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HUMAN EMANCIPATION AND REVOLUTION

NATHAN ROTENSTREICH

I

The concept of human emancipation was introduced by Marx as an antithesis to, and a synthesis above, the concept of political emancipation. Let us first look into a short text published by Marx in 1843, in which some of the concepts and their interrelations are explained.

First, Marx introduces the notion of emancipation in a very broad sense. It is not merely a negative situation of liberating an individual, or a group, from certain oppressions or restraints imposed on them as might be the case with Catholics in Great Britain or with Jews in Europe. The concept of emancipation carried in Marx, from the very beginning, a positive direction: "Every emancipation is a restoration of the human world and of human relationships to man himself."¹ Emancipation thus presupposes a focus and a root which are given ontologically and historically, that is to say, man himself. Emancipation removes the restrictions imposed on man by an external power which is in the first place a political power; but which is all the same the power of the historical and economic process. Emancipation is not just a liberation for the sake of certain rights, like the right in the legal and political sphere, or the right to worship. Emancipation is the restoration of the basis of human life, which is, according to Marx, man himself. Man himself contains within himself not only his inherent value but also the direction of his activities. That direction is the expression of the full man, and the full man is the non-specialized man, capable of

¹ We follow the English translation in: *Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy*, edited by T.B. Bottomore and Maximilian Rubel, Pelican Books, 1963, p. 241. Our analysis is based on what is known as Marx's Early Writings. This character of our analysis runs counter to "the epistemological chasm" supposedly existing between the Early Writings and the "mature" work of Marx. From the point of view of exploring Marx's philosophical view the Early Writings have the advantage of being rendered in the philosophical vernacular. The mature writings, as it were, presuppose that philosophical view in its substance and they adhere to the philosophical program that economic analysis replace philosophical theory, but it replaced it in the Hegelian sense as negating the theory while preserving it. On this issue as well as on the general problem discussed in the present paper consult: Shlomo Avineri: *Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*, Cambridge, 1971.

performing the whole spectrum of human activities without reaching the point where one line of his activity makes him forever clinging as a partial being to that line. It is in this sense that Marx presents his version of the *uomo universale* as hunting in the morning, fishing in the afternoon, etc., without ever becoming a hunter, a fisherman, or any other kind of continued identification between man and a specialized or confined activity.²

Political emancipation—as criticized by Marx—is not the restoration of the human world, and not the redemption of the full creativity of man. Political emancipation, as Marx has it, is “a reduction of man, on the one hand to a member of civil society, to an *independent* and *egoistic* individual, on the other, to a citizen, to a moral person.”³ Marx here attacks political emancipation as an ideal and as the achievement of the French revolution, because it falls short in terms of the restoration of the human world to man himself. The very split implied in the notion of political emancipation and in the reality shaped by that notion between the egoistic individual and the moral person is evidence to the fact that man in his totality has not been restored. Moreover, the duality sanctifies to some extent the split and eternalizes it. This criticism of the political emancipation is usually, and rightly, understood as a criticism of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* since Hegel presents a clear-cut distinction between Civil society on the one hand and the state on the other. Civil society in Hegel is related to particularity; it gives free rein in every direction to satisfy the needs of particularity and even accidental caprices and subjective desires.⁴ As against Civil society, the State is posited as what is called by Hegel the actuality of the ethical Idea.⁵ The essence and the end of the state is freedom.⁶ Though it is clear that Marx attacks Hegel, and his writings exhibit this in the most telling fashion, it seems to be a warranted surmise that he, knowingly or unknowingly, attacks Kant as well. Hegel makes a distinction between two levels of social existence: Civil society, on the one hand, and State proper on the other. Freedom is attributed to the state and not to the moral person directly. A person becomes a moral person through his participation in the state, but not directly or immediately *qua* person. This construction of levels is not characteristic of Kant. On the contrary, Kant sees Civil society as a combination and interaction of independent and egoistic individuals and citizens as moral persons. Let us quote, only by way of illustration, Kant’s Fifth

² *The German Ideology*, edited (without introduction) by R. Pascal, New York, 1947, p. 22.

³ Bottomore and Rubel, p. 241.

⁴ Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*, paragraph 185 in T. M. Knox’s translation, Oxford, 1942, p. 123.

⁵ *Ibid.* Paragraph 257, p. 155.

⁶ *Ibid.*

Thesis of his Essay "Idea For A Universal History From A Cosmopolitan Point Of View." The text reads as follows: "The greatest problem for the human race, to the solution of which Nature drives man, is the achievement of a universal civic society which administers law among men." Then Kant comes to give a more specific characterization of the civic or civil society, and the following is what he says: "Such a society is one in which there is mutual opposition among the members, together with the most exact definition of freedom and fixing of its limits so that it may be consistent with the freedom of others... Thus a society in which freedom under external laws is associated in the highest degree with irresistible power, i.e., a perfectly just civic constitution... They are forced to it by the greatest of all needs, a need they themselves occasion inasmuch as their passions keep them from living long together in wide freedom. Once in such a preserve as a civic union, these same passions subsequently do the most good." ⁷

We notice that Kant considers Civil society to consist of two different directions: one, that of mutual opposition among the members of that society, and another, that of freedom of the individual consistent with the freedom of others. The achievement of an equilibrium between these two trends, the trend of mutual opposition, on the one hand, and the trend of mutual recognition of freedom, on the other, is an honest human achievement, or, in Kant's own words, the most difficult and the last problem to be solved by mankind.⁸ Kant does not erect a superstructure of Statehood on top of Civil society; he views Civil society as a comprehensive sphere containing mutually antagonistic trends. If this interpretation is warranted (Marx himself quotes Rousseau and not Kant), then indeed Civil society is presented as containing a built-in split. Hence in Marx's view, political emancipation which creates Civil society cannot be considered as solving the final problem of mankind, since that problem is the restoration of the human word to man himself. Man himself initially and fundamentally is not a split being who conducts his life simultaneously and concurrently according to two conflicting norms, that of an egoistic individual and that of a moral person. Kant could assume this duality because Kant views man as a citizen in two worlds, the world of nature and sensuousness, and the world of ethics and rationality. The meeting of these two worlds is a lucky chance, and *a fortiori* cannot depend on bringing about a total coincidence between them; neither can it create a full totality.

It is because of the split implied in *political* emancipation that Marx introduces the notion of human emancipation: "Human emancipation

⁷ Included in *Kant on History*, edited and with an Introduction by Lewis White Beck, the Library of Liberal Arts, 1963, pp. 16-17.

⁸ *Ibid.* Sixth Thesis, p. 17.

will only be complete when the real, individual man has absorbed in himself the abstract citizen, when as an individual man, in his everyday life, in his work, and in his relationships, he has become a social *being*, and when he has recognized and organized his own powers (*force propre*) as *social* powers, and consequently no longer separates this social power from himself as *political power*.”⁹

In commenting on this very programmatic passage we have to observe *first* that the real man referred to is the man who has overcome the split between himself as an individual and himself as a citizen. This is rendered by Marx, “has absorbed in himself the abstract citizen.” Man is an abstract citizen in the Hegelian sense because he participates in a state which is detached and superimposed on Civil society; and he is an abstract citizen in Kant’s sense since his being-a-citizen coexists with his involvement in the mutual opposition among the members of the society. The real man is the ethical man who is a sensuous man as well. The *second* comment which we have to make is the following: Marx refers here to the individual man in his everyday life and he assumes a full conformity between man as an individual and man as a social being. He assumes that conformity. Man as a social being would be an ethical being in Kant’s (abstract) sense, unless his everyday life were both individual and social. Marx attempts, therefore, in the concept of human emancipation, to bring about a synthesis between individuality and sociality *without* being carried to the Kantian split or to the Hegelian edifice.

Our *third* comment is that the synthesis aspired to between individual man and social existence does not emerge spontaneously out of the resources of individual man. Marx refers specifically to the organizations of man’s own powers as *social* powers. We may presuppose here this general view that man is “*ein Gattungswesen*” but just the same, unless there is an organization, the individual forces do not carry with and in themselves the propensity to become harmonious forces safeguarding social existence. Unless the human forces are organized, they may evolve in the direction indicated by Kant, i.e. the opposition would co-exist with freedom. To overcome that coexistence and the contradiction between opposition and freedom, called for an organization. But, and this brings us to our *fourth* point: Social organization would not bring about the separation between social existence and political power, since political power is identical with Statehood in Hegel’s sense; or with the external laws in Kant’s sense. Here again, Kant’s Eighth Thesis in his Essay on Universal History is significant. Kant says that a perfectly constituted state is the only condition in which the capacities of mankind can be fully developed.¹⁰ Summing up Marx’s view we must come to

⁹ Bottomore and Rubel, p. 241.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

the following conclusion: human emancipation as the restoration of the human world to man himself is the organization of human powers as social powers which will not need political power as a superimposed authority.

II

Since social life proper, as distinguished from political life in the strict sense of the term, is organized, Marx faced the question of the relation between the spontaneity of man and the organized character of social life. He had to assume, following willy-nilly the classical tradition, that man is a universal creature, or, in his own words, that human nature is the true common life of man. Men, through the activation of their nature, create and produce a "human common life." This human common life is the essence of the nature of every single individual. Still the question remains: Is the common life an expression of human creativity, as, for instance, a folk song would be, or is there a striking and perhaps a strange identity between human nature and human needs? And, indeed Marx says that common life emerges out of the need and egoism of individuals; and thus it is not in man's power to decide whether this common life exists or not. We must understand the statement "not up to man" in a rather limited sense, i.e. not up to man in his reflection, decision, deliberation, since the latter would possibly connote the theoretical possibility that common life would not exist. Marx seems to assume here that authenticity and necessity coincide, as long as the necessity is rooted in human needs which can be concretely discerned. The fact that man has needs can be, according to him, reconciled with the view of attributing the human world to man himself. Thus the political organization, as distinct from the social organization, is criticized and calls for a revolution, because Marx distinguishes between human necessity grounded in needs, and compulsion imposed on men who do have needs and create common life because they are activated by those needs.

Why does Marx make this distinction between organized social life and organized political life, except for the reason that supposedly lies in the implicit distinction between necessity and compulsion? After all, it would be difficult to find an easy harmony between the concept of the whole man and the spectrum of his activities, and the notion of man as a needy being, whose needs call for satisfaction. One might say that satisfaction is implied or embraced in the scope of the whole man. But the satisfaction of needs related to food and shelter would be a different satisfaction from that of the "need" to create a Mona Lisa or to write *War and Peace*. Marx does not say that the need of an artistic character creates common life. He maintains that the need, in terms of satisfaction of primary needs, i.e. the economic need, creates common life. Thus he is bound to assume, even when we follow him

in his view of the whole man, a kind of hierarchy of needs, which amounts to granting primacy to basic needs, though they might not be the most lofty ones. And indeed, Marx's criticism of the political power or of the political State is related to his explicit and implicit assumption about the hierarchy of needs. When he says: "The *political revolution* dissolves civil society into its elements without revolutionizing these elements themselves... This revolution regards civil society the sphere of human needs, of labor, of private interests, and of civil law, as a *basis of its own existence*, as a self-subsistent condition and thus as its natural basis... Thus, man as he really is, is seen only in the form of *egoistic* man, and man in his *true* nature only in the form of the abstract citizen."¹¹ And further: "...man was not liberated from religion; he received religious liberty. He was not liberated from property; he received the liberty to own and acquire property. He was not liberated from the egoism of business; he received the liberty to engage in business."¹² What Marx really is saying can perhaps be summed up in the following way: (a) as against the egoism of needs distributed among all men, the egoism of business emerges which is an egoism of some men only; (b) that egoism destroys fundamental human mutuality and brings about exploitation which runs counter to mutuality, since it implies subjection of man to man instead of mutual adjustment between men. Here emerges the contradiction between the interest of the individual and that of the community. The latter takes an independent form as the State, divorced from the real interest of individual and community. This estrangement inherent in the State is at the same time an illusory communal life. "It follows from this that the struggles within the State, the struggle between democracy, aristocracy and monarchy, the struggle for the franchise, and so on, are merely the illusory forms in which the real struggles are fought out among one another...";¹³ (c) the shift from communal life in the true sense of the term to the State is both an illusion and a concealment. It is an illusion because the state is not a real entity, and as such it is based on a non-real entity, i.e. the *citoyen* as distinguished from the *bourgeois*. But just the same it is a concealment, since it creates a quasi-communal life; it shifts the interest to pseudo-problems of constitution and forms of rule or regime, diverting attention from real problems. The State as a camouflage is criticized by Marx as religion has been criticized by him as an opiate, since it diverts attention and concern from concrete life, and it allows hierarchy and subjection, the other side of the coin of the liberty, to engage in business; to go on while pretending to speak about liberty and crystallizing that liberty in statehood; (d) historically speaking, we may say that the whole distinction between the bourgeois and the *citoyen* is a façade or a front

¹¹ Bottomore and Rubel, p. 240.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *German Ideology*, p. 23.

for the natural state which persists within organized political life, though organized political life pretends to be based on the overcoming of the natural state. The Hobbesian description of the "natural State" comes back in a disguised form in the political State: clashes are present in the political State, though perhaps they are not grounded now in primitive impulses of men, but take shape in organized interests *qua* class interests. Institutions replace urges, but the outcome does not change in course of that replacement. The State, presented by Hobbes as a safeguard or the refuge against the violent death which threatens man in the natural state, is the safeguard for those interested in preserving the conflicts and exploiting them for their advantage. There is no neutrality of the sovereign, since the sovereign is an instrument in the pursuit of the business interests. It is for this reason that Marx maintains the clear-cut distinction between social life and political life; the first being based on mutuality, which as such carries with itself mutual adjustment and neutralization of interests, while the latter carries with itself the priority of one interest represented by one class over another interest represented by another class.

"So far as the State admits the existence of social evils, its attributes them either to natural laws, which no human power can change, or to private life, which is independent of the state; or to the inadequacy of the administration, which is dependent on it."¹⁴ The dissolution of the totality of life characteristic of political systems or states is expressed in the above passage. Instead of viewing the whole human life as embraced in one orbit, states remove certain aspects and push them to the orbit of nature, other aspects to the orbit of private life, and, insofar as there are deficiencies in the state proper, they are questions of administration and, as such, are of a technical character. Here again we see clearly that dismembering is the other side of the coin of the state; and dismembering is characteristic of the natural state in Hobbes, while the pretense of the political state (as Marx analyzes this) is to bring about cohesion. It conceals this dismemberment which inheres in the State and to which the State gives a constitutional and ideological imprimatur.

Human emancipation as opposed to *political* emancipation is, then, the restoration of the human world to man himself. This would mean the abolition of the dismembered character of political life and the abolition of political power, since the political power as estranged from man, embodies the gap between man and his world. Moreover, political existence serves the trend and the interest to suppress man's aspiration to "come back" to himself and to create the human world in the true and authentic sense of that term.

¹⁴ *Marx-Engels' Werke*, Vol. I, Berlin, 1965, p. 401 (the quotation in its English version from David McLellan, *Marx before Marxism*, Pelican Books, 1972, p. 206).

It is because of this consideration that Marx combines the two terms (or notions) "radicalism" and "revolution." To be "radical"—and this is a well-known statement—is to grasp things by the root; *but* for man the root is man himself. Thus radicalism is identical with the aspiration toward human emancipation, as that emancipation intends to restore the world to man himself who is the root of himself. Radicalism would connote the direction while emancipation would connote the achievement. And, indeed, in his Introduction to the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*, Marx says that a radical revolution can only be a revolution of radical needs. These needs are apparently the needs described as composing social existence, and they in turn are suppressed, overshadowed or subjugated by the political existence.

Summing up this part of our analysis, the following can be said: The objective is a whole *and* a wholesome human existence. Political emancipation does not conform to that objective, since by its very nature it splits man into a *bourgeois* and a *citoyen*. Moreover, it pretends, or assumes the mask, of expressing the position of the *citoyen*, whereas in actual fact it serves the needs of the *bourgeois*. The State *as such* has to be abolished because it is grounded in the notion of the *citoyen* and in all the consequences of that notion. This criticism raised against the State is twofold: (a) that it represents an abstraction from the real man; and (b) that its abstract character is eventually a disguise, since, concretely speaking, the abstract character of the State is an instrument of the needs of the *bourgeois*. Marx attacks both the abstraction *per se* and the betrayal which assumes the posture of abstraction. The State is not an abstraction; it is an instrument of power.

III

Let us start with what is perhaps the most elementary aspect of Marx's position, i.e. the instrumental character of political power. There can be no question that political power is an instrument, or can be an instrument, for the preservation and cultivation of particular interests. When a government subsidizes, and continues to subsidize, farmers in order not to produce crops, it surely serves the interests of a certain class of the population. This subsidy, when it goes on, even when the products are needed, enhances the character of the State or political power as a tool subservient to interests. Even when we grant that there are many lobbies, and the state can serve simultaneously many interests, including conflicting interests, the instrumental character of political power cannot be obliterated. Yet historical experience, since Marx wrote his vehement attacks on the State as being an instrument *ex definitione*, shows that political power can be employed in different directions. The example of England is a very telling example in this context, since the participation through universal suffrage in the political process eventually resulted in

the concept and the reality of the Welfare State, which indeed entails certain ingredients of the conversion of the State into an instrument for the satisfaction of human needs related to labor or old age; and thus not only bourgeois needs related to ownership of means of production and aggrandizement of income. But a Welfare State is still within the realm of "instruments." The empirical criticism to be raised against Marx is that, even when we grant that, in his own historical circumstances, the instrument was employed in one direction of serving the freedom of business, an instrument *as such* is at least partially neutral, that is to say, can be used for different purposes either subsequently or simultaneously. Insofar as political power as related to the legal system finds in that system its sanction and uses the sanction as justification for the employment of power, it cannot be said that the legal system is only an expression of the prevailing social structure of an existing society. There is in the legal system and thus concurrently in the political domain a feature which can be possibly coined as the anticipatory character of politics. Politics in this sense does not only express the powers behind it, but anticipates a situation and by the very anticipation helps to create that new situation. A case in point would be the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States of America declaring segregation to be unconstitutional. It thus anticipated a social situation before that situation actually came to exist and the decision on the level of the Supreme Court became a model for the deliberate emergence of the social situation to make it conform to the decision.¹⁵

The empirical criticism to be voiced at this juncture is rather obvious: whether or not the direction of the state as instrumentality is pre-determined and cannot be changed. It seems to be a fact that historical experience shows that when people gain the status of *citoyens*, even when they are concretely proletarians and not *bourgeois*, they can, at least to some extent, attenuate the given direction of the instrumentality, and choose not to take the instrumentality as being, as it were, a fact of nature whose direction is guided by natural laws. Empirically or historically speaking, we can never know where in human life there is the first beginning; or, in this particular case, whether human needs are responded to only on the level of human mutuality or communal life in Marx's sense; or whether they are also responded to through the political power which, in turn, shapes (to some extent at least) human mutuality on the social and communal level. Now, this empirical or historical criticism should not make us oblivious of an important fact, that is, the paradoxical or dialectical share which Marx has in this development. Precisely because Marx, in the acuity of his analysis, called attention

¹⁵ Consult: *Two Faces of Federalism, An Outline of an Argument about Pluralism, Unity and Law* by Robert M. Hutchins, followed by a discussion, Santa Barbara, California, 1961.

to the distinction between the concrete and the abstract, he paved the way or opened the door to making the abstract more flexible than it appeared in his own historical and social circumstances. If the State is an abstraction, one can ask the question, from which concrete data is it abstracted? We can ask the question, when the *abstractum* "color" is abstracted from green, red, or black, can't it be abstracted also from blue, beige, and brown? But since this particular *abstractum*, i.e. political power, is not just a theoretical entity but a tool in the service of the concrete life of certain human beings comprised by the State, one can again attempt to make the abstract instrument subservient to different concrete needs, according to the preponderance of the needs and perhaps guided by the representation and participation of different needs in the political power. Marx took the *abstractum* as both predetermined and rigid; and his conception could not cope with the realities of historical existence, though paradoxically, as hinted above, his conception gave momentum to the historical reality which, as it were, topples his conception. This is a paradoxical victory, but in a paradoxical victory there is nonetheless an ingredient of defeat.

But it would be a mistake to confine our criticism to this aspect of Marx's concept. Marx criticizes political power not only because it is an instrument subservient to a class, but because it is an instrument altogether. The position of an instrument seems to be contradictory to the mutuality of social life; and thus to the strange combination—implied by Marx—of spontaneity and need. To lodge something as an instrument is to remove it from the interaction between spontaneous human behavior and basic human needs. Whatever is human has to be solved or resolved on the level of human existence proper. But the very position of an instrument introduces into the scope of human life something external, as a hammer is external to a hand, even when we view it as an extension of the hand. It is that externality *qua* estrangement or alienation that is criticized by Marx, although the criticism of that aspect emerges as tied up with the criticism of the empirical instrumentality and the empirical needs served by it—that is, the *bourgeois* needs for whose protection and promotion the instrument is employed. We are here facing the question whether instruments have to be disregarded, or whether the only *legitimate* instruments are those which are both expressions and media, as, for instance, language is. We shall turn now to the exploration of that topic.

IV

Let us grant, for the sake of argument, the notion of the "whole man" in Marx's sense. Yet, as we have seen, social life is organized social life, even when we view it against the background of the total man and take the notion of the total man as the norm for the revolution

to come. In what sense is social life essentially organized? Let us grant again that man should not be totally identical with a particular line of his activity, and that the being-engaged-in-fishing would not turn him into a fisherman, to cite Marx's own example. But even to be active in fishing as a kind of hobby, one needs certain skills, practice, experience. The total man might be viewed as potentially capable of being active in fishing as well as being active in writing poetry and the Ninth Symphony but the Ninth Symphony is not innate in him. A process takes place which leads to musical composition and there are even certain rules to be obeyed in carrying out the action. One learns these rules and one needs time and concentration—that is to say, limitation—for the process to take place. There are certain organizations which provide for instruction in the process or in the rules; and the organizational structure of society when it provides for instruction is obviously not confined to only one line of activity to be pursued. There is a structure-of-structures, and not just one structure. The structure-of-structures is an organization, or an instrument, introducing human beings into lines of activity, even—again—if we presuppose that there is a continuity of spontaneity leading from total potentiality to diversity of lines of activities. Why does Marx grant and accept instrumentality on the level of social life and reject instrumentality on the level of Statehood? In other words, why is instrumentality in social-economic life admitted and instrumentality in political life rejected? The reason for this juxtaposition of two kinds of instrumentality is possibly this: Social instrumentality leads to human production, while political instrumentality is *per se* oppressive. Is this really so? Is it bound to be so? After all, activity in the social field, disregarding subjection to laws of an external character that bind the *citoyen*, can be oppressive as well, concretely or morally. If one composes a piece of poetry that flatters his master, he perhaps activates his innate capacity; but, be the reason what it may, he makes himself, or is made, subjugated to another man. Flattery occurs in the inter-human discourse more than in the relation between the citizen and the state, though one may pay lip service to sovereigns too, i.e. to sovereigns as persons. Moreover, unfortunate as it may sound, great works of art have come into being during the time that the artist, as creator, was employed as a kind of high level servant of some master, in Florence or elsewhere. The notion that, by their very essence, instruments differ because they are activated in different spheres, is a questionable notion from the empirical point of view. And it was Marx who played an extremely important role in opening our eyes to the reality of subjugation in human relations.

Hence we have to ask ourselves an additional question: What is the fundamental argument hidden behind this different evaluation of different instrumentalities? In answer to this question the following is suggested: In the orbit of concrete human life Marx addressed himself only to one aspect of common human existence, i.e., the aspect that might be briefly described as that of "mutuality." Social life, i.e., organized social life,

relates to human needs, that is to say, to situations where one human being stands in need to gain, or to be reinforced, by another human being. Mutuality in the economic sense can take the form of exchange of services or commodities; every exchange presupposes mutuality and reciprocity, *and* reciprocity is also expected in every exchange. Marx accepted the instrumentality related to mutuality and leading to reciprocal exchanges since he viewed human beings essentially as social beings. Since they are social beings, mutuality of their relations and instruments based on mutuality (and its induction) are viewed by Marx as an expression of human essence and *not* as an external instrument imposed on man. In spite of the fact that there is a built-in instrumental device in social life, that device is grounded in human essence, since it is grounded in man's social character or in concrete needs, and these two eventually amount to the same. It is because of this expressive character of the social instrument that Marx accepts the instrument and does not even qualify his acceptance by viewing it as a necessary evil.

But when he moves to the political organization, his outlook changes. Political organization is viewed *only* as an instrument and not as an expression of human nature. Being an instrument only allows for the possibility of manipulating the instrument and making it subservient to needs lodged at the level of mutuality. Since the instrument is subservient to needs, it deracinates mutuality proper, that is to say, the equality of human beings engaged in reciprocal exchange. It brings about the situation where one class of human beings suppresses another class of human beings. Marx could adhere to this hidden reasoning since he did not realize that political organization carried in itself an expressive character just as the social organization does, though that which is expressed differs in both cases. Political organization does not express mutuality, but what might be called communality or "togetherness." There is a difference between mutuality and togetherness: mutuality pertains to inter-human relations, while togetherness delineates the boundaries of the society, as, for instance, does a territorial base and political sovereignty, presupposing both the territorial base and the living human beings who inhabit that territorial base. The difference indicated here can be put differently: On the level of mutuality human beings expect something from each other, while on the level of togetherness human beings express their belonging. The attitude of belonging differs from the attitude of expectation. Strangely enough, belonging may be viewed as an attitude which lacks the egoistic character of expectation; and let us not forget at this point that, even on the level of social organization, Marx referred to "egoistic needs." The attitude of belonging is perhaps more nebulous than that of expectation and thus less concrete than the former. But, to use Whitehead's famous phrase, it would be a fallacy of misplaced concreteness to view human existence as confined only to mutuality and to relations grounded in it and to be oblivious of the dimension of togetherness.

An empirical observation might again be appropriate here. There is no pre-established harmony between the level of mutuality and the level of togetherness. Human beings sometimes prefer the expression of their togetherness over the expression of their mutuality. Because of this underlying act of preference, Bangladesh prefers political independence, even though the day after achieving it—or the very same day—it faced all the predicaments of social and economic life that arise within the framework of independence. Marx took a one-sided view of the political instrumentality, since he took a one-sided view of the diversified levels of human relations and human attitudes. To be sure, it is sometimes rather difficult to draw a line of demarcation between the aspect of mutuality and the aspect of togetherness, since in both the recognition of human beings as *human beings* is implied. From the point of view of mutuality we recognize our fellow-men as interwoven in textures of activities, with ourselves. From the point of view of togetherness we recognize our fellow-men as fellow-men, be their concrete activity what it may, and be the impact of their activity on ourselves as negligible as it may. Yet, the recognition of the universal essence of human life pertains both to mutuality and to togetherness.

Why did Marx reject the instrumentality inherent in statehood and in political organization? Again the following suggestion is perhaps warranted: Marx recognized that political organization, even if viewed as an expression and not as an instrument, carried within itself compulsion, legally guaranteed, and more so than in social organization. The aspect of compulsion of statehood was possibly brought into focus by Marx and rejected, because compulsion runs counter, according to him, to human needs, and to the horizontal organization grounded in human needs; and so brings about a vertical organization of subjugation. Compulsion is an instrument, and one cannot view, by any stretch of imagination or interpretation, the continuity from human essence, as a given factor, to compulsion that channels human behavior in a super-imposed order. A kind of harmonistic solution indicated by Kant, for instance, in his "Perpetual Peace" could not be accepted by Marx. Kant says there: "Given a multitude of rational beings requiring universal laws to their preservation, but each of whom is secretly inclined to exempt himself from them, to establish a constitution in such a way that, although their private intentions conflict, they check each other, with the result that their public conduct is the same as if they had no such intentions." And Kant says further: "A good constitution is not to be expected from morality, but, conversely, a good moral condition of a people is to be expected only under a good constitution."¹⁶ Marx could not accept the harmonistic—or the realistic solution—suggested by Kant for the

¹⁶ "Perpetual Peace," included in *Immanuel Kant on History*, Liberal Arts Library, pp. 112-223.

simple reason that he could not accept the characterization of human egoism as "secretly inclined to exempt himself," etc., since human egoism, according to Marx, is not a secret but an open and public fact. He could not accept the second solution either, that a good constitution does not emerge from morality but is a precondition of morality, since he viewed compulsion as essentially contradicting morality and not capable of being placed in the service of morality. He rejects compulsion *a limine* and thus cannot present a soft version of compulsion in the way Kant does.

Is there a way out of this dilemma? Do we face an exclusive alternative: *either* compulsion as an evil *or* compulsion as an instrument which eventually leads to morality and to the good? Perhaps the following suggestion can be made which is deliberately closer to Kant than to Marx, though it does not follow Kant strictly. Human togetherness, precisely because it is abstract, or, at least, more so than human mutuality, does not operate instinctively and certainly does not regulate itself spontaneously. Abstract togetherness can find its expression, as we have seen, not in exchange but in what we may call projection. Political power is projected by human beings out of their awareness of belonging; and that power becomes embodied in institutions. Institutions, again, are abstract entities not on the level of exchange of products and services characteristic of social life. The paradox of togetherness is that it expresses itself in power, which literally holds people together, while mutuality expresses itself in give-and-take. Hence alienation, grounded in projection and presupposing power, is essential for the political sphere and cannot be viewed as just a perversion or an instrument for the sake of interests which lie beyond the political sphere or within the social orbit. The aspect of projection provides for the possibility to use political power in an anticipatory manner, since projection may entail the structure-to-be of the society.

If we grant the facticity of human togetherness (and how could we do otherwise?); and if we grant that togetherness is a potentiality to be activated (and how could we not?), the power-character of statehood is not an accident but a projected extension of the stratum of togetherness. Kant, too, viewed political life as a device only—perhaps as a benevolent device. But because of the distinction between morality and legality the maximum he could achieve was to turn the dichotomy between morality and legality into a relationship in which legality is a contrived instrument for the sake of morality. But lodging legality and statehood as an extension of togetherness carries with it a more neutral position, since it remains within the limits of description and does not get involved immediately in a normative evaluation of the *raison d'être* of the instrument either for the sake of morality or for the sake of interests, and particularly interests of classes of which social existence is composed.

Only when we grant the projected character of political power as a phenomenological datum of human communality can we take a step

further; and that step brings us somewhat closer to Kant than to Marx. Human beings use political power as an instrument, and they may use it for different purposes, and this implies, of course, for social purposes (and class interests are included in the realm of social purposes). But here again the instrumentality of political power is not predetermined either in the sense in which Marx viewed it or in a more flexible direction, as we have seen in the first part of our critical exploration. There is one aspect related to the instrumentality of political power which pertains to human behavior in general and not to particular interests: Men do not rely exclusively on their own benevolence; that is to say, on the fact that mutuality will take care of itself and, through the hidden hand inherent in it, will create modes of conduct which will conform to expectations. Compulsion inherent in political power, sanctioned or legitimized by the legal system, is a kind of tacit insurance policy that human beings devise against each other, in case they do not conform to the expected conduct and its standard. Compulsion is created and cannot be removed from the presupposition of the creative character of human beings in their concrete lives. But since compulsion is related to creativity, creativity, imbued with reflection, deliberation, learning from experience, anticipation, etc., contrives an instrument which *can* be used, *could* be used and *should* be used when spontaneous creativity falls short.

Obviously there is an inherent danger in that sort of device. Instead of using compulsion as an *ultima ratio* it is used as a *prima ratio*. Then, if it is an insurance device, why not take advantage of it whenever things go wrong and the human world gets out of joint? This danger cannot be obliterated. But the fact that we face danger cannot lead us to resolve our dilemma by eradicating the device altogether. There are many dangers; and the political danger is not the only one. To say the least, there are dangers in social life, in human expectations based on reciprocity, and so on.

We may conclude our analysis of Marx by saying that, since Marx introduced the notion of the whole man, he was being led to the conclusion of the revolution as the restoration of human existence to man himself. But the "whole man," if we address ourselves to that notion and apply it, is only a potentiality. In actuality the whole man *creates himself*, and he does this by expressing himself through mediations like language, historical traditions, institutions, etc. The actuality is a multi-layered actuality. Marx's philosophical mistake is that he took the notion of the whole man as pointing toward a single-layered actuality. Because of this error he interpreted radicalism as "coming to the roots," but not granting the full spectrum-of-expression of human creativity. Because of this error he took the revolution as a delineated act, or at most, as a defined historical period that is to bring about a new level of human existence and lead from necessity to freedom, or from pre-history to history. And, at this point, it is of no consequence whether

Marx wrote this or Engels spoke it as his faithful disciple. A conception of the multi-layered essence of human life calls for a different conception of the interaction between necessity and freedom and a different conception of history. We are never at the roots and we are never at the consummation. We are simply in-between.¹⁷

¹⁷ See the present author's: "Spontaneity and Alienation," *International Philosophical Quarterly* (Vol. XI, No. 4, December, 1971, pp. 475ff).

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