

Interpretation

A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Winter 1992-93

Volume 20 Number 2

- 99 Charles Salman Phaedrus' Cosmology in the *Symposium*
- 117 Jeffrey S. Turner The Images of Enslavement and
Incommensurability in Plato's *Meno*
- 135 Leonard R. Sorenson Rousseau's Socratism: The Political Bearing of
"On Theatrical Imitation"
- 157 Hilail Gildin The First Crisis of Modernity: Leo Strauss on
the Thought of Rousseau
- 165 John Farrenkopf Nietzsche, Spengler, and the Politics of
Cultural Despair
- 187 Leah Bradshaw Tyranny: Ancient and Modern
- Book Reviews*
- 205 Will Morrisey *Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas
Jefferson*, by Robert W. Tucker and David
C. Hendrickson
- 209 Christopher Kelly *Reading Rousseau in the Nuclear Age*, by
Grace G. Roosevelt
- 217 Terence E. Marshall *Political Philosophy*, Volume 1, by Luc Ferry

Interpretation

- Editor-in-Chief Hilail Gildin, Dept. of Philosophy, Queens College
- General Editors Seth G. Benardete • Charles E. Butterworth • Hilail Gildin • Robert Horwitz (d. 1987) • Howard B. White (d. 1974)
- Consulting Editors Christopher Bruell • Joseph Cropsey • Ernest L. Fortin • John Hallowell (d. 1992) • Harry V. Jaffa • David Lowenthal • Muhsin Mahdi • Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. • Arnaldo Momigliano (d. 1987) • Michael Oakeshott (d. 1990) • Ellis Sandoz • Leo Strauss (d. 1973) • Kenneth W. Thompson
- Editors Wayne Ambler • Maurice Auerbach • Fred Baumann • Michael Blaustein • Mark Blitz • Patrick Coby • Christopher A. Colmo • Edward J. Erler • Maureen Feder-Marcus • Joseph E. Goldberg • Steve Harvey • Pamela K. Jensen • Grant B. Mindle • James W. Morris • Will Morrisey • Aryeh L. Motzkin • Charles T. Rubin • Leslie G. Rubin • Bradford P. Wilson • Hossein Ziai • Michael Zuckert • Catherine Zuckert
- Manuscript Editor Lucia B. Prochnow
- Subscriptions Subscription rates per volume (3 issues):
individuals \$25
libraries and all other institutions \$40
students (four-year limit) \$16

Single copies available.

Postage outside U.S.: Canada \$4.50 extra;
elsewhere \$5.40 extra by surface mail (8 weeks
or longer) or \$11.00 by air.

Payments: in U.S. dollars AND payable by
a financial institution located within the U.S.A.
(or the U.S. Postal Service).

CONTRIBUTORS should follow *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 13th ed. or manuals based on it; double-space their manuscripts; place references in the text, in endnotes or follow current journal style in printing references. To ensure impartial judgment of their manuscripts, contributors should omit mention of their other work; put, on the title page only, their name, any affiliation desired, address with postal/zip code in full, and telephone. Please send THREE clear copies. Contributors using computers should, if possible, provide a character count of the entire manuscript.

Composition by Eastern Composition, Inc.,
Binghamton, N.Y. 13905
Printed and bound by Wickersham Printing Co.,
Lancaster, PA 17603

Inquiries: Patricia D'Allura, Assistant to the Editor,
INTERPRETATION, Queens College, Flushing, N.Y.
11367-0904, U.S.A. (718)520-7099

Phaedrus' Cosmology in the *Symposium*

CHARLES SALMAN

Trinity University

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND BACKGROUND

While Phaedrus' speech has rarely received the focal attention of interpreters of the *Symposium*, there are several striking reasons for considering it to be of primary importance. Perhaps chief among these, at first blush, comes from outside the *Symposium* itself, from the fact that in his second great dialogue on eros Plato should choose Phaedrus for Socrates' interlocutor. Although perhaps "not without merit in point of simplicity of style and arrangement" (Bury, xxv), Phaedrus' speech seems in certain obvious respects the least outstanding in the *Symposium*, and this alone makes the eponym of the later dialogue at least something of a puzzle. Why should it be Phaedrus in particular to whom Socrates must tell the tale that eros is a kind of "divine madness," himself being inspired to sing of the "hyperouranian place," the dwelling place of the "being that truly is," beyond the horizon of the cosmos?¹

Of course there are certain indications of Phaedrus' importance within the drama of the *Symposium* itself. Since it is his complaint that no one has adequately praised eros which initiates the project of the party (177a–d), he in a sense becomes the overseer or *archon* of the symposium, and he fulfils this role dramatically by governing over the giving of the encomia. Thus Pausanias (185c), Agathon (197e), and Socrates (212b) all formally offer their speeches to him, and at several key junctures he is responsible for seeing to it that the delivery of speeches goes on (cf. 194d, 199b). But there is something of perhaps still greater importance about Phaedrus that is connected with his initiating complaint: since he is the inaugurator of the idea for the symposium, he is commanded to take first place in the series of speeches and in that sense to constitute the beginning of the collective logos on eros. It might be too much to say that Phaedrus stands at the symbolic *arche* (cf. 177d3, 178a4) or inception of the reflection that the *Symposium* as a whole unfolds were it not that Plato seems to thematize something like just this in the often-noted words of Eryximachus: Phaedrus should be the first to go both because he is sitting in the first position and because he is, as it were, the "father of the logos" (177d).

The priority that attaches to Phaedrus by virtue of his standing at the beginning might be said to be merely formal in nature, though it would be especially

important if there were some truth to the view adopted by various commentators that there is a Platonic principle whereby “the higher is prefigured or reflected in the lower” (Rosen 1968, 39). Although this notion is variously construed, perhaps the most revealing formulation comes from the analysis of dialogue structure that has been given by Mitchell Miller.² Viewing the “core motif” of dialogue as an “encounter between the philosopher and the non-philosopher,” Miller sees the first part as occupied with (i) an “elicitation” of the nonphilosopher’s basic position. The elicitation is progressive in the sense that as the dialogue proceeds, this root nonphilosophical position is brought out more and more radically: “the goal is the strongest and most transparent formulation of the non-philosopher’s position.” Ordinarily this proceeds by the elicitation and refutation of definitions from a single interlocutor (as in the *Meno*³), although sometimes (as for example in the *Gorgias*) “the philosopher may provoke one speaker to give way to another’s more radical representation of his own position.” The *Symposium* represents yet another variation “in which non-philosophers drive one another to deeper approaches.”

This “sets the stage for the second structural moment, a basic refutation by the philosopher” which brings the nonphilosopher to the dialogical turning point of *aporia*. The Socratic conviction that the recognition of ignorance is the necessary prerequisite to genuine philosophical thinking explains why (ii) it is only and at just this point that the philosopher “makes his most basic contribution, a reorienting insight that shows a path through the *aporia*”—a philosophical “suggestion” which “sets the issues at hand in a new, more properly philosophical light.” The third and final moment of the dialogue is marked by (iii) a “resumption” of the initial discussion, in effect a “testing” of whether the interlocutor has appropriated the reorienting insight of the dialogue’s central part. The almost invariable failure of Socrates’ interlocutors here (and so the characteristic lapse back, in the last part of dialogue, to the level of the nonphilosopher) Miller reads, finally, as Plato’s testing of *us*, his provocation of the reader to rehabilitate the central insight “*for himself*” and to “try to develop it properly.”

This basic structural rhythm of (i) elicitation, (ii) refutation/reorientation, and (iii) resumption/relapse is not difficult to locate in the *Symposium* and falls in line with an often-voiced intuition, that the *Symposium* divides quite naturally into three major parts or “Acts.”⁴ Thus to transfer briefly Miller’s view to the structure of the *Symposium*: (i) in the first five speeches Plato would be progressively evoking a basic nonphilosophical posture, and Agathon would stand at its culmination, its most “radical representation.” Of course the basic dramatic metaphor of the *Symposium* alone is enough to indicate something of this sort, since the occasion is the gathering of all the symposiasts to celebrate Agathon, as if (to take our cue from the meaning of his name) he embodied their common sense of the “good.” Indeed after Agathon has finally spoken, Plato has all the symposiasts applaud (198a), as if to express how he has given “the strongest and most transparent formulation” of their basic and underlying

convictions. The characteristic turning point of *aporia* comes with Socrates' well-known refutation of Agathon (199c–201b), which opens the way for (ii) Socrates' introduction of his reorienting insight, his attempt to reconceive *eros* in a genuinely philosophical light. While it will be our task further on to try to articulate this insight against the backdrop of the root nonphilosophical position it would supplant and overcome, for now we can refer to Socrates' introduction of the concept of the “daimonic.” The (iii) “test” and relapse to the non-philosophical would, of course, be signaled by the arrival of Alcibiades, who evocatively portrays the failure to be converted by the Socratic “initiation.” Here again Plato indicates the symposiasts' collective complicity by the enthusiastic acclaim with which Alcibiades is greeted (213a), itself a dramatic foreshadowing of Athens' imminent decision to follow him in the fatal Sicilian adventure.

These reflections, schematic as they are, allow us to state the significance of Phaedrus' primacy in the *Symposium* in a somewhat stronger way. If the first “Act” is involved in something like a progressive elicitation, then its root non-philosophical position would already be implicit or present in germ in the inaugurating speech of Phaedrus, if not at its most “radical” or explicit, then at its simplest and most basic. If Agathon represents the nonphilosophical orientation to *eros* at its culmination or *telos*, in Phaedrus Plato would be presenting it at its *arche* or inception.⁵ In this sense Phaedrus' inaugural “cosmology” might capture the fundamental orientation to the “order” of things that governs the nonphilosopher's “cosmos,” a cosmos characterized by a kind of failure of love or the course of a “misguided *eros*.”⁶ This last expression seems especially appropriate in view of Diotima's own rhetoric: in her synoptic and precipitous ascent to the final mystery, she repeatedly emphasizes the need for the initiate to be “properly guided,” and that he must be on the *orthē odos*, and “correctly” or “properly follow.” (Thus *orthōs* appears six times in her description of the ascent: 210a2, 210a4, 210a6, 210e4, 211b6, 211b7.) If Phaedrus' cosmology indeed “prefigures” the collective nonphilosophical orientation to the “cosmos,” we might say that it shows us the failure of love at its Platonically conceived inception or that it stands at the symbolic *arche* of Plato's dramatic disclosure of the path of “misguided *eros*.” From this point of view the movement towards Agathon is a kind of expanding recapitulation, a movement that progressively articulates a “failure” already implicit in the logos of Phaedrus in germ.⁷ Thus while Socrates explicitly addresses himself to Agathon, we might even here imagine the possibility of a wondrous Platonic contrivance—that Socrates' speech could prove at the same time to address itself implicitly to Phaedrus', and point by point prove likewise *its* mimesis and reorientation.

PHAEDRUS' COSMOLOGY

First of all then, as I said, he says Phaedrus started something like this—saying that *eros* is a great god (*meγas theos*), wondrous to men and gods alike

(*thaumastos en anthrōpois te kai theois*) in many different ways, and not the least in the matter of his birth (*genesin*). For being among the oldest of the gods, he is honored (*timion*), he said. And here is the proof (*tekmērion*): parents (*gonēs*) of eros neither exist nor are spoken for by anyone either in prose (*idiōtou*) or poetry. Hesiod does say that Chaos first came to be,

but then, full-breasted Earth, always steadfast seat of all, and eros.

Both Hesiod and Acusilaus agree that after Chaos these two, Earth and Eros, came to be. And Parmenides says of the beginning (*tēn genesin*):

First among all the gods, it devised (*mētisato*) Eros.

So there is agreement in many authorities that Eros is among the oldest.⁸

Phaedrus begins his cosmological reflection with the claim that eros is a “great god,” while Diotima will begin saying precisely that eros is not a god, but rather is a “great daimon” (202d7).⁹ To understand the sense in which *the cosmos is daimonic* insofar as it is animated by eros is thus to take the first step in seeing through to the failure of love in Phaedrus’ perception of the cosmos. Diotima reasons as follows: the gods themselves are happy (*eudaimonas*) and beautiful, whereas what is characterized by eros longs after these things and so must in some way be lacking in them. But precisely insofar as something longs for such things it cannot be wholly ignorant about them, and in this sense what is erotic must have at least some share of the things divine. For this reason eros can be characterized as “daimonic,” being “between divinity and mortality” (202e1: *metaxu esti theou te kai thnētou*).

A cosmos animated by eros is thus characterized by a kind of split or separation between “divinity and mortality,” and insofar as the one is perceived as possessed of good and beautiful things (202c6–7)—as in some sense delivered from the infirmities of the other—by a longing of what is subject to the vicissitudes of genesis for what somehow seems better and stronger. What is erotic is thus characterized precisely by a perception of the “divine,” by the perception of something which surpasses what is already possessed in one’s life, and so which in turn reveals the sense in which this existence is lacking. Eros is daimonic or “in between” precisely insofar as it *separates* these two, revealing a disparity between the mortal and what still outranks it. For the one who is truly guided by eros, the cosmos is in this way animated by the daimonic distinction between the “mortal” and the “divine,” and so the intimation of something blessed which transcends whatever good is already incarnate in one’s mortal existence. Phaedrus’ archaic “failure” is thus a kind of *desacralization of the cosmos*.¹⁰

The living experience of this absence of a distinction between the mortal and the divine Plato now begins to unfold in Phaedrus’ next claim, that eros is “wondrous to men and gods alike.” The strong conjunction (*te kai*) seems intended to underscore Phaedrus’ conflation and carries the sense of “wondrous

to men *in the same way as to gods*. . . .” To be properly initiated into the daimonic character of eros is to see precisely a *distinction* between what eros separates or holds apart, and so to see the sense in which it mediates, as it were, between two *disparate* halves. So it is that when Diotima now closes her instruction on the daimonic nature of eros, she explains to Socrates about the “power” (202e2: *dunamin*) of the daimonic, which is different for men than it is for the gods:

Interpreting and conveying (*hermēneuon kai diaporthmeuon*) human affairs to the gods and divine matters to men: from the one, entreaties [or needs] and sacrifices (*deēseis kai thusias*), from the other commands and recompense [or return-gifts] (*epitaxeis te kai amoibas*) for the sacrifices. Being in the middle it fills up with both so as to bind (*sundedesthai*) the whole together with itself. Through this all divination (*mantikē*) proceeds and all sacred practice (*hiereōn tekhnē*) involving sacrifices, mystery rites (*teletas*) spells (*epōidas*), and all inspired utterance (*manteian*) and sorcery (*goēteian*). A god does not mingle (*mignutai*) with a human being, but all mingling (*homilia*) and conversation between gods and men takes place through this [intermediary]. (202e–203a)

On Diotima’s account eros cannot be equally “wondrous” to the gods in the way that it is to men as what it “conveys” to the one is a kind of supplicating neediness, while what it conveys to the other is a kind of plenitude or abundance. To try now to spell out Diotima’s didactic metaphor into the experience it means to express: the one who is truly initiated into the daimonic character of eros begins to perceive its nature as a *sundesmos* or bond and so to feel the “power” by which eros would unite what it separates or holds apart. But what eros thus brings together or binds into a whole has incommensurable or incongruous sides, of themselves, as it were, incapable of “mingling” or union: on the one hand it is characterized by importunate privation, and so the pathos of being necessitous and distressed, but on the other, the “recompense” of a prodigious boon, and so the intimation of overwhelming good fortune. These two are brought together, as it were, in or “through” eros, so that what is characterized by eros is characterized by the daimonic presence of dissonant or heterogeneous sides. Bringing neediness and abundance together in the same breast, eros moves his initiate to feel precisely the “power” of their disparity. Indeed, “Being in the middle he is filled up with both” and in this sense comes under the magical “spell” or “enchantment” of a “mysterious” or perhaps even “numinous” situation.

It is thus crucial to recognize the reason for the aura of the hierophanous and the mantic that surrounds Diotima’s description of this moment in erotic experience. To speak of the numinous copresence (or being “bound together”) of incongruous elements (of themselves, as she says, incompatible, or incapable of such mingling or union) is to speak of a situation that must, in consequence, present itself as fundamentally paradoxical or mysterious—a situation, to put

this alternatively, of which there is patently no apophantic or manifest logos: the initiate feels both needy and abundantly fortunate, and there is no saying exactly why. Thus we can now begin to understand why it is just here that Socrates is driven to wonder about the genesis of eros (is moved, in Plato's dramatic metaphor, to ask about the parents of eros) while at the analogous juncture, as we will presently see, Phaedrus should be presented as precisely *not* being moved to any inquiry as to "the matter of eros' genesis." "Filled up" with the "power" of the paradoxical copresence of heterogenous forces, the initiate will be "inspired" to try to seek out what this mystery points back to, moved by a "sacred" wonder to try to "divine" the hidden meaning at the origin of his eros.¹¹

In a desacralized cosmos what one thus fails to perceive is precisely the "wondrousness" of eros. Dwelling in a cosmos not animated by the daimonic distinction between the mortal and the divine, Phaedrus' cosmos is characterized by neither the pathos of his neediness nor by the presence of that surpassing plenitude which promises abundant "recompense," "conveying" intimations of a better cosmos. Not "filled up" with the dynamic strife or tension between these two incommensurable things, he is thus not "inspired" with wonder about the hidden origins of eros. He is characterized, rather, at just this point, by a kind of complacency or erotic inertia, precisely failing to be moved to any inquiry about "the matter of eros' genesis." Thus Plato has him say: "For being among the oldest of the gods, he is honored, he said. And here is the proof (*tekmērion*): parents of eros neither exist nor are spoken for by anyone either in prose or poetry."¹² Why Plato should connect this passivity and satisfaction to a compliant appeal to the authority of what has been spoken by "private or public" men, we will best understand after considering the citation which Phaedrus actually does invoke, but even at this point we can say this much: the acquiescence in what has already been said represents exactly the countermood to the experience of the initiate, whose cosmos is animated by the "power" of what presents itself as mysterious, or (to restate this in the form of the relevant paradox) precisely by the presence of an absence of logos. Feeling nothing, as it were, "para"-doxical, Phaedrus' cosmos, by contrast, is animated wholly and only by the doxalogical.¹³

At the analogous juncture in Diotima's account, as we have already anticipated, Socrates asks about the parents of eros,¹⁴ that is, he is moved to inquire about just what it is that eros "points back to." To the one properly guided by eros, it thus becomes generative of wonder, or awakens in him a particular kind of thoughtfulness: in Plato's dramatic metaphor, a recollective or genealogical inquiry. In this sense the wondrous thing about eros to the initiate Socrates is precisely *not* that it is among the oldest, but that it points back to something still "older," the hidden logos, as one might here say, behind the genesis of his eros. What is now revealed to the correctly aspiring lover who thus asks after Eros' origins?

That's rather long to narrate (*diēgēsasthai*) she answered. But I'll tell you. When Aphrodite was born, the gods were feasting, both the others and Poros, son of Metis. And when they had dined, Penia came along begging since there was festivity going on and she stood there by the doors. Now Poros, having gotten quite drunk on nectar—there was no wine then—had gone out to Zeus' little garden, and heavy-headed was overcome by sleep. Here Penia schemed (*epibouleuouosa*), since she herself was resourceless (*aporian*), to have a child by Poros and she lay down beside him and thereby conceived Eros. For this reason Eros has been Aphrodite's attendant and servant, because he was conceived on the day of her birth, and also is by nature a lover of beauty because of Aphrodite's being so beautiful.

As Diotima goes on to complete the narrative, two essential consequences for Eros follow upon this parentage. The first (203c4–d7) brings into the revelation of Eros' nature a distinctly downward turn, as we are forced to confront the sense in which Eros' fate (203c5: *tukhē*) is less than wholly sublime: for “. . . first of all, Eros is always in need (*penēs*), and far from being tender and beautiful as most people think, he is harsh (*sklēpos*) and rugged; possessing his mother's nature he is always living in lack (*endeia*).” Even the “strengths” that follow from his paternal side are really kindred to this indigence, and only underscore the sense in which Eros emerges as an ambiguous (or even tricksteresque) figure: he is “resourceful,” “eager,” “bold,” “intense,” “a clever hunter,” and “weaver of contrivances”; he is a “schemer (*epiboulos*) for beautiful and good things,” a “philosopher throughout his life”—and indeed, at the most extreme, even a “sorcerer, potion-maker and sophist” (*goēs kai pharmakeus kai sophistēs*).

The second basic consequence Diotima spells out (203d7–e5), in a sense, is an elaboration of the sobering first: “And so he is by nature neither immortal nor mortal, but on the same day will bloom and live, when he prospers, and then he will die, but again be brought back to life by his father's nature; whatever he makes his way to always ebbs away (*hupekrei*), so that Eros is never altogether poor (*aporei*) nor completely wealthy, but is in between wisdom and ignorance.” Never wholly wealthy nor wholly at a loss, Eros thus finds himself having a kind of fluctuating character, and his “existence is a continual ebb and flow, from plenitude to vacuity, from birth to death” (Bury, xlii). In a word, Diotima's myth concludes by revealing how Eros is *subject to cycles of motion or genesis*, and indeed these in their most basic or definitive form: what is erotic springs from life to death and from death again to a kind of rebirth.

We may take our first cue in interpreting what the initiate here encounters from the very form of Diotima's narration: what the lover who inquires into the origins of eros receives is likened to an allegorical or mythical message. In thus conspicuously shifting to the mythical in his account of eros' origins, Plato evokes in us the very activity which the myth itself will reveal to be central to the initiate's experience: just as the true intentions of a myth are never directly

or immediately revealed, so the inquiring lover does not receive a transparent logos or immediate grasp of the hidden meaning behind his eros, but rather finds himself given what is much like a mythical account—an answer which even while speaking of the hidden logos behind the genesis of his eros does so in a manner which is circuitous and oblique. The reader is thus compelled to experience the basic vicissitude of eros which (as we will presently see) is itself the central subject of the myth: Eros will call upon the initiate to engage in a particular form of *interpretation* or “hermeneutics,”¹⁵ because his access to, as it were, the true object of his eros, will prove pointedly *indirect*.

Indeed the myth itself articulates this distance between what is erotic and its object. To begin with what seems most apparent: eros is animated by the appearance of something beautiful, divinely promising, or in our earlier language, “conveying” intimations of overwhelming good fortune. Eros is thus “born” on the birthday of “Aphrodite,” surrounded by the aura of divine abundance, as if at a banquet among the gods. But it is also clear that what is erotic does not have direct access to its beloved object, and that its object in consequence has the character of elusiveness or transcendence. Plato captures this unequivocally in the staging of the mythic metaphor: though Eros is a lover of Aphrodite, he is not himself in attendance at the gods’ divine banquet, and so does not, as it were, “see” Aphrodite directly.¹⁶ Eros is in this sense alienated from the beautiful promise which animates it, in the language of the myth, born at a distance from the scene of divine abundance. To try to translate, finally, the mythic scenario into the moment of erotic experience it would express: although the initiate feels a divine promise in eros with a pathos of utter necessity, he does not have an articulate grasp of just what it is that eros thus promises.

And yet what is erotic must have some sort of access to the divine promise which animates it, just insofar as it “knows,” so to speak, enough to love it or feel its promise. Indeed the myth does tell us in the person of Poros that Eros has a connection to the divine,¹⁷ but here again, in view of Poros’ drunkenness and Penia’s seduction, that the divine inheritance is somehow compromised or “adulterated.” Thus when we understand the meaning of what the myth tries to capture in the ambiguous *sunousia* or “relation” of Poros and Penia, we will understand what befalls between eros and its beautiful object, or the precise sense in which, in our earlier language, its access to the plenitude of the gods is mediated and indirect. This then is the central metaphor of the myth: Eros only has a divine inheritance by virtue of its compromising weddedness to mortal Need. To say that the divine plenitude is compromisingly *wedded* to mortal need is to say that it is not inherited “uncontaminated,” in or by itself, but only *bound up with* or insofar as it comes together with mortal lacking. Eros only has a divine inheritance insofar as it at the same time inherits a mortal Neediness. To say *at the same time* here is to say that the divine precisely only appears *as that which illuminates* the lacking as a lacking, that it is not inherited by itself, that is, apart from being this illumination—or that it is only

inherited, in the language of the myth, through this “relation” to mortal Need. What is erotic thus becomes conversant with (or “connected to”) something divine only by virtue of its thus becoming conversant with its mortal lacking.

This sense of the union of Poros and Penia is reaffirmed and elaborated in the particulars of the mythic scenario. Each individually is thus “already” imbued with the attributes of the other, that is, expresses the alteration of character presupposed for each in their coming together or “relation”¹⁸: that the divine is not inherited unpolluted or incorrupted, in or by itself, Plato captures playfully yet poignantly in Poros’ drunkenness. The god is thus “not himself” insofar as he enters into this union (and so is not inherited by Eros in “full possession” or with “unhampered clarity” of vision) but rather only as he would have to become in “engaging” with mortal neediness (having “already” partaken of what draws the divine down into fogginess, obscurity, and “sleep”). That the mortal, conversely, is not inherited by *itself* but rather through its “relation” to the plenitude of the gods, Plato captures with equal precision in Penia’s scheming resourcefulness. The mortal Neediness Eros inherits is thus “already” a “schemer for good and beautiful things,” an eager hunter for means, bold, intense, and resourceful. What is erotic “inherits” not merely mortal lacking but lacking *perceived as a lacking*, and this is lacking “already” standing in “relation” to divine abundance.

We can now begin to understand more precisely the sense in which eros’ access to its beloved object is mediated and indirect and the route of the initiate circuitous and oblique. Since eros only has a divine inheritance through its “relation” to mortal Need, it does not have unhampered possession of what seems so divinely promising, the divine scene, so to speak, apart from this lacking, or wholly delivered from such infirmities. Though what is erotic feels with utter necessity the promise of overwhelming good fortune, what exactly it is that eros thus promises is not “immediately” given, unobscured by the “related” illumination of mortal infirmity and failing. But if eros in this sense alienates the initiate from the promise of divine abundance which animates it, in another sense it can be said to have drawn him more closely and related him to it: while his divine inheritance is not given to him unbenighted and unobscured, it *is* given to the initiate to have illuminated and made clear the lacking in which he falls short of it, and thus to inherit the “means” by which what is better and stronger could be articulated and brought to light. While the initiate thus suffers the pathos of good fortune’s transcendence or absence, he nonetheless has a route to it which is excursive and indirect, since it is present as the “resource” by which he can articulate just how he is wanting and lacking—and by such means pursue the hidden logos of a better cosmos he feels promised within his eros. This articulation is the interpretation demanded of the initiate, the erotic “hermeneutics” to which he finds that the gods “command” him through Eros.¹⁹

We can now understand the consequences Diotima draws for eros’ “fate.”

We see “first of all” why it is that “far from being tender and beautiful as most people think” eros is “harsh and rugged” and the kindred grounds for its character as something of a trickster, “spell-maker” and “sophist”: eros always holds out the promise of something divinely beautiful, but we only have access to this promise insofar as we also inherit the “related” illumination, thus compelled by the pathos of divine transcendence to the recognition of our mortal neediness. Eros in this sense seduces us with the “spell” of something divinely promising, only to then turn around, as it were, and turn out to demand of us something hard. In his intricate artistry Plato had already woven this consequence into a detail of the mythic scenario. We might thus here surmise why he has Penia arrive uninvited, standing at the doors, recalling as this would to every Greek ear the uninvited arrival of the goddess Eris at the marriage feast of Peleus and Thetis: with the appearance of something beautiful which evokes our eros comes an uninvited eris or strife.

We can now likewise understand the final consequence Diotima draws for Eros’ fate and why she should conclude telling how what is animated by Eros is subject to cycles of motion or genesis. Though eros does indeed harbor within it the promise of a better cosmos, it only shows us this divine good fortune in its relation to mortal need, and so *just what must be overcome and undergo genesis* in order for that promise to be delivered and fulfilled. The initiate thus sees how his divine inheritance is wedded to the vicissitudes of mortal lacking and that he must suffer his mortality to inherit the resources by which that lacking could be made good. What is erotic in this sense finds itself subject to the intractable demand of its changing and regeneration, or in the language of the myth itself, to dying and being reborn.²⁰ Thus the route of the “correctly” aspiring lover leads him not only to experience the transcendent and elusive element within eros’ beautiful promise, but to see, *in order that he might continue to follow*, the adamantine Necessity of genesis.

Since what eros thus makes its way to “always ebbs away” (203e3: *to de porizomenon aei hupekrei*), there is no end to the sacred wonder one could feel for this Necessity, and the philosopher, as Diotima is about to tell Socrates, will always be in between (204b).²¹ Here again Plato had already guided us in a detail of the mythic scenario. That eros always shows us the divine as it illuminates the lacking of a *particular* mortal perspective (and so never, as it were, reveals all at once the entirety of what could be surpassed in a mortal) Plato captures by having Eros conceived in *ho tou dios kēpos*. The image is as potent as it is delicate and subtle: what is implanted by eros is like a seedling in the garden of Zeus, one of *many* blooms the keeper of the cosmos would produce, see nourished and “prosper.” And it is just insofar as this divine inheritance may be profaned and abused—used not as a means of mortal growth but as the occasion of vengefulness and repression—that we can finally understand why Plato makes Poros “the son of Metis”: recalling as this does *Theogony* 886 ff.,²² Plato here indicates how Poros might become the “means” for an

attempted *rebellion against* Zeus, who would communicate to us through the contrivance of eros the demanding Necessity of genesis.

If the route of the “correctly” following lover leads to the aporetic character of the beautiful and the recognition of the necessity of genesis, it is just such a rebellion that Plato now places at the heart of Phaedrus’ desacralized cosmos: Phaedrus’ experience thus seems quite precisely characterized by what he now says, captured with ingenious Platonic compactness in a miscitation of Hesiod. In the *Theogony* where Hesiod sings the story of the genesis of the gods, he places at the arche²³ of the cosmos a kind of originating fourfold of deities, while when Phaedrus takes up this beginning he omits mention of Tartaros. As we reflect back on what Hesiod seems to capture in this famous cosmogonic passage, Phaedrus’ suppression of Tartaros begins to have an intriguing symbolic timeliness. Hesiod makes his beginning like this:²⁴

First of all Chaos came to be, and then (116) broad-breasted Gaia (Earth), always steadfast (*asphales*) seat of all (117) the immortals who hold the snowy peaks of Olympus (118), and Tartaros, the murky (*ēeroenta*) in the innermost place (*mukhōi*) within broad-wayed Earth (119), and Eros. . . . (120)

The etymology of *khaos* suggests that its coming into being signals the appearance of a kind of “gap” or separation (cf. West, 192 and Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, 36–38). If line 119 is genuine, then Hesiod seems to place at the arche of the cosmos the separation or complementary opposition of Gaia (Earth) and Tartaros.²⁵ What does Hesiod here oppose to what? Since Earth herself will bring forth and be the center of the ordered, articulated cosmos (*Theogony* 126–33) (and Hesiod’s epithet “steadfast” [*asphales*] seems to capture this stabilizing or grounding character), Tartaros, her complementary opposite, might be likened to the realm of the unarticulated, disorderly, or even the “aporetic.” Hesiod’s epithet “murky” or “misty” (*ēeroenta*) indeed seems to express just such a nature, and West notes that “the ancient connection with *tarassō* is probably right” (195; *tarassō* means “to stir up,” “disturb,” “to trouble the mind,” “confound,” “frighten,” and generally “to throw into disorder”). Hesiod’s archaic fourfold, then, might be said to express something like the following view about the fundamental nature of reality, about the fundamental or “archaic” structure of the cosmos, or about what characterizes, it might be still better to say, the dwelling place of mortals as such: The cosmos is always characterized by the distinction between and copresence of Earth and Tartaros, of on the one hand what is “steadfast,” secure, articulated (and in that sense intelligible) and on the other, that “within” it which is still “misty,” confounding, unintelligible (and so aporetic). Indeed Hesiod seems to confirm something like the present interpretation of the archaic structure of the cosmos in the lines that immediately follow (123–25), where as if to further articulate its own nature as a division Chaos brings forth both Erebus and Night, who in turn bring forth Ether and Day—that is, Chaos articulates itself as the division be-

tween what on the one hand is (intelligible or) “illuminated” and on the other what is (confounding or) “dark.” These two are related, at the outset, precisely in their separation or opposition (Chaos), but they are also, Hesiod seems to suggest, somehow also a potentially procreative or generative couple (Eros).²⁶

The full significance of Phaedrus’ suppression of Tartaros, however, emerges in view of the immediate sequel (*Theogony* 126–210) in which the dynamic of genesis implicit in the structure of the cosmos is precisely what Hesiod begins to unfold. Mother Gaia proceeds to give birth from out of herself to the elements of the articulated cosmos, first Ouranos, the great starry father Sky, who “covers her all around” (127), and after him the hills, and Pontos, the sea. She then lay in love with Ouranos and conceived many wondrous children: the twelve great titans, the powerful Cyclopes, and the “most threatening” (155: *deinotatoi*) and “unspeakable” (148: *ouk onomastoi*) Kottos, Briareos, and Gyes, “overmastering children” (149: *huperēphana tekna*). But the tyrannical Ouranos, fearful for his rule, would suffer the birth of no children:

and just as any one came into being, he hid them all away (or “concealed” them: *apokruptaske*), in the inward places of Gaia, (*gaiēs en keuthmōni*) and would not let them into the light, and Ouranos exulted in his wicked work. But great Gaia groaned within for pressure of pain. . . . (156–60)

Gaia appealed to her children for help, plotting to undo Ouranos’ criminal (164: *atasthalou*) suppression, and her youngest-born, Cronus, took courage. Using the great sickle he had been given by his mother he ambushed and castrated Ouranos as he came on in this amorous embrace, bringing him to ruin for his first “wicked dealings” (166: *aeikea . . . erga*), the first to succumb violently to the intractable dynamic of genesis. The genitals of his father Cronus threw into the sea, and from out of the surrounding foam was born the beautiful Aphrodite. As she stepped forth from the water at wave-washed Cyprus, immediately “eros went with her.”

It seems strange that West is somewhat ambivalent on the question of just where the “most fearsome” children are confined, saying only that “the story must have been that the Titans were kept in Gaia’s womb by Uranus’ unremitting embrace . . .” (214). He thus refrains from making explicit what seems the mythic implication, namely, that this suppressed “womb” or place of confinement “deep inside Gaia” (*gaiēs en keuthmōni*) must be Tartaros itself, which Hesiod had already presented as “the innermost place (*mukhōi*) within broadwayed Earth.” Ouranos’ archaic injustice is thus to be characterized precisely as a *suppression of the contents of Tartaros*, and Phaedrus’ miscitation is its verbal mimesis.²⁷

The image expresses perfectly the counterexperience to Diotima’s initiate and captures the tyrannical hybris at the heart of Phaedrus’ desacralized cosmos. Ouranos suppresses the womb “within” Gaia in order to prevent the birth of any more children who would rise up spontaneously from the “misty”

element “within” the beautiful (beloved Gaia), “threatening” as Ouranos might see it, to overthrow his rule. Thus where the initiate experiences the magical spell or enchantment of a numinous situation—harboring “within” it the hidden promise of a better cosmos—Ouranos sees emerging precisely a confounding and ominous plight, what would subvert the integrity of the order that is, a “fearful,” “overmastering” threat. While the initiate “follows” the elusive and mysterious element “within” the beautiful—seeing there the resources for interpreting just how what is better and stronger may be brought to life—Ouranos “conceals” what would emerge from the mysterious place within Gaia and will “not let it into the light.” Phaedrus’ desacralized cosmos is in this way characterized by a suppression of what is aporetic or “dark” within what is “steadfast” and secure, or in the language of the myth, of what is still “misty” at the center of what order has already come to light.

As the mythic metaphor so vividly suggests, this suppression can be understood as a kind of *violence against the nature of reality*: in suppressing Tartaros Ouranos violates the archaic structure of the cosmos or the fundamental “dynamic” or “power” implicit in and animating the cosmos. As the *Theogony*’s first “wicked dealings,” this violence against the cosmos is in a sense *the archaic act of injustice*, the attempt to exclude or suppress the realm of the aporetic from the prevailing order of things and secure it against what presages its dissolution or perhaps even its overcoming. Since Ouranos would in this way try to immortalize his “order,” his cosmos is not subject to the vicissitudes of cosmogonic change or regeneration, but rather to the titanic pressure of its detainment and repression. Ouranos’ suppression of Tartaros is in this sense a rebellion against the Necessity of genesis. (For the neo-Platonic identification of Tartaros as genesis, cf. Olympiodorus, *Meteorologica*, 141–50.)

As Hesiod’s archaic scenario indicates, this suppression of genesis is at the same time a kind of absolutizing or *tyrannizing* by the order that is. There is therefore nothing that Ouranos concedes beyond the horizons of his order, nothing beyond its reaches or to which it would not extend. Hesiod thus twice likens Ouranos to what would “cover completely,” “extend over,” or even “encompass” the whole: when he is first introduced Ouranos is said to “cover all over” (or “envelop”) all of Gaia (127: . . . *hina min peri panta kaluptoi*), and Hesiod re-emphasizes this character when he is about to meet his end: Ouranos came on and “desiring love spread himself around Gaia, extending over all” (176: *amphi de gaiē himeirōn philotētos epesktheto kai rh etanusthē pantē*). It is in terms of Phaedrus’ mimesis of this suppression of what is “beyond the horizons of Ouranos” that we must understand Socrates’ later hymn to the “hyper-ouranian” place (cf. the first paragraph of this essay). In a cosmos, finally, that in this way reaches over the whole, nothing “paradoxical” is to be tolerated or endured. Thus while Diotima’s initiate suffers the mysterious presence of an absence of logos, in Ouranos’ cosmos what thus has no logos is precisely what is suppressed: the children are thus *ouk onomastoi*, what can “not be spoken”

about. Even as he speaks Phaedrus enacts the mortal mimesis: what men have already said becomes the only *tekmērion* or “sign,” and there is no longer a distinction between existing and being spoken of by men. The cosmos is in this way dispossessed and divested of sacred wonder and, bereft of philosophy, is delivered over to the authorities:

Both Hesiod and Acusilaus agree that after Chaos these two, Earth and Eros, came to be. And Parmenides says of the beginning (*tēn genesin*):

First among all the gods, it devised (mētisato) Eros.

So there is agreement in many sources that Eros is among the oldest.

Whereas Phaedrus thus quotes Parmenides as if to support his perspective, in Parmenides’ original there is an unnamed power behind the “devising” of Eros: the goddess “who steers all things” and “the one Parmenides calls Dike and Ananke.”²⁸ Even while citing the philosopher Phaedrus thus distorts his intention and symbolically spurns precisely the power presiding over the entrance-way to philosophy, the cosmic Necessity implicit in eros by which a mortal could be “properly” guided. Thus Plato has Phaedrus end this *logos* by suppressing the divine Necessity hidden behind the pathos that animates the cosmos, and this would be the “failure” in being a lover of wisdom, as it were, at its most archaic.²⁹

NOTES

1. *Phaedrus* 247c ff. Of the three most recent fullscale studies of the *Phaedrus* (Burger, Griswold, Ferrari) Griswold (18–24) does the most in trying to tie the theme of the dialogue back to Phaedrus’ *Symposium* speech (though in large measure he follows Rosen, 1968). He thus emphasizes how Phaedrus’ praise for the “utility” of eros to the beloved (178c–179b) is actually a defense of erotic passivity and in that sense anticipates Lysias’ praise of the nonlover. Cf. Burger, 10–11 and Ferrari, 6.

The fullest and most rewarding discussion of Phaedrus’ speech in the *Symposium* is still that of Stanley Rosen (1968, 39–59) though this essay will have occasion to differ widely from many key features of his analysis, particularly of the cosmological first third of Phaedrus’ speech with which we will be primarily occupied. All textual references are cited from Bury’s edition.

2. (1980a, 1986). Cf. xii–xix of the former and especially 4–9 of the latter for a fuller presentation of the view sketched only skeletally below. For precedents of Miller’s view, cf. 1980a, 122 n.35.

3. Thus Meno’s third and last definition of virtue (78b: “the power of acquiring fine things”) only makes explicit or transparent what was lurking at the heart of his second (73c: “the capacity to govern over men”), while this in turn was a making explicit of what he already had in mind with the first (71e: “managing the city’s affairs capably”). The “elicitation” thus brings the interlocutor’s convictions before us more and more nakedly or (to borrow a relevant metaphor from the *Charmides*) has the function of “undressing” (154e) him.

4. Thus Bury (lii) says: “we see that it falls most naturally into three main divisions, *three Acts* as we might call them. In the First Act are comprised all the first five discourses; the Second, and central, Act contains the whole of the deliverances of Socrates; the Third Act consists of Alcibiades’ encomium of Socrates.” Cf. also Friedländer, vol. 3, 469 n. 30, and Bacon, 428.

5. For other versions of the principle that the higher is prefigured in the lower cf. Rosen (1968 and 1988), who inclines to see the “base” as an ironic “caricature” of the dialogue’s real teaching, and Kosman, who shows how the deeper insights of the *Charmides* can be viewed as a “redemptive appropriation” of Charmides’ first definition. These three ways of construing the basic “principle” are not incompatible so long as we can imagine that Plato, in his infinite artistry, could weave such hybrid formulations—which while at first appearing base or transparently failing from another perspective can be seen as a very icon of the truth—so long as we can imagine, that is, the systematic compactness of his *ironic mimesis*.

6. Thus Brentlinger (6) aptly formulates the dramatically projected context of the *Symposium*: “By the time of Apollodorus’ telling of the story the political ruin of Athens is complete, and we are thus exposed to the vast social and political dimensions of misguided Eros.”

7. Thus Friedländer compactly states: “Agathon rounds out the circle begun by Phaedrus” (vol. 3, 20).

8. On the textual difficulties in this passage cf. Bury, note to 178b, and Dover, note to 178b8. The problem revolves essentially around the question of whether Phaedrus notes the agreement of Acusilaus with Hesiod before or after his citation from Parmenides, and in any event does not substantially affect the interpretation which follows. Bury, Dover, and Burnet all furnish the order that is followed here, while the text which Robin prints in the Budé edition would yield something like the following alternative:

but then, full-breasted Earth, always steadfast seat of all, and Eros.

He says that after Chaos these two, Earth and Eros, came to be. And Parmenides says of the beginning (*ten genesin*):

First among all the gods, it devised (mētisato) Eros.

Hesiod and Acusilaus agree. So there is agreement in many sources that Eros is among the oldest.

9. In his note on Diotima’s “epithet” *daimōn megas*, Bury rightly says: “The epithet serves to point the correction of Socrates’ definition, *megas theos* (202b).” But we must push the reflection still further: Socrates there was miming a position he located in Agathon (201e), while Agathon in turn was articulating a position already present in Phaedrus. Diotima’s “correction” thus ultimately points back all the way to the nonphilosophical beginning, and its most archaic referent is Phaedrus.

10. That such a desacralization stands at the nonphilosophical arche is reflected in the long-noted aura of sacrilege that hovers over the dialogue as a whole. Phaedrus, Eryximachus, and Alcibiades were all implicated in the desecration of the Hermae, and we are not far from the night of Alcibiades’ profanation of the mysteries, the centrality of which in Plato’s mind the presence of Diotima suffices to indicate. The aura of the sacred thus surrounds Socrates’ “reorientation” from her very introduction (cf. 201d1 ff.) and we should note in this connection *her* very first words: *ouk euphēmeseis*. Her instruction, of course, is cast in the form of an initiation into the lower and higher mysteries, and at its apex she speaks the language of the sacred Eleusianian revelation. Rosen is thus right to make a theme of Phaedrus’ impiety (1968, 39–45), and it is worth keeping in mind the force of a later remark: “Although the Platonic dialogues are by no means consistent in their portrait of the gods, they never present philosophy as anything but a divine gift or expression of the divine in man” (237). Bury (xlvi–lii, “Eros as Religion”) gives brief but appropriately emphatic formulation to the *Symposium*’s religious dimension. It is perhaps not out of place here to say that contemporary commentators on Plato need reminding of the decidedly theological dimension in his thinking to which students of an earlier generation (cf. Jaeger, Voegelin, Cushman) were seemingly more sensitive. (For a recent exception, cf. Cobb 1989.) It was Plato, after all, who invented the term “theology” (*Rep.* 379a), and Jaeger rightly says of this passage: “The coining of the word indicates the importance from Plato’s point of view of the mental attitude which it tries to express. Theology is in a way the very aim and centre of his thought” (194 n.13. Cf. also 4 ff.).

11. That the initiate feels the absence of logos here, that is, feels the necessity, rather, of something like “divination,” Plato deftly expresses with a dialogical shift: Socrates breaks his pattern of dialectical questions and shifts rather to a more patently mythical idiom (203a9): *patros de, ēn d egō, tinos esti kai mētros;*

12. *idiōtou*, as Dover points out in his note to 178b2, could here connote something like “layman,” in which case we might render: “either privately or publicly.”

13. Although here (and indeed we might have chronicled this throughout) we see an example of Plato’s infinite artistry: that these men give no logos for the origin of eros can be viewed as a “caricature” of the truth, “redemptively appropriated” in Diotima’s teaching. (Cf. note 5 above.)

14. Thus cf. Bury’s last note to 203a: “Here we have it tacitly assumed that Phaedrus’ statement (178b), that Eros is unbegotten, is untrue.”

15. Which Diotima had already intimated in the first word of our previous passage: *hermēneuon kai diaporthmeuon*.

16. Thus we can already begin to glimpse why the telos of the whole initiation is the sight of the Beautiful (Aphrodite) itself (210e ff.), but also what a long road of trials stand between that final mystery and the present moment in erotic experience.

17. Bury thus formulates what I take to be more or less apparent: “We must conclude, therefore, that as Poros is the source of the divine side of the nature of Eros, so Penia is the source of the anti-divine side; and from the description of Eros as *daimōn*, combined with the definition of *to daimonion* as *metaxu theou te kai thnētou* (202e), we are justified in identifying this anti-divine side with mortality, and in regarding *hē penia* as a personification of *hē thnētē physis*” (xl–xli).

18. It is well worth bearing in mind here the words of Plotinus (*Enneads* III 5.9), who gives keen expression to what every good reader of myths intuitively knows: “Our way of speaking—for myths, if they are to serve their purpose, must necessarily import time-distinctions into their subject and will often present as separate, Powers which exist in unity but differ in rank or faculty; and does not philosophy itself relate the births of the unbegotten and discriminate where all is one substance? The truth is conveyed in the only manner possible; it is left to our good sense to bring all together again.”

19. Cf. note 15 above. Of course Diotima had also anticipated our present point in that earlier passage, since along with the gods’ presents or gifts came their “orders” or commands”: *tōn de tas epitaxeis te kai amoibas* (202e4).

20. Thus Walter Otto concludes in his study on “The Meaning of the Eleusinian Mysteries” (20–21): “Man receives the fertility which is indispensable to him from the hands of death.” Diotima was prophetic earlier when she said that through eros comes all “sacred practice involving sacrifices” (*hē tōn hierēōn tekhnē tōn te peri tas thusias* . . .) (202e6).

21. Cf. Lowenstam, esp. 96 ff., whose conclusions, however, need to be deeply qualified. What the philosopher acquires does not ebb away in the sense that he later “loses” or “forgets” his vision, but in the sense that it later becomes subject, in turn, to what would reveal *its* lacking and so bid him to *its* overcoming.

22. And so the fledgling arche of Zeus’ governance of the cosmos: Metis is the first consort taken by Zeus after the titanomachia. She was fated to have a son who would rise up and overthrow him, but Zeus took her into his belly and bore the child from out of his own head (a daughter, Athena, who “might advise him as to good and bad”), thereby seemingly averting his overthrow and securing the continuance of his rule. For the beginnings of an account of the subtextual presence of Zeus in the *Symposium* cf. Salman (1991b).

23. In the last line of the *Theogony*’s proem (115) Hesiod commands the Muses to sing of the cosmos *ex arkhēs*. . . All textual references to the *Theogony* are to West’s edition.

24. The emendations of Hesiod’s text which delete lines 118 and 119 probably originated with Phaedrus’ omission at *Symposium* 178a. M.L. West (192–93) argues persuasively for their authenticity, which is now rather widely accepted. Although Rosen is surely right in saying, “Phaedrus proceeds by silence or suppression,” his interpretation of Phaedrus’ miscitation differs greatly from the one given here (1968, 45–48).

25. As we will see shortly, Eros, as a principle of unification, is in turn the complementary opposite of the separating or divisive Chaos. The following reading of the the cosmogonic passage (II. 116–33) has been initially stimulated by the study of Mitchell Miller (1980b) which brings out the logic of complementarity and contrariety which governs over the passage. Responsibility for the existential turn of the interpretation and its placement within the first episode of Hesiod’s succession story (116–210) is my own. Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (with a number of worries) follow

Cornford in taking Chaos to refer to the gapping or separation of Earth from Sky (cf. 38–39). But it is surely right to follow West, who says of *khaos*: “It is in fact the same as that space between Earth and Tartarus which is called a *khasma* in 740” (192). For his persuasive response to Cornford, cf. 193.

26. That is, the presence of Eros at the arche of creation indicates the fundamentality to the cosmos of a dynamic of genesis, a moving dialectic between that which is “illuminated” and what “within” it is “dark.” Thus Athanassakis rightly says: “The position of Eros among such primeval elements as Chaos and Gaia indirectly or tacitly intimates a very important role, that of a demiurgic catalyst, perhaps, within creation” (42). Or similarly West: Eros “ . . . strongly suggests a quasi-demiurgic function . . . he is . . . present throughout as the force of generation and reproduction . . .” (195–96).

27. West’s silence here is all the more strange in view of his own earlier note to line 119: “both Chaos and Tartaros could be considered as something not separate from Earth, but deep inside it and part of it.” The only commentator I know who explicitly suggests that Tartaros is the place where the children are confined is Caldwell (133), though I cannot follow him in his Freudian reading of the originating fourfold, as the present interpretation makes clear. For the place of this connection between Ouranos and Phaedrus in the larger subtextual theogony which animates the *Symposium* as a whole, cf. Salman (1991a).

28. These are the words of Aetius (2. 7. 1, DK A37) cited by Morrison in his study of the various proposals as to the elliptical subject of *mētisato*. Morrison concludes that this *daimōn kubernētis* is the subject of *mētisato* and is followed by Nehamas and Woodruff in their edition of the *Symposium* (“ . . . the unstated subject of “designed” is evidently the goddess of B 12”). Dike appears in the proem as the keeper of the gateway of Night and Day through which the philosophical traveller passes (it is bound by a lintel and stone threshold which encloses it “on both sides”), while in the poem proper it is “strong Ananke” who holds Being “within the bonds of a limit, enclosing it on all sides.”

29. So ends Phaedrus “cosmology” and the first great phase of Diotima’s teaching. It should be fairly easy to now see how the rest of Diotima’s speech might counter the rest of Phaedrus’: as the cosmological section of Phaedrus’ speech corresponds to Diotima’s opening discussion of Eros’ nature and birth (201e–204c), so Phaedrus’ turn to the good eros does among men (178c–179b) corresponds to Diotima’s response to Socrates’ query as to the “use” of eros for men (204c–206a). Phaedrus’ turn to erotic feats in the face of the confrontation with death (179b–180b) has its counter, finally, in Diotima’s turn to the erotic “praxis” (206b2) of striving for immortality (206b–212a). Indeed Phaedrus’ three examples would even seem to correspond to the three routes to immortality Diotima sketches out there: that of Alcestis to the sacrifices made for offspring of the body (207a–208b), that of Orpheus “the musician” to those made for offspring of the soul (208c–209e), and that of Achilles (who to Phaedrus is the “most honored by the gods” and is “sent to the Isles of the Blessed”) to the sacrifices made for “true virtue” (210a–212a) by the one who “becomes a friend of the gods” (212a6). And yet to spell out all the mysteries Plato would likely have contained in this mimesis, that would surely be an altogether higher initiation still.

REFERENCES

The following works are cited in the text and notes by the author’s name alone or the author’s name and date:

- Athanassakis, A. N. *Hesiod*. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983.
 Bacon, H. “Socrates Crowned.” *Virginia Quarterly Review*, 35(1959).
 Brentlinger, J. “The Cycle of Becoming in the *Symposium*.” In *The Symposium of Plato*, trans. S. Q. Groden. University of Massachusetts Press, 1970.
 Burger, R. *Plato’s Phaedrus*. University of Alabama Press, 1980.
 Bury, R. G. *The Symposium of Plato*. 2d ed. W. Heffer and Sons, 1932.

- Caldwell, R. *The Origin of the Gods*. Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Cobb, W. "Plato on the Possibility of an Irreligious Morality." *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, 25(1989).
- Cushman, R. E. *Therapeia*. University of North Carolina Press, 1958.
- Dover, K. J. *Plato: Symposium*. Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- Ferrari, G. *Listening to the Cicadas*. Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Friedländer, P. *Plato*. 3 vols. Trans. H. Meyerhoff. Princeton University Press, 1958–69.
- Griswold, C. *Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus*. Yale University Press, 1986.
- Jaeger, W. *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers*. Oxford University Press, 1960.
- Kirk, G. S., J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield. *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*. 2d ed. Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Kosman, L. A. "Charmides' First Definition: Sophrosyne as Quietness." In *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, J. Anton and A. Preus, eds. Vol. 2. State University of New York Press, 1983.
- Lowenstam, S. "Paradoxes in Plato's *Symposium*." *Ramus*, 14(1985).
- Miller, M. *The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman*. Martinus Nijhoff, 1980(a)
 _____. "The Implicit Logic in Hesiod's Cosmogony." *Independent Journal of Philosophy*, 4(1980b).
 _____. *Plato's Parmenides*. Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Minton, W. "The Proem-Hymn of Hesiod's *Theogony*." *TAPA*, 101(1970).
- Morrison, J. S. "Four Notes on Plato's *Symposium*." *Classical Quarterly*, 14(1964).
- Nehamas, A. and P. Woodruff. *Symposium*. Hackett, 1989.
- Otto, W. "The Meaning of the Eleusinian Mysteries." In *The Mysteries: Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks*. Princeton University Press, 1955.
- Rosen, S. "The Nonlover in Plato's *Phaedrus*." In *The Quarrel Between Philosophy and Poetry*. Routledge, 1988.
 _____. *Plato's Symposium*. Yale University Press, 1968. 2d ed., 1987.
- Salman, C. "Anthropogony and Theogony in Plato's *Symposium*." *The Classical Journal*, 86(1991a).
 _____. "The Wisdom of Plato's Aristophanes." *Interpretation*, 18(1991b).
- Santas, G. *Plato and Freud*. Blackwell, 1988.
- Voegelin, E. *The World of the Polis*. Louisiana State University Press, 1957.
- West, M. L. *Hesiod: Theogony*. Oxford University Press, 1966.