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1668 Appendix to Leviathan

THOMAS HOBBES

Translated, with an Introduction and Notes, by

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INTRODUCTION

"Leviathan" in Latin

On December 9, 1667, the Dutch publisher Dr. Joan Blaeu, through his son Pierre, corresponded with Thomas Hobbes in England, touching some details of a project which the three men had undertaken, namely, the publication of a Latin edition of Hobbes' Leviathan. Writing in French, the younger Blaeu records his father's satisfaction at having learned that Hobbes had finished two-thirds of the work and was working steadily each day to complete what remained before the following Easter. He further recounts the author's manner of proceeding in the work, forced upon him by the paralytic condition with which he had returned from France some sixteen years earlier. Hobbes, it seems, had employed an amanuensis, ignorant of Latin, to transcribe the text, as well as a second, well versed in the language, to reread and correct it. Blaeu finally assures Hobbes of the care that he will take in correcting the proofs, to be printed in the firm's Amsterdam publishing house. Such, in brief compass, were the material conditions under which Hobbes sought to gratify his foreign admirers' wish to have a more accessible text of his political masterpiece.

But however evident to us are Hobbes' reasons and arrangements for producing a Latin edition of Leviathan, it has proved a difficult question whether or in what form the writing of the Latin text ultimately published in 1668 may have preceded that of the English text published in 1651. Three scholars who have considered the matter, Lubienski, Hood and Tricaud, agree on the priority in time of at least some portions of a Latin text. This would mean that, during the period Hobbes resided in France preparing Leviathan, he had at least an outline or some chapters of the text in Latin upon which to draw, many parts of which eventually appeared in 1668.

Scholars have adduced several interesting but inconclusive arguments to support the existence of what Tricaud terms un hypothétique proto-Léviathan

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Latin. For one, the English *Leviathan* is longer and more developed in several places and seems, subjectively at least, to be more exact. Where the English text shows fuller treatment of subjects than that of the Latin, the material is added at the ends of paragraphs, as though Hobbes, confident in his formulations and writing hurriedly, left an antecedent text largely intact, supplementing as further consideration required. The tone of the 1651 text is also more passionate than the Latin text, whose date of composition would thus be earlier than the egregious outcome of the English Civil War, the execution of the king, Charles I, in 1649.

Further, quotations of ancient authors in the Latin text are roughly verbatim or by way of paraphrase, whereas the English text records them in indirect discourse, as though Hobbes, working from his own pre-existing text, allowed himself to omit recourse to the ancient texts. Also, the Latin text refers to events of the Civil War as contemporaneous and belligerent; the English text refers to the period as a past event and in less direct, more ideological terms.

Finally, Hobbes’ late Latin autobiography, which Frithiof Brandt has shown so accurate and precise in relating details of his scientific development, states, “I finished the book [i.e., *Leviathan*] in my native tongue so that it could be both often and usefully read by my fellow Englishmen.” Various editing and holding back texts in Latin and the vernacular seems to have been a characteristic aspect of Hobbes’ way of working, evidenced in the progress his *De Corpore* made to publication. Also, Latin in Hobbes’ day retained its privilege as the appropriate vehicle for philosophic expression, and Hobbes had claimed a place among the philosophers since his reception into that brilliant Parisian circle, gathered about the Franciscan friar Marin Mersenne, which included the atomist Pierre Gassendi, the mathematician Fermat, the libertine Sorbière, Martel and Du Prat, with ties to Descartes.

But, although the precise relation between Hobbes’ two texts remains unsettled, textual and historical reasons indicate that the *Appendix ad Leviathan*, placed at the end of the Latin text and translated here for the first time into English, was written some time after 1651, most likely for the 1668 publication. For one, in line with its intended audience, the Latin Appendix substitutes for the English text’s “Review and Conclusion,” an element of interest solely to an English audience, given its focus on the situation following the Civil War. For another, the third chapter of the Appendix, a response to *Leviathan*’s critics, clearly postdates the text published in 1651 and the criticisms of it that arose from many sides.

In both the Appendix and the corresponding Latin text, Hobbes corrects an error that had appeared in the English text, that of apparently suggesting in a discussion of the Trinity that Moses “personified” God the Father prior to the birth of Jesus Christ. He defends himself on this point against his critics, specifically the Bishop of Derry, John Bramhall, in *An Answer to a Book, published by Dr. Bramhall*. (The title varies according to edition), written in
1668, though published for the first time in 1682.\textsuperscript{15} There he states that the error has been eliminated in the Latin text of \textit{Leviathan}, by then perhaps already printed “beyond the seas.”\textsuperscript{16}

Also, the religious and theological issues which Hobbes takes up in the Appendix lay closest to his immediate interests in the period after the appearance of \textit{Leviathan} in 1651, more particularly after the return of Charles II to England in 1660 and the agitation against \textit{Leviathan} that followed upon the seating of the Cavalier Parliament in 1661.\textsuperscript{17} For, while the general impetus for writing on these matters was Hobbes’ lifelong, intimate and profound interest in religious belief and practice, especially in relation to politics, the specific impetus was clearly the atmosphere of hostility in which he had lived since the late 1640’s, owing to suspicions of his orthodoxy overtly aroused by the exchange he had had in France with Bramhall.\textsuperscript{18}

At the instigation of royalist and ecclesiastic alike, Hobbes had been made to feel unwelcome at Charles’ court in exile,\textsuperscript{19} and, after 1660, the restored monarch, while granting his former mathematics tutor an annual pension, nonetheless placed him under a ban not to publish anything in English on politics or religion.\textsuperscript{20}

Then, in 1666, as a result of recriminations that arose among the people following the twin disasters of plague and fire in London, \textit{Leviathan} was named as a cause of atheism and blasphemy, whose remedy was to be considered by a committee of the House of Commons.\textsuperscript{21} Aubrey mentions the fear Hobbes felt at a motion brought by a number of the bishops in the House of Lords to “have the good old gentleman burn’t as a heretique.”\textsuperscript{22} Pepys relates in his \textit{Journal} that the price of \textit{Leviathan} tripled as a result of the uproar.\textsuperscript{23}

The Appendix is thus one of a number of Hobbes’ post-Restoration texts, for example, the answer to Bramhall, his ecclesiastical history, the \textit{Historical Narration Concerning Heresie},\textsuperscript{24} and the \textit{Dialogue between a Phylosopher (sic) and a Student of the Common-Laws of England}, which include some treatment of the nature of orthodoxy, political and ecclesiastical authority, the definition and punishment of heresy, and more broadly the relation of revealed religion, political power and rational inquiry.\textsuperscript{25} And all treat religious views like those of their author, and his immunity from a charge of heresy is either argued or assumed.\textsuperscript{26}

But while Hobbes, at the age of eighty in 1668, surely did not want to suffer punishment as a heretic, as before he in no way abandoned positions he had long held in the face of possible prosecution.\textsuperscript{27} Indeed he did not think he espoused heretical views. And it is in the pages of the Appendix that he has made an important, sustained effort to exculpate himself.

Contemporaries’ doubts as to his success are well known; he never issued from the opprobrium of entertaining evidently heterodox, if sincerely held, opinions.\textsuperscript{28} Modern doubters dismiss his protestations of orthodoxy as dissimulation and pronounce against the possibility of sincerity.\textsuperscript{29}

But the passage of time and new historical understandings may allow a ver-
dict as to Hobbes' purposes and character different from that of some of his and our contemporaries.\textsuperscript{30} The passions that animated the religious debates of that time have long since cooled and become if not incredible, at least surprising, to us. Also, new research allows us to check conclusions on many points against a more detailed background in the history of Christian theology, especially among Protestants and more particularly among those influenced by Martin Luther. The "Luther Renaissance," carried on earlier in this century, largely by German and Scandinavian scholars, has been accompanied moreover by investigations into the medieval antecedents of the Reformation. These lines of inquiry are particularly valuable if we are to deal with the vexed question of the place of religious belief in Hobbes' thought. Because aspects of his era seem now both so familiar and also so distant, it may be easier to pursue the vagaries of Hobbes' thought under the presumption that he said what he meant and meant what he said.

One stumbling block on the path to clearer historical understanding of Hobbes' intentions and accomplishments is the evidently self-hypothecating notion of modernity.\textsuperscript{31} Hobbes, as an "early-modern thinker," has at times been subjected to interpretive retrofit. Thus, one editor of \textit{Leviathan} omitted all of part four and most of part three, approximately one half of the book, because, to him, those parts added little or nothing to Hobbes' philosophy of men and government. Presumably this excision rested on the judgement that Hobbes' theory of the Christian commonwealth and his critique of a distortion of such a commonwealth could be ignored. This cannot have been Hobbes' opinion of his own project as a theorist, nor can it have been his view of the needs and capacities of his audience. To read Hobbes in this way is to obscure a large part of the value of his thought, both as historical example and as philosophic precept.\textsuperscript{32}

Bracketing the positive treatment of the religious themes so conspicuous in his work withdraws from our consideration a large and complex body of thought, together with the interesting connections it suggests between the thinker and his era.\textsuperscript{33} Such an interpretive procedure renders unintelligible the very disjunctions of philosophy and religion, reason and feeling, belief and knowledge, which Hobbes set up in constructing his system of body, man and citizen, thereby thwarting an adequate appraisal of its theoretical foundations and systematic closure. On these grounds, we would be prohibited from asking whether or to what extent the religious ideas which Hobbes had, or had rejected, influenced or contributed to his political doctrine, or whether his account of political life is not systematically impoverished in favor of the religious understandings and commitments which he brought to his theoretical task. Indeed, it is by no means impossible that his religious formation, in preceding his philosophic and scientific development, conditioned the course of the latter and determined its outcome.
I would advance the argument here that the merit of Hobbes’ formulations of religious themes, in themselves and in relation to his doctrine of political obligation, is intrinsic to his theoretical project. His views on these matters are less heterodox in context, and more revealing, than often thought. Critics have failed to appreciate the full radicalness of the Protestant tradition of which Hobbes was a trenchant proponent. For he addressed the large issues associated with the rise of Protestantism and furnished answers to them framed largely within the terms supplied by its own culture and presuppositions. This new translation of the 1668 Appendix presents an opportunity briefly to examine a few relevant points.

The 1668 Appendix

The 1668 Appendix deals with issues that Hobbes had treated earlier in his writings but now in a somewhat more sustained and focused way than before. Divided into three chapters, it takes up the status and meaning of the creedal statement of the Nicene Fathers in relation to the Bible, the immortality of the created soul as an interpretation of the Christian doctrine of eternal life, and the question of heresy and the nature of orthodoxy in the early church and in the Anglican Church. It ends with a particularized response to critics of the English Leviathan, largely with reference to theological objections raised against his views.

At issue throughout is Hobbes’ desire to vindicate an historically rooted concept of faith, based on the primacy of Scripture over both church tradition and what he calls private theology, and to show the congruity of this concept with the power of civil authority over liturgy and public profession of the faith. Hobbes has here again attacked the view that the human soul, once created, is immortal and has defended again his view that the soul, if it is to be distinguished from bodily existence, dies with the body, to await the general resurrection of the dead at the Last Judgement. This, he believes, is the doctrine indicated historically both by the evidence of the Christian proclamation and by the context in which the faith was preached.

The witness to that proclamation and the context in which it is to be understood is the biblical record. New Testament writers, in describing Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah, have supplied the essential content of the Christian faith. Their proclamation must be understood in a way that is consistent in its parts and in the context of the thought-world in which it spread. Scripture then is the positive source of doctrine, with reason its negative criterion.

Thus, in response to the assertion of Interlocutor A that the created soul does not cease to exist as a self-subsistent entity for the least instant, Hobbes, in the person of Interlocutor B, states:
I shall tell you nothing at all on this point apart from that which I find expressly stated, without the least ambiguity, in the Scriptures, where no other text is openly contradictory.38

Hobbes continues in this vein and makes explicit his recognition of the differences between the thought-worlds of the Greek philosophers and that of the biblical writers:

You and almost all others take it from the philosophers that the human soul cannot die. I for my part have no desire to have them as my masters after the Holy Scriptures.

He pursues the point by appealing to Scripture and forcing a contrast between the Greek notion of natural immortality, putatively presented by such princes of philosophy as Plato and Aristotle, and the Judaeo-Christian idea of eternal life, with its emphasis on sin, human mortality and divine redemption:

Still, if you brought me a passage from the Scriptures in which some type of immortality is attributed to the human soul other than that which is given men under the name of eternal life, then I too should hold with the philosophers.

Clearly, Hobbes has set himself against that understanding of reason, which is located in the immortal soul and participates in the eternal, noetic reality which it to an extent intuits. Reason for him is instrumental; it is not a means whereby the soul ascends from the sphere of genesis to that of being, as it was for Plato.

Indeed, later in the Appendix, Hobbes cites scriptural support for his view that the possession of reason is scarcely sufficient cause to place man above the animals:

The soul (anima), they say, thinks, remembers, reasons. What if, denying this, I were to say that the animal (animal) itself thinks and remembers? How shall they refute me? And what is it to reason except to place names upon things, to connect the names into assertions and to join these assertions into the syllogisms out of which logic is made? In paradise, before he had imposed names on things, how was Adam more rational than the other animals, except by potential only? It does not seem to me then that men are substantially distinguished from the brutes by the fact that they discuss matters in words and brutes do not.39

The claim that Hobbes here denies, namely, that the human soul holds a privileged place in the great chain of being, had been made often enough in the Christian West, especially after the recovery of Aristotelian texts in medieval times and in the wake of the Platonic revival of Ficino during the Renaissance. Borrowing and adapting such ideas, theologians had made them key aspects of the church’s confession. Both the medieval council of Vienne and the Lateran council of 1512 had articulated somewhat differing conceptions of the soul’s
immortality, each under the influence of classical thought, Aristotelianism in
the case of the first and Platonism in the second.40

Hobbes rejected what he considered a combination of Greek thought and
Christian faith as faulty and misleading, a false witness to the faith of the early
church and a pernicious influence on politics. The specific focus of his attack
was what he called the doctrine of incorporeal substances, that is, the belief
that certain disembodied, ideal, immortal and self-subsistent entities really exis-
ted outside the mind. In a striking conflation of different conceptions, Hobbes
equated the doctrine of incorporeal substances with religious teachings on the
immortality of the soul.41

Importing this tenet of ancient thought into Christian theology, he believed,
had led to the abuses of the great bête noire of the seventeenth-century English
Protestant, popish superstition:

This window [the doctrine of incorporeal substances] it is, that gives entrance to
the dark doctrine, first, of eternal torments; and afterwards of purgatory, and
consequently of the walking abroad, especially in places consecrated, solitary or
dark, of the ghosts of men deceased; and thereby to the pretences of exorcisme and
conjugation of phantasmes; as also of invocation of men dead; and to the doctrine
of indulgences; that is to say, of exemption for a time, or for ever, from the fire of
purgatory, wherein these incorporeal substances are pretended by burning to be
cleansed, and made fit for heaven.42 For, men being generally possessed before the
time of our Saviour by contagion of the daemonology of the Greeks, of an opinion
that the souls of men were substances distinct from their bodies, and therefore that
when the body was dead, the soule of every man, whether godly or wicked, must
subsist somewhere by vertue of its own nature, without acknowledging therein any
supernatural gifts of God's; the doctors of the church doubted a long time, what
was the place, which they were to abide in, till they should be re-united to their
bodies in the resurrection; supposing for a while they lay under the altars; but
afterward the church of Rome found it more profitable to build for them this place
of purgatory; which by some other churches in this later age, has been demolished.43

The more evidently deadly, second effect of the doctrine of separated es-
sences was realized in politics. For Hobbes believed that it was fear of disem-
bodied spirits or ghosts, such as the souls of the departed, that caused men to
turn from their lawful sovereigns to seek solace from seditious priests:

But to what purpose (may some men say) is such subtilty in a work of this nature,
where I pretend to nothing but what is necessary to the doctrine of government and
obedience? It is to this purpose, that men may no longer suffer themselves to be
abused by them, that by this doctrine of separated essences, built on the vain
philosophy of Aristotle, would fright them from obeying the laws of their country,
with empty names; as men fright birds from the corn with an empty doublet, a hat,
and a crooked stick. For it is upon this ground, that when a man is dead and
buried, they say his soule (that is his life) can walk separated from his body, and is
seen by night amongst the graves. Upon the same ground they say, that the figure
and colour and tast of a piece of bread, has a being, there, where they say there is no bread; and upon the same ground they say, that faith and wisdome, and other vertues are sometimes powred into a man, sometimes blown into him from heaven; as if the vertuous, and their vertues could be asunder; and a great many other things that serve to lessen the dependance of subjects on the soveraign power of their country. For who will endeavour to obey the laws, if he expect obedience to be powred or blown into him? Or who will not obey a priest, that can make God, rather than his soveraign; nay than God Himselfe? Or who, that is in fear of ghosts, will not bear great respect to those that can make the holy water, that drives them from him? And this shall suffice for an example of the errors which are brought into the church from the entities and essences of Aristotle: which it may be he knew to be false philosophy; but writ it as a thing consonant to and corroborative of their religion; and fearing the fate of Socrates.44

It is beyond the scope of this introduction to examine in any detail the accuracy and justice of Hobbes’ accusations against the thought of the ancients and the theology of the church. Like Aristotle in ancient times and Martin Heidegger in our time, Hobbes conducted an extended conversation with his philosophic forebears, conspicuous, if for no other reason, for its brilliance and high commitment. But, as I believe the Appendix shows, like Aristotle and Heidegger in dealing with past thinkers, he was one sided, in some points unfair, certainly peremptory and perhaps inaccurate.

Nor is Hobbes as clear as might be desired in revealing the ground of his break with tradition. As others have remarked, he rarely acknowledges his intellectual debts, especially to thinkers who lived before the “century of genius.”45 Hobbes seems to have been put to some difficulty in vindicating his own originality, for example, in his dealings with Descartes.46 This may have led him to obscure his intellectual sources, particularly his reading of medieval thinkers. He himself stressed the revelatory character of the encounter with Euclid’s geometry during a trip to the Continent, but even this was possible only against the background of prior understandings. And the conclusions he draws from Euclid are related largely to questions of proof, demonstration and language. His education, the preoccupations of his era, his own scientific and scholarly interests and aptitudes certainly shaped his later thought, though precisely how to sort out these factors remains problematic.47

But knowing the sources of an author’s thought makes it easier to grasp the character, uniqueness and significance of his intellectual achievement; and these are better understood by identifying and studying those who, in either a positive or negative way, influenced the course of his development. Hobbes would have facilitated our understanding of his criticism of the philosophic past had he been clearer in specifying the relations of medieval theologians with their classical antecedents, to the extent he knew them.48

Nonetheless, the burden of his attack on incorporeal substances was not merely or predominantly philosophic or scientific. For, though laying the fear
of disembodied souls was a key feature of his political theorizing, the conclusion he drew from this line of reasoning, in the Appendix as elsewhere, was mainly evangelical. While he allowed for difference of opinion on the point, insofar as men reflected on his own orthodoxy and on the requirements of the Christian faith, he unwaveringly emphasized God’s saving activity in redeeming the soul; that is, he stressed God’s “supernatural gifts” over the “natural” immortality of the created soul.

Thus, in response to Interlocutor B’s hesitation to break with what he takes to be the traditional teaching as to the soul’s immortality, Hobbes, in the person of Interlocutor A, states:

Least of all do I censure those who feel this way. For surely he who has such lofty thoughts about his own soul is most careful not to defile it through baseness of life. But, for the rest, I do not concede that he is less careful who steadfastly believes that his soul has been redeemed through the blood of Christ and made eternal.49

And he remains convinced of the adequacy of his views on the soul, redemption and the hope of resurrection:

And consider those words of Christ on the cross to the robber: “Today you shall be with me in paradise”; and the other words to the disciples: “I am the tree of life”; what purpose do these words serve except that the faithful may know that the great flaming sword has been removed from the gate of paradise and the way made plain, through the sacrifice of Christ, to the tree of life, that is, to life eternal? What need is there then for the pious man to attribute his immortality to creation, that is to nature, rather than to redemption?50

He concludes this discussion in the Appendix by saying:

Let others look forward to what immortality they prefer. I look to that which Christ has acquired for us by His victory over death through His blood.

Here we may draw the first of three parallels with the reformer Martin Luther, the reluctant founder of one of the churches that had demolished the place of purgatory. Luther’s view of the mortality of the soul was like that of Hobbes: opposition to the notion of “natural immortality” in favor of an evangelical insistence upon human mortality and dependence upon God, symbolized in the doctrine of eternal life.51

Luther developed this view in a commentary on two passages drawn from Ecclesiastes: one, mentioned above and quoted in the Appendix, section 56, namely, Ecclesiastes 3:19, where the Preacher compares the animal and man to the disadvantage of man’s claimed superiority;52 the second, Ecclesiastes 9:10: “There is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave, whither thou goest.” Luther comments on the second:

Another place, proving that the dead have no perseverance or feeling. There is, says he, no device, no science, no knowledge, no wisdom there. Solomon judges
that the dead are asleep and feel nothing at all. For the dead lie there [counting] neither days nor years, but when they are waked, they shall seem to have slept scarce a moment.

Hell signifies a pit or grave, but properly, as I judge, that secret withdrawing place, where the dead sleep out of this life, whence the soul goes to her place, whatsoever it be, for corporeal it is not, so that you may understand hell to be that place where the souls be kept, being a certain grave, as it were, of the soul, without this corporeal world, as the earth is the sepulcher of the body. But what manner of place it is, we know not. For they that truly are holy, go not into hell to suffer anything there. The dead therefore are out of all place. For whatsoever is out of this life is out of place. Even as after the resurrection, we shall be clear from place and time.59

Luther’s comments as to the councils’ position on the immortality of the soul bear a sarcasm and anger which cannot be mistaken:

Hence the experts in Rome have recently pronounced a holy decree which establishes that the soul of man is immortal, acting as if we did not all say in our common creed, ‘I believe in the life everlasting.’ And with the assistance of the mastermind Aristotle, they decreed further that the soul is ‘essentially the form of the human body,’ and many other splendid articles of a similar nature. These decrees are indeed most appropriate to the papal church, for they make it possible for them to hold fast to human dreams and the doctrines of devils while they trample upon and destroy faith and the teaching of Christ.64

Although an insistence on the mortality of the soul, with its condemnation of the “demonology of the Greeks,” as Hobbes calls it, or the “doctrines of devils,” as Luther says, has been cited as evidence of Hobbes’ heretical, even atheistic views, he shared it with the reformer and persevered in it for the same reasons and with the same evangelical ends.

A second parallel between these two thinkers is found in their attitudes toward atheism and idolatry or superstition. For Luther, man is naturally religious in the sense that he is obliged to worship in order to propitiate powers whose demands upon him he recognizes but cannot seem to evade or satisfy.55 Men, in experiencing fear, are led to despair, and, as the reformer said in the eighteenth thesis of his Heidelberg Catechism, “It is certain that to obtain the grace of Christ a man must utterly despair of himself.”

Idolatry, turning to false gods, then, is as difficult to avoid as it is useless to practice. And atheism, that is, outright denial of the existence of a higher power, seems on this account more a species of foolishness in the face of evident and perceived need than a creditable stand of conscience.56

And Hobbes agrees:57 it is foolish to deny the existence of powers before whom men are struck with fear.58 This was a position Hobbes had espoused in the 1651 Leviathan, and he repeats it in the 1668 Appendix:

A. As for the third doctrine, that author [Hobbes] states in the sixth chapter, [of Leviathan] toward the end:
Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed [is] religion; not allowed, superstition. And when the power imagined is truly such as we imagine, true religion.59

B. The Preacher says the same thing, in Ecclesiastes 1:16: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom"; as does the Psalmist, in Psalms 13:1:

"The fool has said in his heart, there is no God."60

Religions spring from fear; they are ways in which people worship their divinities, be they true or false.61 The gods take their origin from personal experiences of the numinous or from what one imagines at hearing stories of the experiences of others.62 Their truth or falsity is not open to rational demonstration.63

Superstition according to Hobbes is fear of invisible powers conceived from tales not publicly permitted. What distinguishes them from other religious stories is merely lack of the sovereign's permission to tell them in public or as a part of corporate worship. History has numerous examples of cults whose rites and rituals were banned or circumscribed, usually for political reasons; the Bacchantes of ancient Greece, devotees of the cult of Cybele in republican Rome, celebrants of the Roman Catholic mass in Hobbes' own day, and, later, the Masons all provide examples of proscribed groups.

But, more broadly, tracing the origin of religions to fear and classing them in general as opinion, rather than knowledge, implies no denigration of them for Hobbes. Opinion is in this sense more fundamental and important than knowledge, and belief, of which faith is one type, is for Hobbes a form of opinion.64

Thus, any religion, inasmuch as it involves faith, is opinion, which may be valid and illegal, as Hobbes clearly believes in the case of early Christianity, or idolatrous and lawful, as with the false religions established among non-Christian peoples. In considering religious belief from the standpoint of authorization, Hobbes' concern is then appropriately political.65 Given his own interests as a theorist and his emphasis on the mystery of faith in Christianity,66 he has furnished a definition of religion which allows him both to speak discursively on the matter and to avoid asserting on rational grounds what can only be affirmed as a confession of faith.67 The evangelical understanding of faith which grounds the political definition points to a third parallel between Hobbes and Luther, their description of Christ, the Logos or Word of God, as "promise."

It is generally agreed that the emergence of Reformation theology is organically related to a new biblical hermeneutic, a new appropriation of the Old and New Testaments.68 Luther pioneered in this, beginning, as early as the Lectures on the Psalter of 1513–15, to invest the biblical text with that intense concentration upon the figure of Jesus which has long been recognized as a chief aspect of his theology.69

In the preface to these lectures, Luther states that Christ is literally the sub-
ject-matter and speaker of the Psalter. The true or proper understanding of the Psalter is thus the *sensus Christi*, the sense of Christ, whereby Christ speaks of faith directly to the believer through the text. This emphasis evidences Luther’s break with the medieval approach to the text, according to which David, as author and speaker of the Psalter, was interpreted as a type or figure of the Christ, so that his relation to Christ was not literal, but figurative.70

Later in the preface, Luther describes Christ as faith itself, that is, as conformity to God’s will. Indeed, the ultimate significance of Scripture for Luther is that it presents Christ precisely as faith. Ebeling states succinctly, “Christ is the text.” And in this nexus of text, Christ and faith appears the “Urform” of the Reformation doctrine of justification, God’s way of reconciling the sinner to Himself.71 Faith for Luther is not an intellectual analysis and approbation of specific propositions concerning God, nor do its claims and effects yield to such analysis. It is that episode of hearing and believing in the penitent’s life in which the history and fate of Jesus are “laid upon him” by God.72

Luther deepens this sense of the historical situation of the believer in coming to realize that the Old Testament Psalmist’s hope for the Messiah prior to His incarnation is repeated in the longing of the New Testament Christian for the return of Christ following His ascension. Both testaments give witness to a common experience of faith as hope and trust in an active, benevolent God; both evidence the striving of historical figures to be and remain faithful.73

The Psalmist is thus less a shadowy precursor of Christ, less a bearer of privileged information as to a future event, than a living witness to a promise made by God to those who are faithful to Him. Both Israelite and Christian are united through God’s promise in the household of faith. The Psalmist being under the law and seeking the Messiah is like being in sin and asking forgiveness for the Christian.74 The Psalmist thus no longer speaks figuratively, as a prophet across time, but literally, in his own time and words and out of his own faith and hope for God’s work of salvation.

The key understanding here is that the promise of God grants the very blessings it pledges to the faithful. Christ is God’s promise, His saving activity on behalf of sinful humanity.75 The *locus classicus* of the doctrine of promise is Article IV of the Apology to the Augsburg Confession, written by Luther’s friend and coworker Philip Melanchthon:

All Scripture should be divided into these two chief doctrines, the law and the promises. In some places it presents the law. In others it presents the promise of Christ; this it does either when it promises that the Messiah will come and promises forgiveness of sins, justification, and eternal life for his sake, or when, in the New Testament, the Christ who came promises forgiveness of sin, justification, and eternal life.76

Hobbes articulates this same understanding of the event of Christ in describing the “Word” not as an eternal noetic entity existing above the flux of history, not as the Stoic principle of reason in the universe, that is, not as the logos-
principle of the Greeks,77 but as the saving action of the God of history,78 given witness by writers in both the Old and New Testaments:

A. What did the Fathers understand as to word **verbum**?
B. The natural Son of God, or Him begotten of God, from the beginning, that is, from everlasting.
A. But in that passage, does not word mean some specific word, like a sound uttered by God?
B. Absolutely not! The Fathers deny that in several places.
A. What did they believe then? that it was a word privately uttered, like the eternal decree of God for the establishment of the world and the redemption of man?
B. I do not know what the Fathers felt in this matter. But I doubt they thought that, lest they approach too near the doctrine of the Stoics, whose word **heimarmene** among the Greeks and **fatum** among the Latins means the same as eternal decree.
A. Then, as I said, what is the understanding of word on the part of the Fathers?
B. I do not know, except that in sacred language “word” is often to be construed as the very thing which was decreed or promised. For often in the Old Testament, in place of “what God promised was done,” we read “the word of God which He spoke was done.” I am not accustomed to expounding Holy Scripture to anyone but myself. But if the passage in St. John’s Gospel is to be understood in this way, then I should prefer to seek no further concerning the mystery of the Incarnation. For if the word in that place is the very thing which God had ordained to come into this world for our redemption and had promised in paradise, then it is no mere word, but a true thing and one with Christ. But how “He was made man” is not mine to inquire after. It suffices me that He was made my Redeemer. And what then? If I believe that He created the earth and all other things from nothing and man from the dust of the ground, shall I not also believe that He was able to take on human nature, except I know how?”

It may seem remarkable that Hobbes, that most plebeian and heretical of philosophers, should express views on theological matters of such depth and apparent commitment. But alongside the advances in political and natural-scientific thought with which he is credited, some recognition may also be accorded the originality and overall soundness of understanding which he displayed in approaching the biblical record, especially in relation to his researches into classical thought and experience.

And, along with the self-confessed timidity that forms part of our picture of Hobbes the man, we should also mark a characteristic determination, disclosed in his perseverance in defending views in which he had a considerable investment of intellectual and emotional energy, carried through generally to his detriment and at times to his peril.

For throughout, Hobbes has sought to describe the relation of religious and political life so as to recognize an inviolable, interior sphere, in which the
private individual might approach the divine in the way and on the terms which his faith and judgment have led him to adopt.

This was the irreducible freedom that Hobbes claimed and defended, and it is not too much to identify in the philosopher of Malmesbury a dogged defender of inner freedom and the tender conscience. Nor should we hesitate to recognize in his theorizing an important branch in the stream of political thought that flows from the Protestant Reformation through him into Anglo-American political and legal thought.

It is surely also worthy of note that Hobbes dealt with themes and concerns that have engaged the attention of the modern theologian, following their concealment in the ideal milieu of Enlightenment theology, with its protest against the God of will and absolute power. The historical approach to Scripture, the emphasis on justification in Christ, the drive to recover the proclamation of the early church and the coincident urge to demythologize its theology and free it from the spell of ancient thought may all be mentioned in this connection.

It is my hope that this introduction and the translation and notes which follow may play a part in advancing an understanding of the dire Hobbes that is more complex, more generous and more subtle than any as yet given.

**Notes**


3. Perhaps James Wheldon, Hobbes' servant in the last several years of his life, then the executor of his estate and a major beneficiary under his will.

4. Du Martel had written in 1657, seeking such an edition, followed by du Bose in 1659 and by Sorbière in 1664. In his letter, Sorbière promoted Blaeu as the publisher of such an edition. But Hobbes had had dealings with Blaeu prior to this; the *Catalogus Universalis* of Broer Jansz, a record of the Dutch booktrade catalogues of Amsterdam publications in the period 1640-52, lists
him as the publisher of a French translation of De Cive ("Fondemens de la Politique par Thomas Hobbes de Cive"), presumably Sorbière's (itself recently reprinted), in 1650. Blaeu was a very active and prominent Amsterdam publisher, having taken over direction of the publishing firm following the death of his father, Willem Janszoon (1571–1638). Willem Blaeu had published works by Grotius, Vossius and Barlaeus, in addition to a number of works on cartography; he kept abreast of the scientific discoveries of the era and had been a student of Tycho Brahe. Joan's most imposing work along this line was the 1663 production of the twelve large and lavishly decorated volumes of Le Grand Atlas, dedicated to Louis XIV's minister Colbert. The firm suffered a devastating fire in 1672, continued to publish after Joan's death in 1673 but disappeared in 1712, along with the Leyden house of another of Hobbes' Dutch publishers, Elzevier.

5. See Zbigniew Lubieniski, Die Grundlagen des ethisch-politischen System von Hobbes (Munich: E. Reinhardt, 1932), 254–73; F. C. Hood, The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes: An Interpretation of "Leviathan" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 54–56; and François Tricaud, Translator's Introduction to Léviathan, xvi–xxviii. For a comparison of the Latin and English texts, see also Julius Lips, Die Stellung des Thomas Hobbes zu den politischen Parteien der grossen englischen Revolution (Leipzig: Ernst Wiegandt, 1927), 75–82. Tricaud refers to a suggestion made by Hood that the disclosure in Blaeu's letter of Hobbes' work methods bolsters the thesis that the untrained secretary had written a text to read from, for it would scarcely have been possible for Hobbes to recite in Latin to him. The unfortunate Henry Stubbe has been conjectured as a possible source of such a Latin text; it is certain that in 1656 Stubbe had worked on a translation and had proceeded as far as chapter 9. Stubbe was a noted Latinist and, though indiscreet and intemperate, an intimate of Hobbes. A display of Stubbe's erudition in Hobbes' defense against the Oxford mathematician Wallis may be found in "An Extract of a Letter concerning the Grammatical Part of the Controversy between Mr. Hobbes and Dr. Wallis." See volume 7 of the Molesworth edition, 401–28. But the extant Latin text does not contain words which Stubbe had specifically suggested to Hobbes as desirable translations, so it is doubted that Hobbes incorporated his efforts, preferring presumably to return to his own Latin text. Indeed, Hobbes states (4:317) that he "converted" Leviathan for fear that "some other man might do it not to his liking." Stubbe's death is recounted in a letter of Andrew Marvell to William Popple, dated July 15, 1676: "Dr. Stubbe physician atheist found dead I meane drowned betwixt Bath and Bristol. 23 guinies and 3 broad pieces in his pockett suppost drunk. es magne (sic) Deus." Marvell to William Popple, London, July 15, 1676, The Poems and Letters of Andrew Marvell, ed. H. M. Margoliouth; vol. 2, Letters, revised by Pierre Legous with the collaboration of E. E. Duncan-Jones, 3d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 425.

6. Of course, this may be taken, as Robertson does, to reflect a later desire for greater concision; see Robertson, Hobbes, 197. But, as Tricaud notes, Hobbes' books on politics grew, from the Elements, through the versions of De Cive, to the length of the English Leviathan, and, on this measure, the length of the Latin Leviathan would place it between these last two, as one would conjecture on other grounds.

7. I am unable to follow Professor Tricaud's analysis of this point in one particular. The English text of Leviathan, chapter 14, page 194, he says, compares two formulas: "I will that this be thine tomorrow" and "I will give it thee tomorrow." The Latin text, found also in the English version, bears the following: "Volo hoc tuum esse cras" and "Cras tibi hoc dabo." The formulas are equivalent in both languages. Tricaud notes the incongruity of Hobbes' comment in the Latin text that the word volo ("I want") does not have the same sense in both formulas. That word, viz. will, is present in the second formula only as a future auxiliary in the English text; Latin, as an inflected language, does not use the auxiliary "will" to indicate the future tense. But Hobbes' reference is not to the tense of volo, which is certainly not signalled by the word "will" in the second formula. He is referring to the moment in time when the donor actually purposes to make a gift. Hobbes' point is that the donative intent shown in the first formula in both languages is present, actual and effective, whereas in the second in both languages the words signify merely an empty promise, a future possibility, uncertain of fulfillment and insufficient to transfer a gift. He follows the common law in this analysis.
8. It is of course possible that the resumption of the Stuart line on the English throne in 1660 had assuaged Hobbes' anger by 1668. Still, in his great history of the Civil War, *Behemoth*, written in the same period as the Latin *Leviathan*, his emotions are clearly engaged when he both condemns the wisdom of the Parliamentarians as craft and praises the first Charles Stuart as "a man that wanted no virtue, either of body or mind, nor endeavored anything more than to discharge his duty towards God, in the well governing of his subjects."

9. Thus, in the English text, Hobbes refers to the Civil War as the "late troubles in England," whereas the Latin has "the war which is now being waged." To be sure, the Latin *Leviathan* refers at points to the English edition, as in chapter 47, where Hobbes speaks briefly of the hopes he had had for that volume.


12. The volume which Blaeu produced contains eight of Hobbes' works in Latin, the *Problemata Physica*, the *Six Dialogues against Wallis*, *De Corpore*, *De Homine*, *De Cive*, *De Natura Aëris*, *De Principiis et Ratiocinatio Geometrarum*, and *Leviathan*. The book itself is well made, bound in leather, with several illustrations, indicating the care and expense Blaeu took with what was clearly an item of rather limited popular appeal. Facing the title page is an engraved portrait of Hobbes, at age seventy-six, by the eminent engraver William Faithorne (1616–91). Around it is the inscription, *En quam modice habitat philosophia* (Behold how modestly philosophy dwells). Each of the works is preceded by its own title page, and each seems to have been set anew for this edition. The same work was brought out in the same year in England under a different imprint; I consulted a copy of the Dutch edition.

13. Hobbes says that he had been solicited "from beyond the sea" for the Latin volume, although he surely also welcomed the opportunity to correct the English volume and to present the text to the learned on the Continent. He also states that he omitted "some such passages as strangers are not concerned in"; see 4:317.


17. In the dedicatory epistle of the Seven Philosophical Problems, dated 1662 and presented to Charles, Hobbes shows some sensitivity to the charge of atheism or heresy, made perhaps by an “episcopal man.” The letter clearly seeks Charles’ support but is hardly a retraction of his views, and he surely means “apology” to mean, equivocally at least, defense. For details of this period of Hobbes’ life, see Leslie Stephen, Hobbes (London: Macmillan and Co., 1904), 1–70, esp. 60–61.

18. Bramhall had been a highly successful administrator of the affairs of the church in Ireland, where he had gone as chaplain to Wentworth in 1633. Severe and conventional, he suffered the reverses of many others holding his royalist and Anglican views during the 1640’s, being accused of treason, losing the large holdings in land that had made him a rich man, having to flee abroad on various occasions. Presbyterianists hated the name of “Bishop Bramble,” and Cromwell called him the “Irish Canterbury,” with reference to the hated and condemned William Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury. It was in Paris then, within a community of political and religious exiles from England, that Bramhall met Hobbes and there began the debate with him on liberty and necessity that would be extended in later years. Bramhall returned to England in 1660 with Charles II; defending his property in a law suit at Omagh, he suffered a paralytic stroke and died on June 25, 1663. Jeremy Taylor preached his funeral sermon. He has found a modern champion in the royalist, Anglo-Catholic poet T. S. Eliot; see “John Bramhall,” in Selected Essays 1917–1932 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1932), 301–9.

19. Indeed, Hobbes’ De Cive had already aroused the suspicions of Queen Henrietta Maria, and others had feared that his appointment as mathematics tutor to the young Charles might infect the royal pupil with atheism. Just prior to his return to England, French authorities had been poised to arraign Hobbes for his by then famous and unequivocal attack on papal authority: in Leviathan, which he was openly showing friends in France, he had called the pope the king of the fairies. These movements against him in part explain his wish to return to England, as he confided to fellow exile Edward Hyde, later Lord Clarendon, who himself had a part in “discountenancing” Hobbes in the eyes of Charles’ court. But, as indicated by his correspondence in the period, Hobbes had considered a return to England as early as 1646, when Sorbière’s generous but rather clumsy assistance in publishing De Cive caused him, he believed, some difficulty. Ironically, Hobbes’ seeming closeness to Charles prejudiced his chances of returning unmolested to the England of the Commonwealth. In the event, he entered England in the winter of 1651, made a submission to the Council of State and retired to an active, private life in London, eventually resuming and gaining the friendship and conversation of such men as Davenant, Cowley, Harvey and Selden. Although a friend of poets and writers and himself a translator of Horner and a master of English prose and of metaphor, Hobbes, like many thinkers in the seventeenth century, was harshly critical of the role of emotive elements, images, fantasy and rhetoric as aspects of the rational process. On the use of analogy in theology, see Appendix, section 179 and nn.

20. This ban figures in the Latin editions of some of Hobbes’ works and in the posthumous publication of Hobbes’ Behemoth and certain of the texts arising from the exchange with Bramhall.

21. Robertson reports the entry in the Journal of the Commons for Wednesday, October 17, 1666, ordering “that the Committee to which the Bill against Atheism and Profaneness is committed be empowered to receive information touching such books as tend to atheism, blasphemy and profaneness, or against the essence and attributes of God, and in particular the book published in the name of one White and the book of Mr. Hobbs called ‘The Leviathan,’ and to report the matter with their opinion to the House.” The bill passed on January 31 following, was then referred to a select committee of the Lords, dropped, reintroduced but not finally sent on to the House. See Robertson, Hobbes, 193–94. and Samuel Mintz, The Hunting of “Leviathan” (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 60ff. The Calendar of State Papers, June 9, 1667, records a letter sent by
Hobbes to Joseph Williamson, secretary to Henry Bennet, Lord Arlington, Charles' Secretary of State, to which Hobbes thanks both men for their mediation in the affair, to which he partly ascribed the favorable treatment he had received. Thomas White, to whom the Journal made reference, was a Catholic priest who had spoken in favor of the government of the Protectorate. Like Hobbes, whom he knew well, White denied natural immortality.

22. See Aubrey, Aubrey's Brief Lives, 156.


24. This text echoes, in some cases, textually, many elements of especially the second chapter of the present Appendix. I consulted the version found in Somers' Tracts, ed. Walter Scott, Esq. (1812), 7:373–81, printed with Scargill's 1669 Recantation and the 1680 collection of Hobbes' "Last Sayings," made by Charles Blount. The first editor of the tract states that it resulted directly from the 1666 commotion, as is likely if its size and complexity are compared to the much more detailed and lengthy text appearing in 1668. But Hobbes' account of the Anthropomorphites is more correct in the tract; see Appendix, section 179. Also, there is material in the tract that might be seen as supplementary to the Appendix. Held back until after his death, thus subject to correction following the 1668 publication, the tract may thus reflect Hobbes' first and last intentions in these areas.

25. These issues were still hotly contested in the period following the Restoration Church Settlement of 1662. Indeed, "Hobbism" was a term of abuse hurled at many who had more than a passing acquaintance with Hobbes' religious and ecclesiological views; see John Marshall, "The Ecclesiology of the Latitude-men 1660–1689: Stillingfleet, Tillotson and 'Hobbism,'" Journal of Ecclesiological History 36 (1985): 407–27.

26. Hobbes based his claim on the abolition of the High Commission, the court of heresy put down by the Long Parliament. See the discussion of this point in Appendix, sections 133–34, and nn., and sections 174ff., and nn.

27. I cannot agree with Robertson that Hobbes has here prudently toned down some of the ideas that had earned him the hatred and contempt of some of his contemporaries. Some differences there are, but Hobbes' later writings display rather little development of his mature views. Indeed, there are certain fixed points in his growth as a thinker that Hobbes himself linked to his student years at Oxford. And in fact, there was little possibility in the 1660's that he would come to harm, owing to the protection of his friends, the Earl of Arlington and King Charles himself, both of whom were dissembling Catholics; see above, n. 21.


29. Thus, for example, Raymond Polin, following the lead of Professor Leo Strauss, has said that, rather than attempt a fully thought out program of lying about his beliefs, Hobbes chose to disguise his true thoughts, hoping his sympathetic reader would read between the lines his true intentions; see Raymond Polin, Hobbes, Dieu et les hommes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1981), 7–10. See n. 67, below.

30. Indeed a re-evaluation has already been going on, in writings by A. E. Taylor, Howard Warrender, Quentin Skinner, Carl Schmitt, Paul Johnson, Graf Reventlow, Dorothea Krook, Pocock, Glover, Mintz and others. But the "received" opinion about Hobbes dies very hard. Hobbes' own polemical style, that self-confident, simpliste and often brash approach to difficult questions, which more than anything rankled his enemies, is now perpetuated among those who calumniate his name in the face of disconfirming and contrary evidence. Hobbes' "constant undaunted resolution of maintaining his own opinions," as it has been called, is now replicated in the assertions of those who attribute to him doctrines he never taught and opinions he always repudiated.


32. It seems clear that Hobbes aspired to a complete system of principles and ideas, in the style of the great thinkers of the past; that is, he sought a system that would embrace the whole of phenomena from the motion of bodies, through biological life, up to and including political behavior. It is certainly possible to benefit from a selective reading of Hobbes, but not wholly adequate to the task of interpreting his thought. It was once the custom to let one's eyes fall upon the pages of the Aeneid to gain a glimpse of the future; the sorte Virgiliana served the purposes of several people, including Charles I, who is said to have turned to Virgil's description of a headless corpse. But no one should claim that Charles had gained an adequate understanding of the Roman poet in this fashion.

33. This outcome is particularly deleterious to historical understanding in view of the wide currency in Hobbes' time of an evangelical conception of faith, which by its very nature is less likely than other such conceptions to furnish well-grounded reasons for assenting to its religious assertions. ("Evangelical" is intended here as that which emphasizes salvation by faith in the atoning death of Jesus Christ, the authority of Scripture and the importance of preaching as contrasted with ritual.) For an appraisal of Max Weber's work on the Protestant concept of faith and the problems it poses for historical understanding, see Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 55–69, 257–81.

34. In pointing out similarities in thought and approach between Martin Luther and Hobbes, I seek less to establish an historical dependence of one upon the other than to identify a climate of thought within which to explain what have seemed troubling or at least puzzling aspects of Hobbes' thought. Nor do I wish to blink important differences, as in their views on the Eucharist, the torments of hell, the culpability of original sin, the existence of demons and devils or the secret anger which Luther believed men harbor against God. Many figures and movements of the religious past may have influenced Hobbes, and his views on these matters developed with the progress of his thought in a characteristically independent way. That he had debts to Socialism, for example, was suggested by Leibnitz; see Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 76, n. 3; see also Peter Geach, "The Religion of Thomas Hobbes," Religious Studies 17 (1981): 549–58. Possible influences of Libertinism on Hobbes bear consideration, as do the intellectual antecedents of Galilean science in the school of Padua. These questions are pertinent and interesting, especially in view of so much misunderstanding and even calumny with respect to Hobbes' thought. But the notion of religion and language which unites Hobbes, Luther and such medivalists as William of Ockham in a filiation of ideas, in its religious context and with its complex ties to current issues in philosophy and the rise of natural science, seems to me to be of particular importance in considering Hobbes' physiognomy as a thinker. I hope to deal more fully with these issues in a book-length study, now in preparation.

35. The question of context in the interpretation of Hobbes' thought has been much contorted. But it cannot be inappropriate to consider such concepts as context and intentionality when they play a central role as aspects of Hobbes' own philosophic equipment, both as historian and as analyst of the intentions signalled in language. See among the many examples offered in the Appendix, sections 1–6, 26, 82, 171.

36. Thus, for example, Hobbes can doubt whether the writers of the New Testament were influenced by Homer, Hesiod and Virgil in their descriptions of hell; see Appendix, section 27. On Hobbes' adoption of Humanist techniques of biblical interpretation, see Henning Graf Reventlow, The Authority of the Bible and the Rise of the Modern World, 194–222, esp. 212ff. Apart from questions of biblical interpretation, Hobbes' historical way of thinking is applied to the practices of the church itself, as evidenced several times in the Appendix, for example, throughout the commentary on the Nicene Creed, sections 1–103, in his analysis of liturgical practices, such as the introduction of the Gloria Patri, section 38, and in the very definition of the church, with its emphasis on the historical context and character of the Christian proclamation, sections 182ff.
While Hobbes urges a similar task of private interpretation of the Bible upon his reader, as in Appendix, section 103, he in no way invites public expression of private views if they are contrary to the views promulgated by political authorities; see the discussion following on superstition.

37. Compare the view espoused by Martin Luther in his famous address to the Diet of Worms in 1521:

Unless I am convinced by the testimony of the Scriptures or by clear reason (for I do not trust either in the pope or in councils alone, since it is well known that they have often erred and contradicted themselves), I am bound by the Scriptures I have quoted and my conscience is captive to the Word of God. I cannot and will not retract anything, since it is neither safe nor right to go against conscience.

Quoted in “Career of the Reformer II,” Luther’s Works, ed. and trans. George W. Forell, 32 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1958), 112. Such a view of Scripture is fully consistent with an acceptance of the biblical miracles; Hobbes is not Hume. To be sure, Hobbes affirms the traditional view espoused among many others by Thomas Aquinas, that claims for miracles should be tested. They are not in any case the result of special power in the miracle worker, but God’s direct and special boon to make manifest his mission; see Leviathan, pp. 473–74. For a discussion of some related points, see the recent debate between Professors Gary Habermas and Antony Flew, Did Jesus Rise from the Dead?: The Resurrection Debate, ed. Terry L. Miethe (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987).

38. Appendix, section 46. Hobbes’ dramatis personae in the Appendix are mere conveniences to express and discuss his ideas; they lack a consistent pattern of advocacy or argumentation and are made to appear rather dim by turn. Also, the interlocutors are allowed to retain opposed opinions, rather than coming to agree on a given, disputed point. Thus, the Appendix differs from dialogues which Hobbes wrote in the same period on natural scientific matters, a result which stems presumably from the differing subject matters, science in the one case, religion, that is, opinion, in the other.

39. Appendix, section 56.


41. As an historian of ideas, Hobbes errs in failing to recognize the distinction known to ancient and medieval philosophy between the soul and separated substances (substantiae separatae). Angels and demons would also figure as ranks within the hierarchy of separated substances, but Hobbes disposes of the first by referring to them at times as messengers sent by God to declare His will, rather than as the immaterial, intellectual substances described in the tradition; Appendix, sections 188–90. The existence of demons he counters by referring to St. Paul, who calls them nothing; Appendix, sections 4–6 and 181. That Hobbes should fail to give an account that does justice to the traditional way of thinking is not surprising; a good deal of the vigor and originality of his thought stems from the violence he does to that of others.

42. This notion is not new in Hobbes. Reginald Scot (1538?–99) makes the same charge against the Roman clergy in his Discourse of Devils and Spirits:

And first you shall understand that they hold that all the soules in heaven may come downe and appeare to us when they list, and assume anie body saving their owne: otherwise (saie they) such soules should not be perfectlie happy. They saie that you may know the good soules from the bad verie easily. For a dammed soule hath a very heavey and sowre looke; but a sainte’s soule hath a cheerful and a meerie countenance: these also are white and shining, the other cole black. And these dammed soules also may come up out of hell at their pleasure, although Abraham made Dives beleive the contrarie. They affirmre that dammed soules walke ofteonest: next unto them, the soules of purgatory: and most seldom the souls of saints. Also they saie that in the old lawe soules did seldom appear: and after doomesdaie they shall never be scene more: in the time of grace they shall be most frequent. The walking of these souls
(saith Michael Andraeas) is a most excellent argument for the proof of purgatory; for (saith he) those souls have testified that which the popes have affirmed in that behalf; to wit, that there is not onlie such a place of purgatory, but that they are released from thence by masses, and such other satisfactory work; whereby the goodness of the masse is also ratified and confirmed.

Quoted by Samuel Hibbert. *Sketches of the Philosophy of Apparitions, or An Attempt to Trace Such Illusions to Their Physical Causes* (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1824), 160–61.

43. Emphasis added; *Leviathan*, pp. 638–39. The impact of these religious ideas on political behavior in the Tudor and Stuart periods cannot be doubted; for example, it was the demolition of purgatory that had served Henry VIII as pretext for the spoliation of the vast property of the chantries and monasteries of England.

44. *Leviathan*, pages 691–92. Note Hannah Arendt’s comment on Hobbes’ offer of an excuse to Aristotle for the doctrine of separated essences:

In the *Leviathan* (chap. 46) Hobbes explains that “disobedience may lawfully be punished in them, that against the laws teach even true philosophy.” For is “not ‘leisure the mother of philosophy; and Commonwealth the mother of peace and leisure’? And does it not follow that the Commonwealth will act in the interest of philosophy when it suppresses a truth which undermines peace? Hence the truth-teller, in order to cooperate in an enterprise which is so necessary for his own peace of body and soul, decides to write what he knows “to be false philosophy.” Of this Hobbes suspected Aristotle of all people, who according to him “writ it as a thing consonant to, and corroborative of [the Greeks’] religion; fearing the fate of Socrates.” It never occurred to Hobbes that the search for truth would be self-defeating if its conditions could be guaranteed only by deliberate falsehoods. Then, indeed, everybody may turn out to be a liar like Hobbes’ Aristotle. Unlike this figment of Hobbes’ logical fantasy, the real Aristotle was of course sensible enough to leave Athens when he came to fear the fate of Socrates; he was not wicked enough to write what he knew to be false, nor was he stupid enough to solve his problem of survival by destroying everything he stood for.

Quoted from Hannah Arendt, “Truth and Politics.” *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought*, enlarged ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), 297, n. 3. But Hobbes too was sensible, nor did he assert what he knew to be false. And, when he disagreed with the officially sanctioned opinion, he was able to make his disagreement known, all the while respecting the law; for example, see Appendix, sections 94 and 95. The sarcastic reference to virtues “poured” into someone indicates Hobbes’ criticism of the adequacy of the scholastic doctrine of infused grace (gratia infusa) to account for and teach obedience, that is, to serve as a basis of political obligation; see below, n. 75.


47. The studies of Strauss and Robertson remain fundamental in this area.

48. Hobbes’ polemical opponents among the schoolmen surely included Thomas Aquinas, but, apart from some references to Thomas’ idea of the nunc stans, there is little evidence as to how well Hobbes knew him or other medievals, though he is always happy to dismiss school philosophy as vain and he calls Duns Scotus a blockhead. He may have contented himself with the knowledge of these authors that he had gained as a scholar at Oxford, though he says in his autobiography that, while there, he preferred catching crows to studying. He continued and expanded his reading after leaving Oxford, but Aubrey quotes him as having replied to the assertion that he was not well read that, had he read as much as other men, he would have known as little as other men. Still, in the *Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance*, he says of a certain problem, “It is more than the Schoolmen or metaphysicians can understand; whose writings have troubled my head more than they should have done, if I had known that amongst so many senseless disputes, there had been so few lucid intervals”; 5:342. The Appendix itself gives some evidence of his reading of the Fathers, but unfortunately nowhere does he devote the attention to them or to the medievals that is shown to Bellarmine in *Leviathan*. In any case, a close reading of Aquinas would have revealed his rejection

49. Appendix, section 56.

50. Appendix, section 54. Nature too is of course God’s artifact; that is why it cannot be known, as geometry and politics can be.

51. Hobbes’ rejection of the doctrine of natural immortality and the analysis of Arianism which he conducts in the Appendix should be understood in the context of a continuing tradition of thought. Paul Tillich discusses both in respect of God’s creation of the world ex nihilo: “Being created out of nothing means having to return to nothing. The stigma of having originated out of nothing is impressed on every creature. This is the reason why Christianity has to reject Arius’ doctrine of the Logos as the highest of the creatures. As such he could not have brought eternal life. And this also is the reason why Christianity must reject the doctrine of natural immortality and must affirm instead the doctrine of eternal life given by God as the power of being-itself.” See Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 188.

52. It is often said that Hobbes’ interpretations of Scripture are unorthodox, but the assertion often rests on prior judgements, usually unarticulated, as to the nature of orthodoxy and the use of Scripture in relation to church tradition. In the light of this common use that Luther and Hobbes make of a passage in arguing a controversial point, that bald assertion cannot be supported and should yield to better analysis and historical research into contemporary traditions of biblical hermeneutics.

53. Cited in Norman T. Burns, *Christian Mortalism from Tyndale to Milton* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 30–31. In saying that hell is a grave or pit, Luther is referring to the Hebrew word Gehenna, the name of a ravine, the valley of Hinnon, which served as a place of worship of the Semitic god Moloch; see Luke 12:5. Note that Luther retains a metaphorical element in describing the death of the soul as a “sleep.” Hobbes obviates the metaphorical element.

54. Emphasis added; cited in Norman T. Burns, *Christian Mortalism from Tyndale to Milton*, 28–29. Luther’s mention of vain “human dreams” recalls his stricture that men are deluded in thinking that their sins can be forgiven apart from the redemption offered by Christ. For him, the doctrine of natural immortality stems from human pride and the desire to slip the bonds of human nature.


57. Professor Sherlock is correct, I believe, in asserting that Hobbes recognizes that man is inevitably religious; see Richard Sherlock, “The Theology of Leviathan: Hobbes on Religion,” 43–60, esp. 46ff. But I cannot agree that Hobbes reinterpret Christianity cynically so as to make it more conformable to his political designs than any orthodox interpretation would otherwise permit. Hobbes was more traditional in perspective and conservative in action than that project would permit, which was both unnecessary and hopeless in any case. Both Protestant theology and the history of the church and monarchy in England supplied materials that fit into the comprehensive philosophy to which Hobbes aspired, if they did not contribute to its very genesis and articulation. Nor does it seem likely that Hobbes presumed so upon the good sense and forbearance of his countrymen as to have innovated freely, recklessly adn hypocritically in religion. This is to impute
to Hobbes an unsupported degree of isolation from his fellows and an unreasonably subversive purpose. Hobbes’ project as a political thinker is not likely to have been what reason and experience showed him he could not and would not wish to accomplish.


59. In fact, Hobbes’ account of the origin of religion includes more motives than fear; on this point and for a discussion of Hobbes’ use of the words “feign” and “imagine” in this passage, as well as several other valuable insights, see Paul J. Johnson, “Hobbes’s Anglican Doctrine of Salvation,” in Thomas Hobbes in His Own Time, eds. Ralph Ross, Herbert W. Schneider and Theodore Waldman (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1974), 102–25, esp. 114–18.

60. Appendix, sections 182–83. Hobbes had given a fuller explanation of his views in Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society, found in volume 2 of the Molesworth edition, pp. 185ff.: Many find fault that I have referred atheism to imprudence, and not to injustice; yea, by some it is so taken, as if I had not declared myself an enemy bitter enough against atheists. They object further, that since I had elsewhere said that it might be known that there is a God by natural reason, I ought to have acknowledged that they sin at least against the law of nature, and therefore are not only guilty of imprudence, but injustice also. But I am so much an enemy to atheists, that I have both diligently sought for, and vehemently desired to find some law whereby I might condemn them of injustice. But when I found none, I inquired next what name God himself give to men so detested by him. Now God speaks thus of the atheist: The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God. Wherefore I placed their sin in that rank which God himself refers to. Next I show them to be enemies of God. But I perceive the name of the enemy to be somewhat sharper than that of an unjust man. Lastly I affirm that they may under that notion be justly punished both by God, and supreme magistrates; and therefore by no means excuse or extenuate this sin. Now that I have said, that it might be known by natural reason that there is a God, it is so to be understood, not as if I had meant that all men might know this; except they think, that because Archimedes by natural reason found out what proportion the circle hath to the square, it follows thence, that every one of the vulgar could have found out as much. I say therefore, that although it may be known to some by the light of reason that there is a God; yet men continually engaged in pleasures or seeking of riches and honor; also men that are not wont to reason aright, or cannot do it, or care not to do it; lastly fools, in which number are atheists, cannot know this.

It would be difficult for Hobbes to deny the possibility of a natural knowledge of the existence of a deity since ancient philosophers had arrived at this conclusion centuries before the coming of Christ. Hobbes’ point here is that few are likely to spend the mental effort required to reach this result.

61. Tillich makes the point that every religion is based on a revelation and that every revelation is expressed in a religion; see his Systematic Theology, 3:104. In this sense, even as a revealed religion, Christianity cannot be distinguished as such from other religions, and I believe this understanding is at the root of Hobbes’ definition of religion in the Appendix, sections 182ff. His emphasis on the proclamation of the early church stems from this realization, which is also implied in his recognition of the wisdom and legitimacy of Roman laws proscribing Christianity; see Appendix, sections 115, and n., and 132–33.

62. Hobbes often points out that, in the case of Christianity, as miracles and visions ceased, the faith has generally been propagated by the recounting of stories first told by “martyrs” (martyres), that is, as the Greek makes clear, by witnesses. Martyrdom itself is a means of giving witness to one’s faith. The mediation of salvation is thus made to depend on preaching of the promise God has made to His people, Israel first and then the nations. That Hobbes urges royal licensing of
preachers is consistent with historical precedent, and, though subject to error and vagaries of policy, the Christian sovereign’s public theology is not likely to require denial of the central tenet of Christianity, namely, that Jesus is the Christ. And, finally, public profession of false doctrine does not bind the Christian, whom Hobbes encourages to seek the Scriptures for his salvation. “For internall Faith is in its own nature invisible, and consequently exempted from all humane jurisdiction”: Leviathan, 550.

63. This is why Hobbes can insist that the definition of heresy in no way pertains to the truth or falsity of the disputed doctrine; see Appendix, sections 110ff.


65. It is problematic whether early Christianity was a superstition according to this definition; Hobbes earlier in the Appendix, section 132, had called it a sect. Of course, as Hobbes points out in that discussion, what Roman society reprehended in their behavior was the Christians’ refusal to comply with the recognized demands of the Roman state, especially in the matter of sacrifice to the divinity of the emperor. As the emperor Trajan and his magistrate Pliny reflect in their famous exchange of letters, the exclusivity at the root of Christian monotheism was opposed in spirit to Roman syncretism and in practice to the Roman ruler cult. The miracles the Christians claimed posed no threat to the Romans; they differed only in some particulars from similar claims made in the ancient world by licit religions. Certainly, early Christianity was a superstition in this sense, that it was an illicit, that is, unauthorized, minority opinion. Its establishment by Constantine as a religion permitted by the state made it an authorized religious opinion; but his action no more certified the truth of its claims than a sovereign’s interpretation determines the true sense of Scripture. For, as Hobbes said in his answer to Bramhall, “To obey is one thing, to believe is another;” 4:339–41.

66. See Appendix, section 15.

67. On this point, see the discussion of heresy in the second chapter of the Appendix, esp. sections 110–11. Professor Strauss suggests that Hobbes has sought out this difficulty as an interpretive embarrassment in order to present a “pretended revealed theology,” a tendency that increased with the progress of his thought and, presumably, atheism. This judgement seems harsh to me with regard both to Hobbes’ purposes and his character. If Hobbes’ writings evidence a shift away from reason toward revelation, I believe it results from the organic development of his thought. But see Hobbes’ discussion of the knowledge of God gained through natural reason, given above, n. 60, and the discussion of John Damascene, Appendix, section 179, and nn.


70. See Preus, “Old Testament Promissio and Luther’s New Hermeneutic.”


72. On the “evangelical onset” (evangelischer Ansatz), see Elert, The Structure of Lutheranism, passim.

73. This discussion should in no way be thought to suggest that Luther approximated the ideal of modern historical scholarship, whatever impetus he may have given to its ultimate development. Quite the opposite, he became an important and influential innovator in the apocalyptic interpretation of Revelations, Daniel and the Prophecy of Elias, the chief texts used by Protestants to foretell the future. See Katharine R. Firth, The Apocalyptic Tradition in Reformation Britain 1530–1645 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 9–23.
In his sermons, Jean Calvin reflects a similar, high evaluation of the faith of the Jewish patriarchs, though his characteristic emphasis is on the notion of election, rather than Luther's metaphor of the household of faith. The accuracy of the interpretation of law (Torah) given by Luther on the basis of his understanding of the Pauline epistles has recently become a subject of rather intense interest.

Elert discusses this aspect of Luther's thought in these terms: "When the Gospel, that is, information concerning Christ, is designated again and again as a promise, the "offering" (offerre) and the "promising" (promittere) are not something that is then added to the historical information. No, this information itself is the Gospel. The historical indicative becomes a promise by being announced to me. When it turns to me, I hear the "for me" which makes of the historical faith (fides historica) a "saving faith" (fides salvifica); emphasis added. See Elert, The Structure of Lutheranism, 1:205. The point has particular reference to the doctrine of "infused grace" in relation to the Protestant teaching on justification and sanctification; see above, n. 44.


While it is true that the capacity of words to reflect divine truth is deprecated by Hobbes, as is the power of reason itself (see the discussion above and in the Appendix, section 56), this should not be thought evidence for secularization on Hobbes' part. See Appendix, section 56 and nn.; cf. Margreata de Grazia, "The Secularization of Language in the Seventeenth Century," Journal of the History of Ideas 41 (1980): 319–29. Uncoupling the book of nature from Holy Scripture was consistent with the demands both of natural scientific knowledge and of evangelical faith, though surely incompatible with a certain theological naturalism that neither the new science nor Protestant theology would support. See also G.A. Padley, "The Seventeenth Century: Words versus Things," in Grammatical Theory in Western Europe 1500–1700: The Latin Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 111–53, esp. 141ff.

Although Hobbes may not be religiously musical, to use Weber's phrase, I am unable to endorse Professor Damrosch's judgement, reached also by Cornelio Fabro, that he had no real comprehension of God as an active and personal being, that he realized in thought either a sumptuous facade or a mere principle of attraction, like an unmoved mover. See Leopold Damrosch, Jr., "Hobbes as Reformation Theologian: Implications of the Free-will Controversy," Journal of the History of Ideas 40 (1979): 339–53, and Cornelio Fabro, God in Exile: A Study of the Internal Dynamic of Modern Atheism, from Its Roots in the Cartesian "Cogito" to the Present Day, trans. and ed. Arthur Gibson (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1968). Hobbes, like medieval nominalists before him, drew a distinction between God's ordained power (potentia ordinata) and His absolute power (potentia absoluta), precisely in order to vindicate God's absolute sovereignty as creator of the world, as well as His grace and faithfulness after having chosen a way for men to take to salvation; see Leviathan, 473, and Appendix, sections 61 ff., 183, and nn.

Appendix, sections 19–26; cf. sections 202–3.
Appendix to *Leviathan*

CHAPTER 1. ON THE NICENE CREED

[1]A. I should like you to explain the Nicene Creed to me. I ask not so that I may grasp the matters themselves with my intellect, but so that I may understand how these words of the faith agree with the Holy Scriptures.

[the Nicene Creed as a statement of faith, sections 1–6]

Let us begin with these words, “I believe in one God, the Father almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible.”

First of all, what is this expression, *Credo in...*? For I do not recall having encountered this construction elsewhere among the Greek authors. I read *credo alicui* and *pisteuo tini* (I believe someone) and *credo ita esse* and *pisteuo houtos einai* (I believe it to be so).

[2]B. That way of speaking is proper to those expressing agreement as to the articles of the creed. For the preposition *eis* (to) signifies, among other things, “to (this point).” Thus, when one reads *pisteuo eis theon patera* (I believe in God the Father) and so forth, if, instead of *theon*... (God. ...), we substituted the word *tauto* (the same thing), it would be equal to as saying, “I believe to that same point,” or, “I believe as much as you do.” The preposition *eis* thus signifies a setting of the boundaries of the articles which one must believe; clearly, it shows the extent of the agreement with the Council reached by those subscribing to the creed.

It should not surprise you then if you have not read this locution elsewhere than in the confession of faith. For it is the same thing as saying that you believe that God exists, that He is one and the same, that He is the Father, omnipotent and so forth. You may also read *Credo in evangelio* (I believe in the Gospel); this means, I believe the Gospel, that is, the preachers of the Gospel; except, in this case, the Greek has *en* (in), not *eis* (to).

[3]A. “God is the Father,” “God is omnipotent,” etc., are propositions, as the logicians say. They have their subjects and predicates, and some name is clearly attributed to God in each. But in this affirmation, “God is,” I do not understand what name is being attributed to God. For I do not think that one can say, that God is, and to say, God is God, is to no purpose.

[4]B. When one says, “God is,” the word “is” is a substantive verb (verbum
substantiale), which contains both the copula and the predicate;9 it is found among the Greeks and Latins alike. Thus the saying, “God is,” means the same thing as that God exists, or, if we resolve the substantive verb to its parts, that He is being (ens), ho on (sic);10 that is, He is something real, not merely an appearance (phantasma),11 like that which is called a specter, or like the spirits (daemones) worshipped by the pagans, those which the Apostle Paul calls nothing.12

[5]A. Yes, I remember that the apostle calls the graven images (idola) nothing but not that he says the same thing of the spirits (daemonia) of the heathen.13

[6]B. Do you think it is those images graven in gold and ivory and wood that he calls nothing? It is rather those spirits (daemonia) that are worshipped under the images. Besides, an idol properly so called is not the material thing itself, but the appariition (phantasma), that is, the idea or conception of the thing. It was in order to reflect their ideas of what their gods were like that the Greeks fashioned the images; they rarely adopted the ideas or conceptions of their gods from the images themselves.14 God too is distinguished from names by that word, being (ens). For the thing man is one thing; the name man, another.

Moreover, you should know that the word “is,” commonly employed by the Greeks and Latins as a copula in propositions, was completely unknown to the ancient Hebrews, who accordingly were accustomed to using a substantive verb.15 And in place of the copula in every affirmation, to signal what the grammarians call predication, they merely added one name to another. For the Greeks and Latins, however, “is” is not a verb, but a conjunction.16 For just as “&” [the ampersand]17 signifies that the names between which it is placed are names of different things, so the conjunction “is” signifies that the names between which it is placed are names of the same thing. Thus, the Hebrews could have neither those names that are derived from the copula “is,” like essence, entity, being, etc., nor their equivalents. In Latin, one says, “The land was empty”; in Hebrew, “this empty land.” The speaker of Latin does not hear the “was” in the Hebrew sentence but only “something existing.”18

[God the Father, sections 7–8]

[7]A. What must one believe as to this word “creator”? Is it that this world was made from nothing at all?

[8]B. Clearly so, from nothing; not as in Aristotle, from pre-existing material.19 For it is expressly said in the Holy Scriptures that all things were made from nothing. Even Aristotle, who says the world is eternal,20 contradicts himself, for one speaks of material only as that out of which something is made.21 Thus the creed says this, that God is the maker of all things, out of nothing, and that, in consequence, He has it in His own power to exist and not from any
other entity; hence also that He exists from eternity and, inasmuch as there was no one who bestowed His existence upon Him, so shall there be nothing which will cause Him not to exist. God is thus from everlasting to everlasting.

But whatsoever things are created are not from everlasting, precisely because they are created. They shall be to everlasting, however, in such form and kind as God wills. For the heaven and the earth shall be made anew, and, though the world will burn, still it will not be brought to naught: those things that are real will endure. For God, who was made neither by anyone nor by Himself, cannot be changed or suffer alteration, neither from Himself nor from any other. Indeed He is changeless and utterly without parts, devoid of that Aristotelian mixing. All these attributes, simple, immutable, and eternal, as they are deduced from the words of the creed, so are they also predicated of God in the Holy Scriptures in those very words.

[God the Son, sections 9–35]

[9] A. "And in one Lord, Jesus Christ, only-begotten Son of God."
    Why was it necessary to say "only-begotten"?

[10] B. Because there were heretics in that time who taught that Christ was not the begotten Son of God, but His adoptive son. And there were others who taught that Christ was called the Son of God in the Sacred Scriptures in a sense different from that applied to all the faithful, even though He is often said expressly throughout the Sacred Scriptures to be both begotten and God, born of His Father before all ages. Wherefore one must believe that Christ is God of God, Light of Light, true God of true God, begotten, not made.

[11] A. What is the difference between "begotten" (genitus) and "made" (factus)?

[12] B. In saying "made" (factus), we understand something made by God out of nothing, that is, a creature. For, although living creatures may be said to be both created (creata) and begotten (genita), when we say they are created (creata), this is understood in relation to God the Creator, who created the first male and female in every species out of the earth which He had created. But when we say a living creature is begotten (genitus) in the natural way, this should be understood in relation to the first things that were created, as matter. But when Christ is said to be begotten, this means begotten (genitus) of God the Father Himself, of the matter of the Virgin.

[13] A. What is "Light of Light"? For it seems to me that light is an apparition (phantasma), not something that exists. For example, interpose a glass between your eye and a candle. If the surface of the glass is composed of many planes arranged in a certain way, many candles will appear to you. Still we know that there is only one true candle there and thus that all the others are empty apparitions (phantasmata), idols (idola), that is, as St. Paul says, nothing. And it is not that any one of those candles is truer than the rest as
regards their appearance; the true candle, the one placed there in the beginning, is simply none of the candles that appear. It remains itself, the cause of all those other images (imaginæ). For this reason, Aristotle distinguished it from the apparition (phantasma) by means of the word hypostasis, as though the thing itself “stood under” the image, lurking. The Latins turned this Greek word into the word substance.27 Thus both Greeks and Latins distinguish the true thing, standing on its own, from the appearance (phantasma), which seems to stand on its own but does not and is not an entity. Is this not the true distinction between the thing itself and its appearance (apparentia)?28

[14]B. Yes, it is. But the Fathers of the Church in those times, both before and after the Council of Nicaea, seem in their writings to interpret the word hypostasis in another manner, in their desire to make the mystery of the Trinity intelligible to all Christians. And they thought this could best be done by means of a metaphor (similitudo) of fire, light and heat. Considering these three things as all the same, they ascribed fire to the Father, light to the Son and heat to the Holy Spirit.29

This metaphor would perhaps bear an apt correspondence to the reality but for the fact that neither fire nor the brightness of light nor heat are substances; nor did they seem so to the Fathers themselves, especially to the Aristotelians among them, unless perhaps fire is taken to mean the substance being burned. Man extinguishes fire and light and heat as he pleases. But weak as an agent as man is, we are not commanded, nor is it credible, to believe that he could extinguish a true, substantial creature, created by God Omnipotent, or reduce it to nothing. Thus, as often as the Fathers themselves drew that comparison in their writings, they immediately added that it should not be accepted as though it were a suitable exposition of that great mystery, but that they could find none better than it.30 For they all agreed in this, that the nature of God, that of the Trinity and of the angels and, as Athanasius added, of the rational soul, were incomprehensible.31

[15]A. Indeed, to me it was wrong for them to have sought to explain that mystery at all. For what is it to explain a mystery if not to destroy it or make a nonmystery of it? For faith, changed into knowledge, dies, leaving only hope and charity.32

[16]B. This phrase “Light of Light” is therefore placed in the creed only as an aid to the faith which must be accorded its other articles.33

[17]A. There follows then that great article, which brought so many disorders into the ancient church, so many banishments and killings: “of one substance with the Father, by whom all things were made.”

[18]B. And utterly true it is, made manifest in St John’s clear words (John 1:1): “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God”; and, “All things were made through it.”34

[19]A. What did the Fathers understand as to word (verbum)?
[20]B. The natural Son of God, or Him begotten of God, from the beginning, that is, from everlasting.35

[21]A. But in that passage, does not word mean some specific word, that is, a sound uttered by God?

[22]B. Absolutely not! The Fathers deny that in several places.

[23]A. What did they believe then? that it was a private word, like the eternal decree of God for the establishment of the world and the redemption of man?36

[24]B. I do not know what the Fathers felt in this matter. But I doubt they thought that, lest they approach too near the doctrine of the Stoics, whose word heimarmene among the Greeks and fatum among the Latins means the same as eternal decree.38

[25]A. Then, as I said, what is the understanding of word on the part of the Fathers?

[26]B. I do not know, except that in sacred language word is often to be construed as the very thing which was decreed or promised. For often in the Old Testament, in place of “what God promised was done,” we read “the word of God which He spoke was done.”39 I am not accustomed to expounding Holy Scripture to anyone but myself. But if the passage in St. John’s Gospel is to be understood in this way, then I should prefer to seek no further concerning the mystery of the Incarnation. For if the word in this place is the very thing which God had ordained to come into the world for our redemption and had promised in paradise, then it is no mere word, but a true thing and one with Christ. But how “He was made man” is not mine to inquire after. It suffices me that He was made my Redeemer. And what then? If I believe that He created the earth and all other things from nothing and man from the dust of the ground, shall I not also believe that He was able to take on human nature, except I know how?40

[27]A.

"Who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Spirit of the Virgin Mary, and was made man; was crucified also for us under Pontius Pilate; died and was buried."

There are two difficulties here: the first is that we are told from what place He descended, namely, from heaven; but it does not say to what place He descended. I know the Apostles’ Creed states that He descended “to those below” (ad inferos). But those words do not designate a place; in respect to those living in heaven, we men ourselves are properly said to be “those below.”41 Also, the Scriptures give various names to the place where the enemies of the church are said to be going: at one point, to Gehenna; at another, it says to the darkness outside, that is, to somewhere outside the church of God, given that
the light of the church was in Goshen when one of the plagues sent upon the
Egyptians was darkness. In another place, Scripture speaks both of a lake of
fire, I think with reference to the punishment of the inhabitants of Sodom and
Gomorrah, and also of a lake of pitch.\textsuperscript{42}

But to my knowledge, the church has not yet decided as to these matters.
Some doctors, with Bellarmine, have set the place of the damned near the
center of the earth, so that it might clearly be understood as at a great distance
from the heaven of the blessed.\textsuperscript{43} In this they may be harkening back to the term
from the Greek language, employed by St. Peter,\textsuperscript{44} namely, \textit{tartarizomenos},
one to be cast into Tartarus.\textsuperscript{45} And of course heaven is farther from the center of
the earth than it is from the surface of the earth, taken as one whole point.

But I do not think the apostles believed the gentile poets as to the location of
Tartarus. For Hesiod reckoned it as far from the earth as the earth is from
heaven; he says that, after descending from heaven for nine straight days and as
many nights, an anvil will reach the earth on the tenth day; then, falling from
the earth for nine straight days and as many nights, it will reach Tartarus on the
tenth day.\textsuperscript{46} Virgil, on the other hand, puts the distance from earth to Tartarus
as twice that from heaven to earth.\textsuperscript{47} My own view is that the word was em-
ployed by the Apostle Peter in a figurative sense, a common practice with
many expressions in Sacred Scripture.

[28]B. However that may be, the church in assembly has not yet reached a
conclusion in regard to the place of the damned. At least, our church has not.

[29]A. The second difficulty concerns the saying, "He was incarnate by the
Holy Spirit." For the angel sent to Joseph in \textit{Matthew}, 1:20, says, "What is
born in her is of the Holy Spirit." This sounds as though the Holy Spirit were
the progenitor of the Son, that is, Christ's Father.\textsuperscript{48}

[30]B. What? Is not the Spirit of God also God and the same God with the
Son and the Father?

[31]A. How then are the hypostases to be distinguished?

[32]B. Neither the creed nor the Sacred Scripture distinguishes them or
names the three hypostases.

[33]A. But the three hypostases are found in the Athanasian Creed, which is
part of the Anglican liturgy.\textsuperscript{49}

[34]B. In Greek, the word is \textit{hypostasis}, but in Latin it is \textit{persona} and in
English person.

[35]A. Allow me to question you as to these words \textit{hypostasis, persona, subsistentia}\textsuperscript{50} and numerous others in addition, but only after you have ex-
plained the rest of the creed.\textsuperscript{51}

And He rose again on the third day, according to the Scriptures, and ascended into
heaven, and is seated at the right hand of God; and He shall come again to judge
both the quick and the dead; whose kingdom shall have no end.
All of these beliefs I acknowledge are in the Scriptures and in the same sense as in the creed. The phrase “And is seated at the right hand of God” I do not understand as indicating a comparison of honor [as between the Father and the Son] but as rendering Christ the highest honor.

[God the Spirit, sections 35–39]

As for the phrase “And in the Holy Spirit, Lord and Giver of life, who proceeds from the Father and the Son”: show me from the Holy Scriptures that the Holy Spirit is the Lord and Giver of life, that is, that He is God, and that He proceeds also from the Son.52


Now, as to whether the Spirit proceeds from the Son as well as from the Father, this is manifest in what Christ says: “I will send you the Paraclete;”53 and in what He said when He breathed upon the disciples: “Receive the Holy Spirit.”54 Note that this expression “from the Son,” although present in the Athanasian Creed, is not in the Nicene Creed, having been added, as Bellarmine thinks, at the second general Council of Constantinople.55

[37]A. “Who, together with the Father and the Son, is worshipped and glorified, who spoke by the prophets.”

Why is this “... together . . . glorified . . .” (conglorificatur) placed here?

[38]B. I do not know, but, because it is there, I am inclined to believe that the formula for glorifying the Trinity,56 in which we say or sing our praise of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, had been received in the churches of God either in the time of the creed or before it.57

[the church, the resurrection, the soul, sections 39–56]


“And in one holy, catholic and apostolic Church. I acknowledge one baptism for the remission of sins. I look to the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come.”

Why does the Apostles’ Creed lack the phrase “one baptism”?58

[40]B. Some seventy years prior to the Nicene Council, Saint Cyprian had held a provincial council of the church in North Africa, where it was decreed that heretics should not be accepted back by the church except they be baptized...
again. I think this decretal was being condemned when the words "I acknowl-
edge one baptism" were inserted.⁵⁸

[41]A. In the Apostles' Creed, it reads "the resurrection of the flesh," not
the "resurrection of the dead." What is the difference? When they rise, will the
dead have flesh, bones, blood, hands, feet and the other parts of the human
body?

[42]B. Let St. Paul answer you, 1 Corinthians 15:23: "They shall rise and
each one in his own body."⁵⁹ Then, at verse 44: "A fleshly body is sown," that
is, in my opinion, like a human body when it is dead; "there shall arise a
spiritual body." And so it is changed, as we read at verse 51:

Behold, I tell you a mystery. We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in
a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the trumpet shall
sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed.⁶⁰

[43]A. But two difficulties are apparent to me here: first, since to rise is to
live again, how shall a man in the grave live again unless his soul is added to
his body? Will the soul descend from heaven or from some limbo in heaven;
will it ascend from hell or purgatory?⁶¹

[44]B. What? Will God, who made man into a living being from the dust of
the ground, be unable to bring the same back to life when he has returned to
dust?

[45]A. Then it seems to follow that man will have two rational souls after
the resurrection: one, according to which he rises, and another, separated at
death from the body, which has migrated to heaven or to limbo or to purgatory
or to hell. For all men say that the human soul never dies when once created,
that it does not cease to exist as a self-subsisttent entity, not even for the least
instant.

[46]B. I shall tell you nothing at all on this point apart from that which I
find expressly stated, without the least ambiguity, in the Scriptures, where no
other text is openly contradictory.

You and almost all other men take it from the philosophers that the human
soul cannot die.⁶² I for my part have no desire to have them as my masters after
the Holy Scriptures.⁶³ Still, if you brought me some passage from the Scriptures
in which some type of immortality is attributed to the human soul other than
that which is given men under the name of eternal life, then I too should hold
with the philosophers. But if the passages you brought me were those in which
God threatens sinful men with eternal torments, you would be unable to infer
from these that their souls exist in the interim between their deaths and the day
of judgement, but only after the day of judgement.

Further, you cannot argue for the eternity of their torments from the justice
of God, who has threatened sinners with eternal torments. For even if he is
unjust who does not render those good deeds which he ought, he who does not
render the evils or injuries which he might rightly render is on the contrary not
unjust but merciful. Will God, who is infinitely merciful, be much less able to mitigate both the length and severity of the punishments which men merit without violating His own justice?

Then also, the Scripture, in Revelation 20, says: "Hell itself will be thrown into the lake of fire, which is the second death." The damned will thus rise it appears to a second death.

Finally if the soul is not the same thing as life but a substance existing of itself, distinct from the body, and the same as the essence or nature of man, it seems to follow that, if we count His divine nature, there are three natures in Christ, which is contrary to our faith.

[47]A. Even if it could not be demonstrated from Scripture that the human soul is a substance separate from the body, still it does not seem that the contrary can be so proven either.

[48]B. Let us see then what agreement there is in Scripture, both Old and New Testaments, as to the nature of the human soul. For as the preceding articles may be uppermost in the minds of the theologians, still this article concerning the resurrection to eternal life is uppermost among all Christians. For in it they repose all their hope, a foretaste of the joy to follow the miseries of the present life.

God spoke to Adam in paradise, where there stood two trees, excelling all others, namely, the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil: "On that day when you shall eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, in your death, you shall surely die." But the devil said to Eve: "You are prohibited from eating of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil lest you become as gods." Then, both Adam and Eve, led by ambition, believed the serpent, disbelieved God and ate of the forbidden fruit. And so God expelled both from paradise, lest they put their hand to the tree of life and live forever.

[49]A. From this I understand that Adam could have lived forever by eating of the fruit of the tree of life; that is, he could have been made immortal, not of his own nature but solely by virtue of the tree of life. Further I learn that the punishment inflicted upon Adam for violation of the divine command was mortality; this follows by logical necessity since, having lost the chance of immortality, he could not live forever. I see these things as manifest in the sacred text. But I do not see why Adam did not die as soon as he had eaten, in accordance with the words of God's warning, but instead went on to live nine hundred years longer.

[50]B. God did not simply say, "You shall die," but, "In your death, you shall die" (moriendo morieris); that is, when you die, you will be dead: you will not rise again, but you will be dead forever. This is how Athanasius explains the passage and correctly so, for it is an idiom of the Hebrews. From this we understand that God's warning also extended to all the posterity of Adam, that is, to the human race. And this is the origin of St. Paul's saying,
"Through the sin of one man, death entered the world."70 Further, it follows that not only other men but Adam himself had need of benefitting from the gift of Jesus Christ's death to gain the eternal life which he had lost through his own sin.71

[51]A. Why is this so?

[52]B. Because of what St. Paul says, in harmonizing the two testaments, in 1 Corinthians 15:22:

For, as in Adam, all died, so in Christ shall all be made alive, each one in his own body; first, Christ, then all who are of Christ, in the coming of Christ. Then the end, etc. 72

[53]A. The coming of Christ will be on the same day as the day of judgement. No one therefore will come back to life before that day but only on that very day.

Thus, I think that Adam must surely be saved, but he will not receive the gift of life before the last day.73 In the meantime, how may one say that he is alive? If Adam, prior to his ensoulment, is alive in heaven by virtue of his soul, then his soul, if it is in any way a living substance, is living in a body which has no soul.74 This is a very hard saying. Then again, the souls of men living on the earth in the day of judgement will be raised to the clouds and thence up to heaven; these same souls will have spiritual bodies, themselves brought to life through spiritual souls, provided of course that souls are indeed substances, existing on their own. So what difference will there be then between these two spiritual entities, the body and the soul?

[54]A. Clearly to me, the difference between them cannot be explained unless it is conceded that eternal life does not begin for men earlier than the resurrection. And we must also concede that life and soul are the same thing, for they are never clearly distinguished in the Sacred Scriptures. And consider those words of Christ on the cross to the robber: "Today you shall be with me in paradise";75 and the other words to the disciples: "I am the tree of life";76 what purpose do these words serve except that the faithful may know that the great flaming sword has been removed from the gate of paradise and the way made plain, through the sacrifice of Christ, to the tree of life, that is, to life eternal? What need is there then for the faithful man to attribute his immortality to creation, that is to nature, rather than to redemption?77

[55]B. But I am greatly affected by the general opinion of all believers, past and present, no matter how ignorant they may be of sacred doctrine, that the rational soul is immortal of its own nature, once it has been created.

[56]A. Least of all do I censure those who feel this way. For surely he who has such lofty thoughts about his own soul is most careful not to defile it through baseness of life. But, for the rest, I do not concede that he is less careful who steadfastly believes that his soul has been redeemed through the blood of Christ and made eternal. Nor must I concede to you that the former
belief is and has been generally entertained by all men. For those who have said in their hearts, "Let us eat and drink; tomorrow we die," surely have not held it, and they nonetheless are not few. Further, the beliefs of all those who follow the dictates of their masters without reasoning about them themselves are not properly their own. Farmers, craftsmen and others who are occupied with the concerns of everyday life are almost never in the habit of thinking about the nature of their souls but only about striving for riches and honors, or about their bodily needs; these men should not be said to hold that view. And so, that general opinion of all men is reduced to an agreement among the philosophers only.

Then too, there were Sadducees among the philosophers, who in no way believed in the creation of spirits; accordingly they did not recognize the existence of the soul, except as it was called life. Also, the sect-followers of Aristotle and Plato believed in it upon the sole authority of their masters and not from clear reasonings; these should not be counted as the authors of any opinion they profess. Thus that number which you said included all men is reduced to Plato, Aristotle and the few other princes of philosophy.

Finally, let us consider the words of Ecclesiastes, the third chapter, toward the end, in the polyglot, interlinear version:

I said in my heart concerning the word of the sons of Adam, that God should test them and that they may see they are as the animal, that the end of the sons of Adam and of the animal is the same thing. As it dies, so he dies. There is also one spirit in all. And the excellence of man before the animal is nothing, for all is vanity, with each one going to the same place. And who knows if the spirit of the sons of man ascends and that of the beast descends under the ground?

Where this version has "should test them . . .," the Septuagint has diakrinei ( . . . distinguishes between them . . .) and for " . . . concerning the word . . . ," it has peri lalias ( . . . concerning the empty talk . . .). Thus the sense of the words is this: "I have spoken of that which men claim, namely, that God will make an essential difference between the life of man and the life of the brute; since the end of man and that of the brute are the same and since man does not excel the brute through his essence, how shall it be shown that the soul of man will ascend or that the soul of the brute will descend?" Yet the same Preacher often attests to the judgement of the last day in that very book. This is a weighty argument against that consensus which you say all men have.

Furthermore, lest I seem to you to be stubborn, advance an argument from Aristotle or Plato or any other philosopher whatever by which he openly reasons to the natural immortality of the soul from natural principles as openly as I have shown from the Sacred Scriptures that the future eternity of life for the elect has been acquired through Christ; then I will acquiesce.

The soul (anima), they say, thinks, remembers, reasons. What if, denying this, I were to say that the animal (animal) itself thinks and remembers? How
shall they refute me? And what is it to reason except to place names upon things, to connect the names into assertions and to join these assertions into the syllogisms out of which logic is made? In paradise, before he had imposed names on things, how was Adam more rational than the other animals, except by potential only? It does not seem to me then that men are substantially distinguished from the brutes by the fact that they discuss matters in words and brutes do not.

Let others look forward to what immortality they prefer. I look to that which Christ has acquired for us by His victory over death through His blood.

[Mary, the Mother of God, sections 57–63]

[57]A. What is your feeling concerning the phrase "Mother of God" (Deipara), which many attribute to the Holy Virgin?

[58]B. It seems to me that a woman can rightly be said to bring forth (parere) that which she bears in childbirth (in partu). Now, Mary bore Christ, God and man, in that the assumption of human nature was accomplished in her womb. She thus brought forth God and man. She however conceived only a man, without man's seed, the force of which God supplied.

[59]A. But then a new difficulty arises, namely, how the son of Mary, that is, the flesh of Christ, is not of divine substance.

[60]B. Not even in the case of a man born of man is his flesh of the substance of his father, unless you believe that what is born develops from the seed as that from which it grows. It is the blood of the mother alone that is the material of the fetus as it grows by daily nourishment till term and delivery. The seed in the uterus is the efficient cause of the woman's being pregnant; it is not the material of the fetus. Thus, if you believe that a woman could become pregnant from the power of human seed, why do you doubt whether the same thing could occur by the power of God Almighty?

[61]A. But by your reasoning, since the substance of God exists equally in all flesh, will it not also be shown that all other men are like Christ in having both a human and divine nature?

[62]B. Not at all. For, even if God is everywhere omnipotent, doing everywhere whatsoever He wishes in every creature, still He does not do everywhere whatever He can. In the generation of man from man, God desired from everlasting that only men who cannot do all they wish be produced; but, in the generation of man in a supernatural way, through the Holy Spirit, He desired from all eternity to bring forth a man who could do whatsoever He desired, that is, a man and God. Nor is there any place for asking how. For not only Christians but all peoples who believe that God exists believe Him to be all-powerful, nor do they ask how He gives birth, if they confess a birth.

[63]A. Thus far, you appear to me to have explained the teaching of the
Nicene Creed in such a way as to have confirmed the Christian faith rather than to have shaken it in any way, though after your own fashion.

[hypostasis, essentia, substantia, persona, body and spirit, sections 64–103]

Now show me what the Greeks call hypostasis.

[64]B. When you consider something that you call white, you are imposing that name upon a substance or underlying body, say marble, for example, even though the sight of your eyes cannot penetrate into the substance of the marble or into that of any other entity. Thus the white is of a self-subsistent body, not the name of a color; it is imposed because of a certain fixed appearance. The Greeks call this its emphasis (outward appearance) or phantasma (image), something that certainly seems to exist but in reality is nothing. We know quite well that this appearance cannot lack some cause or basis; that is, the white cannot exist unless some substance really underlies the appearance as its cause and, as the logicians say, its subject. This subject the Greeks call to on (that which is; entity), hyphistamenon (basis), hypostas (premise) or hypostasis (foundation); the Latins have ens, subjectum, suppositum, substantia, basis and fundamentum. What I have said about cognition through sight should be understood also for the other senses. Thus, an hypostasis is opposed to an appearance (phantasma) as cause is contrasted to effect, that is, relatively.

In a similar way, if three things are related, like father, son and grandson, by reason of his double relatedness, the son has two names, even though he is only one real entity: that of father, because he has offspring; and that of son, because he is an offspring. Thus the son, by standing in between his father and son, though only one entity, has two names, which are said to be “imposed” (im-posita) upon him. The entity itself is the subject (sub-positum) of the two names, their hyphistamenon, the hypostasis or basis of the relation. And so hypostasis can be used in reference not only to appearances (phantasmata) but also to names.

[65]A. What then is the difference between hyphistamenon, hypostas and hypostasis?

[66]B. Between the first two, there is no other difference than that the first one means “existent,” the second “presently existent.” The Greeks generally use the word hypostasis in place of these words, and the Latins use the word substantia or essentia, though the Latin Fathers do not distinguish between the two, as is clear from Peter Lombard.

[67]A. How is the word hypostasis understood in the New Testament?

[68]B. In the same way as other writers understand it, as in Hebrews 1:3, where Christ is called the “stamp of the substance of God.” Hypostasis there is contrasted to stamp; that is, substance is opposed to an image of the same
substance. In the same passage, Christ is also called the splendor of the divine glory, or, what is the same, the light of brightness, for the bright object is the substance or subject of the light. Further, in Hebrews 11:1, faith is called the substance (hypostasis) of things hoped for, that is (for the saying is metaphorical), faith is the basis (fundamentum) of hope. Third, in 2 Corinthians 9:4, Paul the Apostle, after having boasted among the Macedonians of the kindness promised him by the Corinthians, calls that promise the “substance (hypostasis) of his boast”; that is, it is its basis (fundamentum).

[69]A. What does essentia mean?
[70]B. As I have said, the Fathers do not distinguish essentia from substantia.

[71]A. What is substantia then?
[72]B. The same thing as entity (ens), that is, whatever is truly existent, distinguished from appearance (phantasma) and name.

[73]A. What need was there for the Greeks and Latins to twist well known and understood names into uncertain ones, whose equivalents are not found in Hebrew, and which no language needs?

[74]B. When names are twisted, as when ousia is made from on or hypostasis from hyphistamenon or essentia from ens or substantia from subsans or whiteness from white; this twisting is what the philosophers call abstraction. Because of this, the name on is called concrete, while ousia is called abstract; ens is concrete, essentia is abstract; white, concrete, and whiteness, abstract. Sometimes however, in place of the abstract word, they use an infinitive, as when, in place of ousia, the Greeks say to einai (being); or in place of essentia, the Latins say esse; in place of leukotes (whiteness), the Greeks say to einai leukon (being white) or even to leukon (whiteness), referring the article to (the) not to leukon (white) but to onoma (name) understood. Likewise, from the concrete vivens (living thing), the Latins make not only the abstract vita (life), but also vivere (living).

These words may indeed be called abstract and with good reason. For when men impose diverse names upon something that truly exists because of the diverse appearances it has, calling it great and colored and hard and heavy, they are considering in that thing at one point that it is of such and such a size, which is the concern of geometers; at another point, that it is colored or hard or heavy, the concern of the scientists. And, because of this, in order to distinguish one appearance (phantasma) whose cause they know resides in the concrete entity, from all the other appearances (phantasmata) of the same thing, they signify it by means of a certain twisting of names. The result is that they no longer speak of great and colored and hard and heavy, but of greatness, of color, of hardness and of weight. This abstraction of words, although it is nothing but the consideration of an appearance (phantasma) or name, separated from all other considerations and names of the same concrete object, is almost necessary for a teaching as to causes.
If you understand these things correctly, you understand that it is also impossible for the essence of any entity to exist separated from the entity itself, as if there might be a white object where there is no whiteness, or whiteness where there is no white object, or man where there is no mankind. You also know that Aristotle is wrong in asserting, "some essences exist separated from the entities whose essences they are." And you realize that the soul is thus neither, as he asserts, the essence of a living being, nor is it existent when the being has died. You see that Aristotle erred per consequens in that he did not distinguish between separate things and separate considerations of the same thing.

[75]A. I understand that abstract words are almost required to delve into the causes of things that appear but do not exist outside of our imaginations. But unlike magnitude, color and the others, which take their origin from the five organs of our senses, the name essence as such was not imposed because of some image (phantasma) of ours. For, as you said above, it is not substance itself nor the entity itself that appears, but only its effects, which one calls its appearances (phantasmata). But the essence of an entity as such is not an appearance (phantasma). What then is essence or being, when it is used as a name? Of what thing is it the name?

[76]B. The essence of an entity concretely, take some white entity, is the name of the white itself, but considered only insofar as it is white. By the same reasoning, the essence of an entity as such is the name of the entity, but considered only insofar as it is an entity. Generally, abstracts are names of concrete objects when they are thought of separately from other names of the same object. A white entity, for example, is white. If we now were to consider the white in a white object separately from the entity, we say whiteness, for pedagogical reasons, in place of white; or we say, being white.

[77]A. Thus, when we say essence as such in place of entity, essence and entity will be synonymous, so that the word essence is superfluous.

[78]B. Indeed so, and inconsistent with the truth of faith; witness John Damascene, in the eleventh chapter of his On the Orthodox Faith: after he had said that the Word had been made man, he added, "we in no way took it that divinity itself (Deitas) had been incarnate or made human." It is clear from this that, in any entity considered by itself, entity and essence differ and much more in concrete things.

[79]A. What caused the doctors to affirm that, except entity and essence were the same in God, the divine substance would be composite?

[80]B. Because a definition, which is the explanation of the essence of something defined, is itself commonly called an essence by the philosophers. Thus, if the definition of man is "rational animal," they call "rational animal" an essence and say that it is composed of animal and rational, as from its parts. They thus fail to distinguish between the definition of man, which is a form of speech that has as its parts the names animal and rational, and man himself,
whose parts are a head, chest, limbs, and other members. But, because it is a hard thing to call a concrete rational animal an essence, some, desiring to soften that way of speaking, say that the essence of man is not rational animal but rational soul and that this same substance exists separately from the human body. Thus they make essence out to be the part of man himself that is at once integrative and indispensable.

[81]A. O, amazing sleights of a vain philosophy!

Tell me now what the word persona truly and properly means.

[82]B. It is a Latin word, meaning any individual thing, no matter whether acting in accordance with its will or that of another. Thus, Cicero says, "Though one single man, I play three parts (personaе), my own, that of the judge and that of the opponent." What does this mean but that Cicero himself took three parts, his own, that of the judge and of his opponent?

Similarly, what does it mean in the Anglican Catechism when the minister asks, "What do you chiefly learn from the articles of your faith?", and the catechumen responds, "I learn first to believe in God the Father, who created me and the whole world; second, in Jesus Christ, His Son, who has redeemed me and all mankind; third, in the Holy Spirit, who has sanctified me and all the chosen people of God." What does this mean if not that God, in His own person, created all things; in the person of His Son, redeemed mankind; and in the person of the Holy Spirit, sanctified the church? What can be said more clearly than this concerning the divine persons or more in accord with the faith? For if, with the Greek Fathers, we used the word hypostasis in place of person, since hypostasis and substantia mean the same thing, in place of the three persons, we make three divine substances, that is, three Gods.

Bellarmine and almost all the other doctors define person as the first rational substance, that is, an individual substance that is single but intelligent, like God, Christ, the Holy Spirit, Gabriel, Peter. What are these three substances, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, if not the three divine substances? But this is contrary to the faith. Bellarmine did not understand the force of the Latin word persona, for, if it meant first substance, would not the word prosopon then mean the same thing in Greek? And it surely does not, for it means properly the face of a man, sometimes a natural one, sometimes artificial, or a mask, sometimes a representation of a face, not only in the theater, but also in the forum and at church. Again, what else is a representation of a face but an image or stamp of the thing represented? And it is in this sense that our Savior is called the stamp of the substance of God by St. Paul (Hebrews 1:4).

[83]A. What does prosopon mean in Sacred Scriptures?

[84]B. Nothing properly but the face or visage. By synecdoche, it is however sometimes used in place of man himself, as in the word prosopolepsia (respect of persons). But in the creed of our faith, no mention is made either of person or of hypostasis or of Trinity, and, even though hypostasis is put in the Greek creed of Athanasius, the church accepts that creed only as a para-
phrase of the Nicene Creed without the word hypostasis. For neither the creed
nor any single article of the faith could have been established by the authority
of individual doctors nor even by the whole church, except by way of inter-
pretation of the Holy Scriptures.

[85]B. Then why did the ancient Fathers and many other more recent men of
learning employ these words?

[86]A. Because they could not otherwise explain the words of the Scrip-
tures: for example, "Go and baptize all nations in the name of the Father, Son
and Holy Spirit";108 similarly, in the words of St. John: "There are three who
give testimony in heaven, Father, Son and Holy Spirit";109 and other similar
passages concerning the divinity of Christ.

[87]A. But why was it necessary to explain such things at all, which they
knew to be incomprehensible, that is, inexplicable?

[88]B. The Fathers of the Church, both before and after the Council of
Nicaea, freely owned that the Incarnation of the Son of God could not be
understood, but they pleaded in excuse that they were forced to debate the
matter by heretics. Thus Epiphanius, in his On the Trinity, at the beginning of
the seventh book:110 "The word of God was sufficient for all believers when He
said, 'Go now and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father,
of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, etc.' But we are forced by the errors of the
heretics and blasphemers to do that which is not permitted and speak of that
which is ineffable and to fall into that error which is the contrary of theirs."

Likewise, Bellarmine, in the first book of his On Christ: "Our doctors do
not debate after the manner of philosophers in order to demonstrate the Trinity,
but so that they might solve the riddles of the philosophers."

And Peter Lombard, in the first book of his Sentences 23, [chapter 14,]
commenting on the seventh book of St Augustine's De Trinitate:111

For the Greeks understand substance differently from the Latins. The Latins say,
"one essence or substance, three persons." In our language, essence is properly
understood [no] differently from substance.112 And so that it might be understood at
least "as in a mystery," whenever someone asked what the three things were, it
was incumbent upon us that some reply be made. Thus, when asked who or what
the three were, we set about the task of finding some name by which to embrace
the three. But nothing occurred to us, for the supereminenence of the Godhead
exceeded our power of customary speech.

[89]A. Epiphanius wrongly excuses himself, for, without threats or outright
force, no one can be compelled by another's error to do that which is not
allowed. Nor is Bellarmine's denial a true one, viz., that his doctors do not
debate philosophically in order to explain the Trinity but to correct the errors of
philosophers. For, of those very theologians who published explanations of the
Nicene Creed, almost all used definitions selected from the Logic and Meta-
physics of Aristotle, although they ought to have explained the Holy Trinity
from Sacred Scripture alone.113 In fact, I am amazed that the Nicene Fathers,
since so many of them were philosophers, did not import the technical philosophic words, which they used in their explanations, into the creed itself.

[90]B. That is not so amazing to me when I consider that only a few of those present at the great councils could speak forcefully and debate. The rest, then, who approved only those propositions taken from the Sacred Scripture, since they outnumbered the ones who argued, found it an easy matter to win with their votes, with the result that nothing was taken into the creed except those things which were clearly inferred from the Scriptures.

[91]A. What is body? What is incorporeal? What is spirit?

[92]B. Those names have seemed so well known and understood to all learned men that I do not know whether any theologian or philosopher has thought it worthy to explain them by definitions. Tell me: the idea of what thing do you have in mind when you or someone in your hearing says the word body?

[93]A. I now take body to mean something about which it can truly be said that it really exists, of itself, and also that it has a certain magnitude. I say that it has magnitude, not that it is magnitude itself. I do recall however that at one time I thought that body was only that which met my touch or sight. And so I thought that body was also the image (species) of a body that appears in a mirror or in a dream or even, to my wonder, in the dark. But then I considered that those species disappeared, so that their existence did not depend on themselves but on some animated entity, and they no longer seemed real to me but only appearances (phantasmata) and the effects of things working on the organs of sense. And so I knew that they were incorporeal.¹⁴

As to spirits, I based my judgement on air, which is spirit, and on wind, which I felt with my sense of touch. On this basis I thought that spirit was indeed body, but thin body; also, that some spirits could be thinner than others and more pure; and that some could differ from others in strength no less than liquids, which, though they may be equally transparent, nonetheless differ greatly among themselves in their powers.¹⁵ But I was unable to conceive of a nature midway between body and spirit or between spirit and appearance (phantasma), that is, between spirit and nothing. It must therefore be asked whether the phrase "incorporeal substance" or "immaterial substance" or "separated essences" is found in the Holy Scripture.

[94]B. They are not. But the first of the Thirty-nine Articles of the faith, published by the Church of England in the year 1562, expressly states, "God is without body and without parts."¹⁶ And this must not be denied. Also, the penalty for those who do deny is established as excommunication.

[95]A. And it will not be denied. Nonetheless, in the twentieth article, it is stated that nothing ought to be enjoined as a belief by the church that could not be derived from the Holy Scriptures. How I wish this first article had been so derived!¹⁷ For I still do not know in what sense something can be called greatest or great that is not body.

But tell me, what is the difference between "be born" and "proceed"?
[96]B. Look at Matthew 1:20, where the angel says to Joseph, “Fear not to take Mary as your wife, for what is born in her is of the Holy Spirit.”

[97]A. But I do not know whether this “is of the Holy Spirit” means “born of the Holy Spirit” or “proceeds from the Holy Spirit.”

[98]B. This passage is part of the Gospel of Matthew appointed for the feast of the circumcision, where one reads in the liturgy published in Latin by Edward VI, “What is born in her is accomplished by the Holy Spirit,” and it is translated by our church as though it read, “He comes from the Holy Spirit.” There you see how the Church of England has interpreted the passage, and I think rightly so.118

[99]A. With what result? Since the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, as it is in the creed, and the Son also proceeds from the Holy Spirit, as it is in this text, and both are said to be “born,” there seems to be no difference at all between being born and proceeding. To what purpose has the Roman Church distinguished between these words?

[100]I do not know. But you know that at one time the sphinx spread terror among the people by means of a riddle.

[101]A. What distinction do the Fathers draw between those words?

[102]B. None that I have seen. Cyril says that the Son is to the Holy Spirit as the Father is to the Son.119

[103]A. Then to Cyril it seemed that the Son bore the Holy Spirit, so we are back once again to equating “to be born” and “to proceed.” To me, it is clear enough that God’s Son was born of God, who comprehends the entire Trinity.

But it does not seem true to me that the salvation of men turns upon the outcome of such trifling quibbles over words. No one doubts that he who believes in Jesus Christ and repents of his sins will be saved, even if he is not a theologian.

Nor am I deviating from the teaching of the Nicene Creed, which I see was most clearly derived from the Holy Scripture, that the Three, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, are one God in three persons, with “person” taken in the word’s true and proper meaning, as one who plays his own parts or those of another.

Further, if the word persona is taken as Bellarmine thinks, simply as a singular, intelligent substance, like Peter, Paul and John, or, what is the same thing, in place of hypostasis, then I do not understand how the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are not three individual substances, that is, three Gods in number.

Nor do I see how that view can be proven from the Scriptures, in which neither hypostases nor persons are distinguished in God. They are said to be three only who give testimony in heaven, namely, Father, Son and Holy Spirit,120 and these three are one.

Those things which the Fathers say beyond the Holy Scripture in their particular explanations of the faith do not bind Christians, each one of whom should seek out his salvation in the Holy Scriptures, and not because of anyone else’s peril, but because of his own most profound peril.121

Now I will go on to other matters.
CHAPTER 2. ON HERESY

[104]A. What is "heresy"?

[105]B. It is a Greek word, meaning the teaching of any sect.

[106]A. What is a sect?

[107]B. A sect is a number of men who follow one and the same master in the sciences, whom they have chosen for themselves by an act of their own will. As "sect" comes from the Latin word for "following" (secutus), so "heresy" comes from the Greek word for "choosing" (hairesis). Lucian of Samosata, an impious man, though a good authority on the Greek language, wrote a book on choosing a master, entitled On Choosing (peri haireseos).

[108]A. What sects have there been, and which men composed them?

[109]B. They were composed of philosophers, that is, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Epicurus and others, though they were called Academics, Peripatetics, Stoics and Epicureans. Such were the principal sects of the Greek philosophers or of those who required they be esteemed as philosophers. For it is true, I think, that Plato and Aristotle, Zeno and Epicurus, the sects' originators, were truly philosophers according to the capacity of the pagans; that is, they were men devoted to truth and virtue. And it is for this that their names have justly shone in the glory of their wisdom throughout nearly all the world. But I do not think that we should call their sect-followers philosophers, for, apart from the opinions they knew their masters held, such men themselves understood nothing. They lacked knowledge of the principles and lines of reasoning upon which the teaching they professed rested. Nor did they at all conduct themselves in life after the manner of philosophy, except that they went about looking sad; they let their beards grow and wore a thread bare pallium. For the rest, they were greedy, haughty and irascible, complete strangers to civic affection.

[110]A. But so far you have omitted to speak of the words truth or error. Do they not pertain to the definition of a heresy? Does not one or the other inhere necessarily in every teaching?

[111]B. No, not in the slightest. Heresy designates only some declared opinion, no matter whether it be true or false, in accord with or contrary to the law.

[112]A. If these men called one another heretics, then it seems that it was not a term of abuse.

[113]B. Oh, the sects of the Greek philosophers did not call one another heretics, but wretches, defilers of the sacred, thieves, parricides, unclean (miaros), accursed (kataratos) and other names such as men of the lowest sort use when they grow angry and come on to blows. But, after heresies had arisen within the church, the greatest reproach of all was to be called a heretic.

[114]A. Were there no other heresies apart from those of the Greek philosophers?

[115]B. In Judaea, the sects of the Pharisees, the Sadducees and the Es-
sences were also called heresies, as the New Testament makes clear. Similarly, Hellenism, Judaism and Christianity counted in those days as so many heresies.\textsuperscript{124} Galatians includes heresy in a list of crimes,\textsuperscript{125} and, in Galatians 1:8, it means any teaching contrary to that of St. Paul, that is, contrary to the Gospel of Christ: “But though we or some angel from heaven preach any Gospel to you except that one which we have preached to you, let him be anathema” (\textit{anathema esto}).

[116]A. What does “anathema” (\textit{anathema}) mean?

[117]B. With a long -e- (eta), anathêma means anything whatsoever that is dedicated, consecrated or separated from ordinary use. But with a short -e- (epsilon), anathema sometimes means a person given over to the shades of the world below.\textsuperscript{126}

[118]A. How can an angel be given over to the shades of the underworld?

[119]B. It certainly cannot be burned or killed. But it could be esteemed as no angel but as a mere specter and denounced as an accursed deceiver, that is, as the Holy Scripture says, handed over to Satan.\textsuperscript{127}

[120]A. In the primitive church, since it had the written Gospel as its rule of the true faith, what was the cause of heresies?

[121]B. It was the pride of the philosophers of whom I have just spoken, ignorant men living at the time of the apostles, who had learned to dispute more subtly and orate more powerfully than other men. These men, in entering upon the way of Christ as elders and bishops, were almost of necessity chosen to defend and propagate the faith, and, as much as in them lay, even as Christian converts, they held fast to the teachings of their pagan masters. Accordingly they sought to interpret the Holy Scriptures so as to preserve at once their own philosophy and the Christian faith, as though they were the same thing.\textsuperscript{128}

[122]A. You have explained clearly what a heresy was in philosophy, but I still do not know what one rightly called a heresy in church.

[123]B. In the primitive church, up to the time of the Council of Nicaea, most of the teachings about which the Christians then disagreed concerned the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. For although everyone held that the mystery of the Trinity was incomprehensible, nonetheless, trusting the philosophy of his masters, each man dared to explain it after his own manner.

From this, there arose at first arguments, then disorders; then, to avoid scandal and establish peace in the church, synods were called, convoked without the order of those in power but through the voluntary drawing together of bishops and pastors, as they were able with the lessening of persecution.

In these councils, the participants defined what one was to believe concerning the faith in any controverted area. That which was defined was called the catholic faith; what was condemned, heresy. For, with respect to the individual bishop or pastor, the council was the catholic church, that is, the whole or universal church. So also was their opinion the catholic opinion, while a specific teaching held by an individual pastor was heresy. And it is from this, as
much as I have gleaned from the historical sources, that the name “Catholic Church” derives. And in every church, the words “catholic” and “heretic” are relative terms.  

[124]A. If "Catholic Church" means nothing other than this, then there are indeed many catholic churches in the Christian world.

[125]B. There are as many catholic churches as there are heads of churches. And there are as many heads of churches as there are Christian kingdoms and commonwealths. For in every land (regio), the prince of the Christians of that land is the head of his subjects, independent of another head on earth. Thus there are as many visible churches as there are heads of churches.

Scattered throughout the whole world, having Jesus Christ Himself in heaven as head, because the number of God’s elect is called and is the true, most catholic and only church, this is also the church in which we profess to believe in the creed of our faith. For there is not nor can there be another catholic church, if, by catholic, we mean all those who are at any one time Christian. For in Christian commonwealths, the kingdom and the church are the same people. Thus, if it were granted to anyone on earth to be the head of the whole Christian Church, to him also would it at the same time be granted to be king of all kingdoms and commonwealths.

[126]A. Which teachings were called heresies by the primitive churches?

[127]B. There were many, but the principal ones pertained to the doctrine of the Trinity, which is contained in the Nicene confession of faith. This statement of the faith had its origins at the ecumenical Council of Nicaea [325], but it was completed by the following three ecumenical councils, namely, those held at Constantinople [381], Ephesus [431] and Chalcedon [451]. Further it was ratified by the Roman emperors of those times who had called the councils.

The reason for calling the Council of Nicaea was Arius, elder of Alexandria. When the bishop of that city, Alexander, had said that the Son of God was homoousios, that is, of the same substance, with the Father, Arius contradicted him. And then, with a large number of elders present, in the rising heat of their argument, he also denied the divinity of Jesus Christ. As a result, shortly thereafter civil strife and bloodshed were born in Alexander’s city. Then, in order to preserve the peace, Emperor Constantine the Great convoked the famous Council of Nicaea. While in attendance, the Fathers settled the wording of the creed up to the phrase “I believe in the Holy Spirit. . . .” And they condemned the belief of the Arians and excommunicated him and his followers, certain of the bishops and elders, and expelled them from their churches.

But because so many of Constantine’s imperial successors were Arians, the heresy could not be extinguished. Fifty years passed, and another general council took place at Constantinople, at which Macedonius’ denial of the divinity of the Holy Spirit was condemned as heresy. Then, after fifty more years, at the general council held at Ephesus, there issued a condemnation of the doctrine of
Nestorius, who, like Arius, denied the divinity of Christ. Finally, the General Council of Chalcedon condemned the heresy of Eutyches and Dioscorus, who denied the union of the two natures of Christ, the human and the divine. In this way then, the creed which is named for Nicaea was finally completed, and the heresies I have mentioned, as well as others similar to them, were condemned.

[128]A. After these heresies were condemned, did no new ones then spring to life?

[129]B. Oh yes, many more; I do not know how many. For after that, the Roman Church by its decrees arrogated to itself the inability to err as to the articles of the faith. And then Emperor Phocas granted supremacy over all bishops to the pope. And, as the power of the empire in Italy began to wane and with the Christian princes seized by fear of the Saracens, the pope, already mightily increased in riches and power, called general councils upon his own authority, without regard for the authority of the emperors and kings of Italy. He even dared to excommunicate some kings and emperors as heretics.

As time passed, they condemned as heresies all those doctrines which seemed either to impede ecclesiastical power or its growth or to detract from that already gained. And from this arose those numerous heresies, on account of which, following the publications of Luther’s writings, so many Christians in this kingdom of England and in other places met a fiery death; until, at length, the princes of those places woke up and their subjects were freed from this, so grievous Roman persecution and servitude.

[130]A. Those whom the Roman Church ordered to be burned, the Lutherans, the Anabaptists and the others, did it consider them Christians or pagans?

[131]B. Without a doubt, Christians, and not only them, but surely also the Arians and all the others whom the Nicene Synod condemned; nor did it call them anything other than heretics. For, even though they used philosophic reasonings concerning the nature of the Savior and felt wrongly about the Holy Trinity, in contradiction to the Holy Scriptures, nonetheless they looked upon Christ as the true Messiah and Jesus Christ as the Son of God and called upon His name.

[132]A. If this is so, it seems to me that the Roman Church wrongly complains of the ancient persecutions of the pagan emperors. For the Christians of those times were sects, having the same relation to the religion established in the Roman empire as a heresy today has to the catholic church. But it is surely a more grievous thing if Christians are tortured by Christians rather than by the faithless (infideles).

[133]B. So it seems to me also. Then again, it is altogether necessary that precaution be taken in kingdoms and commonwealths lest sedition and civil wars arise. And, since these very frequently arise out of doctrinal differences and battles of intellect, those must certainly be coerced by some punishment.
who, in public meetings or in books, teach such things as the laws of princes and commonwealths have prohibited to be taught.

For this reason, when our Queen Elizabeth of England succeeded her sister Mary, who had burned many heretics and had menaced even Elizabeth’s life, she accepted the kingdom and, with the consent of the Lords and people, immediately removed the supreme right of ruling the Church of England from all external powers. For such supremacy is a natural right owed all kings in their territories. And she entrusted administration of the church to her bishops under her, together with a few from the Privy Council, by an act under the Great Seal of England, confirming them in it. In her act, she made provision lest the bishops pronounce any doctrine heretical not so declared in any of the first four general councils I have mentioned. Thus the position of the Church of England as regards heresy was then similar to that of the Roman Church under Constantine the Great.

And so it remained until the seventeenth year of Charles I’s reign. In that year, almost forced to it by the entreaties of his subjects who would no longer bear the great power of the bishops, Charles rescinded Elizabeth’s act. He left the bishops only their ordinary power, namely, that of making canons, which, with the royal assent, become laws of the church.

[134]A. Then the condition of the Church of England, as it appears today, is equal to that of the church at the time of Constantine with respect to purity of doctrine but superior to it with respect to the fairness of ecclesiastical laws. For it is surely unfair that a man, on whose faith rests the peril of his own salvation, should receive punishment upon the accusation that it is in error, especially if the accusation is made by those unharmed by the error.

[135]B. To err, to be deceived, to hold a false opinion, these are by their nature no crime, nor can error, so long as it held within one’s breast, become a crime. For what clues will prompt accusation? What witnesses will argue conviction? And then how will judgement be rendered? But words can be made a criminal matter, and legislators may rightly seek to punish them through penalties, including forfeiture of one’s life. If blasphemy against the king can be punished with death, so much more blasphemy against God.

But fairness requires that such a law specify openly both what crime the law condemns and what the manner of punishment will be, with the end that, if the wrongdoer knows in advance the penalty he will pay, he may be frightened from his wrongdoing. The end of legitimate punishment is not satiation of anger against a man but the prevention of injuries, as much as can be done to the benefit of mankind. Any law is unjust which does not first threaten before it wounds, and, however discretionary the right of supreme powers may be in setting down the laws, still it is not within their discretion to exact penalties which have not previously been defined in the laws.

Moreover, except a law be declared and promulgated, so that any credible excuse of ignorance is removed, not even that which is done against the law can be rightly punished or called a crime.
[136]A. But is that which transgresses the natural law not a crime and liable to punishment, even if no manner of punishment is provided for in the law?\textsuperscript{155}

[137]B. The natural law is eternal and divine and inscribed only in the hearts of men. But few are they who know how to peer into their own hearts and read the things written there. And so, men learn what to do and what to avoid from laws that have been written down. And, having seen the penalties, they then do and avoid only so much as each one deems useful or harmful to him.\textsuperscript{156}

Besides, if something is done against the natural law, it is not usual to call it a crime but a sin, and men consider themselves forgiven their sins immediately if they are repentant, unless what they have done involves some harm to the commonwealth or to their neighbor. And, in that case, they think themselves liable to no more punishment than is required to make satisfaction for the damage they have caused. But they consider the evil itself to be punished by God alone. For if a sinner punishes a sinner, accusing him of the sin alone, after the law has been satisfied, it is like a state of civil war.

[138]A. But why, if someone is an atheist, shall he not pay a penalty, whether or not there is a written law to define the manner of punishment?

[139]B. He shall undoubtedly be punished and most severely, but first he must be accused, heard and condemned. And he can be accused only because of that which he has said and done. But by what deeds will atheism be proven? For what deed have you heard of so wicked and impious the like to which has not at some time been committed, not only by those not considered atheists but even by those who make profession of Christianity? No, it is not from a man’s deeds that he will be adjudged an atheist. Thus, because of something said, either uttered or written, a man can be accused of atheism; that is, if he has directly denied that God exists, but in no other way.

[140]A. But do we not call anyone an atheist who has said or written something, the necessary consequence of which is the nonexistence of God?\textsuperscript{157}

[141]B. Oh yes, provided that, when he uttered or wrote it, he saw the necessity with which that consequence followed. For if the law prohibits certain words or deeds and makes them liable to punishment, then they must be so defined as that everyone whom that law obliges may know them with specificity. If the law punishes deeds, then they must be defined in the law with all their elements. If it is words that are punished, then they must be written out in the law itself.

For the consequences of words are very difficult to judge, so, if an accused man has spoken contrary to the letter of the law in ignorance of good reasoning, this very ignorance will excuse him, provided no injury has been done to anyone. But if a judge, through ignorance of some consequence, binds an innocent man over for punishment, then he cannot be excused. But, if he knows that the words themselves are contrary to the law, he can be punished.\textsuperscript{158}

Now, he who denies that God exists or openly professes his own doubt whether He exists or not can be punished even if no manner of punishment has been inserted in the law, but with exile, even by natural fairness. For religion
and recognition of divine power is commanded by law in every commonwealth; and every commonwealth must ensure that faith in covenants be preserved and especially if it is confirmed by swearing an oath.\textsuperscript{159} Thus, because an atheist cannot be bound by an oath, he must be removed from the republic, not because he is contumacious but as a public nuisance. Then, once the public harm has abated, I do not see why he must be killed, since he may perhaps be converted from his impiety. For, what can a man not hope for from divine patience before he dies? The same should be said concerning blasphemy, which is reproachful speech against God and, if the mind gives assent to the speech, atheism.

[142]A. But why are blasphemers to be killed according to the Mosaic law, rather than suffer exile?

[143]B. Once a law has been enacted, an earthly king has the right to expel a blasphemer from his kingdom. The king of the Israelite people at the time of Moses was God Himself, established so by covenant and also king naturally of the whole world. God therefore had the same right, once the law had been passed, to expel the blasphemer from the earth itself, that is, to kill him. Of course, you must understand this response of mine to your question not as an explanation of the cause of God’s purpose in setting down the law, but only as a defense of its fairness once it had been set down.\textsuperscript{160}

[144]A. Now I understand what heresy is, namely, that it was first an opinion only of a sect, then an opinion of a Christian sect and thirdly an opinion of a Christian sect condemned by the catholic church.

I would also like to know by what power and in what way it became customary to punish heresy, from the beginning up to the present.

[145]B. Before Constantine the Great, the first Christian emperor, neither the pastors nor even the apostles themselves had the power of inflicting any legal sanction upon those whom they had condemned. They could neither send them into exile nor deprive them of freedom of movement nor in any way molest them. Such power was in the competence of the highest ruler alone for the preservation of the peace. They could excommunicate; that is, they could deny their society, intimacy and conversation, and shun those whom they condemned, as was done to pagans and publicans. But this is not a punishment, and it often caused more inconvenience to the excommunicator than to the excommunicate.

At the Council of Nicaea, once the heretics had been condemned, a punishment was established only against the clerics, namely, that they be deprived of their churches. But nothing was done against their disciples, perhaps because the laity was scarcely held responsible for deciding about the teachings of their pastors. Or perhaps it was because quite a few of them were soldiers who had served in the army under the emperor himself; these were not to be provoked without some danger.

Even the learned teachers of the heresies were called before the council;
their reasonings were heard and, after argument, refuted out of the Holy Scriptures. If they refused to the end to subscribe to the judgement of the church, then at length they were deprived of their churches. And, if afterwards they continued to corrupt the people with their heresy, they were sometimes sent into exile. But if these same men, having put their contumacy aside, later adhered to it, they were restored by the emperor himself. Thus Arius himself was restored after he had given the Emperor a written confession of his faith which seemed to the Emperor not to depart from the judgement given by the other Fathers. And Athanasius, who did not want to receive him back, was sent into exile because of this behavior.

[146]A. Did so great a man as Athanasius not think it a sin to refuse obedience to the command of the supreme emperor?

[147]B. So it seems. Nonetheless the passages in the New Testament in which obedience is taught by Christ and the apostles to even pagan powers are not obscure. But with that very zeal which he had shortly before employed to fight the Arian heresy at the Nicene Council, Athanasius afterwards set himself against the emperor’s wish to restore Arius. This should not surprise us, for, when doctors of theology so intently fasten upon those passages in the Holy Scriptures which bear on a current debate, they pass over those passages which pertain to the rights of princes, either through carelessness or sometimes even through partisanship, thereby slighting human laws.

But, to return to the punishments set up for heretics, you should know that among ecclesiastical punishments the ultimate is what is called anathema or excommunication, so that every other punishment depends on the civil power. Now the cause why Constantine and the other Roman emperors instituted many punishments against the heretics, such as exile, confiscation of their goods, the burning of their books, even death, though this measure was taken not against the heretical writers themselves but against those who failed to bring the condemned books to the flames; I say, the cause was lest Christians, and particularly soldiers, divide into factions and kill one other.

Nonetheless, I can find no imperial law requiring heretics be killed, excepting the Manichaeans only, whom I consider less as heretics than as feigned Christians and wicked men. I do find a law according to which a pagan or Jew is to be burned if he has attempted to turn his relative, once converted, away from the Christian faith. But this in no way pertains to the punishment of heretics. I have also heard that Emperor Frederick Barbarossa brought forward a law for the burning of heretics. But while I find that Justinian’s Code does contain a constitution of that Frederick confirming his predecessors’ constitutions as to punishing heretics, no constitution exists as to burning them.

And so, as far as I can gather through inference, that manner of punishing heretics began shortly after the time of Pope Alexander III, who, together with that emperor, was the first to trample upon the imperial power (imperium) itself and the laws of all princes. However that may be, it is certain that, in
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our England, from almost that time until the time of Queen Elizabeth, heretics have generally been burned in accordance with a certain custom, which has passed into law.170

[148]A. Thus a few words must be added to the definition of heresy from this time, namely, that it is a teaching against the catholic faith, to be punished by fire.

[149]B. So it is.

[150]A. By what judge and by what judicial form were heretics to be condemned?

[151]B. Before the popes began to exercise imperial power against the emperors, the judges were by and large those to whom were sent the emperors’ rescripts concerning punishments meted out to heretics, namely, the praetors of Rome and the provincial prefects. But I know nothing of their procedure for convicting heretics.

Then, after pontifical power had grown strong, cognizance of the action lay with one or more of the bishops. If the accused, having been questioned publicly, twice if necessary, renounced the doctrine he had taught, after having made penance in the form prescribed by the court, he was then absolved. But if afterwards he relapsed into the same heresy or fell into some other (for they were without number), he was handed over to the secular power for burning. Nor was there any chance of pardon, given the division between civil and ecclesiastical power, without the consent of the pope.

[152]A. How were heretics to be convicted and punished beginning with the first year of Elizabeth’s reign to the seventeenth year of Charles’?

[153]B. Throughout that time, there appeared very few heretics at all.171 This was because those to whom the queen had entrusted ecclesiastical government under her were prohibited by law from adjudging any doctrine to be heretical which had not previously been condemned at one of the first four general councils;172 as is clear from those councils themselves, this means any doctrine which had not been declared against the faith set out in the Nicene Creed. But any who were convicted would be burned.

[154]A. How is it possible to know what is or is not contrary to the creed unless one either denies the truth of the creed’s very words, in the form in which they were written down, or asserts their falsity?

[155]B. Indeed; no heretic should be punished by the law unless he contradicts the creed’s very words. For it is unjust that someone should say that the faith has been denied in consequence of something and that someone else should be punished because of it. Is it fair to seek a man’s life by means of cunning adroitness in using logical arguments? or to put one’s life at risk because of his adversaries’, or even his judge’s, skill in logic? Should the law, which requires no more than compliance, exact retribution for a flaw in reasoning?

The Fathers of the Nicene Council thought otherwise, for, when only some
few of them hesitated to subscribe to the creed because of the word *homoousios* and demanded a fuller explanation of that word, the rest, gratifying their wish, declared that the word should be understood to mean that the Son of God was indeed the substance of the Father, so that He was nonetheless not a part of the Father.

One of those who sought this explanation from the Fathers was Eusebius, Bishop of Caesarea, who wrote the "circular letter" to the clergy of all the dioceses. In it, he set forth what the council had decided concerning faith in the Holy Trinity, and he explained why he and the others, who had first refused, later endorsed the creed. He gave as the reason for his action "that a formula was prescribed by the Fathers, by which care was taken lest the meaning depart from the sense of the true faith, and that on this account he did not reject the word *homoousios*, namely, because peace was the object constantly before our eyes."

From this, one may understand, that, whenever words are made a crime, according to the opinion of the Nicene Council, they must be reduced to a formula, so that all can be certain without a string of syllogisms which words constitute a crime and which do not. Clearly, in the same manner, through a formula in the law, one distinguishes those acts that constitute a crime from those that do not.

All the popes have felt similarly. For when they condemn some doctrine as heretical in the general councils, they write down in the conciliar decretal as many express formulas as they foresee possible consequences which can arise from the given doctrine.

[156]A. You said a moment ago that, in the first year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, the law prohibited those who exercised ecclesiastical government under her from pronouncing anything a heresy which one of the first four general councils had not so condemned. Now I should like to know therefore whether those ecclesiastical governors whom she then established promulgated notice throughout all the parochial churches as to precisely which doctrines and verbal formulas it was a capital offense to contradict. For I do not believe that uneducated men and those to whom nothing but the Holy Bible had been prescribed for their salvation were obliged to have with them a true transcript of the councils. In fact, I do not know whether a true transcript exists, for there are those who claim that the Arians corrupted the conciliar records, which the Catholics then suppressed for that reason.

[157]B. There can be no doubt but that, of the part of the councils in which the creed was established, there exists a true transcript. As for what pertains to the disputes between the Catholics and the heretics, it is hardly of great interest whether that part perished.

Now, to respond to your question about whether those verbal formulas, by which heresy was contained under Elizabeth, were promulgated throughout the churches: no, none were, nor were the royal letters themselves published except
a long time afterward. As a result, a given defendant could not know what was and was not heresy before he was cited. Thus, even if, through the royal letters, heresy could have been declared to be whatever had been so declared by the aforesaid councils, they were not available to serve that purpose. This negligence of Elizabeth’s ecclesiastical governors, their failure to publish those letters more quickly, was condemned by that most illustrious jurist Edward Coke, in the third book of his *Institutes*.

[158]A. The Anglican liturgy contained the creed. Was its publication not sufficient promulgation of the law on heresy?

[159]B. Yes, if it had been written in law. But no mention is made there of the Nicene Creed, and neither the uneducated nor perhaps even some of the clergy understood what that creed had in common with the councils or how Constantine’s decretal had been made English law.

[160]A. You said that the governors of the church charged with adjudication of heresy lost their legal authority in the seventeenth year of Charles I’s reign. How was it possible that the laws on heresy which existed in the time of Queen Mary did not regain their authority at that point?

[161]B. Because the law to abolish all ecclesiastical power other than royal power had been passed before that of the ecclesiastical governors was set up. So, once the law was removed, they then had no power to punish heretics except their ordinary power to excommunicate; nor do they have any such power today.

[162]A. Today then, a heretic cannot be punished in any way except by excommunication; is that correct?

[163]B. And by those penalties which follow upon excommunication in virtue of the civil laws. He will be called into an ecclesiastical court, where, if he does not condemn his error, he will be handed over to the secular power to be thrown into prison. There he will remain until he renounces his heresy and fulfills the penalty established in the laws.

[164]A. Who can know whether he has truly renounced or not?

[165]B. No one can in any way know, except God alone.

[166]A. Can he not be forced to abjure his heresy?

[167]B. He cannot. During the regime of those ecclesiastical governors, it was occasionally the practice for heretics to be examined under oath as to their interior beliefs. But the bishops’ power to do this was taken away with their authority as unjust. Besides, exacting retribution for thoughts seems to pertain to God alone, the searcher of thoughts. Human law takes notice only of contumacy.

[168]A. Does the Gospel establish any penalty against heretics?

[169]B. None, except that they were to be avoided and prohibited from the communion of saints, who at that time took their meals and sustenance from resources held in common. I find no secular punishment prescribed by law. Nor do I find that excommunication followed upon one’s heresy, but rather from one’s life and crimes, those which brought the religion into discredit.
Quite to the contrary, I think that, if the parables of the New Testament are brought to bear upon Christian doctrine, then the punishment of the heretic on the part of a Christian through civil penalties is prohibited, as in Matthew 13:27-30:

Another parable he put before them, saying, "The kingdom of heaven may be compared to a man who sowed good seed in his field; but while men were sleeping, his enemy came and sowed weeds among the wheat and went away. So when the plants came up and bore grain, then the weeds appeared also. And the servants of the householder came and said to him, 'Sir, did you not sow good seed in your field? How then has it weeds?' He said to them, 'An enemy has done this.' The servants said to him, 'Then do you want us to go and gather the weeds?' But he said, 'No, lest in gathering the weeds you root up the wheat along with them. Let both grow until the time of harvest, and at harvest time I will tell the reapers, 'Gather the weeds first and bind them in bundles to be burned, but gather the wheat into my barn.'"

Is it not clear from this that the weeds, that is, the heresies, are to be reserved until the last judgement? How are they then to be uprooted in this world by death or exile?

Likewise, 1 Corinthians 3:11-15:

According to the commission of God given to me (Paul), like a skilled master builder I laid a foundation, and another man (Apollos) is building upon it. Let each man take care how he builds upon it. For no other foundation can any one lay than that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ. Now if any one builds on the foundation with gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble, each man's work will become manifest; for the day will disclose it because it will be revealed with fire, and the fire will test what sort of work each one has done. If the work which any man has built on the foundation survives, he will receive a reward. If any man's work is burned up, he will suffer loss, but only as through fire.

This means that anyone who holds to this foundation, that Jesus is the Christ, that is, anyone who is truly a Christian, will be saved, even if he builds up wood or hay or straw, that is, false beliefs. He will lose the work but shall nevertheless be saved, though as through fire, that is, once his errors have been purged from his mind.

Also, 2 Timothy 2:25:

Have nothing to do with stupid, senseless controversies; you know that they breed quarrels. And the Lord's servant must not be quarrelsome but kindly to every one, an apt teacher, forbearing, correcting his opponents with gentleness. God may perhaps grant that they will repent and come to know the truth, after being captured by Him to do His will.

Is this not against those who cause the heretic who has twice been cited immediately to be burned except he renounce his doctrine, thereby doing as
much as they can to block a Christian’s way to God’s mercy? To these passages from the Holy Scripture, add the belief of all the theologians that no one is received by Christ who is forced to Him through fear of death.

[170]A. How is blasphemy usually punished?

[171]B. Blasphemy, if it comes from a disposition of the mind, is atheism. For who would dare to blaspheme God if he believed that He exists and works the cure of human affairs? But that which men commonly call blasphemy is nothing other than an affected abuse of the divinity by means of unnecessary oaths. Justinian defines the crime in this way in Novella 77: “Blasphemies are, for example, ‘by the hair of God’ and ‘by His head,’ and words like them.” Then the penalty established is capital punishment.

[172]A. Are no oaths of this kind punished by law among us?

[173]B. I do not know. But I do not doubt that ecclesiastical controls can punish them. For it is both a scandal to the church and a most especially impudent transgression of the Third Commandment of the Decalogue. Any unnecessary oath whatsoever is no small sin, taking its origin from this, that men are habituated to lying. Thus one who has said the truth, seeing that he is not believed and lest he seem not to have spoken seriously, will swear on God. And it is surely God upon whom he should swear if it indeed were necessary. Seeing that these oath-takers receive no punishment, some immoderate wags then begin to divide God up after the manner of the Anthropomorphites, swearing upon these parts in an effort to snatch some little praise for the novelty of their oaths. And from this practice come those sayings, “by His body,” “by His nails,” “by His hair,” which are at the same time blasphemous and heretical.

The church will see how these things should be punished.

CHAPTER 3. CONCERNING CERTAIN OBJECTIONS TO LEVIATHAN

[174]A. In the year of our Lord 1651, there appeared a certain book, written in the English language, entitled Leviathan and composed of four parts. The first part concerned the nature of man and of natural laws. The second part concerned the nature of the commonwealth and the right of the supreme power. The third dealt with the Christian commonwealth, and the fourth, the kingdom of darkness.

Each of these parts contains certain paradoxical arguments, both philosophical and theological. So many of these run counter to the power of the Roman pontiffs over other princes that it easily appears that the book’s author considered differences of opinion over theological questions as the cause of the civil war that was then being waged throughout England, Scotland and Ireland. This discord had arisen first between the Roman and the English churches, and then, within the Church of England, between its Episcopal and Presbyterian ministers.
The Civil War had its origins first in the kingdom of Scotland, in the year 1639, but the king put it down then by making certain concessions, one of which was the lifting of episcopal power from that kingdom. But the war quickly sprang to life again in 1640, at the instigation of English Presbyterians. In that time, ecclesiastical administration was performed in virtue of the king’s letters through bishops. Then, too, there sat a Parliament that was almost wholly Presbyterian, for that faction far surpassed the Episcopal faction in power and in the favor of the people. And so it was in the following year that the king, to placate Parliament, was forced to strip the bishops of all extraordinary ecclesiastical administration as well. That accomplished, no power remained among the English any longer to try heresies; there then emerged every type of sect of men, writing and publishing whatsoever theology he wished.

The author of said book, who was already living in Paris, made some use of this freedom of writing now become so common. And he defended remarkably well the rights of the king in things temporal as well as spiritual. But while he endeavored to do this from the Holy Scriptures, he fell into certain novelties of doctrine, which many theologians have accused of heresy and atheism.

[175]B. What are these doctrines?
[176]A. Tell me how this sentence seems to you; I have taken it from the second chapter of Leviathan, toward the end:

And for fayries, and walking ghosts, the opinion of them has I think been on purpose, either taught, or not confuted, to keep in credit the use of exorcisme, of crosses, of holy water, and other such inventions of ghostly men.

[177]B. For my part, that sentence will seem true, sage and Christian so long as no one proves the contrary point of view from the Sacred Scripture. And in this instance, I read in the Gospel of Matthew (Matthew 27:52) that, at the death of Christ on the cross, it was in fact dead bodies that were raised from the tombs, not souls.

[178]A. Then, in the fourth chapter, at the beginning, our author denies that any substances are incorporeal. But what does he intend here, to deny that God exists or to assert that God is a body?

[179]B. Clearly, he asserts that God is a body. But before him, Tertullian affirmed the same proposition in an argument against Apelles and other heretics of his time who taught that our Savior Jesus Christ was not a body but an apparition (phantasma). Tertullian proclaimed this universal statement: “Whatsoever is not body is not an entity.” Likewise, he affirmed against Praxeas, “all substance is body after its own kind.” And this doctrine was not condemned by any of the first four general councils.

Show me, if you can, the words “incorporeal” or “immaterial” in the Scriptures. But I will show you, “The fulness of divinity dwells in Christ corporeally,” that is, as Athanasius explains, “according to His deity.” We all
move and have our being in God” are the words of the Apostle. But it is quantity that we all have. And can there be quantity (quantum) in that which lacks quantity (in non quanto)? “God is great,” but it is impossible to understand greatness apart from body.

Not even the Nicene Council itself stated explicitly that God was incorporeal, though the Fathers who were there, perhaps not all, did feel this way. And Constantine himself approved the word homoousios, that is, co-essential, since it seemed to him to follow from it that God was incorporeal. Nonetheless, they did not want to import the word “incorporeal,” which is not found in the Scriptures, into the creed. And in fact, even if essence were not body, God’s incorporeality cannot be inferred from the word “co-essential.” The father of David and the son of Obadiah were co-essential; they were the very same man, namely, Jesse. Does it follow from this that the father of David and Jesse were incorporeal?

Further, the Fathers present at the Council of Nicaea intended their creed as a condemnation not only of Arianism but of all those heresies that had crept into the church after the death of our Lord. One of these was the heresy of the Anthropomorphites, who had attributed the limbs of the human body to God. But they did not want to condemn those who had written with Tertullian that the true, real and pure spirit was corporeal. Indeed, those who ascribe purity to God do well, for it is to do Him honor. But to attribute thinness to Him, which is something of a step toward nothingness, is dangerous.

John Damascene, in explaining the Nicene faith, states in the thirteenth chapter of the first book [of On the Orthodox Faith]:

Of the divine names, some are negative, meaning that which is above substance, like anousios, that is, without essence; achronos, that is, without time; anarchos, that is, without beginning. This is not because He is inferior to those things, but because He is lifted up above all things. For God is not to be numbered among the things that are, but He is above all things.

Here you see John Damascene, an Aristotelian philosopher, as is evident from his work, Dialectica, and also a Father of the Church and a pious and learned man, who, because he is fearful of saying with Tertullian that God is body, seeks to attenuate bodily thickness, which he considers unworthy of God, I know not why, and thus descends into atheistic words in saying that God is anousios and nothing of those things that exist.

[180]A. I think that, in using anousios, he wanted to signify nothing other than uncreated.

[181]B. Perhaps. But after he had said enough concerning the attribute of uncreatedness a few lines before, what need was there for him to say the same thing again with that name which is not to be tolerated, anousios?

At length, he realized that all spirit, however thin, is nonetheless body, for what substance or real entity could he invent for himself such that substance
would seem to be incorporeal, except those idols or apparitions (phantasmata) of the kind we see in mirrors, in sleep and in darkness, those the Apostle Paul says are nothing.\textsuperscript{216}

[182]A. As for the third doctrine, that author states in the sixth chapter, toward the end:

Feare of power invisible, feigned by the mind,\textsuperscript{217} or imagined from tales publiquely allowed [is] religion; not allowed, superstition. And when the power imagined is truly such as we imagine, true religion.\textsuperscript{218}

[183]B. The Preacher says the same thing in Ecclesiastes: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom",\textsuperscript{219} as does the Psalmist: "The fool has said in his heart, there is no God."\textsuperscript{220}

[184]A: Fourth, in the sixteenth chapter:

The true God may be personated. As He was; first by Moses, who governed the Israelites (that were not his, but God's people) not in his own name with \textit{hoc dicit} Moses (Moses says this) but in God's name, with \textit{hoc dicit Dominus} (the Lord says this). Secondly, by the Son of Man, His own Son our blessed Saviour Jesus Christ, that came to reduce the Jewes and induce all nations into the kingdom of His Father, not as of Himselfe but as sent from the Father. And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking and working in the apostles: which Holy Ghost was a Comforter that came not of Himselfe, but was sent and proceeded from Them both.\textsuperscript{221}

[185]B. It seems the author wanted to explain the doctrine of the Trinity at this point, though he does not name it: a pious wish, but the explanation is wrong. For Moses, because he too bore the person of God in a certain way, as do all Christian kings, seems here to make up one of the persons in the Trinity. This is very careless. If the author had said that God, in His own person, created the world; that, in the person of the Son, He redeemed mankind; and that, in the person of the Holy Spirit, He sanctified the church; then he would have said nothing other than what the church proclaims in its catechism.

[186]A. But he repeats the same explanation in numerous places.

[187]B. Still, we can easily emend it in each place. Or if he had said that God, in His own person, had established the church for Himself through his servant Moses; in the person of Christ, redeemed it; and in the person of the Holy Spirit, sanctified it; then he would not have erred.

[188]A. In the thirty-fourth chapter, the author denies that it can be shown from the canonical books of the Old Testament that angels are real and permanent substances, but rather supernatural apparitions (phantasmata); for they are called angels because God uses them for the declaring of His will.\textsuperscript{222}

[189]B. It is certain that angels have that name by virtue of their office and also that all spirits, because of the transparency of spiritual substance, are invisible, except in the sense according to which we say that apparitions (phantasmata)
tasmata) are seen in a mirror, in sleep or in darkness. And so, as often as the
Holy Scriptures say that someone has seen an angel, the vision that occurs is
not that which takes place through the eyes. It is like what Jacob experienced
when he saw the angels ascending and descending the ladder, as he slept.223

The men known as, the Sadducees denied that angels were substances.224
Why? Not because they did not believe in the Old Testament, but because there
is no mention of the creation of angels in the Old Testament. Nonetheless, the
Jews did not excommunicate them for their beliefs.

Does the author also deny that angels can be shown to be substances from
the New Testament?

[190]A. He does not. But if they are, he says it can be shown from there
that they are corporeal substances.
[191]B. None of the ancient Fathers found this to be an interpretive crux, nor do any of the doctors of the reformed churches. The Church of England
does not condemn it.

[192]A. In the thirty-eighth chapter, he denies that the human soul is immor-
tal of its own nature, that is, by creation itself, but by the grace of God in
furnishing the fruit of the tree of life to Adam and Eve, provided they abstain
from eating of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.225 But
when they had transgressed God’s command concerning this fruit of the tree of
the knowledge of good and evil, then they were cut off from a way to the tree
of life and became mortal, they and their posterity. Dying and dead have they
remained until, through the death of Christ for the remission of sins, they shall
rise again to eternal life in the general resurrection of the dead.

One consequence of this doctrine is that none of the souls of the dead,
whether faithful or unfaithful, may in any way exist immortal before the day of
judgement.

[193]B. Concerning this view, I have just explained my opinion at sufficient
length.226 But I would add that I do not know how he may be said to sin against
the Christian faith who confesses eternal life, whether he asserts it is received
through creation or through redemption; nor how this doctrine can be against
Christian teaching or worship when neither in the Holy Scripture which con-
tains that teaching nor in the liturgy which contains that Christian worship is
there ever found the words “immortal soul.” But “eternal life through Christ,”
yes, very frequently!

[194]A. In the same chapter, he says that the kingdom of God following the
resurrection will be on earth.
[195]B. Does this assertion derive from his own philosophy or from the
Holy Scripture?227

[196]A. He cites quite a few passages from the prophets, Isaiah, Obadiah,
Joel, which are not well known, at least to me. And he adduces what St. Peter
says as to the burning and renewal of this world.
[197]B. Then add to those passages this more obvious one from Revelation
5:9-11.
The four animals and twenty-four elders shall fall before the Lamb, each having lyres and golden vials full of incense, which are the prayers of the saints. And they shall sing a new song, saying, You are worthy to receive the book and open its seals, for You were slain and have redeemed us to God through your blood, from every tribe and language and people and kindred. And You have made us kings and priests of our God, and we shall reign on the earth.224

What is clearer than this?

[198]A. In the same chapter, he says that the punishment of the damned will also take place on earth and that it will not be eternal.

[199]B. No one can doubt but that, if the damned are to be destroyed by the saints militant, they will be destroyed on earth.229 And if it is true that they will die a second death, then their destruction will not be eternal.

[200]A. In the thirty-ninth chapter, he defines a church in this way:

I define a church to be a company of men professing Christian religion, united in the person of one sovereign, at whose command they ought to assemble and without whose authority they ought not to assemble.230

From this definition it follows that, in the time of the pagan emperors, neither the apostles’ council nor any of the other of the Christians’ councils before the one held at Nicaea met with permission.

[201]B. There were quite a few meetings, or synods, of the Christians under the pagan emperors. But by the word “church,” he understands a synod with authority to decide, whose decrees it was unjust not to obey. Such synods cannot take place without the supreme power.

[202]A. In the forty-third chapter, he quotes John 1:1, “The Word was with God” and John 1:14, “The Word was made flesh,” and he says that “Word” means the same thing as promise and promise the same thing as that which is promised, namely, Jesus Christ. Similarly, in Psalms 104 [105]:19, in Genesis 40:13,231 and other similar places.

[203]B. Why not? For do you think that it is this word “word” that was made flesh or the thing signified by the word? What is the meaning of those words of the same apostle in Revelation 13:8: “The Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world. . .” Could He have been slain before He was incarnate? Does it not follow from this that both the incarnation and the passion of our Lord, which surely occurred in time, nonetheless took place from the foundation of the world?232 How can it be otherwise than in the Father’s eternal decree?233 And what is this decree but the thing decreed? In the same way, is not the Holy Ghost also called the promise of the Father (Luke 24:43)? Christ says, “I will send you the promise of my Father.”

[204]A. In the [thirty-sixth] chapter, to the question “What if some believer is ordered by his legitimate prince to deny Christ?” the author responds that it is permitted to obey, as in the example of Naaman the Syrian, to whom the prophet said, “Go in peace.”234 These words do not seem to me to be a granting of permission but a form of saying farewell.
[205]B. And perhaps they would be, if he had said something more to him, either to express approval or disapproval. But under the circumstances they can be understood only as a granting of permission.

You know that, shortly before the Council of Nicaea, there had been quite a few Christians, good ones, certainly, but not very brave, who, in the face of death and tortures, renounced the Christian faith. What punishments do you think the general council at Nicaea meted out against them? The nineteenth canon of that council requires that those who acted in this way before they were faced with danger and torture had to return to the stage of the catechumen. But as to those who renounced in the face of death itself, it stipulated nothing.

Now I do not deny but that, in an apostle or disciple, that is, in one who had taken it upon himself to preach the teaching of Christ among the enemies of Christ, this was a sin and in Peter a great one, but one of weakness and easily forgiven by Christ.

[206]A. In the same chapter, the author asserts that Christian kings are permitted to administer the sacraments.

[207]B. And with him, so felt almost all of the ministers of the Church of England in the first year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth. For as soon as the Queen had vindicated her supremacy over the church, she issued certain instructions throughout all the dioceses, which she called Injunctions. One of those directed that all clerics should recognize by oath that the lawful supremacy over the church pertained to herself and to her successors.

But there were many who did not want to swear and gave as their reason that, should they concede this, they would also be conceding to the Queen the power to administer the sacraments, should she desire. From this it is clear that the clergy believed that in whomsoever resided the supremacy of the church, to this person also was it permitted, as often as he wished, to administer all things usually done by priests.

At that point, the Queen, to remove this scruple, wrote back that it had never been her intention to take upon herself any administration or power other than that exercised by her father Henry and her brother Edward. And by her letter the Queen neither removed such power from her male successors nor arrogated any to herself, knowing that it was prohibited for women to speak in the churches.

[208]A. The whole of the forty-third chapter is taken up in proving that the penitent sinner need believe nothing further for his salvation than that which is contained in this one article of faith, that Jesus is the Christ.

[209]B. That article contains many things, as that Jesus is the Son of God, the king of the Jews, the restorer of the kingdom of God. For, as the Apostle John testifies (John 20:31), the aim of even the Gospel is none other than that we might know that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God. The same apostle also says (1 John 4:2): "Every spirit that confesses Jesus as the Christ, come into the flesh, is of God." There are many other passages in the New Testament similar to this one.
[210] A. But against this view is what we read at the end of the Athanasian Creed, namely, "This is the catholic faith, which, except a man believe it, he cannot be saved."

[211] B. Then you set the words of Athanasius against the Holy Scripture and the words of the apostle? The church accepts his creed as an explanation or paraphrase of the Nicene Creed, but Athanasius' words are not part of that creed.

[212] A. There are many other paradoxical arguments in the same book, but, because they are of lesser importance than those we have lingered over, I shall not bring them up.

[213] B. As you wish. But in these instances you have brought up, I find nothing against the faith of our church, although there are several which defeat the teaching of private theologians.

NOTES

1. I should like to thank Pat Lally and the anonymous reader of this journal for a number of helpful suggestions on improving the translation that follows. My work was greatly facilitated by the support of the Wisconsin Institute for Research in the Humanities. I have derived considerable benefit from Professor François Tricaud's work, especially from his knowledge of patristic literature. Hobbes' text lacks both section numbers and subject headings, whose addition here I have signalled with brackets. The text also lacks paragraphs; to aid clarity, I have broken the interlocutors' speeches into more comprehensible units. Where Hobbes' point involves some particularity of the Latin language, I have retained the Latin word, written in bold print. Hobbes' Greek has been transliterated and indicated by the use of bold italics; his ligatures, syncopes and elisions have been written out. His use of italics is inconsistent in the text, as is his use of the Greek and Roman alphabets. Thus, the Greek word hypostasis is at times written in Greek characters and at times in Roman characters, with and without italics. At times, italics are used merely for emphasis. Where I have thought it useful, I have retained the emphatic use of italics and have attempted to regularize their use throughout. Where Hobbes has printed a Greek word using Roman characters, I have dropped the italics. Capitalization, too, is inconsistent, again often used for emphasis; here, I have followed modern conventions. Hobbes gives fragments of biblical passages in the expectation that his audience would recognize them as familiar proof texts; I have expanded the quotations. In quoting the English Leviathan, I cite to C. B. Macpherson's Penguin edition of 1968; otherwise I use Molesworth's edition of the English and Latin works. I have checked Molesworth's text of the Appendix against a copy of the 1668 edition; differences are noted. Hobbes' discussion of some issues is somewhat disjointed; topics hang fire and are resumed later, often without explicit reference to what went before. I have used cross-references to draw the pieces together.

2. Hobbes uses the word Latin word "symbolum" (symbolon in Greek) for the English word "creed." The history of this term, which originated in the West, and several interesting conjectures regarding its first application to the church's declaratory creeds are discussed by J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, 3d ed. (London: Longmans, 1972), 52–61. Kelly concludes that symbolum derives from the name given recitations of the faith used at baptisms. This result, emphasizing as it does the corporate context of the confession, casts some doubt on Hobbes' attempt to characterize adherence to the creedal statements as a matter largely of individual choice.

3. This passage establishes two assertions whose implications are developed throughout the Appendix: (1) scripture is the source and norm of doctrine, and (2) religious beliefs are not open to human understanding; though faulty, human reasoning about them may be discerned and corrected or abandoned.

4. Hobbes' point is that the use of these verbs with a preposition governing the accusative case, rather than with the usual construction of the verb with the dative case, is quite rare and ought to be
taken as denoting a meaning different from the usual expression of an attitude of trust or belief. With their strong spatial sense, Hobbes argues, the prepositions here signal the Nicene Fathers' desire to set out certain boundary formulations of key tenets of the Christian faith, as the consensus they felt allowed and required. This interpretation does not reflect current opinion; see n. 6. Hobbes' discussion consistently reflects his awareness of the historical situation which gave rise to the creed and emphasizes its political exigencies and context, especially the role of Constantine as leader of the church and defender of the peace of the empire. Central to his development of this point is a concern to distinguish Greek philosophy from the Christian faith; see, for example, sections 14-16, 24, 46, 56, 77-81, 88-89, and 120-21. Cf. Leviathan, 132f.

5. In this and what follows, Hobbes stresses the democratic element of majority rule obtaining in the councils' deliberations, as well as their lack of coercive power, a defect supplied only by the command of the sovereign under whose authority they met. In his doctrine of the church, as in that of the state, Hobbes' recourse to a primitive democracy obviates what may be termed an original participated universality as the basis for concerted thought and action.

6. In fact, although, as Hobbes says, the construction is not found in classical Greek or in the Septuagint version of the Old Testament, the construction, pisteuo with eis followed by an accusative, is found, rarely in a number of New Testament writings, but principally in the Gospel of John, where its use is characteristic. There it is likely an imitation of the correlative Hebrew verbs, indicating an attempt on the part of the Gospel writer to import into Greek the early Judaeo-Christian understanding of faith. C. H. Dodd states, "It would seem that pisteuein with the dative so inevitably connoted simple credence, in the sense of an intellectual judgement, that the moral element of personal trust or reliance inherent in the Hebrew and Aramaic phrase—an element integral to the primitive Christian conception of faith in Christ—needed to be otherwise expressed." See The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 183-86.

7. Hobbes makes a related point by stressing that the term martyr, or martus in Greek, properly means witness, one who tells of events he has seen. Among Christians, according to Hobbes, faith is belief, or, better, well-founded trust, in stories which witnesses have told of Jesus' resurrection; see Leviathan, 529-30, and the Introduction and notes on this point. Cf. Leviathan, 366 and 555.

8. Hobbes' point is that the attribution of being to an entity is not a proper predicate. Here as elsewhere, he states that languages do not need verbs to express predication, whose function is merely to signal a joining, or copulation, of words, that is, of names. We may illustrate Hobbes' point by borrowing Professor Tricault's convention of denoting this copulative function of the verb with an equal sign, as in Socrates = mortal. Applied to Hobbes' examples in the text, these propositions may be rendered as "God = = ," which is meaningless, and "God = God," which is tautological. On the existential and copulative functions of the verb to be, see Etienne Gilson, "Knowledge and Existence," in Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), 190-215.

9. In using the term verbum substantivum, Hobbes adopts a terminology that dates in Latin from at least Priscian's Institutiones Grammaticae, in imitation of a Greek conception, given new meaning by medieval and Humanist grammarians. The reading in the text, verbum substantiale, is rare or perhaps here a misreading. Used as a grammatical term for centuries, the Latin term copulae, meaning "link," denotes here the combining of a subject and a predicate in a sentence conceived of as a proposition, which Hobbes elsewhere defines as "a speech consisting of two names copulated, by which he that speaketh signifies he conceives the latter name to be the name of the same thing whereof the former is the name"; Molesworth edition, 1:30. The key here is Hobbes' zeal to transform grammatical elements from symbolizations of reality to mere names, that is, to items of lexis. Countering the traditional view that words reflected human understanding of the essences under consideration, Hobbes described words and names as mere expedients for memory and communication: "A name is a word taken at pleasure to serve for a mark, which may raise in our mind a thought like to some thought we had before"; 15. Words in connected discourse are speech, "of which every part is a name"; 16. But Hobbes postulates no relationship of truth between name and thing; on this point, see n. 83. Thus the possible truth of propositions resides only
in the right ordering of the names they contain. This definition may be contrasted with the traditional conception of truth, occasioned by Aristotle's saying that the soul's experiences, its *noemata*, are likenings of things; thus Thomas Aquinas says that truth is the "adequation of the intellect and the thing." This is, the agreement of knowledge with its object (*adaequatio intellectus et rei*). See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), H214ff. Padley points out that it is an aspect of the nominalism that Hobbes has transmitted to modern times that he does not relate names and things. See G. A. Padley, *Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, 1500–1700: The Latin Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 141ff.

10. Hobbes must mean *to on*, that is, something which is, the expression he uses in section 64; the masculine article makes no sense here. Note that, while Hobbes seeks in the Appendix to obviate Greek thought as an interpretive aid or influence in Christian theology, he is nonetheless drawn to employ its vocabulary, but in conformity with his own intentions. Here, he reinterprets an existential proposition concerning the existence of God into a proposition regarding the set of beings in which God fits; see below, n. 213.

11. Hobbes uses the Greek word *phantasma*, as a Latin word, in referring to name, to appearance, actual and fantastic, and to the ideas or images of thought. Hobbes denotes all of these reality because they depend on some other entity for their existence. I have retained the word in the text to indicate the variety of items to which he applies it.

12. The reference is to a passage in Paul's letter to the church in Corinth, 1 Corinthians 8:4, where he discusses eating meat sacrificed to idols: "We know that idols do not really exist in the world and that there is no god but the One. And even if there were things called gods, either in the sky or on earth—where there certainly seem to be 'gods' and 'lords' in plenty—still for us there is one God, the Father, from whom all things come and for whom we exist." In arguing that idols are no more real than the apparitions of sense and no less subject to explanation, Hobbes counters the animism of popular Greek belief and religion, which he feels was to an extent taken up by the Greek philosophers and medieval theologians; and he reinforces the confidence of Old and New Testament writers that such beings do not exist or, if they should exist, that they are subject to the God of Israel, who knows and protects His own. It is striking that Hobbes consistently links apparitions and demons with the "doctrine of separated essences," attributing this doctrine to Aristotle though it is more aptly that of Plato. And he sees in this doctrine an important source of civil discord; see the Introduction. On the separation of substance in Aristotle, see Donald Morrison, "CHORISTOS in Aristotle," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 89 (1985): 89–105. The theme of spirit recurs throughout the Appendix; for example, he considers the effect of a vain philosophy in the deliberations of the Nicene Council at sections 121ff., and, at section 176, in the offense of unpleasing priests, whose teaching figured in the English Civil War. The question was of interest to a number of Hobbes' contemporaries. For example, the Cambridge Platonists found a place for demons on the great ladder of existence. Milton, like Hobbes, sought to counter fear of the supernatural out of fidelity to a conception of faithful life. And in his 1650 poem, *An Horatian Ode upon Cromwell's Return from Ireland*, Andrew Marvell combines an old and a new thought in stating, at lines 40–41: "Nature that hateth emptiness/allows of penetration less." See also sections 178ff., and nn.

13. Interlocutor A is failing to distinguish between the graven images themselves and the divine beings thought to be attached to them. Paul Tillich notes that the Christian attitude toward strange gods was shaped in the thought-world of the Old Testament. He states that, in the earlier Jewish prophets, pagan gods were recognized as powers existing among men but inferior to Jahweh, particularly in foreseeing and determining the future, hearing prayers, and in executing justice; they were regarded as competing powers. As Jewish religious thought and experience developed, these gods' loss of power led to a loss of being, for a god without ultimate power is a "nothing," as Paul later called them. Jahweh, he says, then came to be esteemed less as a tribal god than as the God of justice, in virtue of which He rules the world. Amos was thus able to threaten Israel itself, the nation of Jahweh, in the name of Jahweh, because of its injustice. The covenant between Jahweh and the nation did not give the nation a claim to Jahweh's championship, and he might turn against them if they violated justice. The exclusive monotheism of the prophetic religion
was thus not due to the absoluteness of one particular god as against the others; it was the universal validity of justice which produced the exclusive monotheism of the God of justice. Justice was thus conceived as a principle which transcended every particular religion, making the exclusiveness of any particular religion conditional. Both Jesus (Matthew 25:31ff.) and Paul (Romans) emphasized the universality of the event of the Christ and in so doing freed interpretation of its significance from a particularism which would have made it the property of a single religious group. In early Christianity, the judgement of other religions was determined by the idea of the Logos. The Church Fathers emphasized the universal presence of the Logos, the Word, the principle of divine self-manifestation, in all religions and cultures. The presence of spermatic words (*logoi spermaticoi*), that is, traces they found in pagan culture of divine truth, they viewed as preparation for the epochal, central appearance of the Logos in an historical person, the Christ. Indeed, the Fathers took into Christianity some of the highest conceptualizations of Greek thought as positive creations, freely adopting such words as physis, hypostasis, ousia, prosopon and, above all, logos. But while they developed the universalism implied in an all-inclusive religion, they always applied the unquestioned criterion of the image of Jesus as the Christ, as documented in the New and prepared for in the Old Testament. Christian universalism was thus not syncretistic. See Paul Tillich, *Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 31ff. It is primarily the work of the Fathers that Hobbes takes up in the chapters of the Appendix, largely to obviate and criticize the residue of Greek philosophic thought and experience he found in Christian theology, especially the concept of the logos and the theory of ideal essences he believed it entailed.

14. The assertion here is that their ideas about the gods generally led the Greeks in fashioning images of them. Thus, Greek statues were an attempt to give plastic form to aspects of the conceptions they had of the gods they worshipped, as, by giving statues of Hermes winged feet, they sought a means of illustrating their conception of the speed of the gods' messenger.

15. Hobbes must have learned some Hebrew in the interval between the publication of the English *Leviathan* and *De Corpore*, since what is discussed in the first book as a logical possibility, namely, the existence of a language without the copula, is in the second attributed to Hebrew. Hobbes notes the discovery in his *Response to Bishop Bramhall*; see English Works, 4:304.

16. Port Royale grammarians had the same view of the function of the verb to be. For this and other correspondences in linguistic matters, see Padley, *Grammatical Theory in Western Europe 1500–1700: The Latin Tradition*, 141ff., 151, 186–87 and 228.

17. The Molesworth edition writes out et, "and."

18. The Latin reads: Latine dicitur "Terra erat vacua"; Hebraice "terra existens vacua. ubi ab homine Latino non audiebatur "erat," sed "[erat] aliquid existens." The point is that the speaker of Latin recognizes the convention of using a word, a copula, to indicate predication; he fails to recognize predication in the formula used by the speaker of Hebrew, who signals his intentions in a different way. Hobbes draws our attention to this linguistic fact in order to support the view of predication that he has so far advanced. But the larger interpretive move prepared here is to cast doubt on the use of Greek philosophic understandings, with their reflection in the usages of the Greek and Latin languages, as inappropriate or at least suspect means of interpreting words descriptive of the experience and expectations of speakers of Hebrew and other languages. Hobbes' point involves a rather sophisticated understanding of historical linguistics, as applied in biblical hermeneutics. In fact, it would seem doubtful that the unparalleled expressive capacities of one language render the truths contained in it inapplicable to members of other linguistic families, but what is of interest here is Hobbes' attempt at historical understanding.

19. Hobbes' word here is *materia*, that is, that out of which something is made.

20. Aristotle argues against the creation of the world, as in *De Caelo* 279b 12ff.; 301b31; for him, matter is ungenerated, eternal.

21. Hobbes may be referring to Aristotle's discussion of prima materia, matter utterly without form, as in the *Metaphysics*. In *De Corpore*, Hobbes explains that, while such a conception is possible as a designation of matter in general, apart from its accidents, nothing of the sort exists or is in any way real.
22. Note that Hobbes explains the creed's ascription of attributes to God by reference to the Scriptures. Professor Strauss has asserted that Hobbes' "biblicism" grew more pronounced as he abandoned an earlier dependence upon the arguments of natural theology; see Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 76-78. But, even if this biblicism is a dissimulation, several of Hobbes' interpretations of the texts are well reasoned and insightful, so that he advances an understanding of biblical religion in relation to politics, which, even if feigned, is worthy of study. See the discussion in the Introduction and also section 183 and nn.

23. In what must be a misunderstanding or distortion, Hobbes seems to have in mind Aristotle's notion of substance as the "mixture" of form and matter. The Latin autobiography mentions that this was a teaching he learned from his physics professor at Oxford.

24. Hobbes refers here first to the adoptionists, who denied that Christ was God from all eternity and believed rather that, due to an exemplary life, Christ had been adopted by God as His son. Hobbes propounds the orthodox view that Christ existed pretemporally as God before He appeared on earth and was already the Son of God prior to His birth. In the Historical Narration Concerning Heresy, Hobbes talks of those who taught that Christ was a mere phantasm; that may be his point in this second reference.

25. This discussion prefigures Hobbes' analysis of hypostasis later, sections 64ff., in that the position of the Son in relation to the Father was a key aspect of the Arian heresy.

26. The glass Hobbes envisions here is something like an optroscope or kaleidoscope.

27. Both the Greek and Latin words are compounds, meaning "to stand under."

28. This discussion may refer to the point made by Aristotle in De Mundo, 395, towards the end, where one reads that, among certain phenomena produced in the air, some exist according to appearance and others in reality. There is an echo of this in the Latin autobiography. See below, section 28.

29. See, for example, Quaestiones aliae, in Migne, Graeca Patrologia, vol. 28, question IV, col. 780, now held a doubtful work of Athanasius.

30. Hobbes stresses the metaphoric character of attempts to explain the Trinity in order to dissociate this essential doctrine of the Christian faith from any given metaphysics. In so doing, he risks depriving the Trinitarian symbol of intelligibility, but this fideism is the result of an impasse in his thought. On this point, see below, sections 178ff., and nn.

31. The Quaestiones ad Antiochum ducem, in Migne, Graeca Patrologia, vol. 28, cols 598-600, may be Hobbes' source for Athanasius' views on human understanding.

32. The reference here is to St. Paul's discussion of faith, hope, and love in 1 Corinthians 13:13. Hobbes made the same point in De Homine, chap. 14, where he stated that "questions about the nature of God are all too curious and are not to be counted among the works of piety." He adds that faith would be done away with by untimely knowledge, possibly a reference to knowledge of things laying outside of time or perhaps knowledge sought prematurely, prior to one's death and resurrection. This, perhaps intended, ambiguity finds an echo in Hölderlin's dictum that nature hates untimely growth.

33. Hobbes' insistence that this expression is metaphoric is prompted by his aversion to the metaphysics of light. Among Christians, Tertullian and Clement of Alexandria prepared the way for Augustine's elaborate and profound combination of Platonic and Plotinian elements in describing Christ as divine light. Pseudo-Dionysius' Hierarchia caelestia became a kind of handbook of later Christian light symbolism, and the theory of divine illumination proved immensely influential, evidenced in its use by Avicenna, Isaac Israeli, Robert Grosseteste, Roger Bacon, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Marsilio Ficino, Giordano Bruno, Pico della Mirandola and Jacob Böhme. Hobbes' own studies in optics must have made it clear to him that such speculation could not be supported scientifically, so that its use as a productive site for theology was problematic. Galileo had argued in a similar way regarding the celestial motions he had discovered.

34. John 1:3.

35. A reference to the anti-Arian notion of the eternal generation of the Son.
36. The notion that the word was a sound uttered by God would seem to involve an anthropomorphism and entail a derogation from the nature of God, in whom to think and to accomplish are the same thing; no sound would be necessary to effectuate the divine will.

37. *heimarmene* is the perfect passive participle of *meironmai*, meaning, to receive as one’s due or portion. The form to which Hobbes refers means “that which has been allotted,” namely, one’s fate, with that term’s starkly necessitarian implications.

38. A theological difficulty would be implied for a Christian in the Stoic notion of providence as cosmic necessity. For the Stoics, “fate,” with its etymological roots in both Greek and Latin in the verb “to say” or “to decree,” was the invariant expression of order in the universe, that which had been decreed for all time. Man was part of the structure of the universe in a special way in that he could attune his thoughts and actions through his reason to the dictates of nature for the benefit of himself and others. Appropriating materials available in popular Greek religion, the Stoics had described Zeus as the great figure of order in the pantheon of heaven, subordinated however to the necessity immanent in the cosmos. Both man and the gods were thus beneficiaries of cosmic order; Stoic anthropology and theology were based on cosmology. Hobbes recognizes that to ground God’s being and human happiness in the world in this way was intolerable in the Christian framework. As he says, for man, happiness, that is, salvation, results only from the redemption offered in the life, death and resurrection of Christ. And to impute an element of necessity either to the relation among the divine persons or to God’s dealing with His creation, or to deny generation in God, would be similarly impermissible to Hobbes, who seeks rather to vindicate the freedom of God’s action. Hobbes is at pains to distinguish his point of view from classical models because his is theocentric, not cosmological or anthropocentric. On this point, see the Introduction and the discussion following, on Hobbes’ understanding of the Word. See also Hans Blumenberg, *The Genesis of the Copernican World*, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 175ff.


40. I doubt whether the question of Hobbes’ sincerity in making professions of the Christian faith can finally be resolved, as if that is necessary or would be helpful. Aubrey mentions habitual acts of charity, but the issue may be removed in principle from rational demonstration. See K. C. Brown, “Hobbes’s Grounds for Belief in a Deity,” *Philosophy* 37 (1962): 336–44. Still it is clear that the positions Hobbes develops here set forth undoubted tenets of Christian belief and social thought, most closely linked with the rise, spread and development of Protestantism, so that even his imposture, if it is that, is of interest for the light it sheds on his evaluation of the events and political possibilities of the Stuart period. Certainly, nothing Hobbes himself wrote justifies calling his religious doctrines ironic, absurd, hypocritical or merely conventional. And there is this difficulty in the dissimulation hypothesis: if it is true, as Hobbes says, that a speaker speaks in the expectation that his audience will understand the signs he uses, then it is difficult to see how Hobbes’ “knowing” reader will know to read his dissimulation in this doctrine of the Word, since it is surely a most recondite sign by which to signal religious unbelief. Or perhaps he signals his unbelief not here, but surely in other instances. It is much more likely that, in writing plainly and repeatedly on these topics, Hobbes exposed himself courageously to palpable dangers for the sake of deeply held beliefs, not shared by those who had power to do him harm.

41. Hobbes’ point is that the Latin expression could with equal justice mean that Christ descended to men living on earth as to the shades in hell.

42. Gehenna was a raving south of Jerusalem, associated by early Jewish writers with sacrifices to Moloch, the god of the Semitic tribes in the area (*2 Kings* 16:3, 21:6), and cursed by Jeremiah for that reason (*Jeremiah* 7:29–34, 19:1–20:6; cf. *Isaiah* 31:9; 66:24). Equated with the hell of the last judgement in apocalyptic literature from the second century B.C., Gehenna was used in this sense by the writers of the Gospels to indicate the place where the unjust would receive punishment. Goshen is mentioned in *Genesis* 47, as the fertile northeast sector of Lower Egypt allotted to the Israelites by Pharaoh, in which there was light, and hence salvation, during the plague of darkness, described in *Exodus* 10. The name was applied to the church by New Testament writers. Used also in the Old Testament, fire imagery, such as the lake of fire, is a common figure of divine anger and judgement, and a sulfurous lake of fire is mentioned frequently in *Revelations*. 
43. Bellarmine says as much in his Disputationes, De Christo, bk 4, chap. 10, and in De Gemitu Columbae, bk 2, chap. 2.

44. 2 Peter 2:4.

45. See Leviathan, chap. 38. The opposite of the Elysian fields, Tartaros was the name of a subterranean region regarded by the ancient Greeks as the doleful abode of the wicked dead, where they suffered punishment for evil deeds. Peter’s use of the term is most uncommon among New Testament writers, and, in noting the lack of agreement among the Greek and Roman writers who spoke of the place, Hobbes is on firm ground in concluding that its use by the apostle is metaphorical and not meant to give information as to a specific place. The aim of Hobbes’ analysis of biblical references to hell is to dispose of the apparatus of purgatory and of the harrowing of hell legends, so popular in medieval times, by seeing them as literary conventions, metaphors or borrowings from pagan mythology, a conclusion fostered by the Reformation.

46. Theogony, 722–25. Born around 700 B.C., in Boeotia, Hesiod, the Greek shepherd and rhapsode, wrote his epic poem as a theological justification of the reign of Zeus as the god of justice. The first to develop a poetic persona among the Greeks, Hesiod, together with Homer, established the conceptions of the gods by which Greek religious consciousness was shaped. The anvil Hobbes refers to is found in Hesiod’s description of the distance of the Titans from heaven: “[The Three] drove [the Titans] as far underground as earth is distant from heaven./Such is the distance from earth’s surface to gloomy Tartaro./For a brazen anvil dropping out of the sky would take nine/nights, and nine days, and land on earth on the tenth day, /and a brazen anvil dropping off the earth/would take nine/nights, and nine days, and land in Tartaro/ on the tenth day.” Richmond Lattimore, Hesiod (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959), 59.


48. The difficulty here is that the Holy Spirit seems to be given a role putatively reserved to God the Father, namely, that of paternity. Hobbes will show that Interlocutor A would be misled in thinking that division of roles equates with division of being within the Trinity; see section 82. He engages in linguistic analysis in the sections that follow to show that A’s error stems from a confusion over the use of the Greek word hypostasis as contrasted with that of the Latin word persona. See below, sections 64ff.

49. The Roman Breviary contains the same resume of the articles of the Christian faith under the name Quicunque vult salus esse. Its attribution to Athanasius is today abandoned.

50. In fact, in what follows, as Tricaut points out, one finds an explication of the Latin word substantia, not subsistentia, and, while the words are often used interchangeably, in discussing the Trinity, authors often use subsistentia as the Latin equivalent of the Greek hypostasis. See Albert Blaise, Dictionnaire latin-francais des auteurs chretiens, sub voce subsistentia (Paris: Librairie des Meridiens, 1954).

51. This discussion occurs below, sections 63–103.

52. This refers to the famous “filioque” debate.


55. Hobbes’ point is that the phrase was added to the Nicene Creed; the original text did not have it. He has misread Bellarmine (De Christo, I, II, c. 23), who says the phrase was added at the seventh general council, held in Nicaea, not the second council of Constantinople. On the filioque dispute, see J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, 358–67.

56. The Gloria Patri.

57. Hobbes’ point is that the creed reflected the liturgical usages of churches at the time of its adoption; that is, they did not derive the practices from a reading of the creed.

58. Hobbes’ phrasing may obscure the point that the problem was whether the baptism conferred upon the converted heretics by heretics had been valid, not whether they were in need of a second baptism.
59. The passage in the Authorized Version reads, “But every man in his own order,” as the rendering of the Greek *en to idio tagmati* (Vulgate: *in suo ordine*). Hobbes has evidently quoted from memory.

60. Hobbes’ Latin is not that of the Vulgate, which scholars today think is incorrect at this point in any case. I have followed the Authorized (“King James”) Version of the text here.

61. In this section, Hobbes develops his idea that the soul is either the same as life or dies at the end of life. The corporeality of the soul was a key doctrine of the Libertines, one of whose strongest spirits in France was Hobbes’ close friend Sorbière; see Giuseppe Ricuperati, “Il problema della corporeità dell’anima dai libertini ai deisti,” *Il Libertinismo in Europa* ed. Sergio Bertelli (Milan: Riccardo Ricciardi Editore, 1980), 369–415. Still, I believe it will be clear that the formulation and tendency of Hobbes’ thought on the matter, especially the desire to collapse the distinction between soul and life, differ from that of the freethinkers. This is true also in regard to the arguments of Pietro Pomponazzi, in his famous treatise *De immortalitate animae* (1516).

62. Only Plato among Greek philosophers unquestioningly taught the soul’s immortality. It is doubtful or at least uncertain on Aristotelian principles. Stoics before Posidonius admitted a limited survival, at least to the souls of the wise, but only until the succeeding cosmic conflagration (*ekpyrosis*). And Epicurus explicitly denied it. Cf. *Hebrews* 1:1–3, and *2 Corinthians* 4:4.

63. Hobbes’ Latin here is somewhat obscure, but I believe the sense is clear.


65. I cannot follow Professor Sherlock in understanding this as Hobbes’ attempt to do away with the possibly seditious consequences of the Christian doctrine of heaven and hell. In one or the other case, one experiences an infinite gain or loss, so that the doctrine hardly loses its power at Hobbes hands. See Richard Sherlock, “The Theology of Leviathan: Hobbes on Religion,” *Interpretation* 10 (1982): 43–60.

66. Hobbes’ inclination is clearly to collapse the distinction of soul and life, so that death marks the total cessation of the given human personality in its entirety until the resurrection. But, if the distinction is to be maintained, he shows how his explanation of the general resurrection is nonetheless the most elegant and rational. Again, Hobbes is led by his reading of Scripture to replace the Greek philosophic categories, immortal spirit and corrupted matter, with more clearly Jewish or Judaeo-Christian ideas, viz., the unity of the human personality, human mortality and an emphasis upon human need for God’s work of salvation.


68. *Genesis* 3:5.

69. For Athanasius on *Genesis*, see *Oratio de Incarnatione Verbi*, in Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 25, col. 101. As in the *Response to Bishop Bramhall*, Hobbes cites the translation of the Old Testament made by Santes Pagnino following the Hebrew text. Clearly, this interpretation of the passage supports Hobbes’ evidently unorthodox view, shared by his contemporary Samuel Hoard, that the punishment of the reprobate will not be eternal. It is generally conceded that the Christian conception of an afterlife is not found in Old Testament writers.

70. *Romans* 5:12. Hobbes’ point is that, following his disobedience and punishment, Adam was mortal and in need of salvation, a characteristic affecting not only him but all his progeny. Hobbes thus touches on one of the key tenets of Christianity, humankind’s genetic involvement in one man’s fall, Adam’s, as the occasion for redemption, brought also by one man, namely, Jesus Christ, the second Adam. As Augustine would develop the notion, inherited sinfulness, as a species-wide quantity of corruption in men’s hearts, means that evil in the world increases as a constant and not as the possibly remediable result of individual bad acts; this is the theological presupposition of the so-called prisoners’ dilemma (PD), whereby the choices of free actors may result in a state of affairs worse for all. Hobbes accepted and radicalized the Augustinian doctrine in the direction of the Reformation in stating, in *Leviathan*, 398ff., that sin need not be thought the cause of a man’s affliction. For, according to Hobbes, it cannot be asserted that God might not justly have afflicted the righteous man Job *without regard to his sin*. At the root of this assertion is an intuition as to the power of God, whose will establishes criteria of justice in the world; see below, section 179 and n. 219. Intrinsic to Hobbes’ political doctrine, this view, by negating the possibility that, in a better world, it would be easier to be a better person, shows that on these

71. Adam figured in both the "harrowing of hell" legends of the Middle Ages and in the so-called story of the cross. According to the latter, the tree that supplied the wood used at the crucifixion grew from a shoot placed by Seth in Adam's mouth at the time of his burial. Adam's death and burial are portrayed in the famous cycle of frescoes of the Story of the Holy Cross painted in Arezzo's Church of St. Francis by the early Renaissance artist Piero della Francesca.

72. On this text, see above, n. 59.

73. This assertion runs counter to the belief that Christ led Adam and the other patriarchs out of hell in the harrowing of hell that followed his death, prior to the resurrection.

74. Hobbes is pointing out some logical inconsistencies that arise if it is not admitted that Adam is in fact dead during the time between the end of his earthly life and the resurrection, that is, assuming for the sake of argument there is a soul, so long as his soul is separated from his body.


76. Hobbes has conflated a number of scriptural passages to arrive at this sentence.

77. Though never widely accepted, mortalism, the belief that the soul "slept" or ceased to exist after death, was shared by a number of Hobbes' contemporaries. Its effect, the annulment of the doctrine of purgatory, is fully consistent with Protestant belief, and it had an important proponent in Martin Luther. See the Introduction and Norman Burns, *Christian Mortalism from Tyndale to Milton* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1972), 34.

78. Cf. 1 *Corinthians* 15:32.


80. The 1668 text bears the unattested form *laleias*, rather than the correct form, reported by Molesworth, *lalias*, without notice of his apparent emendation. Tricaud notes that *laleias* is found in Walton's edition of the Bible.

81. Hobbes enters into this comparison to show that, whether or not the Latin manifests the author's rejection of human claims for superiority over the animal, the Greek clearly does show such rejection.

82. Hobbes' point is that the author of *Ecclesiastes* says that the fate shared by man and animal is an effective cessation of life at death, in essence one of the teachings on mortalism, together with man's subsequent return to life through God's power in the final judgement.

83. See *Ecclesiastes*, 3:17, 11:9, and 12:17. This is perhaps the clearest indication of that cast of mind according to which Hobbes undercuts the anthropology of the ancient Greeks in favor of that implied in biblical religion. Reason for Hobbes is instrumental in essence, scarcely distinguishable from the cunning and skill of the animals. Note his statement, in *Objectiones* (iii, 4), written as a response to Descartes' notion of innate ideas, as to the capacity of men to know things in their essence or of their languages to embody a world:

But what shall we say now, if reasoning chance to be nothing more than the uniting and stringing together of names and designations by the word "is"? It will be a consequence of this that reason gives us no conclusion about the nature of things, but only about the terms that designate them, namely, whether or not there is a convention (arbitrarily made about their meanings) according to which we join these names together.

"De Corpore" (New York: Abaris Books, 1981). See also the more critical account given by Edward Thomas Fitzgerald, "Thomas Hobbes' Philosophy of Language: A Study of Naming and Signifying," Master's thesis, deposited in the UC, Berkeley, Library, 1961. But, if Hobbes distinguishes sharply between biblical religion and Greek philosophy, it is not in order to leave both behind in the pursuit of progress. In this section, he so emphasizes the need of humans for salvation that it is doubtful that, in rejecting the ancient teaching as to language, symbol and linguistic sign, he intended the secularization of man, speech and world that has been attributed to him; see Margreta de Grazia, "Secularization of Language in the Seventeenth Century," Journal of the History of Ideas 40(1980): 319–29.

84. The way Hobbes has used the biblical story of the naming of the animals by Adam permits a conclusion contrary to his own. For it is precisely here, in the potential for reason and language, that man's uniqueness is already evident in that, prior to the imposition of names, man already stands out from his environment in a way which makes truth a common human possession. On the Adamic language, cf. Leviathan, 100–101.

85. Hobbes' account of the virgin birth reflects his reduction of the traditional, four-fold account of causality, efficient, material, formal and final, to efficient and material causality only. It is consistent with contemporary medical science.


87. This suggests pagan birth myths, for example, the birth of the world from Chaos, or the births of Dionysus and Athena from Zeus.

88. These terms were used in connection with Aristotelian, Stoic and Platonic notions of appearance, as contrasted with reality. On their use, see G. C. Stead, "Divine Substance in Tertullian," Journal of Theological Studies 14 (n.s., 1963): 46–48. See above, section 28.

89. hyphistamenon and hypostas are participial forms of the verb hyphistemi, the present middle and aorist active forms, respectively.

90. In opposing hypostasis, that is, something real, to name and appearance, that is, things that are not real or "nothing," Hobbes reveals the depth of his commitment to nominalism, with its denial that anything but linguistic terms are predicables of many. Thought is memory, the recollection of mnemonic tokens or devices to retrieve thoughts and objects. Imposing names upon sense impressions and other objects, men construct propositions, from there to syllogisms, as he has said above, section 56. But the process of reasoning thus described reveals nothing certain about the nature of the objects themselves, only about our success at re-uniting the names we have imposed according to the conventions we have arbitrarily constructed in regard to their denotations. Reason concerns names, not an understanding of the essences of things, grasped in thought. So far as Hobbes, the sensualist, knows, reason can establish no certain link between name and thing. The line of argument he takes here underlies the response he made to Descartes' theory of innate ideas in the Objectiones of 1641. Hobbes lacked the hope for a universal language such as animated many of his contemporaries, and he is instinct with the desire not to allow metaphysical speculation, or, perhaps, metaphysical presumption, to condition thought and experience. See Gigliola Rossini, Nature e artificio nel pensiero di Hobbes (Bologna: Il Mulino), 27–35; Marshall Missner, "Skepticism and Hobbes' Political Philosophy," Journal of the History of Ideas 44 (1983): 407–27; William J. Courtenay, "Late Medieval Nominalism Revisited, 1977–1982," Journal of the History of Ideas 44 (1983): 159–64. From this position, the step to experimentalism might seem small, but it was one Hobbes never took. For an analysis of his rejection of experimentalism, see Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).
91. Hobbes is correct in distinguishing between the first, whose temporal reference depends on context, and the second, whose temporal reference is understood as contemporaneous with the temporal location of the speaker.

92. See below, section 88 and n. 111.

93. "Character hypostaseos Dei," character, from charasso, "to engrave or inscribe," may be translated as the noun "impress," that which bears the imprint of a seal or stamp, as a coin or waxen tablet with writing on it. Translations of the phrase vary: the Authorized ("King James") Version has, "the express image of his person"; the Douay Dervin edition has, "the figure of his substance"; the Standard Edition of 1901 has, "the very image of his substance"; the Complete Bible of 1927 has, "the representation of his being."

94. The 1668 text reads "sia."

95. Hobbes refers here to the practice in Latin and Greek of using an infinitive where English prefers a gerund; thus, vivere (to live) for "living," esse (to be) for "being." Hobbes' etymology is doubtful.


97. For example, in Metaphysics, xii, 6–9, Aristotle discusses the unchanging divinity as a "substance which is eternal and immovable and separate from sensible things."

98. The Latin reads: "Essentia entis in concreto, puta entis albi, est nomen ipsius albi, sed considerati quatenus albi. Eadem ratione essentia entis simpliciter est nomen entis, sed considerati simpliciter quatenus ens. " Essence here is evidently the thought of the thing's existence, that is, the thought that the thing exists; cf. Molesworth ed. 1:31. But the truth of such a thought would depend on the truth of our knowledge and naming of some entity, a problematic outcome for Hobbes, for whom truth is a matter of names and memory. Note what Heidegger says of Hobbes' attempt to understand the proposition as a purely verbal artifact:

Hobbes takes the assertion as a pure sequence of words. But his nominalism cannot be carried through successfully. For Hobbes cannot persist in holding the assertion to be merely a sequence of words. He is necessarily compelled to relate the verbal sequence to some res, but without interpreting in further detail this specific reference to things and the condition for the possibility of this capacity for reference, the significative character of names. Despite his whole nominalistic attack on the problem, the "is" means for Hobbes, too, more than a mere phenomenon of sound or script which is somehow inserted between the others. The copula as a coupling of words is the index of the thought of the cause for the identical referability of two names to the same thing. The "is" means the whatness of the thing about which the assertion is made. Thus beyond the pure verbal sequence there emerges a manifold which belongs to assertion in general: identifying the reference of names to a-thing, apprehension of the whatness of the thing in this identifying reference, the thought of the cause for the identifying referability. Subjected to the constraint of the phenomena involved in the interpretation of the assertion as a sequence of words, Hobbes more and more surrenders his own initial approach. This is characteristic of all nominalism.


99. This discussion takes place in the eleventh chapter of the third book. The Damascene's point is that divinity is a term to be applied only to all three of the persons of the Trinity, so that its attribution to Christ alone, as the incarnated Word, is inappropriate.

100. Hobbes seems to be arguing that the essences of words are less removed from those things of which they are the essences than are the essences of substantial things, so that the essence of being white, for example, is closer to whiteness than the essence of man is to that entity with a head, two arms, two legs and the power of reason.

101. Hobbes is referring to the Scholastic distinction between existence and essence. Neither Franciscans nor Dominicans allowed for a contrast between what they called essential and existen
tial being in God, though both accepted that the world was so split. The contrast is of ancient
origin, already considered by the Orphics, the Pythagoreans, Anaximander, and most importantly by Heraclitus and Parmenides. For Plato, existence was the realm of change, opinion, error and evil; true, essential being was above existence, located in the sphere of eternal ideas. Knowledge occurs in the Platonic soul as it remembers what it knew when it lived among the ideas, prior to its fall into existence. Aristotle criticized and resisted the theory of ideas in describing all reality in terms of a dynamic interdependence of form and matter, although he too describes a prime mover, wholly above the world, whose self-intuition is the goal of human contemplation. It is a misleading commonplace that the first millennium of Christian theology took its inspiration from Plato, with Aristotle dominating in the sequel. The medieval doctors developed their theology with greater or lesser awareness of this background in ancient thought and with varying agreement as to its adequacy in expressing the truths of Christianity.

102. Another evidence of Hobbes’ attempt to turn all questions regarding language into a consideration of lexis. It is difficult to imagine that Hobbes believed his assertion that medieval thinkers could not distinguish between a form of speech and a concrete man. The statement is perhaps an ironic way of saying that, following Aristotle, medievals overestimated the capacity of the human mind to name and apprehend the essences of its objects.

103. As an explanation of medieval theory of naming, Hobbes’ view that they “softened” (mollire) their statements is absurd. As an explanation of the medieval description of God as that entity, wholly and eternally what it is, in which no distinction between existence and essence appears, it is a pretentious distortion. Hobbes has failed to grasp what was at stake in the medieval discussion of these terms. On the origin of the description of God in terms of essence (essentialia) and being (esse) in Aquinas’ thought, see Etienne Gilson, “Maimonide et la Philosophie de l’Exode,” Mediaeval Studies 13 (1951): 223–25.

104. De Oratore 2:102.
105. The reference is to De Christo, bk 2, chap. 4.
106. Hobbes’ point is that the Greek word for face or mask, prosopon, cannot bear the meaning “substance.”
107. prosopolepsia, as in Romans 2:11, is a Hebraism in Greek from the intertestamentary period.
109. 1 John 5:7.
110. I find no extant work of Epiphanius that goes under this name.
111. The text is that of St. Augustine, De Trinitate, bk 7, chap. 4, with some minor changes.
112. The negative in this sentence has dropped out and must be reintroduced to reflect the sense of the sentence in Augustine and Peter Lombard.
113. On the sola scriptura principle, see below, n. 117.
114. Hobbes is evidently referring to his early espousal of a species theory of perception, that is, the belief that sight was caused in the eye by the casting off of very slight material particles from the things seen hitting the eye.
115. Hobbes may be thinking of acids here.
116. Article 1 of the Thirty-nine Articles concerns the being of God and reads, “There is but one living and true God, everlasting, without body (incorporeus), parts (impartilibis), passions. " It is one of the original articles of 1553, and its language is quite close to that of the Lutheran reformers in the Confession of Augsburg. Hobbes is evidently referring to the edition of the Articles put out by Convocation early in 1563 (he has MDLXII, in conformity to the old calendar), though their number was reduced by one by Elizabeth, who struck out an article likely to give offense to Roman Catholics, whom she wished to retain in the English church. In the final revision of 1571, that article (no. 29) was restored, since all hope of reconciliation with Rome had ended and irreconcilable Catholics had left the Church of England in obedience to Pius V’s bull, Regnans in excelsis, excommunicating and deposing Elizabeth.
117. Article 20 concerns the church’s authority in doctrine and reads:

The Church hath power to decree Rites and Ceremonies, and Authority in controversies of
Faith: And yet it is not lawful for the Church to ordain any thing that is contrary to God's Word written, neither may it so expound one place of Scripture that it be repugnant to another. Wherefore, although the Church be a witness and a keeper of Holy Writ, yet, as it ought not to decree any thing against the same, so besides the same ought it not to enforce any thing to be believed for necessity of Salvation.

Except for the opening clause, from "The Church" to "Faith," the article derives from the Forty-two Articles of Archbishop Cranmer, signed by Edward VI in May, 1553. The opening clause first appears in the Latin edition of 1563 and was probably added by the authority of Elizabeth. The article, ratified by Convocation in 1571, if not earlier, distinguishes the church's power to legislate external elements of worship and ritual from its authority to adjudicate controversies touching the doctrine and belief of the Christian faith. In the latter area, the church is said to have no power to recognize or decree new doctrines but simply to declare what the truth of the faith is and always has been; it bears witness that a given teaching is in harmony or not with the message it has received and lives to proclaim. In so doing, it may arrive at formulas that give greater exactness to the content of its proclamation, but no novelty must be allowed to break the continuity of apostolic doctrine. Anglican teaching thus differs both from the Puritan view that all rituals not prescribed in the Bible are forbidden and from what has been a Roman Catholic view that the church is the locus of a continuing tradition of organic doctrinal development, apart from and as a supplement to the Scriptures; on the relation of Scripture and tradition, see Oberman, _The Harvest of Medieval Theology_, 361–422. Consistently with his indifferentism, Hobbes too finds worship to be an external, subject to legislation, and he denies that there is an unimpeachable course of continuing revelation in the church. In applying the _sola scriptura_ principle, possibly known through Chillingworth, his friend in the Falkland Circle, Hobbes wishes to show that there is little or nothing in the Nicene Creed that is not drawn from the Scriptures; see below, section 103. His arguments undercut the Catholic concept of _traditio_ and license the private interpretation of Scripture that Luther too at first enthusiastically urged; on this point, see section 173. Divergence of opinion in theology, a major cause of civil strife in Hobbes' day, presented no problem to Hobbes so long as the individual complied with the sovereign's legislation in matters of public worship and profession. Hobbes undercut all pretense to an independent basis of priestly power in the commonwealth by recognizing the power of the sovereign as public interpreter of Scripture and by allowing for sacerdotal functions in the Christian king himself, whose anointing, according to Hobbes, provides an adequate basis for performing such duties. See below, sections 206–7 and nn.

118. I refer the reader to Professor Tricaud’s learned explanation of Hobbes’ reference to Edward’s liturgy; see Tricaud, _Léviathan Traité de la matière, de la forme et du pouvoir de la république ecclésiastique et civile_ (Paris: Éditions Sirey, 1971), 750, n. 70.

119. Cyril’s _Thesaurus_ 23 has a passage like this.

120. Cf. 1 John 5:7.

121. The peril Hobbes intends must be eternal damnation, as he understands it. There is also probably the suggestion that one’s salvation is a private concern, not properly subject to other persons’ intrusive scrutiny or preferences.

122. A noun from the verb _haireomai_, meaning to choose for oneself, to prefer. Hobbes’ point here is that a sect is a voluntary association of persons, constituted by their “heresy,” that is, the free act of choosing their own master.

123. The pallium was a rectangular piece of material worn draped, mainly by men, as an outer garment; it was considered a characteristically Greek form of dress.

124. The author of the _Acts of the Apostles_, verses 6:1, 9:29 and 11:20, knows of Hellenizing Jews who spoke Greek, whereas _Galatians_ 2:14 describes the Judaizers, that is, believers in Christ who required Jewish customs be retained by the new sect. Tricaud notes that Hobbes may have taken the discussion of “Grecism,” Hellenism and Judaism from Epiphanius’ response to Acacius and Paul, perhaps in Petavius’ translation of 1622, which renders “Hellenism” (_hellenismos_) as _Graecismus_. Epiphanius also speaks there of the Pharisees, Sadducees and Essenes, as had Hippolytus before him.
125. Galatians 5:19–21 states, “Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these: adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, sorcery, hatred, strife, jealousy, wrath, factions, seditions, heresies, envys, murders, drunkenness, revelings and the like”

126. Anathema, with an eta, means “that which is set up,” as a tripod or votive offering in a temple. With an epsilon, anathema in the Septuagint includes the meaning of being handed over to evil, as in Leviticus 27:28, and Deuteronomy 7:26, 13:17. It is applied to persons in Romans 9:3 and 1 Corinthians 12:3. Hobbes may also be referring to the Roman notion of devoto.

127. Hobbes may have in mind those angels who have fallen from heaven to be handed over to Tartarus (Jude 6 and 2 Peter 2:4) and await the last judgement, but the passage is quite obscure: “sed pro non Angelo sed pro spectro tantum, haberi potuit, et ut deceptor exercabili declaris, id est, in verbis Sanctae Scripturae, tradi Satanae.” This may refer to the fact that Satan was described as the king of liars. (In chapter 47 of the Latin Leviathan, Hobbes defines the word “faery” (lemur) by reference to the word “specter,” so the passage may be translated, “as no more than a faery.”)

128. Hobbes anticipates the nineteenth century in attempting to distinguish what is Greek in Christianity from Christianity itself.

129. “Catholic” here indicates the will of the majority that binds the whole; in the church conceived of as a voluntary association, confessing and worshipping “according to the whole” means acting in accordance with the majority will. Heresy is in Hobbes’ sense a minority’s opinion, without regard to whether it is right or wrong. The legality of such an opinion can be determined only following the erection of a sovereign competent to legislate and sanction illicit behavior. Its truth cannot be determined, so it is quite possible for men to be deceived.

130. That is, there are as many churches as there are groups having persons with “sovereign power in them. Such power in the church does not encompass coercive force, and, as Hobbes indicated above, section 123, the Nicene Fathers, in meeting voluntarily, required the sovereign power of Constantine to enforce their decisions. The church as such lacks coercive force and is restricted in its remedies for unsanctioned beliefs and practices; see below, section 145.

131. In this section of the Appendix, Hobbes develops the principle of the national church.

132. The organological metaphor of the ruler as head of the body politic, which is quite old, is rendered visually in the famous picture on the title page of the 1651 Leviathan, which is for that reason called the “head” edition. The figure’s facial features have variously been identified as those of Charles I, Cromwell or Hobbes’ patron; cf. Arnold A. Rogow, Thomas Hobbes: Radical in the Service of Reform (New York and London: W. W. Norton and Company, 1986), 158ff.

133. This is the position Henry VIII enunciated in the Peter Pence and Dispensation Act (25 Henry VIII, c.21):

This your Grace’s Realm, recognising no superior under God, but only your Grace, has been and is free from subjection to any man’s laws, but only to such as have been devised, made and obtained within this realm for the wealth of the same, or to such other as by sufferance of your Grace and his Progenitors, the People of this your Realm have taken at their free liberty, by their own consent to be used among them, and have bound themselves by long use and custom to the observance of the same, not as to the observance of laws of any foreign prince potentate or prelate, but as to the customed and ancient laws of this Realm.

Whether the pope exercised jurisdiction in England was a point argued by Maitland and Stubbs, though it seems clear that royal interests were asserted over papal as early as the reign of Edward I (1272–1307). Note what J. Robert Wright says in his careful study The Church and the English Crown 1305–1334: A Study Based on the Register of Archbishop Walter Reynauld (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1980), 153:

[Perhaps in the later years of Edward I and at least certainly by the beginning of the reign of Edward II, the Crown had apparently begun to expand its jurisdiction . . . and to assert the competence of its own courts over those of the church whether within the realm or at Rome. No longer is it simply a matter of prohibition because justice is available within the realm, but now because cognition of the matter in question pertains to the royal courts. The privilege of England, however, did not support this assertion as well as arguments could that were
based upon the royal prerogative and ancient custom, and a more vigorous policy seems to have been gradually formulated. At a time that can not yet be precisely dated, then, the basis of royal prohibition to Rome was changed. Appeals to Rome were no longer said, as in 1233, to be merely “contra formam privilegi nostri” [against the form of our privilege], but now rather, as in 1307, to be “in enervationem juris nostri regii et exheredationem nostram et enormem laesium dignitatis et coronae nostrae” [to the destruction of our royal right and our inheritance and an great injury to our dignity and crown].

I owe this reference to the kindness of Professor Stephan Kuttner.

134. Hobbes may have in mind the language of Henry VIII’s claim to be “head” of the Church of England (26 Henry VIII. c. 1) of 1534:

Albeit the King’s majesty justly and rightfully is and ought to be the supreme head of the church of England, and is so recognized by the clergy of this realm in their convocations, yet nevertheless for corroboration and confirmation thereof, and for increase of virtue in Christ’s religion within this realm of England, and to repress and extirp all errors, heresies, and other enormities and abuses heretofore used in the same: be it enacted by authority of this present parliament, That the King our sovereign lord, his heirs and successors, Kings of this realm, shall be taken accepted and reputed the only supreme head in earth of the church of England, called Anglicana Ecclesia; and shall have and enjoy, annexed and united to the imperial crown of this realm, as well the title and style thereof as all honours, dignities, pre-eminences, jurisdictions, privileges, authorities, immunities, profits and commodities to the said dignity of supreme head of the same church belonging and appertaining; and that said sovereign lord, his heirs and successors, Kings of this realm, shall have full power and authority from time to time, to visit, repress, redress, reform, order, correct, restrain and amend all such errors, heresies, abuses, offences, contempts and enormities, whatsoever they be, which by any manner spiritual authority or jurisdiction ought or may lawfully be reformed, repressed, ordered, redressed, corrected, restrained or amended, most to the pleasure of Almighty God, the increase of virtue in Christ’s religion, and for the conservation of the peace, unity and tranquility of this realm; any usage, custom, foreign laws, foreign authority, prescription, or any other thing or things to contrary hereof notwithstanding.

Henry’s daughter Elizabeth later contented herself with the title “governor.” The phrase in this act regarding the imperial crown of Henry’s realm, which is found in several contemporary acts, as in the Act of Restraint of Appeals (24 Henry VIII, c.12), recalls his surprising claim that his crown descended from that of the emperor Constantine; see Richard Koebner, “Constantine the Great and Polydore Vergil,” Bulletin of the Institution of Historical Research 26 (1953): 29–52. The claim took on significance when, in the context of the royal divorce and with news of Valla’s discrediting of the Donation of Constantine received in England by way of Ulrich von Hutten, the imperial status could be used to compass the headship of both church and state. There are elements of this theory throughout the Appendix, especially in its emphasis on Constantine and other Christian emperors in the life and reform of the church, in the juridical position of the church and in regard to the purity of its doctrine. Hobbes drops the historical justification, which was always weak, not to say fanciful, and sustains the claim on the basis of natural right and scripture.

135. Thus, while all Christians are members of the invisible, universal church, they are organized on earth in visible, national churches.

136. The union of church and state under the sovereignty of the royal person was the goal of Henry VIII, building on historical precedents in England and elsewhere. It is not new in Hobbes. Cf. Henry Parker’s argument in The Question concerning the Divine Right of Episcopacie (1641), esp. 3–4.

137. The upshot of this analysis is to deny the primacy of the pope, for example, over the English sovereign’s Christian subjects.

Interpretation

139. Both the 1668 text and Molesworth’s edition bear the word “homousios,” not the correct form “homoousios.” This may stem from a peculiarity of Dutch orthography or of Blaeu’s Greek type, for it is surely wrong to think that Hobbes would hope to pass over in silence the distinction between homoousios (“of the same substance”) and homoiousios (“of like substance”).

140. One should probably hear a double entendre here, with a reference to both Alexanders, the Macedonian general and the bishop.

141. That the Fathers at Nicaea went no farther in writing the third article of creed is attested in Eusebius’ “circular letter”; see section 179.

142. The heresy of the Pneumachii (“Adversaries of the Holy Spirit”) is commonly associated with the name of Macedonius, the Bishop of Constantinople appointed by Arians prior to 360, when he was deposed by that group for doctrinal differences. It had been part of the Arian creed that both the Son and the Holy Spirit were subordinated to the Father. With the Nicene Fathers’ condemnation of the Arian position on the Son, the second part of the program, dealing with the Holy Spirit, was left to fall with the first. It did not and had to be dealt with by a number of succeeding councils, most fully by the council of Constantinople, which completed this part of the work on the Trinity begun at Nicaea.

143. The heresy of Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople, was a reaction to the confusion of the two natures in Christ by the Apollinarians. Nestorius insisted so strongly on Christ’s human nature as to tend to a separation of the two natures in derogation of the orthodox doctrine of the “hypostatic union,” the view that Christ was one divine person in whom two natures were most closely and intimately united, but without being mixed or confounded together. The council meeting at Ephesus condemned the heresy, and Nestorius suffered banishment to Egypt. The status of Mary figured in the debate on the heresy in that Nestorius denied that she was theotokos, that is, mother of God, but merely Christotokos, that is, mother of Christ, thereby preferring to describe the union of the divine and human natures in Christ as moral only. Hobbes’ discussion of the Latin term Deipara, sections 57–58, shows a familiarity with this aspect of the problem.

144. Eutyches and his followers were the early Monophysites, teaching that there resulted only one nature from the unity of the two natures in Christ. The error was that the human nature seemed to be absorbed in the divine. Eutyches’ opinion was condemned at a synod at Constantinople, but he appealed to Emperor Theodosius, who called a general council at Ephesus upon the advocacy of Dioscorus of Alexandria in Eutyches’ behalf. The council’s procedures were evidently unfair, and its result was unsatisfactory, so that, after further machinations, Marcian summoned another council to meet at Chalcedon. Eutyches, who had been banished by the emperor, was condemned; Dioscorus was condemned, deposed and banished.

145. Phocas’ action is mentioned by John Cluver, in his Historiarum totius mundi epitome, which Aubrey mentions Hobbes read between his return to London in 1651 and the Restoration of 1660. The corruption of the church under Boniface III in dealings with the emperor was a common feature of Protestant historiography.

146. Hobbes has leapt from early medieval times in the Mediterranean to the reigns of Henry and Mary Tudor in England by way of the Reformation in Germany.

147. That is, arguments among learned disputants which may lead to controversy and violence.

148. Hobbes’ Latin is somewhat obscure at this point. Clearly he refers to the Elizabethan religious settlement because of the success of its guiding policies, outward conformity to the religion established by law and sustained by the authority of the Queen. Rather than open windows into men’s souls, Elizabeth promoted agreement as to externals as a basis of unity, so that religion might further, or at least not impede, the course of her government. The wisdom and expediency of this approach recommended themselves to Hobbes, particularly in view of the failure of the early Stuarts’ programs of church discipline and reform. The relevance of these views to the situation under Charles II should not be missed.

149. 1 Elizabeth c. 7. Hobbes seems to have confused some of the effects and procedures of the act and the letters patent.

150. That is, in 1641, in the context of Charles’ struggles with the Scots and the Long Parliament.
151. Legislation of July 5, 1641, (17 Carolus I, c. 11), repealed the eighth section of the Act of Supremacy, abolished the High Commission, the court of heresy, and forbade the erection of a similar court in the future; see n. 152. Despite this action of Parliament, it was not difficult for Charles II to empower a similar commission following the Restoration.

152. Hobbes has recounted the history whereby Elizabeth, in her Act of Supremacy of 1559, restored to the crown the ancient jurisdiction it asserted over the administration of the church and abolished all foreign power contrary to that jurisdiction. The Act similarly inculpated as heretical only those doctrines declared so by the Scriptures, by one of the general councils, relying on the Scriptures, or by the High Court of the English Parliament, with the assent of the convocation of the clergy. The Act also authorized the Queen and her successors to set up inspectors in matters of the church, church discipline and dogma. Later in the first year of her reign, Elizabeth named six to carry out these functions under letters patent. This group formed the nucleus of the High Commission, so called beginning in 1570, or Court of High Commission, as it was known from around 1576 on. It functioned as a kind of ecclesiastical court of administration and heresy and satisfied few, and it was abolished early on during Charles' troubles with Parliament. Star Chamber got its undeserved, bad reputation from having taken over some of the court's procedures and responsibilities. Roland G. Usher's pioneering book, *The Rise and Fall of the High Commission* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1913), remains fundamental in this area, with the corrections and changed emphases contained in a new introduction by Philip Tyler in the 1968 edition. See also Ronald A. Marchant, *The Puritans and the Church Courts in the Diocese of York 1560–1642* (Aberdeen: Longmans, 1960), for the operations of these commissions in that diocese.

153. Hobbes may have the rationale of Justinian’s *Novella* 77 in mind here; see sections 171ff.

154. Note Hobbes’ very early statement of a utilitarian understanding of punishment, as well as his recognition of limits upon the powers of the sovereign consistent with the aims to be pursued through the criminal law. In describing undivided sovereignty, Hobbes did not intend to grant the sovereign wholly arbitrary powers of life and death over his subjects, as is clear from his views here and on self-defense and military service.

155. In saying “manner” (*modus*), Hobbes may intend both the form and measure of punishment, though this is not clear.


157. Cornelio Fabro refers to this exchange as the first explicit discussion of virtual atheism in the history of ideas.

158. The point seems to be that judges left without explicit instructions as to heretical words can err in reasoning and can wrong an innocent person, whereas, if they had explicit instructions, there would be no possibility of error.

159. Hobbes’ reply, that religion is at the basis of civil obligation, puts him in line with Francis Bacon and the Middle Ages against Pierre Bayle, John Locke and other proponents of the principle of toleration. Still, Hobbes’ attempt to articulate an objective concept of atheism, based not on imputed beliefs or as a result of inferences drawn from observation of given actions, but only direct statements, and his moderation regarding punishment, may be cited as evidence of a liberal temper, derived perhaps from a respect for the evidentiary procedures of English common law and from his own experience. Cf. *Leviathan*, 201.

160. Hobbes, who stresses that our knowledge of God is negative, is wary of explaining God’s purposes to men. For one, he believes that statements about God, except that He exists, are not proper propositions, given that our finite imaginations can contain no concept of the infinite; they
are merely evidences of a desire to praise God. Also, he thinks it presumptuous to assert some need or purpose in God to be fulfilled through action in the world. He says in the critique of Thomas White’s *De Mundo*, on the question whether God established the world out of His goodness:

Here it is asked: “To what end has God established the world?” Now whatever men do, they do with the desire of securing something pleasant; and the “end” they always take to be that which, through the imagination that it generates, moves or urges them to secure it. Yet as soon as they have obtained what they sought, then what was once their goal is no longer so, but they press forward to other things, because in his lifetime no one is without the wish to acquire things. No desire exists except that of reaching a goal, or self-benefit, which people think they can gain through their own efforts. But if anyone ascribed such a purpose to God when He established the universe, clearly such a person has claimed that He has not been the Most Blessed from all time, and that He has appetite and need. If such a person wishes to interpret “purpose in God” differently from “purpose in animals,” *i.e.*, as something analogous and above human understanding, then the present disputation does not pertain to philosophy, or to any natural theology; it has to do with religion, in which case the argument should have been conducted not according to man’s reasons but according to Holy Scripture and the decrees of the Church.


161. Very few of the Arians refused to subscribe and were exiled, only Arius, Secundus of Ptolemais, Theonas of Marmarica and some priests.

162. Athanasius was banished against a background of moves against him made after the council by Arians in Alexandria. To discredit him, they had encouraged dissension there and had made complaints about him to the emperor, lodging even a charge of murder against him.

163. Hobbes’ teaching reflects what has been called Erastianism, the doctrine of the subjection of the church to the power of the state, named after Erastus (Thomas Lueber, Lieber or Liebler, 1524–83), an amateur Swiss theologian. M. I. Fell, *sub voce* “Erastianism,” *New Catholic Encyclopedia* 5 (1967), 511–12, states: “Erastus’ real purpose seems to have been to deny to the Church any right to coerce authority apart from the State. He was opposed to any political role for the Church whether that in a theocracy or that of the Church as an independent society within the State.”

. . . [H]e labored to prevent the Evangelical Church from embracing the Genevan doctrine that the Church is a perfect society in and by itself”; 512. Hobbes’ advocacy of the view places him with several others, for example, Henry Parker, Selden, Prynine, and earlier Christopher St.-Germaine, in describing the role and legitimacy of the national church in England.

164. I have tried to bring out what seems to be anacoluthon.

165. See Constantine’s law of 326, in Justinian’s *Code*, bk 1, title 5, *De haereticis et Manicheis et Samaritatis*.

166. Hobbes perpetuates the unsupported attack on the behavior of the Manichaens. Converted to Christianity, Augustine, in arguing vigorously against his former co-religionists, does not complain of their behavior.


168. The legal science of the Bolognese Glossators was based on the theory that the German emperor, by right of the *translatio imperii*, rightfully stood in the place of the Roman emperor, an argument at the root of Dante’s *De Monarchia*. The constitutions of Frederick I and II were thus regularly included in medieval editions of the *Code*. The constitution to which Hobbes refers, *De cumberendo haeretice*, is not often included in medieval editions of the *Code*, probably because it was chiefly the work of Pope Lucius III, who in 1184 issued it as the decretal *Ad abolendam*, confirming the agreement reached in 1177 between the emperor and Pope Alexander III, Lucius’ predecessor, in the Treaty of Venice; see n. 169. Lucius’ decretal stresses the offensive contumacy (*contumacia*) of the heretic and specifies a number of heretical sects and outlines procedures for dealing with both heretical clergy and laity. (On contumacy, cf. section 167.) It differs from earlier
treatment of heresy largely in its clarity and in its forceful requirement that lay authorities cooperate fully with churchly authorities. But in regard to penalties. Ad abolendam leaves the problem of criminal action to lay judges who are to act within locally prescribed legal forms. Thus, while whether it looks forward to the penalty of death by burning may be disputed, it clearly consigns the heretic to the secular arm for such punishment as is merited. See Edward Peters, Inquisition (New York: Free Press, 1988), 47ff.

169. Contrary to his Latin, Hobbes must want to say that Alexander trampled not only the empire but also the emperor under foot, as he perhaps had in Venice as Barbarossa sued for papal forgiveness following his defeat at Legnano. Federico Zuccaro depicts such a scene, though the story is disputed. Rolando Bandinelli, the great Sienese theologian and canonist, as pope vindicated his vision of the relations of church and state against a number of princes, including England’s Henry II in the wake of the Constitutions of Clarendon and the Becket affair.

170. Hobbes is referring to Henry’s statute, 2 Henry IV, c. 15. This section recalls Henry Tudor’s position that the pope had exercised no jurisdiction in England except as the king and people had freely accepted and taken it upon themselves; see n. 133.

171. Hobbes may mean in comparison to those appearing during the reign of Elizabeth’s predecessor.

172. 1 Elizabeth, c. 20.

173. Eusebius of Caesarea (c. 263–339) seems to have written his “circular letter” only to his own diocese, to do his subscription to a creed he might have been expected to oppose; Athanasius reports its text in his discussion of the Nicene Council, De decretis Nicenae Synodi, as do Socrates the historian and Theodoret. Eusebius, the first great historian of ecclesiastical antiquities after Luke, had gone to Nicaea under the ban of excommunication of the recent Council of Antioch due to his espousal of Arius views. His appearance before the Nicene Fathers was likely an attempt on his part and Constantine’s to rehabilitate him to gain the advantage of his considerable prestige for use against the Arians. See J. N. D. Kelly’s illuminating discussion of the letter in Early Christian Creeds, 220–26. See below, sections 179ff. A translation of the circular letter is contained in A New Eusebius, ed. J. Stevenson (London: SPCK, 1968), 364–68.

174. Quite apart from the uneducated, the ignorance of Elizabeth’s clergy was legendary and perhaps known to Hobbes through personal experience: his father had served as a local vicar prior to deserting his family for parts “beyond London.” Cartwright charged Archbishop Whitgift with the fact that “there be admitted into the ministry those of the basest sort, . . . such as are suddenly changed out of a serving-man’s coat into a minister’s cloak, making for the most part the ministry their last refuge;” quoted in J. R. Tanner, Tudor Constitutional Documents, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930; reprinted 1940), 151. This laxness was also dangerous after the arrival in 1580 of learned priests from English colleges established in Douai, then at Rheims and Rome.

175. In fact, Edward Coke discusses heresy in the third book of his Institutes; it is in bk four, c. 74, p. 323, that the discussion Hobbes cites takes place. And in it, Coke complains less of the commissioners’ tardiness than of their presumption and lawlessness. He notes twice that it was Lord Chancellor Ellesmere who had forced publication of the letters patent, so it seems clear that the reference is to the clash of jurisdictions that arose in James’ reign over the common law courts’ practice of frustrating the operation of the ecclesiastical courts; see below, section 167 and n. The debates on ecclesiastical jurisdiction and practice which had occurred between the years 1607 and 1611 culminated in a conference before the Privy Council on May 23, 1611, with Coke, the Chief Justice, the main protagonist against Richard Bancroft, the Archbishop of Canterbury, with Lord Chancellor Ellesmere playing a mediating role. Ultimately, the King issued new letters patent which ended the conflict while leaving the commission’s powers largely intact. Knafla proposes the work of Ellesmere as instrumental in arranging this measure of peace, based on greater acceptance of ecclesiastical authorities by common lawyers and of prohibitions by the civilians. See Louis A. Knafla, Law and Politics in Jacobean England: The Tracts of Lord Chancellor Ellesmere (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 123–54, esp. 139–41. The royal letters to which Hobbes refers were the letters patent which set up the ecclesiastical commission envisioned in the Act of Supremacy; see sections 207ff. Hobbes’ point in this section is that, although the Thirty-nine
Articles of 1563, amended in 1571, stated the Anglican doctrinal position, this statement had no legislative authority as such, so that it did not clarify the juridical/legal situation of heresy.

176. Hobbes' implication is that the church lacked power legally to punish heresy without the power of the sovereign. The point was disputed at various times but seems a clear result of Henry VIII's reforms.

177. Hobbes' Latin is obscure here, though the sense seems clear.

178. See above, section 133 and n.

179. Typically, heretics would be cited into the bishop's court, tried and then handed to civil authorities for punishment. On the procedure of the ecclesiastical courts, see Ronald Marchant, The Puritans and the Church Courts in the Diocese of York 1560–1642, 1–7. In James I's reign, the burning of two heretics, Bartholomew Legate and Edward Wightman, for Arianism is recorded; see 2 Howell's State Trials, col. 727ff. Thomas Fuller mentions that Legate, a native of Essex, was of "person comely, complexion black, age about forty years; of a bold spirit, confident carriage, fluent tongue, excellently skilled in Scriptures; and well had it been for him if he had known them less or understood them better"; from The Church History of Britain, quoted in Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner, Penalties upon Opinion: Some Records of the Law of Heresy and Blasphemy (London: Watts and Company, 1912), 12ff. James had Legate brought before him to trick him into confessing that he prayed to Christ, but Legate, though he admitted having done so once in ignorance, said he had not for the past seven years. "Hereupon the King, in choler, spurned at him with his foot: 'Away, base Fellow,' saith he, 'it shall never be said that one stayeth in my presence that hath never prayed to our Saviour for seven years together'"; ibid. Legate served time as a prisoner at Newgate but was finally declared an "obdurate, contumacious and incorrigible heretic" by a large assembly of clerics. James gave order that a writ de haeretico comburendo be directed to the sheriff of London, and Legate was burned March 18, 1611. The writ de haeretico comburendo was later abolished by Charles II (29 Carolus II, c. 9). If Hobbes were arraigned on the thirteen charges brought against Legate, this Appendix furnishes support for his orthodoxy on every point but one: "10. That Christ by his Godhead wrought no miracle."

180. Hobbes is referring to the hated "oath ex officio," by which an accused called before the commission swore to answer truly and fully all questions asked him without knowledge of either the charges against him or, in some cases, of his accuser, "least after perusal (afore his oath taken) he may be drawn by counsell to answere cautelously, indirectly, or wholly to refuse to make answere; perhaps because he sees they touche him over neere, as conjecturing by whom they may be prooved"; from Richard Cosin, An Apologie: of and for sundrie proceedings by jurisdiction ecclesiastical (London, 1591), part II, p. 50, cited by Mary Hume Maguire, "The Attack of the Common Lawyers upon Oath ex Officio as Administered in the Ecclesiastical Courts in England," Essays in History and Political Theory in Honor of Charles Howard McIlwain (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), 199–229, 215. Fear of the Lollards in England had allowed the bishops to force the enactment of 2 Henry IV, c. 15, the writ de haeretico comburendo, in 1401, which gave them power to imprison heretics and set secular machinery in motion to stamp out those propagating the heresy. This law also authorized the ex officio oath. During Henry VIII's reign, Christopher St. Germaine and Thomas More had expressed sharply divided views as to its legality under common law. Parliament repealed Henry IV's law (25 Henry VIII, c.14), but it was restored under Mary (1 and 2 Philip and Mary, c.6). Elizabeth in turn restored her father's repeal of the medieval law (1 Elizabeth, c. 15). But Elizabeth's policy of enforcing outward conformity to the established church's confession and practices made the High Commission and its procedures an effective instrument of state policy; the ex officio oath was specially authorized in the letters patent of 1583. Late in Elizabeth's reign, the issue of the legal position of the commission rose to prominence in the context of the clash of ecclesiastical and common law jurisdictions. James' reign saw Chief Justice Coke, Lord Chancellor Ellesmere and Archbishop Bancroft dispute the common law courts' practice of issuing writs of prohibition against ecclesiastical courts, with the effect of stopping their proceedings, precluding execution of their judgements and releasing those committed by them on writs of habeas corpus; see above, n. 175. On the goal of civil punishment for ecclesiastical offenses. see below, n. 188.

181. 17 Carolus I, c. 11.
182. Perhaps an allusion to Paul’s statement in Romans 8:27: “And he that searches the hearts knows what is the mind of the Spirit because he makes intercession for the saints according to the will of God.”


184. That the early church’s approach to heresy was more pastoral and social and less legal and forensic than in later eras is generally conceded.

185. Hobbes’ Latin is difficult here.


187. This name was given in the fourth century to those who said God was a body with human form. See below, section 179.

188. Hobbes makes the case then that, while belief cannot be coerced by law, it is nonetheless in the power of the church, with the support of the coercive power of the state, to proscribe forms of behavior which may have a deleterious effect or influence on others in Christian kingdoms. He would banish or inhibit those who advocate illicit religious belief or practice in order to prohibit them from propagating unbelief and contumacy throughout society; see section 141. He thus articulates the traditional view that conversions to unbelief should be prevented and that the moral tone of society, its expectations of what is right and normal, should be protected by prohibiting public expressions of unbelief. See, for example, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 11, art. 3.

189. Hobbes may be using the word paradoxical here in the sense used by Aristotle in the Rhetoric, 1412a26, that is, as diverging from pre-existing opinions (para-doxa).

190. Hobbes is referring here first to events of Tudor England, whereby Henry VIII and his daughter Elizabeth withdrew the church in England from the Roman Catholic Church and established a national church organization and confession under royal direction. The second set of events may be traced to the protracted struggles of the early Stuarts to consolidate and extend royal authority in and through the church and to counter the rise of rival Protestant beliefs and polities, especially that of Presbyterianism, with its disdain for church government by bishops and for ornate ritual, which they felt was insufficiently purged of corruption and Roman influence.

191. This refers to the First Bishops’ War, a series of brief engagements occurring early in 1639 between the forces of the king and Scottish troops united in their support of the Scottish Covenant, an oath sworn in 1638. The war arose as a result of Charles’ attempt to impose a prayer book conceived in England upon the Scottish church, the Kirk, through his Scottish bishops, a move that had proven both futile and dangerous. Riots had occurred in Edinburgh in 1637 whenever the bishops read from it, and calls for the abolition of episcopacy, that is, of church administration by bishops, had led to the Covenanters’ demand that the Scottish Assembly itself act as decisive authority in church affairs. Unable to rouse his nobles or pay his soldiers, Charles was forced to yield the Scottish demands in the war; he signed the Treaty of Berwick in July of 1639. For their part, the Scots pledged to disband their troops, desist from holding seditious meetings and return control of Charles’ Scottish castles to royal officers. Charles engaged to send back his soldiers and to issue a declaration assuring his Scottish subjects that all matters pertaining to the Kirk should be determined by the Assembly and all civil matters by parliaments and other lawful bodies. Charles knew his signature on the treaty meant the erection of a Presbyterian church polity, one ruled by presbyters or elders, in Scotland, rather than by bishops, though he doubtless also hoped for the eventual restoration of episcopacy, the system which he and Laud were strengthening in England. Then, to raise money to re-establish royal authority in Scotland, Charles called Parliament into session in April, 1640, but dissolved it when Parliamentarians wanted concessions in return for increased revenues. This session is known as the “Short Parliament.”

192. This was the Second Bishops’ War of 1640, fought in the northern counties of England between covenanting Scots, impatient of fruitless negotiations with Charles, and forces loyal to the king under the command of Wentworth, the Earl of Strafford. On the morning of August 20, the Scottish army, some 25,000 strong, crossed the Tweed River at Coldstream and hastened to pass
the Tyne at Newcastle. There, the king’s army under Conway fell back in a rout, and the city was left to the Scots. For several days, Charles, encamped at York, sought the advice and support of his lords, and, after a series of riots in London, on September 24, followed the course they had urged by issuing writs for the holding of a parliament to meet on November 3 of that year. Unable to expel the Scottish army without money and unable to raise money without Parliament, Charles was nevertheless prepared to maintain his conception of sovereignty against the men who were to assemble for the “Long Parliament,” Pym, Hampton, Strode, St. John, Holles, Erle and Fiennes. In the Appendix, Hobbes describes a role for the English Presbyterians in urging on the Scots, but this allegation, made also in Behemoth, does not seem to be supported by the evidence.

193. Charles’ Archbishop of Canterbury throughout this period was William Laud. A strong-willed man, Laud hoped with Charles that, once the forces of the anti-episcopal faction within Calvinism had been put down in England, the Anglican Church might at last both realize the ideals of the Reformation and stand clothed in the authority of a pious king, the enlightened guide to his people on matters spiritual as well as temporal. It was Laud who sought to strengthen the episcopal system so hateful to Scottish Presbyterians, and it was he who insisted on the high ritual that was so distasteful to English Presbyterians. Fourteen articles of impeachment for high treason were brought against Laud in 1640 by the Commons, but he was executed in 1645, Hobbes says, “for the entertainment of the Scots.” See sections 133, 157 and 167, and nn. On Laudian divine’s claim to office by divine right, see J. P. Sommerville, “‘The Royal Supremacy and Episcopacy ‘Jure Divino,’ 1603–1640,’” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 34 (1983): 548–58. Hobbes undercut the authority of the bishops by retaining a teaching office in the sovereign and by ascribing to him sacramental powers; see below, section 206 and n.

194. In this statement, Hobbes has addressed a number of issues which scholars have been seeking to sort out in understanding the drift to war following the Scottish troubles. Clearly, he has included the “Puritans” among the “Presbyterians,” so that, at least as regards the situation of 1642, Hobbes’ account agrees with current opinion that the clear division was religious and cultural. As Conrad Russell has said, “It is almost universally true that Puritans fought for the Parliament, and high churchmen and Catholics for the king”; quoted from The Crisis of Parliaments: English History 1509–1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 343. On the question of Arminianism, see Conrad Russell, Parliaments and English Politics 1621–1629 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 26–32, 428ff.

195. This is an allusion to the abolition of the High Commission by the Long Parliament.

196. Hobbes was among the first that left England at the advent of the Long Parliament in 1640 for fear of reprisals exacted for his defense of the king in Elements of Law. Also, he had seen Bishop Manwaring taken to the Tower for espousing views like this.

197. An act of September 20, 1649, “Against Unlicensed and Scandalous Books and Pamphlets, and for better regulating of Printing,” lapsed on September 29, 1651, so that, while the law authorizing censorship was not repealed, its enforcement was rendered difficult. But Leviathan was entered at Stationers’ Hall in January of that year and was in the press during the winter and early spring. The dedication is dated April, 1651, and it must have appeared toward the end of that month, since it is mentioned in a letter from Robert Payne dated May 6. See B.D. Greenslade, “The Publication Date of Hobbes’s Leviathan,” Notes and Queries n. s. 22 (1975): 310. Clearly, the window of opportunity to which Hobbes refers is not the lapse in the 1649 act but the much earlier removal of the bishops’ power through abolition of the High Commission.

198. Hobbes seems to have translated these quotations into Latin directly from the English Leviathan of 1651, without reference to the corresponding places in the Latin text of 1668, from which they depart substantially in form though not in meaning. I have followed the English text of 1651 in reproducing the quotations here.

199. Leviathan, 92. The cynicism that is evident as to these practices of the medieval church was shared by all the Reformers. On the question of miracles, see Robert M. Burns, The Great Debate on Miracles: From Joseph Glanvill to David Hume (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1981).

200. Hobbes allows for the existence of invisible beings, like God, composed of diaphanous, but material, substance. As aspects of his political program, materialism and moralism serve to
counter the superstitious fear of ghosts that made the people a prey of pope, priest and presbyter; see Leviathan, 664. But the point is a difficult one. The key seems to be rejection of the possibility of possession by immaterial spirits and unknown agencies, as if, assured as to the actual, physical reality of spirits, individual and material like themselves, and thus incapable of occupying their bodies or minds, the people would cease to fear them or seek the remedy of their fears from seditious priests. Still, the mirror he holds up to politics must be for princes’ political and religious edification because he is thoroughly realistic in his appraisal of the people’s appetite for abstract thought, such as comprehension of his system and of its bases and elaboration would require. On this and related points, see David Johnston. The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), but also the review of Dennis T. Brennan in The Review of Politics 49 (1987): 448–53. See also D. P. Walker, Unclean Spirits: Possession and Exorcism in the Late Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981).

201. In his essay De carne Christi, written in 208, Tertullian wrote against Marcion, who believed that Christ was not actually born of the flesh but was a phantasm of human form. In defending the orthodox belief in a genuine incarnation, Tertullian expressed the famous paradox, certum est, quia impossibile: it is certain because it is impossible. On Tertullian, see G. C. Stead’s article, “Divine Substance in Tertullian,” Journal of Theological Studies 14 (n.s., 1963): 46–66.

202. Hobbes has conflated a statement from Tertullian’s De Carne Christi, XI, “All that is body after its own kind; nothing is incorporeal except that which does not exist”; with one from Adversus Praxeam, VII: “Who will deny that God is body even though He is spirit? For spirit is body after its own kind and in its own form.” In his Considerations upon the Reputation of T. Hobbes, Hobbes discusses the materialist conception of God: “that doctrine served [Tertullian’s] turn to confute the heresy of them that held that Christ had no body, but was a ghost; also of the soul, he speaks as of an invisible body. And there is an epitome of the doctrine of the Eastern Church, wherein is this, that they thought angels and souls were corporeal, and only called incorporeal, because their bodies were not like ours. And I have heard that a Patriarch of Constantinople, in a council held there, did argue for the lawfulness of painting angels, from this, that they were corporeal. You see what fellows in atheism you join with Mr. Hobbes.” See the Molesworth edition, 4:429. Hobbes may be referring to a garbled account of Nicephorus (c.758–828), the patriarch of Constantinople who was deposed as a result of the Iconoclastic Controversy. In his Antirrheticus, ii. 7, Nicephorus says angels may be painted, not because they are corporeal, but because, in having a beginning and a comprehensible nature, they may be circumscribed; see Paul J. Alexander, The Patriarch Nicephorus of Constantinople: Ecclesiastical Policy and Image Worship in the Byzantine Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 206ff.


204. The commentary on the passage from Paul is found in the third book of a work entitled De Trinitate, whose author may have been Athanasius, as Hobbes says, or possibly Virgil of Thapsus; see Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 62, col. 253. The word dealiter is otherwise unknown in Latin.


206. Hobbes has earlier discussed the circular letter of Eusebius of Caesarea, in section 155, and it has led him to make this assertion. The emperor is represented here as having taken the initiative in proposing the word to the council, following Eusebius’ appearance before the council, with the explanation that ‘homousios was not used in the sense of bodily affections, for the Son did not derive His existence from the Father by means of division or severance, since an immaterial, intellectual and incorporeal nature could not be subject to any bodily affection. These things must be understood as bearing a divine and ineffable signification”; quoted in J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, 214. In fact, the term’s very ambiguity may have suggested it, for it was the rallying point of no party and wide enough to allow as many different schools of thought as possible to embrace it. (In what follows, “co-essential” and “consubstantial” are used interchangeably.)

207. Hobbes is accurate as to the objection of not only Arians but many others at Nicaea against the use of terms not found in the Bible. The orthodox countered that, while they would
have preferred terms more Scriptural than "consubstantial" and "from the substance of the Father," none of the Scriptural titles or images had been proof against Arian twisting. Athanasius was later to argue that, if the term "consubstantial" was not in the Scriptures, the meaning it stood for was; see *De decretis Nicaeae synodi*, cited in J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, 239, n. 1. The Fathers' use of the term was intended to clinch their anti-Arian position that Christ was fully God, not a created, if being, to be distinguished from the Godhead by divinity, truth, origin or substance. While Hobbes' objection is valid to a point, he may obscure the real issue underlying the dispute over usage, namely, the Arian devaluation of Christ. No one, either Arian or orthodox, advanced the thesis of the corporeality of God at the council, and obviating the term co-essential as an inappropriate use of Greek terminology would not advance that view. The linchpin for that argument is Tertullian.

208. That the Nicene Fathers considered this doctrine is not supported by the reports of their deliberations, nor is the word itself attested until after their meetings. One of its early proponents was Audaceus, founder of the Audians, a sect that formed in Syria around the time of the Nicene Council. Hobbes' view in the *Historical Narration Concerning Heresy* is more correct, namely, that the group arose during the time of Emperor Valens (364–78), some forty to fifty years after the Council of Nicaea; on this discrepancy, see the Introduction. The view of the Anthropomorphites differed from that of Tertullian, who, although he believed that God was body, did not assert that the image of God (*Phillipians* 2:6) entailed possession of the parts of the human body. To Tertullian, God was material but not figurate. Augustine, in discussing his conversion in the *Confessions*, mentions his early adherence to something like this view; and he does not condemn Tertullian and even exonerates him of heresy for holding the view (*De Haereticis*, 86). Hobbes seems to cite the heresy in order to distinguish it from his version of materialism and thereby vindicate his belief that materialism neither entails this heresy nor is inconsistent with the scriptural statements about God.

209. The Greek word *anousios* is an example of an alpha-privative, that is, a form, beginning with an alpha, which indicates the absence or privation of that which the word commonly denotes, just as "a-symmetrical" means "not symmetrical." *Ousia* means "substance" or "being" in Greek, so that *a-(n)-ousios* means "that which lacks being," and the ground of Hobbes' objection to the Damascene's statement is this, that it attributes nonbeing to God. The key debate going on within the pages of the Appendix centers on the relation of Greek thought and (Judaico-) Christian religion. Hobbes lamented the great price paid by the West for its knowledge of ancient political philosophy, namely, the blood shed in civil strife caused by the teaching on liberty which he believed the tradition imparted from authors like Aristotle and Cicero. In the Appendix, he concentrates on its prior effects on Western religion. For Hobbes' criticism of John Damascene, see below, n. 213.

210. This text is drawn from John Damascene's *De Fide Orthodoxa*, found in *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 94, col. 845.

211. Hobbes is referring to those chapters of John's summa, *The Fount of Knowledge*, known under this name.

212. In bk 1, chap. 11, John discusses men's gross flesh, which makes an understanding of God impossible except through the images, types and symbols that are appropriate to our own nature.

213. Hobbes reveals here a telling aspect of his thought, namely, the refusal to conceive of God or to speak of Him except as one being among other beings, one substance among other substances, since for him God is real and only individual entities are real. But John Damascene was one in a long train of theologians who have believed that the divine and the human frames, though distinct in essence, are nonetheless related in truth. God, the author of created entities, may indeed be described as the "wholly other," apart from and above all beings, or as the ground and power of being or, as Tillich says, being-itself. But, precisely because they are created, creatures point to that reality beyond themselves in which they nonetheless participate. Thus, while it is true, as the nominalist Hobbes insists, that a portion of finite reality, such as the experience that grounds an assertion, proposition or concept, cannot encompass being-itself or supply a definition of that which is ineffable, still, because the finite participates in the infinite, because each being has a share of being-itself, some relation exists between the two which makes language about God possi-
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214. John discusses this some pages before, in chap. 8.

215. In bk two, chap. 3, John Damascene admits that even the angels, though incorporeal with respect to men, have something of thickness and matter with respect to God, who alone is immaterial and incorporeal.

216. The reference is to 1 Corinthians 8:4; see above, section 12. If one takes Hobbes at his word that *phantasmata* are nothing, as he has said above, section 181, then it is difficult not to conclude that he does not believe in the existence of angels, which he here describes as *phantasmata*. But this conclusion would apply equally to all those phenomena which he calls *phantasmata*, namely, names, appearances and thoughts. The utility and ontological status of all of these are left out of Hobbes' account as a result of an impasse in his thought; see n. 213.

217. Hobbes' Latin in the 1668 edition reads *timente*, "by the one who fears," rather than *mente*, "by the mind."

218. *Leviathan*, 124. The phrase "true religion" is presumably a misstatement, in that religion, opinion, cannot be true. Also, Hobbes' account of the origin of religion includes more motives than fear; on this point and for a discussion of Hobbes' use of the words "feign" and "imagine" in this passage, as well as several other valuable insights, see Paul J. Johnson, "Hobbes's Anglican Doctrine of Salvation," in *Thomas Hobbes in His Own Time*, eds. Ralph Ross, Herbert W. Schneider and Theodore Waldman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974), 102–25, esp. 114–18.

219. This saying is found in *Psalms* (112:10), *Proverbs* (1:7, 9:10), and in the apocryphal *Ecclesiasticus*, also known as the *Wisdom of Sira*; I do not find it in *Ecclesiastes*. It is not accidental that Hobbes refers to the Old Testament, here as elsewhere. In stressing God's freedom and graciousness, he is seeking to reflect a more biblically rooted thought-world in which deed, event, decision and promise are the principal categories; that is, Hobbes as Protestant theologian is attempting to recover the historical emphasis on a conception of God whose roots are ultimately Hebraic. This shift in emphasis away from Greek categories of being, substance, accident, entity, etc., complements the denial that it is possible to gain information about the God of Israel from the way things are. The world, as a contingent creation of God's will, could have been other than it is. The divine nature is thus equally transcendent of and equally compatible with any of the possibilities that were excluded when God chose to create this world and its stable nature. Natural theology, to the extent that its aim is to describe the divine essence, rather than the contingent products of the divine will, is therefore not only inadequate or partial; it is on this view absurd. Cf. George Croom Robertson, *Hobbes Cheap Edition (sic)* (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1905), 113, and John L. Farthing, *Thomas Aquinas and Gabriel Biel: Interpretations of Thomas Aquinas in German Nominalism on the Eve of the Reformation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), 7ff.

220. See *Psalms* 14:1 and *Psalms* 53:1.

221. *Leviathan*, 220. "Reduce" here means to lead back or return, as is evident from the verbal play on "induce."

222. *Leviathan*, 434. The Greek word *aggelos* means "messenger."


224. The Saducees, the aristocratic rivals of the Pharisees and often referred to in the New Testament, as in *Acts* 23:11, denied the doctrines of the resurrection of the dead and of the existence of angels, both of which had arisen in Palestine in the years prior to the birth of Jesus.
Interpretation

225. Leviathan, 483f.
226. See the first chapter of this Appendix, sections 41–56. This crossreference indicates that the third chapter at least was written with conscious reference to the other.
227. Note the explicit contrast Hobbes draws between one's own philosophical position and biblical religion.
228. Hobbes has written "124 elders."
230. Leviathan, 498.
231. In the first of these two passages, the psalmist alludes to a promise made in a story about Joseph, which is related in the passage from Genesis. The promise is the assurance which Joseph gives to his fellow-prisoner, Pharaoh's "butler," that is, his chamberlain, now fallen into disfavor, that he would be restored by Pharaoh to a place of honor. On this meaning of promise, see the Introduction.
232. That Christ was eternally begotten of the Father was a tenet of Origen, adopted by the church.
234. Leviathan, 528. The episode referred to here between Naaman, "captain of the host of the king of Syria," that is, a Syrian general, and the prophet Elisha is found in 2 Kings 5:1–19. Naaman was cleansed of his leprosy by Elisha, who had instructed him to bathe in the Jordan River. But the prophet did not require Naaman, who then converted to Elisha's God, to forsake corporate worship of Rimmon with his sovereign, the king of Syria. Naaman and Nicodemus, Jesus' reluctant disciple, were often cited in this period as examples of licit religious dissimulation in the Bible; see Carlo Ginzburg, Il nicodemismo: Simulazione e dissimulazione religiosa nell'Europa del '500 (Turin: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1970).
235. In fact, the nineteenth century does not deal with lapsed Christians, though the eleventh sets out a process of reinduction into the church of those who had weakened without sufficient cause. It is the twenty-fifty canon of the Nicene Creed that deals with lapsed Christians.
236. Leviathan, 570. This is Hobbes' view that the king (rex) is priest (sacerdos), a conception of the incidents of the ruler's powers of great antiquity, recalling the Hellenistic ruler cults, the divinity of the Roman emperor, the sacred person of European kings and the imperial dignity as the Lord's anointed (Christus Domini). Henry IV's minister William Lyndwood (?1375–1446), in his Canterbury Provinciale, reflects the discussion that had occurred in France on this point in support of the Gallican liberties claimed by the French church, with the support of the French king, through the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges in 1438. Lyndwood states that the anointed king is not simply a lay person but a mixed person, according to some; see Percy Ernst Schramm, A History of the English Coronation, trans. Leopold G. Wickham Legg (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937), 138. In that the sovereign lacked the cure of souls (cura animarum) and other aspects of the priest's ordination, Christian writers rarely asserted that he could administer the sacraments, but the Norman Anonymous had earlier held that the king could offer the elements in the Eucharist; see George Huntston Williams, The Norman Anonymous of 1100 A.D.. Toward the Identification and Evaluation of the So-called Anonymous of York, issued as an extra number of the Harvard Theological Review, 18 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 168ff. James I believed that the person of the king was mixed with that of the priest, and Charles I gained the status of sainted royal martyr in the Anglican Church. In fact, the practice of anointing kings, and only later the emperor and priests, including the pope, began among the Franks, in imitation of the rite mentioned in biblical accounts of kingship (1 and II Kings) in connection with Saul, David, Solomon and others; see Walter Ullmann, The Growth of Papal Government: A Study in the Ideological Relation of Clerical and Lay Power, 3d ed. (London: Methuen and Co., 1970), 24, n. 1; 67; 150ff. But Hobbes' assertion does not rest solely upon Judaic-Christian political theology; rulers before the advent of Christianity had had the power to teach and to ordain teachers of religious belief. Caesar had been pontifex maximus, a style which even Christian emperors retained, reaching a nodal point in Justinian, who brought imperial legislation regarding key aspects of Christian life and practice. According to Hobbes, the power implicit in the mixed person of king and priest (rex-sacerdos) devolves upon the sovereign by natural right, for the preservation of peace; see Leviathan, 567–74.
237. For these royal instructions, see J. R. Tanner, *Tudor Constitutional Documents*, 140. The Injunctions were means of implementing the Act of Supremacy of 1559. Elizabeth's clarification of her position is contained in an Appendix, published contemporaneously with the Act, entitled "An admonition to simple men deceived by malicious." The letters patent addressing the ecclesiastical commission were dated July 19, 1559.

238. The Act of Supremacy itself recognized no authority or power of ministry of divine service in English kings or queens, and the Thirty-nine Articles of 1563 states that no power is given to English kings over the administration of the word of God or of the sacraments. See Article 37.

239. An allusion to Paul's proscription in 1 Corinthians 14:34.