

Interpretation

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Allan Bloom and Thomas Aquinas on Eros and Immortality

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The impetus behind Allan Bloom's *Love and Friendship* is his belief that the modern understanding of the human being is incapable of providing a basis for love and friendship.¹ Bloom sees this modern view as atomistic, materialistic, and above all reductionistic because its general principle is that the higher can be explained by the lower. The highest human activities can be explained by lower, more primitive causes; Socrates is explainable by Freud; form is explainable by atoms. What is real are not the phenomena of form appearing to the lover, friend, or artist but the atoms known only by the scientist.² Eros, classically understood as a natural desire for the other, is now reducible to sex, a purely private, individualistic satisfaction, and sex is perhaps itself reducible to power as the more fundamental reality.³ Underlying this modern view is Hobbes' state of nature, which Bloom sees as the starting point for virtually all modern discussions of "eros." Since human relationships are made up of naturally selfish individuals who have no natural inclinations towards each other or to a common good, all relationships are contracts made for the sake of complementary interests and tempered by a desire to protect myself from the other who is using me for a private good.⁴

Bloom's prescription corresponding to his diagnosis of the failure of modern thought to account for the phenomena of love and friendship is a recovery of the notion of form. He proposes to take seriously the forms of beauty appearing to lovers, friends, and artists and to question whether or not they are reducible to more primitive atomic reality.⁵ Such a recovery of form would coincide with seeing eros as rooted in nature. Atoms, being already fully actualized, have no natural connection with or desire for perfection, but erotic nature needs to be completed either by a state of perfection into which it naturally develops by itself if unimpeded or through others who share its common good. If eros is rooted in nature, then human beings are naturally in potentiality to their perfection, and to understand human nature one cannot simply survey the most common examples of human activity; rather, one must look to the highest human achievements to appreciate human nature in its most actualized state. It is not the most primitive but the highest instances of love and friendship which would be most explanatory. If eros is rooted in nature, then it is by following the highest erotic inclinations that one discovers what love and friendship are.⁶

Central to Bloom's approach, and the most interesting aspect of his attempt to recover form, is the method he uses. The tyranny of the modern approach is the a priori assumption that the only method belongs to natural science and that it can explain the artist. Bloom contends, however, that the method of the artist is irreducible and a valuable method for examining the subject matter of love and friendship. His contention is, I believe, that if we leave aside the modern a priori assumption, the results of following this other method will confirm its validity. Bloom calls his method Socratic: it is psychology in the sense of a science of the soul, but he says that it might more properly be called phenomenology.⁷ The value of novelists and poets is that they are phenomenologists inasmuch as they take seriously the phenomena of love and friendship and are skilled observers of human beings. Bloom says of Shakespeare, for example, that he preserves the phenomena because he is interested in discovering human nature rather than transforming it.⁸ Common to Socrates and the artists is an interest in the highest forms of love and friendship.

How does one judge whether or not Bloom's method is successful? Modern reductionism claims that there is no difference between the higher and the lower. There is no essential difference, for example, between eros and sex: it is a difference that makes no difference. A phenomenological analysis of love and friendship, especially by means of the insights of Shakespeare and Plato, does manifest differences in kind. The difference between Socrates and Eryximachus in the *Symposium* is a difference that makes a difference. There are activities that are better than others because they are more complete realizations of human nature. Love and friendship themselves, in Bloom's analysis, appear different in kind. Nonetheless, the question immediately arises whether this method is begging the question. Does it not assume a priori that the phenomenal is real? It does assume that differences in kind are primarily seen rather than proved. That such distinctions exist must either be seen or they must be dismissed altogether. Thus Bloom describes what Socrates learned from Diotima:

Diotima's nature, at least implicitly, puts more weight on the visible species and gives preference to the kind of motion to be found in the growth of plants and animals as opposed to that found in changes of place. In other words, she is not an atomist and is closer to being a biologist, one who views atoms as controlled by the species or Forms of things, the heterogeneity of kinds as superior to the homogeneity of atoms. . . . Diotima reflects a change in ontology or the understanding of nature, which is historically linked with Socrates' turning around from the blinding attempt to see the atoms to viewing the reflections of the various kinds of things. . . . The Forms or the Ideas in their etymological sense point toward the primacy of the eyes and what they see. There is a connection between natural philosophy understood in this way and the speculative or contemplative pleasure of the lover, who in the first places enjoys looking at the beauty of the beloved. (Pp. 513–14)

More fundamentally, however, Bloom's point is that atomistic reductionism can explain the phenomena only by explaining them away: it explains the differences in kind by saying that there are no real differences. The principle that the higher can be explained by the lower denies a difference between the higher and lower. But the principle that the higher can explain the lower denies neither:

A psychology which hopes to do any justice to the phenomena must begin by understanding the highest and most interesting human types. On the basis of such an understanding, one can easily understand lower and less interesting types simply by slicing off the peaks from the higher ones. But you cannot do it the other way around. You cannot get the causes and motives for the higher types from observing the lower ones, and any attempt to do so will be ludicrously distorting. Plato tries to show in the *Symposium* that philosophy is the most complete and revealing form of Eros. On that basis he is capable of working down to the activities and hopes of persons who will never be philosophers or perhaps even know that there is such a thing as philosophy. But if one says that the fundamental erotic activity is the gross coupling of two individuals, you can explain the philosophic vision only as some kind of miraculous covering up of what one really wanted, rather than a cosmic solicitation. (P. 544)

Bloom's recovery of form entails approaching the phenomena of love and friendship with a method that preserves the phenomena because it is adapted to the subject matter. Hence his reliance on premodern artists and on Plato.

Whether or not Bloom's method is successful depends on whether one sees the differences he sees when following his unique phenomenological analysis based on works of art and the history of philosophy. The power of his analysis is largely dependent on the ability of the language of the writers he uses to present those irreducible forms and the difference between higher and lower forms of love and friendship. Prior to the results of his method, however, is a willingness to engage oneself in a method that takes seriously the phenomena appearing to artists, friends, and lovers. If one finds Bloom's method successful in its argument for a recovery of form against a crude reductionism, more interesting questions arise. In particular, assuming that the notion of form is necessary to account for the phenomena of love and friendship, the question arises whether it is possible to maintain a distinction between form and matter without going beyond Bloom's method.

The problem is that although Bloom argues against a crude materialistic reductionism, he himself remains reductionistic on a central point. Bloom acknowledges that his phenomenological analysis of eros consistently pairs the highest forms of eros with a desire for eternity. Eros, as opposed to sex, is always conjoined with a desire for immortality.⁹ But immediately after acknowledging that eros is naturally united with a desire for immortality, he re-

duces this to an illusion, even though it is not an illusion but very real for the writers to whom he is referring and for the human experience he is recognizing. The lover's desire for the immortality of the beloved, the friend's desire for immortality of the other, is irrational and impossible: indeed, he calls it a natural illusion, which is no less dangerous for being natural.¹⁰ Up to this point Bloom has been saying that the rooting of eros in nature means that we should trust our highest natural inclinations as a guide to what is real and fulfilling. Suddenly, when it comes to immortality, human nature and the highest forms of love and friendship cease to be completely trustworthy guides.

This brings us to another problem. Bloom's phenomenology or psychology is a science of the soul, and such a science requires the existence of a soul. Hence the recovery of form requires the recovery of the notion of soul as well. This much Bloom concedes.¹¹ But Bloom has nothing to say about the nature of this soul. It is necessary as a suppositum underlying his psychology, but his method evidently cannot investigate this reality supporting the phenomena of love and friendship. The activities of soul appear to us but not the soul itself. There is no attempt to move from the activities of the soul to the nature of the soul. The question is whether Bloom's recovery of form can be maintained without making this transition from the activities of the soul to the nature of the soul. Such a question is implicitly raised by Bloom himself in his conclusion, where the phenomena of love seem to be more illusory than real: "[Love] contains powerful elements of illusion, it may be thought to be entirely illusion, but its effects are not illusory" (p. 547). It is Bloom's reduction of the desire for immortality in eros to a natural illusion and his avoidance of a discussion of the nature of the human soul that threaten his recovery of form. To illustrate this point, I turn now to Thomas Aquinas.

What I propose to show first, using Aquinas, is that it is necessary to conceive the intellect as a wholly immaterial power, and the soul thereby as a spiritual substance, in order to maintain Bloom's recovery of form and the distinction of soul and matter. To do this, we begin with the contrary supposition, namely, that the human intellect is a bodily organ. It is consistent with the form-matter distinction to identify the intellect with the brain; that is, if the soul is only a material form, then the intellect must be the brain. In this way there is no difference between human and animal soul in the form-matter relationship except that the intellect would be the most complex of bodily organs. Now in a theory which maintains a form-matter distinction and teleology, bodily organs are directed towards the sustenance and preservation of the organism.¹² But the individual life of the organism is ordered to the species. Aquinas follows Aristotle in viewing the end of individual plant and animal organisms as the imitation of the divine by reproduction. There is an eros in all living beings which naturally seeks to imitate the eternity of the divine by contributing to the ceaseless continuance of the same form.¹³

If there is no fundamental difference in the form-matter structure of human and animal soul, then there is no reason why the presence of intellection in human beings should constitute a different kind of eros. An intellect that is a bodily organ is able to contribute to the self-preservation of the human organism and the reproduction of the human species in a more complex way, but there is no ontological reason why it should not be subordinated to the ends of self-preservation and reproduction. This is problematic because it means that what appears to be higher, namely the intellectual life, is actually subordinated to the lower ends of self-preservation and reproduction. To use Bloom's language, the philosophic vision would be a kind of covering up of what one really wanted.¹⁴ In other words, there is no such thing as a philosophical activity or eros which is an end in itself: all such intellectual activity is really reducible to the ends of self-preservation and reproduction. All eros is for the existence of the organism, and ultimately for the survival of the species.

Bloom would certainly find this view of eros unsatisfactory because it is incompatible with the phenomena of the highest forms of love and friendship. Is it, however, avoidable if the intellect is a bodily organ and the human soul does not essentially differ from the animal? Can we say that human eros differs in kind from the animal given that the human soul does not differ in kind? The worst one can say about Aristotle's and Aquinas' view of eros in animals is that, in attributing to them a natural desire to imitate the divine or eternal, they are too generous. But if we reduce eros in animals to something less lofty, and if there is no essential distinction between human and animal soul, we are left with an even more severe reduction of human eros. Bloom is recovering together the notions of form and nature. It follows, then, that the human being is an individual in a species. But, if there is no essential difference between a human and animal soul, there is no reason why the individual human should not be related to its species in the same way as the individual animal is to its species.

Similar consequences follow from a denial of immortality to the human soul. The human soul cannot be a subsistent, spiritual substance if the intellect is a bodily organ, because it would have no operation that would be wholly immaterial.¹⁵ Therefore, the human soul would be corrupted with the corruption of the composite. The individual organism would be as transitory as any other organism, and the more stable perfection of the species would surpass the very transitory perfection of the individual. It is not surprising that the eros of the individual would be naturally directed to the species through reproduction if its own existence is so temporally limited. The eros in nature Bloom sees as striving towards perfection would find greater fulfillment in the species than the individual because the perfection of the species continues after the death of the individual. Bloom does note that Diotima has counseled Socrates on a threefold hierarchy in which one can achieve immortality through reproduction (pp. 512–

24). Lowest among these is the physical reproduction of offspring by the family. Bloom calls this an illusion of immortality that is even more difficult to attain in our time when family ties are weaker. Higher is the immortality that comes from the education of human beings, which includes the activity of poets, inventors, statesmen, lawgivers, and founders. This immortality is very attenuated as well, since, although cities, works of art, and so on may be more lasting than families, they are still essentially temporal. Last and highest is the philosophical life, but Bloom's interpretation of it seems to be entirely devoid of immortality. Indeed, he sees Socrates as a wholly inner-directed, self-sufficient solitary who derives satisfaction from himself. His Socrates is completely individual, and he discounts the Socrates of the *Phaedo* arguing for the immortality of the soul.¹⁶ In short, Bloom wants to maintain the philosophical life of the individual as the highest perfection, but his view of soul cannot support it. Human soul for Bloom is mortal, and thus the perfection of the species should be superior. Moreover, since there is no essential difference between human and animal soul, there is no reason why intellectual activity should be an end in itself rather than a means to self-preservation and the reproduction of the species.

The phenomena Bloom wants to preserve can be saved on the assumption that the soul is a spiritual substance, that is, immaterial, subsistent, and incorruptible. A nonhuman organism is *in* a species in the sense that it is only a part of the species. A plant or animal is limited not only by its essence but also to its essence. Nonhuman organisms are limited to the perfection circumscribed by their essence. On the other hand, if the intellect is immaterial, the human being is not in a species the way that other organisms are.¹⁷ For Aquinas, the individual human being is limited by its essence, but it is not limited to its essence. Through its essence, the human being is finite, but through its immaterial intellect it is open to the infinite. In fact, Aquinas calls the purpose of intellect in creatures a "remedy" for the finitude of essence (*De veritate* 2.2). Of each essence we can say that it is not some other essence, and the perfection of each essence is limited by the fact that it is not the perfection which is every other essence. This limitation of essences is overcome in a way when one considers the universe as a whole. The essences which make up the universe are limited with respect to each other, but as parts of the whole they complement each other and make up for the limited perfection of the other parts. Nevertheless, the perfection of the whole is external to any essence considered by itself. There is, however, another kind of perfection in knowledge which is a remedy for the limited perfection of essence because it is an inclusion of the perfection of other essences within the limited perfection of the knower. Through the immateriality of the intellect, the knower is open to the perfection of the whole universe. Immateriality is the necessary condition for this openness of the intellect to external perfection because matter is the principle which limits the perfection of form to being the perfection of just this one substance.

If the intellect is a bodily organ, then there is no remedy for the finitude of the essence of which it is a part. Hence the perfection of the species remains superior to that of the individual, and intellectual activity is subordinated to the good of reproducing the species. But if the intellect is immaterial, the human individual is not just a part of the human species but is itself a whole. Through the intellect the individual is open to a whole that transcends the species. The human intellect is not only open to the whole perfection of the universe but to the whole of being—*totum ens* (see *Summa contra gentiles* III.112). In a sense, the human individual transcends the limitation of the species inasmuch as the object of the intellect is a whole that includes the human species as a part. Furthermore, the individual is on a par with the species when it comes to immortality because the human soul is immortal (see *Summa contra gentiles* III.113).

Consequently it makes sense to say that the intellectual life is not subordinated to lower activities but an end in itself and the highest kind of eros. The remedy for the finitude of essence in the immateriality of the intellect coincides with the liberation of the individual from the natural necessity to seek the continuance of the species as a perfection superior to that of the individual.¹⁸ The individuality and freedom of the philosophical life, which Socrates exemplifies and which Bloom praises so highly, is possible only if the intellect is immaterial and the soul immortal. In addition, the remedy of an immaterial intellect means that eros, in its natural desire for immortality, is not an illusion. We are not driven to see nature as illusory, nor are the phenomena of love and friendship a kind of bewitchment to help us forget the ugliness of human life. There is thus no need to qualify the reality of the phenomena of the highest manifestations of love and friendship.

The immateriality of the intellect as the basis for the subsistence and immortality of the soul is necessary to save the phenomena that Bloom's phenomenology distinguishes. But Aquinas' psychology can go further in saving the phenomena because he argues that the soul is not only a subsistent substance but the form of matter. For Aquinas, the soul as an intellectual substance is complete in its existence but not in its nature because human intellectuality requires the sense powers, which, in turn, require formal union with the body. In order to be an adequate knower, the human soul as an intellectual substance that possesses existence must communicate that intellectual and immaterial existence formally to the body with the result that it is united to the body as a substantial form. The soul is both an intellectual substance and form of the body (see *Quaestiones de anima* 1). This latter aspect further heightens the reality of the phenomena in question.

One of the most interesting aspects of Aquinas' psychology is that the human being is united by a single act of existence, but that act of existence belongs per se to the soul as an immaterial substance.¹⁹ It follows from the formal union of this immaterial and intellectual substance with the body for the

sake of its intellectuality that the body exists through an immaterial and intellectual existence (see *Quaestiones de anima* 1 and 14). As Anton Pegis puts it, the whole human being is an intellect.²⁰ So unified is the human being in this immaterial and intellectual existence that Pegis says that we must conclude that death is not, properly speaking, an event of physical nature but a spiritual event. Since it is raised to the spiritual existence of the soul, the body dies in the spiritual and intellectual world of the soul in which it lived.²¹ If death, which is at the extreme limit of the human, must be understood in terms of the unity of human existence, the phenomena of eros must be no less placed within that understanding.

A central concern of Bloom is to maintain alongside his ranking of the philosophical life as the highest kind of eros a continuity of the lower kinds of eros with the higher; more precisely, those who are not engaged in the philosophical life are, nonetheless, seeking to some degree the same thing the philosopher desires (see quotation from p. 544 reprinted above). From the unity of human existence in Aquinas' psychology we can say that all human eros from the lowest to the highest is intellectual. If all human existence is intellectual, if the human being in its entirety is an intellect, then all eros, all friendship, and all love are intellectual. All human eros is a desire to know and a way of being intellectual. There is a commonality between the most bodily of desires and the most explicitly intellectual. The desire of the body is raised to the intellectual existence of the soul, and the intellectual substance that is the soul needs to be completed by the desires of the body. Aquinas' psychology is thus able to provide a framework for seeing the unity of human eros as well as differentiation of higher and lower forms of eros.

In conclusion, the denial of the phenomena appearing to the lover or friend as real, the modern reduction of eros to sex, is a denial of form. Bloom's phenomenological method, which proposes to take the phenomena seriously, entails a recovery of form. Bloom admits that this also entails a recovery of soul, but he does not go far enough in this direction. A soul that is only the form of matter is not sufficient to save the phenomena, nor is a soul that is mortal. In other words, a form-matter distinction alone will not keep the phenomena from slipping back into illusion. What is needed in addition is a human soul that is an immaterial and immortal substance. But even this does not go far enough, because a dualist psychology cannot explain the unity of human eros. The soul that is an immaterial and immortal substance must also be the form of matter, united to the body as substantial form. My contention is that Aquinas' psychology is uniquely capable of supporting the phenomena.

Bloom's phenomenological method is a good starting point for the recovery of form, particularly insofar as it takes seriously the perspective of the poet and novelist, but it is not a good conclusion. Without an ontological consideration of the nature of the soul, the phenomena, as represented by the example of Bloom himself, cannot maintain their reality (see p. 547). Love and friendship

are activities of the human soul. From those activities we can and must proceed to the nature of the soul itself. This is the method that Aquinas learned from Aristotle: from the objects and activities of soul we can understand the powers of the soul, and ultimately the nature of the soul itself (see *Sententia libri De anima* II.6, 131–72). The advantage of Bloom’s phenomenological method as a starting point is the care given to understanding the activities of soul, and the insight of the artist into those activities, before proceeding to the nature of the soul.

Why, then, is there such resistance to discussing the human soul and its nature? Bloom suggests that the notions of “self” and “consciousness” were introduced by modern philosophy in resistance to the linkage of the notion of soul with Catholic thought. In particular, he rejects the linkage of soul and immortality in Catholic teaching.²² Nevertheless, that linkage between soul and immortality need not be through faith. On the grounds of philosophical reason the immortality of the soul can be asserted. Indeed, that linkage of human soul and immortality must be made, given the phenomena of love and friendship which Bloom believes should be taken as real. We cannot detach a denial of the soul’s immortality from a denial of the reality of phenomena of love and friendship. Together with the recovery of form, we need to recover the immateriality and immortality of the human soul.

NOTES

1. “This book is an attempt to recover the power, danger, and beauty of eros under the tutelage of its proper teachers and knowers, the poetic writers.

“What has disappeared is the risk and hope of human connectedness embedded in eros. Ours is a language that reduces the longing for another to the need for individual, private satisfaction and safety.

“Isolation, a sense of lack of profound contact with other human beings, seems to be the disease of our time” (Allan Bloom, *Love and Friendship* [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993], pp. 13–14; quotations not otherwise identified are to this work).

“Make no mistake about it, the specific forms of eroticism that we know have been constructed by modern philosophy in an effort to correct its [sc. the Hobbesian view of human nature] original defects. They appear, however, to be unable to overcome the force of the clearheaded and fully self-conscious thought of its founders” (p. 262).

2. “This [reductionistic] theory is utterly inadequate to explain saints, artists, lawgivers, or even the scientists themselves who propound the theory. But people soon began to see the theory as the reality and to forget what does not fit the theory” (p. 23).

“Rousseau’s soft school was replaced by a hard school. A savage reductionism, unlike the cool reductionism of modern science, which proceeded in its work without being very conscious of its consequences became the order of the day. . . . Evermore the movement is away from the transcendent unity of the loving couple toward Sartre’s assertion that ‘Hell is—other people’” (p. 260. See also pp. 21, 100, and 262).

3. “There are distinctively human faculties that allow sex to actualize itself as eros in human beings. Animals have sex and human beings have eros, and no accurate science is possible without making this distinction. Kinsey pays no attention to the fact that animals, although they indulge themselves whenever they can, have a much smaller range of sexual desires, almost exclusively

directed towards procreation. The strange variety of human sexual desires points toward an indeterminateness that requires molding for a truly human life.

“Yet in America, imprisoned eros turned for liberation not to a romantic literature but to scientific reductionism” (p. 19).

“Supporting this unerotic treatment of eros is the new hot principle that all human relations, especially sexual ones follow from the one motivating principle in man, the will to power” (p. 27. See also p.510).

4. “It is the war of all against all again, and the only possible peace is to be found in artificial constructs. This is the last stage in the attempt to found all human relations on contract, the discovery of complementary interests, rather than on natural inclinations. Abstract reason in the service of radically free men and women can discover only contract as the basis of connectedness—the social contract, the marriage contract, somehow mostly the business contract as model, with its union of selfish individuals. Legalism takes the place of sentiment” (pp. 27–28).

“Parenthetically, it should be mentioned that almost all modern thinkers have started with Hobbes’s state of nature, but our perennial problems in understanding human association make it doubtful whether many have succeeded in emerging from it” (p. 128. See also pp. 48 and 261).

5. “For those who rebel against the orthodoxies of our day and the prescriptions about what they should feel and think, there is a need to recover nature, which is buried under successive layers of ideological ash.

“I suggest that we need a generation or two not of theory but of an attempt to discover the real phenomena of eros. This means a flight from our time to those times and places that believed in it more and did not share our project for transforming it” (p. 29).

“The new philosophy and the new natural science had reduced men to atoms without natural connectedness” (p. 48).

“The permanence of any kind of visible order in nature is a real problem for such atomism. The connectedness of atoms in enduring shapes or forms is very difficult to explain. But the lack of a foundation for the phenomena of the world does not disturb atomists, who tend to despise the visible order as something ephemeral and from which one can not take one’s bearings. This, of course, is not tolerable to lovers, who see something real and natural in their beloveds” (p. 472).

6. “Ancient views of politics taught that man’s nature has an impulse towards society and that society is not necessarily a maiming or division of man but potentially his perfection. Similarly, the ancients taught that eros is a natural longing for the beautiful, which, given the complexity of man and of things, can be damaged and misled but is in itself a perfection of human sociability by way of the passions” (p. 21).

“A psychology that hopes to do any justice to the phenomena must begin by understanding the highest and most interesting human types” (p. 544. See also pp. 89 and 395).

7. “Psychology means the science of the soul. Socrates considered himself to be a psychologist; and he was what we would call today a phenomenologist” (p. 543).

8. “His [sc. Shakespeare’s] plays remind us of the classical goal of contemplation rather than the modern aspiration to transform.

“Shakespeare’s naturalness is what induces me to meditate on his plays in this discussion of human connectedness. I hope through doing so to articulate something of the premodern view of man’s relations with his fellows, to provide serious, and perhaps more satisfactory, alternatives to our characteristic ways of looking at things” (pp. 269–70).

“I have often in this book spoken of nature, and this is the crucial question about it: is nature the selfish atomization of individuals, or does it contain a unifying, and hence moralizing impulse?

... Shakespeare and Montaigne present us in detail relationships formed from the natural inclination to society existing in men that is asserted by Aristotle and denied by Hobbes. This is the fundamental difference among our authors” (p. 421. See also p. 396 and n. 1 above).

9. “The experience of longing for eternity, as when one holds one’s beautiful beloved in one’s arms, is constitutive of Eros as opposed to sex” (p. 510).

10. “Man is a poor, weak being. His greatest terror is his utter extinction. All the wonderful, rational goods are desired for the sake of being always, which is impossible and hence irrational. . . . Human life is too ugly for anyone who thinks about it to rest content with it. This is the

cause of the being of the gods, who underwrite the cosmic significance of human life. The old formula *timor deum fecit*, fear made god, has to be supplemented by *amor deum fecit*, love made god. . . . This longing, impossible of fulfillment, culminates in the Olympian gods, always young, always beautiful. It is both necessary for man's spirituality and his most dangerous illusion" (p. 510).

11. "Psychology means the science of soul. . . . For a number of reasons today, some connected with democratic leveling and easygoingness, there is today an almost religious commitment to the denial of the soul's existence. Inasmuch as we cannot avoid thinking about what is in us, practically everyone gets into the habit of quickly turning from what he really thinks and feels to one of the current categories that are intended to explain it: our selves, our consciousness, all half-baked substitutes for the soul. We lose the habit of taking ourselves seriously and examining the movements of our souls with delicacy and with that combination of affirmation and doubt that is the hallmark of the rare psychological truths" (pp. 543–44).

12. See *Quodlibetum* VII.7.1 and *Sentencia libri De anima* III.7, 48–55.

13. See *De anima* 415a26–415b7 and Aquinas' commentary, *Sentencia libri De anima* II.7, 98–107 and 141–57. See also *Summa contra gentiles* III.22.

14. "A statesman or an executive who undergoes psychoanalysis or who gets caught up in psychoanalytic theory cannot take his activities on their own level but only as the complex result of lower or more primitive causes. Such people get into the bad habit of being ironical about what they do in life, for it must always be interpreted in terms of other things for which it is only a cover-up" (*Love and Friendship*, p. 22. See especially the quotation from p. 544 reprinted above.).

15. For the transition from the immateriality of the intellect to the subsistence of the soul, see *Summa theologiae* 1.75.2 and *Quaestiones de anima* 1 and 14.

16. "The kind of immortality hoped for by acts of reproduction preached by Diotima is based on an implicit rejection of the fondest hope, that our individual souls will be saved. At the very outset, aware or unaware, the erotic persons have to give up the expectation that their own consciousness, which they treasure so much, will live on beyond them. On the day of his death as recounted in the *Phaedo*, a somewhat slacker Socrates, perhaps suitably so, given the occasion, tried not entirely successfully to persuade his grieving friends that his soul will survive always. This hope contains no element of Eros in it. In the immediate face of death Socrates, in his speech at least, is not erotic" (p. 511).

"This lonely contemplation, Socrates' soul engaging in dialogues with himself, proves that for all his involvement with human beings, he is essentially a solitary who can derive satisfaction from himself" (p. 537. See also pp. 531 and 535).

17. For Aquinas' account of the infinite openness of the knower which follows upon the immateriality of the intellect, see *De veritate* 2.2 and *Summa theologiae* I.14.1.

18. An indication that, according to Aquinas, the human individual is not subordinated to its species in the way that other organisms are is the freedom of the individual with respect to reproduction. See *Summa contra gentiles* III.136.

19. "St. Thomas is saying something rather startling, namely, that a spiritual substance not only makes man to be man, but makes man to be an animal, makes the human body to be a body, that is to say, makes matter to be material. Now it is not surprising that matter should exist with a material *to be*; but it does seem at first sight rather extraordinary that matter should exist as matter with a spiritual *to be*. Yet that is exactly what he is proposing" (James Robb, "Intelligere Intelligentibus Est Esse," in *An Étienne Gilson Tribute*, ed. Charles O'Neil [Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1959], p. 210).

20. "Hence, after all, St. Thomas' view of man does in fact answer Averroes. There is a proportion between the immaterial substance that the soul is and the body to which it gives existence. The soul is suited to being an intellectual substance through the body. In and through the body, it is an intellectual substance; which is why we may say of the whole man that he is in a real sense an intellect" (Anton Pegis, "St. Thomas and the Unity of Man," in *Progress in Philosophy: Philosophical Studies in Honor of Rev. Doctor Charles A. Hart*, ed. James McWilliams [Milwaukee: Bruce, 1955] p. 172).

21. "Embodiment is not to be understood simply as the existence of the soul in the world of matter; on the contrary, it is the existence of the body in the spiritual world of the soul itself. The

existence, the life and the economy of the human composite derive from the nature of the soul, so that it is not strictly correct to say that in the human composite the soul is in the body; it is more proper to say that the soul exists in the body—and in the world of matter—*only because* the body exists in the world of the soul. The human body is matter existing and functioning within the life of the intellectual soul. [I]n this union the body is *raised* to the spiritual existence of the soul.

“ It is in the same human world that we must see the meaning of death. The body dies because it is material, and that seems natural enough. But if, with St. Thomas, we make an effort to understand the body as human, then death as a human reality is not properly designated if it is simply characterized as a fact of physical nature. It is rather a fact of human nature, that is, a nature that exists wholly within the intellectual life of the soul. . . . If we accept what St. Thomas is saying, then, on the same philosophical ground on which he established the unity of man, we must say that death is a spiritual event. The body dies within the same spiritual world of the soul in which it lived” (Anton Pegis, “Between Immortality and Death: Some Further Reflections on the *Summa contra gentiles*,” in *An Étienne Gilson Tribute*, pp. 14–15).

22. “The ingrained and stubborn unwillingness to think about the soul or admit its existence has much to do with the religious criticism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The study of the soul had become such a part of Catholic Christianity that its destruction in the name of something like consciousness seemed a necessity. But the Christian teaching was about a specific version of the soul characterized by separability from the body and immortality, great miracles that defied common sense and reason” (p. 545).