

Interpretation

A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Winter 1993–1994

Volume 21 Number 2

- 105 Thomas Lewis Identifying Rhetoric in the *Apology*: Does Socrates Use the Appeal for Pity?
- 115 Joel Warren Lidz Reflections on and in Plato's Cave
- 135 Bernard Jacob Aristotle's Dialectical Purposes
- 169 Mary L. Bellhouse Rousseau Under Surveillance: Thoughts on a New Edition and Translation of *Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues*
- 181 Peter Augustine Lawler Tocqueville on Socialism and History
- 201 Maurice Auerbach Carl Schmitt's Quest for the Political: Theology, Decisionism, and the Concept of the Enemy
- Discussion*
- 215 Victor Gourevich The End of History?
- Book Reviews*
- 233 Will Morrissey *Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus*, by Charles L. Griswold, Jr.
- 245 Leslie G. Rubin *Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle's Politics*, by Mary P. Nichols
- 253 John S. Waggoner *The Liberal Political Science of Raymond Aron: A Critical Introduction*, by Daniel J. Mahoney

Interpretation

- Editor-in-Chief Hilail Gildin, Dept. of Philosophy, Queens College
Executive Editor Leonard Grey
General Editors Seth G. Bernardete • Charles E. Butterworth •
Hilail Gildin • Robert Horwitz (d. 1987) •
Howard B. White (d. 1974)
- Consulting Editors Christopher Bruell • Joseph Cropsey • Ernest L. Fortin
• John Hallowell (d. 1992) • Harry V. Jaffa • David
Lowenthal • Muhsin Mahdi • Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr.
• Arnaldo Momigliano (d. 1987) • Michael Oakeshott
(d. 1990) • Ellis Sandoz • Leo Strauss (d. 1973) •
Kenneth W. Thompson
- European Editors Terence E. Marshall • Heinrich Meier
Editors Wayne Ambler • Maurice Auerbach • Fred Baumann
• Michael Blaustein • Patrick Coby • Edward J. Erler •
Maureen Feder-Marcus • Joseph E. Goldberg • Stephen
Harvey • Pamela K. Jensen • Ken Masugi • Grant B.
Mindle • James W. Morris • Will Morrisey • Aryeh L.
Motzkin • Charles T. Rubin • Leslie G. Rubin •
Bradford P. Wilson • Hossein Ziai • Michael Zuckert •
Catherine Zuckert
- Manuscript Editor Lucia B. Prochnow
Subscriptions Subscription rates per volume (3 issues):
individuals \$25
libraries and all other institutions \$40
students (four-year limit) \$16
Single copies available.
Postage outside U.S.: Canada \$4.50 extra;
elsewhere \$5.40 extra by surface mail (8 weeks
or longer) or \$11.00 by air.
Payments: in U.S. dollars AND payable by
a financial institution located within the U.S.A.
(or the U.S. Postal Service).

CONTRIBUTORS should follow *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 13th ed. or manuals based on it; double-space their manuscripts; place references in the text, in endnotes or follow current journal style in printing references. Words from languages not based on Latin should be transliterated to English. To ensure impartial judgment of their manuscripts, contributors should omit mention of their other work; put, on the title page only, their name, any affiliation desired, address with postal/zip code in full, and telephone. Please send THREE clear copies. Contributors using computers should, if possible, provide a character count of the entire manuscript.

Composition by Eastern Composition, Inc.,
Binghamton, N.Y. 13905
Printed and bound by Wickersham Printing Co.,
Lancaster, PA 17603

Inquiries: Patricia D'Allura, Assistant to the Editor,
INTERPRETATION, Queens College, Flushing, N.Y.
11367-1597, U.S.A. (718)997-5542

Identifying Rhetoric in the *Apology*: Does Socrates Use the Appeal For Pity?

THOMAS LEWIS
McMaster University

Many rhetorical devices in Socrates' defense speech have been identified and compared with similar rhetorical devices in Isocrates' *Antidosis* and Gorgias' *Palamedes*.¹ Two main lines of interpretation emerge from this work. The first treats the rhetorical elements as a vehicle for an ironic parody of the disreputable forensic rhetoric of the day. The second rejects the parody interpretation and portrays the rhetorical elements as a subordinate part of Socrates' attempt to provide a sincere and truthful account of his life. This paper explores the possibility that the interpretations of parody and of sincere truth-telling do not take into account a deeply embedded rhetorical strategy that is still well hidden in the defense speech. I offer as an example of this deeply embedded rhetoric Socrates' use of the appeal for pity and his very successful attempt to conceal this appeal in the peroration of his defense speech. This rhetoric does not appear to fit within either the interpretation of rhetoric as parody or the interpretation of rhetoric as subordinate to truth-telling.

John Burnet's work provides a foundation for the parody interpretation. Recently R. E. Allen and Kenneth Seeskin have extended and refined Burnet's analysis.² Both Allen and Seeskin interpret Socrates' rhetoric in the defense speech as Plato's attack on the pandering rhetoric that permeated the courts and the assembly. Allen interprets the *Apology* as a parody of disreputable rhetoric in general, whereas Seeskin claims that Plato has in mind Gorgias' rhetoric in the *Palamedes* as the specific target for an ironic parody. Although Allen and Seeskin emphasize the highly rhetorical quality of the defense speech, they claim Socrates eschews the use of rhetoric to gain an acquittal and that his use of standard rhetorical devices is sufficiently transparent to be an ironic parody of the disreputable pleading that he rejects. They also emphasize the similarities between this attack on rhetoric in the *Apology* and Socrates' denunciation of rhetoric in the *Gorgias*.³

Those who understand Socrates' defense as a sincere and truthful account of his life largely discount the role of rhetoric as parody or as persuasion. Brickhouse and Smith claim either parody or persuasion would be at odds with Socrates' sincere and straightforward presentation of his way of life.⁴ Thus, for example, they reject the possibility that Socrates is using the story of the Oracle as a rhetorical device. "Were he then to be intentionally misleading about such

a substantive point, he would be guilty of the very sort of dishonest rhetoric for which he condemns the prosecution.”⁵ C.D.C. Reeve agrees there is no overall ironical and parodying tone in the *Apology*. Reeve recognizes that the presence of some rhetorical elements means that Socrates does make some attempt to persuade, but Reeve insists that the persuasive element is much subordinate to truth-telling.⁶ Thus, although Reeve gives more weight to the rhetorical elements than Brickhouse and Smith, he also discounts the significance of rhetoric.

Both the view of rhetoric as ironic parody and the view of rhetoric subordinate to truth-telling set aside the possibility that the rhetorical elements so far identified in the *Apology* may be part of an overall rhetorical strategy. Is there a reluctance to open up the possibility that these rhetoric devices may be only surface indicators of a much more deeply embedded rhetorical structure? Livio Rossetti claims there is such a reluctance and that it is due to “a kind of preconception, a traditional but ungrounded attitude, [that prevents] us from calling a spade a spade, and from treating Socrates’ rhetoric as rhetoric.”⁷

If Rossetti is correct, we may ask what has created and sustained an attitude that prevents us from treating Socrates’ rhetoric as rhetoric. I believe an answer may emerge if we realize that the masterful use of rhetoric may not appear as rhetoric. Skillful rhetoric may be skillfully concealed from its audience. Thus, despite progress in identifying some of the rhetorical elements in the *Apology*, much of a powerful rhetorical structure still could be concealed from view. Perhaps we cannot call this spade a spade because it has been so well hidden that we do not recognize what we are looking at.⁸

With the difficulty of recognizing rhetoric in mind I turn to identifying and explicating some of Socrates’ rhetoric in the *Apology*. I focus on the peroration where Socrates claims that he has not, and that he will not, stoop to the disreputable methods of forensic rhetoric so common in the courts of Athens. He singles out one particularly disreputable appeal that he will not use—the appeal for pity.

THE PLEA FOR PITY IN THE PERORATION

Most scholars have accepted Socrates’ refusal to appeal for pity pretty much at face value. They agree that by not hauling his family before the court Socrates eschews the appeal for pity, even though he could have employed it, for as he says: “To quote the very words of Homer, even I am not sprung from an oak or from a rock” (34d). Socrates does not just omit the appeal for pity. He emphasizes that his failure to appeal for pity is the result of an explicit decision, and he offers a number of reasons for his decision. He claims he is concerned with tarnishing his reputation with such disgraceful behavior. Even more important, he insists it would be impious for him to plead in a way which

would induce the jurors to render other than a just and lawful verdict. Moreover, he adds that such impious pleading would be self-incriminating by substantiating the very charge of impiety that has brought him to court.

Some scholars argue that Socrates' sense of propriety leads him to go further than just eschew an appeal for pity. They suggest that by emphasizing his refusal to appeal Socrates is urging the jurors to overcome any temptation they may have to be moved by pity. Feaver and Hare (p. 212) claim that Socrates emphasizes his rejection of the appeal for pity to attempt to make the jurors discount any emotional factor that would improperly influence their decision.

I offer a very different view of Socrates' disavowal of the appeal for pity—a view consistent with Socrates' choice of words from Homer. By reminding the jurors that he is “not sprung from an oak or a rock” (*Odyssey*, XIX, 163), Socrates is reminding them that, like Odysseus, he too has relatives. But this reminder is more than a general association with the powerful and wily Odysseus. “Not sprung from an oak or a rock” are Penelope's words as she presses Odysseus, still disguised as a beggar, to identify himself. Odysseus, master of deception that he is, responds to Penelope's interrogation with ever more elaborate lies to keep up his disguise. The next day, still not recognized by the suitors, Odysseus takes them by surprise and kills them all.

Part of this phrase is also spoken in the *Iliad* by Hector just before he is killed by Achilles. It is unlikely that Socrates is alluding to Hector (*Iliad*, XXII, 126), however. Hector, speaking to himself, is lamenting that Achilles is deaf to any appeal Hector might make to him. Hector concludes that neither promises, nor respect, nor pity can dissuade Achilles. Hector would appeal to Achilles if he would listen, whereas Socrates claims he will not appeal to the jurors even though they would listen. The comparison between Socrates and Odysseus is more apt.⁹ The prowess of both Socrates and Odysseus is intimately connected to their mastery of speech. Accordingly, I explore the possibility that by emphatically eschewing the appeal for pity Socrates is engaging in Odysseus-like deception. That is, he is disguising his appeal for pity so well that he can use the appeal and he can also claim credit for not using the appeal.

To elucidate the appeal for pity I examine Socrates' peroration in light of the peroration of Gorgias' *Palamedes*. The *Palamedes* is an example of the rhetoric of the day, and Palamedes considers but then rejects the appeal for pity. An appreciation of the rhetorical force of Palamedes' words helps to reveal the more subtle rhetorical force of Socrates' words.

The peroration of a defense speech summarized the main points of the refutation and often buttressed the refutation with an explicit appeal for pity. Defendants often paraded their distraught friends and relatives before the court to appeal to the jurors' compassion. “Direct requests for pity were so common that failure to beg for the jurors' compassion was regarded as a sign of antagonism towards the popular courts and their methods.”¹⁰ Thus we may expect to find an appeal for pity in the *Palamedes*. Indeed, Palamedes acknowledges that

he is expected to conclude with an appeal for pity. There is no appeal for pity in the peroration of the *Palamedes*, however; instead, Palamedes has a good deal to say about his refusal to appeal for pity.

Palamedes begins his peroration by summing up many aspects of his good character, and then, concerned not to appear boastful, he remarks: “It is not for me to praise myself, however, having been accused of these things, the present occasion forces me to mount a defense in every way I can” (32).¹¹ Although he claims he would be justified in mounting a defense in any way he can, Palamedes explains some things are not necessary—it is not necessary to appeal for pity:

Appeals to pity, entreaties, the supplications of friends are helpful when the trial takes place before a crowd; but when it is before you, first among the Greeks and men of good repute, it is not proper to persuade you by using the help of friends, nor entreaties, nor pity. Rather, it is proper for me to escape this charge by appealing to the clearest principles of justice, putting forth the truth, and not entangling in deception. (33)

Palamedes claims an appeal for pity may be proper when appealing to ordinary people (a crowd), who do not understand the clear principles of justice, but it has no place when addressing the “first among the Greeks.” Under the guise of explaining his departure from the standard plea for pity, Palamedes takes the opportunity to flatter his audience. He also continues to praise himself, by indirectly alluding to himself as the kind of person who, even in these desperate circumstances, is prepared to let the outcome rest on “the truth” and “the principles of justice.” He attempts to counter the possibility of appearing too boastful by suggesting that it is the virtue of his fellow Greeks that allows him to adhere to the principled way and forego the appeal for pity.

Socrates begins his peroration by acknowledging that the jurors may expect him to appeal for pity with a flood of tears and a tearful parade of relatives and friends. Like Palamedes, he says he refuses. Also like Palamedes Socrates does not simply omit the appeal for pity. He too emphasizes that he refuses to appeal for pity, and then he uses his refusal as a talking point to explain the impropriety of such appeals and entreaties (34bc).¹² He points out that the jurors and he exist on a higher moral plane, where a defendant tells the jury the facts and jurors determine where justice lies and “return a just and lawful verdict” (35c). For after all, he claims that like them, he too is an Athenian, and anything less is beneath Athenians. By eschewing an appeal for pity, he presents himself as someone who would never stoop to such discreditable pleading, and he expresses his confidence in Athenian jurors to abide by their oaths and dispense evenhanded justice. Like Palamedes, Socrates presents himself as a man of principle and he flatters the jurors that they too are Athenians of the highest principles. On these points the perorations of the *Apology* and the *Palamedes* are very similar.

There are two rhetorical refinements in Socrates' peroration, however. The first is Socrates' consideration of the possible impact of his refusal to appeal for pity. He says he understands that some of the jurors may be annoyed and angry at his refusal, especially if they remember how they begged for pity when faced with a much less serious charge (34bc).

It may be that one of you, reflecting on these facts, will be prejudiced against me, and being irritated by his reflections, will give his vote in anger. If one of you is so disposed—I do not expect it, but there is the possibility—I think that I should be quite justified in saying to him, My dear sir, of course I have some relatives. To quote the very words of Homer, even I am not sprung “from an oak or from a rock,” but from human parents, and consequently I have relatives—yes, and sons too, gentlemen, three of them, one of them almost grown up and the other two only children—but all the same I am not going to produce them here and beseech you to acquit me. (34d)

What is the cause of this anticipated irritation and anger? If it is beneath Socrates to appeal for their pity, and yet the jurors know they have appealed for pity, or they know that they would appeal for pity if hauled into court, then Socrates risks implying that they are beneath him. He may seem to be distancing himself from them by stressing his commitment to the honorable way. Notice he claims his refusal is not due to lack of respect, but it may sound like lack of respect, indeed worse still, it may sound like scorn or contempt (34e). He will provoke an angry reaction if his refusal to appeal for pity is interpreted as contemptuous arrogance.

Socrates' choice of words is calculated to diffuse rather than to exacerbate an angry reaction. He exempts most of the jurors from any criticism. It is only “one” of them who may be provoked to vote against him, and even this he does not really expect, “but there is the possibility.” Socrates implies that most of them are like him; they would not stoop to such disreputable pleading. He also implies that even those few among them, who may have begged for pity, are men of enough character to recognize what a man should do when brought into court. They are not men who would be angry and resentful towards someone who abides by their principles better than they have themselves. They are men who recognize and respect honorable behavior.¹³

To appreciate the rhetorical force of Socrates' words consider what he does not say. Although, like Palamedes, he strikes a principled tone, he does not distance himself from them by insisting that what he does is foreign to them. He does not say: “I take the high road, whereas you always take the low” (even if they do). Instead, he allows that they are much like him in their devotion to the principled way. Moreover, he encourages each of them to think of someone else among them (the ambiguous “one”) whom they can all feel superior to. He chooses his words to dissipate any anger or resentment he may provoke by his claim to the principled way.

The second refinement is Socrates' use of the appeal for pity after claiming credit for eschewing the appeal for pity. Socrates makes his appeal by introducing his family in speech rather than in the flesh. He says he mentions his family only to emphasize his refusal to use them to plead for pity. There is another element here, however. Although he does not physically display his family in court, he does display them in speech. He has three sons; two are only children. Rather than literally bring them to court, Socrates invokes the images of his children. He makes an appeal for pity by alluding to his family so indirectly and subtly that he can also claim credit for not using them to make this appeal.

Some of Palamedes' audience may have been swayed by an appeal for pity, and may even (as Socrates explains) be irritated when it is not made. However, if we accept the *Palamedes* as an example of Gorgias' rhetoric, we must conclude that on balance Palamedes expects to strengthen his case by forgoing an appeal for pity. He must expect the disadvantage of forgoing an appeal for pity to be more than offset by the propensity to think well of him for refusing this ploy and appearing to embrace truth and justice come what may. Socrates follows this reasoning and improves upon it. He anticipates the possible annoyance he may cause by not making the appeal for pity. Then he chooses his words to allow each juror to attribute this irritation to someone else and to encourage each of them to rise above an ill-spirited irritation. He encourages them to think well of a man who lives up to the best of Athenian standards. Then, having claimed maximum credit for not appealing for pity, he makes the appeal for pity by introducing his family in speech rather than in person.

Socrates uses his apparent disavowal of the appeal for pity to structure the remainder of the peroration. He asks: "Why do I not intend to do anything of this kind?" (34d). To answer this question he uses the appeal for pity as an example of all the methods of disreputable pleading which he claims to have eschewed (34e). He rejects the appeal for pity and other disreputable methods of pleading on the grounds that he finds them personally disgraceful and that such methods discredit the reputation of the whole city. To protect the city's reputation he urges the jurors to "make it clear that anyone who stages these pathetic scenes and so brings ridicule upon our city is far more likely to be condemned than if he kept perfectly quiet" (35b). Then he sets aside the question of appearances and moves toward the crux of the issue. He claims that to use such disgraceful methods of pleading would induce them to break their solemn oaths to return a just and lawful verdict (35c). Moreover, he claims that if he were to attempt to induce them to break their oaths he would be guilty of the very charge of impiety with which he has been charged (35d).

If the peroration is read without identifying the subtle way Socrates handles the appeal for pity, Socrates seems to be reminding the jurors that he has done what he said he would do. He seems to substantiate the claim he made in the exordium that he would speak the truth in his usual simple and straightforward fashion (17c). Socrates' words sound very different if his use of rhetorical

technique is understood as I have suggested, however. From this perspective his rhetoric is so much more subtle than the rhetoric of Palamedes that Socrates can conclude his defense by claiming credit for not making an appeal for pity when he has just made this very appeal.

THE PRESUMPTION THAT RHETORIC CAN BE RECOGNIZED

I have used some of the rhetorical techniques in the *Palamedes* to help to identify the similar but more refined use of these techniques in the *Apology*. Most readers have not remarked on Socrates' use of these techniques, so one might well ask whether they are really there. Could so many readers have missed them? I believe they could, partly because they are so subtly used, and partly because of the presumption that if they were used they would be readily identified.

Socrates himself raises the question of identification, but he does not stress the difficulty of identifying rhetorical technique. Indeed he takes the opposite position. He implies that identification is easy and straightforward—even for those like the jurors who are listening to his words rather than reading his words. This implication appears as a suppressed premise in both the exordium and the peroration. In the exordium the claim that rhetoric is readily identified is the suppressed premise of the argument that, since rhetoric will not be seen to be used, it is not being used. In the peroration it is the suppressed premise of the counterfactual argument that, if he had used rhetoric (he claims he did not), they would have noticed.

In the exordium Socrates begins his defense by responding to the accusers' warning to the jurors not to be deceived by his skillful speech. This immediate response to the accusation of being a deceptively skillful speaker follows Aristotle's advice on opening a defense. Aristotle warns that, if the accusers have impressed the jurors, "One must therefore make room in the hearer's mind for the speech one intends to make; and for this purpose you must destroy the impression made by the adversary."¹⁴ Accordingly, Socrates claims that he is particularly astonished at this charge, for it is untrue and it will be confuted very quickly when it becomes obvious that he does not have the slightest skill as a speaker (17b). He claims his lack of skill will become obvious when they hear his straightforward speech in the first words that occur to him (17c). Indeed, he claims he is so unfamiliar with the language of the courts (the deceptive rhetoric of the courts) that his manner of speaking will sound entirely out of place and it might almost seem that he is from another country and speaks a different dialect.¹⁵

Socrates rests his claim that his speech will sound simple, perhaps even alien, on the presumption that skillful speech can be readily identified as skillful speech. Socrates uses the presumption that if speech sounds simple and

straightforward (as his speech will) then it is simple and straightforward. He sets aside the possibility that the simple and straightforward sound of his speech may be the result of the use of skillful rhetoric—a rhetoric so skillfully used that by passing undetected it confutes the charge of being a skillful speaker.¹⁶

In the peroration Socrates claims that he has spoken in a simple and straightforward fashion as he said he would in the exordium. He claims that to have done otherwise would not be reputable, moral, or consistent with his religious duty. In short, he claims he is just not the sort of man who engages in deceptive speech (35d). Moreover, he claims that even if he were that sort of man he would not have attempted to prevail upon them to go against their solemn oaths. For as he says:

Above all you must not expect it when I stand charged with impiety by Meletus here. Surely it is obvious that if I tried to persuade you and prevail upon you by my entreaties to go against your solemn oath, I should be teaching you contempt for religion, and by my very defense I should be accusing myself of having no religious belief. (35d)

Here again is the suppressed premise that rhetoric is readily identifiable. Socrates presumes that appeals to pity, and by extension other impious appeals, would be recognized by the jurors for what they are. This recognition would have two consequences. He would be teaching them contempt for religion (presumably by the example of his impious behavior), and he would be incriminating himself by being seen to do one of the very things of which he is accused.

The presumption that rhetoric is readily identifiable need not be introduced by Socrates; it may be imported into a reading of the *Apology* by the reader. In either event, by trading on the presumption that rhetoric is readily identifiable, Socrates entrenches the presumption in the mind of the audience—an audience either of jurors or of readers—that if he were to use rhetoric the audience would see it for what it is. Because his rhetoric is so subtle, however, it is not immediately apparent. Thus the reader is not provoked to investigate the possibility that Socrates is both using rhetoric and taking great care to conceal his use of rhetoric. It is not surprising that Socrates' appeal for pity has remained so well concealed.

CONCLUSION

In the peroration Socrates identifies the appeal for pity as an example of the disreputable rhetoric he refuses to employ. He then makes the appeal for pity so subtly that he can go on to claim credit for being the kind of man who would not make such an appeal. He also anticipates the possible annoyance of jurors who take his disavowal of the appeal for pity at face value, by flattering the jurors that it is beneath them to be irritated by his refusal to appeal for pity—

for as men of principle they too appreciate honorable behavior. Socrates' rhetoric is far more subtle than Palamedes'. Palamedes forgoes the potential of the appeal for pity and relies solely on the ploy of displaying himself as the kind of man who refuses to stoop to such disreputable pleading. Socrates attempts to obtain the rhetorical force of both making the appeal for pity and disavowing it.

Socrates' subtle rhetoric in the peroration is difficult to detect. He compounds the difficulty of detection with his misleading claims in the exordium and the peroration. In the exordium he claims that rhetoric is so readily identifiable that the simple and straightforward sound of his speech will be clear evidence that he has no rhetorical ability. In the peroration he claims that rhetoric is so readily identifiable that if he were to use rhetoric his audience would quickly recognize its use and condemn him for impiety. Thus it is very difficult for the reader to overcome the attitude which Rossetti claims prevents us from treating Socrates' rhetoric as rhetoric. It is difficult because Socrates has used his rhetorical skill to create and sustain the reader's belief that the rhetoric in the peroration is not rhetoric.

Although Socrates' rhetoric in the peroration is deeply embedded, I believe I have identified enough of an underlying rhetorical structure to open up the possibility of comparable rhetorical structures in other parts of the speech. If similar rhetoric is identified elsewhere, it will be difficult to sustain interpretations of the *Apology* as either ironic parody or as sincere and straightforward truth-telling. We will need a more comprehensive understanding of Socrates' use of rhetoric.

NOTES

1. George Norlin, *Isocrates* (London: William Heineman, 1929). James A. Coulter, "The Relation of the *Apology* of Socrates to Gorgias' *Defense of Palamedes* and Plato's Critique of Gorgianic Rhetoric," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 68 (1964): 269–303.

2. John Burnet, ed., *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924). R. E. Allen, "The Trial of Socrates: A Study in the Morality of the Criminal Process," in M. O. Friedland, ed., *Courts and Trials* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), pp. 3–21; *Socrates and Legal Obligation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980); Kenneth Seeskin, "Is the *Apology of Socrates* a Parody?" *Philosophy and Literature* 6 (1982): 94–105; reprinted in *Dialogue and Discovery* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987). See also Douglas Feaver and John Hare, "The *Apology* as an Inverted Parody of Rhetoric," *Arethusa* 14 (1981): 205–17.

3. The *Gorgias* serves as a basis of a parody interpretation of the *Apology* only if Socrates' denunciation of rhetoric in the *Gorgias* is taken pretty much at face value. The *Gorgias* is not a firm basis for a parody interpretation if the denunciation of rhetoric in the *Gorgias* is itself considered as part of Socrates' rhetoric, however. For explorations of the *Gorgias* as an example of Socratic rhetoric see Steven Rendall, "Dialogue, Philosophy, and Rhetoric: The Example of Plato's *Gorgias*," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 10 (1977): 165–79; Charles Kauffman, "Enactment as Rhetoric in the *Gorgias*," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 12 (1979): 114–29; Thomas J. Lewis, "Refutative Rhetoric as True Rhetoric in the *Gorgias*," *Interpretation* 14 (1986): 195–210.

4. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, "Irony, Arrogance, and Sincerity in Plato's *Apology*," in E. Kelly, ed., *New Essays on Socrates* (New York and London: University Press of

America, 1984), pp. 29–46. A revised version appears in *Socrates on Trial* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 37–47.

5. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, “The Origin of Socrates’ Mission,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 44 (1983): 658. A revision of this article appears in *Socrates on Trial*, pp. 89–100.

6. C.D.C. Reeve, *Socrates in the Apology* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), p. 8.

7. Livio Rossetti, “The Rhetoric of Socrates,” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 22 (1989): 225.

8. I hope it is clear from the contexts in which I have used the word “rhetoric” that I am using it in the traditional narrow sense, rather than as an overall science of discourse or of practical reasoning—a meaning that has emerged in the twentieth century. Thomas Cole defines the narrow sense of rhetoric as “a speaker’s or writer’s self-conscious manipulation of his medium with a view to ensuring his message as favorable reception as possible.” (*The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* [Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991], p. ix.)

9. In his note on this line John Burnet assumes that Socrates is alluding to Odysseus (*Plato’s Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito*, p. 145). Leo Strauss makes the same assumption in *Studies in Political Philosophy*, with an introduction by Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 48. Brickhouse and Smith claim that because both the passage from the *Iliad* and that from the *Odyssey* fit the context of the *Apology*, they cannot tell which passage Socrates is referring to or if he is referring to either (*Socrates on Trial*, p. 202, n. 63).

10. John O. Lofberg, *Sycophancy in Athens* (Chicago: Ares, 1976), p. 15.

11. Quotations from the *Palamedes* are from the translation by Kenneth Seeskin in *Dialogue and Discovery*, Appendix A.

12. Brickhouse and Smith offer a detailed examination of Socrates’ explanation of why he will not use an appeal for pity (*Socrates on Trial*, pp. 202–9). My interpretation of the peroration is very different, however. They explain Socrates’ reasons for not appealing for pity, whereas I explain how Socrates attempts both to make an appeal for pity and also to claim credit for not making an appeal for pity.

13. See Brickhouse and Smith, *Socrates on Trial*, pp. 207–9, particularly n. 71.

14. *Rhetoric* III, XVII, 15. The exordium is one part of the defense speech where the role of rhetoric has been much debated. Brickhouse and Smith (*Socrates on Trial*, pp. 48–57) summarize much of this debate. For a very different interpretation of Socrates’ use of rhetoric in the exordium from that offered by Brickhouse and Smith, see Livio Rossetti, “The Rhetoric of Socrates,” pp. 227–28. For an exploration of just how deeply embedded Socrates’ rhetoric may be in the exordium, see Thomas J. Lewis, “Parody and the Argument from Probability in the *Apology*,” *Philosophy and Literature* 14 (1990): 359–66.

15. Note the use of the *argumentum ex contrario*, an argument based on the supposed reversal of facts that arrests attention and arouses interest—Socrates is not from another country. See Robert J. Bonner, *Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), pp. 228–29.

16. I believe this is an example of what Rossetti means by the claim that in the exordium Socrates is “concealing his own rhetorically elaborate prose” (“The Rhetoric of Socrates,” p. 228).