

interpretation

a journal of political philosophy

volume 4/3

spring 1975

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martinus nijhoff, the hague

edited at

queens college of the city university
of new york

interpretation

a journal of political philosophy

volume 4

issue 3

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interpretation is a journal devoted to the study of political philosophy. it appears three times a year.

its editors welcome contributions from all those who take a serious interest in political philosophy regardless of their orientation.

all manuscripts and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the executive editor

interpretation

building g101 - queens college - flushing, n.y. 11367 - u.s.a.

subscription price

for institutions and libraries Guilders 36 + Guilders 5.50 postage

for individuals Guilders 28.80 + Guilders 5.50 postage

subscription and correspondence in connection

therewith should be sent to the publisher

martinus nijhoff

9-11 lange voorhout - p.o.b. 269 - the hague - netherlands.

XENOPHON'S *ANABASIS* *

LEO STRAUSS

Xenophon's *Anabasis* seems today to be regarded universally as his most beautiful book. I do not quarrel with this judgment. I merely wonder what its grounds are. The question is obviously reasonable; in the eighteenth century, quite a few judicious men would have assigned the highest place among Xenophon's writings to his *Memorabilia* rather than to his *Anabasis*. In other words, the fact that we judge the *Anabasis* to be Xenophon's most beautiful book does not yet prove that that judgment was shared by Xenophon. Before we can agree or disagree with the ruling opinion, we would have to know what the book meant for Xenophon, we would have to know the place and function of the book within the Corpus Xenophonticum and therewith possibly the full beauty of the *Anabasis*. Perhaps we have answered our question unwittingly and thoughtlessly, if truthfully, by speaking of Xenophon's *Anabasis*, of Xenophon's ascent.

The authentic title of the book is "Cyrus' Ascent," i.e., the expedition of the younger Cyrus from the coastal plain to the interior of Asia. The title is misleading, for Cyrus' ascent came to its end in the battle of Kunaxa in which he was defeated and killed; the account of his ascent fills at most the first of the seven Books of the *Anabasis*. The title of the *Anabasis* is not the only misleading title of Xenophon's works: *The Education of Cyrus* deals with the whole life of the older Cyrus while his education is discussed only in the first Book; the *Memorabilia* contains what Xenophon remembers of Socrates' justice and not Xenophon's memorable experiences as such.

The *Anabasis* opens as follows: "Dareios and Parysatis had two sons born to them, of whom the elder was Artaxerxes and the younger Cyrus." The work begins as if it were devoted to a memorable incident in the royal family of Persia. This opening makes us see that Persia, apparently the strongest monarchy, was in fact a dyarchy in which the preference of the queen for her younger son had the gravest consequences. Yet while the *Anabasis* tells us a great deal about Persia, it tells us very little about the royal family of Persia; it cannot be said to be devoted to Persia, not even to the Persian-Greek conflict, except incidentally.

* This manuscript was left by Leo Strauss in its handwritten form; the printed version was not seen or approved by him. The transcription presented certain difficulties, but great care was taken to assure the accuracy of the printed version.

The editors are very grateful to Joseph Cropsey for transcribing the original manuscript and to Jenny and Diskin Clay for the valuable assistance they gave him.

Perplexing and even misleading as the title and the opening of the *Anabasis* are, the identity of its author is no less enigmatic. When Xenophon recapitulates in his historical work, the *Hellenika*, with utmost brevity the events narrated in the *Anabasis*, he ascribes the account of those events to Themistogenes of Syracuse (III 1.1-2). Nothing is known about Themistogenes, not even regarding his ever having lived. One is entitled to assume that Themistogenes of Syracuse is a pseudonym for Xenophon of Athens. In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon speaks of his outstanding deeds and speeches only in the third person; he apparently wishes to preserve this kind of becoming anonymity as much as possible. Syracuse and Athens were the most outstanding commercial and naval powers of Greece; Xenophon might be thought to mean "slayer of strangers," while Themistogenes is "the offspring of Right"; Themistogenes could seem to be a somehow idealized Xenophon. In the same context in which he mentions Themistogenes, he mentions the name of the Spartan admiral who was ordered by the ephors to assist Cyrus in his expedition; his name was Samios. When he mentions him in the *Anabasis* (I 4.2), Xenophon calls him Pythagoras. It would not be surprising if the author of the *Memorabilia*, when hearing the name "Samios" thought at once of the most famous Samian philosopher, Pythagoras.

In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon appears on the center of the stage only at the beginning of Book Three. Let us first see what we learn about him and his intention from the first two Books by observing certain peculiarities of his manner of writing. As can be expected, he will say everything necessary about the cause as well as the circumstances of Cyrus' ascent, but it is not likely that he will forgo things worthy to be mentioned which came to his attention on the occasion of that ascent although they do not throw light on it directly. Still, it is doubtful whether what he says in particular about the fauna and flora of the countries through which he passed was not required by his interest in provisions for the army and concern with them.

In order to secure himself against disgrace and even mortal danger threatening him at the hands of his brother, the king, to whom he had become suspect, Cyrus resolved to make himself king; for this purpose he secretly assembled an army consisting of different contingents of Greek mercenaries, to say nothing of the Persian troops whose command had been entrusted to him by his brother. For his march inland he found a pretext which was plausible in the eyes of the king, but which did not fool the king's loyal satrap Tissaphernes. Xenophon mentions as the most important stations of the way the cities which he describes by a standard formula that is susceptible of characteristic variations. The first cities mentioned are "inhabited, prosperous and large." In the present context (I 2) the standard expression occurs three times, whereas the description of cities as "inhabited" with the omission of "prosperous and large" occurs five times; in one case the city in question is simply called "the last city of Phrygia." What this procedure means becomes clear from the

description of Tarsos as a large and prosperous city; as is said immediately afterward, Tarsos was not inhabited, its inhabitants having fled at the approach of Cyrus' army. In the case of the last city of Phrygia, one wonders whether it was not uninhabited even before the rumor of Cyrus' approach reached it. This much is clear: the standard expression indicates the normal or optimal case; the variations indicate the various states of defectiveness. This has the consequence that Xenophon is not compelled to speak in many cases expressly of defects or that his general tone is less harsh, more gentle than it otherwise would be; he enables or compels himself to speak as much as possible in terms of praise rather than in terms of blame.

The inhabited, prosperous and large city is the first, in itself not important example of a practice of great importance. Let us think above all of the virtues. On a number of occasions Xenophon gives lists of virtues. Out of those lists one can easily construct a comprehensive list of all virtues which he regarded as such. In describing the character of a man who was not in all respects admirable but on the whole deserved praise, it is sufficient for Xenophon not to mention the virtues which the individual in question lacked; he does not have to speak explicitly of his blemish or blemishes. Here we mention only his silence on Cyrus' piety in his eulogy of Cyrus (I 9).

The second Xenophonic device which must be discussed at this point is his use of *legetai* (he, she, it is said to...). It makes a difference whether a human being is said to possess such and such qualities and whether he possesses them in fact. Artaxerxes and Cyrus are introduced as the sons of Dareios and Parysatis. When Xenophon speaks of the parents of the older Cyrus, in the *Education of Cyrus* (I 2.1), he says that Cyrus is said to be the son of Kambyzes and that his mother is agreed upon to have been Mandanes. Was the paternity of Dareios known to a higher degree than was that of Kambyzes? And in what way? And does this help to explain Parysatis' preference for Cyrus? We do not know. We do not have to seek the reason why Cyrus was said to have had intercourse with Epyaxa, the wife of the king of the Kilikians (I 2.12). When Xenophon speaks of a city located near the river Marsyas, he says: "There Apollon is said to have flayed Marsyas after having defeated him when he challenged him to a contest regarding wisdom, and to have hung up his skin in the cave from which the sources (of the river Marsyas) issue...There Xerxes is said to have erected (magnificent buildings) when he returned from Greece after having been defeated in that battle" (I 2.8-9). Xenophon treats here a mythical and a non-mythical story as equally trustworthy or untrustworthy. The conflict between Apollon and Marsyas was foolishly provoked by Marsyas who received condign punishment; the conflict between Xerxes and the Greeks was foolishly provoked by Xerxes, who was of course much less severely punished: the object of the conflict between Xerxes and the Greeks was not wisdom. The parallel treatment of the two stories draws our attention

to the broad and in a sense comprehensive theme "gods and men." Yet this theme is not strictly comprehensive, let alone all-comprehensive, because of the equivocality of "gods." For instance, "The Syrians held the big and tame fishes of the river Chalus to be gods, and did not permit anyone to harm them, nor doves" (I 4.9): are these Syrian gods regarded as gods also by the Greeks? or are only those gods truly gods that are said by the Greeks to be gods? and are the latter regarded as gods by Xenophon in particular? There is surely a very important agreement in this matter between the Greeks and the Persians, in particular as regards sacrificing and swearing (I 8.16-17; II 2.9). The conflict between Greeks and Persians after Cyrus' death turns precisely on the question as to which of the two sides broke the solemnly sworn treaty. When addressing Tissaphernes, the Greek general Klearchos takes it for granted that they both agree as to the sanctity of oaths and its ground: the universal rule of the gods (II 5.7, 20-21, 39). When Cyrus' army succeeded in crossing the Euphrates River on foot, the event seemed to the people living in that place to be divine, and the river plainly to have retired before Cyrus as the man who was to be the king. The omen soon proved to be misleading, just as Cyrus' interpretation of the predictions of the Greek soothsayer proved to be wrong (I 4.18; I 7, 18-19).

The points which we have stated or indicated are brought together at the end of Book Two. Xenophon had narrated how most of the Greek generals (*strategoî*) and quite a few Greek captains (*lochagoî*) had been treacherously murdered by the Persians, and is now describing the characters of the murdered generals. One of these generals, the Thessalian Menon, proves to have been a man of unbelievable wickedness; not only was he a deceiver, liar, and perjurer; he prided himself on using these qualities and ridiculed those men who were foolish enough to become their victims. He was the one who in a critical situation determined his fellow Greeks to follow Cyrus against the king (I 4.13-17). He was a friend, and guest friend of Ariaïos, the commander of Cyrus' Persian troops, who after Cyrus' death betrayed Cyrus' Greek contingent to the Persian king (II 1.5; 2.1; 4.15). Klearchos at any rate suspected that Menon was responsible for the betrayal to the Persians of his fellow officers, whereas Ariaïos makes the already murdered Klearchos responsible while claiming that Menon and Proxenos, having denounced Klearchos' plotting, are greatly honored by the king (II 5.28, 38). Be this as it may, Xenophon concludes his statement on Menon as follows: "While Menon's fellow generals were killed for having campaigned against the king together with Cyrus, he was not killed although he had done the same things, but after the death of the other generals the king took revenge on him by killing him, not as Klearchos and the other generals who were beheaded, which is thought to be the quickest death, but, having been tortured alive for a year, is said to have met the end of an evil man" (II 6.29). The king of Persia punished most severely that Greek general whose crime, whose perjury, whose breach of solemnly sworn

oaths, was most beneficial to him; Menon was punished for his impiety, not by any god, but by the human beneficiary of his crime. But this "is said" to have been done. It suffices to note that whereas in the case of the other murdered generals Xenophon tells us how old they were when they died, he is silent on this point in the case of Menon. The implicit premise of the justice or highmindedness of the king of Persia is as credible as that of the gods' revenge of perjury. Through the quoted "he is said" sentence Xenophon is enabled to present things—all things, "the world"—as grander and better than they are (cf. Thucydides I 21.1) while indicating at the same time the difference between the naked truth and the adornment. He has succeeded, not indeed in mitigating his harsh condemnation of Menon—what useful purpose would have been served by such mitigation?—but nevertheless in speaking on the whole in terms of praise rather than in terms of blame.

With a slight exaggeration one may say that Book Two ends with Menon and Book Three begins with Xenophon taking the center of the stage. At any rate, the end of Book Two and the beginning of Book Three read as if they were meant to bring out the contrast between Menon and Xenophon, between the arch-villain and the hero. It remains to be seen whether Menon is truly the foil of Xenophon in the *Anabasis*.

In his first enumeration of the Greek contingents of Cyrus' army Xenophon mentions the generals of those contingents in this order: 1) Klearchos of Sparta, 2) Aristippos the Thessalian, 3) Proxenos the Boiotian, 4) Sophainetos the Stymphalian and Sokrates the Achaian (I 1.9-11); Menon is not mentioned here because he joined Cyrus' expedition after it had already begun its march inland (I 2.6). At any rate, the contingent led by Proxenos, and hence Proxenos, can well be said to occupy the central place in the initial enumeration. When describing the characters of the Greek generals at the end of Book Two, Xenophon speaks extensively only of three of them: Klearchos, Proxenos and Menon (II 6); Proxenos is again in the center. Why does Proxenos deserve that place?

Let us now see what we learn from the first two Books about Xenophon. It should go without saying that the "I" who is said to have said or written or thought something in the *Anabasis* (I 2.5; 9.22, 28; II 3.1; 6.6), unless this happens in a quotation from a speech explicitly ascribed to Xenophon, cannot be identified by anyone who has a decent respect for our author, with Xenophon, but only with Themistogenes of Syracuse. Xenophon himself occurs in these Books three times. In the first place he approaches Cyrus who is just passing by on horseback while surveying the two opposed armies and asks him whether he has any orders to give; Cyrus commands him to tell everyone that the sacrifices are favorable and that the entrails of the sacrificed beasts are fine. Xenophon was also fortunate enough to be able to satisfy Cyrus' curiosity regarding a similar point (I 8.15-17). This conversation is important, not so much because it takes place shortly before the fatal battle but because

it is the only exchange between Xenophon and Cyrus recorded by Xenophon, just as there is only one exchange between Xenophon and Socrates in the *Memorabilia*; the former concerns sacrifices, the latter concerns the dangers inherent in kissing handsome boys. When Xenophon occurs in the *Anabasis* for the second time, he is in the company of Proxenos (II 4.15); when he occurs for the third time, he is in the company of two other generals (II 5.37, 41). In the central case, Proxenos is again somehow in the center.

But we must not completely overlook an occasion on which Xenophon is indeed not mentioned by name yet may very well have been meant. After the battle of Kunaxa, when Cyrus was already dead but his Greek mercenaries were victorious, the king sent heralds to the Greeks, one of them being the Greek traitor Phalinus, with the request to give up their arms. The chief speaker for the Greeks was in fact the Athenian Theopompos, who explains to Phalinus that the only good things which they have are arms and virtue, but their virtue would not be of any avail without the arms; with the help of their arms they might even fight with the Persians about the Persians' good things. When Phalias heard this, he laughed and said, "You resemble a philosopher, young man, and speak gracefully" (II 1.13-14). Theopompos' thesis is identical to the one most familiar to us from Aristotle: virtue, and especially moral virtue, is in need of external equipment (*Eth. Nic.* 1178a 23-25, 1177a 27-34; compare *Mem.* I 6.10 and *Oec.* II 1-4). Why Xenophon should appear for a moment in the guise of a Theopompos ("God-sent") will become manifest soon.

After the murder of their generals and of many of their captains the Greeks were utterly disheartened, when they considered the situation in which they found themselves; only few of them could take food, kindled a fire, or went to their arms. In spite or because of this, all of them settled down to rest for the night—with one exception: "There was in the army a certain Xenophon from Athens who went with the expedition without being a general, a captain, or a soldier of any sort but Proxenos, being a guest-friend of his for a long time, had sent for him who was then at home. He promised him if he came to make him a friend of Cyrus whom Proxenos himself said he regarded as better for him than his fatherland." We begin now to understand why Proxenos is assigned a central place: he was the one who had suggested to Xenophon to join Cyrus' army (III 1.1-4). Proxenos was then not unqualifiedly attached to Boiotia or for that matter to Greece; he was to some extent uprooted. Apparently he had no doubt that Xenophon was not unqualifiedly attached to Athens or even to Greece, that he too was to some extent uprooted, although he does not state why this was the case. To whom or what was then Proxenos attached? From his very youth he desired to become a man capable of doing the great things and for this reason he took paid instruction from Gorgias of Leontini. After his intercourse with Gorgias he had come to believe that he was now

capable both to rule and, by being a friend of the first men, not to be inferior to them in requiting them for the benefits he received from them; in this state of mind he joined Cyrus. He believed to acquire through his actions with Cyrus a great name and great power and much money; but he was obviously concerned with acquiring those things only in just and noble ways. He was indeed able to rule gentlemen but he was unable to inspire the soldiers with awe and fear of himself; he obviously feared to become hated by the soldiers; he thought that it was sufficient for being and [being] regarded a good ruler that one praise him who acted well and not praise him who acted unjustly (II 6.16-20). Proxenos and Xenophon, in contradistinction to Menon and even to Klearchos, were amiable gentlemen. Proxenos seems to be more attracted to the noble acquisition of fame, great power and great wealth anywhere on earth than to his fatherland. Xenophon is clearly distinguished from Proxenos by the fact that he was tougher, wiler and wittier than the latter. One is tempted to trace this difference to the difference between their teachers, Gorgias and Socrates. But Gorgias was also the teacher of Menon. The difficulty cannot be disposed of by the assertion that Socrates was a philosopher and Gorgias a sophist, for how do we know that Gorgias was a sophist according to Xenophon or his Socrates? (cf. Plato, *Meno* 70a5-b2, 95b9-c8, 96d5-7; cf. *Gorgias* 465c1-5). This much however may safely be said, that this difference between Proxenos and Xenophon is likely to be connected with Xenophon's having been familiar with Socrates. Must we then understand Xenophon—the Xenophon presented in the *Anabasis*—in the light of Socrates?

When Xenophon had read the letter from Proxenos, he communicated with Socrates of Athens about the journey. (Socrates is called here "Socrates of Athens" because Xenophon of Athens is not the writer.) Xenophon was obviously aware of the gravity of the step which he contemplated and sought therefore the counsel of an older and wiser man. Socrates suspected that Xenophon might get into trouble with the city by becoming a friend of Cyrus, since Cyrus was thought to have warred zealously together with the Spartans against Athens in the Peloponnesian War. But of course he did not know. Nor did his *daimonion* give him any guidance, or if it did, it was not of any authority for the city, to say nothing of the fact that its verdict might be disputable (cf. Plato, *Theages* 128d8-e6). He therefore advised Xenophon to go to Delphi and to communicate with the god about the journey. Xenophon followed that advice and asked Apollon in Delphi to what god he should sacrifice and pray in order to make the contemplated journey in the most noble and best way and, after having performed noble actions, to return safely. Apollon told him to which gods he ought to sacrifice. Xenophon does not tell us why Apollon did not give him any guidance regarding the god or gods to whom he ought to pray. On his return to Athens, he reported at once to Socrates. Socrates was somewhat taken aback: instead of asking the god first whether it would be better for Xenophon to make the

journey or to stay at Athens, he had by himself decided to go and asked the god only how he could make the journey in the most noble way. Xenophon must have thought that the question as to whether becoming a friend of Cyrus was in itself desirable, and in particular as to whether the Athenians' reaction to this was worth considering, could be answered by his own unassisted powers, but that no human being could know whether the journey would be beneficial to Xenophon (cf. *Mem.* I 1.6-8; cf. *Hellen.* VII 1.27). Perhaps Xenophon, as distinguished from Socrates, was rash in underestimating the hostile reaction of the city of Athens to his joining Cyrus. Socrates merely replied that after he had addressed to Apollon the second or secondary question, he must do what the god had commanded him to do. Therefore Xenophon sacrificed to the gods whom Apollon had mentioned and left Athens (III 1.5-8): he is as silent about prayers as Apollon.

The agreements as well as the disagreements between Xenophon and Socrates regarding the oracle make it all the more necessary for us to return to the question as to whether the Xenophon presented in the *Anabasis* must be understood in the light of Socrates, in other words, as to what precisely is the difference between the two men. Xenophon was a man of action: he did the political things in the common sense of the term, whereas Socrates did not; but Socrates taught his companions the political things with the emphasis on strategy and tactics (*Mem.* I 2.16-17; 6.15; III 1). What this difference means in simple practical terms appears when we remember the three ends which Proxenos so nobly pursued: a great name, great power and much wealth. Socrates, we know, was very poor and in no way dissatisfied with this condition. As to Xenophon, he returned from the expedition with Cyrus in very comfortable circumstances (V 3.7-10). This proves that he exercised successfully the economic art in the common sense of the expression. But this implies that Xenophon, as distinguished from Socrates, was desirous of wealth, of course only of nobly acquired moderate wealth. In this respect he resembles Ischomachos who taught Socrates the economic art, not exercised by Socrates, rather than Socrates; Xenophon also makes us think of his contemporary and friend Kritoboulos whom Socrates tried to teach the economic art, but in his case Xenophon leaves it open whether Socrates had any success (cf. the *Oeconomicus*). We hardly go too far by saying that the principle which individualizes Xenophon in the *Anabasis* comes to sight by the contrast between him and Socrates, and not by that between him and Proxenos, to say no further word of Menon.

Cyrus deceived Xenophon as well as Proxenos about the purpose of his expedition; he did not say a word to anyone about his plan to depose or kill the king except to Klearchos, the most renowned general in his employment. But after his army had come to Kilikia, everyone saw that the expedition was aimed against the king. Yet most of the Greeks—Xenophon being one of them—did not abandon Cyrus out of shame

before one another or before Cyrus. Xenophon was as disheartened as everyone else after the Persians' treachery but then he had during a short slumber a most astounding dream. He dreamed that a lightning had struck his father's house and had set it altogether on fire so that no one could escape. This dream was in one respect comforting: Xenophon seemed to see a great light coming from Zeus; but on the other hand, Zeus is a king and might show by a dream what was awaiting those who had dared to attack the king of Persia (III 1.9-12; cf. I 3.8, 13, 21; 6.5, 9; II 2.2-5). The dream brought Xenophon, and Xenophon alone, to his senses: he must do something, and at once. He gets up and calls first Proxenos' captains together. He addresses to them a speech which is quoted in full and in which he sets forth clearly and forcefully the dangers to which they are exposed as well as the great benefits accruing to the Greeks from the Persians' treachery: the Greeks are now no longer under an obligation to comply with the treaty; they may now justly take of the Persians' possessions whatever and however much they like. The judges of the contest are the gods, who will be on the side of the Greeks, as is reasonable to assume; for the oaths were broken by the Persians while they were strictly observed by the Greeks. Xenophon mentions in this speech the gods five times. He concludes the speech by promising the captains his full cooperation and even more than that: if they wish him to lead them, he will not use his youth as a pretext for declining the leadership. He is naturally elected to be their leader, i.e., the successor to Proxenos, with the unanimity of all who were in fact captains and even Greeks (III 1.12-26). This is the beginning of Xenophon's ascent: through a single speech, spoken at the right moment, and in the right way, he has become from a nobody a general.

Proxenos' captains next called together the generals and other high commanders who had survived the bloodbath, of all Greek contingents. Introduced by the oldest of Proxenos' captains, Xenophon is asked to say to this more stately assembly what he had said to Proxenos' captains; but he does not simply repeat himself. The second speech is again quoted in full. He puts now the emphasis on the fact that the salvation of the Greeks depends decisively on the mood and conduct of the commanders; they must act as the models for the soldiers. Therefore, the most urgent thing to do is to replace the murdered commanders; for everything, especially in war, depends on good order and discipline. In this speech, the gods are mentioned only once. The officers then proceed to the election of five new generals, one of these being Xenophon (III 1.32-47).

Shortly after that election, when the next day was about to begin to break, the commanders decided to call an assembly of the soldiers. The soldiers were first briefly addressed by the Spartan Cheirisophos and then by the Arcadian Kleonor, who had been assigned the central place in Xenophon's enumeration of the newly elected generals (III 1.47). Kleonor's speech is about twice as long as Cheirisophos' and is devoted to a rehearsal of the Persian treachery, about which Cheirisophos had

been silent. Accordingly, Cheirisophos refers only once to the gods, but Kleonor four times. Yet their speeches served only as preludes to the speech by which Xenophon addressed this most stately assembly before which he appeared in as stately an attire as he possibly could: he wished to be attired becomingly for victory as well as for death on the field of honor. When he mentioned the many fine hopes of salvation which they may have if they wage ruthless war against their enemies, a man sneezed. Thereupon all soldiers with one impulse made obeisance to the god (cf. Aristophanes, *Knights* 638-45). Xenophon grasped the opportunity thus offered with both hands or without any false shame; he interpreted the sneezing as an omen from Zeus the Savior and proposed that they vow to offer sacrifices to that god as soon as they come to a friendly land, but to make a vow also to offer sacrifices to the other gods according to every man's ability. He put this proposal to a vote; it was unanimously adopted. Thereupon they made their vows and chanted. After this pious beginning, Xenophon began his speech by explaining what he meant by the many fine hopes of salvation which the Greeks have. They are based in the first place on their having kept the oaths sworn by the god in contrast to the perjury committed by the enemy; hence it is reasonable to assume that the gods will be opposed to the Persians and will be allies of the Greeks, and the gods can of course be of very great help if they wish. Xenophon arouses the Greeks' hopes furthermore by reminding them of the deliverance of their ancestors with the gods' help from the Persians in the Persian wars. Even Cyrus' Greek contingents defeated the many more numerous Persians a few days ago with the gods' help and then the prize was Cyrus' kingly rule: but now the prize is the very salvation of the Greeks. Having arrived at this point, Xenophon ceases to mention the gods. As orator he had spoken of the gods in this third speech eleven times, whereas he had spoken of them in his first speech five times and in his central speech only once.

He turns next to purely human considerations or measures. In this connection he points out that if the Persians succeeded in preventing the Greeks from returning to Greece, the Greeks might very well settle down in the midst of Persia, so rich in all kinds of good things, not the least in beautiful and tall women and maidens. Could the vision of himself as founder of a city in some barbaric place be the second stage of his ascent? We recall that Proxenos' invitation to join Cyrus could have implied his certainty as to the lukewarmness of Xenophon's patriotism, not to say Xenophon's lack of patriotism; this impression could seem to be reinforced by what Xenophon says now to the army. Be this as it may, the final and by no means the least important measures which he proposes to the army are the restoration and even strengthening of the commanders' punitive powers, which must be supported by the active and zealous assistance of every member of the army; he demands that this proposal be put to the vote. He is strongly supported in this matter by the Spartan Cheirisophos and the proposal is thereupon unanimously

adopted. Finally Xenophon proposes that Cheirosophos be put in command of the van of the army on the march, and he and Timasion, the two youngest generals, in command of the rear. This proposal too is unanimously adopted. Xenophon has become quite informally, if not the commander of the whole army, at least its *spiritus rector*. After the most urgent matters have been settled, Xenophon reminds in particular those who desire wealth that they must try to be victorious; for the victors will both preserve what belongs to them and take what belongs to the defeated (III 2). The economic art as the art of increasing one's wealth can be exercised by means of the military art (*Oec.* I 15).

The Persians next tried with very minor success to corrupt the Greek soldiers and even captains. They were more successful when they sent bowmen and slingers against the Greek rear guard, which suffered considerable losses and were unable to retaliate. Xenophon thought of a device which proved to be wholly useless. He was blamed by some of his fellow generals and accepted the blame in good grace. By analyzing what had happened more closely and by drawing on his knowledge of things military, which he surely had not acquired during the present campaign, he found a solution which promised to redress the Persians' superiority in slingers and cavalry. Again his proposals were adopted.

In his speech to the soldiers Xenophon had explained to them that their fear of being cut off from the way to Greece by the big and deep rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, was unfounded: all rivers, even though they are impassable at a distance from their sources, become passable if one approaches their sources (III 2.22). He had failed to mention there that this solution brings up a new predicament: the predicament caused by mountain ranges, by the ascent. After having defeated the Persians, the Greeks reached the Tigris River at the deserted city of Larisa, originally Median, which could not be taken by the Persians at the time when they conquered Media, until a cloud concealed the sun and the inhabitants thereupon fled from the city. The Greeks came next to another originally Median city, which the Persians also could not take until Zeus horrified the inhabitants with thunder. (Shortly before making this remark Xenophon uses the expression *legetai*: are we to think that Zeus' having caused the thunder is what was said as distinguished from what was known?) The Greeks continued their march while the Persians pursued them cautiously, especially after the Greeks had improved their tactical arrangements. Their situation improved in proportion as the country through which they had marched became more hilly, but whenever they had to descend from the hills to the plain, they suffered considerable losses. On one occasion there arose a difference of opinion between Cheirisophos and Xenophon which was soon amicably settled. The settlement required a strenuous uphill march, to which Xenophon, riding on horseback, encouraged the soldiers in question by a somewhat exaggerated promise. When one of the soldiers complained that the ascent was easy

for Xenophon who was on horseback, while he was marching on foot carrying his shield, Xenophon leaped down from his horse, pushed the complaining soldier out of his place, took away the shield from him and marched on with it as fast as he could, although he had on his cavalry breastplate in addition to the infantryman's shield. But the rest of the soldiers sided with Xenophon, and by their striking and abusing the complaining soldier, forced him to take back his shield and to march on (III 4). Xenophon was not a Proxenos.

Another difference of opinion between Cheirisophos and Xenophon arose when the Persians began to burn down the villages near the Tigris which were well supplied with victuals. Xenophon seemed to be well pleased with the spectacle: as long as there was a treaty between the Greeks and the Persians, the Greeks were obliged to abstain from doing harm to the king's country but now the Persians themselves admit by their actions that the country is no longer the king's: therefore we ought to stop the Persians' incendiaries. Cheirisophos, however, thought that the Greeks too should set about burning, for in this way the Persians would stop the sooner. Xenophon, who may have remembered his thought that if the worst came to the worst, the Greeks could settle down in the midst of the king's possessions, did not reply. However this may be, the officers were greatly disheartened. Yet after the interrogation of the prisoners the generals decided to march north through the mountainous land of the Karduchians—a difficult land inhabited by a warlike people but not subject to the Persian king. This decision proved to be the Greeks' salvation. While it was taken by "the generals," its seed had been planted, as we have seen, by Xenophon's speech to the soldiers (III 5).

Books Two to Five and Seven begin with summaries which state very briefly what had been narrated before (but cf. also VI 3.1). In none of these summaries or introductions is the name of Xenophon mentioned. He may have wished to counteract the not involuntary but inevitable self-praise conveyed through the narration of his deeds and speeches. The introduction to Book Four is by far the most extensive, about as long as the introductions to Books Two, Three, Five and Seven taken together. Book Four is the central book. By failing to supply Book Six with an introduction, Xenophon brings it about that Book Four is the central Book also among the Books supplied with introductions. Is the doubly central position of Book Four justified by its content?

The Karduchians were no friends, let alone allies, of the Persian king. This does not mean that they gave the Greeks a friendly reception. On the contrary, when the Greeks entered their land, they fled into the high mountains, taking their women and children with them, and inflicted as many losses on the Greeks as they could. In fact, during the seven days during which they marched through the Karduchians' land, they had to fight all the time and suffered more evils than the king and Tissaphernes altogether had inflicted on them while they marched through Persia (IV 3.2). The difficulties were considerably increased by the snow which

began to fall. Cheirisophos was now in sole command of the van and Xenophon of the rear. Communication between the van and the rear became very difficult especially since the rear was very hard-pressed by the enemy and the forward march of the rear began to resemble a flight. When Xenophon complained to Cheirisophos about his not having waited for the rear, the Spartan had a good excuse but could not suggest a solution; the solution was suggested by Xenophon, whose men had taken two prisoners. By having one of them slaughtered within the sight of the other, he induced the latter to help the Greeks to overcome the obstacles caused by his countrymen and to act as the Greeks' guide. The march through the land of the Karduchians reveals again the bravery and resourcefulness of the Greeks and especially of Xenophon. Despite the savage fighting with the barbarians, under a treaty Xenophon succeeded in recovering from them the Greek dead and burying those dead in a most becoming manner.

From the difficult and dangerous mountains of the Karduchians they descended to Armenia, which is lying in the plain and whose climate seemed to offer in every respect a relief from the hardship suffered from the former country and its inhabitants. Yet their entry into Armenia was blocked by a river difficult to cross, and the crossing was resisted by an army consisting of Persians and of Persian mercenaries, some of them Armenians. In addition, the Karduchians reappeared in force in the rear of the Greeks and likewise tried to prevent the Greeks' crossing the river. Thus the Greeks were again in great difficulties. In that situation Xenophon had a dream—just as in the night after Kunaxa—but the present dream was much less frightening, and when dawn came he reported it to Cheirisophos together with its favorable interpretation of Xenophontic origin. The good omen was confirmed by the sacrifices offered in the presence of all generals which were all favorable from the very beginning. Xenophon, who could always be easily approached by the soldiers if they had to tell anything related to the war, was now told by two young men that they had by accident discovered a ford. Xenophon showed his gratitude to the gods for the dreams and the other helps in the proper manner and informed Cheirisophos at once of the two young men's discovery of the ford. Before crossing the river, Cheirisophos put a wreath upon his head and the soothsayers were offering sacrifices to the river; these sacrifices too were favorable. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the Greeks succeeded in their enterprise. Contrary to what "Theopompos of Athens," who resembled a philosopher, had said, weapons and virtue were not the only good things within the power of the Greeks (II 1.12-13); or, if you wish, the gods' favor followed with a kind of necessity the Greeks' keeping their oaths. Yet if one wishes, one may also say that one of the virtues by which Xenophon distinguished himself was his piety, provided one adds that his piety is hard to distinguish from that combination of toughness, wittiness and wiliness which separated him from Proxenos and which revealed itself already

to some extent in the query addressed by him to the god in Delphi. It surely differs *toto cælo* from the piety of a Nikias.

After their entry into Armenia the Greeks marched through western Armenia, which was ruled by Tiribazos, a "friend" of the king of Persia. Tiribazos tried to conclude a treaty with the Greeks. Despite their two experiences with Tissaphernes and the king, the Greek generals accepted the offer. But this time they were cautious enough to prevent another Persian treachery. The Greeks were helped and hindered by heavy snowfall. Xenophon's example showed them again a way out. Violations of the treaty had also been committed by some Greek soldiers who had wantonly burned down the houses in which they had been quartered; they were punished for their transgressions by having to live in poor quarters. Their further march through Armenia was again hampered by deep snow, and the north wind blowing full in their faces and freezing the men. Then one of the soothsayers told them to offer sacrifices to the wind; when this was done, it seemed quite clear to all that the violence of the storm abated (IV 5.4): "seeming quite clear to all" is more trustworthy than "what is said." Owing to the snow many of the human beings began to suffer from ravenous hunger; Xenophon did not know what the trouble was but when he learned it from an experienced man, he did the necessary things with the desired result.

While the march through the land of the hostile Karduchians inflicted many hardships on the Greeks, the march through Armenia was gay and the reception by the natives was very kindly. This was due to a great extent to an Armenian village chief (*komarchos*) with whom Xenophon succeeded in establishing a most cordial relation within the shortest time. Provisions and especially an excellent wine were ample. When Xenophon came the next day in the company of the village chief to look after the soldiers, he found them feasting, cheerful and most hospitable. With the help of the village chief Xenophon and Cheirisophos found out that the horses bred there were meant as a tribute to the king. Xenophon took one of the colts for himself and gave his own rather old horse to the village chief for fattening up and sacrifice, for he heard that it was sacred to Helios. He also gave colts to the other high commanders. (The number of horses bred for the king in Armenia was seventeen; the daughter of the village chief had been married nine days before, and nine is the center of seventeen. [IV 5.24]—Gods are mentioned by Xenophon as orator in his first three speeches by which he established his ascendancy seventeen times: III 1.15-2.39).

Perhaps we are now in a position to answer the question as to why Book Four—or at least the account of the march through the land of the Karduchians and through Armenia—is located in the center of the *Anabasis*. We might add here that Book Four is the only Book of the *Anabasis* in which no formal oaths (like "by Zeus," "by the gods," and so on) occur. The march through the Karduchians' country is the toughest and

the march through Armenia is characterized by descriptions of gaiety: the Karduchians and the Armenians are in a way the two poles. When we turn from the *Anabasis* to the *Education of Cyrus* (III 1.14 and 38-39), we find in the latter work and only there a kind of explanation of the distinction accorded to Armenia in the *Anabasis*. The son of the king of Armenia had a friend, a "sophist," who suffered the fate of Socrates because the king of Armenia was envious of his son's admiring that "sophist" more than his own father and therefore accused that "sophist" of "corrupting" his son. Armenia seems to be the barbarian analogon to Athens. It is then not quite true that the Persian-Greek antagonism is of no or of only subordinate importance in the *Anabasis*.

From here we understand somewhat better than before the difference between Xenophon and Socrates. The Armenian analogon to Socrates is perfectly free from any desire for revenge with his pupil's father. More generally stated, he does not believe that virtue consists in surpassing one's friends in benefiting them, and in surpassing one's enemies in harming them; he tacitly rejects the notion of virtue which Socrates tries to instill into the mind of Kritoboulos (*Mem.* II 6.35; II 3.14), the gentleman's virtue, and which Cyrus is said to have possessed to an extremely high degree (*Anabasis* I 9.11,24,28; cf. *ibid.*, V 5.20). The questionable character of this notion of virtue is pointed out not only by the Platonic Socrates (*Rep.* 335d11-12) but also by Xenophon's two lists of Socrates' virtues in which courage (manliness) does not occur and in which justice is identified with never harming anyone in the slightest (*Mem.* IV 8.11 and *Apol. Soc.* 15-18).

The ascent of Xenophon or rather his native ascendancy showed itself in the sole serious rift between him and Cheirisophos. He had given to Cheirisophos the village chief as guide. Since the Armenian did not quite act according to Cheirisophos' wishes, the Spartan beat him without binding him; thereupon the Armenian ran away (IV 6.3). Proxenos would never have beaten the village chief; Cheirisophos beat him, just as Klearchos would have done, but failed to bind him; Xenophon would have beaten him if necessary but have taken the precaution of binding him; Xenophon keeps to the right mean.

When after some time their way was again blocked by hostile natives, Cheirisophos called together a council of generals. Two opposed proposals were made. Kleanor favored a straight attack on the barbarians' strong position. Xenophon also was no less eager to overcome the obstacle but to do it with the minimum loss of lives; he proposes to achieve the goal in the easiest way: the enemy position should be taken not by means of a frontal attack but by means of a feint, of "stealing." He appeals to the excellent training of the Spartan ruling class in stealing. After he has thus gained Cheirisophos' good will, the Spartan replies equally good-naturedly that the Athenians are outstanding in stealing public money, as is shown by the fact that they prefer to have the best thieves for their rulers. Xenophon's proposal is naturally adopted with

a minor modification suggested by Cheirisophos and leads to an entire success. In a similar incident shortly thereafter it was again in the first place Xenophon's shrewd calculation, as distinguished from Cheirisophos' simple aggressiveness, which overcame the obstacle to the Greeks' onward march that was caused by other barbarian tribes (IV 7.1-14). After some further strenuous efforts the Greeks came finally within sight of the sea. Xenophon, who was in command of the rear, was so to speak the last Greek who was vouchsafed this deeply moving and beautiful sight. But this did not minimize in the least the greatness of his achievement: it was his prudent counsel which had saved the Greeks from the king's and the other barbarians' attempts to destroy them.

If there could be any doubt about this, it would be disposed of by the grand, solemn and gay celebration which the Greeks staged after having arrived at the Greek city of Trapezus, located at the Black Sea in the land of [the] Kolchians. They stayed for about thirty days in Kolchis where they found ample provisions partly by plundering and partly by buying from the Trapezuntianes. Thereafter they prepared the sacrifices which they had vowed. They sacrificed to Zeus the Savior and to Hercules the Leader as well as to the other gods to whom they had made vows. Here Xenophon seems to disclose the identity of the gods to whom the god in Delphi had advised him to sacrifice prior to his departure and which he had disclosed previously only to Socrates (III 1.6-8).

Next the question arose of how the army should continue its progress toward Greece proper. There was universal agreement that the rest of the journey should be made by sea. Cheirisophos promised that if he were sent to the admiral in command of the Spartan navy, he would bring back the ships required for the purpose. This proposal was approved by the army. Xenophon alone, who was the least sanguine, uttered a warning. He told the soldiers what they would have to do and how they would have to behave until Cheirisophos' return, and in particular that they could not be certain that Cheirisophos' mission would succeed. But when he drew their attention to the fact that they might have to continue their way by land and hence that the cities situated along the sea ought to be directed to repair the road, the soldiers protested loudly: under no circumstances would they continue to march by land. Xenophon wisely refrained therefore from putting his proposal to the vote but achieved what he regarded as indispensable by persuading the cities to take care of the roads; in addition, of the detachments which disregarded Xenophon's injunctions, some were destroyed by enemy action.

After Cheirisophos' departure Xenophon was in fact the chief commander of the whole Greek army. The Trapezuntianes did not wish to get into trouble with the Kolchians for the sake of provisioning the Greek army and therefore led that army against the Drilai, the most warlike of the peoples of the Pontos who inhabited territory difficult of access. The Greeks' light armed troops could not take the enemy stronghold and it was quite impossible for them to retreat. In this situation

Xenophon, asked for a decision, agreed with the view of the captains that an assault on the stronghold be made by the hoplites, for he put his reliance on the favorable sacrifices as interpreted by the soothsayers (V 2.9). The counsels of human prudence and the hints of the god proved to be in full agreement: the stronghold was taken by the hoplites. But this was not yet the end of the battle; an enemy reserve, apparently first observed by Xenophon, came to sight upon certain strong heights. That is to say: there was agreement between the view of the other commanders, and not of Xenophon in particular, and that of the soothsayers. The situation was as desperate as it was before Xenophon's intervention. Then quite unexpectedly and suddenly some god gave the Greeks a saving device: somebody—only god knows how and why—set a house on fire and this led to a panic on the part of the enemy; when Xenophon grasped the lesson supplied by chance, he gave orders that all houses, i.e., the whole city, be burned down. What was first called "some god," is now called "chance": *deus sive casus*. It is surely something different from human prudence or, from the point of view of the good pursuit of human prudence, something higher than human prudence which brought about the Greek victory (*Mem.* I 1.8). It was Xenophon's reliance on the superhuman, on the *daimonion*, which distinguished him from the other commanders and which showed itself with particular clarity after he had become in fact the commander-in-chief. One cannot help wondering how Xenophon's extraordinary piety went together with his extraordinary wiliness. As a human being he was surely less powerful than any god. But may he not have been wiler than any god? May not a slave be wiler than his master, however wily? Yet, the gods, in contradistinction to human beings, know everything (*Mem.* I 1.19, but compare *Symposium* 4.47); therefore, they will see through every human ruse. But is precisely the attribution of omniscience to the gods not part of a human ruse, of human flattering? The great difficulty which here remains in Xenophon or his Socrates is connected with the fact that according to him (or to them), the pious man is the man who knows the laws, or what is established by laws, regarding the gods, and that he never raises the question, "what is law?" (*Mem.* IV 6.4 and I 2.41-46). This difficulty cannot be resolved within the context of an interpretation of the *Anabasis*. It would be both simpler and less simple to say that Xenophon or his Socrates never raise the still more fundamental question, "what is a god?"

The Greeks were finally compelled to leave Trapezus by land. Only the least strong, led by the two oldest generals, were sent off by boat. Those who marched arrived on the third day in Kerasus, a Greek city on the sea where they stayed for ten days, made a review of the hoplites and counted them: 8,600 hoplites out of about 10,000 proved to have survived. Thereafter they distributed the money received from the sale of the booty. A tithe had been assigned to Apollon and to Artemis of Ephesus; each of the generals took his part to them in the place indi-

cated by the god. Xenophon specifies how he applied the portion entrusted to him in honor of Apollon. As for the portion to be given by him in honor of Artemis, he ran into some difficulty because in the meantime he had been exiled by the city of Athens—presumably because he was fighting on the side of the Spartans against his fatherland—but the Spartans settled him in Skillus where he bought a plot of land for Artemis according to Apollon's oracular choice. The land was rich in beasts of chase; the hunting, to which the whole neighborhood was invited, took place in honor of the huntress-goddess. Xenophon had the temple to the goddess built as a replica of the Artemis-temple in Ephesus. It would indeed have been a shocking solecism if he had abandoned his piety or receded from its demands after his blessed return. His account of his life in Skillus is a fitting conclusion to his account of the supreme command which he exercised after Cheirisophos' departure.

From Kerasus the Greeks proceeded by sea or by land to the mountains of the Mossynoikians. The Mossynoikians to whom they came first attempted to prevent them from passing through their territory, but Xenophon arranged an alliance with those Mossynoikians who were enemies of the former. The attack upon the enemy stronghold led to a disgraceful defeat not only of the allied barbarians but also of those Greeks who had of their own free will accompanied them for the sake of plunder. On the next day however, the whole Greek army, properly prepared by sacrifices which were favorable, attacked and was entirely successful. The Greeks were naturally well received by the allied Mossynoikians. Those people were regarded by the soldiers as the most barbarous men whom they had met on their march, the most remote from the Greek laws, for they did in public what others would do only when they are alone, and when they were alone they would act as if they were in the company of others—talking to themselves, laughing by themselves, dancing wherever they chanced to be, as if they were giving an exhibition to others (V 4.33-34). We were previously led to believe that the Karduchians and the Armenians were the two poles whom the Greeks came to know on their march. We see now that the Mossynoikoi are more alien to the Greeks than either the Karduchians or the Armenians. This does not mean, as goes without saying, that the Mossynoikians lived in a "state of nature"; they lived under laws as well as all other tribes. All men live under laws; to this extent, law is natural to man or law belongs to man's nature. Yet it is nevertheless necessary to make a distinction between nature and law (cf. *Oec.* 7.29-30 and *Hiero* 3.9) and to preserve it. Some light falls on the seeming paradox if we observe the similarity of some traits of the most extreme barbarians with some traits of Socrates (cf. *Symposium* 2.18-19; cf. Plato, *Symposium*, 175a7-b3, c3-d2, 217b7-c7, 220c3-d5).

When the Greeks came to the land of the Tibarenians, the generals were tempted to attack their fortresses but they abstained from this since

the sacrifices were not favorable and all soothsayers agreed that the gods in no way permitted that war. So they marched peacefully through the Tibarenians' land until they came to Kotyora, a Greek city, a colony of the Sinopeans. There they stayed 45 days, in the first place sacrificing to the gods and each Greek tribe instituting processions and gymnastic contests. As for provisions, they had to take them by force, since no one sold them any. Thereupon the Sinopeans became frightened and sent an embassy to the army. The spokesman for the embassy was Hekatonymos, who was thought to be a clever speaker. He revealed his power of oratory by addressing to the Greek soldiers a few friendly words which were followed by a much more extensive and insulting threat to the effect that the Sinopeans might ally themselves with the Paphlagonians and anybody else against Xenophon's army. Xenophon disposed of the threat by not only contrasting the customs and actions of the Sinopeans with those of the Trapezuntians and even some of the barbarians through whose land they had passed, but by a much more effective counter-threat: the alliance with the Paphlagonians is at least as possible for Xenophon's army as for the Sinopeans. As a consequence of Xenophon's oratory Hekatonymos lost his standing among his fellow ambassadors and there was perfect harmony between the Sinopeans and the army. Xenophon had perfectly succeeded in defending the army against the charge of injustice; he had given a signal proof of his justice by presenting his possible recourse to war against Greeks in alliance with barbarians as an act of sheer self-defense.

Yet the harmony was not as perfect as it seemed at first. On the next day the generals called together an assembly of the soldiers and of the ambassadors from Sinope, in order to decide the question of whether the army should continue its journey by land or by sea; in either case they would need the help of the Sinopeans. Hekatonymos again made a speech. He asserted that to march through Paphlagonia was altogether impossible; the only way out was by sailing to Herakleia. Although the speaker was by no means trusted by all soldiers—some of them suspected him of being a secret friend of the king of the Paphlagonians—the soldiers voted to continue the journey by sea. Xenophon added this warning: the resolution is acceptable only if literally all soldiers will be embarked and accordingly if the necessary number of boats be provided. So new negotiations between the army and the Sinopeans became necessary. In this situation it occurred to Xenophon that, considering the magnitude of the Greeks' armed force in this out of the way region, it would be a resplendent thing if the soldiers were to increase the territory and power of Greece by founding a city. It would become a large city, considering the size of the army and the number of the people already settled in the region. Before talking to anyone, Xenophon sacrificed and consulted Cyrus' soothsayer. But that soothsayer was eager to return home—for he had his pockets filled with the money which Cyrus had given him for his true prophecy—and therefore betrayed to the army Xenophon's plan

which he traced solely to the latter's desire to preserve for himself a name and power.

Here we seem to have reached, and already surpassed, the peak of Xenophon's ascent. Granted that the foundation of a great Greek city "in some barbaric place" (Plato, *Republic* 499c9) would have redounded to Xenophon's name and power, was that name and power not amply deserved? Would his action not have been beneficial, not only to him but to Greece and hence to the human race? Had he not justly and piously performed anything, and more than anything, that one could expect from someone who had joined the expedition of Cyrus as a nobody and apparently for rather frivolous reasons? Xenophon was fit to the highest degree not only to be the supreme commander of the army but to become the founder of a city, worthy of the greatest honor during his life and especially after his death: the honors awarded to the founder of a city. But then, in the last moment, that highest and so well-deserved honor is snatched away from him not by any divine ill-will but by a greedy soothsayer. It goes without saying that the gods did not come to Xenophon's assistance in that matter.

But perhaps we have not paid sufficient attention to the true difficulty. When the soldiers heard of Xenophon's still undivulged plan to found a city far away from Greece, the majority disapproved of it. In an assembly of the soldiers a number of men attacked the plan. Xenophon however listened in silence. Timasion, who officially was Xenophon's fellow commander of the rear (III 2.37-38), declared that one must not esteem anything more highly than Greece and hence not think of staying in the Pontos (V 6.22). Tacitly, perhaps unknowingly, Timasion was opposing Proxenos' invitation addressed to Xenophon to join Cyrus' expedition, for the invitation was based on the premise that it is perhaps right to regard Cyrus as better for oneself than one's fatherland (III 11.4). Xenophon fails to reply to that grave, if implicit, charge: was the thought that one can esteem a barbarian prince or king more highly than one's fatherland not an act of profound injustice, perhaps even the root of Xenophon's injustice?

But, to repeat, Xenophon remained silent. Only when he was reproached for trying to persuade the soldiers privately and for sacrificing privately, instead of bringing the matter before the assembly, was he compelled to stand up and to speak. He begins by stating that, as they knew through their own seeing, he sacrifices as much as he can both regarding the soldiers and himself in order to achieve by speaking, thinking and doing what will be most noble and best both for the soldiers and himself. In other words, the soothsayer's distinction or opposition between Xenophon's and the soldiers' interest is a vicious imputation. In the present case, Xenophon continues, he sacrificed solely in order to find out whether it would be better to speak to the soldiers and to do the required things or not to touch the matter at all (V 6.28). This means in plain English that he did not consult the sacrifices regarding

the advisability of his thinking about the founding of a city. The case resembles his conduct toward Proxenos' invitation to join Cyrus' expedition when Xenophon, deviating from Socrates' counsel, asked the god in Delphi not whether he should join that expedition but what he should do in the way of sacrifices and prayers in order to make the journey in the most noble manner (III 1.7). Yet there is this important difference between the two cases: in the case of Proxenos' invitation, Xenophon himself made the decision to join Cyrus' expedition; in the case of the founding of a city, he found out from the soothsayer the most important thing, namely, that the sacrifices were favorable: so that there was nothing wrong with thinking about the founding of a city. But thinking is one thing; speaking and doing are entirely different things. Xenophon was prevented from consulting the sacrifices regarding speaking and doing, not by unfavorable sacrifices or by his own decision, but by the very soothsayer. This happened in the following manner. The soothsayer had told Xenophon the truth about the sacrifices since he knew of Xenophon's thorough knowledge in this field of human endeavor; but he added of his own the warning that, as the sacrifice revealed, some fraud and plot against Xenophon was being prepared; for he knew—not indeed from the sacrifices—that he himself was plotting to slander Xenophon before the soldiers by asserting that Xenophon intended to found a city without having persuaded the army. Xenophon has thus succeeded perfectly in refuting the soothsayer's charge. But now, he goes on, given the opposition of the majority, he himself abandons his plan and proposes that anyone who leaves the army before the end of the journey be regarded as having committed a punishable offense. His proposal was unanimously adopted. This decision naturally displeased the soothsayer greatly, for he was eager to go home with his money at once. His lone protest did not have the slightest effect on the generals. The case was different with some more powerful members of the army who had conspired with the Greeks of the Pontos against Xenophon. A rumor was launched that Xenophon had not given up his plan to found a city. There was a mutinous spirit abroad so that Xenophon found it advisable to call together an assembly of the army.

It was very easy for him to show even to the meanest capacity the stupidity of believing that he could deceive the whole army about his alleged plan to found a city in Asia while the large majority, if not all except himself, were eager to return to Greece. Regardless of whether the imputation of that folly was due to one man or to more than one, it stemmed from envy, a natural consequence of the great honors awarded to him which were the natural consequences of his great merits. He had never prevented anyone from acquiring the same or greater merits: by speaking, fighting or being awake (V 7.10). The tripartition "speaking, fighting, being awake" takes the place of the tripartition "speaking, thinking, doing" (V 6.28) but fighting now takes the place which thinking occupied in the earlier discussion, because thinking was there central for

the reason given when we discussed that passage; "thinking" is now replaced by "being awake" since it is intended as "worrying," a special kind of thinking (*merimnai*, *phrontizein*). Xenophon is willing to cede his authority to anyone who shares his deserts but to a slight degree. This is the end of his defense. But he has an important point to add. The greatest danger that threatens the army does not come from a plan to found a city or similar things but from the lack of discipline in the army which has already led to terrible crimes, partly told to Xenophon now for the first time and as a whole told by him for the first time to the army; it will in the future inevitably lead to its destruction. Xenophon has turned from defense to attack, and this turn is entirely successful. The soldiers spontaneously move and resolve that henceforth those responsible for the crimes committed will be punished and that those who in the future will start illegal proceedings will be put on trial for their lives; the generals will be responsible for the proceedings against all crimes committed since Cyrus' death and the captains will form the jury. At Xenophon's advice and with the approval of the soothsayers, it is further enacted that the army be purified and the purification was performed.

This was not yet the end of Xenophon's defense turned into attack. It was resolved—Xenophon does not say at whose suggestion—that the generals themselves should be prosecuted for any offenses they might have committed. One of the generals accused of misconduct was Xenophon himself; he was accused by some of having beaten soldiers from *hybris*, i.e., without necessity. This means that at this time the difference between him and Proxenos becomes the theme. It was as easy for him to defend himself against the charge of acting against the soldiers from *hybris* as it was to defend himself against the charge that he would found a colony against the will of the army. In continuing he asks the soldiers to remember not only the harsh actions which he was compelled to perform for their benefit but also the kind ones. His speech ends with this memorable sentence: "It is noble as well as just and pious and more pleasant to remember the good things rather than the bad ones." It is pleasant to remember bad things after one has come safely through them, although even as regards the pleasures of memory the good things are preferable to the bad ones. At any rate, from every point of view there seems to be in the last analysis a harmony between the noble, the just, the pious and the pleasant. No wonder then that Xenophon speaks as much as possible in terms of praise rather than in terms of blame. It should go without saying that his audience complied with the advice with which he concluded his speech.

Xenophon's trial leads then to a complete acquittal. Perhaps nothing shows more clearly the difference between him and Socrates than the fact that Socrates' trial culminated in his capital punishment. But we must not forget that Xenophon's plan to found a city failed.

In Book Five there occurs a somewhat larger number of oaths pronounced by Xenophon himself than in all preceding Books.

The dissatisfaction of the army which led to Xenophon's accusation was not altogether unfounded. If we are not "excessively pious" (Herodotus II 37.1)—and nothing and no one forces us to be so—we may admit that Xenophon has indeed succeeded perfectly in vindicating his piety; but did he vindicate his justice? Did he meet the implicit charge that he esteemed something more highly than Greece? More than that: is full devotion to Greece the sole or even the highest ingredient of justice? Must one not, just as in the case of horses, prefer not the indigenous or homebred, the children of the fatherland, but the best human beings (*Cyropaedia* II 2.26. Dakyns *ad loc.* observes: "Xenophon's breadth of view: virtue is not confined to citizens, but we have the pick of the whole world. Cosmopolitan Hellenism.")? Xenophon has described an army, nay, a political society, which is constructed according to this highest standard in his *Education of Cyrus*. What then is the difference from the point of view of justice between the hero of *The Education of Cyrus*, the older Cyrus, and Xenophon? The older Cyrus achieved what he achieved partly by virtue of his descent, his inheritance: he was on both sides the heir of a long line of hereditary kings; Xenophon had no such advantages. Granted that from the highest point of view only knowledge of how to rule gives a man a right to rule—and not, for instance, inheritance (cf. *Mem.* III 9.10), does not knowledge of how to rule need some iron alloy, some crude and rough admixture in order to become legitimate, i.e., politically viable? Is, to use a favorite term of Burke, "prescription" not an indispensable ingredient of non-tyrannical government, of legitimacy? In a word, "justice" is an ambiguous term; it may mean the virtue of the man which consists in surpassing his friends in benefiting them and his enemies in harming them (*Mem.* II 6.35); but it may also mean the virtue of a Socrates whose justice consists in not harming anyone even in a little thing (*ibid.* IV 8.11). While Xenophon undoubtedly possessed the justice of a man, he can hardly be said to have possessed the justice of Socrates. This does not mean that his place is near to that of the older Cyrus. One fact settles this question to our full satisfaction: the enjoyment which Cyrus derived after his first battle from looking at the faces of the slain enemies was too much even for his own grandfather, the tyrannical king of Media, to bear (*Cyrop.* I 4.24); cruelty is indeed an indispensable ingredient of the military commander as such (*Mem.* III 1.6), but there is a great variety of degrees of cruelty. Xenophon stands somewhere in between the older Cyrus and Socrates. By this position he presents to us not a lack of decisiveness but the problem of justice: justice requires both the virtue of a man (and therefore with the possible emancipation of cruelty) and the virtue of Socrates; the virtue of the man points to Socratic virtue and Socratic virtue requires as its foundation the virtue of the man; both kinds of virtue cannot coexist in their plenitude in one and the same human being. Xenophon may

have regarded himself as the closest approximation best known to himself to their coexistence in one and the same human being. (Cf. Strauss, *Xenophon's Socrates*, 144.) Surely, Xenophon (does not equal Plato) presents himself in his difference from Socrates.

Shortly after Xenophon's acquittal and the restoration of military discipline as well as the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Paphlagonians, from whom the Greeks had for a time partly procured their provisions through robbery, Cheirisophos returned from his mission to the Spartan admiral Anaxibios. He did not bring the boats which he had promised or hoped to bring but he brought words of praise and a promise from Anaxibios that if the army would succeed in getting out of the Pontos, he would employ them as mercenaries. This increased the soldiers' hope for a speedy return to Greece and hence for possessions which they might take home. They thought that if they were to choose a single commander for the whole army, they would achieve their goal best because of the obvious advantages of monarchic rule (greater secrecy and dispatch and the like) for purposes of this kind. With this thought in mind they turned to Xenophon. The captains told him that the army wanted him to be sole commander and tried to persuade him to accept this position. He was not entirely adverse to the prospect of being sole, absolute ruler, not responsible to any one; he considered that this position would increase his honor among his friends and his name in Athens and perhaps he might do some good to the army. But when he considered how immanifest to every human being the future is, he saw that the exalted position offered him brought with it also the danger of his losing even the reputation which he had gained heretofore. Unable to make up his mind, he did what any sensible man confronted with such a dilemma would do; he communicated his difficulty to the god. He sacrificed two victims to Zeus the King. That god distinctly indicated to him that he should not strive for the position nor accept it if he were elected to it. The oracle was less clearly unfavorable. But instead of saying this directly, straightaway, Xenophon gives a brief survey of his earlier experiences with the omnia related to his fate: his experience with his attempt to found a city and perhaps with his accusation throw a new light on the old omnia. As for his consulting Zeus the King, this was the god who had been named to him by the Delphic oracle. Furthermore, he was the same god who, Xenophon believed, had shown him the dream when he set out to take care of the army together with others, i.e., after the murder of the generals; the dream was ambiguous (III 1.12) but originally Xenophon had taken it as rather a good omen. Finally, he remembered now that at the very beginning of his setting out from Ephesus to join Cyrus, a sitting eagle screamed upon his right; as a soothsayer explained to him, this omen was a great one, by no means befitting a nobody, indicating great fame but at the same time great toil, for birds are most apt to attack the sitting eagle; nor did that omen prognosticate the

acquisition of great wealth, for the flying eagle is more likely than the sitting one to take what it wants.

For a moment one is tempted to believe that not the plan to become the founder of a Greek city in the Pontos but the election to supreme command of the whole army, to "the monarchy" (VI 1.31), would have been the peak of Xenophon's ascent (cf. *Cyropaedia* VIII 2.28; Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1115a32). But can "monarchy" equal "foundation" in grandeur, in sacredness?

In an assembly of the soldiers all speakers said that one man should be elected commander of the whole army and after this proposal was approved Xenophon was proposed for that position. In order to prevent his election, which seemed to be imminent, he had to state the case against his election as clearly and as forcibly as he could. That case had been made in the required manner by the gods, but in his speech to the army he is to begin with silent on this theme; to begin with, he keeps his pious thought private, for himself. In his public speech, he speaks to begin with publicly, politically, as a political man. The reason seems to be this. He does not merely wish to prevent his own election but to give the army some guidance as to whom they should elect. As for that guidance he had no oracular indication. He had to make the decision himself—just as he had made the decision in Delphi as to whether or not he should accept Proxenos' invitation. Xenophon disapproves of the thought that the army would elect him as supreme commander when a Spartan was present and available; in the circumstances the election of Xenophon would be inexpedient both for the army and for Xenophon himself. As the Spartans have shown by their conduct in the late war, they will never permit leadership to go to a non-Spartan (cf. III 2.37). Xenophon assures the army that he will not be so foolish as to cause dissension if he is not elected: to rebel against the rulers while a war is going on means to rebel against one's own salvation. The seemingly casual observation of Xenophon regarding the Spartan preponderance and her concern with it must never be neglected; it helps to explain the partly true and partly alleged pro-Spartan bias of his writings. The immediate reaction to Xenophon's observation was indeed anti-Spartan; whether and to what extent that immediate reaction was intended by Xenophon perhaps as a warning to the irascible Spartan candidate against misuse of his power in case of his election it is impossible to say. The reference to the Peloponnesian War is also helpful and even more helpful for indicating the questionable character of fidelity to Greece as the sole or most important ingredient of justice. At any rate Xenophon is now compelled to counteract the effect of this seemingly pro-Spartan move. Swearing by all gods and goddesses he now states that the gods have stated to him in a manner which even a tyro in such matters could not misunderstand that he, Xenophon, must abstain from "the monarchy"; to accept that position would be bad for the army but in particular also for Xenophon (cf. *Mem.* I 1.8). It literally goes without saying that Cheirisophos is

elected sole and absolute commander. He gladly accepts the honor and confirms Xenophon's suspicion that the Athenian would have had a very hard time with the Spartans. The fact that the choice lay only between Xenophon and Cheirisophos shows that the struggle for hegemony within Greece was still the Spartan-Athenian struggle and therefore that the identification of justice with fidelity to Greece remained questionable.

Under Cheirisophos' command the Greeks sailed on the next day along the coast to Herakleia, a Greek city. But the soldiers still had to settle the question whether they could continue their journey from there by land or by sea. The question was inseparable from that of how to provision the army. One of the men who had opposed Xenophon's plan to found a city proposed that they should demand money from the Herakleotai: should one not send Cheirisophos, the elected ruler, and perhaps even Xenophon to Herakleia for that purpose? Both leading men strongly opposed the use of violence against a friendly Greek city. The soldiers elected therefore a special embassy. But they met only firm resistance on the part of the Herakleotai. This led to a mutinous mood of the majority of the Greek soldiers who were Achaians and Arcadians and refused to be dictated to by a Spartan or an Athenian. They separated therefore from the minority and elected ten generals of their own. In this way, the command of Cheirisophos was terminated about a week after his election: an indication of the impermanence of the Spartan hegemony. One sees in retrospect how well the gods had advised Xenophon regarding the rejection of "the monarchy." He was displeased with the splitting up of the army—a splitting up which, he thought, endangered the safety of all its parts. But he was persuaded by Neon, the commander immediately subordinate to Cheirisophos of the latter's contingent (V 6.36), to join, together with Cheirisophos and his contingent, the force commanded by Klearchos, the Spartan commander at Byzantion. Xenophon gave in to Neon's advice perhaps because it agreed with the oracular indication of Herakles the Leader; surely that indication was not, as far as we know, supported by any calculation or guesswork on the part of Xenophon. But is this quite correct? Xenophon was contemplating leaving the army and sailing home, but when he sacrificed to Herakles the Leader and consulted him, the god indicated to him that he should stay with the soldiers. Whether or to what extent Herakles' indication or Xenophon's or Neon's purely human persuading determined Xenophon, it is impossible to say. Thus the whole army was split into three parts: the Arcadians and Achaians, the troops of Cheirisophos, and those of Xenophon. Each part went in a different way in the direction of Thrace.

The Arcadians (and Achaians) disembarked by night at Kalpe Harbor; they immediately proceeded to occupy the villages of the neighborhood which abounded in booty; in fact the Greeks took a lot of booty. But when the Thracians recovered from the unexpected attack, they killed a considerable number of their assailants and cut off the retreat of their

enemies. Cheirisophos, on the other hand, who had marched along the coast, arrived safely in Kalpe. Xenophon, the only Greek commander who had some cavalry, learned through his horsemen of the fate of the Arcadians. Thereupon he called his soldiers together and explained to them that their situation required that they save the Arcadians. Perhaps, he concluded, the god wishes to arrange things in this way that those who talked big are humbled whereas we, who begin with the gods, will have a more honorable fate. He made of course all the necessary arrangements. Timasion with the horses would be in the van; everything was to be done to create the impression that the troops relieving the besieged Arcadians were much more numerous than they in fact were; the first thing they did in the next morning was to pray to the gods. Eventually—be it through the wish of the god or through Xenophon's counsel or through both—the three parts of the army were reunited in Kalpe, which is located in Asiatic Thrace. The region was very fertile and attractive, so much so that the suspicion arose that the soldiers had been brought hither owing to the scheming of some who wished to found a city (VI 4.7). Yet the majority of the soldiers had joined Cyrus' expedition not from poverty at home but in order to make money in order to return to Greece loaded with riches. At any rate, after the failure of the Arcadians the whole army resolved that henceforth the proposal to split the army would be treated as a capital crime and that the generals elected by the whole army be restored to their power. The situation was further simplified by the death of Cheirisophos, who had taken a medicine for fever; his successor became Neon. In a way unforeseen by any human being Xenophon had thus become the "monarch," while the plan to found a city remained as abortive as before. The question is however unresolved of how the political difficulty obstructing an Athenian's monarchy in a period of Spartan hegemony can be overcome. As we shall see almost at once, it is resolved by an event which could be understood as an act of the god or Xenophon's piety.

As Xenophon next explained to an assembly of the soldiers, the army had to continue its journey by land, since no boats were available, and they had to continue it at once, since they had no longer the necessary provisions. Yet the sacrifices were unfavorable. This renewed the suspicion that Xenophon had persuaded the soothsayer to give a false report about the sacrifices because he still planned to found a city. The sacrifices continued to be unfavorable, so that Xenophon refused to lead out the army for provisioning itself. An attempt made by Neon to get provisions from the nearby barbarian villages ended in disaster. Eventually provisions arrived by ship from Herakleia. Xenophon arose early in order to sacrifice with a view to an expedition and now the sacrifices were favorable. A soothsayer saw at about this time another good omen and therefore urged Xenophon to start the expedition against the enemy (Persians and their Thracian allies). Never before had the resistance of the gods to intended actions of the Greek army been so sustained.

Needless to say, there were opportunities left to Xenophon to reveal his military and rhetorical skills. In the ensuing battle the Greeks were unmistakably victorious.

While the Greeks still waited for the arrival of Kleandros, they provisioned themselves from the nearby countryside, which abounded in almost all good things. Furthermore, the Greek cities brought things for sale to the camp. Again a rumor arose that a city was being founded and that there would be a harbor. Even the enemies tried to establish friendly relations with the new city which was alleged to be founded by Xenophon and turned to him with questions on this subject but he wisely remained in the background.

Eventually Kleandros arrived with two triremes but with no merchant ship. He arrived in the company of the Spartan Dexippus who had rather misbehaved in Trapezus. Thus it came to an ugly dissension between Kleandros and Agasias, one of the generals elected by the army. Despite all efforts of Xenophon and the other generals Kleandros took the side of Dexippus and declared that he would forbid every city to receive the Greek mercenaries, "for at that time the Spartans ruled all Greeks" (VI 6.9). Kleandros demanded the extradition of Agasias. But Agasias and Xenophon were friends. This precisely was the reason why Dexippus slandered Xenophon. The commanders called an assembly of the soldiers in which Xenophon explained to the army the gravity of the situation that had arisen: every single Spartan can accomplish in the Greek cities whatever he pleases. The conflict with Kleandros will make it impossible for the Greek mercenaries either to stay in Thrace or to sail home. The only thing to do is to submit to Spartan power. Xenophon himself, whom Dexippus had accused to Kleandros as responsible for Agasias' quasi-rebellion, surrenders to Kleandros for adjudication and advises every other man who is accused to do the same. Agasias swears by the gods and goddesses that he acted entirely on his own initiative: he follows Xenophon's example by also surrendering to Kleandros. Thanks to Xenophon's intervention the whole conflict is peaceably settled: he saved not only himself but so to speak all his comrades in arms, not only from the Persians and other barbarians but from the Spartans as well.

The Spartan admiral Anaxibios was induced by the Persian satrap Pharnabazus to arrange for the removal of the Greek army from Asia since it seemed to constitute a threat to his province. Anaxibios promised the commanders to hire the army as mercenaries in case they crossed over to Europe. The only man who was unwilling to consider Anaxibios' proposal was Xenophon, but he gave in when Anaxibios merely asked him to postpone his leaving the army until after the crossing. The soldiers next entered Byzantium but Anaxibios failed to give them the promised pay. On the other hand he wished to avail himself of the services of the mercenaries in a war with the Thracian Seuthes in which he was engaged. He succeeded in persuading the mercenaries to leave the city until they became aware that they were to be cheated of their pay; then

they re-entered the city with the use of force. An ugly conflict threatened. Thinking not only of Byzantion and the army but also of himself, Xenophon intervened. When the soldiers saw him, they told him that here was his great chance: "You have a city, you have triremes, you have money, you have so many soldiers." He first attempted to quiet them down, and, after he had succeeded in this, called an assembly of the army and told them the following things: by avenging themselves on the Spartans for a deception attempted by a few Spartans and by plundering a wholly innocent city, they merely would make all Spartans and all allies of Sparta, i.e., all Greeks, their enemies; the experience of the Peloponnesian War has shown them all how mad their proceedings and intentions are; it will lead to a hopeless war between the small army of mercenaries and the whole power of Greece which is now under Spartan control; all justice is on the side of the Spartans, for it is unjust to take revenge on the Spartans for the deception attempted by a few Spartans and by plundering a wholly innocent city—the first Greek city which they occupied—while they never harmed a barbarian city; the mercenaries themselves will become exiled by their fatherland and hence their fatherlands' and even their kin's enemies. He urges them that being Greeks they obey those who rule the Greeks and thus try to obtain their rights. If they fail in this, they will at least avoid being deprived of Greece. On Xenophon's entreaty the army resolved to send to Anaxibios a properly submissive message. Xenophon knew both when to resist and when to give in. So it came to pass that ultimately through Persian treachery even those Greeks who were willing to esteem Cyrus more highly than Greece were compelled to restore Greece to her rightful place. But—to say nothing of the justice of Cyrus' expedition against his brother—this is not yet the end of the story.

Anaxibios' reply was none too gracious. This gave a Theban adventurer the opportunity to try to sabotage the arrangement which Xenophon had proposed. The next result however was that Xenophon by himself left Byzantion in the company of Kleandros. Thereafter there arose a dissension among the generals as to where the army should move; this led to a partial disintegration of the army—a result welcome to Pharnabazus and therefore also to Anaxibios. But Anaxibios was about to hand over the command of the Spartan navy to his successor and was therefore no longer courted by Pharnabazus. Therefore Anaxibios asked Xenophon to return to the army and to bring back to Asia by all means the bulk of Cyrus' mercenaries; the soldiers gave Xenophon a friendly reception, glad as they were to leave Thrace for Asia. Given the intra-Spartan jealousies, fidelity to Sparta and hence to Greece was not easy, if not altogether impossible.

In this situation Seuthes renewed an earlier attempt to win Xenophon over to his side. Kleonor and another general had already before wished to lead the army to Seuthes, who had won their favor with gifts, but Xenophon refused to give in to Seuthes' wish. The new Spartan comman-

der in Byzantion, Aristarchos, forbade the return of Cyrus' mercenaries to Asia. Xenophon had to fear being betrayed by the Spartan commander or by the Persian satrap. He therefore consulted the god as to whether he should not attempt to lead the army to Seuthes. Anaxibios' plot against Xenophon becoming now most manifest and the sacrifices being favorable, he decided that it was safe for him and for the army to join Seuthes. In their first meeting Xenophon and Seuthes stated what kind of help each expected to receive from the other; Xenophon was especially concerned with what kind of protection against the Spartans Seuthes would offer to the mercenaries. In an assembly of the soldiers Xenophon stated to them, before they made up their minds, what Aristarchos on the one hand and Seuthes on the other promised to them; he advised them to provision themselves forthwith from the villages from which they could safely do so. The majority of the soldiers thought that Seuthes' proposal was preferable in the circumstances. Thus Cyrus' mercenaries became Seuthes' mercenaries. But it soon became clear that Seuthes was not quite honest. He had invited the commanders to a banquet but he expected to receive gifts from them and especially from Xenophon prior to the banquet. This was particularly awkward for Xenophon, who was practically penniless at the moment. Still, when his turn came, he had had already a drink which enabled him to find a graceful way out.

Xenophon and his Greeks kept their bargain with their Thracian allies faithfully; they did their best to help Seuthes in subjugating his Thracian enemies. Yet there was the exorbitant cold of the Thracian winter. Above all, Seuthes' friend or agent Herakleides tried to cheat the Greek mercenaries of part of their pay. When found out by Xenophon, he incited Seuthes against him and attempted to induce the generals to defect from Xenophon. Xenophon began now to wonder whether it was wise to continue his alliance with Seuthes. In addition, as the pay for the soldiers was not forthcoming, they became very angry with Xenophon. At this moment, the Spartans Charminus and Polynikus sent by Thibron arrived and told the army that the Spartans were planning an expedition against Tissaphernes for which Cyrus' former army was urgently needed. This gave Seuthes a splendid opportunity for getting rid of the mercenaries and his debts to them at the same time. In an assembly of the soldiers the two Spartan emissaries laid their proposal before the soldiers who were delighted with it, but one of the Arcadians got up straightaway to accuse Xenophon who allegedly was responsible for the mercenaries' having joined Seuthes and received all the rich benefits of the soldiers' toils from Seuthes; Xenophon deserves capital punishment. Xenophon's ascent has finally led to the lowest descent. But ought one not also say that Xenophon's apology, which refers to deeds and speeches well known to innumerable men, is infinitely easier and at the same time infinitely more effective than Socrates'? Seuthes made a last minute attempt to prevent Xenophon's reconciliation with the Spartans by

calumniating the latter. But Zeus the King, whom Xenophon consulted, dispelled all suspicions.

There followed a somewhat ambiguous reconciliation between Xenophon and Seuthes and as its consequence the payment of the debt still owed to the mercenaries, and thereafter an unambiguous reconciliation between Xenophon and all mercenaries and between Xenophon and the Spartans. Xenophon eventually showed by deed that he esteemed Greece more highly than Cyrus and other barbarians (III 1.4). He failed to show that he esteemed his fatherland more highly than Cyrus or Sparta because the city of Athens had exiled him (V 3.7, V 6.22, VII 7.57), as he tells us, for reasons which he fails to tell us. Could Socrates' apprehension when he heard of Proxenos' invitation be vindicated by the *Anabasis* as a whole?

Xenophon begins at once to wage war against the Persians with a view to capturing booty. He was rather successful in this enterprise.

The density of references to god, of oaths and in particular of formal oaths pronounced by Xenophon himself is greater in Book VII than in all preceding Books.