

Interpretation

A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Fall 1996

Volume 24 Number 1

- 3 Leo Strauss An Untitled Lecture on Plato's *Euthyphron*
- 25 Alexandre Kojève The Specificity and Autonomy of Right
Translated and with an Introduction by
Bryan-Paul Frost and Robert Howse
- 67 Gary Alan Scott and William A. Welton An Overlooked Motive in Alcibiades' *Symposium* Speech
- 85 In Ha Jang The Problematic Character of Socrates' Defense of Justice in Plato's *Republic*
- Book Reviews*
- 109 Will Morrisey *Erotic Liberalism: Women and Revolution in Montesquieu's Persian Letters*, by Diana J. Schaub
- 117 Harry Neumann Political Philosophy or Self-Knowledge?
Comments on *Glossarium: Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947–1951*, by Carl Schmitt, and *Die Lehre Carl Schmitts: Vier Kapitel zur Unterscheidung Politischer Theologie und Politischer Philosophie*, by Heinrich Meier

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Subscriptions	Subscription rates per volume (3 issues): individuals \$29 libraries and all other institutions \$48 students (four-year limit) \$18 Single copies available. Postage outside U.S.: Canada \$4.50 extra; elsewhere \$5.40 extra by surface mail (8 weeks or longer) or \$11.00 by air. Payments: in U.S. dollars AND payable by a financial institution located within the U.S.A. (or the U.S. Postal Service).

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Composition by Eastern Composition, Inc.,
Binghamton, N.Y. 13904 U.S.A.
Printed and bound by Wickersham Printing Co.,
Lancaster, PA 17603 U.S.A.

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The Problematic Character of Socrates' Defense of Justice in Plato's *Republic*

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Of the many great scholarly controversies regarding Plato's *Republic*, two deserve especially to be noted for their interconnection. The first controversy, started by Sachs (1963) several decades ago and kept alive by numerous responses since then, concerns this problem: although Glaucon and Adeimantus at the beginning of Book Two ask for a defense of justice as ordinarily understood, Socrates responds in Book Four by defending justice on the basis of a definition of the justice of the individual that appears to have little link with justice as ordinarily understood. The other controversy—which is much older (see, e.g., Foster 1936) but is still a source of sharp debate today—deals with Socrates' argument in Book Seven that it would be just for the philosophers to rule in the best regime even if this entails their having to lead worse lives. How can Socrates hope to defend justice in thus pointing to a crucial instance where justice seems to be at odds with happiness? It is obvious that the issues that gave rise to these heretofore separate controversies are linked in that they both bear on the question of the adequacy of Socrates' defense of justice in the *Republic*, but the connection between these issues, in this and other important respects, has not been sufficiently explored and emphasized by those who have participated in the controversies.¹ I here seek to remedy this situation in the course of considering the overarching theme of the problematic character of Socrates' defense of justice in the *Republic*.

In trying to understand Socrates' view of justice in the *Republic*, it is important for us to take account of the fact that he presents, throughout most of the work, a defense of justice. In Book One, for example, having heard Thrasymachus' assertion that justice is not good at all for the one who practices it (338c–339a, 343b–344c), Socrates defends justice by getting him to agree to the following: that justice is both virtue and wisdom; that it is stronger than injustice; and that it brings happiness (348a–354a). But it is not too hard to see that Socrates, in his discussion with Thrasymachus, is not above defending justice by hook or by crook. Thus Glaucon and Adeimantus are justified, at the beginning of Book Two, in forcing Socrates to provide a truly adequate defense of justice (357a–367e). That Socrates engages in a rhetorical defense of justice in Book One, however, serves as a clear warning to us. There is no guarantee that the defense of justice that Socrates provides in the rest of the *Republic* is

not itself rhetorical. Just as Thrasymachus may be too easily charmed by Socrates' arguments, as Glaucon suggests (358b), we must beware of suffering the same fate. I argue that Socrates' defense of justice in the rest of the *Republic*, designed to prove that justice is intrinsically good and that it is better than injustice, is in fact problematic. This paper delineates the key difficulties of this defense, to which one must pay the utmost attention in attempting to grasp Socrates' view of justice in the *Republic*.

JUSTICE IN THE SOCRATIC SENSE

Responding to the request of Glaucon and Adeimantus for a true defense of the justice of the individual, Socrates first endeavors to bring to light the justice of the city, for, he says, since the justice of the city is bigger and easier to see than the justice of the individual, it is better for those who cannot see sharply to turn to the justice of the individual after examining the justice of the city (368c–369b). To facilitate the discovery of the justice of the city, Socrates outlines (through Book Four) a succession of cities: first, the city based on needs; next, the luxurious city; and, finally, the city purged of luxuries—a city that is characterized by the existence of a warrior class, the recipients of an extensive civic or moral education (369a–427c). After looking for justice in this last city, the good or virtuous city (in which justice is most likely to be found [420b–c, 434d–e]), Socrates declares that the justice of the city can be defined as each of the three classes of the city—whether the ruling, guarding, or wage-earning class—minding its own business (432d–434c). Then, on the premise that the justice of the city is parallel to the justice of the individual, Socrates defines the justice of the individual as each of the three parts of the soul—the rational, the spirited, and the appetitive—minding its own business (442d–e, 443c–e).² He also makes clear that the just individual is concerned not with affairs that are external to him but with the harmony of his own soul; and that such an individual calls “just” any action, whether political or otherwise, that helps produce this condition in the soul (443c–e). By arguing that the justice of the individual as defined in this way is analogous to the health of the body, moreover, Socrates ultimately leads us to draw the conclusion that justice is intrinsically good because it is a kind of health of the soul (444d–445b).

Unfortunately, however, there are difficulties with Socrates' definition of the justice of the individual, on which his argument in favor of the intrinsic goodness of justice relies. In the first place, while according to this definition the just man is concerned with the harmony of his own soul or with his own good, the just man is ordinarily thought of as being eminently devoted to others or to the common good.³ Furthermore, according to this definition, the just man calls “just” any action that conduces to the harmony of his own soul. Hence

this definition has the troubling implication that, at least in principle, an action that is ordinarily considered unjust could be just (and vice versa). It also has the surprising result that an action that is not even in the realm of justice and injustice—for instance, the act of engaging in mathematical studies—could, in principle, be just or unjust. These difficulties cast doubt on Socrates' assurance that the justice of the individual as embodied in his definition would be perfectly in keeping with the ordinary standards of justice, that is, his assurance that the just man who allows each of the parts of his soul to mind its own business would not steal, cheat, dishonor his parents, and so on (442e–443b. Cf. Sachs 1963, p. 154; Weingartner 1964–65, p. 250; Mabbot 1971, p. 58; and Waterlow 1972–73, p. 24). Socrates' definition of the justice of the individual, for all these reasons, is paradoxical and has little relation to justice as ordinarily understood. It contrasts with the more commonsensical definitions of justice offered in Book One, for example, justice as giving back what one takes and telling the truth (331b–c; cf. Demos 1964, p. 395). We have to wonder then whether Socrates' definition of the justice of the individual in Book Four is not arbitrary, a mere invention of his mind. If it is arbitrary, Socrates' defense of justice, to the extent that it relies on such an arbitrary definition, would not be adequate.⁴

As noted, this definition is based on the existence of a strict parallelism between the justice of the city and the justice of the individual (368e–369a, 434d–435a, 441d–e, 442d–443c). But the questionable character of this premise is ultimately acknowledged by Socrates himself: while he tries to support the existence of such a parallelism through making the lengthy argument that the soul, like the city, has three parts, Socrates reveals—precisely in the context of elaborating on the justice of the individual—that there may be more than three parts of the soul (435b–441c, 443d–e; cf. Cross and Woosley 1964, p. 113). In opposition to the above premise, moreover, we can point out that justice sometimes demands much more from individuals than from cities. During times of war, for instance, individuals are often asked to sacrifice their lives on behalf of justice; but cities are seldom, if ever, asked to sacrifice their existence on behalf of justice. It is also worth observing that Socrates is not completely successful at giving definitions of justice that would lead one to believe firmly in the existence of a strict parallelism between the justice of the city and the justice of the individual. First, his definition of the justice of the city as each of the three classes of the city's minding its own business is consistent with rule by merit and absolute dedication to the city, which are ordinarily believed to be just (420b–421c). Hence it is not as paradoxical as his definition of the justice of the individual as each of the three parts of the soul's minding its own business (cf. Vlastos 1981, pp. 115–17, 119). Second, his definition of the justice of the city does not necessarily rule out the potential lack of happiness in any one of the three classes of the city (419a–421c; cf. 465e–466c, 519e–520a), but, by contrast, his definition of the justice of the individual is not indicated to entail the potential unhappiness of any one part of the soul.

Despite the questionable character of the argument that results in Socrates' definition of the justice of the individual, it is possible that this definition, taken by itself, could be correct. Yet, as noted, there are difficulties connected with this definition considered by itself, such as that according to this definition the just man is exclusively concerned with his own good. This particular aspect of the definition, though, appears to receive some justification from Socrates' analysis of the justice of the city (as discovered in a good or virtuous city). While Socrates' definition of the justice of the city does not take account of foreign affairs, it is in keeping with the good or virtuous city's looking exclusively to its own advantage. Indeed, Socrates indicates that such a city takes care of its own good in a less than scrupulous way: in order to preserve itself, it promotes something like civil war in other cities (422a–423c). If even the good or virtuous city is guided only by its own good, the question arises whether there is not some justification for describing the just individual as one who is concerned solely with his own good. It can be retorted, however, that the fact that the good city is concerned merely with its own good is problematic from the point of view of justice. That is, one could excuse the good city for pursuing its own good—even to the detriment of other cities—insofar as it must preserve itself, but one could not, at the same time, call such a city positively just, at least with respect to other cities. (Of course, it would be difficult to excuse the good city if it had an expansionist foreign policy that is geared toward neither security nor inner harmony.) This means that the way in which the good or virtuous city behaves toward other cities can hardly be used to justify similar actions on the part of the individual, at least if he is to be regarded as *positively* just in regard to other individuals.

The paradoxical character of the justice of the individual in the Socratic sense is underscored by the fact that the most important members of the good and just city, as described from Book Two through Book Four, do not necessarily possess such justice. Socrates does give the impression at one point that both the guardians and the rulers of this city would be able, through the sort of education they receive, to acquire the justice of the individual as harmony of the soul (441e–442a). Yet he delineates the following two ingredients of such justice, which neither the guardians nor the rulers would possess: the wisdom of the individual that consists in the knowledge of what is beneficial for each of the three parts of the soul as well as for the soul as a whole (442c, 443e–444a); and, the rule in the soul of the reasoning part that provides “speeches”—that is, reasoned arguments—as to what is truly to be feared and is capable of making one wise as an individual (442c). Instead of being guided by the “speeches” about what is to be feared, the guardians rely on the “lawful opinion” as to what is terrible and what is not (429a–430c). The rulers, moreover, are wise in the sense of knowing how the city as a whole would best deal with itself and the other cities (428c–d), but, while they are thus the source of the city's being wise, they do not necessarily possess the wisdom of the individual as embodied

in the knowledge of what is good for the individual soul. Indeed, they are chosen to be rulers only if they have love for the city as well as the accompanying conviction that one must do what is best for the city (412c–d). Yet Socrates reveals that this conviction is not simply true, at least insofar as it is meant to be in keeping with the assumption that a man would “love something most when he believed that the same things are advantageous to it and to himself, and when he supposed that if it did well, he too himself would do well along with it, and if it didn’t, neither would he” (412d), for, in response to Adeimantus’ objection that he is making those who govern the city unhappy, Socrates argues that what is best for the city need not be consistent in every case with the individual good (420b–c; cf. 465e–466c, 519e–520a).

While they are not just in the Socratic sense, however, the guardians and rulers would be regarded as just in the ordinary sense.⁵ They certainly contribute to the justice of the city understood as each of the classes doing its own job and are devoted otherwise to the good of the city. For they would send even their own children to a lower class to ensure rule by merit, and, in having no privacy and no more property than what is needed, they would remain guardians and rulers instead of becoming money-makers and hence would preserve the city (414d–417b). In being dedicated in these ways to the city and its justice, moreover, they would, from the perspective of ordinary justice, be considered to be just as individuals. But Socrates indicates that they are far from being just on purely rational grounds: their justice is dependent on the noble lie as well as on the institutional arrangements concerning privacy and property that are forced upon them (414d–417b). (So too, while defending the city would not only be an act of courage but also to some extent an act of justice [see 332e], the guardians would defend the city on the basis only of lawful opinion [429a–430c]. And the rulers would do what is best for the city and hence be just in the ordinary sense as a result of a mere conviction, whose truth is not beyond dispute [412c–d].) Socrates, of course, never speaks thematically about justice in outlining the official discussion of the education for the rulers and guardians, for he does not want to speak about their education to justice before discovering what the truth about justice is, even if this means refraining from criticizing certain traditional views on justice that cast doubt on its goodness (392a–b). Thus, contrary to the expectation that he raises at the outset, his discussion of their education does not contribute, in any obvious fashion, to an understanding of justice (376c–d). After his discussion of their official education, however, he indicates, in various ways, that the sort of justice that they would acquire would be less than fully rational. The question that Socrates appears to pose therefore is this: Can ordinary justice rest on a strictly rational foundation, just as justice in the Socratic sense surely does?

The definition of the justice of the individual in Book Four, as analyzed in the foregoing, must also be considered in the light of what occurs in the rest of the *Republic*. Having examined the virtues of both the city and the individual,

Socrates attempts, at the end of Book Four, to turn to a discussion of the forms of vice (445c–e). Yet, at the beginning of Book Five, he is asked by Adeimantus to delve into the proposal for the community of women and children, a proposal that he had mentioned without any discussion in founding his good city (449c, 423e–424a). Hence he is induced, in the first place, to outline the arrangement concerning the equality of the sexes (which is in keeping with the community of women and men in education) and to show its possibility and goodness (451d–457c). He then is led to indicate the character of the community of women and children as well as its goodness (457c–466d). Asked to show the possibility of the community of women and children, however, Socrates introduces the proposal for the philosopher-kings, the greatest of the three waves (471c–473e). This has the result, as Glaucon points out, that from Book Five through Book Seven Socrates brings to light a finer city and individual than he had earlier done (543c–544a). Now, Socrates and Glaucon agree, at the end of Book Seven, that it is plain who this finer individual is (541b). It is safe to say that they have in mind the philosopher: the philosopher, after all, is the individual who is parallel to the city ruled by philosophers. Socrates confirms this when he turns to an analysis of the defective regimes and individuals in Book Eight. He there identifies the “good and just man” with the father of the timocratic man; and this man is almost a caricature of Socrates himself (544e, 549c–550b; cf. Nettleship 1925, p. 305; Bloom 1968, p. 420). By calling the philosopher good and just, then, Socrates puts forward the equation of the just man and the philosopher. He makes this equation quite explicit in trying to prove that justice is better than injustice in Book Nine, for he employs the argument that tyranny, that is, injustice par excellence, is inferior to justice because the pleasures of the philosopher are better and more real than the pleasures of the tyrant (580d–587e). This is a crucial development in Socrates’ argument, especially since the equation of the just man and the philosopher is from the ordinary perspective rather suspect (see 473e–474a and 487b–d).

In the light of this development, we must ask, What is the status of the definition of the justice of the individual as provided in Book Four? The account of the soul on which this definition is based certainly goes through some revision by the end of Book Nine: while still maintaining the existence of the three parts of the soul, Socrates reveals that the rational and spirited parts of the soul have desires and pleasures of their own (580d–583a; cf. 435e–441c).⁶ But the definition of the justice of the individual given in Book Four also undergoes some modification. Socrates, at the end of Book Nine, modifies that definition by making clear that the philosopher is just in the sense outlined in Book Four. Speaking of the just man who would rule in the best regime—that is, the philosopher—Socrates says, in terms that hark back to his statements regarding the just man in Book Four, that such a man is concerned with the harmony of his own soul and does everything with a view to bringing about such harmony (591c–592b; cf. 549c–550b, 496d).⁷ This turn in the argument may not be

wholly surprising, for the just man in Book Four is described as being ruled by reason and able to act on the basis of wisdom regarding what is best for his soul as a whole (443c–444a). Thus he is a harbinger of the philosopher, who seeks, if not possesses, the knowledge of the good (504a–521b; cf. Strauss 1964, p. 109; Kraut 1973b, p. 214). But, insofar as the philosopher is just in the sense outlined in Book Four, the equation of the just man and the philosopher is problematic for the same reasons that the definition of justice in Book Four is problematic. To begin with, the philosopher does not act wholly in accordance with ordinary standards of justice; his activity of thinking, for instance, requires that he question the authority of law (consider in this regard Socrates' discussion of dialectics [537e–539a]). Furthermore, he spends a substantial amount of his time in activities that appear to have very little connection with justice (such as investigating what nature is). But the main difficulty is that the philosopher would be concerned exclusively with his own good, for, in being just in the sense described in Book Four, he does everything for the sake of the harmony or health of his own soul.

From the point of view of ordinary justice, contributing to the good of others if and only if it is conducive to one's own good would be questionable. But the possible coincidence between what one does in pursuing one's own good and what is good for others is critical in terms of establishing at least some link between justice in the Socratic sense and justice as ordinarily understood. Socrates points to the existence of such a coincidence precisely in the context of making clear, at the end of Book Nine, that the philosopher is just in the Socratic sense. In response to Glaucon's statement that the man who is just in the sense of pursuing a healthy soul would not mind the political things, Socrates declares that such a man—that is, the philosopher—would mind the political things at least in the best regime (592a–b).⁸ Unfortunately, that the philosopher would rule in no other city suggests the remoteness, at least on the political level, of the possibility of a coincidence between the good of the individual who is just in the Socratic sense and the good of others, for, according to Socrates, it is very difficult, though not impossible, for the best regime to come into being (499b–d, 502c, 540d). It should be noted, moreover, that Socrates says that ultimately it does not matter whether the regime in which the philosophers rule is or will be somewhere, for the best regime that exists in speeches can serve as a vehicle for individual reform by being a pattern “for the man who wants to see and found a city within himself on the basis of what he sees” (592b). At any rate, Socrates provides an extended argument in favor of the possibility of philosophic rule in his discussion from Book Five through Book Seven. Hence an examination of this discussion will help us to see whether there can really be any coincidence on the political level between the good of the individual who is just in the Socratic sense and the good of others. In another respect, too, this discussion will shed light on the precise relation between justice in the Socratic sense (as practiced by the philosopher) and

justice as ordinarily understood: while being silent about the philosopher's being just in sense described in Book Four, Socrates there speaks explicitly of the way in which the philosophers can be said to be just in the ordinary sense.

THE PHILOSOPHER-KINGS AND JUSTICE IN THE SOCRATIC SENSE

In Book Five, Socrates puts forward the proposal for the philosopher-kings as the single necessary and sufficient condition for the transformation of an ordinary city into the best regime (473b–e; cf. Strauss 1964, pp. 118, 122, 126). In defending this proposal against Glaucon's vehement objection, Socrates tries to show, among other things, that "it is by nature fitting for [philosophers] both to engage in philosophy and to lead a city, and for the rest not to engage in philosophy and to follow the leader" (473e–474a, 474b–c). According to Socrates, the philosophers are fit to rule for the following reasons: they would be best able to guard, as well as to give, the laws of the city because they are superior intellectually (due to their being able alone to comprehend the *ideas*); and they are neither lacking in experience nor inferior in the rest of virtue (484b–c, 484d). After listing a number of the philosopher's virtues, moreover, Socrates makes clear that there is no way in which "the orderly man, who isn't a lover of money, or illiberal, or a boaster, or a coward, could become a hard-bargainer or unjust," and hence that, starting from youth, a philosophic soul would be both just and gentle (486b). Thus, while he is more or less silent about the philosopher's being just in the sense described in Book Four, Socrates here argues that the philosopher is qualified to rule in part because he is just in the ordinary sense. It is worth noting, however, that Socrates hints at the fact that the philosopher would be just in this sense simply because he lacks interest in those things that ordinarily lead to injustice. As Socrates suggests, the philosopher is concerned not with the pleasures of the body but with those of the soul. And, "when someone's desires incline strongly to some one thing, they are therefore weaker with respect to the rest, like a stream that has been channeled off in that other direction" (485d; cf. Kraut 1973b, pp. 214–15; Mara 1983, p. 601). At any rate, if the philosophers are fit to rule for the reasons that Socrates mentions, they would have the capacity to be just in the broad sense of being able to provide for the common good.

Expressing a strong doubt as to the justice of the philosophers, however, Adeimantus objects to the proposal for the philosopher-kings on the grounds that the most decent of the philosophers are useless while the rest are all but vicious (487b–d). In response, Socrates first indicates through an image that the philosopher who possesses the true political skill is useless to the city because ordinary political life is so defective that it allows only those who are skillful merely at gaining political power to rule (488a–489b). He makes clear, moreover, that in this situation the blame for the uselessness of the philoso-

phers must be placed on those who do not make use of them: "For it's not natural that a pilot beg sailors to be ruled by him nor that the wise go to the doors of the rich" (489b). As for Adeimantus' charge that the philosophers are vicious, Socrates offers the countercharge that potential philosophers are corrupted by the city itself, which is the true sophist (489d–495c). Having done so, he points out that the philosophers' reputation for viciousness is due merely to the pretenders to philosophy (495c–496a). Returning to the theme of the uselessness of the philosophers, he then makes the following argument: the philosopher cannot safely come to the aid of justice in ordinary cities—and be useful in this way—given the savageness present within those cities; hence he is forced to mind his own business instead of participating in politics in a substantial way (496a–e). To this, Glaucon replies that the philosopher would still leave his life here "having accomplished not the least of things" (497a). But Socrates remarks in turn that he would not accomplish "the greatest either if he didn't chance upon a suitable regime. For in a suitable one he himself will grow more and save the common things along with the private" (497a). To the extent that saving the common things along with the private is tantamount to justice, Socrates here asserts that justice is the greatest of things—something which, under the right circumstances, the philosophers would be able to come to the aid of. Furthermore, Socrates indicates that justice is beneficial for the philosophers themselves in implying that they would "grow more" in saving the common things along with the private.

Socrates' overall argument in defense of the proposal for the philosopher-kings, as outlined in the foregoing, is open to a number of questions. The first question has to do with Socrates' view as to the right conditions under which the philosophers would rule. In the passage where he speaks about the greatest of things, Socrates describes the philosophers' simply coming upon a suitable regime in which they would rule (497a; cf. 497b–c). But he first indicated that the rule of philosophers is the single necessary and sufficient condition for the transformation of an ordinary city into the best regime (473b–473e). Hence it is not clear that the right conditions under which the philosophers would rule will be present without any action on the part of the philosophers themselves. In this connection, it is worth calling attention to the fact that, while he initially points to the need for a coincidence of philosophy and political power (473c–d; cf. 592a), Socrates also asserts that some sort of necessity (together with chance) is required: "neither city nor regime will ever become perfect, nor yet will a man become perfect in the same way either, before some *necessity* chances to constrain those few philosophers who aren't vicious, those now called useless, to take charge of a city, whether they want to or not, and the city to obey" (499b–c, my emphasis; see also 499c–d and 500d). But it remains to be seen whether such necessity, which would have to overcome the great obstacles to the philosophers' being useful (and hence being positively just) in ordinary cities, would ever exist. We observe that, by saying here that there needs to be some sort of

necessity for the philosophers to lead a city “whether they want to or not,” Socrates raises the difficulty that the philosophers may not, for reasons yet to be made fully clear, willingly undertake the transformation of an ordinary city into the best regime. But he also leaves the impression that the philosophers would ultimately welcome such a transformation by pointing to the view that they will become “perfect” only by becoming rulers. Unless the best regime is possible, though, such perfection (not to mention the growth of the philosophers that Socrates mentions at 497a) would be imaginary.

Even if the best regime is possible—to this issue I will return a bit later—Socrates reveals that the willingness of the philosophers to rule (and hence also their willingness to come to the aid of justice in the ordinary sense) in an already existing best regime is not as certain as he first suggests. In Book Seven, Socrates says that the philosophers ought not to be allowed to pursue philosophy uninterruptedly to the end but that they must take turns in ruling the city (519b–521b). To this, Glaucon asks whether they are not doing an injustice to them in making them live a worse life when a better is possible for them (519b–d). While not contradicting Glaucon’s assertion that the philosophers would lead worse lives (White 1986, p. 27), Socrates first reminds him of the fact that the concern of law is not to bring about the well-being of any one class in the city but the well-being of the city as a whole (519e–520a). Socrates then states that they will not in fact be doing injustice to the philosophers and that they will say just things to them while compelling them in addition to rule and share in the labors of the city (520a). They will say that when philosophers come into being in ordinary cities it would be fitting for them not to share in the labors of those cities: “For they grow up spontaneously against the will of the regime in each; and a nature that grows by itself and doesn’t owe its rearing to anyone has justice on its side when it is not eager to pay off the price of rearing to anyone” (520a–b). But Socrates asserts that they would owe something to the best regime, which is responsible for their receiving a superior education and rearing, and hence that it would be a matter of justice that they rule. Socrates still maintains, however, that they must be compelled to rule (520b–521b).⁹ Therefore he points out that the simple appeal to justice is not enough to get the philosophers to act in accordance with justice. The philosophers, in Socrates’ account, would indeed be unwillingly just. It is true that, when Socrates asks whether the philosophers would disobey the command to rule, Glaucon replies that this is impossible since they would be “laying just injunctions on just men” (520e), but, having noticed Socrates’ stress on the need for compulsion in this case, Glaucon quickly adds that they would still regard ruling as a necessary thing (520e).

Now, Socrates says that the potential philosophers must also be compelled to pursue the study of the Idea of the Good (515c–516c, 519c–d), and, since the compulsion used in this case is something that is ultimately desirable—as it would lead to the greatest good for a human being (519c, 496c)—one might be

tempted to believe that the compulsion for the philosophers to rule could also be desirable in the end (cf. Kraut 1973a, p. 342; Hall 1977, p. 302). But the compulsion to rule is not declared to lead to a positive good at all. Indeed Socrates' paradoxical argument is that the philosophers are fit to rule precisely because due to their belief that ruling is not some great good, they are least eager to rule and have the most contempt for the political life (520d, 520e–521b, 500b–c; cf. 540d–e; cf. Aronson 1972, p. 393). Thus, according to this argument, if the philosophers ever come to regard ruling as a positive good, as do all others who engage in politics, they would no longer be considered as fit to rule. It is significant that Socrates suggests that compulsion would be needed precisely by those who are guided by the study of the good—which he calls the greatest study (503e–506a)—rather than by those who are guided by some sort of conviction or by lawful opinions. The philosophers' keen sense of their own good as separate from the good of the city is responsible for their needing to be compelled to rule. (For the philosophers, ruling would be different from engaging in the greatest studies in that the latter, unlike the former, would ultimately lose its compulsory character, for once one becomes aware that something is good, one would automatically pursue it.) Socrates' reference, at the end of Book Seven, to the philosophers' acting on the basis of the view that justice is the “greatest and the most necessary” thing, then, has to be understood in a certain way (540e; cf. 497a). They would regard justice in this way only in connection with their ruling (540d–e). They would not consider it as the greatest and most necessary simply.¹⁰

As noted, if the philosophers must be compelled to rule because they do not regard ruling as a positive good, then they would be unwillingly just. They would surely be unwillingly just in regard to justice understood as giving what is owed. But they would be unwillingly just in a more fundamental way because ruling, at least when it is geared toward the common good, could encompass greater acts of justice than merely giving what is owed. This is all the more distressing because Socrates' argument is that the philosophers have the greatest capacity to be just (in the ordinary sense) through ruling. Indeed, they would be especially fit for rule because they possess the knowledge of what is good for human beings (503e–506a; cf. 520c). Still more disquieting is the fact that, for Socrates, the philosophers have the greatest latitude to be just in the best regime. There they no longer have the excuse of the obstacles of ordinary political life that prevent them from ruling and coming to the aid of justice. This suggests that it is politics as such (rather than merely unhealthy politics) that is questionable for them. Even the sort of politics as practiced by the best regime—which aims to be as rational as possible—is questionable for the philosophers. The philosophers thus can hardly be understood to be paragons of justice, at least understood in the ordinary sense. But there is no reason why they would not be just in the Socratic sense (cf. Foster 1936, pp. 303–4; White 1986, pp. 27–31). In fact, it is precisely their concern with justice in the So-

cratic sense that would lead them to be less than fully just in the ordinary sense. This, I believe, points powerfully to the problematic character of justice in the Socratic sense as practiced by the philosophers. The tension between ruling and philosophy, we note, undercuts the following suggestions made by Socrates in the course of defending the proposal for the philosopher-kings: that it is natural for philosophers both to philosophize and to lead a city (474b–c); that the philosophers would “grow more” in the best regime (497a); and that they would become “perfect” in becoming rulers (499b–c).

At this point, we can return to the question of the possibility of the best regime. An answer to this question would decide, among other things, whether the philosophers would even have the opportunity to reveal that they would be unwillingly just when they have the greatest latitude to be just. According to Socrates, philosophic rule is the single necessary and sufficient condition for transformation of an ordinary city into the best regime (473b–e), but, evading the issue of what is really involved in such a transformation, Socrates at various times speaks as if the best regime already exists, without explaining how this regime comes into being (497a, 502c–d, 519b–521b). He in fact implicitly indicates that the kind of transformation required for the best regime to come into being is impossible. To begin with, having heard Adeimantus’ statement that perhaps the many will become less angry after hearing truthful arguments in favor of philosophic rule, Socrates rests satisfied with the mere assertion that they would indeed be completely persuaded (502a). Furthermore, he reveals that, in order for the best regime to come into being, the philosophers will have to exile all those over the age of ten from an ordinary city that they want to transform (540e–541a). It would be difficult to find greater evidence of the impossibility of the best regime than this: there is obviously no possibility of persuading the many to leave the city, and no army loyal to the philosophers is available to carry out a forcible expulsion of them (cf. Strauss 1964, p. 126). An equally massive obstacle, however, is that the philosophers would, in the final analysis, refrain from undertaking the transformation of an ordinary city into the best regime due to their lack of desire for ruling (519b–521b). Besides, if the philosophers do not owe anything to ordinary cities (520a–b), then they would even have justice (though in a narrow sense) on their side in not endeavoring to achieve such a transformation. There is, in short, no “necessity” that, according to Socrates, would lead to the transformation of an ordinary city into the best regime (499b–c, 499c–d, 500d). If the best regime is, for the above reasons, impossible, one could doubt the truth of Socrates’ assertion that philosophic rule is natural (474b–c), for how can anything impossible be natural? Moreover, one can say that the philosophers are not required by justice (in a broader sense than merely repaying what one owes) to try to transform an ordinary city, for, just as nothing impossible can be natural, so nothing impossible can be just.

Now, Socrates speaks about the philosopher's desire to release some from the confines of the cave (515c–516a), and this raises the question whether the philosophers' interest in providing a philosophic education does not furnish them with an incentive to rule in the best regime (cf. Kraut 1973b, p. 223; Cooper 1977, p. 156). For Socrates, of course, there is no possibility of providing the city as a whole with a philosophic education, as the truly philosophic natures to which such an education is properly directed are few (503b–d). In keeping with this, Socrates makes clear that political society as such is a kind of a cave, and hence that even the best regime as ruled by philosophers, in contrast to the best individual, cannot be fully rational (514a–521b). (It is worth noting here that, in his account of the virtues in Book Four, Socrates indicates that the education to civic virtue—as opposed to education to virtue simply, which is geared toward individuals as individuals—is not entirely rational [427e–434c, 441c–444a].) But there is a philosophic education provided for the rulers of the best regime. Socrates' proposal for the philosopher-kings, which is aimed partly at ameliorating the tension that ordinarily exists between philosophy and the city as a whole (490e–493d, 496a–e), dictates that the city itself should supply its potential rulers with an education to philosophy whose core is dialectics (502e–540e). The question, then, is whether this aspect of the best regime does not offer a sufficient incentive for the philosophers to rule willingly. By indicating that the philosophers must be compelled to rule in spite of this aspect of the best regime, Socrates gives a negative answer to this question. For the philosophers, the unwelcome burden of ruling—which, even in the best regime, is aimed at many things other than fostering a philosophic education (and hence for this reason, among others, has the character of a drudgery)—far outweighs whatever attraction the possibility of providing a philosophic education in the best regime has.

Socrates also indicates that the sort of education provided for the rulers in the best regime is problematic from the perspective of what is required for a strictly philosophic education. He initially says that the kind of study that is suitable for the potential philosopher-kings must be good equally for turning the soul to being, that is, for philosophy, as for war (521d), but, when, in regard to astronomy, Glaucon says that a better knowledge of seasons, months and years is appropriate not only for farming and navigation but also for generalship, Socrates rebukes him by saying that he seems like a man who is fearful of the many in not wishing to appear to demand useless studies. He then points out the great benefit of astronomy in the pursuit of the truth, of which the many are wholly unaware (527d–528a).¹¹ By thus revealing the existence of a great gulf between the sort of education required for philosophy and the sort required for ruling, Socrates points to the view that any attempt at an assimilation of the two ways of life is doomed to fail. In the light of all this, it may be reasonable to conclude that the philosophers would prefer to provide a philosophic education

privately in ordinary cities, where they do not have to rule. This concern of the philosophers to provide a philosophic education, moreover, must be taken into account in determining whether justice in the Socratic sense, as practiced by the philosophers, has any connection with justice as ordinarily understood. If the best regime is impossible, then a coincidence between the good of the one who is just in the Socratic sense and the good of others cannot exist on the political level. But the philosophers' interest in providing a philosophic education to potential philosophers in ordinary cities suggests the possibility of such a coincidence's existing at least among a small circle on the private level (cf. 496a–e). Certainly, there is room for optimism with respect to this possibility because knowledge is the kind of good that can be shared without the compromise of any person's own good. Still, it is far from clear whether this coincidence that takes place in private, and for the very few, is sufficient either to justify Socrates' identification of the just man and the philosopher or to provide a strong link between justice as ordinarily understood and justice in the Socratic sense.

In this connection, it is worth noting that, from the point of view of the requirements of a philosophic education, democracy may be more suitable than one is first led to believe. To be sure, Socrates argues that democracy is opposed to what he, along with the others, solemnly said in founding the best regime: "that unless a man has a transcendent nature he would never become good if from earliest childhood his play isn't noble and all his practices aren't such" (558b). But one cannot overlook his suggestion that the individual who has a "transcendent nature" need not be adversely affected by the lack of a good education in a democracy, and, since his reference to such an individual brings to mind his description of the philosopher as one who comes into being spontaneously against the will of bad regimes and who has a nature that grows by itself and does not owe its nurturing to anyone (520b), it is possible to argue that for Socrates those who possess truly philosophic natures would not regard democracy as a great impediment to their education. We observe that Socrates also implicitly indicates that philosophers may look favorably upon democracy at least to the extent that, unlike the best regime, it does not compel to rule even those who are fit to rule (557e; Strauss 1964, p. 131). Of course, Socrates also says that democracy is a regime that "dispenses a certain equality to equals and unequals alike" (558c, cf. 557a). This means, among other things, that democratic justice is defective because it does not take account of the differences among human beings that are relevant to the question of who ought to rule (cf. Foster 1950–51, p. 209), but, insofar as he does not wish to rule, the philosopher may not be too perturbed by this defect of democracy, at least as far as his own interest is concerned. This, however, would give us further reason to wonder about the truth of the equation of the just man and the philosopher.

THE RHETORICAL ADVANTAGES OF JUSTICE IN THE SOCRATIC SENSE

Given the problems connected with justice in the Socratic sense (as practiced by the philosophers), we are led to ask why Socrates introduces such justice at all. In order to answer this question, we must begin by re-examining the key passage concerning the philosophers' return to the cave. There Socrates, while being silent about justice in the Socratic sense, speaks of justice as ordinarily understood: first, by mentioning justice as paying back what one owes, which recalls Cephalus' definition of justice in Book One (cf. 520b and 331b–d); second, by making the argument (for the third time in the *Republic*) that it is not the concern of law to bring about the well-being of any one class but the well-being of the city as a whole, an argument which points to the ordinary understanding of justice as devotion to the common good (420b–421c, 465e–466c, 519e–520a). Socrates first introduced this argument in response to Adeimantus' question whether he is not making the guardians (who are to have no privacy and no more property than what is needed if they are to remain a part of the guardian class) unhappy (419a–421c). And this argument has the crucial implication that the definition of the justice of the city as each of the three classes' minding its own business is not necessarily in keeping with the good of every individual. Socrates is now suggesting that happiness conceived not in any childish way (the sort of happiness the guardians run the risk of pursuing [466b]) but genuine happiness as experienced by the philosophers must be sacrificed to the demands of such justice (cf. Aronson 1972, p. 393; Foster 1936, pp. 301–4). The call for some sort of sacrifice, of course, is in keeping with the ordinary understanding of justice. Yet the problem is that justice is also ordinarily identified with the good—something that puts the stamp of approval on the enterprise of the *Republic* as a whole, which is nothing so much as an attempt to show that justice is indeed good for oneself. There is, it appears, an inner difficulty with justice, a difficulty that is reflected in the curious fact that forcing the philosophers to rule is viewed by Socrates, on the one hand, as just and by Glaucon, on the other, as unjust.

It is true that Socrates attempts in the *Republic* to found a regime that is in keeping with a true or complete common good, which would encompass the individual good without difficulty. In particular, the proposal for the community of women and children is intended to eliminate the tension between the individual and the common good. The aim of this proposal, after all, is to create the greatest unity possible within a city, the sort of unity usually associated with an individual human being, in whom the pleasures and pains that are experienced by a part are also necessarily experienced by the whole (462a–465c). Yet, Socrates implicitly suggests that this sort of unity, which would secure the greatest good for a city if it is possible (462a–b), would not be

possible. To be sure, he argues that the rule of philosophers, being the single necessary and sufficient condition for the transformation of an ordinary city into the best regime, would bring about such unity (473b–473e). But he tacitly indicates that the rule of philosophers itself is not possible (see especially 540e–541a).¹² And one of the reasons why it is not possible is the tension between the philosophers' own good and the good of the city: Why would philosophers want to transform an ordinary city into the best regime in which they would be compelled to rule? Ironically, although the best regime ruled by philosophers is the only regime that is meant to bring about both a private and public happiness (472c–473e), it does not secure this in the highest case of the philosophers. Perhaps, then, Socrates' awareness of the problem within ordinary justice—the tension between the individual good and the common good—explains why he takes refuge in the *Republic* in what we have called justice in the Socratic sense. Unlike justice in the ordinary understanding, this sort of justice is meant to be wholly in keeping with the individual good.

Now, we cannot know what justice in the ordinary understanding is unless we address, more adequately than we have done here, the difficulty regarding its goodness. It is true that Socrates, at the end of Book One, tries to separate the question of the goodness of justice and the question of what justice is (354a–c), but Socrates' serious view, expressed in the context of his elaboration of the Idea of the Good in Book Six, is that we cannot know what justice is unless we know the way in which it is good (506a). As for the criticism that the enterprise of the *Republic* as a whole—that is, trying to defend justice in terms of its goodness—is wrong and that this leads us to raise falsely the issue of an inner difficulty of justice, we can say the following.¹³ In the first place, Socrates' rather unambiguous thesis in Book Six is that *all* human beings strive for the good (505d–e). Hence, for Socrates, the demand that justice must be good if it is to be acceptable would not come as a surprise. Moreover, according to the *Republic*, the belief in the goodness of justice is part of the ordinary understanding of justice. This is especially made clear in Book One. There Cephalus and Polemarchus, who provide definitions of justice that are in keeping with the ordinary understanding of justice, assume that justice is good: the former rejects the justice of returning a weapon to a madman because he thinks that justice is good for all concerned, while the latter believes that justice is human virtue (331c–d, 335c). These two interlocutors apparently do not even feel the need to raise the question of the goodness of justice precisely because they assume that justice is something good. This leads one to wonder, however, whether those who want to see the goodness of justice defended are not somehow already beyond the ordinary perspective on justice. It is probably no accident, after all, that the first to raise the question of the goodness of justice in the *Republic* is Thrasymachus, who is a great critic of justice (338c–339a, 343b–344c), but this question is also raised by individuals like Glaucon and Adeimantus, who, perplexed by the claims made by Thrasymachus and others,

want to see justice defended in terms of its goodness (357a–367e). Since it is not adequate simply to assume that justice is something good, Glaucon and Adeimantus appear to be in this respect superior to Polemarchus and Cephalus. Thus Socrates' attempt to defend justice in terms of its goodness is, according to the *Republic*, fully justified from the point of view of justice itself.

There is a further important reason why Socrates is induced to make the equation of the just man and the philosopher or to posit justice in the Socratic sense. At the beginning of Book Two, Glaucon and Adeimantus ask Socrates to show that justice is intrinsically good and hence to make it clear that men are capable of being just not merely for the external rewards that come from the reputation for justice. They are aware that, if justice is good merely for its external rewards, then there is always the temptation to practice injustice: one could garner the rewards of justice by merely *appearing* to be just (357a–367e). Now, in Book Ten, Socrates says that since they have already shown that justice is intrinsically good, they should return the external wages and punishments for justice and injustice by allowing the just man to have the reputation for justice and the unjust man the reputation for injustice (612a–d). But Socrates was able to show that justice is intrinsically good only by referring to the justice of the individual as outlined at the end of Book Four—to justice as harmony of the soul, which is analogous to the health of the body—and ultimately to the philosopher's being just in this sense. Certainly, the pleasures of the philosophers, which Socrates cites in order to prove not only that justice is intrinsically good but also that it is superior to injustice in the form of tyranny, are intrinsically good and compatible with maximum self-sufficiency. The difficulty, however, is that Socrates had been asked to show that ordinary justice is intrinsically good, and, as far as I can tell, he nowhere shows this. If anything, he points to the obstacles that would prevent one from simply accepting such a view.

As for Socrates' turn to the external rewards and punishments for justice and injustice, it is clear that from the point of view of justice in the Socratic sense, which is intrinsically good, they would be more or less superfluous (see 588e–591b). (Socrates does allow for punishments that would improve the unjust [591a–b].¹⁴) Hence his desire to turn to them does not make much sense. In fact Socrates gives back the external rewards and punishments not to justice in the Socratic sense but to justice in the ordinary sense, which, as I noted, had not been shown to be intrinsically good. This is confirmed by the fact that the external rewards and punishments for justice and injustice are linked with the reputation for justice and injustice among ordinary human beings (612a–614a). Here, the question may arise whether the just man in the ordinary sense would regard the external rewards as mere icing on the cake, as it were, rather than as absolutely necessary. Socrates implicitly indicates that the latter is closer to the truth, for in Book Three he argues that the decent man would not mourn the loss of loved ones due to his self-sufficiency as well as to his belief that death

is not something terrible at least for the decent man (387d–388a). In Book Ten, however, Socrates consciously takes this argument back by suggesting that, despite the law forbidding mourning, it is impossible for the decent man not to mourn the loss of loved ones (603b–606b; cf. Bloom 1968, p. 433; Nichols 1987, pp. 141–42). This points to the view that, for Socrates, the decent man would likely demand external rewards for justice, from gods and human beings, both in this life and the next, precisely because of his lack of self-sufficiency. From this, it would appear that Socrates identifies the just man with the philosopher or introduces justice in the Socratic sense in trying to prove at all costs that justice is good without reference to external rewards; perhaps only the philosopher, being the most self-sufficient of human beings, would not hope for external rewards for his justice (cf. Strauss 1964, p. 137).

It is worth calling attention to the fact that, just as Socrates' argument aimed at showing that justice is intrinsically good appears to be rhetorical in certain respects, his argument in support of the view that justice is better than injustice (in the form of tyranny) has rhetorical elements. Socrates first tries to argue on the basis of the assumption, which he maintains throughout the *Republic*, that there is a parallelism between the city and the individual. One implication of this assumption, which Socrates delineates, is that "as city is to city with respect to virtue and happiness, so is man to man" (576c–d). Hence, if, as Socrates says, with respect to both virtue and happiness, the tyrannic city is the worst and the kingly city the best, then the tyrant himself must be deemed to be unhappy (576d–e), but, perhaps due to his awareness of the fact that the tyrant himself, as opposed to the city ruled by him, could plausibly be happy, Socrates does not immediately draw this conclusion.¹⁵ Instead he stops to point out the importance of judging the tyrant's happiness simply by observing him up close (576e–577b). Unfortunately, however, Socrates merely pretends that they are in the presence of someone who can provide a firsthand account of the tyrant's life (577b), and no sooner does he point to a truly adequate sort of investigation regarding the happiness of the tyrant than he returns to the less than adequate one based on the faulty assumption of a parallelism existing between the city and the individual. He goes on to argue that if a man is like his city, it is also necessary that the same order that exists in his city will also be in him (577d; cf. 351d–352a). Thus, among other things, just as a city that is under a tyranny least does what it wishes, the soul as a whole that is under a tyranny least does what it wishes; and, just as a city under a tyranny is poor and full of fear, the tyrannic soul is poor and full of fear (577e–578a). By this questionable line of reasoning, Socrates is able ultimately to conclude that while the kingly man, who is the most just man, is happiest, the tyrant, who is the most unjust man, is most wretched (578b, 580b–c). The inadequacy of Socrates' argument becomes even clearer when one reflects on the fact that he did not establish that the kingly man—that is, the philosopher who rules in the best regime—is as happy as the city that he rules (519e–520a).

While saying that the foregoing provides one proof against tyranny, more-

over, Socrates offers two more proofs which, like the first, are based on the assumption that the just man is the philosopher (580c). According to these proofs, justice is superior to injustice because the pleasures of the philosopher are better and more real than the pleasures of the tyrant (580d–587e). Here one difficulty is that Socrates criticizes tyranny on the basis of the identification of the tyrant, whom he had earlier described as an erotic man, with the money-lover (cf. 573c and 580d–583a; Annas 1981, p. 306). A more serious difficulty is that, for reasons mentioned, it is far from clear that the just man is the philosopher. Even if one grants Socrates' argument that philosophy is superior to tyranny in regard to pleasure, one could wonder whether this proves that justice is better than injustice (cf. Kraut 1992, p. 323). Still, Socrates reveals the supreme importance of his equation of the just man and the philosopher to his defense of justice by pointing out, at the very end of the *Republic*, that only the philosopher is able truly to resist the temptation to tyranny. In his Myth of Er, Socrates relates how a man who “lived in an orderly regime in his former life, participating in virtue by habit, without philosophy” chose the greatest tyranny in having the opportunity to select a way of life (619b–d). Through this story, Socrates indicates that the only thing that separates the just man (in the ordinary sense) and the unjust man is habit (cf. 518d–e, 500d). He also indicates that only the philosopher's justice, being based on knowledge rather than on habit, would not be subject to corruption. Nor, according to Socrates, would it require any external supports. Indeed, unlike the man who is just merely due to living in an orderly regime that produces a certain habit of living, the philosopher is just even in a regime that is not good (see 549c–550b).

Even if Socrates' account of the justice of the individual is not entirely free from rhetoric or even arbitrariness, it can still educate us. While forcing us to seek clarity on our own regarding the question of the goodness of justice, it offers food for thought by pointing to what justice must be like if it is to be understood as leading to happiness. It certainly allows us to see the character of what Socrates calls “the best pursuit,” namely, philosophy (495b; cf. 407b–c). In calling attention to the philosophic life, moreover, Socrates sheds some light on the philosophic approach to justice. He points out that, from a strictly rational perspective, there is little place for moral indignation: if justice is good, it is due to ignorance that the unjust are unjust; and, since they are thus not willingly unjust, they should not be blamed (589b–591b; cf. 336e, 549c–550b). Moreover, he indicates that from the point of view of philosophy the unwilling lie—the lie in the soul that is due to ignorance—is more to be hated than the willing lie, which is ordinarily regarded as unjust (535d–e, 382a–383a, 389b–d, 331b). But as to the fundamental problem with which we are faced in the *Republic*—the adequacy of Socrates' definition of the justice of the individual in Book Four and his argument that the philosopher is just in this sense—a turn to a fullscale study of Book One may be of some help. There Socrates takes up definitions of justice that are linked with certain commonly held views about justice, definitions that can serve as a fitting counterpoise to his rather paradox-

ical presentation of justice in the rest of the *Republic*. Of course, in keeping with what is required by dialectics understood as the core of philosophy (537e–539a), Socrates questions the adequacy of these definitions. Hence he inevitably leads us to ask whether the defects of the ordinary understanding of justice as presented in Book One fully justify his account of justice in the rest of the *Republic*.

NOTES

1. All quotations from the *Republic* are from the translation of Bloom (1968). The most notable responses to Sachs are: Demos (1964), Weingartner (1964–65), Schiller (1968), Hall (1971), Waterlow (1972–73), Kraut (1973b), Sartorius (1974), Irwin (1977, pp. 208–12), Vlastos (1977; 1981, pp. 111–39), Annas (1978; 1981, pp. 153–69), and Reeve (1988, pp. 235–73). In addition to Foster (1936), see Barker (1918, pp. 234–36), Adkins (1960, pp. 290–93), Strauss (1964, pp. 124–26), Bloom (1968, 407–12; 1977, pp. 316–23), Aronson (1972), Kraut (1973a; 1992 pp. 327–29), White (1979, pp. 44–48, 189–96; 1986), Cooper (1977, pp. 155–57), Hall (1977, pp. 298–311), Irwin (1977, pp. 242–43, 337–38), Annas (1981, pp. 266–71), Mara (1983), Klosko (1981; 1986, pp. 140–41), Reeve (1988, pp. 95, 197–204), and Mahoney (1992). Klosko merely notes that the two controversies have come to be associated with one another (1986, p. 113).

2. Just as the definition of the justice of the city is based on the sort of justice found in a good or virtuous city, the definition of the justice of the individual is based on the kind of justice possessed by the good or virtuous individual.

3. This difficulty is noted by Demos (1964, p. 396), Waterlow (1972–73, p. 23), Irwin (1977, pp. 205, 211), Annas (1981, p. 119), and Vlastos (1981, pp. 115–17).

4. Sachs distinguishes between two kinds of justice: the “Platonic conception of justice,” which is tantamount to the sort of justice that Socrates describes at 443c–e; and the “vulgar conception of justice,” which is equal to the sort of justice that he outlines at 442d–443b and is in keeping with “ordinary morality” (1963, pp. 142–43, 152, 154). Sachs claims that, in order to satisfy the request of Glaucon and Adeimantus (who hold the “vulgar conception of justice” [p. 143]), Plato must prove two things: (1) that Platonic justice would result in the sort of actions required by “vulgar justice” and (2) that the man who is just according to the “vulgar conception of justice” would also be Platonically just (pp. 152–53). But, according to Sachs, Plato proves neither of these things and hence commits “the fallacy of irrelevance” that “wrecks the *Republic*’s main argument” (pp. 141, 154–56). There have been many responses to Sachs’s thesis over the years, and all of them are, in one way or another, aimed against it. This is despite the fact that some of these responses acknowledge the apparently paradoxical character of Socrates’ definition of the justice of the individual. (See, for example, Cooper [1977, p. 151]; Annas [1981, p. 121]; and Vlastos [1981, pp. 115–17.]) While there are significant differences between Sachs’s formulation of the problematic character of Socrates’ definition of justice and my own, I am sympathetic with his overall thesis. Consider also Strauss’s discussion of “the two meanings of justice” in the *Republic* (1964, p. 115; cf. pp. 114, 127–28, 132, 137).

5. For the view that the citizens of the good or virtuous city would possess the justice of the individual, see Foster (1935, p. 63) and Demos (1957, pp. 170–71). Cf. Barker (1918, pp. 205–6). As to whether there is a tension between the justice of the individual and the justice of the city, see Hall (1959, p. 158), Aronson (1972, p. 387), and Nichols (1987, pp. 59–78).

6. More precisely, Socrates now indicates that the spirited part contains the love of honor and that the rational part of the soul contains the love of wisdom (580d–583a; see also 568d–e). It is also worth calling attention to the fact that, in speaking of the *eros* of the tyrant, Socrates points out that the account of the soul in Book Four is defective in that it is simply silent about *eros* as distinct from, or as a special part of, desire (572d–575a).

7. White correctly notes the similarity between the argument at the end of Book Four and the argument at the end of Book Nine (1984, p. 404). See also Cross and Woosley (1964, p. 268), Schiller (1968, p. 8), Irwin (1977, pp. 244–45), and Annas (1978, p. 446).

8. Socrates does mention that some sort of “divine chance” could result in the philosopher’s ruling in a different regime (592a), but he earlier indicated his unwillingness to engage in discussions that are like prayers (499c).

9. The problem of the philosophers’ having to be compelled to rule is stressed by Strauss (1964, pp. 123–25) and Bloom (1968, pp. 407–8; 1977). For a critique of their position, see Hall (1977) and Klosko (1981).

10. There is, according to Socrates, a greater object of study than justice and the other virtues—namely, the Idea of the Good (504d–505b).

11. In keeping with all this, when Glaucon suggests that as much of geometry as is needed for war is necessary, Socrates argues that in fact only a small part of geometry—as of calculation—is necessary for war, but that it must be determined “whether its greater and more advanced part tends to make it easier to make out the *idea* of the good” (526d–e). Both astronomy and geometry, of course, do not really turn the soul to being as dialectics does (531d–534e; cf. Bloom [1968, p. 408]).

12. Because the possibility of the proposal for the women and children depends on the possibility of the proposal for the philosopher-kings, Socrates points to the impossibility of the former in implicitly indicating the impossibility of the latter. Accordingly, Socrates is far from proving the naturalness of the community of women and children.

13. For a Kantian critique of Socrates’ attempt to defend justice in terms of its goodness, see Prichard (1968).

14. Any other kind of punishment for the unjust may not be appropriate strictly speaking: if justice is better than injustice, then the unjust man must be dealt with gently, for he is not “willingly mistaken” (589c).

15. Being aware of this difficulty, Socrates tells Glaucon to look to the tyrannic city as a whole, rather than merely the tyrant and those around him, in determining its happiness (576d–e).

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