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Nietzsche's Impatience: The Spiritual Necessities of Nietzsche's Politics

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The everyday stories of our time have come to include not merely the typical problems of political rule, but large-scale alienation, displacement, and even genocide on a grand scale. And so we look for salutary principles or redescriptions for the invigoration of post-foundationalist, pluralist-agonistic democracies, in which peaceful coexistence—even when confrontational—remains the order of the day. John Rawls has described the peaceful liberal pluralism we seek in this context as “an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines in which peaceful toleration in one form or another carries the day above any other universal claims to truth” (1993, pp. xvi, 134ff.). Friedrich Nietzsche has been favored among some political theorists as a thinker from whom one may draw principles for such a peaceful coexistence. The intent of such readings is to create a kind of “Nietzschean” “polite agonism” for liberal democracy.

But in late 1888, Nietzsche erased a text. This erasure indicates a problem he poses for politely agonistic enterprises of any kind, whether based on his texts or not. He had just completed *The Antichrist*, which was to be the first volume of a planned four-volume work that he provisionally entitled *Transvaluation of all Values*.¹ The last section of this “Transvaluation” was a Decree Against Christianity, a table of seven laws banning Christianity, instituting legal measures for its destruction, and prescribing punishments for recalcitrant practitioners. The priests (who teach anti-nature) would be imprisoned or banished. Christian shrines would be eradicated and Christian vocabulary transfigured. Nietzsche expunged this Decree from his text as he was about to send the final manuscript to the publisher. Having written the first notes for *The Antichrist* in the spring of 1888, he declared it completed by late autumn of that year (1986a, 8:492). The last page of his manuscript had rough notes scribbled on its back, and he did not want them to distract the publisher. Accordingly, he glued the page on which the Decree was written to the back of this final page, thereby covering up the notes, and making the Decree the last page instead. He repealed his legislation by gluing a further blank sheet over this sheet, so that only the first sheet, containing the last part of the last aphorism (62) of *The Antichrist*, was actually used by the eventual publisher.²

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The first argument of the present essay is that this Decree and Nietzsche's subsequent revocation are *emblematic* of a larger project, which he seems to have had in mind in a variety of forms since the inception of *The Birth of Tragedy*. The tone of the Decree is generally consistent with his wider, strident diatribe against Christianity in *The Antichrist* and elsewhere, but it goes a step further by proposing to abolish the religion by force. The Decree seems to have anticipated a new era—its public declaration being “the day of salvation”—that Nietzsche echoed in his subscript to the Preface of *Twilight of the Idols*, and also much earlier. Nietzsche's revocation of the Decree is equally emblematic of a problem that he recognized in the kind of political founding or transformation for which he hoped and to which his Decree was ostensibly directed. The second argument of the present essay is that the problem that Nietzsche recognized in his revocation imposes a significant caveat not only for his own project, but also for post-Nietzschean appropriations of his thought for projects (such as polite, democratic agonism) that he did not directly support or even excoriated. It is the dual implication of Nietzsche's double move—promulgation and repeal—that I explore here. The Decree is an admittedly minor incident in a much larger corpus; I employ it here principally as an illustrative but significant entree into a politically crucial problem in this larger Nietzschean corpus and its current appropriations. Accordingly, the considerations of Nietzschean texts and of the implications for “post-Nietzschean” projects will proceed on parallel tracks.

But Nietzsche is a thinker of moments and a writer of multiple voices. His work is perhaps more self-consciously susceptible to multiple interpretations than that of any other philosopher. Richard Rorty has suggested that his most important voice is the universalization of a local, narcissistic project, and that the political import of his thought for liberal politics is, therefore, nil. Even though Rorty finds aspects of Nietzsche's philosophizing useful for a redescription of liberal democracy, there are no salutary political principles for liberal pluralism to be found in Nietzsche's corpus, only a program for private perfection that should, in Rorty's view, remain private (1989, pp. 44–45, 83, 95, 99–100, 118–21). William Connolly, on the other hand, suggests that Nietzsche's thought has important potential as a therapeutic for the “homesickness” of modern political thought. Nietzsche teaches us to abandon the drive for finality, absolute identity, and conclusive resolution in our political thinking. He teaches us how to live without resentment and the violence it breeds in a late-modern pluralist age (Connolly [1993a], pp. 137–75). Bonnie Honig extends Connolly's argument by taking up Rorty's evaluation (rearticulated by Dana Villa) and suggesting that Nietzsche's aesthetic preparation or self-fashioning, which causes Rorty to disregard Nietzsche as having any contribution to current political debate, is not a crucial limitation of his politics, but a necessary condition of a possible politics in modernity. In this way, Alexander Nehamas' seemingly apolitical interpretation of Nietzsche's self-constitution becomes politicized,

which is to say, it becomes important for our life together with others, and not merely in our private sphere (Honig [1993b], pp. 531–32; Nehamas [1985]).

Still others, most prominent among them Bruce Detwiler and Bernhard Taureck, suggest that such a pluralistic post-Nietzschean politics seems to include a denial of the importance of Nietzsche's own apparent (and abhorrent) politics for interpreting his overall thought. Such interpretations then deploy portions of Nietzsche's thought on behalf of projects that Nietzsche himself seems to have rejected (Detwiler [1990], pp. 1–16; Taureck [1989], pp. 17–73, 193–205). Both Detwiler and Taureck find in Nietzsche a radical-aristocratic or proto-fascist political theory and agenda that are closely consistent with and cannot be divorced from the other aspects of his thought. Rorty's interpretation joins this critique when, insofar as he *does* discern a politics in Nietzsche's projects, he excludes it from consideration in a liberal-pluralistic polity. For liberals, Nietzsche (like Loyola) is a madman whom we must banish as a partner in political conversation (Rorty [1988], pp. 268–69). Taureck and Detwiler engage the madness on a different key, tracing its trajectory as though we *do* have to engage Nietzsche politically if we engage him at all.

Continuing on this register, it may be that even though proponents of a democratic agonism, a polite perspectivalism, or a new, post-Nietzschean pluralism have generally considered Nietzsche's psychology carefully as part of their own projects, they are prone to dismiss too readily Nietzsche's caveats for the enterprises they base, in part, on readings of his texts. As we seek to invigorate or re-form democratic pluralism on partially Nietzschean grounds, we would do well to reconsider closely why Nietzsche rejected such moves, calling instead for a new nobility. As Connolly notes, however, “[n]o political thematization of Nietzschean sentiments can dispense with selecting a context for its presentation. The point then, is not to offer the true account of the true Nietzsche hiding behind a series of masks, but to construct a post-Nietzscheanism one is willing to endorse and enact” (Connolly [1991], p. 197). Connolly echoes Foucault's assertion that to make Nietzsche “groan and protest” does not in and of itself vitiate an interpretation, especially if the insights and strategies it delivers promote the projects we hold dear. Indeed, to deform and use Nietzsche's thought is the only “valid tribute” to it, and faithfulness or unfaithfulness to Nietzsche is of “absolutely no interest” (Foucault [1980], pp. 53, 54).³ But this move may overly privilege the Nietzsche of our choice. The present paper offers a relatively pedestrian reading of Nietzsche that problematizes a Nietzschean-based respectful, democratic agonism from within the Nietzschean circle itself, but in a way that may continue to make Nietzsche a helpful partner in liberal discussion. It does not haul forth threadbare “fascist” quotes; instead, it recounts one of Nietzsche's stories, the plot of which itself embodies the spiritual and psychological obstacles that problematize polite agonism for him. While it acknowledges the pluralist-agonistic possibilities in Nietzsche's texts amidst the multiplicity of Nietzschean voices, it emphasizes a

discordant problematic in this particular chorus. Thus, while it is important to consider Nietzsche's image of the best regime, his aristocratic political vision, and certain of his political reflections regarding human excellence, I am interested in these as the *context* for one specific spiritual indicator that he explicitly recognized as a problem for the instantiation of any of these images, even as they are incorporated into the pluralist appropriation of Nietzsche's thought. To be clear, then, this essay does not offer a comprehensive critique of Nietzsche's politics per se, but a Nietzschean caveat, delivered out of his own texts, for the possible instantiation of a particular political image derived from his writings. This also is not to claim that we cannot draw inspirations from Nietzsche's work that arrive at conclusions at odds with Nietzsche's own. It is only to reflect on Nietzsche's likely attenuation of one of them.

Following Detwiler and Taureck (supported in an ironic fashion by Rorty), I preserve the possibility that Nietzsche's position is both more defensible on his own grounds and more critical of liberal appropriations of his thought than is frequently acknowledged. This move is not a defense of Nietzsche's politics, which are repugnant, but an insistence that taking Nietzsche's elitism seriously as an integral and not "underdetermined" part of his project implies taking quite seriously as well the difficulties this project raises for a Nietzschean defense of agonistic yet tolerant pluralism. The difficulty for Nietzsche, *in this particular instance*, is not so much a conceptual, philosophical, or theoretical one as it is *spiritual*. Pursuing this interpretation implies that we address, even if often obliquely, the provocative and intelligent interpretation of Nietzsche's politics offered by Mark Warren, both because of its estimable characteristics, and because it is so decisively at odds with the present interpretation.

To argue that psychology (into which he folded concerns of the spirit) is central to Nietzsche's thought is to state a seemingly obvious point on which all are agreed, but this formal consensus produces little substantive agreement. Warren suggests that the close relationship between Nietzsche's psychology and politics holds together only on the basis of a number of weak, "philosophically underdetermined," assumptions within Nietzsche's thought concerning contemporary social organizations and human nature. More forcefully, Warren argues that Nietzsche not only misunderstands modern societies (thereby missing the most important sources of modern nihilism), but that his own thought on matters of the political is internally inconsistent (Warren [1988], pp. 209–10). He characterizes Nietzsche's elitism or aristocratism as (situationally) conservative. This ascription alone, if it were accurate, would provide a strong critique of indeterminism or inconsistency in Nietzsche's work. Taureck and Detwiler, however, have both shown that Nietzsche's aristocratism, elitism, or proto-fascism is, perhaps, mildly conservative in a situational way, but also radical. Nietzsche wishes not to return or preserve, but to dismantle and rebuild anew. Moreover, whereas Warren discovers a sketchy and fragmented account of politics in Nietzsche's writings, Detwiler and Taureck discover considerably more

substantive continuity. Accordingly, this continuity is not underdetermined, but a consistent thread in Nietzsche's overall thought. Tracing one particular strand of this thread, as in this essay, problematizes both Nietzsche's politics and ostensibly un-Nietzschean appropriations of that thought in provocative ways.

Contra Warren, then, it seems that Nietzsche's political assumptions are only distantly related to the specific institutional constellations of power in modern society: they rest on a psychology of aesthetics. As Warren considers Nietzsche's assessment of liberal democracy, he suggests rightly that for Nietzsche, "societies that sustain individual powers are intrinsically more desirable than those that displace self-identity onto supra-individual institutions such as the state." Nietzsche's sentiment appears to be that "all politically sustained hierarchies are inconsistent with the intersubjective space of individuation." "Why," Warren asks, "does Nietzsche fail to follow through on the immanent political logic of his philosophy?" which is to say, why does he take the route of aristocracy rather than egalitarianism and intersubjective pluralism? Warren suggests that the answer lies in Nietzsche's inadequate characterization of modernity (pp. 225, 223). It may, however, lie in aspects of Nietzsche's psychology that Warren disregards. If we reconsider the psychological dimensions of Nietzsche's critique of Romanticism, the Enlightenment, Christianity, and democratic notions of equal and universal rights, then the specific episodes I will consider here may be more than philosophically underdetermined dreams and declarations.

Collaterally for Nietzsche, nihilism is in its ultimate origins, manifestations, and consequences a spiritual-psychological, not first and foremost a political or philosophical problem. (On Nietzsche's "immanentist" spiritual sensitivity, see Voegelin, pp. 8ff.) Certainly, the sum total of politics is not simply spiritual, and no one, not even medieval thinkers, has ever thought so. For Nietzsche, even the *Genealogy of Morals*, that most spiritual of his analyses, begins with a concrete, historical instance that then produces spiritual outcomes. But spiritual or spiritualized aspirations were for Nietzsche an important aspect of politics, and one that problematized life together with others in a way that made a kind of "aristocratic radicalism" seem the best choice of regimes. Accordingly, overcoming nihilism—pace Warren—is *not* primarily a social enterprise, but a spiritual one that has corresponding social connotations. It requires discipline. Nietzsche's point here is nearly Christian: hard work, perhaps not attainable for everyone, is needed to overcome the nihilism that hounds our age. Nietzsche repeats a traditional move of Roman Catholicism to a kind of spiritual elitism,⁴ which Warren perhaps overlooks because of his antagonistic mischaracterizations of Christianity and a prior commitment to egalitarianism. Nietzsche certainly offers a repugnant proto-fascist elitism, but also a thoughtful problematization of the spiritual necessities demanded by a postmodern politics of pluralistic agonism. I explore Nietzsche's own politics within this problematic not to offer a full-blown account of them, but in order to contextualize his own treatment of the problem.

THE DECREE AGAINST CHRISTIANITY

From the emblematic episode of the Decree, let us pose this question: What was Nietzsche *doing* with the Decree, and what do his *actions* teach us about his ultimate view of politics? Like Detwiler, who admits and ably summarizes the indeterminacy of Nietzsche's texts ([1990], pp. 9–13), I make a determination, however indeterminative. In contradistinction to Detwiler and Taureck, let us focus more directly on what Nietzsche actually *does* with his texts than on what those texts alone may or may not in themselves imply. The point, then, is not what the Decree substantively adds to Nietzsche's text, which, in the context of *Antichrist*, is not much, but what Nietzsche's *activities* surrounding this text add to our understanding of what he was trying to do, and what he thought about what he was trying to do. Let us attempt, then, a biographical refraction of the textual and philosophical claims of Detwiler and Taureck. This method, I think, is consistent with Nietzsche's advice to his readers that they read texts as indicators of deeper processes and motives than the surface of these texts might suggest ([1974a], pp. 3, 7, 8, 9). It is also consistent with a suggestion he made in 1886 that his published works were travel books (*Wanderbücher*) about experiences or problems he had surmounted by writing each of them. These journals of exploration and overcoming are means by which his readers may also probe and overcome what ails them ([1986b], II: Preface, p. 6). It is this autobiographical aspect of his work that we may strategically deploy here. The politics of the postmodernity Nietzsche was hoping to foretell and that was *one part* of his lifelong project of writing, required a constant self-overcoming. As we shall see, deep-rooted impatience, born of resentment, along with weariness, self-delusion, and a host of other vices, must be continually overcome, at least in the soul of the donator of horizons (about which more later), to make *any* postmodern politics possible. Acknowledging the indeterminacy of Nietzsche's texts, let us consider instead an act attached to a particular, epitomizing text and consistent with one particular reading of Nietzsche's texts generally. It is an act concerning a text, and therefore an act whose meaning must ultimately be discerned with reference to a text, but it is not merely a text, nor merely a textual act of writing. Thus, what Nietzsche means is rendered by the story of what he does, as well as writes. What did Nietzsche do? He erased a text. It was an erasure of Nietzsche against himself.

Four interpretations of Nietzsche's promulgation and erasure come to mind. First, perhaps he was having a bad day. Second, he may have made a bad joke, a tasteless attempt at irony. Third, it is possible that he really meant it; the decree was a serious response to what he understood to be a serious crisis. Finally, perhaps it is the product of a moment of madness in a deteriorating situation that ended less than two months later, on January 3, 1889, with his collapse in the Piazza Carlo Alberto at Turin. I propose the following interpretation: Nietzsche was having a bad day, but he really meant what he wrote.

The extremism of this decree is an indicator of previous sentiments and not a display of clinical madness. It was not meant as a joke, and it is consistent with important elements of his life work that extend much further than to his last writings.

Although the “Decree against Christianity” echoes a consistent Nietzschean voice that extends from *The Birth* to *Ecce Homo* and that can be tapped for its articulation of a problematic extending beyond his own politics to appropriations of his thought for other sorts of political and moral enterprises, it was for him a publicly inadmissible part of his own enduring project. To indicate the project’s continuity and precise character, including why Nietzsche believed the Decree could not be made public, I propose first to focus briefly on the problems at which he appears to have directed the Decree and, second, to several episodes in his work to show that the Decree is not only consistent with one enduring thread in his thought, but, more importantly, that its brief existence itself underscores a persistent Nietzschean problematic that extends beyond his immediate political intentions into the postmodern, liberal-agonistic appropriations of his project. A turn to these questions includes a few brief comments about Nietzsche’s use of narratives and various readings of his texts.

LIFE AND NIHILISM: NARRATIVES, HORIZONS, AND NIETZSCHEAN PSYCHOLOGY

Nietzsche declared a new era with his Decree: an age had ended and a new one was about to begin. This schema of historical progress, decay, and redemption is a common motif in Western thought, originating in the Jewish and Christian apocalyptic and millennialist literature of the two centuries on either side of the life of Jesus of Nazareth (Benz [1966], pp. 1–48). Having passed through the speculation of Joachim of Fiore in the thirteenth century into the modern era, this schema, beginning with the French Enlightenment, has taken both religious and secular forms in the writings of the likes of Hegel, Marx, Saint-Simon, Comte, and Maritain. The creation of new calendars and dating systems, moreover, is a common feature of modern revolutionary and utopian movements. Yet Nietzsche does not seem at first glance to belong in this illustrious company. Seeking to banish any notion of historical progress from his writings, he seems to have equally reviled liberalism, progressivism, and socialism, which all share a form of historical optimism. On the other hand, he did seek the transformation of European culture and current practices, revealing part of the shape of this transformation in his rescinded edict.

One may delimit an “age” by its narratives. To speak of an historical age is to speak, in essence, of a set of stories that limn for us the contours of that age. What is morally, socially, and politically important (and what is not) to an age or a political founding is indicated by what is included (and what is not) in a

narrative of the life and times of those who inhabit the age or become its legendary founders and who shape it with their actions and their evaluations of those actions. Nietzsche did not ignore this phenomenon. As Gary Shapiro shows, Nietzsche turned on several occasions from forensic essays or aphorisms to narrative to describe and deconstruct the values of the present age and to present the values of his hoped-for age to come. These narratives include the story of Zarathustra, his own autobiography (whose title from a biblical narrative should not be ignored), and *The Birth*, which “offers a continuous picture of Western history from earliest Greece to the cultural politics of 1870” (Shapiro [1989], pp. 2–3 and *passim*).

Nietzsche’s declaration of an end and a new beginning (the great noon of his transvaluation) is, therefore, only one of his narrative schemata. His use of an edict to define an end and initiate a new beginning, a new story, is not, however, what we might expect from the foremost composer of the aphorism and the genealogist of morals. The schema seems too grand for a political and psychological agonist or a self-creating literatus, too hopeful for the exegete of nihilism.

Nietzsche’s decree is not, of course, a narrative—it is an imperial pronouncement. It must be understood, however, within a narrative framework, which is the story of the rise and decline of Christianity as he tells it. Space precludes retelling this story, but when we consider the immediate aim of Nietzsche’s decree, to declare a new age, we are pointed to a long-considered *political* intention, to establish in a concrete way such a new age, that emerges in his writings not merely in his final active years, but from the beginning, from *The Birth*. From here (and more centrally to my concerns), we are directed to the spiritual difficulties that inform Nietzsche’s disdain and dislike for liberal pluralism. Nietzsche intends a contest between stories, between Christianity and its offspring (including liberal pluralism) on the one hand, and his new account of the present world and the one for which he hopes and toward which he labors on the other. He declares it a spiritual battle.

Nietzsche characterized “radical nihilism” as “the conviction of an absolute untenability of existence when it comes to the highest values one recognizes; plus the realization that we lack the least right to posit a beyond or an in-itself of things that might be divine or morality incarnate.” “This realization,” he continued, “is a consequence of the cultivation of truthfulness—thus itself a consequence of the faith in morality” ([1967b], §8). Radical nihilism implies for him that there are no “objective” standards, no possible “foundations” by which we can know right and wrong, good and evil, true and false. Nietzsche thought, moreover, that this conclusion about the lack of absolutes in human life was a direct result of a philosophical project, concerning truthfulness itself, that he linked directly to Christianity:

Christians must believe in the truthfulness of God . . . they may not in any case admit to a relative truth. Christianity breaks up because of the necessary character

of its morality.—Science has awakened doubt in the truthfulness of the Christian God: and by this doubt, Christianity dies (Pascal's *deus absconditus*).⁵

In a foundationalist epistemology, God “dies,” because we have no absolute proof of his existence. But with the death of God, Nietzsche suggests, everything that is supported by a belief in an absolute Being comes into doubt. This includes: the notion of an ordered, knowable cosmos; the veracity of the scientific method that claims to give us knowledge of that cosmos; the usefulness of the generalizations of political ideologies that imitate such knowledge; and the veracity and tenability of a conceptual language, of truth-claims in general. In Heideggerian terms, we become disillusioned with metaphysics, and this disillusionment, according to Nietzsche, has significant consequences for how we make sense, as it were, of the world.

But why should this be a problem? Why can we not get along perfectly well without absolute truth-claims, deterministic categories, objective truths? Nietzsche suggested that perhaps we could, but that we would have to acquire a new set of habits for looking at the world in order to do so. This acquisition, about which the “post-Nietzschean” Rorty is quite optimistic ([1989], pp. 85ff.), seemed for Nietzsche more problematic. Nihilism marked the end of an age for him, but this end could not simply be celebrated. His well-known parable of the madman in the marketplace is not only a celebration; it also contains a cry of despair. While he may have celebrated what was to come, he also anticipated the pain of childbirth, as it were, that would attend the new coming ([1974b], §125). The question for Nietzsche was how humankind might survive the catastrophe of nihilism, the dissolution of an entire, albeit unhealthy, form of life, and go on to celebrate a new, transformed world. Nietzsche could celebrate the demise of the otherworldly, life-denying progenitors of nihilism, Socratic metaphysics and Christianity, at the same time that he anticipated with foreboding the backwash of their destruction ([1969a], pp. 270–75).

Nietzsche did not believe it possible for human beings to flourish under conditions of universal nihilism. It would be necessary for the post-Christian or post-Socratic to create a new set of conceptual, cultural, aesthetic horizons within which human endeavors could be intelligible and meaningful. Regardless of its ultimately indeterminate ground, conscious and self-conscious (human) life, Nietzsche thought, required such determinative horizons. A peculiar conception of “life” and nihilism, linked to Nietzsche's spiritual necessities, led him to think that the task of taming the nihilistic ocean-river of chaos could only be accomplished by those with noble or aristocratic souls, because only they could navigate its treacherous paths of nihilism for the sake of a coherent life for ourselves and together with others. The horizons for life are created, promulgated, and established by one or another of Nietzsche's types for human excellence: the overman, genius, free spirit, philosopher of the future, artist, or saint. Although Nietzsche seems to celebrate the (solitary) individual through these types, their activity of shaping and making aesthetically persuasive for the

rest of us the horizons by which all live is the epicenter of the political theory that Nietzsche sparsely articulates in his writings. This specific activity of the highest type is the link for Nietzsche between nihilism, politics, culture, and the general activities of the solitary, excellent men ([1986b I, §480; [1983], pp. 66, 67–68, 5–6; [1980], 7: 34[37]). It is also a basic premise of his critique of Christianity, in which the weakest and lowest, rather than the strongest and highest ultimately come to cultural, and hence political, predominance ([1969a], I, §12–16). And he had hopes for what a spiritual opposition to Christianity would achieve: perhaps his sustained counteraction would overcome this predominance and reestablish the possibility of a noble politics.

It is possible to sublimate the political elitism that emerges for Nietzsche out of this battle.⁶ The tendency to do so may reside in the scholarly enterprise itself. The life of the mind is not an immediately practical activity, and those who engage in it may, as Nietzsche thought, neglect the practical implications of their ideals ([1974a], §204). Anticipating such sublimation, Nietzsche may have welcomed it, since it would keep hidden until an appropriate time the wisdom that he eventually decided to reserve for the few. But any radical transformation, as Nietzsche reminds us in *Homer's Contest*, implies winners and losers. And losing entails its ugliness. God-fearers and champions of democracy and human rights will be the losers in his hoped-for world, because Nietzsche concluded that their genealogically related perspectives are worthless or, indeed, harmful.

Kant's epistemology, which was for Nietzsche well along the road to the modern realization of nihilism ([1968b], pp. 485–86), served him as one of several conceptual means for linking life and nihilism. According to Kant, all empirical reality is an appearance to us. We cannot know what things really are like, but only how they appear to us through the medium of the senses. Kant postulates a *thing-in-itself* that is behind the appearances, their foundation as it were, but which is entirely inaccessible to us. Without such a thing-in-itself, appearance, namely the empirical world, becomes "mere illusion" (Kant [1979], pp. 72, 78, 82–91 [B 44, 52, 59–73]). To this argument for the epistemological necessity of the thing-in-itself, Nietzsche replied with the question that is now a given of late modern existence: Why should the thing-in-itself or, more particularly, synthetic judgements a priori (for which the I as the thing-in-itself of the transcendental unity of apperception is the necessary ground) be necessary at all? For Nietzsche, to say that they are necessary is to claim that the human intellect is constituted in such a way that it *requires* such constructs. It is to say that human beings require intellectual foundations, that they cannot live in a situation in which concepts fail.⁷ To make Kant's things-in-themselves a necessity of the intellect, however, is ontologically to say nothing about them: it is to speak only of their psychological (or, perhaps, physiological) status. Epistemology becomes psychology. Left with only the realm of phenomena, a world of illusion and constant change, we are set adrift on a sea of mobile, meta-

morphosing phenomena that have no permanent foundation, no real essence that we can know. Nietzsche suggested that such a conception of human knowing poses three problems.

First, despite this epistemological conclusion, Nietzsche insisted that permanence and freedom to act are fundamental and concomitant needs of human life and flourishing. All living things require for their flourishing to be bounded by "horizons," which is Nietzsche's metaphorical term for the limits, boundaries, or intellectual structures that shape our world ([1983], p. 63). These provide the necessary permanence required in the face of death and change to give life the order and structure it requires to be meaningful and intelligible to us. Alone among all the animals, however, human beings have no eternal horizons and perspectives ([1974b], §143). Human horizons are necessary, but not instinctual: we must choose the horizons within which we act. Politically, such horizons implied for Nietzsche a set of institutions within which human creativity takes shape (Honig [1993a], pp. 69ff.; Nietzsche [1980], 1:770–72; [1986b], §462, §480).

Second, all choices of horizons may not be equivalent. Like the conditions for growing a crop, some intellectual or aesthetic horizons may be more conducive to a Nietzschean ideal of human flourishing than others. This human condition of indeterminate determinacy means that the question of horizons becomes paramount for human thriving. But what kinds of horizons are available to us in the world of nihilism, in which there are either no constants or absolutes at all, or in which we are all too consciously aware that our horizons are merely willful constructions, and not reflections of what is beyond our will? Radical nihilism confronts human flourishing: we cannot know anything absolutely, yet we must discover or invent satisfactorily binding horizons to make human life possible.

Third, as I have already suggested, Nietzsche believed that these horizons are given by great individuals who, by their donation, also enact a cultural transformation with political overtones. And this is the meaning of what I have called Nietzsche's aesthetics: political and cultural truth, the horizons by which we live, are aesthetically created and aesthetically (not by reason or revelation) made persuasive for those who live within them. But how is this possible?

Nietzsche responded with an aesthetic (and Romantic) judgement. He insisted that any set of horizons we moderns might accept as authoritative would need to display in themselves and force upon us a consistent, unique, and robust unity of style and expression such that at all times our aesthetic unitary life of health could express itself in "act[s] of will and desire" ([1983], p. 63). A lack of unity in cultural matters, he thought, would extirpate life, because it leads to a dissipation of effort and tends to destroy the determinative boundaries of the intellectual horizons that are necessary for human thriving. It would simply be a reinstatement of nihilism. He complained that this dissipation described modern western European civilization.

This nihilistic dissipation is the product, for Nietzsche, of a revulsion against the abyss with which our existence confronts us. It manifests itself in one mode in the self-contradictions of Christian *communal* asceticism, which is an ancestor for Nietzsche of liberalism. The ascetic ideal, Nietzsche suggests, is a rejection, in the face of nihilism and meaninglessness, of the bounty that life offers. It is an expression of the resentment against the contingencies and instabilities of human existence, seeking to eradicate the possibility of a noble, affirmative, unitary horizon by wreaking revenge on the noble in spirit who can live in creative gaiety despite the abyssal truth of nihilism ([1969b], I, §11). The ascetic ideal is self-contradictory, since its denial of life ironically “springs from the protective instinct of a degenerating life which tries by all means to sustain itself and to fight for its existence.” It is “an artifice for the preservation of life” ([1969b], III, §13), and it accomplishes this end by resentfully but powerfully redirecting the life-negating vengefulness and hatred of the majority of human beings (Nietzsche’s “herd”) either into the interior of the self, which is not to be creatively ordered, but persistently scrutinized, and overcome ([1969b], III, §16), or onto external enemies, who are not engaged, but must be destroyed ([1969b], I, §10, §11; III, §15). Such resentfulness is a constant possibility in every soul, a pervasive feature of humankind, and the essence of Nietzsche’s characterization of liberalism, including its disciplinary, pluralistic-democratic forms.

Determinative horizons, however, do not imply the strict identity politics of, say, fascism. Nietzsche could experiment within his Dionysian horizons with a variety of self-disciplinary regimes, which he describes in detail in *Ecce Homo* ([1969a], pp. 223–35). Thus, Nietzsche is suspicious of his own truths ([1974a], §296), perhaps prefers brief habits ([1974b], §295), and sometimes speaks of his enemies as his closest friends ([1974b], §279; [1969a], pp. 231–33). What remains constant in this self-creation, however, is a refusal to succumb to that despair of nihilism that is manifested in the many varieties of resentment. But this refusal requires spiritual strength, a kind of will-to-power, as it were, over oneself and for oneself. It is the will-to-power of the Dionysian dance that seeks not merely to dominate, but to give away ([1969a], pp. 304–6).

Accordingly, part of Nietzsche’s lifelong project was to overcome nihilism by rejecting its form of asceticism and reaffirming life, by which he meant the creation and affirmation of a new kind of horizon. By way of examining several moments along this register in Nietzsche’s work, I make three claims. First, he had a clear, enduring vision for accomplishing this affirmation, which necessitated a transformation of European culture. Second, as he developed a program for this affirmation-transformation, his strategy for accomplishing it changed, becoming increasingly elitist or aristocratic and esoteric. This change and Nietzsche’s reasons for it are reflected in what became of the Decree. His revocation directs our attention to his shifting strategies for initiating the transformation as an enduring project. His politicization of this project is told in his story, because his aphoristic works do not reveal it so much as they presuppose

it. Third, the form, content, and motivations of Nietzsche's agenda present a caveat for the seductively recontextualized reading of his works as useful tools for invigorating pluralist or agonistic democratic enterprises. In particular, we must focus on the spiritual exigencies Nietzsche thought were involved.

To repeat, this argument has two parallel tracks. On the one hand, we take "a glance" at Nietzsche's politics. On the other, it seeks to expand the horizon of this glance to include implications beyond Nietzsche's immediate concerns. The former is the context for the latter.

PREMONITIONS OF THE DECREE: NIETZSCHE'S EMBLEM ANTICIPATED

Nietzsche's journey to the Decree properly begins with *The Birth of Tragedy*, which is, on its face, a study of Greek tragic drama. It is also, however, a study of the use of tragedy for living well. Space prohibits a thorough rehearsal of Nietzsche's view of tragedy or the future awakening or transformation of German culture that he sought at the time. But two brief points are in order. First, to accept the tragic perspective is to anticipate his later doctrine of eternal recurrence, to take upon oneself the weight of the abyss and to say yes to it. It is to accept conceptual nihilism as a given of human existence, and to overcome it through a vision of the aesthetic unity of the whole of that conceptually ungrounded existence. It is the antithesis and rejection of resentment against the indeterminism of the *nihil* that subtends the world of appearances and that can render us seemingly powerless ([1969a], pp. 270–75). Second, the tragic theater, which presents the aesthetic vision of tragedy, was for Nietzsche a political enterprise, because it could lead to communal transformation. Even as he retreated from his immediate communal and institutional efforts, this political aspect of tragedy and his own attempted recovery from European nihilism retained its group complexion.

These political dimensions of Nietzsche's hope for a restoration of German-European culture became clearer in a set of lectures that he gave at the University in Basel in the spring of 1872, entitled "On the Future of our Educational Institutions." Their contents constituted the pedagogical agenda for the total transformation of European culture that he foresaw in *The Birth*. The lectures were well received, with over three hundred people regularly in attendance, and for some time Nietzsche enthusiastically thought to publish them as his next book.⁸ In his proposal for publication to E. W. Fritsch (who had published *The Birth*) he linked the lectures to two important events. They would have to be ready for distribution by May 22, 1872, because on this date the cornerstone of Wagner's *Festspieltheater* would be laid in Bayreuth, and because the international German conference of philologists and educators was to begin in Leipzig on the same day. The "intentions and essence" of the lectures, he wrote, was to deliver to the conferees in Leipzig the meaning of the events in Bayreuth,

particularly to impress on the teachers there the cultural significance of the musical movement in Bayreuth ([1986a], 3: 300). He had earlier linked this movement to the German recovery of Greek tragedy ([1967a], §19). Thus, the lectures were consciously linked both to the political and cultural concerns of the Bayreuth enterprise to which Nietzsche was personally attached, and to his pedagogical concerns for the cultural transformation of Europe, which he at that time believed Bayreuth implied and might help bring about. He wrote to his mentor, Ritschl, that the lectures were intended as an expression of the “practical consequences” of *The Birth*.⁹

Yet how much practical political activity Nietzsche actually intended to initiate through these lectures remains somewhat unclear. They were delivered publicly, and he claimed that the word “Future” in the title was meant at the least to console for the present those who lamented the demise of a true education in aesthetics and politics: “*The future* I wish to predict only in the sense of the Auspices, who prophecy from intestines, but with the precondition that eternal nature will at some time once again prove correct. *When* this future will come to pass, I do not know: but it is sufficient in the present to persuade a few of the necessity of this future, in case one does not wish despairingly to lay one’s hands in one’s lap” ([1980], 7: 8[60]; cf. [1980], 1: 645–46). Nietzsche’s gaze into the future, however, did not mean that “the purpose of humankind [is to be] sought in the future of humankind” ([1980], 7: 11[1]). He hoped, rather, to act purposefully in the present in at least small ways, so that the not too distant future might be an overcoming of its immediate, nihilistic past.

On the other hand, his letters began to reveal an uneasiness with the publicity of the lectures, pointing both to an incipient elitism, if not esotericism in his thinking, and to a feeling that his treatment of the subjects of *The Birth* and these lectures were not yet to his own standards. This elitism developed as he began to doubt Wagner’s quasi-populist notions of aesthetic regeneration as he himself had expressed them in *The Birth*. Nietzsche’s transforming education was intended for the few, and his prescriptions for such an education were likewise to be read by the few, as he stated in the lectures themselves. (On the [non-Nietzschean] sources of this elitism, see Schneider [1992], pp. 308–25.) As he prepared an introduction for the possible publication of the lectures, he wrote that like Aristotle he wished “to publish and yet not publish this book.” Nietzsche found himself in self-conflict, self-contradiction. The truth is for the few, the grand lie for the many; but to reach the few he must risk tipping off the many. His writings are difficult, intended for those few who understand as he does, but what if the many understand too much? Perhaps it would be better to send private copies to those few “good and worthy readers” to whom the new education might be directed.¹⁰ Fritsch agreed to publish the lectures, but Nietzsche’s doubts about both his selected audience, whose membership remained elusive perhaps even to him, and about his own ability to communicate to this audience increased. As his hesitation continued, he decided in February,

1873, not to publish them at all, but to wait until he was more mature and adequate to the task for which they were intended, and to write a new book “in a few years” when he was ready ([1986a], 4:125–29).

Nietzsche's self-critique might well be taken as the opening up of a space for multiple self-individuation, pluralism, or postmodern liberalism. Accordingly, near the end of his critical examination and summary of Nietzsche as a political thinker, Keith Ansell-Pearson suggests that as Nietzsche, “in his most self-reflective moments,” “allows his readers the freedom of interpretation, he ironically becomes the most democratic of philosophers” ([1994], p. 205). But Nietzsche's notion of a spiritual inequality complicates such an egalitarian reading of his text. Nietzsche's self-critique and ironism do not contradict a growing radical elitism. After all, if one is to communicate with an aesthetically and spiritually sensitive few, one must do so with corresponding care, sensitivity, and precision. One's audience and one's ability to communicate with it are, in this reading, two sides of the same elitist coin. Nietzsche's conception of *Erziehung* and *Bildung* within the lectures themselves seems to encourage this interpretation.

Both terms are rendered in English as “education.” *Erziehung* means etymologically “to pull out,” as a midwife does a child at birth, corresponding most closely with “educate,” from the Latin “to lead out.” The creation of determinative cultural-intellectual boundaries is the work of a select few, who come to their positions of cultural preeminence by means of a disciplined and thorough education. They must be led out through a selective education, which is open to all, but accessible to only a few ([1980], 1:665). These few are the objects-subjects of Nietzsche's later “fish hooks,” his books. Once one has been liberated in this educational process, one is ready for Nietzsche's *Bildung*, something akin to edification, the creation of new images and thoughts beyond nihilism, beyond good and evil, for the enactment of new deeds ([1980], pp. 716–17; [1969a], *passim*).

With *Wagner in Bayreuth* and *Human, All-too Human*, Nietzsche completed his gradual turn away from the cultural politics of *The Birth*. Space prohibits a consideration of Nietzsche's detailed critique of Wagner's ethnocentric and even racist enterprise of cultural transformation, but we may note one specific disappointment for Nietzsche, namely Wagner's apparent return to a “Germanic Christianity” in operas such as *Parsifal*. In response, Nietzsche came to reject the possibility of an overtly political and programmatic transformation of European or German culture in the way Wagner foresaw it in his activities in Bayreuth. The guiding thread of Nietzsche's implicit critique was that Wagner was a poor educator, which is to say, an unlikely and undesirable transformer of European cultural horizons. The unlikelihood of such a transformation was reinforced in Nietzsche's mind by the response Wagner evoked in his audience. The Germans greeted Wagner's attempts at aesthetic transformation with polite silence or laughter ([1980, 7:32[25, 28]). Nietzsche surmised that he, like Wag-

ner, had overestimated his audience. Like Zarathustra's later audience in the Motley Cow, the Germans blink, stare, or laugh, but no further response is forthcoming ([1968a], pp. 128–31).

Zarathustra's adventure at the Motley Cow, however, is not one sided. The town's name recalls Plato's description of democracy as a "many-colored cloak" ([1968], 557c), and an early liberal-pluralist democracy seems to be precisely what the Motley Cow represents. Zarathustra's experience of rejection and his turn to a chosen few is, first, an autobiographical reflection of Nietzsche's rejection of Wagner, and through him, of the German people. On the other hand, Plato's many-colored cloak is also the physical and intellectual context in which his (or Socrates') philosophical activity takes place, philosophy itself being one of the stripes in the garment. Similarly, Zarathustra-Nietzsche's turn from the people may not be final: it seems to rest in part on Zarathustra-Nietzsche's insufficiencies, not merely the receptive incompetence of the people. Although Nietzsche's weight is decisively on the side of a growing elitism, his ambiguities may attenuate it, and it does not turn him to apoliticism. The existence of Zarathustra's disciples (which Nietzsche also desired for himself [Kaufmann (1974), pp. 46–48, 369]), Nietzsche's publication of books, and his hope for institutions to study his work in the future (Nietzsche [1969a], pp. 259–62) are concrete (even if multilayered) acts and appearances in space and time. They have public significance and their designs intrude politically, because Nietzsche does not simply retreat to a private (or transcendent) sphere with them. His books remain politicized and politicizable: there is neither privatization nor privatization of politics here, even though the growing, if ambiguous, elitism of *On Our Educational Institutions* recurs now in stronger form.

UTOPIANISM, ELITISM, AND PATIENCE

The direction that Nietzsche's rejection of Wagner's and his own enterprise of political transformation would take, and the scope of his rejection of his own method for forming the horizons of our being in *The Birth* on the political side become clearly visible in the first volume of *Human, All-too Human*. In aphorism 462, Nietzsche reiterates the hierarchical structure of an ideal society, which he calls his "utopia":

My utopia—In a better ordering of society the heavy work and exigencies of life will be apportioned to him who suffers least as a consequence of them, that is to say to the most insensible, and thus step by step up to him who is most sensitive to the most highly sublimated species of suffering and who therefore suffers even when life is alleviated to the greatest degree possible.

Nietzsche claims that, in contrast to the ideal of most utopian dreamers, his ideal political community will not bring an "age of happiness," for that is not

possible ([1986b], I, §471). Human beings are constituted in such a way that they can enjoy happy moments. Happy *ages*, however, would bore them, so that they would begin to “downright pray for misery and disquietude,” and seek to bring them into being. Accordingly, the “perfect state” of the “happy age” of the socialists, for example, is not merely impossible, but also undesirable. In such a state, “there would no longer exist . . . any motive whatever for poetry and fiction,” so that only “the retarded” would still have “a desire for poetical unreality.” They would yearn for the “half barbaric” times of the imperfect present. Thus, the “comfortable life” of the perfect state would “destroy the soil out of which great intellect and the powerful individual in general grows: by which I mean great energy” ([1986b], I, §234, §235). Perhaps it is possible to substitute various consumerisms for Nietzsche’s yearning. Or perhaps Rorty is correct to suggest that the flatter culture of liberalism will adequately satisfy longings previously satisfied by metaphysical or essentialist accounts of existence ([1989], p. 85). Perhaps such a society would remain stable. Nietzsche, however, was unconvinced. Our spiritual yearnings, he thought, would eventually incite activity, and Marxist laboring or liberal consuming would be insufficient. Like Francis Fukuyama, we would become bored (Fukuyama [1992], pp. 18, 300–312, 328–39). Nietzsche sought to avoid such “enfeeblement” and boredom, envisioning instead a new kind of aesthetic state.

Nietzsche’s aesthetic utopia is based upon a hierarchy of suffering. What is most beautiful and sensed most acutely in the “most highly sublimated species of suffering” in this new community is not merely the Dionysian-Apollonian tragic unity of *The Birth*, but knowledge itself:

The barbarians of every age were *happier* . . . our passion for knowledge has become too strong for us to be able to want happiness without knowledge or the happiness of a strong, firmly rooted delusion; even to imagine such a state of things is painful to us! Restless discovering and divining has such an attraction for us, and has grown as indispensable to us as is to the lover his unrequited love, which he would at no price relinquish for a state of indifference—perhaps, indeed, we too are *unrequited* lovers! ([1986b], I, §429).

This new fellowship of “unrequited lovers” will resemble the aesthetic state of Nietzsche’s earlier writings, but the aesthetics tend toward an aesthetics of knowledge, while the idea of the aesthetic political community has become a “utopia.”

Nietzsche’s growing vituperation against Christianity and his perceived need to discipline his own hostile sentiment are clarified in the contrast between Christianity and the new aesthetic state. If Christianity does seek knowledge, then, according to Nietzsche, it is the knowledge of absolutes—a truth—not the knowledge of nihilism that Nietzsche suggests here we should seek instead (as a means of overcoming it). A knowledge of absolute truth is love required, but since Nietzsche cannot believe in such knowledge, his longing remains. It

must be sufficient for such lovers to draw around themselves their own horizons of their existence and to bear the pain of such self-creation in the face of nihilism's abyss, resisting the comfortable boredom of liberal democracy.

Nietzsche's turn to a new aesthetics, the creation of self-willed horizons, is a turn away from the overt, sociopolitical revolution that we find in *The Birth* and in *Our Educational Institutions*, to a more private, interior conversion among an elite few. This elitism is already foreshadowed in the latter work, but not yet developed in the direction Nietzsche takes it in *Human*. This new combination of political change and continuity in Nietzsche's thought suggests that revolution, which the immediate establishment of Nietzsche's ideal state in liberal-democratic Europe would certainly be, would not bring about the desired results. It is better to be patient and moderate; such qualities befit the nature of the free spirit. They also preclude the "merely half-usefulness or the total uselessness and perilousness of all sudden changes" ([1986b], I, §463, §464). Nietzsche begins to call less for a European revolution and more for an inner transformation of a select few that may eventually lead to wider political and cultural effects.

In this way, Nietzsche's new political vision, his "utopia," is not merely a personal perspective, but remains, as Bonnie Honig partially suggests, a plea for and elucidation of a political order that corresponds to *his* perspective and that fosters the perspective and activity of the spiritually sensitive genius of Nietzsche's new conception. The new utopia also remains consistent with his earlier critique of Wagner's grand politics. He returns to the individual and to his education. He writes books for "everyone and no one," i.e., "for each man as man, insofar as his essential nature becomes at any given time an object worthy of his thought . . . [but] for none of the idle curious who come drifting in from everywhere," that is, not for the many (Heidegger [1985], p. 64). The new curriculum that replaces the questionable hopes of *The Birth* and the lectures on *Our Educational Institutions* has now been revealed: it is Nietzsche's books themselves, beginning with *Human*. His books are not merely the scholarly examinations of old philosophical problems with the attendant new answers, but a means to teach us a new way of seeing, thinking, and being. Already in *Our Educational Institutions*, Nietzsche anticipated the laughter and hatred of his detractors that is echoed in *Zarathustra* ([1980], 1:696; [1968a], pp. 130–31). It taught him that "ultimately, nobody can get more out of things, including books, than he already knows. For what one lacks access to from experience one will have no ear." Books like those of Nietzsche that speak of "nothing but events that lie altogether beyond the possibility of any frequent or even rare experience . . . [are] the first language for a new series of experiences" ([1969a], p. 261). The audience that comprehends them may be small and select, but as yet, it remains unknown even to Nietzsche. Hence the need for careful publicity, which will attract those few, like the secret agent's code in a classified advertisement.

The size and rarity of his audience returns us to the spiritual-political problem. These features were givens for Nietzsche, based on two observations. First, it was empirically the case for him that the great majority of human beings have always been a resentful herd. Such resentment was for Nietzsche not an ontological fact, yet less a contingent human possibility than a human constant (Nietzsche [1969b], I, §7; III, §13, §14).¹¹ It can be controlled and channelled, but it arises not out of historical contingency, but the human condition itself (Rorty [1989], pp. 87–88), where it induces the greatest sort of struggle within those few who would not succumb to it ([1969a], pp. 222–35). Second, he had observed in himself the exceeding difficulty of overcoming decadence and resentment. The physical, mental, and spiritual discipline such an overcoming required for the purpose of reaffirming life was a rarity. Indeed, he surmised that it might be circumscribed by a certain fatedness. “I took myself in hand, I made myself healthy again: the condition for this—every physiologist would admit that—is *that one must be healthy at bottom*. A typically moribund being cannot become healthy, much less make itself healthy” ([1969a], pp. 224–25). His experience of resentment, of both decadence and ascent within himself, and his journey upward led him to a spiritual-elitist conclusion.

Connolly suggests that Nietzsche's aristocratism is self-defeating, since it will perpetuate in new modes the very resentment Nietzsche's “noble ethics” seeks to overcome. Accepting Nietzsche's suspicion that resentment is a continual human potential, he goes on to suggest that “perhaps the human animal cannot be delivered from this interior struggle between civility and resentment, self-containment and revenge, but only from those doctrines which magnify cruelty to the self, hegemony over otherness, and danger to the species by pretending to transcend the struggle” (Connolly [1993a], p. 160). Certainly Nietzsche thought that the emergence of the priest as the prime articulator of resentment and leader of the ignoble masses greatly enhanced the power of the many to focus and express their resentment. Accordingly, a diminution of their power (in the form of doctrines and disciplines) would likely diminish the cultural power of resentment. But for Nietzsche, liberal-democratic politicians and intellectuals are the inheritors of this power, and they extend the agenda of resentment. Moreover, a new form of (non-Christian) slavery is consistent with his view that the masses, the herd, will always be spiritually slack, and that if we desire a renewal of culture, we must concentrate on the few at the expense of the many ([1969b], I, §9). These, after all, are for Nietzsche the creators of the horizons within which we all have our existence. Left to their own devices, the many could, for Nietzsche, only be their resentful destroyers.

In *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche makes clear that any new politics he has in mind will not warrant a new idolatry of political institutions or the state as such. His new political order may require some form of legislative, executive, and judicial activities, be these in an aristocratic or other mode, and thus it may use or

imply the use of institutions. None of these, however, will be for their own sake, whereby they would produce a new idolatry of the modern state. They are a means to further aesthetic, creative, or self-expressive ends of the great men, the creative genius, artist, saint, philosopher, and so on ([1968a], pp. 163–64; [1969a], pp. 259–69; [1974a], §61). Nietzsche's remarks on politics and the political are consistent throughout his works in this specific regard: whatever they may mean for the many, politics, which for Nietzsche is the organization and maintenance of some set of institutions for the preservation of communal and cultural life ([1980], 1:767–68; [1986], §472; [1982], §179; [1968a], pp. 163–64), are a means for the highest types to be left free to do their creative work. Insofar as this work has any effect on the many, it likely goes largely unnoticed and disregarded, even though its effects of shaping our cultural and conceptual horizons or habits of mind may form our existence in fundamental ways ([1968a], pp. 163–64). In Nietzsche's best regime, these individuals are the beneficiaries of hierarchical arrangements of power and material distribution; in the second-best regime, they will at least be left undisturbed ([1986b], I, §462, 480; [1968a], pp. 163–66; [1980], 1:725).

Thus, Nietzsche's philosophical and psychological elitism do not merely have political *implications*; he had specific political plans that he hoped would live on in his writings themselves. Whereas Rorty, joined by Warren, Connolly, and others, may be right that we can disregard the specifics of these plans, we might do well to reflect on their underlying motivations. These should be assessed within the context of Nietzsche's evaluation of liberal democracy, which he called the "heir of the Christian movement" ([1974a], §202). Of the multiple links that he ascertained between Christianity and democracy, none is more important for our purposes than the notion of equality, which, he claimed, is a product of the Christian idea of the soul, now turned into a principle of political rule. "With this idea, the individual is made transcendent; as a result, he can attribute senseless importance to himself." Consequently, Christianity invites "the individual to play the judge of everything and everyone from a transcendent or eternal perspective" ([1967b], §765). Democrats inherit the secular vestiges of this doctrine, namely the notion of universal suffrage ([1967b], §130). From the added Christian doctrine of the equality of all souls before God, they inherit the doctrine of the universal rights of man.¹²

It is these principles of universality and equality that Nietzsche finds most objectionable, for he believes not only that they lead to dissipation, stultification, and mediocrity ([1967b], §130), but that, in a world without a determinative metaphysics to support them, they are inherently unstable in noncreative, uninteresting ways (Rorty [1989], pp. 73–95, 96ff.). The democratic movement, he suggests, "is not only a form of decay of political organization, but a form of the decay, namely the diminution, of man, making him mediocre and lowering his value" ([1974a], §203). It threatens Europe with the worst sort of nihilism, a "new Buddhism," that preaches resignation, quiescence, pessimism, and the

consolation of pity (for self and others), rather than a nihilism of the heroic, of overcoming, of strength, which was Nietzsche's new hope. Moreover, its ideological instability may lead to explosive conflict ([1969a], pp. 319–21).

Nietzsche's vision of health,¹³ in contradistinction to the "sickness" of Christianity and democracy, may eventually require and be able to sustain the institutions adequate for its fulfillment: "Some day institutions will be needed in which men live and teach as I conceived of living and teaching; it might even happen that a few chairs will then be set aside for the interpretation of *Zarathustra*." That day has not yet come, however, so he must wait: "but it would contradict my character entirely if I expected ears and hands for my truths today: that today one doesn't hear me and doesn't accept my ideas is not only understandable, it even seems right to me" ([1969a], p. 259). (On Nietzsche's conception of the role of institutions, see also [1982], §542.) Corresponding to his new curriculum, Nietzsche offered a new utopianism. His new psychological perspectives would produce a new account of what counts for knowledge and they would usher in a new politics, but not in the manner foreseen in *The Birth*.

PLATO AND IMPATIENCE

In response to the liberal-democratic, egalitarian forms of nihilism, the "new Buddhism," and to Christian wishful thinking, Nietzsche suggested that his select readers "learn the art of *this-worldly* comfort" ([1967a], Preface, §7). To categorize discrete phenomena into categories is to order the chaos of the appearances into a coherent world so that, nihilism notwithstanding, we may live in it; to appeal to transcendent or eternal categories (whether "God" or "universal rights"), however, is to exchange for a life-denying chimera the only thing we have left of human existence, the appearances themselves. In a note from 1888, he evaluated the moralism linked to the "true world" and declared, "It is of cardinal importance that we abolish the *true world*. It is the great skeptic and value-diminisher of the world, *which is us*: It was until now our most dangerous assassination attempt against life" ([1980], 13: 14[103]).

This murderous attempt, however, is the product of a natural impulse toward permanence and certainty, which, in the case of creating language symbols, is generally useful for maintaining the health and life of an individual or of an entire culture. But in the face of death and our need for horizons and permanence, we may act in haste to overcome our condition of transience. In an unpublished note from the summer of 1880 that has strong echoes in *Daybreak*, §496, §542, Nietzsche saw in Plato's life and writings an example of such haste. His interpretation of Plato is perhaps dubious, but the wider political lesson is not:

Plato became impatient, he wanted to be at the end. And why? His feeling of power, that strong political drive, wanted to be satisfied. The brevity of our life requires that the peak (*Höhe*) enters at some point and the goal is reached: otherwise we remain suspended forever, and that one cannot tolerate because of impatience. The appearance (*Anschein*) of truth [is] individually *necessary*. ([1980], 9: 4[286]).

Nietzsche does not think that living is a totality that can be completely known, understood, or deciphered as “a life.” To do so would be to deny tragedy and opt for superficial comedy. Paradoxically, however, he understands that to give meaning to ourselves we seem to require precisely such a terminus that will give our living a foundation. This terminus Nietzsche must and does patiently deny. But such a terminus includes a realm in which we are assured that our practices—our intentions, our actions, our words—will have meaning and lastingness. It is a realm, as Nietzsche suggests in *Daybreak* and *Ecce Homo*, that implies institutions and that is therefore constituted politically ([1982], §542; [1969a], p. 259). It is a realm that Nietzsche impatiently demanded in his Decree.

Nietzsche’s evaluation of Plato in this fragment finds a supplementary expression in *Twilight*, where he criticizes Plato’s cowardice over against Thucydides’ courage. Bernard Williams has suggested that Nietzsche’s praise of Thucydides must be understood in light of Thucydides’ “Sophoclean” conception of the world. It is a world without gods in which there is nothing, “beyond some things that human beings have themselves shaped . . . that is intrinsically shaped to human interests, in particular to human beings ethical interests” ([1993], p. 163). It is, Williams goes on to suggest, a world very much like the “post-Christian” world Nietzsche purports to inhabit, and in this world, Plato’s impatient desire for the “appearance of truth” is a manifestation of cowardice, born of resentment. Nietzsche therefore concludes that “Plato is a coward before reality, consequently he flees into the ideal; Thucydides has control of *himself*, consequently he also maintains control of things” ([1968b], pp. 558–59).

Nietzsche’s impatience encapsulates an essential ingredient of his psychology, namely the existential tension human beings confront in the face of their mortality. It is one’s orientation to death that determines one’s orientation to life. Is death an end to be resented, resisted, accepted, or acknowledged, an end toward which one proceeds, from which one is repulsed, which one greets, fears, or denies? Our mortality may lead us to demand certainty of life, but it is a certainty that, for Nietzsche, never comes. Death is a limit, and for beings who cling to life, it is a limit that raises questions and the concomitant possibilities of anxious impatience, resentment, and nihilism.

Under the restrictions his notion of a noble nihilism placed on him, Nietzsche sought to discover how one can affirm the appearances so as to avoid resigning oneself (as did Schopenhauer and all Romantic pessimists) to the dark void that

opens up in consequence of post-Kantian nihilism, but without impatiently securing for oneself or others what he took to be the fraudulence of a comforted soul that comes from resting on a misbegotten faith in the transcendent (as Christians who believed in God and liberal democrats who believed in universal rights or universal equality tended to do). One can circumvent this Nietzschean critique by denying any transcendent or contractual universality to one's liberal-democratic sentiments. Insofar as laws and police enforce certain standards of conduct even in a society established on such sentiments, however, one cannot entirely escape the imposition of a set of boundaries that Nietzsche specifically questions, at the same time that he seeks to establish new ones (Rorty [1989], pp. 73–95; Connolly [1993b], p. 157 n.35). The epistemological problems of nihilism would become psychological ones, and these psychological motivations of epistemological questions and constructs would remain close to Nietzsche. For whatever ineluctable reason, and whatever their actual epistemological or ontological status, horizons *were* necessary for human existence and thriving. Thus, Nietzsche would engage in a campaign of saving the appearances against the darkness of Romantic pessimistic resignation, but without offering a universalist foundationalism of either a Christian or a liberal-democratic kind. The difficulty would be to live within the horizons that one knew were not absolute, that were only foreground, perspective, and shadow.

The political conditions under which these horizons would once again become tenable in a way that was not possible in the cultural corruption of Europe were not immediately available to Nietzsche. In *Human* Nietzsche suggested that he, like Plato, could create a perfect city in speech, although with much less detail than Plato had, but not realize it on earth ([1986b], I, §462, §471, §480). Like Plato, he would have to wait. Unlike Plato, Nietzsche hoped for an immanent appearance of this city, but failing that, he, like Plato, could tell a “saving tale” that would serve as a curriculum for those who had ears and hearts to hear it (Plato [1968], 621b, 352d; Plato [1987], 522eff.; Aristotle [1962], 1095a7–14). Nietzsche's books, like Plato's dialogues before him, would be the basis for his new curriculum. Nietzsche's audience would be an indeterminate group made up of those whose experience, hopes, passions, and strengths would give them an ear for Nietzsche's words ([1969a], pp. 261, 295–309).

NIETZSCHE AND LIBERAL-PLURALIST AGONISM

I have argued that Nietzsche's philosophical enterprise is constituted at least in part in the form of a narrative. At its conclusion, let us ask whether his narrative is sufficient to sustain pluralist enterprises that are ostensibly extracted from it, or even to accomplish his self-ordained task. What story shall we find that teaches or displays patience in the face of impulses toward completion?

Concomitantly, how does Nietzsche's project reflect on its own suitability for interpretation in a pluralist, liberal-democratic mode?

One might suggest that Nietzsche's story *is*, in fact, enough. After all, he rescinded the legislation. That is a story of self-control, self-regulation in the best tradition of the heroic virtue of the Greek aristocrats and later Stoics that Nietzsche and, following him, Foucault, tried to sustain (Milbank [1990], p. 290). But this self-control was, in Nietzsche's understanding, elitist. And this elitism, while it may degenerate into a kind of dandyism (Hadot [1992], p. 229), originates in Nietzsche's belief that the kind of self-control required to overcome the anxiety and resentment that spawns responses like his Decree requires a strength of spirit that is very rare ([1969a], pp. 249–53). Hence the spiritual utopia of *Human* ([1986b], I, 462).

But what, then, of "the many," whose resentment initiates its own powerful political forces ([1969a], I, §10)? One cannot simply leave them to their own devices, lest the violence of their resentment and anxiety toward nihilism overtake the aesthetic practices of the spiritually powerful few. For this reason, Nietzsche could complain that European culture made the training of genius (a spiritual aristocracy) nearly impossible ([1983], pp. 137–38; [1980], 1: 725). This psychology of resentment is the source of Nietzsche's abusive politics and also the essential reason why both the fascism and the pluralistic postmodern ethics (which tries to overcome what Connolly has aptly called a "transcendental egoism" [(1993b), p. 1391]) that seem to emerge from Nietzsche's thought are subject to his wide-ranging analysis of the ills of European political psychology and how to cure them.

To repeat, Nietzsche's texts point to an ongoing ambivalence in the projects for a postmodern ethic that emerge from it. Specifically, Nietzsche's own hatred and resentment displayed in his Decree (but elsewhere as well) and in his attempt to initiate a new narrative lurk in the shadows of every ethical attempt like his own, and the need to restrain this menacing beast vitiates, in a practical and theoretical sense, an emancipation that denies a concomitant set of restrictions in opposition to the set it supersedes.¹⁴ This new set of restrictions is given a cheerful face by interiorizing its effects into a kind of noble cultivation of the self. For Nietzsche, however, its outward, political manifestations are not necessarily as edifying.

But Connolly and Honig, for example, do recognize the possibility that nihilism and its concomitant denial of foundational ethics may lead to resentment, violence, and possibly tyranny. Both seem hopeful, in different degrees, that a proper cultivation of human passions can be universally or nearly universally instituted so that everyone, or nearly everyone, can be part of "the quest to incorporate generosity into one's corporeal sensibilities" (Connolly [1993b], p. 151; Honig [1993a], pp. 209–11). Nietzsche was much less optimistic, at least in part because he weighed more heavily the spiritual strength required for the struggle against resentment and impatience.

CONCLUSION: THE MEANING OF PATIENCE

In late 1888, Nietzsche erased a text. The erasure was not merely a discard, the rejection of a rough note. The text was in final form, about to be sent to the publisher. But whither this Decree? It echoes, in crude form, Nietzsche's intentions for a thorough transformation of Western civilization, which included the rejection and, indeed, annihilation of Christianity along with its democratic progeny. His intentions of transformation can be understood in light of his analysis of the nature and causes of European nihilism and the nature and conditions of human flourishing, which I have outlined in cursory fashion. His explicitly anti-Christian stance must be understood in the same light. The meaning of his Decree and of its revocation can be understood in this light, but this perspective may not be the most interesting for Nietzsche's inclusion in contemporary liberal discourse. There are, echoing Foucault, two ways to make Nietzsche groan and protest. The first is forgetfully and uncritically to take portions of his thought, excise them from the whole, and do with them as we see fit. The second is to remain sensitive to Nietzsche's concerns even as we respectfully move beyond or reject or modify the conclusions to which these concerns led Nietzsche.

In the first instance, then, we must consider Nietzsche's analysis of what he believed to be the political possibilities of effecting the transformation he foresaw, which is to say: Nietzsche moved from an openly public agenda of working for the revitalization of a European culture that had gone bad to the more difficult, but presumably more likely successful one of using his own writings as such a vehicle for a transformation in the future. In a moment of what I have called "impatience" (by which I follow his characterization of Plato's political idealism), Nietzsche wrote a decree, which could only become politically feasible after the silent revolution brought about by his own transformational writings had occurred. My examination of this Decree has considered only a small part of what is involved in Nietzsche's attempt at a radical transformation of European culture (i.e., it has said nothing at all about the doctrines of the Will to Power or Eternal Recurrence, nor about the substantive aspects of his transformation such as the role of art, the state, the genius, or philosophy).

We cannot suspend an entire interpretation of Nietzsche's writings from this one slender and disputed peg that is the Decree. But this text brings us to a second lesson in Nietzsche's work, because it is an important part of a larger picture: along with emblemizing in a stark way the political intentions Nietzsche entertained in his work, it also points to the dangers of resentful impatience he revealed to be inherent both in those intentions and in any appropriation of a postmodern ethic based on his writings. These dangers are indicated in the *acts* of writing and rescinding this legislation against Christianity, even as the first of these two acts is consistent with the tenor of *Antichrist* as a whole, and as the second act points to the potential danger of resentment inher-

ent in the sentiments of this text and in the political instantiation of our ideals in general. Such dangers may imply that even the politeness of postmodern liberalism ultimately presupposes necessary constraints. Foucault has shown at length what such constraints may entail, and even Connolly's optimism does not blind him to their seeming necessity ([1993b], p. 157 n.35). The question therefore becomes not *whether* we require boundaries, but what *kind* they should be, and what kind of authority they should command.

Curiously enough, Nietzsche appears to offer us an instantiation of, if not an argument for, a certain kind of moderation. Perhaps this image is at odds with the prevailing image of his irresponsibility, which is usually admitted even by friendly commentators and which is evident in several of the political episodes in his writings that I have considered here. Indeed, in light of Nietzsche's wide-ranging and often lofty goals, the policy specifics of his "Decree" and other passages seem vindictive and nearly tawdry. Let us recall, however, the importance of ritual and concrete memorials for drawing the horizons of our existence. It is these that sustain the story, reminding us of its truth and significance. We may call to mind here a central aphorism of *The Gay Science*:

New struggles. After Buddha was dead, his shadow was still shown for centuries in a cave—a tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown. And we—we still have to vanquish his shadow, too. ([1974b], §108)

Nietzsche's decree points to the importance of banishing Christianity's "cave," both metaphorically and in its concrete manifestations in the shrines at Jerusalem and elsewhere, in everyday Christian perspectives, in the visible Christian organizations, and even in our current calendar. If Nietzsche, following Voltaire's rallying cry, cannot "crush the infamy" ("*Ecrasez l'infâme!*" [1969a], p. 335), then two problems remain. First, Christianity will remain at least an object of nostalgia and yearning for some. Second, its "shadows," including liberal-democratic pluralism, will remain a concrete political possibility for all. If Nietzsche seeks to reclaim the earth, he must ultimately annihilate every vestige of Christianity that reminds us of its practice or its various "shadows," including liberal-democratic or religious sentiments. He must erase its story.

Leaving aside this primary necessity of Nietzsche's politics, we consider the secondary one; the demise of Christianity is hardly the crucial point, rumors of its imminence may be greatly exaggerated, and debating those rumors belongs, in any case, elsewhere for another time. But leaving Nietzsche behind on the secondary score is another matter. His impatience and the vituperation it calls forth are important caveats for those who find in his writings a discourse of emancipation from the ethics of resentment and transcendental egoism that silently and not so silently usher in a moral sadism that seeks not peacefully to engage, but to crush, regulate, and control its opponents. Nietzsche, after all,

displays a similar impetus in the face of his own mortality and the anxiety it produces. To overcome it, he thought, is rare and noble. Such overcoming may, therefore, not be available to the many: its heavy spiritual requirements—patience against resentment—may render doubtful its display in the wider circles of a liberal-pluralist polity. In this secondary way, we need not entirely “privatize” Nietzsche’s repugnant politics, leaving only a deconstructive remainder. Instead, we can render their problems and lessons publicly and politically useful, regardless of our evaluation of their primary characteristics. Such doubts about liberal democracy are not novel; deep suspicions that a stable rule of the many is possible, let alone desirable, permeates the tradition of political philosophy from Plato to Machiavelli, to Bodin and Hobbes, and to the founders of the American polity. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison attenuated their institutional solution for the insufficiency of the rule of the many with an implication that the bad character of the populace could overcome even the best of such arrangements ([1937], pp. 54, 337). Nietzsche reminds us along a similar register of the fundamental need for a (post- or pre-Nietzschean) nonresentful patience. Hence, to reverse our title, the political necessities of Nietzsche’s spirituality.

APPENDIX

Decree Against Christianity

Proclaimed on the day of salvation, on the first day of the year one

(—on September 30, 1888 of the false reckoning)

*War to the death against depravity: the depravity
is Christianity*

First proposition.—Every kind of anti-nature is depraved. The most depraved kind of human being is the priest: he teaches anti-nature. One does not have reasons against the priest, one has prison.

Second proposition.—Any participation in a worship service is an attack on public morality. One shall be more severe against Protestants than against Catholics and more severe against liberal Protestants than against the strict believers. The criminality of being a Christian increases in proportion to one’s proximity to science. The criminal of criminals is consequently the philosopher.

Third proposition.—The accursed place in which Christianity has hatched its basilisk eggs shall be razed to the ground and, as the vile place of the earth, be the terror of all posterity. Poisonous snakes shall be bred there.

Fourth proposition.—Preaching chastity is a public incitement to anti-nature. Any contempt of sexual life, any contamination of it by means of the concept “impure” is the actual sin against the holy spirit of life.

Fifth proposition.—Eating with a priest at the same table is forbidden: one thereby excommunicates oneself from honest society. The priest is our chandala,—he is to be condemned, starved, and driven into every kind of desert.

Sixth proposition—“Sacred” history shall be called by the name that it deserves, accursed history; the words “God,” “Savior,” “Redeemer,” “saint” shall be used as invectives, as criminal insignia.

Seventh proposition—The remainder follows from the preceding.

The Antichrist

NOTES

1. In a letter to Paul Deussen on Nov. 26, 1888, he went so far as to call *The Antichrist* his (entire) “Transvaluation of all Values.”

2. My English translation of this table of laws is included in the Appendix. To my knowledge, it is treated nowhere in the interpretive literature concerned with Nietzsche, with the sole exceptions of the purely philological treatment of Colli and Montinari in Nietzsche (1980), 14: 448–53, and Gary Shapiro’s brief analysis in Shapiro (1989), pp. 144–49. Shapiro integrates the Decree into Nietzsche’s account of his own life in *Ecce Homo*, and of his self-stated importance as a pivotal figure in the coming history of the post-Christian world. Colli and Montinari, who offer the best and most extensive philological treatments of both the Decree and of *The Antichrist* as a whole, conclude their careful philological consideration of this text and their justification for publishing it with the observation that we cannot with certainty determine what Nietzsche’s intentions were in writing the edict and then hiding it. They point out, however, that the sentiments it expresses are consistent with certain of Nietzsche’s apparent intentions in both *Ecce Homo* and *The Antichrist*. This consistency along with Nietzsche’s use of a sentence of the Decree in *Ecce Homo*, fragments in his *Nachlass*, and fragments in letters indicate the Decree is not merely a passing whim (Nietzsche [1980], 14: 450–53).

3. Connolly is perhaps the most nuanced of contemporary sympathetic interpreters of Nietzsche. He has noted the difficulty of conjoining Nietzsche’s own apparent elitism with an interpreter’s sentiments for a popular ethics. At the same time, he recalls Nietzsche’s own admission that “[s]ome folly keeps persuading me that every human being has this feeling [of awe toward the ‘whole marvelous uncertainty and rich ambiguity of existence’] simply because he is human.” Connolly does not find sufficient resources in Nietzsche’s work alone to carry through this enterprise of (re-)invigorating a liberal-democratic ethic. He suggests instead that we take a stance of “antagonistic indebtedness” toward Nietzsche, appreciating “the reach of Nietzschean thought as well as its sensitivity to the complex relations between resentment and the production of otherness,” but turning “the genealogist of resentment on his head by exploring democratic politics as a medium through which to expose resentment and to encourage the struggle against it.” The political outcome is a “radical liberalism” in which the modernist impetus toward normalization and universalization of the subject is contested on Nietzsche’s own genealogical grounds (Connolly [1993a], pp. 158, 169, 175; Nietzsche, [1974a], p. 2). In a similar manner, Bonnie Honig supplements Nietzsche’s genealogical investigations with resources critically obtained in the writings of Sandel, Arendt, and Kant, among others, even as she points to Nietzsche’s “reverence of agonistic institutions” as an aid for stabilizing his otherwise “wild-eyed” politics (Honig [1993b], p. 529; Honig [1993a], pp. 69–75).

4. In “The Greek State,” Nietzsche points to the Christian approval until the modern era of a need for slavery and subordination to maintain a healthy political-cultural order (1980, 1: 769).

5. Nietzsche (1980), 12:2(123); cf. Nietzsche (1974b), §357; (1969b), vol. 3, §27. Here again, I depart from Warren’s interpretation that Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism is the product of social or political powerlessness. That may be *one* original impetus toward nihilism, but nihilism is for Nietzsche ultimately a conceptual-aesthetic complex that does have socio-political overtones and implications, but that does not correlate directly with these latter occasions.

6. I would point to the work of Thiele (1990a) and again, Nehamas (1985) as pertinent examples. Thiele points to a similar sublimation in Foucault’s work (1990b), pp. 907–25; cf. Johnson (1991), pp. 581–84, with Thiele’s reply, pp. 584–91.

7. "Or, to speak more clearly and coarsely: synthetic judgments *a priori* should not 'be possible' at all; we have no right to them; in our mouths they are nothing but false judgments. Only, of course, the belief in their truth is necessary, as a foreground belief and visual evidence belonging to the perspective optics of life" (1974a, §11).

8. Nietzsche (1986a), 3: 242–44, 296–97, 300. See also Nietzsche (1986a), 3: 250–51, 262, 277, 292, 255–56, 279–80, 288–89, 258–59; Rohde and von Gersdorff both shared his enthusiasm and encouraged him to continue work on the lectures; Gersdorff even copied out the lectures by hand for his own personal use (Nietzsche [1986a], 4: 132–34, 138–40, 141–43).

9. Nietzsche (1986a), 3: 281–82, 302–4. In his notes from this time, we find the lectures listed together with "Philosophy in the Tragic Age" and *The Birth* as part of a conceptual and thematic whole ([1980], 7: 3[22]).

10. Nietzsche (1980), 7: 8(83, 84). The reference to Aristotle seems to be directed to his mention of esoteric and exoteric studies in his *Politics* and elsewhere. Cf. Aristotle (1984), pp. 9–10.

11. On the binding intricacies of such resentment, see Brown (1993), pp. 390–410. Brown suggests that even though people could be free *not* to will resentfully, their historical rootedness makes them incapable of envisioning such possibilities.

12. Nietzsche (1967b), §765. A kind of "Christianization," as it were, of Nietzsche's thought may, therefore, be observed in Connolly's description of his and Foucault's universalizing enterprises: "This model [of the interiorization, spiritualization, and universalization of the overman] is implicitly suggested by Foucault when he eschews the term 'overman' (as well as 'will to power') and shifts the center of gravity of Nietzschean discourse from heroes and classical tragic figures to everyday misfits such as Alex/Alexina and Pierre Rivière. These textual moves are, I think, part of a strategy to fold Nietzschean agonism into the fabric of ordinary life by attending to the extraordinary character of the latter" (Connolly [1991], p. 187; cf. Connolly [1993b], p. 138).

13. Nietzsche claimed that he presented to his readers a vision, not an ideal ([1969a], pp. 217–19, 236–40). That he continued to take seriously the physiological component of the so-called life of the mind may be seen in his many dietary, geographical, and recreational recommendations in the second section of *Ecce Homo*.

14. This is not the only way to come to my conclusions. Milbank's critique of the metanarrative and metaethics behind Nietzsche-inspired deconstruction is another (Milbank [1990], pp. 278–325). I have merely allowed Nietzsche more clearly to speak, as it were, for himself.

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