

Interpretation

A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Winter 1997

Volume 25 Number 2

- 155 Robert D. Sacks The Book of Job: Translation and Commentary on Chapters 30 and 31
- 181 Tucker Landy Philosophy, Statesmanship, and Pragmatism in Plato's *Euthydemus*
- 201 Gary B. Herbert Fichte's Deduction of Rights from Self-Consciousness
- Review Essay*
- 223 Walter Lammi On Catherine Zuckert's *Postmodern Platos* and the Strauss-Gadamer Debate
- 249 Catherine Zuckert Response to Walter Lammi
- Book Reviews*
- 257 Francis Canavan *Collected Essays*, by Ernest L. Fortin
- 265 Adam Schulman *Francis Bacon and the Project of Progress*, by Robert K. Faulkner
- 271 John S. Waggoner *Tocqueville's Civil Religion*, by Sanford Kessler
- 281 Scot J. Zentner *Arguing About Slavery*, by William Lee Miller
- 289 Will Morrisey *De Gaulle*, by Daniel J. Mahoney

Interpretation

- Editor-in-Chief Hilail Gildin, Dept. of Philosophy, Queens College
Executive Editor Leonard Grey
General Editors Seth G. Benardete • Charles E. Butterworth •
Hilail Gildin • Robert Horwitz (d. 1987) •
Howard B. White (d. 1974)
- Consulting Editors Christopher Bruell • Joseph Cropsey • Ernest L. Fortin •
John Hallowell (d. 1992) • Harry V. Jaffa •
David Lowenthal • Muhsin Mahdi • Harvey C. Mansfield
• Arnaldo Momigliano (d. 1987) • Michael Oakeshott
(d. 1990) • Ellis Sandoz • Leo Strauss (d. 1973) •
Kenneth W. Thompson
- International Editors Terence E. Marshall • Heinrich Meier
Editors Wayne Ambler • Maurice Auerbach • Fred Baumann
• Michael Blaustein • Amy Bonnette • Patrick Coby •
Elizabeth C' de Baca Eastman • Thomas S. Engeman
• Edward J. Erler • Maureen Feder-Marcus •
Pamela K. Jensen • Ken Masugi • Will Morrisey •
Susan Orr • Charles T. Rubin • Leslie G. Rubin •
Susan Shell • Bradford P. Wilson • Michael Zuckert •
Catherine Zuckert
- Manuscript Editor Lucia B. Prochnow
Subscriptions Subscription rates per volume (3 issues):
individuals \$29
libraries and all other institutions \$48
students (four-year limit) \$18
Single copies available.
Postage outside U.S.: Canada \$4.50 extra;
elsewhere \$5.40 extra by surface mail (8 weeks
or longer) or \$11.00 by air.
Payments: in U.S. dollars AND payable by
a financial institution located within the U.S.A.
(or the U.S. Postal Service).

THE JOURNAL WELCOMES MANUSCRIPTS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS WELL AS THOSE
IN THEOLOGY, LITERATURE, AND JURISPRUDENCE.

CONTRIBUTORS should follow *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 13th ed. or manuals
based on it; double-space their manuscripts, including notes; place references in the
text, in endnotes or follow current journal style in printing references. Words from
languages not rooted in Latin should be transliterated to English. To ensure
impartial judgment of their manuscripts, contributors should omit mention of their
other work; put, on the title page only, their name, any affiliation desired, address
with postal/zip code in full, E-Mail and telephone. Contributors using computers
should, if possible, provide a character count of the entire manuscript. Please send
FOUR clear copies, which will not be returned.

Composition by Eastern Composition, Inc.,
Binghamton, N.Y. 13904 U.S.A.
Printed and bound by Wickersham Printing Co.,
Lancaster, PA 17603 U.S.A.

Inquiries: (Ms.) Joan Walsh, Assistant to the Editor
INTERPRETATION, Queens College, Flushing, N.Y.
11367-1597, U.S.A. (718)997-5542 Fax (718) 997-5565

E Mail: interpretation_journal@qc.edu

Philosophy, Statesmanship, and Pragmatism in Plato's *Euthydemus*

TUCKER LANDY

Kentucky State University

Perhaps the oddest of Plato's dialogues, the *Euthydemus* shows Socrates carefully observing, sometimes refuting, but most often patiently submitting to, the absurd verbal trickery of two unimpressive sophists, Euthydemus and his older brother, Dionysodorus. Though his treatment of them is palpably and unfailingly ironic, we cannot help wondering why Socrates seems willing to participate in their ridiculous display. The action of the dialogue before us actually takes place on the day following the display. It is arranged as a conversation between Socrates and his old friend Crito, who was also present at the display but unable to hear because of the crowd that had gathered. Not only does Socrates describe the display to Crito with a level of detail that comes only from close attention (see 272d–e, also 283a), but he even tries to get Crito to join him in attending the sophists' classes. Why does Socrates show such fervent interest in them?¹

There are, I believe, philosophical reasons for Socrates' interest, which we shall touch upon later, but the main focus of this essay will be on the reasons for Socrates' apparent protectiveness of the sophists, which we see portrayed most vividly at the end of the dialogue. There Socrates defends the sophists against an attack (which Crito feels is important enough to relate to him) by a nameless speechwriter who happened to be present at the display. In his report, Crito explains that he himself made a token effort to defend the pair, saying to the speechwriter, "But nonetheless philosophy is a charming thing, at least" (304e). The speechwriter, however, continued his abuse, blaming "philosophy" as good for nothing. Socrates offers no objection to Crito's or the speechwriter's use of the term "philosophy" to describe the display of the sophists; in fact, he even uses the term himself in defending the pair. Evidently, then, Socrates sees himself as defending philosophy when he defends the two sophists from the speechwriter's attack, at least in the presence of Crito. Indeed, Socrates' comportment throughout the dialogue, odd as it sometimes seems, begins to make more sense when understood as guided by this desire to protect philosophy from the speechwriter or, to be more precise, from a potentially threatening alliance between Crito and the speechwriter. The author of the dialogue, Plato is surely not concerned about Crito or this nameless speechwriter, whoever he may be, as individuals; more likely he is concerned about a potentially threaten-

ing alliance between the two classes of people that Crito and the speechwriters represent.

The nature of the threat posed to philosophy by the speechwriters is explained in a crucial part of Socrates' response to Crito's report:

[These speechwriters] are the ones, Crito, who Prodicus said were the border ground between the philosophical man and the political man; and they suppose that they are the wisest of all human beings, and not only that they are but that they are thought so by very many, so that none but those concerned with philosophy prevent them from being well thought of by all. Consequently, they think that when they can bring these others to a status of worthlessness, the victory prize for the reputation of wisdom will be accorded by everyone without debate to them. For they think that they are in truth the wisest, but whenever they are caught up in private conversations, they believe they are cut off by those connected with Euthydemus. (305c–d)²

The speechwriters, Socrates adds, have dabbled in philosophy and in politics and, “being outside risks and struggles, pluck wisdom like a fruit.” Neither involving themselves directly in political affairs nor striving after knowledge for its own sake, the speechwriters offer a brand of wisdom that is limited to what society considers useful. Insofar as they attack philosophy and present themselves as having obtained the highest form of wisdom, we can imagine that they do indeed pose a threat to philosophy. They might reinforce the public animosity frequently directed against philosophers in the ancient world or they might at least entice away from philosophy some of its most promising devotees. People like Crito, who are well disposed toward philosophy but who are of a mundane disposition, are likely to find the pragmatic wisdom of the speechwriters appealing.³ Since the Critos of the world are the principal sponsors of learning, the threat to philosophy that could come from an alliance between these two classes of people is quite clear.

The lessons of this dialogue reach beyond the conflicts between ancient schools of philosophy and speechwriting and beyond concerns about the patronization of learning. They bear on the ever important questions of the role of philosophy in society in general, on the relation between theory and praxis, on the founding ideas of modern science (I am referring to the proto-pragmatism of Bacon and Descartes), and on the nature of higher education in general. Without addressing any of these huge subjects in this essay, I hope it will become apparent that the *Euthydemus* has more to say about them than has been appreciated hitherto.

Why Crito and then Socrates include Euthydemus and Dionysodorus among the followers of philosophy (the speechwriters, on the other hand are distinguished from philosophers) is not addressed explicitly. What we can gather from the dialogue as a whole, however, suggests that for Crito—and for Socrates in this dialogue—philosophy is distinguished, not by any set of doctrines or

rigor of method, but above all by its tendency to view wisdom as having value independently of whatever public reputation or political power it may bring. Those, like Euthydemus, who practiced the eristic art also showed this apolitical tendency.⁴ It is precisely this apolitical tendency among the devotees of wisdom that Socrates (and Plato) wishes to protect, I believe, especially against those who would disparage philosophy in favor of learning that purports to be useful in ways that nonphilosophers can understand.

Strangely, however, protecting philosophy and its apolitical tendency requires practical intelligence of a sort that resembles in some ways the skill of statesmanship. Plato portrays Socrates in the *Euthydemus* as a consummate master of this kind of skill. Thus, while Socrates was disinclined to participate in ordinary politics himself (see *Apology* 31c–e), he does nevertheless show in this dialogue a marvelous prudence in managing the conflicting interests and concerns of the various characters that appear in it. Socrates' brand of statesmanship, however, if we may use this term here to describe Socrates' skill in managing the discussion, does not serve the welfare of Athens or any city, but of philosophy. Since the ends of philosophy are higher and more difficult to comprehend than the mundane ends of ordinary statesmanship (see Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1112b), the philosophical statesmanship of Socrates is necessarily hard to comprehend, especially for nonphilosophers like Crito.

The characters Plato has chosen and the way he has arranged the action of the dialogue, then, become more intelligible if they are understood in relation to the concern Plato has about the threat to philosophy posed by the speechwriters and their efforts to persuade others of the greater value of their wisdom. In order to show this, I shall first treat the main characters that appear in the dialogue and point out how their roles relate to this concern, so I shall examine the roles of Crito, the sophists, and Ctesippus in that order. Then I shall discuss the two conversations that Socrates has with young Clinias, since the outcome of these conversations reveals why philosophy and statesmanship have radically divergent ends and why the attempt to combine them necessarily results in a corruption of one or the other activity. At the end of the essay, then, I shall look more closely at Socrates' critique of the speechwriters and his final exchanges with Crito in light of what we learn from our analysis of the dialogue.

CRITO

We know from the dialogue that bears his name that Crito is very concerned about his reputation among the many (see *Crito* 44b–d); the same characteristic appears in the *Euthydemus* (see 272b and 305b). Crito, let us say, is the quintessential demotic man, decent, for the most part, but lacking in spirit and intellectual energy. His ambitions seem to be roughly those of upper-middle-class Athenians. He is not a complete Philistine, for if he were, he could never be

friends with Socrates. Indeed, he seems to admire Socrates and certainly respects his wisdom (see 272d and 304d), but his main interest is in making money (304c). In the *Euthydemus*, however, Crito is for the moment preoccupied with the education of his son, who is not turning out to be the splendid gentleman he had hoped for (271b, 306d–307a), and he seems to want Socrates to help him decide how to proceed. This is no doubt the reason why he is willing to hear Socrates' lengthy account of his conversation with the two educators that have come to town. But Socrates does not prove very helpful to Crito here. This reluctance to help is central to the meaning of the dialogue.

Socrates does not practice philosophy for the good of society or even for the good of close friends like Crito. Indeed, the *Euthydemus* shows Socrates determined to protect philosophy, not only from those who would revile or slander it, but also from well-meaning admirers, like Crito, who would like to see philosophy become useful to themselves. One of the more important conflicts between the personal concerns of the demotic man and the broader concerns of the philosopher relates to the purpose of philosophical education: What end does it serve? Does it aim at making good citizens or at the advancement of knowledge for its own sake? Can the two ends be brought together, or is there something fundamentally incompatible between them?⁵ If its ultimate aim is the advancement of knowledge for its own sake, how much obligation does philosophy have to educate any but those with the greatest capacity for advancing philosophy? Perhaps philosophy should not degrade itself by taking pains to convince the world of her usefulness. Perhaps the only obligation of philosophy is to appeal to those capable of appreciating it. On the other hand, philosophy must recognize its debt to the public that has little if any appreciation for it: without society, there can be no philosophy. It is to people like Crito, the moderately educated—and wealthy—segment of the demos, that speechwriters appeal in their bid for wisdom and for the chance to educate the young. Socrates' task, in this dialogue, will be to induce in Crito the proper respect for the activity of philosophy, understood as the love of wisdom for its own sake, an activity which Crito is not fully capable of comprehending or appreciating. We shall not see Socrates dealing frankly or philosophically with Crito, but rather in a polite though somewhat high-handed manner.

The dialogue is entitled *Euthydemus*, but we learn from Crito's opening exchanges with Socrates that not one, but two sophists are offering their services to the young. Crito asks, "Who [singular form] was it, Socrates, whom you were speaking with yesterday in the Lyceum?" Crito says he had trouble hearing the conversation because a great crowd had gathered, but he caught a glimpse and saw, he believed, some stranger. Socrates explains that there were two strangers taking part in the conversation, not one. It turns out that Euthydemus, for whom the dialogue is named, is the one Crito saw (271b). The two sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, have come as a team, but one of them seems to have made a significantly greater impression on Crito, who was ob-

serving from a distance. In fact, Euthydemus, the younger of the pair (283a), appears slightly superior in debating skill to his older brother. One incident makes this especially clear. Late in Socrates' narration, while Socrates is debating with Dionysodorus, Euthydemus interrupts and rebukes Dionysodorus for spoiling the argument, causing Dionysodorus to redden (297a). Crito's initial impression that only one sophist was making a display, then, is not entirely without cause. Now, the sophists claim to be able to teach virtue or excellence most splendidly and quickly (273d). Presumably, the sophists themselves have this virtue which they can convey to others, but they do not seem to have acquired it to the same degree. The sophists advertise that a person's "nature" will not prohibit anyone from easily acquiring the wisdom they offer (304c), but the difference in skill observable in Euthydemus and Dionysodorus suggests that their art cannot in fact overcome natural inequalities.

This problem is of some importance to Crito, who declares his concern for his son at the beginning of the dialogue. He noticed that between Socrates and the stranger, who turned out to be Euthydemus, sat Axiochus' boy, Clinias (271b). Clinias, he says, seemed to be about the same age as his own son, Critobulus. Clinias, however, has grown up impressively and is a gentleman in appearance; Critobulus is still puny.⁶ He does not ask Socrates to undertake Critobulus' education, perhaps because he knows that Socrates would have already made an effort himself had he been so inclined. Socrates is always eager to talk to certain young men. In any case, Crito seems to be wondering whether Euthydemus might offer an education that could help his son. By the end of the dialogue, Crito, disappointed by Socrates' account of the conversation with the sophists, wonders whether anyone can help. He says that especially when he is with Socrates, he feels he has neglected the education of his sons, but he does not know how to turn them toward philosophy (306d–307a). Socrates says nothing explicitly to discourage Crito from thinking that philosophy might indeed help his sons become more impressive, more like gentlemen. On the other hand, he does not offer any guarantees to Crito that it will help. Socrates' interest in Clinias and his disinclination to help Critobulus would seem to imply that for Socrates the important question in philosophical education is not, as Crito believes, how philosophy can help others, but rather who can best serve philosophy.

As it turns out, Socrates would very much like Crito and his sons to enroll in the sophists' class with him, but the reason Socrates gives for doing so has little to do with Crito's or his son's education. Socrates wants to take lessons himself (272b). The reasons for Socrates' interest in the sophists will be taken up shortly; for now we shall remain focused on Crito. Now Crito is a little shocked; he asks Socrates if he is not too old for this sort of thing. Crito, again, is concerned about appearances. Socrates seems (deliberately?) unaware of the importance of such matters and answers Crito as though the only question with respect to age is whether an old man would be fit to take on and master a new

skill. With respect to appearances, Socrates is concerned only about bringing disgrace upon the teachers and so rendering them unwilling to teach. To mitigate this danger, he hopes to persuade some other elderly men to join him, as he has done in the case of his harp teacher. Socrates asks Crito to bring his sons along as bait: the sophists will, it is hoped, accept old men in order to get the younger ones.⁷

Socrates, then, has come up with a proposal to help himself and his friend. It will afford Socrates a smoother entry into the classes he wants, and it will afford Crito a chance to educate his sons. For the moment, the philosopher and the demotic man have reached an accommodation and seem to have found some use for each other.⁸ We must watch to see whether this accommodation can be sustained.

EUTHYDEMUS AND DIONYSODORUS

The next task is to try to understand why Socrates shows so much interest, at least in the account he gives to Crito, in the pair of sophists that have come to town. This will help us see the contrast between Socrates and Crito, or between the aims of the philosopher and the aims of the demotic man.

To Crito's query about the sophists (271c), Socrates replies that they were originally from Chios, left for Thurii as colonists, but later fled from there and since have spent many years in these parts. They are rootless, traveling sophists like their older contemporaries Protagoras and Gorgias. They had apparently visited Athens before and had professed to teach all the skills of war and courtroom speechwriting, arts of unquestionably practical value. This time, however, they have something new to offer. In describing this new skill of the sophists to Crito for the first time, Socrates represents it as an addition to their other practical skills, an addition that somehow completes their mastery of the "all-around fighting art" (*pankratiastike techne*, 272a): they can now refute anything said whether it be true or false. At this point in the dialogue, while Socrates is trying to persuade Crito to enroll in the classes, a presentation that emphasizes the practical bent of their wisdom seems quite suitable.

Later, however, while describing his introduction of the sophists to young Clinias, we get a slightly different picture of the relation of their newly acquired art to what they had possessed previously. Socrates explains that he presented them to Clinias as teachers of the art of generalship and courtroom self-defense (273c). But the brothers proclaimed with a laugh that they now considered these arts pastimes; they presented themselves this time as teachers of *arete*. Perhaps we see now why Socrates claims, at least, that his "customary sign, the *daimonion*," stopped him from leaving the Lyceum before the sophists had arrived (272e). The brothers professed to teach not just some particular set of skills, but human excellence, presupposing, it seems, that the ability to refute

anything said, “whether it be true or false” (272a–b), is what makes an excellent human being. It is not impossible to imagine Socrates finding this presupposition worthy of investigation. What doctrines did they adhere to that could make them believe such a thing? Furthermore, the apparent contempt in which the sophists held such eminently useful and honorable arts as military science and speechwriting must have given Socrates reason to marvel. They seemed to possess something they considered of far greater value than what the many esteemed and what the two sophists themselves had valued highly not long before. They apparently considered *arete* to be something above and apart from what are usually considered the highest political skills.

Socrates’ treatment of the sophists was of course ironic, and it was not difficult for him to identify the snares in their arguments. His continuing interest in them and his current efforts to enroll in their classes seem to come from a desire to uncover their secret doctrines. Perhaps he assumes that when he becomes a paying student, he will have more leverage over them. Much of the conversation between Socrates and the sophists consisted for the most part in Socrates’ efforts to get at these doctrines.

The sophists, meanwhile, stubbornly refused to display anything but the skill with which they could befuddle their interlocutors. Eventually, Socrates discerned that something like the measure doctrine of Protagoras lay behind their sophistry. When Dionysodorus seemed to claim that contradiction is impossible on the grounds that one speaks only of what is and never of what is not (285–286b), Socrates replied:

How, Dionysodorus, do you mean this? For having heard this argument often and from many people, I always wonder. Those who followed Protagoras always made a lot of use of it as well as those still more ancient. To me it always seems to have a marvelous character and to overturn others as well as itself. And I imagine I shall be persuaded of its truth by you better than by anyone else. It is impossible to say anything false—is this the force of the argument? Or not? In speaking, one speaks the truth; or does not speak?

The sophists, though insisting on continuing their display, did not reject this account of their doctrines. Socrates’ interest in them, however, seems to have exceeded any interest he ever had in Protagoras.⁹

Perhaps the reason for Socrates’ interest has something to do with the commitment of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus to their peculiar brand of wisdom without regard to political reward or public recognition. Indeed, toward the end of his conversation with them, Socrates praised them precisely because they had no care for the many or for those of high repute, but only for those like themselves (303c). Socrates, it seems, admired, or at least wished to encourage, their esotericism and their refusal to prove the respectability of their art. He urged them to avoid public display, not, however, because such displays might

invite ridicule, but rather because their skill could be picked up quickly by listeners who would then give them no credit for their wisdom (304a).

At the end of the dialogue, Socrates defends Euthydemus and Dionysodorus from Crito's and the speechwriter's scorn, even as he seems to acknowledge the meagerness of the wisdom they offer. What distinguishes the two sophists from their detractors and why Socrates feels compelled to defend them will become clearer after we have studied the character and actions of another major player in the drama: Clinias' ardent admirer, Ctesippus.

CTESIPPUS

Standing as something like a mean proportional between the mundane Crito and the lovers of wisdom who have gathered for the display, the erotic Ctesippus helps us understand the vast distance separating the pragmatic concerns of the demotic man and the loftier concerns of philosophy. Ctesippus' eroticism moves him to participate in a contest for at least the appearance of wisdom, and this elevates him above the earthbound Crito. We even see him rise, under the goading of the sophists and the delicate manipulation of Socrates, to the level of appreciating, in a crude way, the intricacies of verbal snares (see 303a–b). In this dialogue, as in almost any Platonic dialogue, eros proves to be or to be related to, or at least to resemble, that force in human nature that compels the human soul to look beyond practical concerns toward all that is beautiful for its own sake. Plato's (and Socrates') attention to this force in human nature is one thing that distinguishes his understanding of wisdom from that of the speechwriters.

The difference between the erotic and unerotic souls is illustrated metaphorically in the physical arrangement of those present at the sophists' demonstration, an arrangement caused by the action of Ctesippus.¹⁰ Socrates explains that he told the sophists that all who did not possess virtue, which included himself, Clinias, Ctesippus, and all the other lovers of Clinias, would certainly want to possess it. Socrates was able, while saying this, to point to Ctesippus and the other lovers of Clinias because Ctesippus had gotten up, soon followed by the rest, and had placed himself opposite Socrates and the others, "wishing to contemplate (*theasasthai*) his favorite and at the same time being an eager listener" (274c). Thus was formed the crowded circle that prevented Crito from hearing what was being said. Outside the circle are Crito and the rest of the city of Athens. Inside were people united by the bond of eros or something very like eros. The followers of Clinias, including Ctesippus, were there because they admired Clinias' beauty; the followers of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus were there because they admired the virtue and wisdom of the two sophists. Socrates is evidently interested in this wisdom also, and the sophists are hoping to acquire or to increase a following of young, noble Athenians. They gathered, not

under the constraints of political exigencies, as the citizens of an assembly do, or even because they thought they could acquire knowledge that would be useful in public life at a later time, but because they wanted to have a share in something they considered noble and beautiful.

Perhaps the best way to see the difference between the spirit or atmosphere outside the gathering and the spirit inside is to compare the way Crito and Ctesippus reacted to Clinias' beauty and to the wisdom of the sophists. Upon seeing Clinias, Crito thought first of the problems with his own son. His interest in the wisdom of the strangers, then, is limited to the practical consideration of how much help they might be in educating Critobulus. By contrast, Ctesippus' erotic admiration of Clinias eventually moved him to participate actively in the conversations, if only to protect himself and his beloved from the attacks of the sophists. In his clumsy way, he showed himself willing and even eager to strive for at least the reputation of wisdom, not for the sake of public esteem or monetary gain, but only because it might make him more beautiful to Clinias.

If Ctesippus' eros elevates him above Crito, it falls far short of Socratic eros. The manner of Ctesippus' participation in the sophists' display and Socrates' response to him make this clear. Ctesippus was first stirred to intervene by something Dionysodorus said. This intervention added a note of gravity somewhat lacking in the conversation up until then, and it required considerable adeptness from Socrates to keep this new and welcome seriousness directed to the questions at hand and away from personal attacks. Dionysodorus asked Socrates if he was serious in wanting Clinias to become wise (283b). Socrates replied that he was amazingly serious. Dionysodorus pointed out that this meant that Socrates, along with the admirers of Clinias, wanted Clinias to be other than he was. This would mean that they wanted Clinias to be dead. What kind of friends and lovers could wish such a thing? It was then that Ctesippus interrupted and attacked Dionysodorus, no doubt hoping to show off his affection and protectiveness for Clinias. Perhaps, however, the sophists had struck a sensitive nerve in Ctesippus. In time, of course, Clinias will cease to be what he now is. He will eventually outgrow his youthful beauty; or if he becomes more virtuous and wise, he may cease to be in need of the benefits that Ctesippus could offer (cf. *Phaedrus* 239e–241d). Eventually, Socrates intervened in order to prevent the exchanges from becoming abusive, but he aimed his remarks specifically at Ctesippus, trying to calm him down (285a). Socrates suggested to Ctesippus that perhaps the sophists knew how to destroy someone who was in a bad way so as to reconstruct him in a good way (285a–b). If, Socrates added, the admirers of Clinias were unwilling to submit the boy to this treatment, he was willing to submit himself. In this way, Socrates showed Ctesippus that becoming virtuous might involve some drastic changes in one's character and way of life and that some risk was necessarily involved. In any case, we see that Socrates' eros is open to change in a way that Ctesippus' is not.

In his exchanges with Ctesippus, Socrates tried to tame him in order to avoid losing a chance to hear the sophists reveal their doctrines. If we follow the behavior of Ctesippus, we can see that Socrates did succeed in rendering him a little more docile and open to the sophists' novelties. Ctesippus interrupted twice more after his initial outburst (294b–d, 298b–300d). After the first of these interruptions, the sophists refused to respond because they believed they were being ridiculed. Ctesippus made no attempt to understand the philosophical grounds or consequences of their claims, trying instead to humiliate them, to no avail; but he avoided the abusive language that had prompted Socrates to intervene previously. In the second interruption, he had evidently changed his tactics. He had picked up enough of the eristic art from the conversations to be able to defeat them now and then at their own game. Growing excited on account of Clinias' presence, he caught Dionysodorus contradicting himself and laughed triumphantly, prompting his beloved Clinias to laugh as well. Socrates, however, was not laughing: "Why," he asked Clinias, "are you laughing at such serious and beautiful things?" (300e). Taken as mere irony, such a remark seems flat and ungraceful, unworthy of Plato's subtle artistry. Taken as something other than irony, such a remark would seem to show that these verbal games were to Socrates at least potentially serious, that is, they offered material for serious philosophical consideration.

The role of Ctesippus, then, serves to highlight and clarify the difference between the pragmatic and philosophic dispositions of Crito and Socrates, respectively, by showing the limitations of the former and serving as a foil for the latter. Ctesippus' behavior resembles that of the erotic Socrates insofar as his passion remains undeterred by practical considerations. Such passion, as we know from the *Phaedrus*, can elevate human beings to the realm of the noble as it renders them impatient with the merely practical. What is required in addition is the Socratic education of eros by means of philosophy.

SOCRATES' CONVERSATIONS WITH CLINIAS

We turn now to the two conversations Socrates had with young Clinias, conversations that interrupted for a while the displays put on by the sophists. Together, they suggest that the serious pursuit of wisdom probably contributes little to the practical improvement of human life and that, indeed, philosophy cannot remain true to itself if it submits to this pragmatic criterion of value. They also suggest that philosophy and statesmanship are each in some sense the highest of arts, but that they lack the precision and clarity of lower arts.¹¹ The results of these conversations, then, provide the philosophical basis for Socrates' critique of the vaunted wisdom of the speechwriters.

The first conversation with Clinias arose because Socrates was not satisfied with the way in which the sophists had attempted to meet the request he had

made of them to persuade Clinias to philosophize and to practice virtue (275a–b). Finding the sophists' display to contain little that was serious (278b–c), Socrates proceeded to show the sophists the kind of protreptic speech he would like to hear.

Socrates' first interrogation of Clinias ascended, like his famous conversation with Glaucon and Adeimantus, toward philosophy. This interrogation, however, did not issue in anything as shocking as the political doctrines of the *Republic*. It remained within the scope of demotic concerns; Socrates was merely trying to convince Clinias of the practical benefit of wisdom or knowledge in general. He did not explain to Clinias the long, arduous conversion of the soul toward a life of contemplating the ideas, so there can be no surprise that much of the argument proves to be shallow. That the alternative to a longer controversial argument is a shorter superficial one makes us wonder whether Socratic philosophy can fully accommodate demotic concerns.

After admitting his status as an amateur in the art of protreptic speech, Socrates began by eliciting from Clinias the admission that all human beings wish to prosper (278e). Following this, Clinias agreed that the possession of many good things would bring prosperity, among which are wealth, health, good birth, etc. After including the virtues of temperance, justice, courage, and wisdom, Socrates suddenly realized that they had overlooked "the greatest of goods," good fortune. But then he decided that if one had wisdom, one would not need good fortune: after all, he said, flute players are successful at flute playing; grammarians are successful at reading and writing; generally, wise pilots are successful in the dangers of sea voyages; and who would prefer to fight under an ignorant general rather than a wise one, or submit to an ignorant physician rather than a wise one? Thus, Socrates concluded, wisdom eliminates the need for good fortune. Of course, Socrates' arguments do not support his conclusion; they establish only that wisdom is better than ignorance in securing success.

Socrates then convinced Clinias that the mere possession of goods did not produce happiness; one also had to know how to use such goods beneficially. Wisdom, then, had to be sought at all costs (280b–282b). The question, said Socrates, was whether wisdom was teachable or came to human beings spontaneously, and to this Clinias replied that he thought it was teachable. Socrates was delighted, having been relieved by Clinias' assent from undertaking a lengthy investigation. Acquaintance with the *Protagoras* and the *Meno* makes us wary of Socrates' apparent endorsement of the supposition that wisdom is teachable. The immediate goal of persuading Clinias of the need to philosophize evidently overrode Socrates' concern for accurate reasoning.

In any case, Clinias seems to have come away from the first conversation with the conviction that enough of the right kind of knowledge can render the possessor self-sufficient. The practical benefit of philosophy was firmly established, at least as far as Clinias was concerned. We cannot help wondering,

however, whether Socrates has better arguments than these to support the conviction Clinias gained or whether he himself has doubts. The second conversation with Clinias brings the doubts to the fore.

We must first look at what transpired between the two conversations with Clinias in order to understand what gave rise to the more radical and farther reaching inquiry of the second. After the first conversation, the two sophists had made the suggestion, mentioned previously, that if Socrates and the lovers of Clinias were serious about wanting the young man to become wise, then they must have wanted him to die (283d). This was the suggestion that stirred Ctesippus to intervene and eventually prompted Socrates to volunteer himself to be operated upon by the sophists on the condition that they remake him into a virtuous man (285a–c). Socrates was apparently interested in the implicit proposal that human excellence can be reached only by abandoning life in some sense.¹² It is after all the pressures exerted by nature upon the living that give rise to what we have called the pragmatic concerns of the demotic man. These pressures, for many people, do not allow much time for a serious and considered investigation of the nature and order of these concerns. The philosopher must resist these pressures and so in this sense withdraw from life in order to investigate the ultimate end of all vital activity. It is at least consistent with this line of thought that Socrates eventually moves the conversation to a more radical inquiry into the nature of the good. This occurs in the second conversation with Clinias.

At the beginning of the second conversation, Socrates and Clinias reestablished that it is necessary to pursue wisdom, to philosophize, which is the acquisition of knowledge (288d). They also affirmed that knowledge of how to procure goods is of no advantage without being accompanied by the knowledge of how to use the goods gained. Apparently, said Socrates, they required the kind of knowledge that combined production and good use. The concept of use, of course, always implies some end for which the product is used as a means. Socrates took advantage of the relation of means to ends in order to push the investigation to the question of what the highest good could be.

Now something unusual happened, so unusual that it moves Crito to interrupt Socrates' narration. In what follows, then, we must keep track of three things: (1) the subject matter of the conversation between Socrates and Clinias, which he is now reporting to Crito, (2) the context of Socrates' exchanges with Crito, i.e., Crito's hope that Socrates can help him with his son, and (3) the relation between the two.

In the course of their conversation, Socrates and Clinias examined the two arts the sophists had professed to teach before they had acquired the art of eristic: speechwriting and generalship. Displaying now a remarkable, not to say implausible, degree of intellectual maturity and independence, Clinias rejected both of these arts on the grounds that those skilled in producing speeches or military victories do not necessarily know what to do with what they produce.

(This rejection recalls the sophists' earlier dismissal of such arts as pastimes at 273d. Both Socratic dialectic and Euthydemian eristic, therefore, aim at some good higher than the obvious practical benefits of such arts.) In supporting his rejection of generalship, Clinias said that generals handed over the people they caught in their military victories to statesmen, just as geometers, astronomers, and calculators handed over their discoveries to dialecticians, whenever some could be found that were not "totally mindless" (290c). In this way, statesmanship emerged as the only serious candidate for the supreme art that would make its possessor happy. Socrates shortens his account of how he and Clinias arrived at this conclusion (see 291b); much, then, is left out. In any case, by the end of the investigation, Socrates and Clinias no longer considered it essential that the knowledge they sought be capable of producing the goods it uses. Somehow they had abandoned the attempt to find a kind of knowledge that would render its possessor self-sufficient. They sought only for the knowledge that allows one to use goods properly. Already, then, they had lowered their expectations of philosophy and of the power of such knowledge.

Now, after a considerable period of silent listening, Crito bursts in. He cannot believe that Clinias is capable of such pronouncements (290e). Even Socrates is no longer certain who said the things he has been attributing to Clinias. He knows only that neither Euthydemus nor Dionysodorus said them. Given what we have heard from and about Clinias up to this point, we are inclined to agree with Crito's doubts. What, then, has happened, and what is the significance of this interruption?

The dialogue seems to be ascending to a peak. Socrates and Clinias were trying to pin down the art that would insure happiness, and they had arrived at the most comprehensive of practical arts, the art of statesmanship. To make the comprehensive nature of this art clear, they had compared it to the most comprehensive of theoretical arts, the art of dialectic (see *Republic* 531c–534c). Socrates was no longer engaging, it seems, in a merely protreptic speech, but in a serious investigation of the relation between theory and praxis, between knowledge and happiness. Now, in all likelihood, what actually happened was that Socrates himself made the arguments he has attributed to Clinias and that he merely elicited Clinias' agreement with them, just as he had been doing up until this point in the conversation. But while recalling the conversation to Crito, with his attention directed toward the substantive matters in front of him rather than toward who was speaking, it is not unreasonable that Socrates should neglect the matter of who said what at this point. Socrates, then, both the day before and now in front of Crito, seems to have been carrying on a conversation with himself, oblivious to the concerns or even to the presence of those around him. He has evidently forsaken his initial goal of persuading Clinias of the need to philosophize. The dialectical investigation has begun to take on a life of its own, as this playful remark by Socrates might be meant to suggest: "Tell me, mysterious Crito, was one of the superior beings there to

utter these things?" (291a). Here we see Socrates engaged in his main activity, and he is for the most part on his own.

Crito's interruption presents a marked contrast between his concerns and those of Socrates. Clinias' apparently extraordinary skill in argumentation has no doubt roused Crito's anxiety about his own son's lack of education, and this anxiety, which surfaces at the beginning and at the end of the dialogue (271b and 306d), has surely persisted throughout Socrates' account and has now moved him to interrupt. This break in the narration, I believe, serves to emphasize the extent to which Socrates has transcended the concerns of the demotic man. The ensuing conversation between Socrates and Crito shows how far apart these two worlds are.

Crito reveals his pragmatic nature with this comment: "I suppose that if [Clinias] said these things, he has no need of Euthydemus or anyone else for an education" (290e). Crito evidently believes one can finish one's education. This belief is probably fairly typical of the demotic man: after "completing" one's education, one should get out of school and make oneself useful to his family and to his fellow citizens in some honorable capacity. But this is certainly not Socrates' belief. We know from this dialogue that Socrates enrolled in classes with the harp teacher and that he is now apparently trying to enroll in classes with the sophists (272c–d). Crito can be persuaded of the value of learning only if he can see some tangible good coming from it. Socrates' devotion to wisdom is, by contrast, unconditional; and he is not at all apprehensive that no obvious practical benefit will result from its pursuit.

This difference is made more explicit by the ensuing conversation. Crito asks Socrates whether he and Clinias continued the search for the art that makes the possessor happy and whether they found it (291a). Socrates has disappointing news for Crito: they were altogether ridiculous, resembling children who chase after crested larks. Every time they thought they had at last seized upon the science, it slipped from their grasp. Since Euthydemus and Dionysodorus were not involved in Socrates' conversation with Clinias, it would appear that not just the eristic art of the sophists, but even the dialectic art of Socrates is in some sense ridiculous. More specifically, dialectic appears to be ridiculous to the extent that it does not seem to be able to reach its ultimate goal, the attainment of knowledge that renders the possessor happy—the knowledge of the good. If the dialectic art shares the property of ridiculousness with the eristic art, it seems to be superior, among other reasons, by virtue of the fact that its leading practitioner, Socrates, is aware of its ridiculousness. Socrates, unlike the sophists, does not profess any ability to teach virtue. In any case, it would seem that philosophy, even in the hands of Socrates, must prove disappointing to the pragmatic concerns and hopes of Crito and those like him.

Socrates' account of how he and Clinias arrived at the *aporia* reveals clearly how far apart the open-ended activity of philosophy is and must be from the goal-directed activity of statesmanship. As Socrates explains, they were consid-

ering the royal art, which they took to be identical with the statesman's art (291b–c). It seemed to them to be the supreme art; all other artisans hand over what they procure to the statesman because he alone knows how to use them, having command of the whole. Socrates next asked whether the monarchic art produces any effect. The monarchic art is unique, it seems, in using the products of the other arts in order to produce a comprehensive good. Socrates tells Crito that he and Clinias agreed that it did produce an effect, inducing Crito to agree as well. He appeals now to the examples of medicine and agriculture; the former produces health, the latter, food from the earth. What, then, does the monarchic art produce? Socrates, showing unusual impatience with Crito, does not give him time to reply: "Perhaps you are not quite ready to answer," he says (292a). Socrates, it seems, is not terribly interested in Crito's views, adding that he and Clinias were not ready with an answer either. But, he continues, the monarchic art must produce some good, which, as he and Clinias had agreed to before, must be some kind of knowledge. Crito's response is not enthusiastic: "Yes, so you told me" (292b). Socrates continues to distance himself from demotic concerns. He explains that since he and Clinias had scorned all the works usually said to belong to the political art, such as making citizens wealthy and free and safe from faction (292e and 292b), they could not define this knowledge any better than to say that through it one made others good by conferring it upon them, who would in turn confer it on others, and so on. In what respect this knowledge makes men good, Socrates explains, they could not say. Now Socrates speaks as though statesmanship were at one with philosophy in seeking the ultimate good for human beings. Indeed, at its best, statesmanship must be or stem from philosophy; that is the lesson of the *Republic*. How can a statesman be worthy of the name without having a thorough knowledge of the good? This a statesman must get, Socrates maintains in that work (473d–e), from philosophy. The *Euthydemus*, however, acknowledges what the *Republic* does not and perhaps cannot acknowledge, given the context in which the discussion with Glaucon and Adeimantus takes place: that philosophy might be unable to determine what the good is.¹³ Once this possibility is acknowledged, it becomes evident that statesmanship (in the ordinary sense of the word) and philosophy cannot be united in practice. Certainly, both philosophy and the political art aim at the comprehensive good; but the philosopher is free to leave the question open for as long as the investigation requires, even indefinitely. The statesman, on the other hand, is not. He must act, which means he must proceed as if he knew the good or at least as if he had a reasonably good idea of what it is. He cannot afford the philosopher's liberty when decisions have to be made. He will usually assume that it is one or more of the things scorned by Socrates and Clinias: making citizens wealthy and free and safe from faction (see 292b). Indeed, philosophy may be unable to comprehend the ultimate good, but the lovers of wisdom must be free from the necessity of having to assume what they do not know. If nevertheless philosophy, in its capacity as

protector of philosophy or as educator of potential philosophers, can be considered a kind of statesmanship (which seems to be one lesson of Plato's *Statesman*), it is distinguished from ordinary statesmanship by this freedom.

THE SPEECHWRITER

Now we are better able to understand Socrates' critique of the speechwriters at the end of the dialogue. The speechwriter represents that class of intellectuals who seem to have found a way to make the usefulness of their knowledge apparent to almost anyone. The harm to philosophy posed by such pragmatism now emerges into the open and becomes an explicit theme in the dialogue.

It is Crito who first mentions the speechwriter. After Socrates once again urges Crito to join him in taking classes with the sophists, Crito, showing reluctance to enroll, reveals that he has already heard about the display from the speechwriter (304c–305b), who gave a scathing report. Crito tells Socrates that he protested against the speechwriter's criticisms, saying, "But nonetheless philosophy is a charming thing, at least" (304e). Crito's respect for Socrates induces him to acknowledge that Socrates' activities, however useless and frivolous they might seem, must have some value. To him, the exchanges with the sophists probably resembled many other conversations he has heard Socrates having on matters of little practical importance, so he describes Socrates' conversation with the eristic artisans as "philosophy." But the speechwriter was much harsher than Crito: "Charming, blessed one? Good for nothing, I say." He added that Crito would have been ashamed to see his friend Socrates submitting willingly to the sophists. Crito tells Socrates that the speechwriter was wrong to disparage this business, but right to blame Socrates' lack of caution in conversing with such men in public.

Now Socrates reveals that he, too, had been thinking about speechwriters. Upon learning from Crito that the speechwriter was not an orator, but strictly a composer of speeches, Socrates replies, "Now I understand; I was just about to speak of these people myself" (305c). In fact, speechwriting was one of the subjects that arose during Socrates' second interrogation of Clinias (289c–290a), at which time it was rejected as a candidate for the supreme art. Was Socrates aware of the speechwriter's presence at that time? Was he also aware of Crito's meeting with the speechwriter, and did he shape his account of the sophists' demonstration with this in mind?¹⁴ In any case, Socrates explains that, according to his old teacher Prodicus, speechwriters are on the border ground between the philosopher and the statesman, dabbling in the affairs of each but avoiding their risks, but they believe they are the wisest of all. Only philosophers, among whom Socrates evidently includes Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, stand in the way of their universal renown. The speechwriters hope

to diminish the esteem for philosophy and so claim for themselves the prize of wisdom.

What Socrates means by this remark is only partly explained by the next exchange he has with Crito. The upshot of what he says is that when anything is compounded of two good things that do not have the same end, it is inferior to both of them (306a–d). The speechwriters, having a share of both philosophy and politics, could not admit that either activity considered separately is bad; they must admit that both are good. Therefore, they must admit that they themselves, participating in each only half way, are inferior to both. What needs to be added to this argument is an explanation of what the different ends of philosophy and politics are. We saw in Socrates' last conversation with Clinias that philosophy and politics differ precisely in the nature of their ends. The statesman's business must be conducted as though the usual ends of political action—peace, freedom, prosperity—goals which are understandable and acceptable to the demotic man, are indeed of intrinsic value, because political decisions must be made in a timely fashion. Philosophers, on the other hand, must have the leisure to pursue the theoretical question of what the good is, even going so far as to consider what freedom or peace are good for. Since, as we have seen, Socrates' dialectic may not be able to determine with any precision what the good is, Socrates welcomes the opportunity to discuss the subject of excellence and wisdom with anyone who professes to have a new idea. Each of these activities, that of the statesman and that of the philosopher, involves risks. The statesman's risks in any decision he makes are obvious. The philosopher's risks are obvious in one sense also: witness the fate of Socrates. Even apart from this, the philosopher risks losing all ethical bearings when he abandons accepted notions of what is good or bad in the pursuit of more reliable knowledge (see again 285b–c and 292e, 293a). The prospect of a politician adding the ethical risks of philosophy to the already formidable risks of statesmanship is dreadful. From this perspective, we can see that attempts to combine the goals of philosophy and statesmanship must result in either pragmatic restrictions on the range of questions philosophy can ask or debilitation of statesmanly resolve with philosophical doubt, a corruption of one or the other activity. Most likely, the speechwriters opt for the first of these alternatives but do not take any of the risks that statesmen take. This seems to be the implication of Socrates' remarks.

Socrates has taken the side of the "philosophers" Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, albeit with some irony, in their competition with the speechwriters. He evidently prefers such intellectuals because, in this circle, knowledge seems to be sought for no end beyond what takes place in the conversation. From Crito's point of view, on the other hand, the speechwriter's moderate involvement in philosophy and politics probably gives the speechwriter a stronger claim to the prize of wisdom. Crito can probably see no reason to condemn, and

indeed much to recommend, the speechwriter's endeavor to put some of the knowledge of the philosophers to what he considers good use (cf. Isocrates, *Antidosis* 264–78). Socrates, however, lends the weight of his considerable authority to the support of impractical, third-rate intellectual activity in order to upset the demotic man's inevitable tendency to prefer knowledge whose value he can comprehend. It is a mistake, then, to assume that Socrates' objections to sophistry come mainly out of a concern to protect society or the demos from the harm caused by careless, irresponsible teachers of rhetoric. His main concern, as always, is to protect philosophy from those who, for whatever reasons, try to diminish its prestige in favor of what they consider useful, be they sophists or the most respected citizens.

As the dialogue comes to a close, it descends to the level of the mundane. Crito returns to the problem which was in the back of his mind throughout Socrates' narration: what to do with his sons. He refers to the problem as an *aporia*, recalling perhaps Socrates' *aporia* reached at the end of the second conversation with Clinias concerning the nature of statesmanship and the ultimate good. Socrates' *aporia*, however, was philosophical; Crito's is personal. One of Crito's sons is still quite young, but his oldest son especially needs someone who could benefit him. When Crito is in Socrates' company, he explains, he feels it is madness to have taken care of his son's social and financial needs while neglecting his education. But everyone who professes the ability to educate seems, in his view, entirely unsuitable. The result is that he does not know how to turn his son toward philosophy.¹⁵ Socrates no doubt detects Crito's masked invitation to try a protreptic speech on Critobulus as he had done for Clinias, but Socrates does not answer this request, having judged, perhaps, that Critobulus is not worthy of such an effort. Instead, he rebukes Crito for not according philosophy the same treatment he accords to other arts he deems worthy of study: in spite of the abundance of poor teachers and the rareness of good ones in gymnastic, moneymaking, rhetoric, and generalship, Crito would not prohibit his son from getting involved in them; should he then prohibit Critobulus from finding mediocre teachers of philosophy? In a manner reminiscent of the end of the dialogue named after him, Crito replies, meekly, "No, that would be unjust, Socrates."

In the *Crito*, Socrates compels his old friend to respect the Athenian laws and to subordinate his immediate, particular concerns to their broader demands. Similarly, in the *Euthydemus*, Socrates compels Crito to respect an activity he is not competent to judge. Socrates bids him to let those who practice philosophy alone, whether they are helpful or useless, and to turn others away only when he has tested the matter thoroughly (which he evidently has not). If, Socrates adds, philosophy turns out to be such as he thinks it is, then Crito should boldly pursue and practice it himself along with his sons.

NOTES

1. Leo Strauss in "On the *Euthydemus*," in *Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 67–88, takes this question seriously. My essay is based in good part on the subtle but often puzzling observations contained in Strauss's paper.

2. Translations from Burnet's Oxford edition are my own.

3. I am not using the word "pragmatic" to refer to the philosophy of Pierce, but only to characterize the wisdom of the ancient speechwriters as having a practical rather than a theoretical orientation.

4. *Euthydemus* and Dionysodorus disparage courtroom speechmaking and generalship as side activities (*parergois*, 273d). See also 303c, where Socrates praises the pair for caring not at all about the many or about famous and important people, but only about their own kind. Aristotle distinguished the eristic men, who disputed for the sake of victory, from the sophists, who disputed for the sake of reputation with a view to making money (*On Sophistical Refutations* 171b).

5. The *Euthydemus* offers an important counterweight to the *Republic* in that it emphasizes the incompatibility of philosophy and politics. We shall see later that the *Euthydemus*, like the *Republic*, includes an ascent of sorts toward the good, except that in this dialogue, where no demands are placed on Socrates to vindicate justice, the good remains out of reach and even out of sight.

6. We know from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 1.3.8–13 that Critobulus was an admirer of Clinias. Are we to assume he was present among the band of Clinias' lovers during the display? Socrates does not even mention him. Of Clinias' lovers, only Ctesippus makes his presence felt. Perhaps Plato wished to indicate in this way that Critobulus was of no account.

7. It is likely that Socrates had already been accepted into the sophists' classes (see 304b–c). Why, then, does he need Crito's sons as bait? The most probable answer, it seems to me, is that he does not. Socrates is not being entirely straightforward with Crito. What he needs most of all from him is tuition money.

8. One cannot help noticing the parallels and the differences with the situation in the *Crito*, whose dramatis personae are the same as those in the *Euthydemus*. (Leo Strauss alludes to this link in his essay.) In the *Crito*, Socrates discourages his old friend from spending money to get Socrates out of prison; in the *Euthydemus*, Socrates urges Crito to spend money to enroll the two of them in classes with the sophists. The *Crito* shows the philosopher instructing the demotic man about civic duties, justifying for him the execution of the philosopher ordered by the Athenian laws; the *Euthydemus* shows the philosopher attempting to make use of the demotic man to support an apparently frivolous philosophical activity. In both situations, the philosopher must determine whether and in what way the demotic man can help the philosopher. We also notice that Socrates' efforts in the *Crito* are successful: Socrates persuades Crito not to spend his money. The outcome of the *Euthydemus* is not so clear: Crito is reluctant to spend money on classes with the sophists (see 304c). It is evidently easier for the demotic man to be made to understand his dependence on and obligations to the city than to understand the value of philosophy.

9. Cf. *Protagoras* 310b, where Hippocrates, at the crack of dawn, excitedly announces to Socrates the arrival of Protagoras in Athens, and Socrates, still in bed, replies by asking if Hippocrates has just learned of this, since the great sophist had come two days ago.

10. I have this from Strauss, p. 71.

11. See David Roochnik, "The Serious Play of Plato's *Euthydemus*," *Interpretation* 18 (1990–91): 211–32.

12. In beginning his narration of this part of the sophists' display, Socrates says to Crito, "for the argument that the man began was something marvelous, and it is worth your hearing as an incitement to virtue" (283b). Strauss asks, "Did Socrates consider that philosophizing is learning to die?" (p. 78).

13. In the *Republic* Socrates is pressed to show that the just life is superior to the unjust life, which requires him to show that philosophical kingship is workable. In the *Euthydemus*, Socrates has himself initiated an investigation into the kind of knowledge that would insure happiness. Even

in the *Republic*, however, Socrates repeatedly protests his ignorance of the good, but these protestations are brushed aside by his demanding interlocutors (see 505a–507a).

14. Socrates' pointedly ironic treatment, during his second interrogation of Clinias, of the art of speechwriting lends some credence to this reading (see 289d–290a). At the end of the dialogue, Socrates asks Crito to explain whether it was an orator or a composer of speeches that had spoken to him (305b), but this question does not necessarily imply that Socrates was unaware of his presence. It may only mean that representatives of both intellectual camps were present at the display and that Socrates was not sure which of these had given the report to Crito, or that Socrates was not being straightforward with Crito.

15. Perhaps Crito was concerned that Critobulus might follow his beloved Clinias into lessons with Euthydemus and was hoping, perhaps with Socrates' help, to encourage his son instead to seek lessons from the anonymous speechwriter. Socrates' behavior toward the sophists and toward Crito could be seen as a deliberate attempt to divert the speechwriter's potential clientele.