

interpretation

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Volume 15 number 1

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Discussion

The Moral Foundations of the American Republic

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The Moral Foundations of the American Republic, 3rd ed. Edited by Robert H. Horwitz. (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1986. x + 347 pp.: cloth \$25.00, paper \$6.50.)

The bicentennial of the framing of the American Constitution is being ushered in with little of the self-congratulatory fanfare that accompanied the bicentennial of the American Revolution, a fact that reflects in some measure our ambivalence about this event, as well as our uncertainty about its importance relative to earlier collective experiences. A characteristic American tendency toward self-criticism, which is noted throughout *The Moral Foundations of the American Republic*, is clearly manifest in our ambivalence toward the Constitution, and takes its bearings by interpretations of that document. As indicated by the recent furor over the weight to be accorded to the intent of the framers in judicial review, we wonder less about whether their intention can be in the main discerned than about whether the framers' views should in fact be binding upon us. Should it happen that our commemoration of the Constitution continues to be marked in a sober and reflective manner—by lecture series, books of essays, new editions of the founding documents, etc.—we might reasonably agree that such a response is fitting. A meditative posture corresponds not only to our own mixed feelings, but also partakes of the sobriety of the original workmen themselves. Even those scholarly productions that owe their appearance to the bicentennial, moreover, essentially extend and continue the process of appraisal and reappraisal of the framers' work that, in the debates between Federalists and Anti-federalists, came into being with the Constitution itself. In his editorial preface, Robert Horwitz ties the publication of the third edition of *The Moral Foundations of the American Republic* expressly to the bicentennial of the Constitution. The book aims to make a contribution to our ongoing reflections in this year of heightened awareness of our foundations. The value of the contribution it makes will endure far beyond the anniversary itself. For the light that it sheds on the work of the framers and their intent, for the justice that it does them—illuminating both the strengths and weaknesses of the project, its readers can be most grateful. It is an important and wonderful book.

Although the American Constitution is not the official subject of every essay in the book, all the contributors take as their theme the founding principles in one way or another and consider them in light of their moral effects, as experienced during the last two hundred years. Each essayist also treats of possible resources within our heritage for overcoming the defects of those principles and augmenting their strengths. The book accords due prominence to the views of Madison, the philosophy of Locke, the larger philosophical and political context within which the framers' work took place, and the contours of current criticism of the Constitution by some of its best representatives. There are also two essays that address specifically two of the most vexing constitutional issues still very much on our minds today—the definitive accounts of the founders' view of slavery by Herbert Storing and of the "establishment" clause of the First Amendment and its background by Walter Berns.

Considering the great success of this book, one would be ill-advised to alter it lightly. The additions Mr. Horwitz has made to the third edition enhance the value of the book, while preserving the extraordinary quality of the individual essays, the responsible manner in which the authors discuss controversial issues, and the book's well-articulated and coherent structure. The new essays further clarify the book's central pedagogical intention: to oblige the reader to consider conflicting arguments on fundamental questions relative to our moral foundations and to leave him to draw his own conclusions. With the new essay by Michael Zuckert on Locke's view of civil religion, the book establishes even more firmly the centrality of Locke's philosophy to an understanding of the American project. The addition of James Ceaser's thoughtful and lively critique of Robert Dahl's proposals for the refounding of the nation in view of its defects extends the scope of the book in a more pronounced way into the realm of policy prescriptions. The new introductory essay by Will Morrissey explains the book's format and demonstrates how and why to read it. Mr. Morrissey takes the reader by the sure route of common sense into the concerns of the book, brings its design into focus for him, and alerts him to the disputes he will encounter in the essays, which are arranged in pairs. The introduction is an excellent argument for the approach to the study of American political thought employed here. I can only point to, without being able to describe, the deep comprehension of the essays and of the relationships among them that informs Mr. Morrissey's introduction. It clearly exhibits the qualities of the essays it introduces. It will assist the first time reader, but only after spending considerable time with the essays can one fully appreciate its value. Although the introduction is written, as the book is, with the undergraduate student especially in mind, it is also, as the book itself clearly proves to be, a manual for teachers. The book now comprises six pairs of essays, three on either side of the essay on the United States as regime by Joseph Cropsey, which is so placed as to emphasize that it is the central essay in the work.

The first pair of essays by Robert Goldwin and Benjamin Barber presents two general views of the founders' political project and establishes the central themes

of the book. While they are allied in their praise of the founders' political moderation and realism, the two men disagree about the character and consequences of the Constitution. Mr. Goldwin discerns a deliberate effort on the part of the framers' form-giving project to respond to the distinctive American character or genius, which they found already preformed, so to speak, by cultural diversity and shared historical experiences prior to 1787, in light of general republican principles. Mr. Barber argues that the framers recast republican principles in light of a need to respond to distinctively American economic conditions. While both men perceive the emancipation of the passions conducive to commodious self-preservation and the encouragement of economic growth and entrepreneurial energies to be objects of the Constitution, they have differing views of the moral standing of those objects and of the extent to which real accommodation of republican principles was possible with them in view. Both do see genuine moral principles in the Constitution and agree that neither the American character, nor American conditions, nor republican principles as they were understood required government to be the vehicle of moral elevation in any grand sense. They are most concerned with the consequences of this fact.

In order to bring to light the manner in which these essays deepen the reader's understanding as he goes along, I will try to follow out the strand of argument that runs through the book stemming from Mr. Goldwin's orientation, extend it in one respect, and then return to the objections to that orientation raised by Mr. Barber and others.

Mr. Goldwin asserts that the moral principles embodied in the Constitution foster in Americans habits of right action—especially decency, moderation, and self-restraint. In a way that is pertinent to later discussions, he also notes, however, the ease with which these qualities can be shorn of their loveliness. They can repel as frequently as they attract; they cannot escape an association with the middle class. As indicated by *Federalist* 10, a fair assessment of their worth must proceed from an unflinching recognition of the fact that men are not angels. Mr. Goldwin urges that if such qualities fail to satisfy a purer or nobler moralism, as lacking grandeur, they also militate against the utopianism that can harden into misanthropic self-righteousness when its unrealistic hopes are disappointed. The American tendency toward self-criticism, including the occasional severity of our moral judgments on ourselves, confirms for Mr. Goldwin the decency of our regime. Throughout its history it has granted a field for the exercise of a steady, if not high-flown, moral sensibility or sense.

To reach a similar evaluation of its moral consequences, Martin Diamond takes the reader in his essay further into the nature of the political project embodied in the Constitution. To understand the moral dimension of the Constitution, we must set it in the context of the rejection of classical or Aristotelian political science by the "new science of politics," to which the American founders enthusiastically subscribed. The hallmark of the new science distinguishing it from the old one is the priority it gives to "the efficacy of means" over "the nobil-

ity of ends." That is to say, it lowered the ends of politics to make them more commensurate with means generally and readily available (p. 83).

Following Mr. Diamond, we may say that, like their philosophic teachers, the founders sought to secure to men their own, in the sense of what belongs to them, including their own children, but beginning with their proprietorship over their own bodies, and to liberate men who are all born by nature, as Locke says, with "a perfect title to freedom," from arbitrary political authority and personal dependence, neither of which benefits nature itself can guarantee. The creation by consent of an artificial public power or "mighty Leviathan," that directs men through settled, standing rules or common measures rather than will or whimsey, can overcome the irregularities or uncertainties of the state of nature and/or the tyranny that is worse. The public purpose of the public power is conceived in terms of the need to cure the savage vengefulness that can overtake men in cases of injury close to home, but also the apathetic remissness that descends on them when injury occurs at a further remove, a consequence of the fact that, as Hobbes says, we are fitted with natural microscopes but no natural telescopes. To a considerable extent all the defenders of the modern commercial republic based on the rights of man share in Rousseau's vision of a regime that would overcome the chief problems incident alike to the austere ancient republic¹ and the luxurious modern despotism, where men learn best how to command or exploit and how to obey, leaving them neither free, nor equal, nor tolerant, nor humane. It is, moreover, possible to achieve these ends without requiring self-mastery in the old-fashioned sense, i.e., the suppression of the baser passions as unseemly or sinful, and without encouraging an inclination toward war and the mastery of others: the fundamental passions of men will be redirected toward peaceable ends. Madison's statement in *Federalist* 10 that the regulation of the various and interfering interests of man, which are permitted to flourish in a free society, forms the principal task of modern legislation, implies that the framers relied essentially on calculations of self-interest to supply the defect of better motives, such as public spirit, shame or self-sacrifice, to maintain our republic.

Although the liberal philosophers take their bearings by the fundamental passions of men, Mr. Diamond detects and stresses, above all, the prescriptive component in their psychology. He demonstrates that the question of the moral foundations of the American republic easily resolves itself into the question of its moral intent. He accords us the status of a regime in Aristotle's sense largely because the Constitution, like liberal thought, sought to and did nurture, albeit on a "less demanding model" than formerly, a particular kind of ethos. What we intuitively call "the American way" arises out of a deliberate effort on the part of liberal thought to dampen down or domesticate the passionate self-preferences of men which could be translated into character ennobling motives, on the one hand, but which also precipitate the most ferocious civil strife, on the other.

1. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *First Discourse*, in *First and Second Discourses*, trans. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's, 1964), p. 57.

Endorsing the efforts of their forebears, the founders evince a decided preference for some objects of the passions, or for some passions, over others. In Mr. Diamond's view, the American system is framed deliberately to resist "the upward gravitational pull of politics."

The founders seek no less than to alter the nature of political conflict itself, to "depoliticize" it, thereby to ameliorate it; enabling men to be more sociable and accommodating to one another. It is not only and perhaps not especially opposite and rival economic interests that create adversaries who are too adversarial (Barber, p. 56). Noneconomic interests as such contain this potential, especially quarrels over the good and the just or those arising out of religion. As Rousseau suggests, one cannot live peacefully beside, let alone love, the neighbor whom one supposes to be damned. As a consequence of the regime's sanctioning of the passions conducive to self-preservation, however, men "will tend to form political opinions in defense of [economic] interests, and then jockey frenetically, but ultimately tamely, for group and party advantage on the basis of those interests" (p. 91). If they did not dream of eradicating religious and political differences, as being inconsistent with individual liberty, the founders hoped to see them multiplied in the manner of economic interests and in that way to dilute them. The founders' preference for the large commercial republic, while certainly not offensive to either the American character or the American conditions, is established on principle. This principle enabled them also to prefer the condition in which they found themselves. The size of the American republic is variously praised for the diversity it permits and encourages in types and degrees of property, in religious sects, and in avenues for the expression of individual talents.

By so firmly establishing the context within which to view the American constitutional project, Mr. Diamond clarifies the gains to be expected from it and by examining its moral intentions, he raises the central moral questions of the book. What is the moral standing of the human character fostered by the American regime or way of life? Are the resources of that character adequate to the task of maintaining our free institutions?

If the founders and their predecessors feared there could be too much high spirit in politics, as a consequence of high goals that addressed the soul, they did not seem to fear that there could be too little—a downward gravitational pull toward supine inertness—as an untoward consequence of their very success. Is it possible to render the rough and jagged edges of men so smooth and uniform that one need no longer worry about their accommodating themselves to one another, but rather about how to distinguish them from one another? The threat posed by an "autonomous herd" preoccupied both Tocqueville and Nietzsche, one of democracy's truest friends and one of its most bitter enemies. Their concerns are treated in the book, first in the context of discussions of Locke by Robert Horwitz and Michael Zuckert.

Taken together, these two essays provide undergraduate students with a more comprehensive view of Locke's thought than they would normally be afforded

and permit a fuller judgment of what the founders made of their philosophic inheritance. They also balance two previous essays that stress the importance of the thought of Rousseau (Barber, p. 43) and of Hobbes (Hofstadter, pp. 73–74), but exclude Locke. Neither Mr. Horwitz nor Mr. Zuckert urge by any means that the American founders took over Locke's thought completely on the subjects they discuss. They point, on the contrary, to a narrowing of his views in his heirs. The essays bring to the forefront what might seem at first to be two un-Lockean elements of Locke's own philosophy. By means of an interpretive account of his *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* and *On the Reasonableness of Christianity*, Mr. Horwitz and Mr. Zuckert focus respectively on Locke's proposals for a civic education and for a civil religion.

According to Mr. Horwitz, Locke's educational proposals express a judgment about the insufficiency of the prudential calculus altogether to supply the defect of better motives in the commercial republic; to act as a substitute for morality or civic virtue. In order to maintain the inspiring love of liberty in its members, something must be added to the association of justice and self-interest embodied in the civil law, on which the regime fundamentally relies for its security. A domestically managed civic education allows for the inculcation of proper sentiments and opinions in men by an operation independent of the laws themselves but commensurate with their ends, properly understood. Such an education would enlighten self-interest and instill civic virtue, although not in either a classic or Christian sense.

Although the American framers did not share in Locke's concern for a civic education, Mr. Horwitz argues that our experience during the past two hundred years may only confirm its necessity. The successful effort to ensure that men's spirited self-assertions would take on fewer angry or antisocial forms than in other times and places seems to have domesticated "spirit" to such an extent that the vigor of our republic is threatened. We must now fear the appearance of Tocqueville's "virtuous materialism," the optimism Tocqueville expressed about America on this particular point to the contrary notwithstanding. In his concern for the potentially demoralizing effects of the intrinsic features of our regime, Mr. Horwitz treats the framers' moral intentions entirely apart from, and as more important than, the influence on our development of objective economic conditions, on which, according to Mr. Barber in his essay, both the regime's success and the limits of its success can be shown to depend. In so doing, he lays the responsibility for the success or failure of the American republican experiment squarely on the shoulders of the founders themselves and on their principles.

Locke aims his education at the gentlemen or gentry, and envisions, therefore, a fundamental reform of the existing gentry. The leading citizens would continue to impose the stamp of their character on the society as a whole. Since Gordon Wood implies in his essay (pp. 109–14) the incompatibility of a gentlemanly class in Locke's sense and the democratizing currents unleashed by the founders, both he and Mr. Horwitz lead us to ask about the implications for us of

Locke's proposals. Should the value of Locke's civic education be admitted, in what manner could we inherit it? What alterations would it theoretically have to undergo to suit American circumstances or is there a substitute for it to be found in the American experience?

As Mr. Horwitz presents it, Locke's educational science and his political science are perfectly compatible: they rest on identical psychological premises and employ the same general method. In both cases Locke asserts the psychic priority of the passions to reason. Nor does any moral reproof attach to his assertion. The Lockean education does not seek to suppress the passions or "natural vices," but instead to redirect or rechannel them toward socially useful ends. In particular, Locke wishes to redirect our "natural pride" or love of dominion, the spirited self-preference Rousseau calls *amour-propre*, by operations that would gradually convert it into the love of credit and the apprehension of shame and disgrace. Taking them in some measure out of themselves, Locke would teach the young to submit willingly to the "law of opinion or reputation." It is this operation that discloses the fundamental principle of Locke's educational reform and constitutes what he calls its "great Secret." In general, it seems that the nobler aspirations of men, which suit them for leadership, must be trained so that they will not contradict the pursuits of those who are content to follow (p. 163). We would be entitled to pose to Locke the same question Mr. Horwitz poses to the American founders if it could be shown that, owing to the preoccupation of the commercial republic with curbing the love of dominion or the antisocial forms of spirit, he himself failed to take sufficiently into account the vulnerability of the love of liberty in the established commercial republic.

The above qualification notwithstanding, Mr. Horwitz's account of Locke enables us to see more clearly the extent to which liberalism conceived of man as malleable. It was by no means necessary for those philosophers with whom we most closely associate the belief in man's malleability to refute their predecessors, in the manner that Richard Hoftstadter suggests in his essay (pp. 72ff.). The tendency of liberal psychology to reduce nature to the passions would seem of itself to enhance the importance of education, in the general sense of habituation, over nature. To consider man as the *matter* of education and politics is to give at the same time an immense boost to man as the *maker* of education or politics. It is through legislation or will that the passions (e.g., fear or natural pride) acquire their objects and, thus, their form or bent; that which determines how men will preserve themselves and so in an important sense makes them what they are. From the unchanging or unchangeable features of human nature as designated by liberalism, therefore, widely divergent and even opposite results, such as war and peace, can be expected. In this way liberalism's very definition of the natural, as that which stands in need of man's constructions, produces the denigration of the natural by comparison to the man-made, which, as the proud imposition of one's own form on the "almost" formless, comes to maturity in later thought. The theory or conceptualization of human nature that Leo Strauss calls "the last

refuge of nature” in modern philosophy would seem to have within it a distinct predisposition to self-destruct.² That men themselves and not only their comforts are in a decisive sense the fruit of their own labors, their own creatures, is a proposition that can only expand the perfect title to freedom Locke says they may already claim: men are the property of those whose workmanship they are (cf. p. 187). It is in the allegation of man’s freedom and all its implications that we can discern a greater kinship between the apparent pessimism and lowered political expectations of classical liberalism and the immense optimism about the possibilities for altering human behavior by means of institutions in the thought that succeeded it, than between either of these views and the traditional science of politics.

As the perfect complement to Mr. Horwitz’s reflections, Michael Zuckert’s essay on the question of civil religion in Locke investigates a second mode of imbuing citizens with the proper sentiments and opinions by an operation independent of the civil laws. His essay furthers the argument that, in Locke’s view, right opinion must undergird the political calculus fostered in the commercial republic, for the sake of its perpetuation. The two distinct modes of influencing opinion, which are perhaps even more prominent as distinct modes in the thought of Rousseau, lead us, in the case of both thinkers, to consider the relationship between them and, in particular, to ask if one is more useful than the other or could replace it. Just as Locke’s education is aimed at the relatively few, so might it seem at first that the civil religion is aimed at the relatively many, those in whom “the religious attitude” is most prominent and who must, in any case, believe rather than know (pp. 197, 199). Mr. Horwitz does indicate that religious instruction has a decidedly subordinate role in the education Locke outlines, although he leaves open the question whether or not the new gentlemen do not remain believers in some sense. For this reason, we must correct our initial impression that these two modes can be differentiated simply by being directed at different groups of people. By qualifying Locke’s own support for civil religion in his essay, Mr. Zuckert alerts us further to the complexity of the task of establishing any relationship between his proposals for a civil education and for a civil religion.

Mr. Zuckert treats *On the Reasonableness of Christianity* as an integral part of Locke’s philosophy of government, a necessary companion to the *Treatises*. In his detailed and acute analysis of Locke’s arguments, Mr. Zuckert takes the reader securely along with him despite the difficulty of the path. He discloses two problems concerning the role of religion that Locke sets himself to solve: the need for “something like a civil religion,” perhaps a derivative of Christianity (p. 201), to encourage salutary moral practices in the commercial republic and the need to render organized religion, viz., Christianity, reasonable or civil, that is, passive, pacific, and subservient to political authority. Unless the second prob-

2. Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 175, 201.

lem is solved, Christianity cannot be the instrument to solve the first. In Locke, as in other liberal thinkers, the question of the political utility of piety is, then, weighed against the clear and present danger organized religion poses to the establishment of just politics. It also seems fair to say that the liberal thinkers had, or at least began with, a keener and more lively apprehension of religion's dangers than of its utility; the question of its utility can have a hearing only after it has been rendered harmless. The first of Locke's questions concerning the role of religion has particular relevance for the perpetuation of our political institutions and the second considers the role of religion in relation to the proper founding of political institutions.

Mr. Zuckert shows that it is Christianity's special emphasis on faith over works, and thus on authoritative interpretations of the articles of faith, that is of paramount concern to Locke. Clerical "impositions on men in matters of faith" are chiefly responsible for the vehement political divisions in modern times. Indeed, Locke stresses the brutal state of war raging throughout the last thousand years of Christianity's history in language lurid enough to meet Hobbes's standard for the state of nature. Nothing is seen but "schisms . . . quarrels, blood, and butchery," and Christians "tearing and being torn in pieces." Locke leaves no doubt that the uniquely uncivil character of "all" Christian sects stems from clerical claims to infallibility. Claims to revealed truth are the means by which sects set themselves up as "the standing measure of truth to all the world" and arrogate to themselves the right to punish and condemn the heterodox. Locke seems to explain theological intolerance by reference to the natural love of dominion and its success by reference to natural fear. The corporate interests of clergies can best be advanced by claims to exclusivity on matters of utmost importance to the people, enabling them to take advantage of the people's credulity and fearful apprehensions.

With Hobbes, Locke regards the presence of organized religion, constituting the clergy as a body, in terms of the threat it poses to public power as its competitor for sovereignty. From ecclesiastical bodies emanate the most important private judgments of good and evil that, properly understood, are for Hobbes the causes of all quarrels.³ Locke also agrees with Hobbes that the common and "just measures of right and wrong" that are embodied in civil law and serve as the bonds of civil society (p. 199) would eliminate both the sheer relativity of moral judgments constituting the chief defect of the state of nature and the competing orthodoxies constituting the chief defect of existing civil societies. Although the scope of the public power is to be limited by the ends for which it is erected, according to Locke, it must be unrivaled and unconstrained in its sphere. Since religious and political authorities will invariably contest the same field, their rivalry threatens the ability of the civil law to bind men together. It is, therefore, hostile to civil peace and destructive of social unity.

3. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York: Collier, 1962), Ch. 15, pp. 123–24; Ch. 29, pp. 238–39.

By treating theological intolerance or Christianity as practiced as the major impediment to the proper founding of a free regime, Locke essentially places the critique or reform of religion instead of religion at its base. The need he expresses to render Christianity civil forces us to reconsider his own statement about the utility of religion to founders; he makes the case specifically by citing, in the manner of Rousseau, its historical necessity (p. 197), and, we may add, no more than its historical necessity. Those founders who embraced religion to establish their societies, and who did not subordinate religion or revelation as such, may belong to the negligent and unforeseeing first ages of men that yielded political orders inimical to freedom and the law of reason. As the American case demonstrates, modern natural right provides for the incorporation of men into a people by other means entirely.

Indirectly challenging the clerical authorities by circumventing them, Locke returns to Scripture to read it by his own unaided lights. Mr. Zuckert suggests that, guided by the desire to meet the problem of theological intolerance without abandoning religion, Locke is seeking a Christianity he can endorse. Locke puts forward in defense of Christianity, and as proof of its reasonableness, what is essentially a reinterpretation of Christian doctrine that brings it into apparent conformity with his political ends. Since the interpretation that makes Christianity reasonable itself is tantamount to a rejection of the biblical orientation, we are entitled to conclude that the concord is more apparent than real. The reinterpretation serves, that is, to point up the actual incompatibility between Christianity and the Lockean political project. The Christianity he is willing to endorse is no longer Christianity. In the end, Locke goes beyond a stance that is anticlerical and takes a stance that is also anti-Scripture or even antireligious: By teaching men that they are the creators of value, Locke derogates "the religious attitude," especially gratitude and guilt, feelings on the basis of which men have hitherto been encouraged to suppress or master as sinful, rather than to redirect, their "natural pride." That human labor alone transforms "the gifts of nature," such as they are, into utilities or resources, also relieves from opprobrium the acquisitive impulses for more than one needs. Locke suggests, finally, that the law of God can be incorporated into "the law of reason, or as it is called, of nature" (p. 188), such that obedience to the latter suffices perfectly for obedience to the former.

Mr. Zuckert concludes that the steps Locke took to render Christianity civil or harmless, undermine the possibility that religion could ever be useful to the regime. The reinterpretation he directs at the clergy weakens his ability to meet the needs of the people. To make the former less antisocial, he risks making the latter less social. We might say that in the process of solving the problem affecting the proper founding of a free regime, he imperils its perpetuation, insofar as the religious attitude is needed for that end. Nor could Locke meet one challenge without rendering the other more formidable. Since most men must believe rather than know, Mr. Zuckert argues that Locke does not wish to abandon religion or the religious attitude entirely. His reflections on civil religion seem to

Mr. Zuckert, then, to expose the core dilemma in Locke's thought; a dilemma which he did not purport to resolve, but which he presented with unexampled lucidity.

Should it be the case with Locke, as we might more readily say of Hobbes, that one of these problems always remains more dangerous and more important than the other—the need to render religion harmless to foundings or refoundings, when the project is most vulnerable and insecure, rather than useful to perpetuation—the over-all demise of “the religious attitude” would not appear as problematic in Locke's thought as Mr. Zuckert suggests. That is to say, we might change the emphasis of Mr. Zuckert's conclusion, on the basis of his evidence and argument. Locke's own arguments in the *Reasonableness* would lose their aporetic quality, if, by comparison to the solution of the problem of right, he treated religion's role in perpetuation as a secondary issue. We would as a consequence, however, be impelled to ask whether Locke envisions religion in any form to have more than a residual role in the perpetuation of the commercial republic.

According to Mr. Zuckert, the *Reasonableness* is essentially directed toward the religious authorities, from deists to the most conservative theologians. In the spirit of ecumenism, Locke searches for and, in the acceptance of Jesus as savior, finds the sole necessary article of the Christian faith; the rudimentary or core dogma on which all Christians can be made to agree. On the basis of Mr. Zuckert's analysis of the source of religious incivility as Locke presents it, we might be more inclined to say that the ecumenism for which Locke stands in the *Reasonableness* can only be a result and not a source of the free society. The achievement of peace among the warring sects requires elimination of the claims of revelation and the attendant power to condemn and censure, which, as the source of clerical influence, it is not likely they would surrender or forfeit voluntarily. To eliminate the untoward consequences of a clergy with a corporate interest, the claims of revelation must be displaced by the claims of natural right. The private measures of right and wrong must be forcefully disallowed by the establishment of sovereignty on the consent of free men. A religiosity that will not enmesh men in a conflict between their religious and their political duties requires the complete separation of church and state, achieved by the subordination of religious to civil authority.

We get a somewhat different perspective on the question of the meaning of Locke's presentation of his teaching in Christian terms when we note that it takes the form of an appeal over the clergy's head, as it were, directly to the people. Given the inescapable influence of passion and interest on reason, Locke may agree with Hobbes that reason must stand together with eloquence in the moral though not in the natural sciences. Locke suggests several times that philosophers in the past have proved to be unable to persuade or convince the people because they only had truth (“reason and her oracles”) on their side. Despite several obvious flaws in the analogy, Locke cites as an example of the difficulty, the vio-

lence against Socrates' heterodoxy by a people immersed in superstition and guided by self-serving priests. Might it not be the case, then, that rather than seeking to placate a clergy that is in his view implacable, Locke means to speak the language of the people in order to interpose himself or philosophy between the clergy and the people, for the sake of their good and his own? By arrogating to himself the right to reinterpret Christian doctrine, Locke puts himself on a par with the clerical authorities and, to this extent, as other legislative founders have done, he too presents his moral rules as authoritative by presenting them in the guise of religion, as reformed and transformed. He comes "with authority from God." Since no other interpretation of Christianity would be civil or useful to political society than the one Locke presents, we might say that the laws of nature, insofar as they are not compatible with Christianity, replace Christianity as the source of right opinion. This is tantamount to saying that the laws of nature become themselves a kind of civil religion. Since the laws of nature are not really laws until embodied in civil law, however, it is also the case that no authoritative teaching about duty is permitted that does not derive from natural right or freedom.

It may be that in order to curb the clergy, Locke jeopardizes the religious attitude. Alternatively, we might say that he deliberately jeopardizes the religious attitude in order to curb the clergy. In other words, he may aim to achieve the demise of the religious authorities precisely by effecting the demise of the religious attitude.

Once the regime is founded or the grounds for judging existing regimes are established, as Mr. Zuckert indicates, its effects in and of themselves would go a long way toward ameliorating, if not altogether eradicating, the "fearful apprehensions" of men that constitute for Locke as for Hobbes, the natural, passionate, source of religion or the religious attitude only to rechannel or redirect them in a manner consistent with the aim of making the body of more compelling concern than the soul. Of men put in such a condition we might say further, however, that they would be disinclined to subordinate themselves to the self-appointed authorities and private judges of good and evil, who have heretofore been able to take best advantage of the religious attitude to the detriment of civil peace. Heretofore, men's piety has more often given rise to harmful rather than beneficial political effects. With respect to the perpetuation of political institutions, men are encouraged to consult their material interests (and the just measures of right and wrong tied to them) rather than their consciences before they act. Along with the laws of nature, in the fully constituted Lockean society an additional source of right opinion may present itself, assuming the rest of society would follow their lead, in the education of the gentlemen.

As an instrument to meet the challenge posed by religion to the sovereign public power the *Reasonableness* suggests the value of avoiding where possible a frontal assault on such questions and distinguishes the manner as well as the substance of Locke's presentation from that used in two other famous efforts to ad-

dress the same problem. A more direct confrontation with religious authority in the name of political authority is evident in both the writings of the injudicious Hobbes and in the theory of the divine right of kings, in its seventeenth century incarnation, whose proponents sought to give kings an illimitable royal prerogative that could not be diminished by, because it owed in its origins nothing to, the clergy. Despite their great differences in other respects, both of these treatments of political power confirm the bitterness of the rivalry between king and clergy to the detriment of civil peace. Locke seems to suggest, however, that they not only fail to solve the problem of sovereignty as it bears on executive power, but also the problem of religion as it bears on sovereignty. Following Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Locke's criticisms imply that these views do not merely conduce to despotism, but also that they employ a method ill-calculated to achieve the desired effect: both an extensive, if not illimitable, royal prerogative and the diminution of corporate ecclesiastical influence, are prizes better won in the practice than in the theory.

The discussions of Locke by Mr. Horwitz and Mr. Zuckert invite comparison with the parallel reflections of Rousseau on civil religion and education. This comparison would benefit our understanding of classical liberal philosophy, whether by revealing the particular emendations or transformations Rousseau believed it must undergo in the two areas of concern, or by bringing out more clearly the kinship between the liberalism of Hobbes and Locke and that of Rousseau. Before turning to the question of religion in the American founding, I would like to try to elaborate further several elements to be included in a comparison of Locke and Rousseau, as suggested by Rousseau.

Rousseau's association with a civil religion is often treated as a kind of correction of classical liberalism for the sake of civic virtue. Mr. Zuckert draws our attention toward the possible disjunction in liberalism between the conditions necessary to the founding of free societies, especially self-awareness of freedom, and the conditions necessary to their perpetuation, and/or a potential contradiction between various of the conditions necessary to their perpetuation. This question becomes pronounced in the thought of Rousseau, e.g., in the *Social Contract*. From what Mr. Zuckert calls the Varran or utilitarian perspective, Rousseau argues for the necessity of a civil religion to inculcate "sentiments of sociability" in citizens in order to add force to the calculations of self-interest embodied in the civil law. Rousseau's search for a social bond beyond that which the just measures of right and wrong provide appears to be owing to the ineradicable tension between political and natural or original freedom, which he posits on the basis of the liberal premises, and which the true theory of the social compact may actually heighten.⁴ Citizens require the support of religion to endure the exercise of liberty. Whenever they are reminded of their natural rights, as Rousseau says must periodically be done, they are reminded as well that man is

⁴ Strauss, pp. 287–89.

not by nature a political animal. Reflection on the fact that man is born free but is everywhere in chains may make those chains chafe and oppress even where they are legitimate. It is necessary to prevent citizens from making reservation of themselves in the name of their original freedom whenever they are required to make sacrifices in the name of political freedom.

Every citizen must have a religion that teaches him to love his duties. A way must be found to civilize religion, then, or one of the "great bonds of society" will be without effect. In Book IV, Chapter 7 of the *Social Contract*, Rousseau assigns the task of civilizing religion to the civil religion, as perhaps its central function. The civil religion is, so to speak, the standard by which all other religions are judged; no religion will be tolerated that contradicts its tenets. Following Hobbes and Locke, then, Rousseau considers the utility of the religious attitude in the context of the overriding need to render harmless all existing religions, which are characterized as such by an anti-social "theological intolerance." Rousseau's analysis of the chief impediments to the founding of a free society interfuses questions of principle and, as in his attack on Christianity as practiced "today" or "the religion of the priest," questions specific to the times.

By detaching "the theological system from the political system," Christianity makes social unity impossible. Rousseau declares that some method must be found to end the "perpetual conflict of jurisdiction" between civil and religious authorities, which divides the people's loyalties between "the master and the priest," or rather between two masters. It turns out, however, that the king is no less a slave than the people. By means of communion and excommunication, the punishments for breaches or errors in faith, i.e., by means of theological intolerance, priests are able to become masters over both "peoples and kings." The claim to revealed truth, from which the right to punish heterodoxy derives, unites the clergy in a social compact and gives it a corporate interest that is separate from and hostile to the particular political societies in which it resides. The "religion of the priest" is a kind of theocracy or exclusive national religion, as found in ancient regimes, in which politics and religion are perfectly united because they are indistinguishable. In its zeal to defend its temporal "homeland," branding everything outside itself as infidel or heretic, the modern theocracy "amounts to" paganism at its worst, a circumstance that enables Rousseau to chastise it under another name. Intolerant religions place themselves in a natural state of war with all other societies; they invariably encroach upon the rights of sovereignty. Rousseau's sweeping indictment of theological intolerance embraces Calvinism as much as Roman Catholicism; there are now two legislative systems or two homelands "everywhere."

The "ancient system" of social unity that Rousseau endorses must not be achieved by a revival of ancient means. Rousseau does not undertake to destroy the modern theocracy with a view to restoring the ancient one. Social unity can not be purchased at the cost of the rights of nature. Herewith Rousseau would seem to be compelled to revise his earlier suggestions in Book II, Chapter 7

about the need for a legislator who can ascribe a divine source to his laws, or who is a founder of religion. Theocratic government belongs to “early” peoples. Rousseau’s insistence that there can never again be an “exclusive national religion” seems to rest on the fact that the true principles of political right have now come to light. Since men no longer regard their kings as gods, to end the era in which men reason like Caligula, it remains to prove that the people are not beasts.

Of all “Christian authors” only Hobbes has correctly understood both the evil and the remedy. Rousseau bestows effusive praise on Hobbes for daring to propose the restoration of political unity on the proper grounds. Hobbes departs from the methods used by all those who sought to strengthen despotic power without subordinating religion as such; to establish their authority on divine foundations rather than on the consent of free men. Rousseau criticizes “the philosopher Hobbes,” however, for failing to see that “the dominating spirit of Christianity” and “the interest of the priest,” which are incompatible with his system, would always prove to be stronger than the interest of the State, and, thus, stronger than those who speak on behalf of the state.

Hobbes’s case suggests the problem posed by theological intolerance to the philosopher. Rousseau makes this question, as Locke also seemed to do, one of the underlying themes of his consideration of religion. What is “correct and true” in Hobbes’s philosophy made it “odious” to those whom he wanted to strike. By making himself the enemy of the clergy or revealed religion, Hobbes made himself the friend of despots, which friendship proved to be insufficient to protect him from the wrath of the clergy against philosophy. By contrast to his more philosophic opponent Grotius, the clergy apparently retaliated against Hobbes’s open attack on its homeland with the customary charges and, fired by the customary zeal, interposed itself between Hobbes and the people. Hobbes strengthened the alliance of the people and their true masters, without being able to liberate kings from theirs. While Rousseau lets it seem that he faults Hobbes for being too weak a friend of kings, he actually faults him for being too weak an enemy of the clergy. What was “horrible and false” in Hobbes’s philosophy, which should have made it odious, did not. The priests attacked Hobbes for his religious heresy and branded him an atheist, but they upheld his defense of despotism. Inverting this position, Rousseau upholds Hobbes’s rejection of revealed religion, while attacking Hobbes for his political heresy. Indeed, for his strictures against tyrannicide and his preoccupation with public tranquility, Hobbes teaches the Gospel (or Rousseau’s tendentious reading of it) and Rousseau brands him a Christian author.

To solve the problem of theological intolerance, without which there can be no solution to the problem of sovereignty, nor peace for the philosopher, it is necessary to embrace what is correct and true in Hobbes and leave what is horrible and false behind. Everything might be different if the philosopher were to make himself the friend of the people and thus orient himself by the rights and

the needs of the people. The philosopher must interpose himself on the people's behalf between the tyrant and the clergy. In the context of his discussion of the civil religion, Rousseau speaks approvingly of the alliance of Cato and Cicero against the theologizing, philosophizing Caesar. Further, by pointing inadvertently to the weakness of kings vis-à-vis the clergy, that is to say, to the insurmountable strength of the people when aroused, Hobbes's theory suggests that the liberation of the people from their greater master, may in turn serve to liberate them from their lesser one. A revolution in cult may suffice to effect the expulsion of tyrants. The truly effective and just solution to the problem of the rivalry between "the prince and the church" is not the substitution of one particular will for another, one form of mastery for another, but the declaration of legislative sovereignty by the people. If we may properly associate Hobbes with despotic royal power and the dissemination of the light of science, in the *Social Contract* Rousseau puts in their place the general will and civil religion.

Rousseau does not look to any existing religion as the source of the "sentiments of sociability" necessary to the free regime, but rather to "a purely civil profession of faith," which establishes its articles "not exactly" as religious dogmas, but as sentiments essential to support the morality on which the free society is based. The civil religion does not give rise to the social contract as a matter of right, but is, on the contrary, a (necessary) derivative of it, and, in particular, of the sovereign's right to establish laws on the basis of public utility, the standard that replaces the standard of revelation. At the base of a free society one finds neither natural nor positive divine right, but rather natural right.

The true social compact dissolves the clerical social compact. By removing matters of faith, except as they relate to civil morality, from political consideration as a matter of right, the sovereign takes from priests the power to censure and condemn errors of faith and curbs the zeal to punish them. Whether within or across states, ecclesiastical sects cannot promulgate the views by means of which they prosecute a corporate interest to the detriment of the sovereignty. By denying to itself the right to punish errors of faith or to inspect the faith of another so long as morality is upheld, the sovereign also denies that right to the clergy.

It is precisely in the call for a civil religion to sanctify the social compact that Rousseau defends the principle of the subordination of all religion to political authority; the complete rejection of theocratic government. If men must have a religion in support of their duties as citizens, they can have no religion contrary to their duties, nor one that is contrary to their natural rights.

The civil religion, which is compatible with all religions that tolerate others, requires that intolerant religions be driven out of the state. In its single negative tenet, its almost fanatical intolerance of intolerance, the civil religion declares war on uncivil religion or the religion of the priest. For the people to acquire the legislative right to change religion, it must be prepared to use the clergy's own arms against it. It is necessary to turn the furious zeal of the citizen against the

zeal of the priest.⁵ A war undertaken under the auspices of the positive and negative tenets of the civil religion would “not exactly” be a holy war, but would have a tincture of holiness. In this sense, as is the case with religions in the past, the civil religion presents itself as an instrument useful in the origin of nations, to bring the true social compact into being.

As a most outspoken and zealous spokesman for the civil religion and, thus, in the name of civic duty, Rousseau may not mind incurring the wrath of the clergy. Rousseau does not join the debate with the clergy on theological, but on political grounds, in the name of the interest of the state; he acknowledges no interest for the philosopher apart from the interest of the state and no other reason for opposing theological intolerance than its destruction of sovereignty. It is as the spokesman for the civil religion that the philosopher Rousseau shows himself to be most useful to the state. In turn, the civil religion meets the needs of the citizen without encouraging the hostility to philosophy that is characteristic of both ancient and modern theocracies. There are indications in the chapter that the alliance between the philosopher and the citizen may conceal a deeper antagonism. If Rousseau does not share the zeal of citizen in every respect, however, opposition to theological intolerance is the issue on which the bond between them is most securely forged. Stated another way, in the chapter on civil religion, Rousseau lays the foundation for the strongest possible alliance between the philosopher and the people and points to the limits of that alliance.

The civil religion does not purchase social unity at the cost of freedom and equality, nor these civic goods at the cost of tolerance and humanity. While Rousseau repudiates the notion of a “Christian republic,” as consisting of mutually exclusive terms, he himself stands for a synthesis. The civil religion tempers the religion of the citizen, which promotes vigor and an ardent love of freedom, with the gentleness and charity of the religion of man. The synthetic or mixed qualities of the civil religion point to the wholly new character of the republic Rousseau envisions in the *Social Contract*. That regime could not be typified in the image of Caesar with the heart of Christ, but perhaps of Cato or Cato-Cicero with the heart of Christ. The novelty of this synthesis shows itself most clearly in the elimination of impiety as a civil crime.

Rousseau’s discussion of civil religion leaves open the question whether a civil profession of faith is the only or the most effective method of instilling the sentiments of sociability necessary to the perpetuation of free regimes. The answer to the question of the role of civil religion would require a full consideration of the place of religion in Rousseau’s own educational proposals in the *Émile*.

To say nothing of other disagreements that may have led Rousseau to assert that the topic of education was still as fresh after Locke’s *Thoughts* as before, we can readily see the central disagreement between the two men on the issue of

5. *Second Discourse*, pp. 159–60; *Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. D’Alembert on the Theatre*, translated by Allan Bloom (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 31.

“natural pride” or love of dominion. What presents itself as the cure of the educational problem for Locke would seem from Rousseau’s perspective to entrench forever the disease. While assigning the origin of amour-propre to man’s relative or social existence in the *Émile* rather than to nature, however, the “great Secret” of Locke’s education, as presented by Mr. Horwitz, by no means escapes Rousseau. Further, in the *Émile*, the tutor-Rousseau dissociates himself from the end of Locke’s educational proposals at the beginning of Book V, claiming that he at least has not raised a gentleman. In an age of imminent political upheaval, it would of course be folly to promote any reform that depended on settled social conditions or an existing social class, but the larger question lingers whether Rousseau has not fashioned in the “decent” *Émile*, a democratic gentleman after all, one finally subject to the passions of other men and to the empire of opinion, but not “carried away” by either. What Rousseau may add to the character fostered in the commercial republic does not seem to contradict its basic tendencies. *Émile* is innured to the enervating influences of social life, but Rousseau’s additions respecting conjugal society also have much to do with “sentiments of sociability” that add force to civil law and bind the individual more firmly than otherwise to civil society.

Both Mr. Horwitz and Mr. Zuckert point out that Locke saw his task, by contrast to ancient ethics, as an effort to “endow” virtue by tying it to interest. The ancient philosophers failed to see that the rewards of virtue not its beauty make men willing to espouse it (pp. 158, 199). For his part, in the *Émile*, Rousseau seems to endow Lockean calculations of interest by tying them to taste and sentiment, to “the sweetest sentiments,” so that men will love the duties calculation alone would incline them to resist. The manner in which he incorporates the love of beauty into his own project, both in substance and in form, suggests he at least does not wish to sacrifice the beauty of virtue to its endowments or rewards. Given the sort of character nurtured in the commercial republic, Rousseau seems to be concerned to insure that its members love not only their duties, but also themselves. By contrast to ancient virtue, it seems necessary to “endow” decency with beauty, to beautify decency to make men willing to espouse it. This aspect of Rousseau’s task seems to require at times blurring the distinction between the decent and the virtuous, as in the case of the decent city Geneva, and blurring the distinction between the decent and the good, as in the case of the decent *Émile*, while at other times Rousseau is at pains to emphasize the differences among these three terms. Although he often presents decency as a mean between virtue and vice, Rousseau’s practice in the *Émile* suggests it is perhaps better understood as a mean between the denatured virtue of ancient republics and the goodness of the state of nature. As such, it evinces an advantage over ancient republics, in particular, but not necessarily over natural goodness. Both the negative effort Rousseau makes to shield its view of itself from a light too bright, and the positive effort he makes to beautify it indicate that the educational proposals for

modern republics must include an attempt to make the decent loveable; a consideration of special importance if there were ever to be a politically managed domestic education, i.e., suited to the domicile. Rousseau points, in other words, to the importance of the family in the commercial republic and subtly corrects Locke on the nature of the ties that bind.

To return to the influence of Locke on the Constitution, Walter Berns argues in his essay that, however matters stand in Locke's philosophy, the religious problem was not left unsolved or in an equivocal condition by the framers of the American Constitution. Regarding, as Locke did, the problem of religion to be the fundamental political question, they either made clearer the implications of Locke's thought by applying it or narrowed his perspective. Mr. Berns delineates the religious problem in terms identical to those Mr. Zuckert employs from Locke, illustrating, here as elsewhere in the book, the remarkable integration of the essays and their genuinely comparative character, as well as an internal process through which the insights in the individual essays can be verified.

Mr. Berns begins by saying that from the first the American founders approached religion from the standpoint of its political utility. Like Locke, and under his influence, they weighed the utility of the religious attitude to support republican institutions against the threat potentially posed by organized religion to those same institutions. Keeping the two dimensions of the religious question in mind helps, in Mr. Berns' view, to clarify the meaning of the "establishment" clause of the First Amendment. This approach is also necessary if we are to recapture the reasoning, now obscured in judicial doctrine, that explains how the framers could make the free exercise of religion, or religious tolerance, an absolute right, but not freedom of political expression.

Discerning widespread agreement among the founders on fundamental issues, Mr. Berns takes note of some disagreement on "secondary issues," among the most important of which is whether the perpetuation of free institutions depends in some measure on religion, or "national morality," in Washington's phrase, grounded in religious belief. Such a view is embodied in the First Amendment and enables the government to assist religious establishments on a nondiscriminatory basis. Quoting Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Mr. Berns interprets the First Amendment to mean that "for the sake of liberty, government must support religion in general, but no particular religion." He also cites Tocqueville's observation that Americans tend to defend their religiosity unabashedly in terms of the support it gives to free institutions. It was largely because classical liberalism had already successfully reformed religion and rendered it harmless to the founding of republics that the framers could consider making an ally of it with a view to perpetuation—letting religion flourish freely in the private sphere. Mr. Berns suggests that we view the preoccupation of the liberal thinkers with the religious problem as a project to insure to their statesman-heirs the freedom to ignore it as

a political question. The American founders were still wary, however; they extended the work of their forebears toward both the secularization of society and the socialization of religion.

It is in their establishment of absolute religious freedom instead of religion, the principle on which the specific provisions of the First Amendment rest, that, according to Mr. Berns, the framers' fundamental attitude toward religion can best be discerned. As is evident from Locke and Rousseau, the absolute right to the free exercise of religion, or the principle of religious tolerance, is derived from a nonreligious source. The solution to the problem of religion is to be attained by the subordination of religion to just politics, established on other grounds. The moral foundations of the American republic are not religious foundations; reiterating Locke and Rousseau, he argues that modern natural right, is, on the contrary, incompatible with the claims of revealed religions. Officially, all religious doctrines are of equal worth, and it is a matter of indifference to the state which cult one embraces in private.

Tocqueville argues that religious belief is more necessary in democracies than in other social or political orders. Given the ends and ordinary operations of the American regime, however, religion cannot be expected to activate men or set them in motion, but at most to restrain or apply a brake to the passion for material gain, which, if unchecked, would be inimical to political freedom. Tocqueville himself seems to qualify the extent of any potential alliance of free politics and religion in two related respects. He first describes religion's subordination to the prevailing tendencies of democratic ages, and as a corollary to this observation, he prescribes its subordination as a means to combat the dangers to political freedom most pronounced in those ages. He seems to accord far greater weight to the artificial supports for individual independence supplied by free institutions and, thus, to the second nature instilled by their habitual use. In turn, he praises those aspects of American life that are most congenial to the generation of such habits.

In the priority accorded to nonreligious over religious structures in the support of freedom, Tocqueville and the American founders seem to be agreed. Apart from the freedom granted to the exercise of religion, Mr. Berns questions the degree to which the Constitution actually relies on piety as an instrument to perpetuate our institutions. Drawing on the writings of Madison, Jefferson, and Paine, he indicates that the framers did not fear the demise of the religious attitude that would occur apace with the socialization of religion, and that some Americans, notably Paine, openly celebrated that demise. Reiterating Mr. Diamond's statement of the Constitution's moral intent, he suggests that, as interpreted by Madison, the Constitution expresses the view that the moral habits necessary to republican freedom should be derived and, more and more, would be derived from some other source than religion, that is, from the ordinary operations of the regime itself, or from acquisitiveness, which would serve as a substitute for morality inculcated by other means. Religion might yet remain as a subordinate source

of social values, but only as such. To keep religion in a subordinate position, Mr. Berns educes, as Mr. Diamond did, an advantage of the extended republic as the founders generally saw it. While it might not be fair to say, with Mr. Barber, that they assimilated political relations to market relations, it does seem to be the case that they assimilated religious relations on principle to political relations. They reposed their trust, therefore, in the self-censorship and checks and balances made possible by the multiplicity of religious sects.

Mr. Berns' account returns us to the fundamental question Mr. Zuckert poses in his essay. Are we as a nation well-served by the demise of the "religious attitude," however it might have been effected? This question is raised in a number of ways later in the book. Joseph Cropsey points to changes in scriptural religion wrought by our regime. Wilson Carey McWilliams' essay resonates with Mr. Zuckert's ultimate concern for the religious attitude in a large sense, so that it includes not only the "fearful apprehensions" that might plague men's imaginations, but also their very openness to mystery and transcendence. It is the special concern of Mr. McWilliams' essay to show that what we might call the gnosticism of modern life adversely affects the belief in absolute values and, in particular, to show that unless the value of equality is sanctified or enshrined by being understood to mean equality of worth or dignity, revealing therein its true ground, we undermine our political resilience. If I have not misunderstood Mr. Storing, I think his essay also raises a question similar to Mr. Zuckert's, in the context of his discussion of slavery.

While modern natural right declares slavery to be unjust, the close association it posits between individual natural liberties and prudential calculation enables the civil or positive law to drift toward slavery, insofar as that institution is convenient and practicable. We may stand then, in even more awe of Lincoln's specific ability in his debates with Douglas to crystallize the issue of slavery in moral terms for the nation ever after. Even apart from the issue of slavery, however, the near equation of the moral and the prudential, as qualified by the legal, encourages men to believe they may do whatever they can do, threatening a general lowering of moral sensibilities. It will be especially difficult for justice to have a hearing when its commands conflict with what is convenient. The government established to protect our natural liberties would be seriously imperilled if, instead of being sanctified by some higher source or motive, its moral foundations were themselves confounded with shifting utilitarian or prudential standards. The passage from Jefferson that Mr. Storing adduces to establish his points is reminiscent of both Lincoln's call for a political religion and Rousseau's. Particularly as he shares in Rousseau's defense of periodic refounding, Jefferson takes us back to Rousseau's reasoning. "'And can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are the gift of God?'"

The questions raised by these authors about religion in America all concern a possible tendency of our principles to deplete our moral resources more than we

realize and more than the founders did. Yet, we may ask, why should not the latitude granted by the regime to the private sphere enable it to be a breeding ground for all manner of resources, moral as well as material? Our very readiness to take our principles to task on moral grounds is evidence of our wakefulness in such matters and points to the possibility of self-correcting moral influences to counteract those we may deem to be harmful. We may even take solace from the recognition that any salutary extra-constitutional moral influences impinge on us by permission of the regime itself. The nature and scope of our regime's influence and the need for our regime to co-exist with other influences that bear on our moral character as a whole is the theme of Joseph Cropsey's essay.

Mr. Cropsey suggests that our way of life, our regime in an extended sense, flows only partly from our constitution, laws and official utterances, what he calls the "parchment regime," and that it is decisively influenced by certain "extrapolitical" factors, "alien to the regime and unrepressed by it." These extrapolitical factors array themselves, on the contrary, explicitly against the parchment regime and the ethos nurtured by it and constitute the well-spring of our tendency toward self-criticism. In its identification of extrapolitical influences decisive for the meaning of our way of life that do not flow from, but rather contradict the parchment regime, Mr. Cropsey's essay is reminiscent of the Marxian distinction between state and civil society. In the first place, however, Mr. Cropsey places the antagonistic economic interests that constitute civil society for Marx on the side of the parchment regime. The family and property are natural outgrowths of the express design to promote life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and not the ends we pursue cynically and surreptitiously, under the guise of doing the opposite. In the second place, for Mr. Cropsey, the determinative factors or causes, in both the political and the extrapolitical realms, are noetic rather than economic, i.e., types of thought. After examining the extrapolitical influences on us, Mr. Cropsey concludes, once more against Marx, that we owe our form to political rather than extrapolitical factors: the influence of the parchment regime, itself a product of thought, on thought.

According to Mr. Cropsey, our self-dissatisfaction is prompted not by the failure of the regime to attain its ends, but precisely insofar as it does. There is something unlovely and repugnant, perhaps even ugly, in the ideals of the regime itself ("privacy, calculation, preservation"); they fail to satisfy the human spirit. In one way or another our self-critical reflections on family and property express modern man's dissatisfaction with "the absence of any exaltation, vivacity, or high-heartedness from official political modernity as laid down by Hobbes and Locke and, incidentally, embodied in our parchment regime" (p. 172). The animus against classical liberalism occurs first within the tradition of modern political philosophy: the dialectic present in American thought replicates in its way the self-criticism inherent in modern philosophy. Mr. Cropsey detects an energetic tension in modern philosophy, rooted in differences between Machiavelli and Hobbes, and renewed in philosophy from Rousseau onwards. He identifies two

strands of moral meaning in modernity—one inspiring and the other indulgent. The latter strand or tendency makes its presence felt in classical liberalism and the former in liberalism's critics.

Our replication of the debate characterizing modernity is made possible in part by the regime's depoliticization of thought or opinion, in the sense in which Mr. Diamond and Mr. Berns employ this notion. The over-all effect of the premises of the regime, occurring in tandem with the emancipation of thought and opinion, may ultimately deserve to be called the democratization of thought and opinion (Wood, pp. 132–35). As Mr. Cropsey presents it, we, the people, become, by default, as it were, the guardians of thought and the arbiters of its influence in political life. Since we collectively perform, through the vehicle of public opinion and according to our character, what must be regarded as the statesman's highest task, Mr. Cropsey suggests that we practice and test the ultimate form of self-government.

I cannot hope to do justice to the profundity and delicate precision of Mr. Cropsey's analysis of the medley of extrapolitical thoughts coming under our collective influence. Put in very general terms, with the original versions in view, he reflects on the diluted, distilled, and distorted versions of the major developments critical of liberalism in modern philosophy, which comprise our self-criticism in ordinary discourse: science, existentialism, socialism, and psychoanalysis, along with traditional scriptural religion. Mr. Cropsey argues that the extrapolitical thought giving form to our way of life so decisively as to be treated as part and parcel of the regime in its extended sense is itself "passed through the medium of liberalistic modernity it is intended to reform, and transformed by it" (p. 175). Mr. Cropsey speaks in this passage specifically of existentialism, but his remark has relevance for all the types of thought he discusses, including scriptural religion. In the case of scriptural religion this means that an unintended transformation is occurring alongside the one the framers intended; one they would not regard as benign. It is Mr. Cropsey's central contention that the distortions we make in the thought we receive generally cater to our self-indulgence, "even when the original thought had the opposite intention." He concludes, then, that each nation "apparently modifies or vulgarizes available thought according to a principle of selection and mutation that is, or is best articulated in, its own parchment regime, its Constitution, its guiding conception of justice and right" (p. 180).

Mr. Cropsey's essay establishes our regime's inherent tendencies and its ability to sustain them in an unexpected manner—in its critics, not despite them. He also shows that the regime threatens or undermines itself where it does not believe it has cause to fear. Without better-fortified challengers to its self-indulgent proclivities, it relaxes the energetic tension it has absorbed from modernity and is, thus, in danger of losing sight of its own defects. Mr. Cropsey's conclusion comports well with Tocqueville's observation that in democratic ages the pleasures of equality will always be more easily and more keenly felt than the plea-

tures of freedom, and that these ages are dangerously predisposed, therefore, toward a collective lassitude or torpor that is not inimical to equality, but to humanity. In Mr. Cropsey's phrase, "the indulgent silently consumes the inspiring."

Marx argued that genuine freedom or human emancipation requires the end of the material dialectic. For his part, Mr. Cropsey suggests that the noetic dialectic is necessary to cure, or at least to confront, the dehumanizing elements of modern life. His account does not preclude any of the other sources of moral vigilance that are urged in the book—civil or private religion, new economic conditions, the preservation of structures conducive to the use of free institutions, traditional private communities (McWilliams, p. 311), or racial and ethnic diversity (Storing, pp. 331–32). Mr. Cropsey intimates, however, that the solution to the problems posed by liberalism, in us as perhaps also in modernity at large, must ultimately lie in the realm of thought itself.

Although he draws our attention specifically toward philosophy, his suggestion also has special relevance for the democratically fostered enclaves of thought in our society that are supposed to be detached from public opinion. May we not reasonably infer from Mr. Cropsey's extraordinary analysis that democratic societies can least dispense with liberal education—the education pertaining to free men and women—and that one essential purpose of that education must be to promote the dialectic between the two strands of modern thought that the regime itself tends to abate, but on which our continued maintenance as a free nation may depend. To meet their responsibilities and to take advantage of the freedom they are afforded, our educational institutions would need to keep before students, and accustom them to respond to, thought in its full-bodied, unalloyed, and undiluted forms, as uttered by its best representatives, and including the best spokesmen for premodern alternatives to modernity. Such a task might ground and guide the widespread recognition in our colleges that students must learn to transcend the parameters of contemporary debate and, to use Mr. Morrissey's phrase, become attuned to "a world of thought beyond the familiar grabbag of received opinions." By contributing to this world of thought, *The Moral Foundations of the American Republic* practices and promotes liberal education in the sense suggested.

Taken together, the self-critical reflections on the regime contained in the book, evident in every essay, enact the modern conversation analyzed by Mr. Cropsey. They fall into two general categories—those that see our chief problems to stem from our essentially democratic character and those that see them to stem from our essentially undemocratic character. The two strands of argument prominent in the book that follow from these orientations hark back to the dichotomy of moral meanings put forward by Mr. Cropsey. There are four essays in the book that urge us to recognize our anti-democratic or inequalitarian character. These essays also share a concern to impart a more communitarian spirit to our regime. As the respondents to two of the four essays suggest, it is on the basis of

their interpretation of both the goals for which we should strive and the means we should use to achieve them that we can best judge which of the two moral meanings in modern thought serves most to guide them (See Diamond, pp. 98–100, and Ceaser, pp. 280–81).

The four essayists treat our egalitarian sentiments as part of our political heritage, but as more or less alien to the regime. As it happens, these challenges to the regime for its imperfect attainment of democracy view our way of life, as Mr. Cropsy does, as a struggle between two opposing but co-existing American tendencies; they see the intensity of the American contest to be increasing, however, rather than decreasing. Mr. Barber considers our way of life in terms of a conflict between republic and empire. Mr. Dahl and Mr. Hoftstadter see our democratic ideals suppressed by anti-democratic constitutional arrangements. Mr. McWilliams notes a conflict between traditional private communities and the modern ideas reflected in the Constitution. I would like to address the arguments raised in the individual essays further, concentrating on the two essays, Mr. McWilliams' and Mr. Barber's, that do not already have official respondents in the book.

Mr. McWilliams argues that true communality, which entails genuine sharing or union, requires a moral commitment to equality or sameness that is at odds with liberalism and, in particular, one that rejects liberalism's truck with inequality in the name of individual freedom. A perfect oneness with others finds resistance in the hearts of men. Liberalism, the political form of our era, is perfectly willing to compound with this psychological fact. The ideal of perfect community that is necessary to the best politics and a revitalized public life, cannot be attained in our time, then, in public life, as it was in the ancient polis, but only in those private, substantive communities that operate on the inner man. Such communities are, as much as liberalism itself, a part of our political inheritance. "Our political history has involved a conflict between modern, dominantly liberal ideas and those derived from religion and traditional philosophies and cultures . . ." (p. 311). Such communities have customarily served to "check" modern ideas and must be the source of the requisite spiritual or moral reform. The moral significance of equality must be acknowledged if a true communal spirit is to exist in America, which can only be done by divorcing equality from every utilitarian and, therefore, shifting ground and by removing it from any association with material gratification. True equality means men are of equal worth or dignity. Mr. McWilliams' view combines elements drawn from scriptural religion, on the one hand, and from Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel, the reformers of classical liberalism, on the other.

As he views it, we may say that the problem of equality is inseparable from the problem of the anti-social sentiments or amour-propre: submission to a measure of equality of treatment does not go far enough if one secretly yearns for supremacy and is a tyrant in one's heart. It is not enough to live beside the neighbor, one must also love him. Seeking to purge rather than to redirect our "natural

pride” or love of dominion, Mr. McWilliams seems to call for our voluntary self-limitation or self-effacement. He also seems to part company with the proposals of Locke, Rousseau or Tocqueville (see p. 384) for dealing with the problem of amour-propre at the point at which they ascribe great if not paramount importance to individual autonomy or self-dependence and political freedom. To prevent the subsumption or absorption of the individual into the collective, which he fears as a “monstrosity” possible in mass society (p. 311), Mr. McWilliams assigns the task of moral reform to private, e.g., religious, communities. Other essayists in the book have noted the difficulty of preserving the integrity of such communities in America. We can also readily observe the way in which such communities bring the concept of equal dignity, ever more nicely defined, to bear in public life, not in opposition to, but under the influence of, democratic politics. We must, therefore, wonder whether the opposition between the private and the public order on the issue of equality is as great as Mr. McWilliams portrays it and, further, whether, with regard to human dignity, we must not restore to our discussions of community, the recognition of its dangers to the individual.

Mr. McWilliams’ argument that we should work toward the eradication of exploitative attitudes is useful as a basis of comparison with arguments appearing in the essays of Mr. Hofstadter, Mr. Barber, and Mr. Dahl. The spirited self-preferences liberalism sought to tame, if imperfectly, these other authors tend to regard as nonexistent. They treat the unequal distribution of wealth as almost the sole cause of political conflict and exploitation, and the demand for economic equality as almost the sole claim that could call itself justice. Insofar as their own proposals either call for or anticipate national moral reform, they tend to rest their hopes on very different methods from those appearing in Mr. McWilliams’s account.

Mr. Barber does envision the possibility of a national moral reform. In the manner of the Anti-Federalists, he reopens the debate about the desirability of the extended commercial republic, as opposed to one founded on civic virtue, shared values, and public purposes. He asks us to purge our luxurious cities and to rebuild our regime along sterner lines. The rapprochement with technology in his account of a new republicanism, and his emphasis on communal sharing and cooperation, suggest that he also purges the old republicanism of some of its sterner elements.

Since objective economic conditions at the time of the founding militated against the creation of a “democratically tinged republic” with “pristine” republican institutions, the framers drafted instead a political structure consisting in crucial respects of surrogates for those institutions (e.g., federalism, the representative system, the adversarial method); a regime we may call from his description of it a republican tinged empire. The framers “made a virtue of necessity and modified republican institutions to meet the demands of expansion and empire” (p. 60). Our preoccupation with economic growth, progress and material well-being, as well as with continental power, qualifies us to be an empire. Mr. Bar-

ber notes our “imperial scale,” but also our disposition toward “imperial domination,” and “imperial offense.” It is, finally, our economic conditions themselves, however, rather than our form, or the founders’ legislative skills, i.e., the possibilities for “capitalist expansion” (“open spaces, open jobs and unmade fortunes”), that made such accommodation of republican virtue as we have known possible. The framers “trusted in invisible hands to guide the pursuit of private wealth in publicly useful directions—and succeeded if only because there was so very much wealth” (p. 52). America has witnessed, however, a gradual but decisive and irreversible alteration in its conditions. Our new conditions, requiring limited or even zero economic growth, have compromised our compromises, especially our tolerance of inequality, and have created what we experience as a crisis in public purpose. We cannot stay as we are. We must abandon the unfounded optimism in the beneficial trickle-down effects of unlimited economic growth, but we have the opportunity to build new structures that are compatible with our new conditions. Although at the moment our new conditions bespeak an increased polarization of society, as shared conditions encompassing both rich and poor, they hold out the promise of tighter social unity, cooperation, and the development of national public purposes. The prospects for our becoming a full and uncompromised republic are greater now than ever before in our history; we need no longer accommodate empire. Mr. Barber’s somewhat surprising conclusion rests on an inversion of the Marxian view of “conditions”: scarcity is the natural soil for republican mutualism, i.e., species life, and abundance is the natural soil for competitive individualism (p. 60). As is consistent with his interpretation of the framers’ success, our success at making “a necessity of virtue” depends less on any new form than on our new conditions. Mr. Barber’s sanguine hopes for our moral reform neither rest on nor require, then, a direct repudiation of the acquisitive self-indulgence or passionate preoccupation with private life that he sees in our history.

Mr. Barber is unjustifiably skeptical of the very idea of an extended commercial republic and prefers the term empire to describe it. His approach to “the republican idiom” also prevents him from coming adequately to grips with either the Rousseauian or the Madisonian understanding of the defects of ancient republics—where there was no lack of either economic conflict or imperialism—or to see clearly the conditions under which their virtues came to be. A republican “scale” may be far less important to their virtues than severity of morals or self-mastery, without which, some famous examples suggest, small size and relative scarcity can become the basis precisely of imperial aggrandizement and the mastery of others. We should perhaps ask why our own so-called imperial conditions did not give rise to anything similar. In his analysis, the complexity of the whole question of republican “conditions” in general and of the issue of scarcity, in particular, tends to get lost or become obscured. Struggling small republics today daily present to view a wide range of conditions necessary to their continued survival. Further, political theorists from Plato to Machiavelli and from Locke to

Marx have doubted whether a natural moderation imposed on men from a condition of natural scarcity could or should maintain itself. Those who have not sought to overcome natural scarcity through labor seem to have favored, albeit for a variety of reasons, a politically mandated and artificial scarcity to lend support to their ends.

We should all heed Mr. Barber's reminder that unlimited economic growth is a vain dream. But we must also reflect on the intransigence of the passions underlying such dreams in democracies and on the corresponding need to temper them. In America concerns about the limits to economic growth are expressed as increasing demands on the existing social wealth proceed apace; as witnessed, for example, in the objections that proponents of economic democracy make to minimum standards of housing, education, and medical care for the poor. Nor is it surprising if Mr. Barber's claim is frequently countered by the more optimistic prognosis that the limited economic growth we are experiencing is a temporary problem, and that it can be solved by central planning, state-run capitalism, and strategic investment initiatives.⁶ It remains to be seen whether the customary American blend of acquisitiveness, compassion, and self-dependence, still present in this latter view, will preserve the moderation on which it depends.

In his praise of the founders Mr. Barber obscures the distinction between deference to the American condition that the founders thought would insure their success, our size, and the political principles that led them to prefer it. Far from viewing our condition as requiring a compromise with republican institutions, they saw it to be the one most congenial to the natural liberties government was established to guarantee. Our extent makes the task of exploiting faction, evident in any free regime, more manageable, enabling us to cure by republican means the problems most incident to republics. The lack of substantive ends or uniform public purposes, in favor of a multiplicity of ends, is indeed a hallmark of the liberal democratic regime, but it should be evaluated, rather than by conditions, by liberalism's standards of sociability and, thus, of community. Society is composed of essentially asocial individuals who are by nature "absolute lords" over themselves; the needs of their bodies are the foundation of states. The regulation of their various and interfering interests is, however, a public task, the performance of which does not require the surrender of political work to "invisible hands," or the assimilation of political relations to market relations. The regulating is accomplished by political and quite visible means—in deliberations governed by constitutional law. Whether choices are made in city councils, houses of Congress, or even under the influence of the lobbyists who mill in congressional corridors, are they not fundamentally different from choices made by market mechanisms?

The influence exerted by capitalism on our political order is thematically treated by Mr. Dahl's essay as well as Mr. Barber's. The rivalry between our

6. See Robert Kuttner, "The Democrats May Have a Program After All," *The Washington Post*, Thursday, November 13, 1986.

democratic moral foundations and other, antidemocratic “historical commitments” more favorable to capitalism as such, which Mr. Dahl sees to have been playing itself out in our history, has so far been decided in favor of the antidemocratic. Democracy has been thwarted by our antimajoritarian Constitution and by hierarchical institutions pervading our society. Our constitutional structures, in particular, are intentionally biased, in his view, against “the demos” and biased in favor of a governing elite drawn from the privileged economic classes. Our form has, in turn, enabled economic interests, especially the interests of corporate capitalism, to predominate over what should have been more fundamental political ends—liberty, equality and justice. On this view, the Constitution itself is of secondary importance by comparison to our moral foundations, which oppose its tendencies. By means of a wholesale reorganization of our political structures, it would be possible to fulfill rather than to thwart our fundamental moral purposes and to work toward the full participation of the demos, with a view to allowing its interests to predominate. Mr. Dahl supplies us in his essay with the major criteria to guide and to evaluate our performance as a pure democracy, which he calls procedural democracy. As Mr. Ceaser points out, the procedural standards guaranteeing the equal participation of all adults and the democratization of all aspects of our life, would also meet, and almost automatically, a substantive standard of justice.

Mr. Dahl does not make the argument in favor of a more thoroughly egalitarian order because of its moral effects on the participants, as might be possible, that is, because a fuller political participation would imbue them with a disposition toward independence that is appropriate to those who are citizens and free beings rather than subjects or slaves. He views more participation rather as a better way for “the demos” to aggregate its demands and articulate them to government, or to fulfill its needs. Relying on the fact of participation to guarantee both the benign character of the political authority and the reconcilability of interests, he would dismantle the apparently archaic constitutional structures that place legal limits on or otherwise modify or break up majority will. He interprets the constitutional safeguards to individual rights, especially those that might temper majority will or limit the scope of government, merely as safeguards for the unfairly privileged class. His proposals for procedural democracy, would, however, leave the individual with very few resources, natural or artificial, to resist an increasingly powerful social and governmental pressure. To serve the public interest, he would interject in lieu of the enlightened statesmen on whom the founders chose not to rely, enlightened social scientists or experts who would give members of the demos the opportunity “for discovering and validating, in the time available, what his or her preferences are on the matter to be decided” (p. 243).

These proposals are free of, and treat as unnecessary, any intention to effect our moral reform. Herein they would seem to make manifest a kinship with the indulgent strand of modern thinking that, to use Mr. Mansfield’s succinct phrase, occupies itself with making us better off rather than better. Mr. Dahl does estab-

lish new economic goals for America. In the priority he accords to the redistribution of wealth as the central political task, however, he does not seem to alter much the deference of politics to economic ends that he describes as the failing of liberalism. Although Mr. Dahl's conceptualization of procedural democracy displays Rousseaucan and Kantian roots in its assumption that just decisions are virtually guaranteed by the decision-making process itself, he does not see, as they did, that in politics some independent operation on the character of the people is necessary, that justice is not automatic.

A more complete and knowledgeable discussion of Mr. Dahl's procedural democracy than my own is undertaken by James Ceaser in his essay. He replies that Mr. Dahl's vision and policy prescriptions come from a variety of sources external to the regime, but he is by no means persuaded that they really do lie within the American tradition, including the place it accords to constitutionalism. He associates them rather with the schools of criticism noted by Mr. Cropsey. Mr. Ceaser is particularly concerned about the evident failure in Mr. Dahl's account to see equality or majoritarianism as in any way a threat to our freedom, from the vantage point of either the nation or the individual. Given the requirements of a healthy republic to maintain its freedom from internal and external threat, Mr. Ceaser asks whether or not the impediments to a more egalitarian order in America might not with reason be preferred to their removal. He concludes that Mr. Dahl's "vision of the future, however benign it may appear, represents a flight from the realism of the greatest parts of our tradition that draw on the sterner qualities of the human spirit that have helped to build and sustain our republic" (p. 281).

Mr. Ceaser himself presents the outlines of the genuine encounter with the founders' self-understanding, as well as with that prevalent in the Jeffersonian-Jacksonian era, which he calls for in his essay to stand in place of "creative myth-making" of the sort he sees in Mr. Dahl's account. Merely to note several of the other dimensions of his comprehensive and forceful reckoning with Mr. Dahl's proposals and their implications: he examines the "historical commitments" treated by Mr. Dahl as impediments to democracy and offers an alternative understanding of their relationship to liberal democratic goals; he considers the significance of an era of limited economic growth in light of goals that may be more fundamental than economic growth in our republic; and he analyzes Mr. Dahl's proposals in the context of several decades of criticism of the Constitution from the American left. The other essays in the book alleging our undemocratic character can fruitfully be referred to Mr. Ceaser's essay as well.

I would like to end with a final statement about the character of this collection. Without either circumventing or asking us to jettison the disciplines themselves, the essays in *The Moral Foundations of the American Republic* are emphatically interdisciplinary. They combine historical, economic, and philosophical research by scholars who are well-versed in both theory and practice and very much at home wherever theory and practice intersect. The essays reveal with the utmost

clarity that the true foundation of interdisciplinary education, so much in vogue, depends on that which is least susceptible to institutional reform, namely, teachers who are able to combine depth and breadth of scholarship, on the one hand, and the capacity as well as the willingness to render impartial judgments on the meaning of our collective experience, on the other. The contributors to this volume attest to the existence of a "natural aristocracy" of letters. The repute that they have deservedly earned for their scholarship is accompanied by the repute they have, including the younger among them, as teachers. This combination of excellences is by no means an unimportant consideration in light of the fact that spiritedness seems to have taken flight from political and social life only to find a curious refuge in intellectual life, and especially on college campuses, making partisanship occasionally stand for scholarship and replacing pale, cold objectivity with hot self-assertion. Our colleges have recently witnessed left-leaning faculties recoiling in alarm from the indisputable fact that right-leaning intellectuals, including their young disciples on campus, have learned so well the lessons they themselves were once anxious to teach about the political, i.e., ideological, character of all education. Those faculty members who do not take the challenge as a cue to dig in their heels and escalate the battle, or to insulate themselves from criticism under the guise of doing the opposite, are reminded of the fragility of free discussion and of the forces that will always threaten it.

It is in the quality of the individual voices in this volume and in the responsible nature of their dialogues, and also the manner in which they are formed into a whole or collective voice, that the greatest value of the book resides. In addition to its other virtues, by bringing to light so well the overall design of this work and the intelligence underlying it, Mr. Morrissey's introductory essay makes visible the hand of the editor that might otherwise escape notice or remain invisible. Above all, then, the introduction is an exceedingly fine and fitting tribute to the farsighted care and penetrating acuity of Robert H. Horwitz. His scholarly, pedagogic, and legislative skills, expended so freely and so benignly on behalf of liberal education, make him a founder in his own right.