of whether the world originated by emanation or in an act of creation. In his efforts to cling to both the emanation theory of the philosophers and the traditional idea of creation he is bound to find himself bogged down in contradictions. (Pp. 134–35)

In any event, it is safe to say that Ibn Daud rejects the idea of an eternal necessary emanation. But he also accepts the idea of creation only up to a point. Nowhere, for example, does he state explicitly that God created the world from nothing, nor does he say anywhere that God created the world in time. That, in particular, would have conflicted with his ideas of an immutable God. For if God created the universe at a single particular moment, it might be wondered why he should have chosen that precise moment. This presupposes a change in God's will.

Thus we can only conclude that Ibn Daud accepts both ideas, creation and emanation, in a diluted form. God produces the world, in whatever way that might be, and he does so with his will. But for the problems that this ambivalence creates, Ibn Daud has no other solution than the shortcomings of human understanding. (P. 135)

Several key points emerge in this passage. First, Fontaine sees the two views, emanation and creation, as distinct and contradictory. Secondly, although she claims that Ibn Daud seeks to maintain the view of emanation of the philosophers, she says that Ibn Daud does not think that there is an "eternal necessary emanation." The question arises: What does emanation mean? Thirdly, she says that he accepts creation but at no point does he state explicity his agreement with creatio ex nihilo or creation at a point in time. Another question arises: What does creation mean? Her conclusion is that Ibn Daud does not solve the contradictions. In order to confirm that this is her final judgement of his view, let us examine several other passages in her book in which the issue is discussed.

Fontaine introduces Ibn Daud's use of Aristotle's account of form and matter in her exposition of his chapter 2. According to Ibn Daud's version of Aristotle, matter is known to exist because something common exists amidst the changes of forms. For example, in the case of perceptual matter (*hiyuli ha-muhash*) and artificial or manmade forms (*ha-ṣurot ha-mel'akhutiyot*), a gold scepter can be made into a gold coin and then into a gold ring and into a thousand different forms. The gold is common to each new entity; Fontaine calls this common entity "matter" or "substrate" (*homer*) or "the essence of gold" (*'aṣmut bezahav homer*) (p. 23). In the case of natural forms (*ha-ṣurot ha-tivi'ot*), or what Ibn Daud also calls divine forms (*ha-ṣrot ha-'elohiyot*), the substrate is imperceptible and is called "prime matter" (*ha-homer ha-ri'shoniyot*). The forms also are called "prime forms" (*ha-ṣurot ha-ri'shoniyot*). In this context Fontaine says that the forms and matter, whether prime form and prime matter or the individual elements, are both "emanated" from and "created" by God (pp. 23–24). She omits any comment here regarding what Hebrew terms she would translate as

"emanated" or "created." The usual term for emanation is *ha-shepha'* which is used in ER I.2, p. 10, ll.30–33; but it is also possible that the term *ha-ga'ah*, which also occurs in ER I.2, p. 10, ll.30–733 and again in ER I.2, p. 12, ll.25–40, could be translated as "emanation." Nevertheless it is in an exposition of this chapter that she begins to use the term emanation. Although she does not draw attention to the verb *bara'* in this chapter, Ibn Daud uses this poignant verb from Genesis 1 to speak of God's creative acts.[21]

Fontaine shows sufficiently that Ibn Daud's initial exposition reveals his Aristotelian starting points. Fontaine says that Ibn Daud "borrows" from Aristotle's *Physics*, I,7–8 and the *Metaphysics*, VIII. Ibn Daud's account of form and matter are an infusion of Aristotelian physics into his treatise. In consistency with these Aristotelian formulations, Fontaine notes that Ibn Daud insists, inter alia, on the Aristotelian affirmation that "nothing can proceed from nonexistence" (p. 25). It is at this point, however, that a difficult question begins to emerge: Is not creatio ex nihilo necessary to a biblical account of creation? Fontaine neglects to mention in this context that a rejection of creatio ex nihilo entails the eternity and necessity of the effect from an eternal necessary cause, and thus the eternity of the world. Furthermore, if the world proceeds from a necessary cause, then the cause in no sense wills the effect at one time rather than another and, moreover, the effect is necessarily of a particular nature. For Aristotle potentiality is not absolute nonexistence. Her only concern here—which is typical of her preoccupation with the identification of types of sources rather than with an inquiry into the *aporia* presented in Ibn Daud's text—is whether Ibn Daud read an Arabic translation of Aristotle's treatises or whether he had some other source (p. 25). Since it is Fontaine's conclusion that the contradictions are not harmonized in Ibn Daud's treatise, that he indeed fails at his stated aim of harmonizing religion and philosophy, she avoids further reflection of these difficult questions. What she offers is Ibn Daud's correction of Aristotle on the basis of biblical creation. Can we be content, however, to admit as easily as Fontaine that Ibn Daud was aware of, but could not solve, the contradictions which preoccupied the writing of his treatise? Or do we gain the impression that an alert writer introduces us as initiates to grave issues for further exploration?

Ibn Daud's account of origins is complicated further, as Fontaine recognizes, because Ibn Daud introduces other non-Aristotelian and nonbiblical elements into this chapter. In particular, Ibn Daud's view of matter is not identical to Aristotle's. She argues that Ibn Daud's notions of an "undifferentiated incorporeal form" (*surat geshem beshilluaḥ*) and of "cohesion" or "volume" (*hitdabqut*), both of which exist in prime matter, are of Neoplatonic origin. Thus she says "prime matter cannot be wholly formless since it must in any event have a certain extension, a certain volume" (p. 26). After a refutation of Jacob Guttmann's hypothesis that this notion of a universal corporeal form follows Ibn Gabirol's philosophy, Fontaine concludes that neither Ibn Gabirol nor Ibn Daud

can be acquitted of the charge of "contradiction and ambivalence" (pp. 29–30), especially in regard to matter. Fontaine's judgement of Ibn Daud's view of matter persists throughout her book. She says that his "ambivalence regarding matter will cost Ibn Daud dear, as when he discusses the relationship between body and soul" (p. 30).

In the midst of this discussion of the contradiction between Aristotelian, Platonic, and perhaps Plotinian accounts of matter, another version of beginnings is introduced. She says that Ibn Daud includes a "creation report" (ER I.2, p. 10, ll.1–18) in order to explain the origin of both prime matter and prime form (p. 30). Although she admits that the creation report is "distinctly out of place" (p. 30), Fontaine judges that it is still proof that Ibn Daud ultimately defers to a biblical account of creation. In this report Ibn Daud states his belief that God prepares the material for his craft. According to Fontaine, Aristotle provides Ibn Daud with a "magnificent explanation for the generation and the corruption of things" (p. 30), but Aristotle did not have a "monopoly on explanations of the origin of either matter or form." (p. 30). Matter is not eternal, but created. For Fontaine, the use of the term "emanation" by Ibn Daud means that matter and form are not "immanent principles in nature" and the use of the phrase "by the will of God" is a "clear indicator" that these principles are of divine origin (p. 30).

While on the whole her judgements here are correct, she does not comment on the careful movement of this part of the chapter. After a summary of the conceptual demonstration (*ha-mophet ha-sikhli*) (ER I.1, p. 9, l.41–p. 10, l.1), Ibn Daud begins a sentence with "We believe" and continues with the use of the verb "God created" (*bara'*). The juxtapositioning of two forms of knowledge, demonstration and belief, is used to make a point. Ibn Daud does not claim that the createdness of the world is demonstrative. It is a matter of belief. As we will learn later in Ibn Daud's treatise, beliefs are 'traditions' (*mequbbelot*) which are not above intellectual scrutiny. The procedure of verification, or falsification, is closer in resemblance to proof in a court of law than to a mathematical demonstration. Ibn Daud is aware of the potentially precarious nature of the verification of traditions, but he also reminds us that traditions are necessary for human community, and therefore cannot be dispensed with simply because they are not provable in the manner of scientific demonstration. Ibn Daud's view of these traditions is presented in ER II.5. The createdness of the world thus is a tradition which requires continuous examination. Ibn Daud's presentation here suggests his keen awareness of possible contradictions between scientific demonstrations and religious teachings. We should expect further examination of these issues later in his treatise, especially since his aim is to harmonize philosophy and religion.

In the final section of Ibn Daud's chapter 2, a section which is devoted to a discussion of scriptural passages, we are introduced in a cryptic manner to Ibn

Daud's account of intermediaries, and thus to a central ingredient in his account of emanation. Fontaine does acknowledge the unusual nature of this passage in a section on the teaching of Scripture. In a comment on a phrase from Job 38:14, he reflects on the secrets of the world of nature, that is, he gives an exposition of how the first sphere (*ha-galgal ha-rishon*) moves all other spheres, how the ecliptic (*galgal ha-mazzalot*) generates genera and species, and how the stars which are proceeding along the motions of the zodiac (*'azor*) generate individual forms. This chain causes the generation and dissolution of the motions of the elements and the unification and removal of forms from matter. This appears to be a passage which would invite further reflection on 'emanation,' especially in a list of passages which are used to show that biblical texts suggest Aristotelian accounts of substance. Fontaine is content here to remark that Ibn Daud "must describe what role the heaven-world plays in the sublunary" (p. 32) in order to explain generation and corruption, providence and human actions. She says we will have to look to subsequent chapters in the treatise to see why this is the case.

Ibn Daud's comments regarding Scripture in this passage initiated part of our earlier discussion on the pedagogic purpose of the treatise. According to Ibn Daud, Scripture only suggests (*remazim*) and makes allusions to what is known in philosophical demonstration. The literal sense of the Tanach thus is written for the masses. Only the special individual (*yehid segulah*) will see the secret allusions to philosophy in Scripture. To what extent does Ibn Daud present his own treatise after the pattern of Scripture? We are deliberately left with much to ponder.

Three central issues do not emerge sufficiently in Fontaine's initial discussion. First, what is necessary in an inquiry into the meaning of 'emanation' is whether a particular writer, such as Ibn Daud, understands it as a necessary progression of beings from the One or whether, at some point, perhaps only at the beginning, the First Mover makes a act of will to set the procession in motion. Second, if Ibn Daud seeks to defend God's knowledge of particulars and also particular providence, then either the First Mover or perhaps intermediaries must make continuous acts of will to govern the world. Aristotle's First Mover neither creates by an act of will nor changes in any respect to account for contingencies. Thus Aristotelian causation is necessary, and if necessary, also eternal. Necessary being itself always exists; the good and necessary effect of a good and necessary cause also always exists.[22] Third, Fontaine speaks of causation only within what is called in Aristotelian terminology "efficient" causation. In an article on Aristotle's separate movers, J. Owens writes:

> That an immobile Mover of the *Metaphysics* can function *only* as a final *cause*, and that its causality requires the Aristotelian heavens to be animated, may be taken as admitted in this question, and indeed should now be beyond controversy.[23]

Owens's summary expresses agreement with D. Ross's comments; Ross says that in book Lambda of the *Metaphysics* Aristotle argues that the First Cause moves the world only as something loved. The First Mover does not in any way "will" the world into being. Accordingly, any suggestion of voluntarism in Ibn Daud means that he is not consistent with Aristotle's argument.

This subject emerges again in chapter 7 of Fontaine's book. Chapter 7 is a discussion of ER I.8 and II.4. Fontaine summarizes the purpose of ER I.8 as Ibn Daud's intention "to prove that the motion of the heavenly spheres emanates not from their nature but from their soul" (p. 111). The heavens, or to be more specific, the spheres, have souls. The motion of the spheres is a soul-like or voluntary motion (*tenu'ot naphshiyot be-raṣon*). Natural motion, motions of nonintellectual entities due to their natures, is distinct from psychic or voluntary motion. Entities which move by natural motion move by the "will of God" (*reṣon ha-'el*), but the use of the phrase here is equivocal. The spheres are living entities. The life of these entities is higher than animal life because the spheres are rational living beings (p. 112). See especially the discussion in ER I.8, p. 41, 1.40–p. 42, 1.3.

Ibn Daud's proof of the existence of incorporeal heavenly souls is derived in part from his argument for the incorporeality of the human soul. The movement of the human soul from potential knowledge to actual knowledge proves the existence of a separate active intellect because that which is potential requires an external mover which is already actual to cause the transition to the higher existence. In a similar way, the souls of the heavenly spheres go through a transition from potentiality to actuality, and the transition must be caused by a more perfect mover. The continuous circular motion of these spheres is the most perfect actualization of potentiality possible. Fontaine remarks at this point that the motion of the spheral souls arises from the "desire of the spheral souls to become like the unmoved movers" (p. 112); and "Thus these movers cause this motion to the extent that they are the final cause, in that the heavenly bodies strive after perfection, just as the beloved object, without itself being moved, serves as the cause of the movement of the lover desiring his beloved" (pp. 112–13).

Fontaine remarks that in this exposition Ibn Daud "borrows" from Aristotle's *De Caelo* (p. 117). She does note several differences, the most important of which is that Ibn Daud's first proof of the motions of the heavenly bodies arising from a soul is derived from "premises from Aristotle's doctrine of motion" (p. 118). She says:

> [The proof] hinges on the notion that the moving principle cannot be nature because natural motion is rectilinear and comes to rest. The proof as such comes not from Aristotle but from Ibn Sina and Al-Ghazali, in both of whose works Ibn Daud would have been able to find it. Ibn Daud makes a point of stressing that motion of the heavenly bodies is voluntary and not natural, and here he disagrees with

Aristotle, who, as I have already observed, teaches that the spheres have souls but does not refer to the will. Ibn Daud's terminology reflects that of the Islamic authors to whom I have referred. (P. 118)

Fontaine explains that an objection could be raised to Ibn Daud's separation of natural and voluntary motion. She says that Aristotle himself might object (p. 293, n. 38); although Aristotle maintains that the motion of the heavens is unlike the motions beneath the heavens, the motion of the heavens is still a form of natural motion. Fontaine concludes that Ibn Daud moves on to a second demonstration for the movement of the heavens by 'soul' because he is afraid that his first proof might lead to an indentification of soul with nature (p. 118). Fontaine then examines this better proof, although the issue at stake in this first proof is, to be sure, decisive. If the motion of the soul is voluntary, and if the influence of the heavens in causation is by the will of the sphere-souls, then Ibn Daud offers a considerable modification, if not rejection, of Aristotelian science.

The difficulty in unravelling the tightly bound knots of this issue continues in ER II.4. This chapter is, according to Fontaine, "devoted to proving the existence of the so-called incorporeal substances, intelligences, or angels" (p. 119). ER II.4.1 is a demonstration of the existence of angels with respect to human thought. ER II.4.2 is a demonstration of the existence of angels with respect to the motion of the heavens. In ER II.4.2 Ibn Daud rehearses his argument, first presented in ER I.7, for the existence of an active intellect. But, as Fontaine notes, when Ibn Daud gets to the point where we expect him to produce the second proof, he says:

> If we wished to give a true and necessary proof of the existence of the intelligible substances on the basis of the motions of the spheres, we would do so. But we can only do this in a way which we wish to avoid, so we leave that path to him who will tread it, and we choose the straight path. (Fontaine's translation from p. 121 of her book, ER II.4.2, p. 60, ll.11–14)

What is Ibn Daud saying here? Is he claiming that there is a proof for the existence of incorporeal celestial intelligences which, though demonstrative, he does not wish to reproduce? Or is he saying that there is a sophistical demonstration that some people use that he does not wish to use? Fontaine's reading is that the proof is not derived from the motion of the intellects themselves, but from the movement from actuality to potentiality (p. 121). Thus she says that Ibn Daud simply returns to the demonstration for the Active Intellect, which may well indeed be a sufficient proof, although not a different one. While this is indeed one possible explanation for his procedure, it is difficult to know why Ibn Daud would start a new chapter with the statement that he was producing another proof which is independent of his proof from the nature of understanding in the human soul only to abandon this proof at the point at which it is

required. Rather it appears that here again Ibn Daud is avoiding full exposition because of the difficult nature of the proofs and the protreptic purpose of his treatise, or perhaps for other reasons. We have shown earlier that there are numerous examples in his predecessors, contemporaries and successors for partial expositions. Fontaine notes elsewhere that there are themes which are not part of his inquiry, but she does not conclude that the same is true here. Ibn Daud continues his discussion with an examination of primary instances of knowledge (*ha-yediyot ha-ri'shonot*), the need for an arouser (*me'orer*) and the reaffirmation that the heavens are moved by will (ER II.4.2, p. 60, ll.30–31).

The theme of the motion of the heavens arising from their love of perfection, a teleology of final cause, receives little further comment in Fontaine's book. She remarks that the concept of the *falasifa* of an intellectual desire causing the creation of a mental representation (*taṣawwur*) of the beloved is not found in Ibn Daud. Fontaine has no explanation for this omission (p. 122). Nor does she address the full implications of this notion of causation by attraction for her evaluation of the Aristotelianism of Ibn Daud. While I offer this judgement as a criticism here, I do not underestimate the difficult challenge for anyone who wishes to explicate this issue in Arabic philosophy.

Ibn Daud's distinction between the natural, rectilinear motion of the terrestrial sphere and the voluntary motions of the soul of man and the celestial spheres will emerge again in our next section on the soul, but this crucial formulation allows us, at this point, to present Aristotle's view. Let us begin with a quotation from *De Caelo*:

> We may take it that all movement is either natural or unnatural, and that the movement which is unnatural to one body is natural to another—as, for instance, is the case with the upward and downward movements, which are natural and unnatural to fire and earth respectively. It necessarily follows that circular movement, being unnatural to these bodies, is the natural movement of some other. Further, if, on the one hand, circular movement is *natural* to something, it must surely be some simple and primary body which is ordained to move with a natural circular motion, as fire is ordained to fly up and earth down. If on the other hand, the movement of the rotating bodies about the centre is *unnatural*, it would be remarkable and indeed quite inconceivable that this movement alone should be continuous and eternal, being nevertheless contrary to nature. At any rate, the evidence of all other cases goes to show that it is the unnatural which quickest passes away. And so, if, as some say, the body so moved is fire, this movement is just as unnatural to it as downward movement; for any one can see that fire moves in a straight line away from the centre. On all these grounds, therefore, we may infer with confidence that there is something beyond the bodies that are about us on this earth, different and separate from them; and that the superior glory of its nature is proportionate to its distance from this world of ours. (*De Caelo*, I,2 269a 34–269b 18).[24]

The motion natural to the spheres is circular motion. The continuous and eternal nature of this circular motion attests to a simple and primary body whose nature possesses a superior glory to the bodies of our world. To be sure, this account sounds very like Ibn Daud's universal corporeal form. Be that as it may, Aristotle's statement here does not distinguish natural and voluntary motions, and therefore he does not say exactly that the motions of the heavens are voluntary. Aristotle's account is the opposite of this. To the extent that the motions of the spheres approximate perfection, that is, the most perfect imitation of Perfection itself in moving things, this motion must be of a certain and necessary manner. The challenge which Ibn Daud faces, as does anyone who seeks to preserve the rule of law against the vagaries of tyranny, is to combine a serious defense of law, and thus also of prophecy, with the notion that nature entails necessity. Can there be a genuinely scientific correction, if indeed there needs to be a correction, to Aristotelian science which is consistent with, or derived from, biblical creation? Is this correction always in the form of voluntarism?

5. ON THE SOUL

Fontaine examines ER I.6 and 7 in her chapter 5 entitled "The Soul," and in so doing traverses two central subjects of inquiry in Ibn Daud's treatise, the soul and angels. The link between the two subjects is established at the beginning of ER I.6 in which Ibn Daud says the true science of the soul requires an explanation of the intermediaries that exist between the First and the corporeal substances. The intermediaries are called "angels" (*mal'akim*) in Scripture and "intellects" (*sheniyin*) by the philosophers. A demonstration of the existence of incorporeal entities, such as souls, could be derived from sense perception, but Ibn Daud says that this would not indeed be a true demonstration because the premises of such an argument are not necessary. He writes: "This is only a true demonstration if it is derived from the path of human perfections and from the path of the motions of the heavens" (ER I.6, p. 20, ll.13–15). Indeed, it is only in the following chapter, entitled "Angels," that Ibn Daud produces his argument that the rational power of the soul is neither a body nor a force in a body. Thus the issues explored in our discussion of emanation and creation also emerge in the account of the soul. He says clearly here that there are two demonstrations for incorporeal substances. We know already that the second demonstration remains unstated.[25]

Fontaine explains that Ibn Daud's first argument for the existence of the soul is actually an argument from "observation" (p. 49). We recognize different types of beings as we observe their different "functions." This leads to a definition. She formulates Ibn Daud's definition as follows: "'It is the perfection of a

natural organic body and if we wish we can say that the soul is the perfection of a natural body which has the potentiality of life" (ER I.6, p. 21, ll.10–11). Fontaine remarks that while Ibn Daud says this is Aristotle's definition of the soul, in fact, the wording suggests a different source (p. 56). Aristotle's definition is: "the first grade of actuality of a naturally organized body" (*De Anima*, II 1 412a29–412b9). She notes that Ibn Sina includes the reference to "the first grade" of actuality, but still concludes that Ibn Daud's wording suggests Ibn Sina's *Risālah*. Fontaine is careful to recognize Ibn Daud's claim that the soul in fact cannot be defined. He says he is going round about and defining the soul in respect to what happens with it. The soul cannot be defined because the genus and differentia, which are necessary for definition, cannot be identified with respect to the soul. Ibn Daud says that his definition is that of the philosopher, presumably Aristotle, but he makes no reference to the rest of Aristotle's definition, namely, that "the soul is a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it" (*De Anima*, II 1, 412a20–21). Nor does Fontaine comment, at this point, on this omission in Ibn Daud's treatise.

Ibn Daud proceeds to affirm that the soul is a substance and not an accident. As a substance, the soul is not a "mixture" of elements, but something that is "added to the mixture from outside" (p. 50). Thus Ibn Daud rejects various theories of the materialists. Fontaine explains these comments by saying: "The soul is the form and the end of the body and is the motive cause of it" (p. 50), and in her commentary: "The soul is not a mixture with a certain equilibrium, but the form that a mixture with a certain equilibrium acquires" (p. 59). The accuracy of this identification of the soul as the form of the body, however, is crucial. Fontaine herself contradicts this statement several pages later where she says: "Ibn Daud does not simply see the soul as the form of the body, but prefers to describe it as perfection, that term being more comprehensive" (p. 79). In respect to both Ibn Sina and Ibn Daud, she says: "The relationship between soul and body is not like that between form and matter" (p. 80). The soul is "independent" of the body and has "no real attachment to the body" (p. 77). Thus the soul is immortal, though it was created at the same time as the body. She concludes that the contradictory views of the relation between the soul and the body are not harmonized in Ibn Daud, and this causes an "ambivalence" which influences his views of practical and ethical matters (p. 80).

Fontaine's exposition reflects a difficult tension in Ibn Daud's treatment of the soul. In ER I.6 Ibn Daud argues that the soul is the form of the body. He says:

> We have already explained to you that the form is the substance which shines upon the hyle which is common to diverse things. Form makes the hyle into one of these individual entities. Form makes matter to be what it is by bringing it forth from potentiality to actuality. Form is the actualization of the body. The soul is the

composite of itself and hyle that exists in it as part of it. The soul is the form of the body and its actualization and its end. (ER I.6, p. 23, ll.25–29, translation mine)[26]

In the following chapter, ER I.7, Ibn Daud, after an extensive argument that the soul is not dependent on the body, offers a different solution:

It is reasoned with what we have already established that the human soul is not the form of a body at all. The doctrine of reincarnation [*gilgul*] says: indeed if there is a soul of man proper to his mixture which is generated with the generation of his mixture and still there is a soul which is separate from his body, then for one man there are two souls. (ER I.7, p. 39, ll.4–7, translation mine)

The passage definitively states that the soul is not the form of the body. The reason which follows this statement is that to make such a claim engages one in the absurd doctrine of reincarnation. Nevertheless, the contradiction between the passages from the two chapters is evident. Fontaine judges rightly that these contradictions are due to non-Aristotelian elements in Ibn Daud's psychology (p. 80).

In Ibn Daud's account of appetitive and rational powers of the soul, he refrains from identifying a faculty of will. He does explain that the appetitive faculty has the power of a mover. He says that the power of locomotion is sent forth from the brain, and the brain arouses the nerve which moves the limb. The account is strictly physical and does not explore the implications for politics of appetitive motions in the human soul (ER I.6 p. 30, ll.30–34). The omission is puzzling.

An inquiry into the causes of human action becomes even more perplexing when we consider that Ibn Daud's formulation of the relation between the soul and the body take on a political orientation—the soul governs the body—a view that is not precisely stated in Aristotle's *De Anima*. This formulation is consistent with our exposition of the political orientation of Arabic philosophy. Ibn Daud's interest in this political orientation is, in turn, consistent with his defense of Jewish religion. He thus employs the scientific account which is most harmonious with Judaism, even if such usage requires a modification of Aristotle on certain points.[27]

6. LAW (TORAH) AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

The inquiries into the faculties of the soul and into the government of the body by the soul lead inexorably to the inquiry into the foundations of law. To be sure, for Ibn Daud this inquiry entails, inter alia, an exposition of the pre-eminent legal prophecy of Moses. A defense of Judaism is a defense of law and legal prophecy. There are, however, many prophets in the Tanach. Thus, ER II.5 is an explanation of the grades of biblical prophecy. But, as we shall see, the

political concern of Ibn Daud's treatise continues even after his discussion of prophecy. ER II.6 presents his arguments regarding God's governance of the world and the mystery of omnipotence (*sod ha-yekholet*), and ER III presents the nature of right action.

Fontaine rightly observes the change in "method" (p. 140) in Ibn Daud's exposition in ER II.5. In this chapter Ibn Daud concentrates completely on the nature and validity of biblical traditions. The abstract which precedes his inquiry, the second, and only other abstract in the entire treatise, introduces a distinction between perceptual understanding (*muhshot*) and conceptual understanding (*muskalot*). The perceptions of past events are traditions (*mequbbelot*). They cannot be verified completely, although witnesses can be found to determine their validity. Fontaine writes: "Ibn Daud's starting point amounts to an assertion that certain traditions (*mequbbelot*), the reliability of which is incontrovertibly established, simply have to be accepted" (p. 141). Although Ibn Daud will proceed to commend the witness of the biblical traditions, the force of his distinction between perceptual and conceptual understanding is made not simply to establish the perfection of biblical authority, but rather to distinguish two types of verification. The deliberate distinction Ibn Daud made between demonstration and faith in ER I.2 is continued here. The demonstration of the validity of past events cannot proceed in the same manner as the demonstrations of science. This possible "frailty" of traditions, however, does not cause Ibn Daud to abandon or despair over the task. Traditions are necessary to the preservation of the order of the world. The inquiry into the veracity of ancient traditions is like the work of a judge who must carefully sift through the accounts of the witnesses. The legal nature of the procedure is germane to the legal nature of biblical traditions.[28]

The delineation of degrees of prophecy is essential for a justification of the supremacy of the Mosaic legal prophecy. The gradations of prophecy are derived from the respective faculty of the soul which is operative in the emanation of the divine. Fontaine explains that the highest grade of prophecy occurs for Ibn Daud when the imagination is "restricted" by the intellect (p. 143). The imagination is a source of "interference" (p. 143) and a "disadvantage" (p. 144). She contrasts this view with Alfarabi, for whom the imagination (in her account of Alfarabi, the *mutahayyila*) is necessary for someone who wishes to be a prophet. Ibn Daud presents an intellectual view of prophecy. According to Fontaine, the prophet is also required to have high standards of moral perfection, and prophecy can only arise in a particular period of time, at a particular place, and among a particular people (p. 147). Following this discussion of the qualifications of a prophet, we would expect an inquiry into the biblical prophets who attain to each grade. She does not engage in a reflection of Ibn Daud's views of dreams and symbols nor of those prophets whose intellect is so strong that they need no intermediaries. Nor does she reflect on the grades of prophecy in the Tanach. This omission is most strikingly noted when she says

in passing: "That Moses is unrivalled among the prophets is apparent from, among other things, the title 'Lord of the prophets' which Ibn Daud bestows upon him him [sic]" (p. 149). We would expect a substantial discussion of Mosaic prophecy.

The reticence is not only Fontaine's but also Ibn Daud's. There is very little in ER II.5.1 that is an exposition of biblical passages which elucidate the nature of Moses's prophecy. The chapter refers briefly to two prophets, Abraham and Moses, who are educated in the nature of prophecy, and the chapter also includes several comments on Moses's righteousness and humility, but there is no comment on Numbers 12 and only a brief comment on Exodus 33–34, biblical passages which examine Moses's grade of prophecy. Abraham receives both symbolic and nonsymbolic prophecy, but the nonsymbolic, that is, the non-imaginative, is a higher grade. Ibn Daud does not make a similar point in regard to Moses, even though he might have discussed Numbers 12 in this context. Ibn Daud provides an examination of Exodus 33–34 in II.6.1, the chapter on equivocal and metaphorical terms which occur in the Hebrew language. We can only begin to ponder what ER II.5.1 means in the context of Ibn Daud's treatise as we recognise that a full explanation of biblical passages and of the purpose of each prophet's understanding is incomplete. The introductory nature of the treatise persists. We observe a procedure in which Ibn Daud often addresses a subject in a different chapter than we expect the discussion.[29]

Fontaine concludes that Ibn Daud's view of prophecy is "borrowed" from Halevi or from Rabbinical discussions (p. 147). She writes:

> But compared with the *falasifa* Ibn Daud's work gives intellectual qualities a subordinate role. Where ER discusses prophecy there is no reference to intellectual perfection or the various stages of the process of apprehension, there is merely talk of preparation of the soul: and the preparation is mainly on a moral plane. (P. 147)

In this statement Fontaine not only expresses her view that morality is a more critical preparation than intellectual perfection for the obtaining of prophecy, but she reveals that the soul is a moral entity. She adequately notes that in regard to the critical issue of prophecy, Ibn Daud's orthodoxy is secure.

Ibn Daud has a remark in ER II.5.1 which confirms Fontaine's thesis regarding the purpose of the entire treatise. According to Ibn Daud, dreams that have meaning only for one individual are not instances of prophecy. Dreams must possess matters pertaining to the nations. Prophecy has a political import. The first example Ibn Daud gives is the symbolic representation of the nations in Daniel 7.

ER II.5.2 presents a more decisive defense of Mosaic legal prophecy. The chapter makes an inquiry into the question of whether law can change (*temurah*), that is, whether legal prophecy is universal. The first part of the chapter is a discussion of rational commandments (*mephursamot*) of the Mutakallimun.

Fontaine surmises that Ibn Daud agrees with the Mutakallimun, although she says his view most closely approximates that of Saadya Gaon's. She also distinguishes Ibn Daud's view from that of Maimonides, since Maimonides rejects rational commandments (p. 152). Whatever Ibn Daud's final judgement of the rational commandments of the Mutakallimun, Fontaine does make a valuable distinction in Ibn Daud's choice of words. The mind knows "intelligibles" (*muskalot*) rather than "rational commandments" (*mephursamot*), and good is an intelligible (see also ER I.7, p. 37, ll. 3–4). We do not know from Fontaine's inquiry, nor for that matter, from Ibn Daud's treatise, what biblical laws qualify as intelligibles. Even in this issue which is vital for the practice of true religion, Ibn Daud continues his introductory procedure. Ibn Daud explains the categories which are necessary for the inquiry into biblical law, but he does not do our work for us.

ER II.5.2 entails a criticism of Christianity and Islam. Christianity teaches that the Mosaic law is superseded by the new covenant. Islam teaches that the Torah has been falsified. The Christians are reminded, inter alia, of the prophecy found in Malachi 4:4, and the Muslims are reminded of the well-attested traditions (*shemu'ot tekhuphot*) (ER II.5.2, p. 78, ll.5–6). Fontaine says that these refutations are a "polemic" (p. 166), though Ibn Daud is moderate in his presentation. He notes that it is the philosophers and the Mutakallimun who are most opposed to any notion that God may change, that is, they are closest to the true intention of Scripture, while the literal reading of many passages of Scripture suggest that God repents (ER II.5.2, p. 75, l.38–p. 76, l.20).

ER II.6.1 and 2 present Ibn Daud's account of God's governance of the world and the secrets of ability. A perpetual law can only be useful if various actions are possible and efficacious. According to Fontaine, Ibn Daud rejects the Mu'tazilite approach of Saadya and Halevi (p. 213). Ibn Daud wishes to preserve causality in creation, and therefore he opposes various doctrines of occasionalism even amongst "orthodox" coreligionists. He rejects the assertion that God's foreknowledge implies determination which, according to Fontaine, is found in both Saadya and Halevi. She concludes: "For this reason there is now only one way open to him: to restrict God's knowledge of the possible in order to save the freedom of the will. He may swear that this does not mean a deficiency in God's knowledge, but if it is a matter of choosing between the freedom of the will and God's omniscience, the choice is not in favour of God's omniscience." (p. 213). She adds that those, like Halevi, who trace all causes back to God have for Ibn Daud a deterministic tendency. It is Ibn Daud's account of intermediate causes that makes actual the possibility of human action. Fontaine makes the same judgement in the following section on "providence" (pp. 216–17).

I can only make two remarks here. First, Ibn Daud does not express criticism of Halevi's views. Throughout the entire treatise he is remarkably reticent regarding his illustrious predecessor. He cannot but have been in sympathy with

Halevi's understanding of the faith. Second, for Ibn Daud, the intelligences emanate wisdom, but only in necessary ways. The proper subordination of matter to intelligence only occurs with the recognition of necessities. There are possibilities in certain beings, the possibility of action in harmony with the good or not. While Fontaine's thesis regarding the centrality of moral or political philosophy to Ibn Daud is correct, and therefore it is necessary to speak of "free will," the emphasis in his treatise must continually be placed on the subordination of free activity to intelligence. Neither the One nor the human soul possesses a faculty of will. Freedom is only discovered in knowledge.

According to Fontaine ER III does not depart from Ibn Daud's earlier formulations. She writes. "The final chapter of ER is a logical conclusion to what has gone before: man is free to choose, and practical philosophy points the way. Achieving bliss calls for triple perfection: perfection of man's moral disposition and of his life in the family and the community at large" (p. 225). She admits a substantial Platonic element in this final chapter in regard to the tripartite division of the human soul and in regard to the virtues. In particular, Ibn Daud, like Plato, maintains that justice is the virtue that corresponds to the rational faculty (pp. 225–27). Her exposition of the relation of intellect and action is an inquiry into Ibn Daud's account of 'happiness' (*haṣleḥah*). She concludes that the "emphasis" in this final chapter is on conduct. She writes:

> For the fact is that in this chapter there is no question of the primacy of theoretical intellect: the emphasis is rather on man's conduct, and in particular on his service to God. Certainly there are references to theoretical intellect, with its concomitant activity of acquiring knowledge, but the supreme virtue is justice, even though in the first instance Ibn Daud marked justice, in so far as it amounts to dominion, as a virtue belonging to practical reason. Here, then, contemplation remains in the background, giving way to action. (P. 231)

And finally, Ibn Daud's delineation of rational and traditional commandments confirms this emphasis on action. Fontaine says that Ibn Daud's initial introduction of traditional commandments in this chapter places them in a subordinate position to the rational commandments (p. 234). But she says that his position at the end of the chapter is different. She writes:

> Thus in the final pages of ER we see the beginnings of a gradual shift in Ibn Daud's appreciation of the traditional commandments from 'the least important' through 'psychologically useful' to 'superior'. This is an extremely significant shift because it shows us what Ibn Daud's real standpoint is regarding the question of the relationship between philosophy and religion. It is one of the few passages from which it becomes apparent that at critical moments the scales tip towards religion. Earlier Ibn Daud has said, sporadically but in unmistakably clear terms, that human reason has its limits. Not everything can be grasped by the intellect, and that applies to the point of the commandments: far from all the commandments can be

shown to have a rational justification, but we must accept them without asking their purpose. (P. 235)

Ibn Daud's final position is "surprisingly close" to J. Halevi (p. 235).

This exposition of ER III is a confirmation of a certain aspect of Fontaine's thesis concerning the treatise. Judaism is a legal tradition. A defense of Judaism requires a defense of law. A defense of law requires an account of the human soul in which human beings have the possibility of free action, or in Fontaine's words a "free will." Indeed the chapter ends with the cryptic reflection on the prophet Abraham, who did not consider his knowledge equal to God's and who took the risk to fulfill the commandment when he offered his son without full knowledge. Ibn Daud does not seek a rational justification of all the command-ments, but the commandments must be obeyed even if they are not understood. Fontaine recognizes Ibn Daud's political concerns.

While this emphasis on the legal defense of religion is germane, it is neces-sary to remember that Ibn Daud apprehends his project as harmonizing philoso-phy and faith. Let us reflect further on Ibn Daud's account of political philosophy. He writes such powerful statements as: "Political philosophy (*ha-philosophiya' ha-ma'asit*) exists in the Torah in a more perfect way [than in the sciences]" (ER III, p. 101, 1.44);[30] and "[Political philosophy] is found in our Torah in the most perfect state possible" (ER III, p. 98, 11.22–23); and "Political philosophy exists in the Torah in a more perfect way. It is taken from the Torah and the Torah proceeds with it to its end" (ER III, p. 101, 11.44–45). He does not juxtapose these two possible rival claims on knowledge and action. Fon-taine's separation of faith and philosophy is more decisive than Ibn Daud's. She often points out Ibn Daud's unresolved contradictions, and thus she judges that he is not able to accomplish his aim.

Furthermore, lest we consider that Ibn Daud's protreptic intentions are ful-filled prior to book III and we thus seek in this book to discover his final and complete statement on his subject, let us observe two aspects of his presentation here that reveal his consistency throughout the entire treatise. First, although Ibn Daud's orthodoxy is certainly substantiated in book III, his presentation of the purpose of sacrifice leaves us with much to ponder. Ibn Daud remarks that sacrifice is one of the feeble grades of the law. After a citation of several prophetic passages which reveal the weakness of sacrifice, Ibn Daud examines a series of cases in which the feebleness of sacrifice is evident. As an example, Ibn Daud says that the belief that the shedding of blood placates Being is derived in part from the astrological teaching that Mars is the heavenly object responsible for the governance of the shedding of blood, and killing or blood-letting, either among animals or humans, reduces the harm of such acts. Ibn Daud here notes the continuity between certain biblical and pagan practices. He is careful to draw to our attention that the first three of the Ten Commandments oppose the worship of heavenly bodies. The context in which an argument is

used is essential. Nonetheless, Ibn Daud requires us to reflect on the various grades of law in the Torah, in this instance, the purpose of sacrifice. He knows he has not exhausted his subject.

Second, here in book III Ibn Daud says: "Justice is the head of all the virtues" (ER III, 99, ll.2–3); "Justice is the beginning of the commandments" (ER III, p. 99, l.9); and "By Justice the heavens and the earth endure" (ER III, p. 99, ll.9–10). This justice is intellectual: "Because the faculty of the active intellect is the judge of the rest of the powers of the body" (ER III, p. 99, l.5); "It [Justice] is the virtue which is sent from the wealth of the intellect" (ER III, p. 99, l.17); and "Its [Justice's] opposite is vice, the offshoot of folly" (ER III, p. 99, ll.18–19). Ibn Daud does not abandon his attempt to show the harmony of the Torah and intelligence.

Ibn Daud essentially introduces us, both in book III and in the entire treatise, to the subject of political philosophy. It is practical, or perhaps more adequately named, political philosophy. It offers a true understanding of tradition because above all Judaism is a set of moral and political teachings. An examination of the grades and purposes of the commandments and of the demonstrations of the roots of the Torah is found only in the true science of the law, political philosophy. The first and only science which can claim to examine Justice is political philosophy. "First" is, to be sure, an equivocal term, and sometimes first in the order of sequence is not first in the order of rank. But if Justice is to be given its due, we will at some point be required to reflect upon the Exalted Faith, and we will need a science to offer a true understanding of that faith. Ibn Daud introduces a science, perhaps the architectonic science itself, and he points to the type of good government such a science would produce. Book III does not ignore the concern for a proper understanding of voluntary action and free will, but the emphasis here is on the abundance of good conduct and loving worship that flows from true knowledge. It is necessary to moderate Fontaine's argument sufficiently to acknowledge his protreptic emphasis. Ibn Daud knows he has introduced us to possibilities we may not have considered and he has not exhausted his subject. He writes neither for the completely innocent nor for the masters.

7. CONCLUSIONS

Fontaine's extended examination of the *The Exalted Faith* will remain an unavoidable study for those who wish to understand Ibn Daud. My central criticism of her study is its failure to recognize the introductory nature of the treatise. All syllogisms, and therefore all demonstrations, are not found therein. The attempt to elucidate a logical structure to the treatise is challenged by this quality of the text. The master of the art of logic is required to construct those syllogisms which are absent. Her repeated comments on the unresolved contra-

dictions in the treatise, which are in certain respects true, also misunderstand and underestimate the deliberate purpose of these contradictions. The protreptic nature of the treatise is more intentional than she appreciates, and it is not a mark of incompetence.

Ibn Daud's defense of the political nature of Judaism can only be appreciated within this context. Scripture is only adequately understood if it is appreciated as a theologico-political document. Science can only demonstrate the foundations of Judaism, that is, it is only harmonious with Judaism if it is a science which can defend legal prophecy. Ibn Daud would have those of us who are not absolute beginners proceed with an investigation which will end in the true understanding of Scripture.

The greatest thinkers of medieval Arabic science usually present their inquiries as commentaries on classical philosophical texts. It is unfortunate that current dissertations cannot follow this example more rigorously. There is always a place for the careful and orderly exposition of the thoughts of an intelligent writer as he has presented them to us. This is even more so the case when we are still so uncertain regarding the actual readings of an original Arabic text that is now only available to us in two later imperfect Hebrew translations. The procedure of such a commentary must at all points be philosophical. Fontaine's interest in sources is valuable, but it all too often becomes a distraction from sustained evaluation of the manner of presentation of the treatise itself. Nor is our task complete when we have identified contradictions. If the partial exposition is deliberate, the contradictions are the axes upon which the understanding of the treatise is founded. The *falasifa* are known for their subtlety, and there is sufficient evidence from *The Exalted Faith* that Ibn Daud takes his place among the best of the tradition. We are required to become students in the presence of the masters of the Arabic scientific tradition.

NOTES

1. T. A. M. Fontaine, *In Defense of Judaism: Abraham Ibn Daud. Sources and Structure of ha-Emunah ha-Ramah*, Studia Semitica Neerlandica (Assen-Maastricht: Van Gorcum, 1990). The book is a slightly adapted version of her doctoral dissertation, and I assume that it is in this revised version that she wishes the book to be evaluated. The book was translated into English by H. S. Lake. All page references in this essay are to this English translation. The Hebrew text upon which her study is based is Abraham Ibn Daud, edited and translated into German by S. Weil under the title *Das Buch Emunah Ramah Oder Der Erhabene Glaube* (Frankfurt am Main: Druck der Typographischen Anstalt, 1852); I will continue to use Weil's Hebrew version even though only a few years prior to the appearance of Fontaine's book there was a Hebrew edition, English translation, and commentary on the treatise completed by N. Samuelson and G. Weiss. See N. Samuelson, translator and commentator, and G. Weiss, translator, *The Exalted Faith* (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1986; London and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1986). Samuelson and Weiss's study requires an evaluation in its own right. Fontaine says that she is aware of Samuelson and Weiss's work, but unfortunately was not able to use it (p. 3), but she does not say why. It would have been useful if Fontaine had commented on Samuelson and Weiss's edition and

commentary in her book; their edition was published at least three years prior to publication of the English version of her dissertation. Perhaps Lake's English translation is an essentially unrevised dissertation which had been completed several years before Samuelson and Weiss's publication. At any rate, we anticipate further scrutiny of their work, which contains no apparatuses, on her part. The three other Hebrew versions of the treatise should also be mentioned. E. Alon prepared chapter 7 in Motot's translation for partial completion of a master's degree at Hebrew University. See E. Alon, *Chapter Seven from Emunah Nissa'ah of Ra'bad HaLavi* (master's dissertation: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1966), in Hebrew. A second Hebrew version is also partial. It produces both the Ibn Labi and Motot translations of book 2, chapter 5 through to the end of the treatise. See J. Eisenberg, *Emunah Ramah* (Jerusalem: Hoṣa'at Haskel, 1986), in Hebrew. A. Eran made a complete version of Motot's translation for partial completion of a doctoral degree. A. Eran, *The Philosophical Sources of Abraham Ibn Daud in His Book 'Al-'Aqidah 'Al-Rafi'ah (Special Emphasis on the Translation of Samuel Motot: HaEmunah HaNissa'ah)* (doctoral dissertation: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1990), in Hebrew. The enumeration of the treatise that I use is as follows: the abbreviation ER refers to Weil's Hebrew edition of *The Exalted Faith*, followed by the book number and chapter, followed by the page and line numbers. Some chapters also have subchapters.

2. Bookstaber dates *The Exalted Faith* to A. D. 1168. P. D. Bookstaber, *The Idea of Development of the Soul in Medieval Jewish Philosophy* (Philadelphia: Maurice Jacobs, 5711–1950), p. 68.

3. Abraham Ibn Daud, *The Book of Tradition (Sefer Ha-Qabbalah)*, translated and introduced by Gerson D. Cohen (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1967–5728).

4. But see W. Bacher's reflections on the Arabic title of the treatise. W. Bacher, "Der arabische Titel des religionsphilosophischen Werkes Abraham Ibn Daud's," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 46(1892): 541–44. Fontaine's bibliographical entry contains an error.

5. The Hebrew is as follows: *ve-hu' ha-perek 'asher biglalo u-ve-sibbato hoṣenu zeh ha-sepher ve-hu' hayah teḥilat ha-maḥshabah ve-soph ha-ma'aseh*, ER II.6, p. 93, ll.22–24.

6. The purpose of this passage requires further reflection. Fontaine makes no commentary on the passage, nor for that matter, on the introductory Abstract.

7. The sense of the Hebrew in this passage as it is presented in Weil's edition is difficult. A crucial phrase in this passage for delineation of the purpose of the entire treatise is uncertain: *ki taklit ha-philosophiyyah—ha-ma'asit* (ER Abstract p. 4, l.10). Samuelson and Weiss do not have the dashes in their Hebrew text, and they translate the line as a nominal sentence. Unless we have a better manuscript, we do not know whether a word or phrase has dropped out.

8. G. Whalley, "On Translating Aristotle's *Poetics*," in *Studies In Literature and the Humanities: Innocence of Intent* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), pp. 44–74.

9. Alcinous, *The Handbook of Philosophy*, translated with an introduction and commentary, by J. Dillon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 48.

10. Porphyry, *Porphyry the Phoenician: Isagoge*, translated, with an introduction and notes, by E. W. Warren, Medieval Sources in Translation 16. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1975), p. 27, ll.7–10. An English translation was also made in the last century: Porphyry, *The Introduction of Porphyry*, in *The Organon, or Logical Treatises of Aristotle*, translated with an introduction by O. F. Owens (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853), vol. 2, p. 609.

11. Avicenne, *La Metaphysique du Shifā': Livres I à V*, translated and with an introduction, notes, and commentary by G. C. Anawati (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1978), p. 42. Alfarabi, "Al-Farabi's *Eisagoge*," edited and translated by D. M. Dunlop, *The Islamic Quarterly* 3(1956): 117–38. Dunlop writes that Ibn Bajjah says that Alfarabi was not alone in maintaining that the *Eisagoge* is not merely propaideutic but a partial logic. This distinction is obscure and needs elucidation. Alfarabi, *Al-Fārābī, Fuṣūl al-Madanī ("Aphorisms of the Statesman")*, translated by D. M. Dunlop (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961). Alfarabi, "Al-Fārābī's Introductory Sections on Logic," edited by D. M. Dunlop, *The Islamic Quarterly*, 2 (1955): 264–82. P. Kahle, "Mosis Maimonidis Aphorismorum Praefatio et Excerpta," *Galeni in Platonis Timaeum Commentarii Fragmenta* (Berlin, 1934), pp. 91–96. See M. Mahdi's comments in a review of D. M. Dunlop's *Fuṣūl al-Madanī ("Aphorisms of the Statesman")* in *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 23(1964): 140–43. Ibn Tufayl, *Hayy the Son of Yaqzan*, translated by G. N. Atiyeh, in R. Lerner

and M. Mahdi, editors, *Medieval Political Philosophy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 134–62. M. Maimonides, *The Guide of the Perplexed,* translated and with an introduction and notes by S. Pines and an introductory essay by L. Strauss (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 1a–2b, pp. 2–4.

12. In noting the parallel between Ibn Daud's addressee and Maimonides' addressee it must be kept in mind that what one writer achieves with the use of a certain strategy may not be what another writer achieves.

13. This second division in the treatise has, of course, been recognized by other commentators. In the modern context, J. Eisenberg was sufficiently convinced of the change of subject that he was willing to publish a Hebrew version of ER II.5 to the end of the treatise, that is, to separate the second part of the book from the first part. J. Eisenburg, *'Emunah Ramah* (Jerusalem: *Hoṣa'at Haskel,* 1986). It is unusual that Eisenberg entitles his Hebrew edition *'Emunah Ramah* that is, "an exalted faith." Note the use of the definite article with the noun, *Ha'Emunah,* in both abstracts in Weil's edition and in the second abstract in both manuscript versions of the text in Eisenberg's edition. Eisenberg both uses and omits the article in references to the title in the foreword to his edition. All manuscripts of both Ibn Labi's translation (G. Weiss omits the opening lines of MS Mich 57 in his summary of the manuscripts, and it is therefore possible that this manuscript is an exception) and the one manuscript of Motot's translation have the definite article.

14. M. Maimonides, *Maimonides' Treatise on Logic (Makalah Fi-Sina'at Al-Mantik),* Hebrew edition and English translation by I. Efros (New York: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1938), p. 64.

15. M. Mahdi reflects on the political orientation of Islamic philosophy as a whole in an essay entitled *The Political Orientation of Islamic Philosophy,* Occasional Papers Series, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 1982). In a more specific but cryptic account of political thought in Alfarabi and Ibn Sina, Mahdi notes the difference between Alfarabi's "identification of religion with the city" and Ibn Sina's "philosophic interpretation of religion." M. Mahdi, "Avicenna: i. Introduction," in *Encyclopedia Iranica,* edited by El Yarshater (London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1989), vol. 3, pp. 66–67. Mahdi's comments suggest that there is a different political philosophy in these Arab writers. Fontaine argues persuasively that Ibn Daud is more in agreement, at least in general, with Ibn Sina than Alfarabi. It is essential, therefore, to inquire whether the relation between theoretical and practical philosophy is the same in Alfarabi and Ibn Sina. In a comparison of two writers it is necessary to base the conclusions on a careful comparison of content. The impressive suggestion made by M. T. d'Alverny that Avendauth of Toledo, one of the translators of Avicenna, is really Ibn Daud, must be considered at length, however. M. T. d'Alverny, "Avendauth?" *Homenaje a Millas-Vallicrosa* (Barcelona: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1954–56), vol. 2, pp. 19–43. A. Eran has also shown Ibn Daud's dependence upon Ibn Sina's notion of the immortality of the soul. A. Eran, "Avicenna's Influence on Abraham Ibn Daud's Proof of the Immortality of the Soul," *DAAT: A Journal of Jewish Philosophy and Kabbalah,* 31 (1992–93): 5–25.

16. There is a thoughtful discussion of this issue in the preface to *Falaquera's Epistle of the Debate,* English translation and Hebrew edition by S. Harvey (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. ix–xvi.

17. Fontaine does not in fact point out which of the two Guttmanns she is criticizing here. The reader is required to check the endnotes at the back of the book, only to discover that the publisher's method of endnote citation only gives the year of publication. We then turn to the bibliography and discover that the publications of only one Guttmann are listed, even though both father, Jacob, and son, Julius, have been mentioned in the Introduction (p. 4). We then need to check the endnote in the Introduction to Julius Guttmann to see when he published on Ibn Daud. This complicated procedure is created by the publisher's cryptic endnote citations and also by an omission in the bibliography. Of course, if we knew the identity and dates of the authors, we would not need to track this down, but the purpose of footnotes and bibliography is to provide what we do not already know.

18. M. Arfa's unpublished doctoral dissertation remains the central study on this issue. There is no sustained evaluation of Arfa's argument in her study. See M. Arfa, "Abraham Ibn Daud and the

Beginnings of Medieval Jewish Aristotelianism (with special reference to the concept of substance in the EMUNAH RAMAH)" (New York: Columbia University, 1954).

19. Alfarabi, "Al-Farabi's paraphrase of the Categories of Aristotle," Arabic edition and English translation by D.M. Dunlop, *Islamic Quarterly* 4(1958): 168–97, and 5(1959): 21–54. Alfarabi, "The Existence and Definition of Philosophy: From the Arabic text ascribed to al-Fārābī," English translation by D. M. Dunlop, *Iraq* 13(1951): 76–94. Alfarabi, "Al-Fārābī's Introductory Sections on Logic," Arabic edition and English translation by D. M. Dunlop, *The Islamic Quarterly* 2(1955): 264–82. Alfarabi, "Al-Fārābī's *Eisagoge*, Arabic edition and English translation by D. M. Dunlop, *The Islamic Quarterly*, 3(1956): 117–38. Alfarabi, "Al-Fārābī's Introductory Risālah on Logic," Arabic edition and English translation by D. M. Dunlop, *The Islamic Quarterly*, 4(1957): pp. 224–35. M. Türker has also published Arabic editions and Turkish translations of several of Alfarabi's treatises, one of which is listed here because it is not one of Dunlop's editions. M. Türker, "Küçük Kiyas Kitabi (Kitâb-ul-kiyâs-Sagîr)," *Revue de la Faculté de Langues, d'Historie et de Géographie de l'Université d'Ankara*, 16(1958): 214–86.

20. E. K. Rowson, "Review of I. R. Netton's Al-Farabi and His School," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 26(1994): 338–41.

21. Ibn Daud's theory that there must be a generation of a mixture or balance of the elements in matter which is necessary for association of this matter with a particular soul is not Aristotelian. Afnan says that it is also found in Ibn Sina. S. M. Afnan, *Avicenna: His Life and Works* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958), p. 136. At the same time, Ibn Daud seeks to distinguish his theory from the crasis theory. See Fontaine, pp. 59–60.

22. There is no faculty of 'will' in Aristotle's *De Anima*. See the passages at III. 9, 432b 5–9, 433a 22–433b 5, and III. 11, 434a 10–15. See Kogan's inquiry into the issue of eternal necessary creation in Averroes' criticism of Al-Ghazali. B. S. Kogan, *Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985).

23. J. Owens, "The Reality of the Aristotelian Separate Movers," *Review of Metaphysics* 3(1950): 322. See Owens's bibliography on this subject in footnote number fourteen of his article.

24. Aristotle, *De Caelo*, translated by J. L. Stocks, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, R. McKeon, editor (New York: Random House, 1941), pp. 400–401.

25. Samuelson and Weiss note that MS 57, the manuscript that serves as the basis of their Hebrew edition—because it is "complete and beautifully preserved" and "the script is exceptionally legible," and it "seems to be the latest copy known to us"—omits a reference to the first demonstration; thus the only demonstration mentioned by this manuscript is one that is not stated. See their *The Exalted Faith*, p. 105, n. 1. Samuelson and Weiss do not reflect on this anomaly. For their comments on the manuscript see page 17. They say that the second proof is found in ER I 8 (p. 121). The chapter certainly says that locomotion may be accidental.

26. Weil's *hu'* must be *hi'*, and thus it refers to 'soul.'

27. A. Eran argues that Ibn Daud's account of the soul is dependent upon Ibn Sina. See article cited above in footnote 15.

28. This distinction has collapsed in biblical studies with the result that mathematical-like certainty is now expected of biblical traditions. When this certainty cannot be obtained, there is an attendant scepticism of the merits of all traditions. Concomitantly, it is not surprising that the "Enlightenment" schools of biblical scholarship do not conduct their inquiries in a legal or political mode.

29. Concerning Moses he says: "Furthermore, we will complete the account of these characteristics in the chapter on the grades of virtue." ER II.5.1, p. 75, l.12.

30. *Ha-philosophiya˙ ha-ma'asit* should be compared to *ha-hanahagot ha-mediniyyot*.