

# Interpretation

A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Fall 1995

Volume 23 Number 1

- 3 John C. Kohl, Jr. The Fabric of the Longer Repeated Passages in the *Odyssey*
- 41 John R. Pottenger The Sage and the Sophist: A Commentary on Plato's *Lesser Hippias*
- 61 Gary B. Herbert Immanuel Kant: Punishment and the Political Preconditions of Moral Existence
- Discussion*
- 77 Harry Neumann Political Theology? An Interpretation of Genesis (3:5, 22)
- Review Essays*
- 89 Will Morrisey Thirty-nine Reasons for Reading Benardete on the *Republic*, Review Essay on *Socrates' Second Sailing*, by Seth Benardete
- 101 Maureen Feder-Marcus Gendered Origins: Some Reflections, Review Essay on *Fear of Diversity*, by Arlene Saxonhouse
- 111 David Clinton Statesmanship for a New Era, Review Essay on *Traditions and Values in Politics and Diplomacy*, by Kenneth Thompson
- Book Reviews*
- 117 Ken Masugi *The Public and the Private in Aristotle's Political Philosophy*, by Judith A. Swanson
- 121 Alexander L. Harvey *Black Holes & Time Warps*, by Kip S. Thorne

# Interpretation

- Editor-in-Chief Hilail Gildin, Dept. of Philosophy, Queens College  
Executive Editor Leonard Grey  
General Editors Seth G. Benardete • Charles E. Butterworth •  
Hilail Gildin • Robert Horwitz (d. 1987) •  
Howard B. White (d. 1974)
- Consulting Editors Christopher Bruell • Joseph Cropsey • Ernest L. Fortin  
• John Hallowell (d. 1992) • Harry V. Jaffa •  
David Lowenthal • Muhsin Mahdi • Harvey C. Mansfield  
• Arnaldo Momigliano (d. 1987) • Michael Oakeshott  
(d. 1990) • Ellis Sandoz • Leo Strauss (d. 1973) •  
Kenneth W. Thompson
- International Editors Terence E. Marshall • Heinrich Meier  
Editors Wayne Ambler • Maurice Auerbach • Fred Baumann  
• Michael Blaustein • Patrick Coby • Thomas S. Engeman  
• Edward J. Erler • Maureen Feder-Marcus •  
Joseph E. Goldberg • Steven Harvey •  
Pamela K. Jensen • Ken Masugi • Grant B. Mindle  
• Will Morrisey • Susan Orr • Charles T. Rubin •  
Leslie G. Rubin • Susan Shell • Richard Velkley •  
Bradford P. Wilson • Michael Zuckert •  
Catherine Zuckert
- Manuscript Editor Lucia B. Prochnow  
Subscriptions Subscription rates per volume (3 issues):  
individuals \$25  
libraries and all other institutions \$40  
students (four-year limit) \$16  
Single copies available.  
Postage outside U.S.: Canada \$4.50 extra;  
elsewhere \$5.40 extra by surface mail (8 weeks  
or longer) or \$11.00 by air.  
Payments: in U.S. dollars AND payable by  
a financial institution located within the U.S.A.  
(or the U.S. Postal Service).

---

THE JOURNAL WELCOMES MANUSCRIPTS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS WELL AS THOSE  
IN THEOLOGY, LITERATURE, AND JURISPRUDENCE.

---

CONTRIBUTORS should follow *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 13th ed. or manuals  
based on it; double-space their manuscripts, including notes; place references in the  
text, in endnotes or follow current journal style in printing references. Words from  
languages not rooted in Latin should be transliterated to English. To ensure  
impartial judgment of their manuscripts, contributors should omit mention of their  
other work; put, on the title page only, their name, any affiliation desired, address  
with postal/zip code in full, and telephone. Contributors using computers should, if  
possible, provide a character count of the entire manuscript. Please send THREE  
clear copies, which will not be returned.

---

Composition by Eastern Composition, Inc.,  
Binghamton, N.Y. 13905 U.S.A.  
Printed and bound by Wickersham Printing Co.,  
Lancaster, PA 17603 U.S.A.

Inquiries: (Mrs.) Guadalupe S. Angeles, Assistant to the Editor,  
INTERPRETATION, Queens College, Flushing, N.Y.  
11367-1597, U.S.A. (718)997-5542

## *Discussion*

# Political Theology? An Interpretation of Genesis (3:5, 22)

HARRY NEUMANN

*Scripps College*

We find a well known account in the *Bible* called the sinful fall of man—an account which in its profundity expresses mythologically not merely an accidental history of man. . . In the words of God: “See! Adam is become as one of us.” It is therefore not Satan’s lie, since God himself confirms it. However this usually is overlooked that God himself confirms it.

Satan has the broadest perspectives for God. Therefore he keeps himself so very far away from God—Satan, that is, as the oldest friend of knowledge.

Where the tree of knowledge stands, there is always paradise: thus speak the most ancient and the most recent Serpents.<sup>1</sup>

The atheist Hegel notes that interpreters of Genesis 3:5, 22 regularly overlook the decisive agreement between God and Satan (serpent) concerning what God is: *Quid sit deus?* what makes a god a god.<sup>2</sup> To be divine means to know what good and evil really are. Hegel rejects the strict biblical position by insisting that this knowledge, in its fullness, must be created through the mind’s labor, its progressive historical assimilation of the merely abstract knowledge of Genesis 3:<sup>3</sup> From being *as* gods, they become gods through the mind’s historical progress to full realization that good and evil are its creations. Grasping atheism more profoundly than Hegel, god and Satan realize that no historical (Hegelian-Marxist) labor (creativity) is needed. Atheist wisdom is readily available always and everywhere. Its price, too, never varies: the sale of one’s soul to the devil.

The boundless (atheist) freedom thus purchased is a moral-intellectual void which no Hegelian-Marxist historical labor (creativity) can redeem: there is no nonarbitrary standard of good and evil, truth and falsity, to which human reason and will are subordinate. Men are subject to nothing outside their atheist reason—and, contrary to Hegel’s view, this reduces human thought and life to nothing. In atheism’s world, all work or creativity, is arbitrary, meaningless

(*Liberalism*, pp. 22–42, 261–66). Man's disobedience, his negation of God's law, elevates him to a divinity whose consequences terrify him. This brings home the truth of God's prediction (Genesis 2:17): Men die, if they refuse to subordinate themselves to divine law. They cannot be atheist and live. The price of satanic apotheosis is death—a spiritual death, the death of the soul. To be sure, Satan denies that atheism means death, nothingness (Genesis 3:4–5), but he means merely bodily death: the death of the soul does not necessarily mean physical death as modernity's pseudo-atheist politics and morality testify. That pseudo-atheism is swindle, an attempt to have one's cake and eat it too, to combine atheism and morality (politics). The impossibility of this combination is concealed by intellectual dishonesty.

Honestly confronted, atheism is humanly impossible: all desires are pious, moral, political, wanting what is felt to be good and avoiding the bad. Thus desire demands a moral-political world in which nonarbitrary justification and condemnation, proof and disproof, is possible (*Liberalism*, pp. 19, 38–42, 81–82, 103, 120–21, 171, 261–66). That world is annihilated by deification through atheist wisdom. Nothing can reconcile moral-political (human) life to this wisdom.

When, for example, feminists and sexists, democrats and nazis, hate each other, they see their enemies as evil, truly evil. Their hatred, if justified as they are convinced it is, implies a god, an eternal, nonarbitrary standard of good and evil. Men with shared gods (moral absolutes) unite against enemies. Politics always has been, and always will be, this belligerent determination to empower one's gods, to ram them down the enemy's throat by legal enactment enforced by police-military power. Politics is legislated morality (religion). Carl Schmitt, citing Donoso Cortez, rightly insisted: Without theology, no morality and without morality, no politics!<sup>4</sup>

Denial of one's god (the moral orthodoxy of one's faction) undercuts one's ruling passions—and that, as God warns, means to die, the death of the heart (Genesis, 2:17). Yet it is the only road to deification according to God and the devil (John, 12:24). Genesis' atheist divinity negates Greek mythology and philosophy, in which man cannot become god and gods cannot become men. One becomes a god by being generated by gods, just as one becomes human through human generation. Only knowledge, a knowledge not grounded in nature, in generation and birth, makes men gods according to the biblical god and devil. The notion of divinity in Greek philosophy presupposed a natural order in which, as Aristotle notes, men generate men and apes, apes—and, for mythology, gods, gods. No Rousseauian (Darwinian) evolution (of beasts to men) is possible. The order of nature, of birth and death, is eternal. The Greek word for nature means birth and growth. Growth always is teleological, aiming at a state of maturity or perfection (Aristotle, *Physics*, II:1).

Acorns want to become oak trees and children want to become men, although what maturity involves is far more difficult to secure in human growth.

In any case, all natural birth and growth aims at the perfection natural to it, whether human or bestial. This perfection is its natural good, what it really desires to become. In the case of men, reason must order and guide the desires to their natural good, their true happiness. Thus for Greek philosophy, there is, in principle, harmony between reason and desire; between intellectual excellence and happiness. This harmony is negated by the atheist wisdom responsible for biblical deification. Here deification means the perpetual, aimless war of all one's desires (which always are pious and therefore political) against reason's atheist wisdom—aimless because atheism deprives desire—any desire—of the state of maturity or perfection for which it naturally strives. Atheism is unnatural or antinatural. Its spirit is the nihilism informing the conquest of nature inaugurated by the atheist science of Bacon and Descartes (*Liberalism*, pp. 39–40, 108, 125–26, 165, 230–34). That science, the heart of all modern life and thought, renders meaningless the most natural desire, to secure what is good for oneself, one's happiness. As the gate of Dante's Hell warns: the price of intellectual honesty (atheism) is abandonment of all hope of happiness.

The aimless war in every honest man (of nature or desire against antinatural, atheist reason) is reflected in the always aimless conflicts of moral-political life. To be sure, acknowledgement of this universal insignificance and accidentalness is rare. Intellectual honesty is unbearable as the liberated (deified) Adam and Eve learn when atheist wisdom opens the eyes of their mind. No less than acorns want their natural fulfillment as oak trees, so all men, by "nature," desire their fulfillment, their happiness. Different notions (of what that happiness is) are responsible for all serious political conflict whose heart is hostile gods, opposing claims to nonarbitrary moral-political standards, for which their respective partisans fight—even when they dishonestly claim to be atheists!<sup>5</sup> Thus all men are members of some political faction whose partisans fight against the immorality of hostile factions. The enemy's morality always is immoral; his notion of happiness, a wretched snare from which humanity must be liberated!

Each faction's goal is restoration of Eden's blindness with one's own faction's morality (happiness) imposed upon all mankind! For in Eden, there was only one notion of happiness (morality) experienced by all men. There were no factions, no enemies, domestic or foreign. Adam and Eve constituted the whole human race and, under the spell of their happy ignorance, they enjoyed perfect union, "one flesh." Until "their eyes were opened," they experienced neither internal (desire against reason) nor external wars.

In Genesis (2:24, 3:7) "one flesh" and "nakedness" refer to reason (soul) not body. Adam and Eve never were blind physically. When the eyes of their mind were opened, they realized their spiritual nakedness, the nihilism depriving desire of its "natural" fulfillment—and, therefore, of all hope of happiness. Under the beneficent spell of Eden's blindness, the redemptive stupidity of all

moral-political (human) life, they had enjoyed an illusory oneness (“one flesh”) of heart and mind, a common good of what then was all mankind.

As it always must, this faith in a common good—in any nonarbitrary human community—ended with intellectual honesty, atheist enlightenment. Honesty unmasks all appeals to a common good as lies, propaganda, by which one or more partisans claim to speak for their whole faction or particular factions claim that their god, their notion of happiness, is valid for all mankind.<sup>6</sup> This dishonesty is everywhere, e.g., in contemporary “politically-correct” demands that men (“persons”) do what nobody ever will or can do—respect “diversity” or cease being elitist. All politics is intolerant (elitist), championing its sect’s gods (morality) against enemies. Nobody fights for the freedom and equality of all men: racists and humanitarians, feminists and sexists, would rather die than fight for each other’s freedom and equality! Sharing the passionate elitism of all politics, they castigate the immorality of what their enemies experience as the only true morality.

Eden’s blindness, the mythical innocence for which the common good is real, not illusion or propaganda, is shattered by atheism; no common good exists. Genesis 4:17–22 highlights this inhuman situation, making the fratricide, Cain, the founder of the first city, the seedbed of the arts and sciences and the prototype of politics everywhere and always. When the atheist eyes of man’s mind were opened, he saw this Hell from which God’s law (Genesis 2:17) meant to spare him.<sup>7</sup> Satan frustrated God’s benevolence by seducing man into atheism’s moral emptiness, its destruction of nature. In light (or darkness) of this void, orthodox fundamentalist interpretation of Genesis 1:1 is partly correct: creation is out of nothing, a moral abyss. But it wrongly maintains that God is exempt from this emptiness. It falls into this error because, unlike the disobedient Adam and Eve, it has never been forced to realize that divinity’s hallmark is atheist wisdom: to be as God is to realize that happiness is impossible, that good and evil (and therefore all life, human or divine) is meaningless (arbitrary creation).

The fundamentalist illusion of all desire informs “politics” that still believes in a common good of mankind or of any of its factions; a “politics” unaware of the mark of Cain on its soul.<sup>8</sup> It was Machiavelli who first imitated Satan, liberating men from illusions bestowed by a merciful God. In the fifteenth chapter of his *Prince*, he rejects mythical Edens and their “one flesh” (common good) lies. His satanic enlightenment despises God’s humane propaganda. To be sure, like Satan’s education of Eve, Machiavellian education is compelled to disguise the horror of truly liberal, liberating education with the usual “consciousness raising,” the lies about liberal education’s enhancement of happiness (“self-esteem,” etc.). But, basically, Satanic-Machiavellian education wants men to confront life honestly, to regard the dishonest life as not worth living, however much the natural desire for happiness compels it to sugar coat the bitter pill of liberal education. It means to discredit the fraud informing all morality and therefore all politics, all man’s yearning for happiness. In this

decisive respect, it shares the ethos of theologies and moralities which dispirit rather than encourage politics. This is the Christian element of Machiavellian liberal education.<sup>9</sup>

The Christian Paul rightly insists that a crucified god, who is fully human and suffers death, is no god either for Greek philosophy (to whom such theology is beneath contempt) or for Jewish legalistic piety to which it is hateful (I Corinthians, 1:23). For that piety, informed by obedience to eternal law, shares Greek philosophy's rejection of Christianity's "absolutely free and sovereign God," who is beyond the law, "beyond good and evil." Like the Greek philosophers, "official Judaism was legalistic and hence rationalistic. Its rationalism . . . had found its perfect expression in the Platonic conception of God as an artificer who makes the universe by looking up to the unchanging, lifeless ideas. In accordance with this, official Judaism asserted that God has created the world and governs it *sub ratione boni*."<sup>10</sup>

In the spirit of Paul's crucified god, Spinoza and Hegel "rebelled against the official assertion" that Christianity's "absolutely free and sovereign God" is subordinate to unchanging law (legalism), eternal ideas. This Christian rejection of Jewish-Platonic legalism is the heart (or heartlessness) of the atheism brought home to Adam and Eve by their disobedience to divine law. Put differently: Paul's incarnated, antilegalist god cannot provide theological support for the natural desire for happiness and, therefore, for politics.

Erik Peterson rightly observes, against Carl Schmitt's failed attempt at a Christian political theology: "Something like a political theology is possible only on a Judaic or pagan basis."<sup>11</sup> In the spirit of God and Satan, Peterson dismisses political theology as a Judeo-Greek oxymoron. A humble, crucified god provides no support for the elitism inseparable from politics. Although correct about Schmitt, Peterson, like most Christians, does not perceive the atheism responsible for his repudiation of political theology. Schmitt scorned the atheism of Jew-haters such as Peterson, but his own Jew-hatred precluded conversion to Judaism's legalistic (Platonic) political theology. As Peterson suggests, the Jewish-Platonic aspect of Schmitt's theology tended to make it political. That aspect was undercut by Schmitt's Christianity, his faith in an incarnation rejected as atheist by political theology. This faith vitiates man's most natural yearning (for happiness) and therefore all morality and politics. Schmitt is aware that his faith is not in eternal law, in a god governing *sub ratione boni*. Strauss's attack on G. Scholem's defense of mystical (Kabbala) Judaism's repudiation of official Judaism's legalistic God also applies to Schmitt's faith. For both Schmitt and Scholem appeal to individual experience against (Greek-Jewish) legalism. Strauss observes that such ultimate appeals to individual (religious) experience are naturally more open to Christianity than the medieval Jewish philosophy informed by Greek political theology: "Jewish philosophy has proved to be much more impervious to the influence of the Christian dogma than the Kabbala."<sup>12</sup>

Serious, consistent atheists (Machiavelli, Spinoza, Hegel, etc.) naturally

prefer apolitical, antilegalist Christianity to Judeo-Greek political theology. Hegel admits that the deathless Olympic deities were more beautiful, more resplendent, and far happier than the suffering, crucified god. But, for atheists, precisely this constitutes their inferiority. Hegel contends that Christian incarnation incarnates the atheist wisdom which makes *mortal* men be as gods. The blissful immortality of Greek and Jewish gods reveals ignorance of that wisdom. To be a god in Genesis (3:5, 22) means to be mortal and atheist. It has nothing to do with the immortality ascribed to God by political theology's myths. Immortality is denied to man *after* he has become as god (Genesis 3:22). God is not subordinate to eternal law, the eternal nonarbitrary standard, over the nature of which all serious moral-political fights occur (see note 10). A god subject to nothing but his own reason (or will) is wholly arbitrary. His freedom is atheist, nihilist. In his world, if one may speak of a world here, misery reigns, since man's most natural passions become empty lunacies. That world:

A land of dreams . . .  
 Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,  
 Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;  
 And we are here as on a darkling plain  
 Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,  
 Where ignorant armies clash by night.

To be sure, there is "certitude," the certitude of atheism, nihilism, revealed by the wisdom which transforms men into gods. As Nietzsche rightly observes, certitude, not doubt, drives honesty to despair.<sup>13</sup>

On Jewish-Platonic horizons, that certitude is ridiculous or repugnant: political theology's god is not, nor can he become mortal; his eternal governance of the world is *sub ratione boni*. This irreconcilable conflict between Jews and Christians also pits philosophy (Socrates, Plato) against science (Machiavelli, Descartes, Spinoza, Nietzsche), a war fired by the hatred of "natural" desire for rational, atheist enlightenment.<sup>14</sup> Thus the partisans of Greek-Jewish political theology strive "to adorn their Spartas" by discrediting atheist wisdom.<sup>15</sup> This is philosophy's job: Cicero in Rome, Farabi and Averroes in Islam, Aquinas in Christendom, Lincoln and Jaffa in America. Like God and Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor, they want their fellow citizens secure in pious citizenship, in political theology's comforting soporifics. Unlike the Inquisitor and God (and Satan), they misperceive this propaganda as truth. In any case, they also want men convinced that atheism is the worst crime, far more pernicious than racism, sexism, murder, etc. Atheism means that nothing is in itself right or wrong, true or false. No politics can act on this, and God, unlike Satan, does not want to warp politics with truth (atheism). Obedience to God's law preserves political-theological innocence, making it impossible for men to be what, in fact, they are. It makes honesty impossible.

Nietzsche describes the always self-destructive fight for honesty: “Compared to the importance of this battle, everything else is of no concern: the final question about the conditions of human life is raised here and the first attempt to answer this question experimentally. To what extent can truth endure incorporation? . . . this is the question, this is the experiment. . . . We are making an experiment with the truth. Perhaps mankind will be destroyed by it! Fine!”<sup>16</sup>

To risk that question, that experiment, means eradication of religion and, therefore, of morality and politics. No man can or would do that! To be sure, politics may be impoverished by refusing to prosecute atheism as the worst crime, an impoverishment infecting contemporary societies in which jokes about women and minorities are deemed more offensive than defamation of old-fashioned fundamentalist piety. This “politically correct” delusion is responsible for an immature, infantile politics unaware politically of what it is doing (“Eternal and Temporal Enemies,” pp. 280–83).

The job of political theology and philosophy is to bring such communities to their political senses, to see atheism’s eradication as necessary for all serious politics: Cicero in Rome, Maimonides in Judaism, Aquinas in Christendom, Jaffa in America. Consider Jaffa’s attack on Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in the 1954 Brown school desegregation ruling. Jaffa agrees with the outlawing of school segregation but opposes Warren’s justification for it: “The Court said that segregation was unconstitutional because of the *feelings* of inferiority it produced in the black children. It did not say, as it should have done, that distinctions of color have no constitutional standing . . . that the Constitution is color blind.”<sup>17</sup>

Like all political theologians (philosophers), Jaffa abominates grounding moral-political decisions in nothing but always subjective, always arbitrary personal experience (feelings). Such grounding reduces political—that is, human—life to the moral void which terrified the liberated Adam and Eve. An Aristotelian, probably the only contemporary one, Jaffa wants to rescue his country and civilization from the infantilism of a “politics” which refuses to subordinate personal feelings to eternal principles (*sub ratione boni*). In the case of America, this means Jaffa’s insistence that all valid judicial decisions be informed by the eternal natural rights of man, by the Declaration of Independence’s reliance on those rights as guaranteed by nature and nature’s god.

If Jaffa’s rescue mission fails and Americans are forced to be honest, to confront, as Adam and Eve did, atheism’s abyss, their passions will hate it and enslave them to anyone (e.g., God or the Inquisitor) who promises to restore Eden’s redemptive blindness, to sustain man’s natural pursuit of happiness. Prior to her disobedience, Eve never dreamt that apotheosis meant atheism, nihilism. When that lesson’s horror sank in, she was prepared, indeed eager, to endure anything to be saved from it.

Thus feminists demanding deletion of Eve’s punishment (subordination of women to men, Genesis, 3:16) from the Bible lack self-knowledge, failing to

perceive that they, like her, would endure even worse punishments to save themselves from the consequence of the knowledge mercifully prohibited by God. Similarly Adam does not organize the first trade union to protest God's forcing men to work. Contrary to the Hegelian-Marxist position, work—any work—is a philanthropic “punishment” which mercifully obfuscates the nihilist wisdom unendurable to men. For all work—all activity—as Aristotle rightly notes, aims to accomplish some good or avoid some evil (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1:1; *Politics*, 1:1). Work presupposes the innocent world of Eden and Aristotle in which the pursuit of happiness is not illusion. God's punishment of man (work) actually demonstrates his love for man, his aversion to Satanic-Machiavellian enlightenment!

When Bukharin publicly confessed to crimes he never committed, he did so in obedience to Stalin's Communist Party. Since his life was given its god, its meaning and direction, by that party, he had to obey. Disobedience confronted him with a “black nothingness” (*Liberalism*, pp. 13–20, 135–37, 272–73, 284–85), as terrifying as the “nakedness” which unhinged the disobedient Adam and Eve. To be sure, as a Communist, he believed himself to be what no moral-political man ever is, an atheist. For, like all partisans—that is, all men—he was firmly convinced of the justice of his cause. Had he thought through what that conviction entails, he would have ceased to consider himself—or any dedicated Communist—atheist. In any case, he, like Adam and Eve, fanatically blinded himself to life's “black nothingness.” Whether violent (Bukharin) or gentle (Plato, Aristotle), that obfuscation is responsible for all theology, morality and politics. It is the heart of human life! Nietzsche rightly maintained that the really crucial errors, those arising from hatred of political (natural) passion for reason's atheism, stem from cowardice, not blindness.<sup>18</sup>

Men dread to be the “black nothingness” which, in fact, they are. No man, only a superman, could be honest with himself about himself. Honest men would be nietzschean supermen or biblical-hegelian gods. Their state of being (or nonbeing) would be available only if all desires were eliminated: “The amoralist speaks—Nothing is more repulsive to thoughtful men than man insofar as he desires. . . . They despise the desiring man, also the ‘desirable’ man . . . and, in general, everything desirable, all ideals of man.”<sup>19</sup>

## NOTES

Author's note: The research for this article was assisted by a grant from the Earhart Foundation.

1. The first epigraph is from G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, II (Part 2, “Die Bestimmte Religion”), in Hegel, *Werke*, 16 (Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969), 265–66; cf. *ibid.*, vol. 17, pp. 258–59, where Hegel dismisses the orthodox interpretation that God speaks ironically in Genesis 3:22. On Hegel's Christianity, see K. Löwith, *Zur Kritik der christlichen Überlieferung* (Kohlhammer Verlag, 1966), pp. 54–96. The second and third are from F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, secs. 129 and 152, respectively.

2. On the relation of Hegel's nihilism to Christianity, see C. Schmitt, *Glossarium* (Duncker

und Humblot, 1991), p. 212; Neumann, *Liberalism* (Carolina Academic Press, 1991), p. 173. "Political Theology?" like my "Eternal and Temporal Enemies" (*Political Communication*, 9 [1992]: 279–84), clarifies *Liberalism's* main problems, particularly those relating to Schmitt's failed attempt at a Christian political theology (*Liberalism*, pp. 92–95). On the racial, patriarchal (one might almost say Jewish!) aspect of Schmitt's Christianity, consider Schmitt, *Glossarium*, p. 131: "Sie teilen mir Ihre Konversion zu katholische Kirche mit. . . . Es ist aber nicht leicht, etwas Meritorisches dazu zu sagen. Für mich ist der katholische Glaube die Religion meiner Väter. Ich bin Katholik nicht nur dem Bekenntnis, sondern auch die geschichtlichen Herkunft, wenn ich so sagen darf, der Rasse nach." ("You announce your conversion to the catholic church. . . . It is, however, not easy to say something meritorious about this. For me, the catholic faith is the religion of my fathers. I am catholic not only as a matter of faith [confession] but also according to historical descent if I may say so, according to race.") See also p. 80: "Je me vois maintenant en Westphalie, dans la maison paternelle, où j'ai assisté en 1932 à la fête des noces d'or de mes parents. Je dors dans la chambre où mon père a dormi, où il est mort en novembre 1945, ayant 92 ans. Je vois par ma fenêtre la cimetière catholique, où gisent mes parents et où depuis 20 ans est réservée une tombe pour ma femme et moi. Je fais les promenades que j'ai fait depuis de 50 ans c'est une certaine continuité spatiale et même stabilitas loci pour un temps de terre et nihilisme général." ("I see myself now in Westphalia in the house of my father where, in 1932, I assisted in the golden wedding anniversary celebration of my parents. I sleep in the room where my father slept, where he died in November, 1945 at age 92. From my window I see the catholic cemetery where my parents are buried and where for 20 years a tomb for myself and my wife has been reserved. I take the same walks which I have taken for fifty years. . . . This is a certain spatial continuity and even stability of place for a time of general terror and nihilism.") Neumann, *Liberalism*, p. 50.

3. S. Rosen, *G. W. F. Hegel* (Yale University Press, 1974), p. 8.

4. Neumann, *Liberalism*, p. 267. Since all men are political (moral, religious), only supermen or crucified "gods" (see below, notes 12, 19) would be so inhuman as to disobey the First Commandment or so foolish as to say in their hearts that there is no god. No man is, or wants to be, atheist or even agnostic (doubting whether or not god exists). On the impossibility of agnosticism, see Neumann, "Eternal and Temporal Enemies," p. 283. Philosophers are neither agnostic nor atheist. Like nonphilosophic political men, they too are pious insofar as they believe to know, or at least divine, that god, a true, nonarbitrary standard of good exists (Plato, *Republic*, 505A–511D; Neumann, *Liberalism*, pp. xv–xxiii, 85–107, 230–34, 267–68). The philosopher, however, unlike ordinary political men, is seriously confronted with the question whether the god regnant in his "cave," and therefore in him, is the true god. He alone is "open to the full impact of the all-important question which is coeval with philosophy, although the philosophers do not frequently pronounce it—the question *quid sit deus*" (L. Strauss, *The City and Man* (Rand McNally, 1964), p. 241.

The philosopher is not the liberal individual "freed . . . of the obligations that tie man to God. To break these ties is a decision more active than a mere parting of the ways, as in an uncontested divorce. . . . One must venture profanely into sacred precincts and declare them subject to human necessities and human sovereignty as Machiavelli did when he excused Romulus's [and Cain's!] fratricide as necessary to make oneself *uno solo*. With this demonstration of the daring it takes to make oneself truly alone, Machiavelli unsheathes the original liberal individual . . . a tyrant and necessarily so . . . the original empowered individual" (H. Mansfield, *The Taming of the Prince* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993], p. xvi). But why do these tyrannic individualists bother with politics—that is, with human life? Why not aim for supermen or crucified gods? Did not their passions—which always are political and therefore pious—overpower their liberal (atheist) reason! Consider Neumann, *Liberalism*, pp. 82, 261–66.

Serious philosophic questioning (as opposed to liberal individualism) always is informed by awareness of what god (and therefore politics) can and cannot be. Consequently (like Maimonides in Judaism, Aquinas in Christendom, and Jaffa in America), insofar as possible, it "adorns its Sparta" (below, notes 15 and 17) by discrediting the oxymoronic (atheist, anarchic) piety of a Schmitt or a Scholem (see below, notes 12 and 19). In this spirit, Jaffa fights devaluation of the

American founding principle (that all men are created equal) into a self-evident half-truth, since, for him, the American founding, fired by this principle, is the best regime. Consider H. Jaffa, *The American Founding as the Best Regime: The Bonding of Civic and Religious Liberty* (Claremont, 1990).

5. Nietzsche, *Joyful Science*, 125; Neumann, "Eternal Temporal Enemies," pp. 279–83.

6. Plato, *Republic*, 338D–339A, 343C, 540E–541B. This dishonest claim to universal validity fires current "politically correct" demands that men cease being "elitist" and respect "diversity" ("multiculturalism"). Only a (Nietzschean) superman or a (Christian) crucified god could meet these demands. Those inflicting the demands rarely, if ever, realize their inhumanity, the staggering price of their atheistic need to emasculate *eros* into *agape* (see below, note 19). Luther rightly insisted that the Christian command to love one's enemies (a real respect for "diversity"!) convicts men of sin, since they neither can, nor want to, do this. Only a miracle-working god, capable of *ex nihilo* creation, could transform *eros* into *agape*, and thus make possible love of enemies, rejection of elitism, respect for diversity, etc. On that transformation's atheism (nihilism), see Neumann, *Liberalism*, pp. 262–66, 271–73, 284–88; "Eternal and Temporal Enemies," pp. 279–84.

7. Nietzsche, *Will to Power* 910, 583(c); *Joyful Science*, 125; Neumann, *Liberalism*, pp. 120–21, 272–73.

8. L. Strauss, *Thoughts on Machiavelli* (Free Press, 1958) pp. 174, 329 (note 1).

9. Rousseau, *Social Contract*, IV:8, II:7; Neumann, *Liberalism*, pp. 202–7; A. Kojève, "The Christian Origin of Modern Science," *The St. Johns Review* (Winter, 1984), pp. 22–26; Nietzsche, *Joyful Science*, 322, 344, 377; *Genealogy of Morals*, III, 24–25.

10. L. Strauss, *Liberalism Ancient and Modern* (Basic Books, 1968), p. 242; Neumann, *Liberalism*, pp. 55–59; Plato, *Euthyphro*, 10A.

11. H. Meier, "Was ist Politische Theologie?" in J. Assman, *Politische Theologie Zwischen Ägypten und Israel* (Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung, 1992), pp. 16, 28. Neumann, *Liberalism*, pp. 92–95.

12. L. Strauss, "How to Begin to Study Medieval Philosophy," in *The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism* (University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 215. Contrast Schmitt, *Glossarium*, p. 283: "Vous devriez savoir que je suis catholique de race. Ma liberté vis-à-vis des idées est sans bornes parce que je reste en contact avec mon centre inoccupable qui n'est pas une 'idée' mais un événement historique: l'incarnation du Fils de Dieu. Pour moi le christianisme n'est pas en premier lieu un doctrine, ni une morale, ni même (excusez) une religion; il est un événement historique." ("You should know that I am a catholic by race. My freedom *vis a vis* ideas is limitless because I remain in contact with my unoccupied center which is not an idea but a historical event: the incarnation of the son of God. For me, Christianity is primarily not a doctrine, nor a moral, nor even [pardon] a religion; it is a historical event.")

The justification for Schmitt's racial catholicism is the Incarnation, a particular experience, not a universal law or principle. Schmitt's god, and therefore Schmitt, is beyond good and evil. Consider *Glossarium*, p. 209, where Schmitt supports Hegelian rejection of Jewish *Gesetzreligion*. A god beyond good and evil cannot supply the nonarbitrary, eternal moral standards implied in all serious political conflict. It leaves human experience with pointless desire for a nonexistent happiness, its "natural" fulfillment. The crucifixion of Schmitt's incarnated god is an accurate image of this pointlessness. As Paul rightly observed, an incarnated, crucified god is blasphemy to the Jews and ridiculous to the Greeks (I Corinthians 1:23). On the primacy of eternal principles (legalism) to particular experience, see Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 126, 27–28, 10 (note 3), and *The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism*, pp. 212–26.

Schmitt's radically Christian "liberation" of desire from its natural fulfillment is evident in his rejection of Nietzsche's assertion that all *Lust* (desire, joy) wants eternity: "Alle Lust will Ewigkeit? So? Die Lust will nichts. Sie ist totale Gegenwart und kennt und weiss and will nichts anderes. Sie will nichts als sich selbst, sich selbst gefallen. Sie will nicht Ewigkeit" ("All longing [desire] wants eternity? Really? Desire wants nothing. It is totally in the present and knows and wills nothing else. It wants nothing but itself, to please itself. It does not want eternity.") (*Glossarium*, p. 87). Schmitt's Christian hatred of Jewish legalism is responsible for this emasculation of *Lust* (desire, longing).

On Scholem's emphasis on mysticism (*Kabbala*) against legalism (rationalism), consider his *On Jews and Judaism in Crisis* (New York: Schocken Books, 1976), pp. 32–33, 36: "Reason is a great instrument of destruction. For construction something beyond it is required . . . something moral.

Secular morality is a morality built on reason alone. I do not believe in this possibility. This is an utter illusion of philosophers. . . . Anarchism held many attractions for me, especially its positive utopianism. . . . The only social theory that makes sense—religious sense, too—is anarchism. . . . Of course from the standpoint of the values of official traditional Judaism, this conception is negative. I wasn't an atheist anarchist. I thought that the organization of society under absolute liberty is a divine mandate." Unlike Strauss, Scholem failed to see the atheism (nihilism) informing anarchism. This failure is the hallmark of pseudo-liberalism, the attempt to do the impossible, to make liberalism political. See Neumann, *Liberalism*, pp. xvi–xxiii, 34–42, 82–84, 92–95, 170–72, 259–60, 263–68, 272–73, 284–88.

13. M. Arnold, "Dover Beach"; Nietzsche, *Birth of Tragedy*, 7 (end); *Ecce Homo*, "Why I am so Shrewd," 4.

14. Neumann, *Liberalism*, pp. 94, 100–104; cf. Kojève (above, note 9).

15. Strauss, "Reply to Professors Schaar and Wolin," *American Political Science Review*, 57 (March, 1963): 155.

16. Nietzsche, *Joyful Science*, 110 (end); *Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967 ff.) VII<sub>2</sub>, 84.

17. Jaffa, "What is Racism?" *Claremont McKenna College Forum* (February 25, 1993), p. 15. See also Jaffa, "Is the Constitution Good (And If So, Why?)" (to be published in *The American Founding as the Best Regime and Other Essays in Socratic Rationalism*, University Press of America, forthcoming): "The *Constitution* is good because it is the embodiment, to the greatest extent possible in 1787, of the principles of the *Declaration of Independence*. The essential relationship of the *Constitution* to the principles of the Declaration is one of means to ends. The statement of principles in the *Declaration of Independence* is a compressed summary of 'the laws of nature and nature's God'. It consists in an articulation and a perfection of a natural law tradition that goes back at least to Aristotle, and that embodies the ethical core of the Judeo-Christian tradition as well."

18. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, Preface (3); *Beyond Good and Evil*, Preface; *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, II:8.

19. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, IX:32; Neumann, *Liberalism*, pp. 261–66. Cf. above, note 12, Schmitt's denial that desire wants eternity.

Schmitt's Christianity deforms natural love (*eros*) into miraculous love (*agape*). For any natural desire always implies eternity, as Nietzsche notes (above, note 12). Opposing ideas about what constitutes desire's eternal satisfaction, man's true happiness, are responsible for mankind's perpetual hot or cold wars: Love and War are inextricably bound, as the old myths testify. Consider the remarks of Scott Fitzgerald quoted in Neumann, *Liberalism*, p. 295.

Like the *agape* of Christianity's crucified god, the Nietzschean superman's amoral contempt for desire and the desirable "leaves human experience with a pointless desire for a nonexistent happiness" (above, note 12). Since *eros* (desire) is pointless in their atheist world, the superman and the crucified god experience life as "the joyless quest for joy" (Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, pp. 251; 10, note 3). Unlike Nietzsche, Schmitt is not alive to that atheism's horror. Not insanity, but awareness of this insanity-inducing horror led Nietzsche to sign one of his last letters (January 4, 1889) as "the crucified." See Neumann, *Liberalism*, p. 84 (last paragraph).