

# Interpretation

A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Spring 1995

Volume 22 Number 3

- 301 Leo Strauss Two Lectures
- 339 Mark Blitz Plato's *Alcibiades I*
- 359 Jacob A. Howland Aristotle on Tragedy: Rediscovering the *Poetics*
- Discussion*
- 405 Dorothy L. Sayers Aristotle on Detective Fiction
- Review Essays*
- 417 Daniel J. Mahoney Modern Man and Man *Tout Court*: The Flight from Nature and the Modern Difference, Review Essay on *La Cité de l'homme*, by Pierre Manent
- 439 Peter McNamara Popular Government and Effective Government, Review Essay on *The Effective Republic*, by Harvey Flaumenhaft, and *Alexander Hamilton and the Political Order*, by Morton J. Frisch

# Interpretation

- Editor-in-Chief Hilail Gildin, Dept. of Philosophy, Queens College  
Executive Editor Leonard Grey  
General Editors Seth G. Benardete • Charles E. Butterworth •  
Hilail Gildin • Robert Horwitz (d. 1987) •  
Howard B. White (d. 1974)
- Consulting Editors Christopher Bruell • Joseph Cropsey • Ernest L.  
Fortin • John Hallowell (d. 1992) • Harry V. Jaffa •  
David Lowenthal • Muhsin Mahdi • Harvey C.  
Mansfield • Arnaldo Momigliano (d. 1987) • Michael  
Oakeshott (d. 1990) • Ellis Sandoz • Leo Strauss (d.  
1973) • Kenneth W. Thompson
- International Editors Terence E. Marshall • Heinrich Meier  
Editors Wayne Ambler • Maurice Auerbach • Fred Baumann  
• Michael Blaustein • Patrick Coby • Thomas S.  
Engeman • Edward J. Erler • Maureen Feder-Marcus  
• Joseph E. Goldberg • Steven Harvey • Pamela K.  
Jensen • Ken Masugi • Grant B. Mindle • James W.  
Morris • Will Morrisey • Susan Orr • Charles T.  
Rubin • Leslie G. Rubin • Susan Shell • Richard  
Velkley • Bradford P. Wilson • Michael Zuckert •  
Catherine Zuckert
- Manuscript Editor Lucia B. Prochnow  
Subscriptions Subscription rates per volume (3 issues):  
individuals \$25  
libraries and all other institutions \$40  
students (four-year limit) \$16  
Single copies available.  
Postage outside U.S.: Canada \$4.50 extra;  
elsewhere \$5.40 extra by surface mail (8 weeks  
or longer) or \$11.00 by air.  
Payments: in U.S. dollars AND payable by  
a financial institution located within the U.S.A.  
(or the U.S. Postal Service).

---

THE JOURNAL WELCOMES MANUSCRIPTS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS WELL AS THOSE  
IN THEOLOGY, LITERATURE AND JURISPRUDENCE.

---

CONTRIBUTORS should follow *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 13th ed. or manuals  
based on it; double-space their manuscripts, including notes; place references in the  
text, in endnotes or follow current journal style in printing references. Words from  
languages not rooted in Latin should be transliterated to English. To ensure  
impartial judgment of their manuscripts, contributors should omit mention of their  
other work; put, on the title page only, their name, any affiliation desired, address  
with postal/zip code in full, and telephone. Contributors using computers should, if  
possible, provide a character count of the entire manuscript. Please send THREE  
clear copies, which will not be returned.

---

Composition by Eastern Composition, Inc.,  
Binghamton, N.Y. 13905 U.S.A.  
Printed and bound by Wickersham Printing Co.,  
Lancaster, PA 17603 U.S.A.

Inquiries: Patricia D'Allura, Assistant to the Editor,  
INTERPRETATION, Queens College, Flushing, N.Y.  
11367-1597, U.S.A. (718)997-5542

# Popular Government and Effective Government

PETER MCNAMARA

*Utah State University*

Harvey Flaumenhaft, *The Effective Republic: Administration and Constitution in the Thought of Alexander Hamilton* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992, x + 314 pp., \$34.50 cloth).

Morton J. Frisch, *Alexander Hamilton and the Political Order: An Interpretation of His Political Thought and Practice* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991), xi + 118 pp., \$28.00 cloth.

*The Effective Republic*, by Harvey Flaumenhaft, and *Alexander Hamilton and the Political Order*, by Morton Frisch, two longtime students of Hamilton, are particularly useful and timely pieces of work, for they allow us access to the thoughts of one of the first great theorists of both activist government and the American Presidency. Those readers with less sympathy for Hamilton than Flaumenhaft and Frisch may draw different conclusions after considering Hamilton's ideas, but they are certain to benefit from the exercise.

## I

Flaumenhaft's book provides a rigorous and thought-provoking account of Hamilton's understanding of the relationship between the written Constitution of the Framers and what Hamilton saw as the necessity of an "efficacious administration." Flaumenhaft's style is unusual. He has chosen to let us see the great debates of the Founding period through Hamilton's eyes. Indeed, for the most part, he uses Hamilton's own words, ranging far and wide over Hamilton's writings in order to distil his political principles. While this approach might annoy some readers, it fulfills admirably Flaumenhaft's intention of making Hamilton our teacher and letting the author recede into the background (pp. 2, 265). Without being a biography, the book does reflect the course of Hamilton's controversial career: it begins and ends with Hamilton engaged in the struggle for liberty, while the central part deals with his thoughts on administration.

In the first part, Flaumenhaft attempts to set out Hamilton's understanding of the ends of government as well as the primary means for securing those ends. Flaumenhaft's Hamilton is a thorough modern who rejects the spirited politics of antiquity because of its inhumanity. The purpose of politics is not to

provide an arena for the display of one's virtue, but rather it is to secure the natural rights of man. These are best secured in a society where citizens devote themselves to profits rather than to politics, war, or religion and where the "polemic polity of spiritedness" gives way to a "politics of administration" (pp. 15–40, 71–72). In order to effect the purposes of government, the new politics relies on the clever construction of institutions rather than on the rhetorical feats of, say, a Pericles who was able to reduce the many Athenian wills to one will (p. 70).

Flaumenhaft's presentation of Hamilton's views is forceful and well documented, but it is, perhaps, a little misleading in at least one important respect. Hamilton thought that many of his opponents exaggerated the extent to which enlightened modernity had transformed the character of political life. On the critical question of the effect of commerce on international relations, for example, Hamilton was far less sanguine than his opponents that international peace would follow the spread of commerce. Thus, when compared with his contemporaries rather than with ancient philosophers and statesmen, Hamilton appears, to a significant extent, to affirm rather than deny the continuity of ancient with modern politics.

As to the means of securing the natural rights of man, Flaumenhaft's Hamilton believes that while popular representation is essential for ensuring that the ends of government remain popular, it is not sufficient. For these ends to be realized in practice an "efficacious administration" is necessary. In other words, an "effective republic" must be created. This task is the focus of the central part of Flaumenhaft's book. Hamilton's enemies portrayed him as the leader of the "monocratic" party that sought to subvert, rather than perfect, popular government. Hamilton, to use Flaumenhaft's words, responded by accusing them of advocating a form of government that *affected* popular workings, rather than truly *effecting* popular works (p. 70). Hamilton's emphasis on the necessity of an efficacious administration made him a controversial figure for, as Flaumenhaft points out, what is necessary to effect popular ends is, often, not popular (p. 79). In the case of the executive, for example, the key to an efficacious administration is "energy," and the chief ingredients of energy, as explained in *The Federalist*, Number 72, are "unity" and "duration." Neither of these ingredients sits well with what Hamilton called "maxims of republican jealousy" that hold that power should be placed in many hands and for short periods of time. Flaumenhaft discusses at length Hamilton's understanding of how the new Constitution incorporated unity and duration in the office of the President and in the body of the Senate.

What makes Flaumenhaft's discussion of the Presidency particularly relevant is his claim that the separation of powers serves not only to check abuses of power, but also to energize government. If correct, the Wilsonian critique of the Constitution's separation of powers, which underlies the now dominant

progressive understanding of the Presidency, is founded on an important misconception. Wilson believed that the separation of powers tends to frustrate necessary policy measures. In order to overcome it, a President, Wilson taught, must assume the role of national leader; persuading the people, leading them, and even inspiring them to support his program. Flaumenhaft's account of Hamilton suggests that the Wilsonian strategy might in practice lead to less rather than more energetic government.

For government to be safe and effective, powers must be separated into their kinds; there must be a "diversification" as well as a division of powers (p. 69). A simple division of power makes government neither safe nor effective because it results in a power struggle among separate but similar institutions. This struggle will, in turn, lead either to paralysis or to anarchy. Paralysis cannot be a permanent state of affairs because, as Hamilton states, and as Flaumenhaft rightly emphasizes, the public business must go forward. One possibility is that an "extra-constitutional" government that can truly govern will spring up, leaving the formal government as a screen for the behind-the-scenes activity of a boss. If instead, paralysis gives way to chaos, chaos will eventually give way to order imposed by a tyrant (pp. 163, 192). The alternatives to a properly constructed constitutional government are, then, the tyrant or the boss.

Diversification is not an arbitrary process. Each power has its own inherent nature and ought to be assigned to a separate branch of government (p. 89). What kind of power is executive power? Flaumenhaft draws attention to Hamilton's important distinction between "administration" in the broadest sense which encompasses all the operations of government, and administration in its more precise sense, meaning matters of "executive detail" (pp. 69, 87). In this latter sense, administration is properly the preserve of the executive, because the factional bickering, compromises, and delays which are common to assemblies of representatives make them unsuitable for administering such details (p. 84). The cause of good government had been harmed, observes Hamilton, by the tendency of the Continental Congress to engage itself in the details of administration (p. 85–86). It ought, as any legislative body ought, to have confined itself to generalities, that is to say, to making laws. The administration of details requires the constant attention of officers who possess the necessary expertise, sufficient tenure of office, and who are individually accountable for their performance. It is the responsibility of the *chief* executive officer to hold subordinate officers responsible. It is his duty; it is also in his interest as he, being one alone, is solely accountable for the performance of his officers. The executive is, when properly constructed, the home of "responsibility" in government (pp. 96–98, 113–18, 285 n.5). Energy in the executive, argues Flaumenhaft's Hamilton, does not involve any violation of the independence of the legislative branch. While it might involve a sacrifice of the vanity of legislators, in substance it requires only that Congress refrain from entering into the

details of administration and that Congress consult executive ministers when deliberating. Congress retains the right to inspect the conduct of ministers, to accept or reject their plans, and to originate its own plans (p. 85–86).

In order to improve administration in the larger sense of that term (encompassing the legislative, executive, and judicial functions), the executive is given through a qualified veto a share in the legislative power, chiefly for reasons of self-defense, but also in order to check the momentary impulses of the legislative branch or, at times, even the people (pp. 111–12). The job of the executive is to *resist* and *persist* (p. 117). According to Flaumenhaft's Hamilton, administration in this broader sense is also made more efficacious by the establishment of the Senate—a body not only less numerous than the House, but having the longest tenure of office of any of the elected parts of the government (pp. 133–57). Thus, the executive lends energy and the Senate stability to governmental measures, both of which advance the cause of good administration.

In the final part of the book, Flaumenhaft returns to Hamilton's concern for liberty. He spells out, first, the grounds for Hamilton's opposition to Jefferson's attack on the judiciary. Hamilton believed that it was the independence of the judiciary from legislative and executive interference that secured the constitutional order in place, thereby making it a stable whole. A tenure of "good behavior" is the key to judicial independence, and it was this security that Hamilton judged as threatened by Jefferson's attempt to repeal the Judiciary Act (pp. 204–40). This story is well known, but two other aspects of Flaumenhaft's account in this part of the book bear particular mention because they are less familiar. Both concern Hamilton's argument in *The People v. Crosswell* (1804), in which Hamilton defended a newspaper editor against a charge of seditious libel. Crosswell's paper had written that Jefferson had hired a pamphleteer to attack the characters of Washington and Adams, calling the former a "traitor" and the latter a "hoary headed incendiary," among other things.

Commenting on Hamilton's oral argument in the case, James Kent later said that "a more able and eloquent argument was perhaps never heard in any court" (p. 243). Flaumenhaft stresses two elements of Hamilton's argument. First, while Hamilton is not an advocate of "the novel, the visionary, the pestilential doctrine of an unchecked press," he argues that publishing the truth with good and justifiable motives, even as regards high public officials, ought to be a defense against sedition, just as it was under the true common law of England. The cause of liberty, he believes, would be greatly harmed if citizens were prevented from making legitimate criticisms of their government (pp. 242–44). Hamilton urged that as a general rule the common law must be understood as informing the United States Constitution so as to serve as a barrier to partisan interpretations of such terms as "*habeas corpus*" and "crimes and misdemeanors" (pp. 248–49). The second important element of Hamilton's argument

is his defense of the right to jury trials in criminal cases. In the United States, even more than in England, there are reasons to fear the creation of a partisan judiciary. In England, the elected legislature and the hereditary executive are unlikely to unite in a conspiracy, but in the United States, where both branches are elected, such a conspiracy is not beyond contemplation. Hamilton concludes that temporary citizen juries drawn by lot with the power to decide important questions of law and fact constitute an important popular check on government (pp. 246–49).

Throughout his book, Flaumenhaft deftly and convincingly deals with many of the charges that have hurt Hamilton's reputation as an American statesman. I will mention just one example which is of some significance for my wider argument. Flaumenhaft notes the differences between Madison's recollection of a speech of Hamilton's at the Constitutional Convention and that of others present. The differences are important given the charges made by Jefferson, Madison, and their followers that Hamilton favored the corruption of the legislature by the executive. Madison has Hamilton, in his speech of June 22, 1787, citing Hume as authority for the idea that executive "influence" or "corruption" is necessary for maintaining constitutional equilibrium in Great Britain. However, in Yates's more extensive notes, Hamilton cites Hume only to the effect that there is *always* a body of *patriotic* members who will shake corrupt administrations. Both accounts are perhaps accurate, but the difference is important when a further omission of Madison's is noted. Madison does not record, as Yates does, that Hamilton argued for *preventing* members of Congress from simultaneously holding executive offices. Hamilton, it is true, did argue against a more rigorous exclusionary proposal. Such exclusions, he noted the following day, are easily evaded. The more important reason he mentioned immediately on June 22: it would constitute a substantial disincentive for public service, and this inconvenience must be balanced against any risk of corruption (pp. 160–61, 296 nn. 5,6). Thus, Madison's account gives the impression that promoting executive influence was Hamilton's chief concern, whereas the real issue was the motives for public service.

## II

After reading Flaumenhaft's book, one might be left wondering how such a well-intentioned and profound a statesman as Hamilton could become so controversial and be so misunderstood by men of the capacities of Madison and Jefferson. The reasons are made clearer in Morton Frisch's short book on Hamilton. Rather than look at the Founding period through Hamilton's eyes, Frisch places Hamilton alongside his great contemporaries by developing a number of comparisons between Hamilton, on the one hand, and, on the other, Madison

and, especially, Jefferson. I will mention the main points of comparison and in the course of doing so, I will raise a question about Flaumenhaft's account of Hamilton.

When Frisch deals with the question of political economy, he enters a little way into the classical republican view of Jefferson. (He does not discuss Madison's political economy.) Frisch has Jefferson devoted to equality more than to either liberty or excellence, and as preferring an agrarian republic because it maintained equality and civic spirit. Frisch traces these views to Rousseau's influence on Jefferson. Hamilton, argues Frisch, was by contrast a "John Locke—David Hume limited government man" who was an unequivocal advocate of liberty. Hamilton, he continues, believed that the commercial spirit was a substitute for civic virtue and brought with it the added advantage of encouraging excellence and vigor in society (pp. x, 41–51). While this argument is in significant respects true, and widely accepted, it again seems to me a little misleading. Rather than seeing the difference between Hamilton and Jefferson as reflecting a battle between the modern commercial spirit and classical civic spirit, Frisch might have pointed to Jefferson's general agreement with the enlightenment radical Thomas Paine that governing is not a very complicated matter, and left to itself *society* is, for the most part, self-regulating. In this view of politics, tensions between liberty and equality and between liberty and order tend to melt away. Hamilton would, then, appear less modern than his great rival because of his affirmation of the need for government superintendence of the economy. Jefferson, of course, saw this superintendence as a corrupting influence on the people and, more immediately and directly, on the government.

A second point of contrast between Hamilton and his great contemporaries that Frisch brings out concerns their different understandings of the nature of the Constitution. Like Flaumenhaft, Frisch argues that Hamilton saw the Constitution as an *enabling* document, in that it granted broad powers, apportioning them to the various branches according to their inherent natures (pp. 21–32). A constitution, Hamilton believed, must reflect political reality. Jefferson, by contrast, saw the Constitution more as an *inhibiting* document specifying precise limits on the power of government. As already noted, it was his view that government was easy and, therefore, not much of it was required. Furthermore, he believed that each generation has a right to frame its own constitution, which means that the current generation ought not undertake obligations that will constrain or burden the future (pp. 33–39, 73). Madison thought that Hamilton's doctrine of liberal construction was dangerous because it seemed to legitimate actions not intended by the authors of the Constitution as revealed by the Convention debates and, especially, by the State Ratifying Conventions. Hamilton was, he charged, trying to "administer" the government into a new form (pp. 63–64). Whether or not government is easy, Madison seems to say, we must strictly confine ourselves to what the parties to ratification *thought* was

intended. While Frisch does not go into the historical and interpretative questions raised by Madison's theory, he seems to conclude that both of the alternatives to Hamilton's view will, almost certainly, involve either frequent and embarrassing incapacity on the part of government or frequent and equally embarrassing violations of the fundamental law. Thus, the Hamiltonian view is correct for Frisch because it is the only view that is compatible with governing (pp. 31, 35, 64).

A final point of contrast developed by Frisch involves the differing views of Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson on the appropriate balance between executive and legislative power. Frisch's account is useful because it highlights a difficulty in Hamilton's view which is, perhaps, not emphasized enough by Flaumenhaft, who implies that it would be a matter of mere vanity for Congress to refuse to acquiesce in an arrangement where it was expected to consult ministers before acting (pp. 85–86). Yet this was not how Jefferson and Madison saw matters. Whereas Hamilton envisaged the executive as a critical source of *initiative* in the system, they believed in the primacy of the legislative branch, conceiving of the executive as essentially *ministerial* (*Alexander Hamilton*, pp. 65–68, 76–77). Their reasons were many: concern for the purity of the republican form, fear of executive tyranny, and, perhaps, a greater optimism that the legislative branch was equal to the task of administration. (Whether these two men practiced what they preached when they became President themselves is, of course, another matter.) In October of 1792, Jefferson complained to Washington that the “executive had swallowed up the legislative branch.”<sup>1</sup> Madison, departing somewhat from his early views on the subject, argued in Congress that it was an improper delegation of legislative authority to ask the Treasury for reports on the subjects of loans and taxes. The reports of the Treasury Secretary, he complained, are not presented in an impartial and equitable manner. They report only one side of the argument, thereby depriving members of the House of the “freedom of exercising their own understandings in a proper constitutional manner.”<sup>2</sup> The legislative branch, Jefferson and Madison contended, could only be “pure and independent” if the executive branch ceased taking the initiative on policy (*Alexander Hamilton*, pp. 67–68). Frisch points out that, whereas Madison and Jefferson desired a strict division of powers to keep the legislature “pure and independent,” Hamilton envisaged a “competition” between the branches (pp. 7, 29–30, 56, 67, 77).

### III

This last difference between Hamilton and his rivals leads me to raise an important issue. Does not an efficacious administration require popular support? The effectiveness of Washington's administration, Hamilton granted, was made possible in large part by the popularity of Washington (*Effective Repub-*

lic, pp. 247–48, 301 n.33; *Alexander Hamilton*, pp. 54–55). He was, Hamilton said, “an Aegis very essential to me.” Flaumenhaft mentions that Hamilton saw the early days of the republic as an opportunity to fix policies that would be difficult to change under the complex structure of government established by the Constitution (pp. 110, 112). Thus Flaumenhaft implicitly grants that at least at that time the energy engendered by the separation of powers gave way to a more potent form of energetic government. Under Washington, the executive exercised so great an influence over the legislative branch that there was, perhaps, a kernel of truth to Jefferson’s and Madison’s strictures against monarchism. Jefferson and Madison were wrong, however, to see this executive dominance as permanent or as part of a strategy to introduce an hereditary monarchy. Such times of executive dominance are not likely to be ordinary times, but Hamilton, more than most, believed that human affairs would continue to see extraordinary times that called for statesmanship. The importance of Washington himself for the success of his own administration also leads me to wonder whether Flaumenhaft understates the extent of Hamilton’s agreement with the “political heresy” which holds that forms of government are less important than the individuals who administer the government (cf. *Effective Republic*, p. 93). I might add further that it is likely that Hamilton’s often mentioned “theoretic doubts” about the viability of strictly republican government turned on whether, in the “competition” he envisaged between the branches, the executive would be victorious frequently enough to ensure a good administration.

In the terminology of today, Hamilton was willing to spend Washington’s political capital in order to administer the government effectively. There is, however, a critical difference between Washington and those modern Presidents who have followed in the progressive tradition. The office of the President has a dual character in that it is both representative and executive. It is representative in that the people elect the President. Yet, as Flaumenhaft discusses so well, it is not essentially representative, because the President must be able to resist the will of the people. The nature of the President’s work is executive. The progressive understanding of that office threatens to collapse its dual character by making the President into a simply popular representative. As Presidents try to reach out to the public at large on a regular basis, they become less and less distinguishable from any other popular representative and are more and more likely to be subject to the turbulent fluctuations of public opinion. On balance, this is likely to make them less effective as administrators. The greatest danger with the progressive view is that, in the long term, populist government will be substituted for constitutional government.

Washington, by contrast, was popular without being a populist. This was possible because he possessed a “reputation” rather than, or in addition to, popularity, and, specifically, a reputation as an executive in war and politics. To

understand this better, it is useful to consider the description of Washington Hamilton gives in the *Crosswell* case.

A character so bright and pure as General Washington's, [Hamilton] says, is not only a source of honor to our nation, giving glory to it; it is most useful also as a pattern of virtue to us and our posterity, serving as a model to be imitated. Washington headed our armies with perseverance and success, and he administered our civil government unmoved by calumny and faction. A popular spirit of inquiry only revealed the splendor of his character; to spread the truth about his character was only to increase its utility as a model for imitation. Washington, unmoved by calumny, was unmoved as well by faction; he was thereby himself an impediment to the baneful influence of the specific evil of republican government. (*Effective Republic*, p. 247, Flaumenhaft's paraphrase of James Kent's notes)

An executive ought not to be responsive to public opinion, but there is something impressive about the executive power that can make those who exercise it well popular or, more precisely, respected. An executive can provide examples of his firmness, his decisiveness, and his accomplishments—his virtue, as Hamilton calls it. The example of Washington indicates how a President might make his reputation as an executive the core of his popularity. He won the kind of popularity that facilitates rather than impedes an energetic administration.

It might be said that one requires an opportunity to prove oneself before one can gain a reputation as an executive. And, furthermore, that in an elective system one must become popular before one can have that opportunity. This is true, and perhaps more true than it has ever been. The question really turns upon how that popularity is acquired. Flaumenhaft notes that late in Hamilton's life, with the Federalist party disintegrating around him, he began to reflect on the need to take more popular measures so as to compete with the Jeffersonians. Hamilton debated with his colleagues the balance that must be struck between constitutional propriety and being popular enough to govern effectively. Hamilton confided to James Bayard that the Federalists relied too much on the "rectitude and utility of their measures" but had "neglected the cultivation of popular favor by fair and justifiable expedients." While ruling out "measures intrinsically unworthy," Hamilton even granted that "irregular" measures might be justified; irregular in the sense that in a "more sound and stable order of things" they would be unnecessary (*Effective Republic*, p. 199). We might infer that Hamilton saw as fair, justifiable, and worthy measures that supported rather than undermined the constitutional order, one purpose of which was to give stability and energy to the administration of government. These remarks were directed towards the plight of the Federalist Party as a whole. They are, however, just as applicable to executives.

The distinction Hamilton drew between worthy and unworthy measures is all but unknown today. To suggest that it is important might even sound idealistic.

Yet those interested in executive service ought to be careful to acquire the kind of popularity which makes a good administration possible. It is in their interest to do so. If candidates and incumbents were to consider more carefully their interest, then it would be less likely that an ordinary man in ordinary times would be tempted to take comfort in a popularity earned through populist stratagems. A President who seeks to ingratiate himself with the public is sure, eventually, only to earn its contempt.

#### NOTES

1. "Notes of a Conversation with George Washington," *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. Julian P. Boyd et al., 24 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950–90), 24:435.
2. November 21, 1792, *The Papers of James Madison*, ed. William T. Hutchinson et al., 16 vols. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1962–89), 14:415–16.