

# Interpretation

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# Interpretation

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# The Wisdom of Exile: Edward Everett Hale's "The Man Without a Country"

COLIN D. PEARCE  
*The Heritage Foundation*

When someone reproached Diogenes with his exile, he replied, "Nay, it was through that, you miserable fellow, that I came to be a philosopher."

Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers*

## INTRODUCTION

No man was a greater American patriot than Edward Everett Hale, a figure who concerned himself with the formation of American citizens and who exercised a broad influence from his pulpit in Boston and via his voluminous writings. His short story "The Man Without a Country" is universally regarded as an American classic. Within a year of its publication in the *Atlantic Monthly* in 1863, it had sold a half a million copies. As John R. Adams notes, "Almost at once Philip Nolan, the remorseful exile, became as clearly defined a figure as Washington Irving's Rip Van Winkle or Ichabod Crane; and he was more recognizable as an American character than the protagonists or the antagonists of Hawthorne's or Poe's tales."<sup>1</sup>

One might think that this short story which was so successful in civics textbooks would go the way of most of the patriotic writings of the Civil War period and be forgotten almost as soon as the cannons were silenced.<sup>2</sup> But the tale's enduring relevance is attested to by its continued success.<sup>3</sup> In Francis R. Gemme's view, Hale's story, if approached in the tradition of Aristotle and Donne, remains "highly relevant in this modern age in which questions of legal and moral dissent abound."<sup>4</sup>

Briefly, the tale is narrated by a certain Ingham, who had known Nolan as a young officer in the navy. He was moved to tell his story by reading Nolan's obituary notice in the newspaper in 1863. If Nolan "was near eighty when he died,"<sup>5</sup> we can conclude that he must have been born during the Articles of Confederation period in the early 1780's. Nolan would have been about ten years old when the United States Constitution came into effect in 1791. Nolan's life was thus roughly parallel to the birth of the "New Nation" in the

American Revolution and its “death” in the American Civil War in the early 1860’s.

The decisive event in Nolan’s life was his involvement in the Aaron Burr conspiracy. He met Burr in Louisiana in 1805 and was court-martialled in 1807 in the remote western outpost of Fort Adams for his connection to the Burr scheme. Nolan was “guilty enough” as far as the court was concerned, but when the judge asked him at the close of the proceedings “whether he wished to say anything to show that he had always been faithful to the United States he cried out, in a fit of frenzy: ‘Damn the United States! I wish I may never hear of the United States again!’” (p. 11).

The indignant president of the court, “Old Morgan,” then decided to give Nolan, like Midas before him, everything he wished. He sentenced the young man to be taken away and, “subject to the approval of the President,” arrangements would be made “that you never hear the name United States again.” Nolan was then taken onto a Navy ship and for the remainder of his life cruised the oceans on United States vessels under the care of officers and crew who were forbidden to mention, speak or convey any fact, information or detail relevant to the United States whatsoever. “From that moment, September 23, 1807, till the day he died, May 11, 1863, he never heard her name again. For that half century and more he was a man without a country” (p. 12).

Ingham explains the improbable story of an American seaborne outcast by or in terms of the indifference, secrecy and cowardice of the United States government. It was certain that President Jefferson approved of the sentence if we may “believe the men who say they have seen his signature” (p. 14). The Secretary of the Navy also signed off on the orders for Nolan’s “mild custody” (p. 16). In later life, during the 1830’s, when he thought he had “some influence in Washington,” Ingham tried to “move heaven and earth” to free Nolan, but “it was like trying to get a ghost out of prison. They pretended there was no such man, and never was such a man. . . It will not be the first thing in the service of which the Department knows nothing!” (p. 36) The conduct of the government in his own case would appear to justify to some extent the young Nolan’s initial attitude of contempt for the United States.

[A]fter 1817, the position of every officer who had Nolan in charge was one of the greatest delicacy. The government had failed to renew the order of 1807 regarding him. What was a man to do? What then, if he were called to account by the Department for violating the order of 1807? Should he keep him? What then if Nolan should be liberated some day, and should bring an action for false imprisonment or kidnapping against every man who had him in charge? . . . the Secretary always said, as they so often do at Washington, that there were no special orders to give, and that we must act on our own judgment. That means, “If you succeed, you will be sustained; if you fail, you will be disavowed.” (Pp. 40–41)

When he was a young soldier the adventurer Aaron Burr won Nolan over by showing the kind of interest in his particular case which his own government completely failed to show once he had become an aging exile. Whatever the patriotic intention of Hale's story, and its lesson that the United States is wholly worthy of the loyalty of its citizens, the story also shows us that the government of the country is surely capable of unconstitutional behavior, cowardice and incompetence. Loyalty to the United States does not imply unlimited trust in its government.

#### THE EDUCATION OF AN OUTCAST

The circumstances of Philip Nolan's upbringing were singular. He had grown up in the West during the 1780's and 90's. This "gay, dashing, bright young fellow" was immediately captivated by Aaron Burr when they met, "as the Devil would have it . . . at some dinner party." He "wrote and rewrote and copied . . . long, high worded and stilted letters" to Burr but received no reply. "The other boys in the garrison sneered at him because he sacrificed in this unrequited affection for a politician the time which they devoted to Monongohela, sledge, and high-low jack" (p. 10). When Burr returned to "seduce him," he was "enlisted body and soul" in the conspiracy. We see then from the start that Nolan was a character whose guiding passion was ambition and honor, things which he associated with the "dashing expedition" of Burr.

Nolan's "formal" education had been irregular and "un-American," if we may speak anachronistically.

He had been educated on a plantation, where the finest company was a Spanish officer or a French merchant from Orleans. His education, such as it was, had been perfected in commercial expeditions to Vera Cruz, and I think he told me his father once hired an Englishman to be private tutor for a winter on the plantation. He had spent half his youth with an older brother, hunting horses in Texas. (Pp. 11-12)

Nolan seems to have grown up in the West more like a wild cavalier of aristocratic Europe than a steady citizen of a democratic republic.<sup>6</sup> "[I]n a word, to him, 'United States' was scarcely a reality." And yet when he joined the army as a young man he had sworn "on his faith as a Christian to be true to the 'United States'" (p. 12). Aaron Burr's dream of a new empire in the southwest fired Nolan's imagination and called forth a "flesh and blood" commitment in a way that his situation in the forces of the United States did not.

Nolan then was of a more spirited and daring type than the usual time-servers in the services. But at the same time, as a man of high ambition and great daring, he was dependent on society more than his more average or contented comrades. He needed it as a "playing field" for his virtues in a way they

did not.<sup>7</sup> Exile with its permanent obscurity or privacy must therefore be all the more difficult to bear for someone of Nolan's type. The pain he goes through during his banishment bears this out.

#### NOLAN'S NEED FOR SOCIETY

Nolan's exile meant that he could never satisfy whatever desire he had to know and understand the political developments as they were unfolding in his own country. "No mess liked to have him permanently, because his presence cut off all talk of home or of the prospect of return, of politics, or letters, of peace or of war,—cut off more than half the talk men like to have at sea." Hence Nolan "ate and drank alone" (p. 16). Conversations Nolan did have, but never on matters to do with his own country.

But as we learn at the end of the tale, Nolan had all along been "living for" the United States. His room was decorated with the symbols of American life—map, flag and so on—and his concern to know how his country was developing, to know of the new states, "of emigration, and the means of it,—of steamboats, and railroads, and telegraphs,—of inventions, and books, and literature,—of the Colleges, and West Point, and the Naval School," was great (p. 45). His interest in the fate of country was in inverse proportion to his ability to be a part of it. He was deprived of the thing he came to hunger after most. Only on his deathbed does Ingham's friend Danforth convey to the old man some of the details of American history from 1807 to 1863. But Danforth explains that he "could not make up my mouth to tell him a word about this infernal rebellion" (p. 46).

Thus we are left with the unmistakable impression that Hale wishes to teach through his story the human need for community and membership in a larger group of human beings joined together by mutual trust and a common discourse, or, in his words, to provide "a warning to the young Nolans and Vollandighams and Tatnals of to-day of what it is to throw away a country" (p. 40).

The harshness of Nolan's fate indicates clearly Hale's point in describing the life of a "man without a country," which is to say the individual outside the pale of civic life. Hale is implicitly addressing the liberal doctrines of the State of Nature or making an excursion into "social contract theory." But the fact that Hale gives us a story of exile rather than of man alone in the wilderness shows his basic standpoint.<sup>8</sup> While Hale would allow that the individual can be separated from the community to some degree, the idea of human existence without civil community where Hobbes said his life must be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" is unthinkable to him.<sup>9</sup> In the State-of-Nature doctrine the individual antedates the social contract, but in the thought of Hale the community is prior to or coeval with the individual.<sup>10</sup>

Thus, in comparing Hale's description of "The Man Without a Country" with Hobbes's State of Nature, we notice some basic differences. Nolan has food and lodging supplied, his jailers are basically well disposed towards him, he leads a highly civilized life in some respects, and he lives to the ripe old age of eighty. Nolan on his ship has all that Hobbesian man desires. He has security of body and possessions as well as private liberty. And yet he is not a happy man. His loss of the "fellowship" of others is a great catastrophe for him.<sup>11</sup>

We are not surprised to learn then that Hale disagrees with Hobbes, who said that nature "dissociates" human beings. For Hale man is a "gregarious animal." "[A]ny one who separates himself from the race of which he is an organic part, at that moment death begins. 'The human race is the individual of which men and women are so many separate cells, or organs.'"<sup>12</sup> Hale makes these remarks in likening the human race to the bees, who cannot live apart from the hive. He presents man as a higher bee. He thus implicitly takes issue with Hobbes, who allowed that "It is true, that certain living creatures, as Bees, and Ants, live sociably one with another, (which are therefore by Aristotle numbered amongst Political creatures;)" but who insisted that "Mankind cannot do the same."<sup>13</sup>

Thus it appears from a certain angle that Hale takes the side of Aristotle over against the "first liberal," Hobbes.<sup>14</sup> In some sense this is true, as Hale implicitly denies the State of Nature as a starting point for reflections on the human condition. But as we shall see, it is not that simple. Aristotle's case for the naturalness of the city hinged on the highest end of the city, which is philosophy, which is to say the fulfilment of human nature in a self-sufficient, self-absorbed, purely truth-seeking, apolitical way of life. Hale does not believe in the desirability or even the possibility of this justifying "telos" of human community.

To appreciate this aspect of Hale's thought we need to look at his more general statements of principle. In particular we should look at his thoughts on politics and the "life of the mind."

#### EDWARD EVERETT HALE'S PURE AMERICANISM

In an address entitled "Democracy and Liberal Education," delivered in 1887, Hale attacked the then President of Princeton University, the distinguished Scottish academic James McCosh, for his remarks in a lecture to the Exeter Academy.<sup>15</sup> Hale argued, in effect, that McCosh was "un-American" in his pedagogical purposes because he defended the idea of liberal education as creating "a separate class of men,—sort of a book-made aristocracy . . . to supply our lack of a political body of noblemen by an aristocracy founded on letters and learning." In so doing, Hale explained, McCosh was drawing on

analogies “as old as Plato.” “They are analogies which come most naturally to a man trained among well-defined classes in social order. But they ought not to be long sustained among people who have been trained in the social order of a democratic republic” (“Democracy and a Liberal Education,” p. 43).

For Hale the idea of liberal education should have no “elitist” or exclusivist overtones. Liberal education does not seek “to make any class of scholars.” Indeed, “a true republic expects, in the end, to give a liberal education to all its people . . . the republic regards a liberal education not as the good fortune of a governing class, but as the privilege, if you please, the necessity of all” (*ibid.*, pp. 44–45). In the final analysis Hale blurs the line between civic and liberal education completely. Moreover, he defines liberal education in Tocqueville’s sense as incompatible with the American regime and American conditions.<sup>16</sup>

Hale’s particular concern is the corruptive effect on society of “intellectuals” or, in the older terminology, “sophists.” These he defines as those to whom one might send “at ten o’clock to-night, and bid him before two to write up for you Bulgaria. . . . One thousand words, two thousand, ten thousand words, as you have demanded and are willing to pay for.” But these modern equivalents of the Athenian sophists ultimately have nothing to say. “And for any uplifting of mankind, for guiding life, for helping society, what is written has not the worth of the money paid for the ink with which it was done!” (“Democracy and a Liberal Education,” p. 48).

Philosophy or liberal education, as Hale defines it, uplifts mankind and helps society, not as an ancillary consequence of its pursuit of truth, but as its primary object. “[T]rue literature and true philosophy need to be fed, in every hour, by the tides of the people’s life . . . on the other hand, the people’s life quickens, enlarges, and with a new dignity controls history and nature, as it is fed by the daily food which it receives from Science, Literature, and Philosophy.”<sup>17</sup> In other words philosophy both springs from the people and helps the people to attain its ends. It is not fundamentally at odds with society. Hale makes no mention in his lectures of the execution of Socrates.

Hale therefore has very much an “enlightenment” conception of liberal education’s relationship to society. Liberal education illuminates the social world in order that all its members may see and live better. It “lets in the light; it stains the panes; it paints the frescoes on the walls, while it gives its strength and symmetry to the whole.” There are no dangerous truths for Hale. All that can be known should be available for all to see. “In all true literature and science, there are no secret medicines or private paths. Everything is really patent. ‘Noblesse oblige’ and what a man discovers, he dis-covers: he opens it for universal good” (*ibid.*, p. 50). Moreover,

The man best fitted by his education to do the manly and godly service expected of an American citizen is not, by that fortune, in any jot separated from the people.

The people can lead him quite as much as his books can lead the people . . . The men of letters, the men of liberal education, are not to hold themselves in any sort

as parted from other workmen of the country or superior to them . . . Distrust the dainty advice, uttered no matter how gracefully, that you study science for herself, truth for itself, or literature, or philosophy. You study each and all, whatever you learn for mankind. (*Ibid.*, pp. 61–64)

Hale is, to be sure, careful to add a warning against the “quack or the demagogue who tries to make science or literature popular, by making either of them superficial, petty, or in any jot small” (*ibid.*, p. 65). But in saying this he does not imply that the political world is inherently problematic from the point of view of liberal education. Hale stays within the framework of politics altogether when discussing the requirements of education.

#### EDUCATION: CIVIC AND LIBERAL

Part of Hale’s concern is to make sure that education in America is, unlike that which the young Nolan received, truly “American education.” Hale’s starting point is the fact that “there is such a reality as American thought, [and] there are certain principles which belong to the American Government, [and] certain feelings which are experienced by none but an American.”<sup>18</sup> America is a “pure democracy” and “is a nation different from any other” (*ibid.*, pp. 71–72). The term “The People” in America designates the “We” in the Constitution. This “We” “is not a class; it is the whole, and this whole is sovereign.” Hence “with us any language which speaks contemptuously of this People is treason against the sovereign” (*ibid.*, p. 72). Thus for Hale the “trenchant satires upon democracy . . . of almost all the European schools” derive from their lack of appreciation that the people is the community not the rabble (*ibid.*).

For Hale American education cannot be European in nature because of a “difference of principle.” “We educate all the people with one motive; they educate a part of their people with another” (*ibid.*, p. 81). In discussing what he sees as a needed reform in American college education, which is for some public-spirited soul of wealth and benevolence to endow “one special professorship” in every first-class college “which should be the professorship of America,” Hale reveals the thought behind his conceit of having the young Nolan educated by a Spanish officer, a French merchant and an English tutor. The training of American youth should no longer be skewed by its confinement to “English newspapers, French novels, German philosophy, and, lately, Prussian religion” (*ibid.*, p. 82). An “accomplished man in each college” could “show young men and women that the Fathers of a century ago had the greatest genius for government which has ever been seen at one time, in one company of men” and that “the morals of Zola, and the dreams of Tolstoi and of Turgeneff, do not fit in with American character and surroundings” (*ibid.*, p. 83).

In what then is the intellect of the American sovereign, which is to say the people, to be trained? It will be trained firstly in the history of the people itself,

in the understanding of its government and administration, in the capacity to recognize genius when it crops up in its midst and in “the great lessons of mutual help and tolerance.” This training “will not try to make [the pupil] merely a student of language or indeed of any one science. There will be philologists enough, and men of science enough. We shall not crowd him, as a prince with Latin and Greek, or Sanskrit.”<sup>19</sup> The American model shall be George Washington, who “had no knowledge of any language but his own” but who “gained—by a training quite unlike that of the colleges—a strong and easy style of writing” (*ibid.*, p. 114). All this is to happen through such agencies as reading circles, Chautauqua and university extension—“adult education,” we might say today.<sup>20</sup>

We can say that Hale saw very clearly the tension between the principles of the American republic and the implicit effects of liberal education,<sup>21</sup> but he resolves this tension in favor of the democratic or civic side of liberal education rather than in the direction of its philosophic ends. While Tocqueville argues that the “threat” to liberty and civilization is no longer from the old order which was dying, but from the new democratic system which was gathering strength, Hale still speaks as though there is a danger from “feudalism” or “caste consciousness.”<sup>22</sup>

#### CHRISTIAN LIBERALISM VERSUS PAGAN ETHICS

We understand more clearly now Hale’s vantage point on the American civic condition and his concept of American citizenship. In his interpretation of American republicanism there is no room for a lofty distance from the popular concerns and democratic purposes of the American regime. We observe then that Hale’s republicanism is not to be confused with the tradition of aristocratic republicanism emanating out of Greece and Rome. This difference is at the root of Hale’s moral and political views. To understand Hale’s fundamental standpoint we must, above all, take into account his interpretation of Christianity and what it meant for the political world.

For Hale, Christianity is the fundamental event which divides the republican tradition of the United States from its antecedent in the classical world. In short, for Hale, the advent of Christianity reconciled once and for all vulgar and true virtue, or had the effect of bringing together the sphere of public life with the sphere of genuine truth. Whatever Hale takes to be the precise character of American republicanism, it is to be part of the “New Civilization” of Christianity rather than the “Old Civilization” of “paganism.”<sup>23</sup> This is made most apparent in his little essay entitled “The Old and the New Face to Face: A Thumb-Nail Sketch.” The scene Hale wants us to envisage here is the “culminating moment” of the old pre-Christian order.<sup>24</sup> At this “moment” we see the faith, courage and morality of St. Paul, side by side with “the moral results of the ancient civilization” represented by Seneca (*ibid.*, p. 74).

Hale says of Seneca's "system" that it indeed represented "the best of Roman morality and Greek philosophy, [but] still it was mean. His daring was the bravest of the men of the old civilization . . . Seneca dared say no more to Nero, to venture more with him, than did any other man" (*ibid.*, p. 80). Ancient philosophy was cowardly at its heart.

[A]ll that Seneca's daring could venture was to seduce the baby-tyrant into the least injurious of tyrannies. From the plunder of a province he would divert him by the carnage of the circus. From the murder of a senator he could lure him by some new lust at home. From the ruin of the Empire, he could seduce him by diverting him with the ruin of a noble family. And Seneca did this with the best of motives. He said he used all the power in his hands, and he thought he did. He was one of those men of whom all times have their share. The bravest of his time, he satisfied himself with alluring the beardless Emperor by petty crime from public wrong; he could flatter him to the expedient. He dared not order him to the right. (*Ibid.*, pp. 80–81)

Hale dismisses the whole philosophic tradition of advising tyrants.<sup>25</sup> He does not consider it an extenuating circumstance that Seneca could have been trying to moderate and improve a horrible regime by "working on" the tyrant, that Seneca might have been concerned to do what he could to improve a tyrannical order rather than simply to occupy the moral high ground. The morality of the philosopher is a low-stakes morality to Hale. It implies an exceedingly dim view of the world and of the prospects for improvement. Moreover, it may imply a certain sympathy with the tyrannical regime as being preferable to a democracy under the best circumstances. For Hale the first order of priority is to smite the tyrant hip and thigh with moral thunder, and damn the consequences. Seneca was concerned only to moderate the excesses of tyranny, whereas St. Paul was concerned to condemn the tyrant to his face.<sup>26</sup> Hale tries to articulate what he suspects might have been Seneca's thoughts on hearing St. Paul's address to the Emperor, which is to say his bearing witness to the encounter of "Faith on one side, before expediency and cruelty on the other!"<sup>27</sup>

This wild Easterner has rebuked the Emperor as I have so often wanted to rebuke him. He stood there, as I have wanted to stand, a man before a brute. He said what I have thought, and have been afraid to say. Downright, straightforward, he told the Emperor truths as to Rome, as to man, and as to his vices, which I have longed to tell him. He has done what I am afraid to do. He has dared this, which I have dallied with, and left undone. What is the mystery of his power?"<sup>28</sup>

In Hale's hands the tyrant and the philosopher both come to sight as pure "individualists." The tyrant will have the city with its people and its goods all to himself, while the philosopher seeks self-preservation in a cowardly calculating way. Only the Christian teaching can show the way beyond such "egoism"

in the direction of true morality. It can give reasons why one should surrender all for the sake of justice here and now. The Christian proves the genuineness of his philanthropy by brooking no compromise where justice and humanity are concerned.<sup>29</sup>

Given what we have seen of Hale's fundamental position above, it might appear that little more need be said. Hale preaches the individual's sociality because he is a Christian philanthropist, and human beings in all their need for justice and humanity are first to be found in one's own community. "[T]here is no success for a man if he try to live for himself, in himself, and by himself. He must live in the common life or he dies. He must enjoy with the joy of others; he must sorrow in their sorrow."<sup>30</sup>

But if we go deeper into the experience of Hale's Nolan, we find that Hale has created a more complicated picture. It would seem that despite or because of his best efforts to make the case for the essential need of the individual for his community, and for the morality of noble self-sacrifice, Hale ends up making a very strong case for the ennobling effects on the individual of exclusion from full membership in the community or for freedom from the demands of civic life.

#### NOLAN'S RE-EDUCATION

Nolan's isolation necessarily had the unintended effect of "educating" or more precisely, re-educating him. It turns out that during his exile Nolan became a great reader. A "system was adopted from the first about his books and other reading . . . everybody was permitted to lend him books, if they were not published in America and made no allusion to it" (*The Man Without a Country*, p. 18). Any "American content" had to be cut out of the material he could see. Such a proviso hardly resulted in the exclusion of the largest part of the Western literary tradition. But "[t]his was a little cruel sometimes, when the back of what was cut out might be as innocent as Hesiod" (p. 18) and "Philips swore old Shaw had cut out the *Tempest* from Shakespeare before he let Nolan have it, because he said 'the Bermudas ought to be ours, and by Jove, should be one day'" (p. 19). As it happened, Nolan had "quite a windfall" in the form of "a lot of English books" which an English Admiral had lent to officer Philips at the Cape of Good Hope. Amongst Nolan's main readings then were the Bible, Shakespeare, Walter Scott, Flechier's "Sermons" and the reports in the "foreign papers" of Napoleon's battles and Canning's speeches.

Thus as a man without a country Nolan made a life for himself in which "reading his notes were his profession." His life on board ship became as "methodical" as it had been chaotic back in the western states.

He said it did not do for anyone to try to read all the time, more than to do anything else all the time; but that he read just five hours a day. "Then," he said, "I keep up my notebooks, writing in them at such and such hours from what I have

been reading; and I include them in my scrap books." Those were very curious indeed. He had six or eight, of different subjects. There was one of History, one of Natural Science, one which he called "Odds and Ends." (P. 29)

Nolan's reading and note-taking "took five hours and two hours respectively of each day," and for "diversion" he would turn to his "Natural History," which would take "two hours a day more." "These nine hours made Nolan's regular daily 'occupation.'" Sometimes the men would bring Nolan birds and fish to study, "but on a long cruise he had to satisfy himself with centipedes and cockroaches and such small game. He was the only naturalist I ever met who knew anything about the habits of the house-fly and mosquito."<sup>31</sup>

Nolan's formal exclusion from civic life left him with no other option but to cultivate his mind. Thus he became in his life on the high seas a litterateur, a scientist, somewhat of a physician and a kind of poet-priest. But at the same time he did not lose his old "aristocratic" virtue of courage,<sup>32</sup> and for all the pain of his exile it seems evident that he grew in his humanity and dignity.<sup>33</sup> His exile made of him an excellent citizen "in absentia," as it were. Nolan becomes a better citizen despite or because of the fact that the rule of his "re-education" was that it be free from all content appertaining to his country.

#### PREACHING PATRIOTISM WHILE LIVING APART

At one point Nolan has occasion to play the role of an interpreter to a group of slaves liberated by his ship because he is the only man available who understands Portuguese. The slaves' emotional response to his explaining that they were to be taken back to their homes moves Nolan to give a little sermon to his young friend Ingham on the relationship of the individual to his country.

Youngster, let that show you what it is to be without a family, without a home and without a country. And if you are ever tempted to say a word or do something that shall put a bar between you and your family, your home and your country, pray God in His mercy to take you that instant home to His own heaven. Stick by your family, boy; forget you have a self, while you do everything for them. (P. 35)

Thus Nolan seems to be recommending to the young boy to seek the opposite situation to his own, in which he can have no other concern or focus for his life than himself. Uncompromising dedication to family and country is to be preferred to a self-absorbed existence where the other human beings encountered are merely means to the basic necessities of existence such as food and shelter. It seems that Nolan's own intellectual progress and his appreciation of the human costs of being stateless or "without a country" advance in tandem. The more learned he becomes, the more emphatic he is that the citizen should view his country as his mother. In other words Nolan recommends the virtues of civic dedication in inverse proportion to his own connection to such a life.

But there is a fundamental disjunction between Nolan's own virtues and the virtues he preaches to the boy. Nowhere in his little sermon on love of country do the words "mind," "knowledge" or "intelligence" appear. Nowhere in it does he allude to the years of study he has pursued as result of his being exiled. The contradiction between Nolan's little sermon and his actual dealings with Ingham is apparent in the role Nolan played in Ingham's "formal" education. Ingham explains that Nolan taught him "a great deal of my mathematics . . . lent me books, and helped me about my reading" (p. 36). This had a lifelong impact, as indicated by the fact that we first meet Ingham "devouring to the very stubble all the current literature [he] could get hold of" (p. 7). How could Nolan have played this role if he had not been absorbed with his researches and studies, which is to say preoccupied solely with his own interests, for all those years? Would he have been a competent teacher if he had not blurted out his shocking statement at the court martial and thereby had remained a "full citizen?"

But if Nolan has palpably improved in all the virtues as a result of the strange twist of fate that placed him outside the pale of political or civic life, why does he not encourage his young friend or anybody else to try to maneuver himself into a position, certainly not of exile, but reminiscent of his own in that the "life of the mind" and the study of natural phenomena are the major pre-occupations?

In answer to this question we must recall that Nolan's "liberation" from the demands of his society was forced on him in the sense that his life situation was not something that he chose directly for himself. It was not by natural inclination that he came to lead his life in pursuit of knowledge but by force of circumstance.<sup>34</sup> His new-found virtues went "against the grain" of his earlier, "freer" life where he had other options, such as soldier or adventurer, to choose from. Thus the attainment of his new virtue was at the cost of certain basic natural inclinations that would have had free play back "on land." We might say that on land the lower and more naturally powerful of Nolan's inclinations would have submerged the higher, while this situation was reversed in his unique or "artificial" situation at sea.

#### INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

Despite his early conduct Nolan must have had a good nature underneath all his youthful wildness, somewhat like Prince Hal in *Henry IV*, who would later become the all-conquering Henry V. Otherwise he would not have gone so far in the acquisition of knowledge and the development of his character while floating on the oceans of the world. In the case of Nolan we are dealing not with the pure philosopher nor with a totally undistinguished and ungifted type. Rather we are dealing with the kind of individual who, although perhaps not

originally destined to lead the purely philosophical life, is nevertheless well enough endowed by nature to be capable of capitalizing on a situation where the acquisition of learning and the pursuit of the sciences is the only path left open to his mind.

Nolan then is of a type that is susceptible to both the call of his intellect and the call of his community. As such he is neither a total solitary who is by nature fitted for life alone, nor is he simply the citizen and nothing more, who receives full human satisfaction simply by virtue of belonging to, and participating in, the life of the community. To the extent then that Nolan is a “hybrid,” which is to say not totally satisfied or fulfilled by his pursuit of knowledge or totally overcoming all the natural inclinations which tended to link him to the life of the community, we can appreciate how drastic a punishment he had received.<sup>35</sup>

Nolan’s agonies in exile serve to show just how “superior” as a human type (to use Aristotle’s terminology), he would have to have been in order for him to be truly indifferent to the fact of his exile, which is to say truly free from all possible concern or attachment to the land of his birth, to his family and to his “past,” so to speak.<sup>36</sup> But being “neither beast nor god” as Aristotle says the man without a city must be, Nolan must endure the costs, even as he takes advantage of the benefits, of his isolated position.<sup>37</sup>

The life of philosophy or science is only a possibility opened up by human society, and is no more the explicit purpose of that society’s coming into existence than it is the explicit purpose of the United States Navy to provide the conditions for the flourishing of such a fine human being as Philip Nolan. The community as such does not philosophize and has other concerns than the perfection of the intellect. It must first absorb itself with external security and internal order. It must then pay heed to producing a citizen body that will assume the responsibilities that accompany the end of perpetuating the community’s existence. Citizens are expected to obey the law, participate in government, serve in the defense forces, etc. And nobody seriously claims that these requirements on the part of the community are unreasonable.

But it is clear that these reasonable demands are at odds with the ultimate requirements of philosophy or intellectual virtue. Nolan becomes who he is because he found peace and extended periods of “uninterrupted” time aboard ship. Although Nolan is a kind of prisoner, he is at permanent leisure, while his keepers or supervisors are obliged to work and to fulfil their naval responsibilities.<sup>38</sup> He could do what he did precisely because he is not part of the ship’s crew and therefore has none of the demanding responsibilities of a crew member. Nolan’s experience is a paradigm of the relation of intellectual to simply civic virtue.

Nolan’s strange case serves to remind us of the ambiguity of human nature insofar as it includes both individualist and communitarian tendencies. His becoming a somewhat outstanding human being in exile reminds us that we must

expect to feel and appear different from the community norm if we would pursue "self-improvement," to use John Stuart Mill's phrase for our highest individual obligation. The approach to true virtue involves a kind of transformation or conversion, such as Nolan seems to have experienced, from an earlier, inadequate, civic or social stage, into a later, more fully human, individual stage. But the fact that Nolan's achievement of a high degree of human excellence is not accompanied by the fullest personal happiness also reminds us of the tension between the full development of individual potential and simple or ordinary happiness or contentment. The case of "The Man Without a Country" shows us that the situation of those individuals who by whatever means come to cultivate virtues not strictly required or even appreciated by the civic order is ambiguous from the point of view of happiness.

Nolan's nobility seems to consist in the way he accepts the situation in which his imprudence as a youth placed him. He "repented of his folly, and then like a man submitted to the fate he had asked for."<sup>39</sup> In his acceptance of his fate or situation Nolan approaches the life of the philosopher who above all does not complain about the dominion of chance over human life. He accepts his lot by recognizing that some things are forever outside one's control, especially one's past errors and the consequences that flow from them.

#### CONCLUSION

We must conclude from a study of Hale's great story in the light of his general political principles that while it may make a dramatic plea for patriotism it fails to persuade us of the ultimate sociality of mankind. Hale's story seems, on the surface at least, to demonstrate his claim that the "human race is the individual of which men and women are so many separate cells, or organs." His account of Nolan's "re-education" in exile seems to describe the reintegration of the unfortunate man into the community, to the principles of which he had not been properly educated, but from which he had been expelled. In the course of the story Hale necessarily reveals the interdependence of this re-education and Nolan's basic condition of alienation from the community. But if, in his very description of the human need for society, Hale is forced to show that, in the decisive respect of the acquisition of wisdom or knowledge, man cannot be a fully social being, has he not conceded the point that the individual is ultimately of higher dignity than the community and is therefore not simply social?

Hale's case for the community and against "individualism" may work for all the ordinary purposes of showing how "no man is an island." Hale would certainly say that his defense of human sociality is at the same time a case for the fuller development of the individual. But in the final analysis his suggestion that dedication to the community or philanthropical benevolence should be our

determining principle cannot be the last word. This is because of the fact that the development of Nolan's natural potential is connected to his loss of full membership in the community. Nolan's "self-realization" is a double-edged sword. On the one hand it involves a fuller appreciation of his fundamental dependence on the community, and on the other hand it involves his transcending the level of community "consciousness" through the cultivation of his reason and his intellect. This fuller intellectual development may not ultimately be an adequate compensation for the pain of his exiled condition, but this simply shows not that man is by nature social, but that "the virtues of our composite nature are human . . . [and] the excellence of reason is a thing apart."<sup>40</sup>

## NOTES

1. John R. Adams, *Edward Everett Hale* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1977), p. 27.

2. Hale himself gave a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding his story's composition. He explains that he was influenced by the careers of Vallandigham, who was expelled from Ohio for opposing the Union cause, and of Napoleon, who suffered his exile on St. Helena. He notes that at a time when it was thought "that the United States *are* a confederacy" (emphasis Hale's), "any lesson was well received by persons of conscience which showed, either positively or negatively, what the word 'Patriotism' means,—or what one's Country is" ("Author's Note to Edition of 1897," in Edward Everett Hale, *The Man Without a Country and Other Stories* [Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1899], pp. 3–4).

3. Adams summarizes the story's commercial career as follows: "How many anthologies included *The Man Without a Country* is mere speculation, as is also the number of translations. In addition to the printed trade editions, it appeared in Pitman, Graham, and Gregg shorthand; in braille; and as a comic paperback. Numerous inexpensive school editions with suitably educational introductions are accompanied by a patriotic edition sponsored by the Veterans of Foreign Wars and an expensive illustrated volume for the Limited Editions Club (1936) with an introduction by Carl Van Doren. It has been recited on phonograph records; and it has been rewritten for radio programs and, as late as 1973, for a national television network. Although it has been staged as a one act play, it has also been published by Samuel French as a play in three acts, prologue, and epilogue. A commercial moving picture was made in Hollywood, and an operatic version was composed by Walter Damrosch and was sung at the Metropolitan Opera" (*Edward Everett Hale*, p. 35).

4. Francis R. Gemme, *The Man Without a Country and Other Stories* (New York: Delta, 1969), pp. 4, 7.

5. Edward Everett Hale, *The Man Without a Country and Other Tales* (New York: Magnum Books, 1968), p. 28. All page references not otherwise identified are to this edition.

6. John R. Adams says that Nolan's "irregular education, pieced together from private British tutors and by association with foreign commercial interests, had lacked the moral discipline to temper the swagger of an impatient aristocratic youth" (*Edward Everett Hale*, p. 28).

7. "The liberal man will need money for the doing of his liberal deeds, and the just man too for the returning of services . . . and the brave man will need power if he is to accomplish any of the acts that correspond to his virtue, and the temperate man will need opportunity; for how else is either he or any of the others to be recognized? . . . for deeds many things are needed, and more, the greater and nobler the deeds are" (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1178a30–38).

8. Nolan's situation is akin to that of Defoe's Robinson Crusoe, in that he has been born and reared in society and subsequently cast out. But in Crusoe's case it was the blind forces of nature combined with his proneness to take risks that ushered him to a life without society. In the case of Nolan it was "politics" that forced the change, or more precisely the political climate combined

with youthful rashness. Moreover, Nolan is not devoid of all human company whatsoever, as was Robinson, as he is aboard ship and not on a desert island. But ultimately this situation only serves to make Nolan's fate all the more painful. He is within range of "society" but cannot really participate in it. And of course he never again saw his homeland, while Robinson served only twenty-seven years on his island. Defoe is obviously an intellectual source for Hale. More generally Hale seems to have been under the influence of Fichte, Tolstoi, Dickens, Bunyan, Scott and others.

9. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), chap. xiii, p.186.

10. In the eighteenth century Montesquieu had said that "where we find man we find him together with others," and following this lead philosophers such as Hume, Paley and Bentham rejected the idea of the State of Nature as a "philosophical fiction" (See Henry D. Aiken, ed., *Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy* [New York: Hafner, 1972], p. 189). Thus British liberalism became "utilitarian liberalism," with its "greatest happiness of the greatest number" principle, while American liberalism continued to talk in terms of the "rights of man." Hale the American patriot would seem to want to keep the rights but abandon the "fiction" out of which they grew.

11. Nolan's life on naval vessels was of course without the distraction of female company. Once at a ball at Naples he had a chance to dance with a southern beauty, but when the topic of "home" arose, she "left poor Nolan alone, as he always was." Nolan "did not dance again" (p. 25). Because he is truly without regular relations to the general membership of any political community, he must perforce spend his days without prospect of family life.

12. Edward Everett Hale, "Democracy and a Liberal Education," in *Addresses and Essays on Subjects of History Education and Government* (Boston: Little Brown, 1900), p.48.

13. Hobbes supplied six reasons why Hale must be wrong. Firstly man is in competition for honor and dignity; he constantly compares himself to others; he "thinks himself wiser and able to govern the Publique, better than the rest"; he can make judgments of good and evil, "discontenting men, and troubling their peace"; he is "most troublesome when he is at ease"; and his agreement "is by Covenant only, which is Artificial" (*Leviathan*, chap. xvii, pp.225-26).

14. Unlike Hale Aristotle draws a very clear distinction between man and the bees, in that "man is much more a political animal than any kind of bee or any herd animal . . . [because] man alone among the animals has speech . . . [and] speech serves to reveal the advantageous and the harmful, and hence also the just and the unjust" (*Politics*, 1253a10). Aristotle then, does not say that man is more "social" in the sense of naturally more in harmony than the bees. Man is more political than the bees, but this means that his capacity to speak about the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, the advantageous and the disadvantageous makes him more likely to be in conflict, making his community more tenuous and his "socialization" crucial.

15. McCosh was Professor at Queen's University, Belfast, before moving to Princeton. McCosh agrees with Hale that American education has danced to European music and that this is unfortunate. But the issue for McCosh is whether "America has arrived at a stage at which there is a body of men and women who have leisure and taste to cultivate the liberal arts and advance the higher forms of civilization" ("General Introduction: What an American Philosophy Should Be," in *Realistic Philosophy Defended in a Philosophic Series*. 2 vols. [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1887], 1:1). According to McCosh, America is ready. "The time has come, I believe, for America to declare her independence in philosophy . . . she should require that her philosophy have a character of its own." According to McCosh, "Yankees are distinguished from most others by their practical observation and invention . . . The American philosophy will therefore be a REALISM, opposed to IDEALISM on the one hand and to AGNOSTICISM on the other" (*ibid.*, pp.2-3). In a word, while acknowledging the merits of the thought of Locke, Berkeley, Leibnitz, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Mill and Spencer, McCosh explains that America must "naturalize" these "imports." "[A]s with the emigrants who land on her shores, in regard to whom she insists that they speak her language and conform to her laws; so she should require that her philosophy have a character of its own" (*ibid.* p.3).

16. Tocqueville allowed with Hale that it would be dangerous to have the older education given to individuals who must face a society grounded on entirely different principles and requiring entirely other skills. "It is evident that in democratic communities the interest of individuals as well as the security of the commonwealth demands that the education of the greater number should be

scientific, commercial, and industrial rather than literary Greek and Latin should not be taught in all the schools." But at a certain point Tocqueville decisively parts company with Hale. He insists on the importance to American life of the "few," the "true scholars," the "elite." "It is important that those who, by their natural disposition or their fortune, are destined to cultivate letters or prepared to relish them should find schools where a complete knowledge of ancient literature may be acquired and where the true scholar may be formed" (Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*. 2 vols. [New York: Vintage Books, 1945], 2:66).

17. *Ibid.*, p.46. One could say on Hale's behalf that he is arguing that philosophy must root itself in the real "flesh and blood" issues of life lest it become simple star-gazing, like the natural philosopher Socrates in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. Philosophy should return to "the cave" from time to time in order not to lose its human bearings. But in the authentically philosophical tradition there is always an "outside" of the cave, and the prime concern is that a few should be able to make their escape into the light or to turn their back on the life of the city. Hale holds back from such thoughts.

18. "The Professor in America," in *Addresses and Essays*, p.66.

19. "The Education of a Prince," in *Addresses and Essays*, p.117.

20. According to Hale, "the feudal critics, the people who believe in government by caste" fail to see the importance for education and democracy of the distinction between labor and work. Labor is simple brute effort, and it is the lot of only about 10 per cent of the American population, while work, which "is labor inspired by the Holy Spirit," is the lot of about 90 per cent. According to Hale, the overwhelming majority of this overwhelming majority "are to receive a liberal education" (*ibid.* p.124).

21. Hale was worried that the kind of liberal education that McCosh and Tocqueville recommended to the best colleges might have some "un-American" effects. Hale complained about the "Eurocentrism" of college education in his day, meaning that it was not focussed enough on the requirements of American life. Today Hale's own Americanized education would fall under the label of "Eurocentrism," since for all Hale's concern about cleansing American education of its Europeanizing influences, he still conceived of America in terms of the Western experience. Although the term might not be used, the implicit meaning of today's campaign for "political correctness" is also that liberal education is "un-American." Paradoxically, however, the view that such high-quality liberal arts training is not right for America is expressed in precisely those institutions to which McCosh and Tocqueville looked as its home.

22. Tocqueville describes *the* American danger in the following terms: "I know of no country in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in America . . . there the body is left free, and the soul is enslaved . . . The majority lives in the perpetual utterance of self applause, and there are certain truths which the Americans can learn only from strangers or from experience" (*Democracy in America*, 1:274-75). "The public, therefore, among a democratic people, has a singular power, which aristocratic nations cannot conceive; for it does not persuade others to its beliefs, but it imposes them, and makes them permeate the thinking of everyone by a sort of enormous pressure of the mind of all upon the individual intelligence" (*ibid.*, 2:11).

23. Hale then is manifestly not a classic, eighteenth-century enlightenment liberal like Edward Gibbon. In Gibbon's hands historical Christianity always has the color of intolerance about it, while paganism is portrayed as tolerance itself. "Such was the mild spirit of antiquity, that the nations were less attentive to the differences than to the resemblances of their religious worship" (*The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* [New York: Dell, 1963], p.44).

24. "The Old and the New Face to Face: A Thumbnail Sketch," in *The Man Without a Country and Other Tales*, p.77.

25. In Book V of the *Politics* Aristotle does not refrain from showing how a tyrant may be preserved in his position by transforming himself into "the manager of the city" or becoming a competent ruler (*Politics*, 1314b7). References to the classical thinkers' openness to advising tyrants how better to do their job may of course be multiplied.

26. Whatever one may say about the adequacy of Hale's treatment of Seneca, it should be observed that it has the merit of not minimizing the distance between Seneca's famous Stoicism and Christianity. Hale is not influenced by what W. E. H. Lecky describes as the "many curious

coincidences of phraseology . . . between the writings of Seneca and the epistles of St. Paul.” According to Lecky, “[To] suppose that his [Seneca’s] system of morals is in any degree formed after the model, or under the influence of Christianity, is to be blind to the most obvious characteristics of both Christianity and Stoicism; for no other moralist could be so aptly selected as representing their extreme divergence. Of [the essential characteristics of Christianity] all the teaching of Seneca is the direct antithesis. Careless of the future world, and profoundly convinced of the supreme majesty of man, he labored to emancipate his disciples ‘from every fear of God and man;’ and the proud language in which he claimed for the sage an equality with the gods, represents, perhaps, the highest point to which philosophic arrogance has been carried” (W.E.H. Lecky, *History of European Morals*. 2 vols., (New York: D.Appleton,1875), 1:363–64).

27. “The Old and the New Face to Face,” p.81.

28. *Ibid.*, p.83. Hale in criticizing Seneca makes no mention of the most salient features of his life. He does not mention the fact that Seneca was banished by the Emperor Claudius, that he was accused of complicity in Piso’s conspiracy against Nero and was ordered by the tyrant to end his life, which he did in a manner more or less identical to that of Socrates in the *Phaedo*. Thus Hale does not detail the ultimate cost of crossing swords with tyrants, as indeed Seneca, as well as the Christian Paul, was guilty of doing. His purpose is rather to associate pagan philosophy with cowardice and Christianity with moral courage, regardless of historical fact.

29. Hale’s Christianity may be called “Lockean” Christianity, but it is obviously held more genuinely or “literally” than it was by Locke. Before the advent of Christianity, Locke says, “Those just measures of right and wrong, which necessity had anywhere introduced, the civil laws prescribed, or philosophy recommended, stood on their true foundations. They were looked on as bonds of society, and conveniences of common life, and laudable practices. But where was it that their obligation was thoroughly known and allowed, and they received as precepts of law; of the highest law, the law of nature?” But Jesus Christ has “changed the nature of things in the world and given the advantage to piety over all that could tempt or deter men from it” by bringing “life and immortality to light” and opening humanity’s eyes “upon the endless, unspeakable joys of another life” (*The Reasonableness of Christianity* [London: Rivington et al., 1824], secs.243–45).

30. “Democracy and Liberal Education,” p.50. Compare John Stuart Mill: “In the Republic, which has [the definition of Justice] for its express purpose, and travels through the whole process of constructing an ideal commonwealth to arrive at it, the result is brought out that Justice is synonymous with the complete supremacy of Reason in the soul [but resolving] justice, pre-eminently the social virtue . . . into the supremacy of reason within our own minds [involves] a disregard of the fact that the idea and sentiment of virtue have their foundation not exclusively in the self-regarding, but also, and even more directly, in the social feelings: a truth first fully accepted by the Stoics, who have the glory of being the earliest thinkers who grounded the obligation of morals on the brotherhood of the whole human race” (“Grote’s Plato,” *Edinburgh Review* [April, 1866], p.171). It is worth noting here that while Mill praises the Stoics for the “glory” of their ethical conceptions, which included the brotherhood of man, Hale describes the great Stoic Seneca as a morally bankrupt symbol of the depravity of ancient morals.

31. Like that other character who in Aristophanes’ *Clouds* lived outside the bounds of his political community—the philosopher Socrates—Nolan spent his time in the study of nature, in particular in the study of household insects. In the humorous presentation by Aristophanes it was the study of the digestive system of gnats which absorbed Socrates’ attention. The individual may independently become entirely indifferent to the political or social realm, as in the case of the Aristophanic Socrates, or he may be expelled and exiled from this realm, as in the case of Nolan. But the cause of this condition in the case of Socrates is the same as the effect of it in the case of Nolan, i.e., the study of the natural world, or, more generally, a fascination with the natural order. It seems that, potentially at least, the individual, whether somehow innately indifferent to, or expelled from civic membership, finds his home in nature. He substitutes the order of nature for the political order as the fundamental “world” in which he lives and breathes.

32. In one of “the great frigate duels with the English in which the navy was really baptized,” Nolan took over a cannon crew and, using the artillery skills he acquired in his youth in the army, led them through the battle. After this episode the Commodore said, “[W]e are all very grateful to

you today; you are one of us today; you will be named in the dispatches" (*The Man Without a Country*, p.27).

33. "He always kept up his exercise and I never heard that he was ill. If any other man was ill, he was the kindest nurse in the world; and he knew more than half the surgeons do. Then if anybody was sick or died, or if the captain wanted him to on any other occasion, he was always ready to read prayers. I have remarked that he read beautifully" (*ibid.*, p.30).

34. Nolan's situation in some respects reminds us of Rousseau. "The most sociable and the most loving of humans has been proscribed from society by unanimous agreement . . . I would have loved men in spite of themselves." Rousseau's being forced out of the fellowship of human beings and thereby being excluded from the pleasures and happinesses it can bring, although it was ultimately liberating from all cares, was at the same time also a terrible fate. (See *The Reveries of a Solitary Walker*, trans. Charles E. Butterworth [New York: Harper and Row, 1979], pp.1-5.)

35. Socrates, it would appear, did not want his ultimate rejection of the final authority of the political community on questions of the just and the unjust, or the best way of life for man, to be taken simply for a cold indifference to his "home and hearth" and to his fellow citizens. In his *Apology to the Jury* he says to his fellow countrymen: "I, men of Athens, salute you and love you," even as he says he will defy the City's commands and "not stop philosophizing"(29d2-4), And later in the trial, just before the vote to convict (34d3-5), he says to the jury, "I, best of men, surely do have some family; for this is also just what Homer says: not even I have grown up 'from an oak or a rock,' but from human beings." Thus the philosopher in his alienation from, and indeed fatal opposition to the City, must try to impress upon his fellow citizens that he is very much like them, and that they should not take him for some sort of freak of nature devoid of all human sentiments.

36. "But such a life [contemplating the truth] would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him; and by so much as this is superior to our composite nature is its activity superior to that which is the exercise of the other [practical] kind of virtue. If reason is divine, then in comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life" (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177a25-1178a5).

37. "He who is without a city through nature rather than chance is either a mean sort or superior to man. . . . One who is incapable of participating or who is in need of nothing through being self-sufficient is no part of a city, and so is either beast or god" (*Politics*, 1253a1-5; 27-28).

38. "And happiness is thought to depend on leisure; for we are busy that we may have leisure . . . and the self-sufficiency, leisureliness, unweariedness (so far as this is possible for man) are evidently . . . connected with the activity of reason which is contemplative" (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177b5-250).

39. "Finally, feeling that all my efforts were useless and that I was tormenting myself to no avail, I took the only course which remained—that of submitting to my fate without railing against necessity any longer. I have found compensation for all my hurts in this resignation through the tranquility it provides me . . ." (Rousseau, *Reveries*, p.2).

40. *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1178a20-22.