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NIETZSCHE AND LIBERATION:
THE PRELUDE TO A PHILOSOPHY
OF THE FUTURE*

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Nietzsche begins *Beyond Good and Evil* by asserting that philosophic dogmatism has decisively obstructed the philosophic quest for truth.¹ The fact that all philosophy until now has been dogmatic in some fundamental sense is, however, nothing more than a sign of the youthfulness of the philosophic enterprise (*Beyond*, Preface, I, 11, II, 31). Nietzsche strives to bring philosophy to its maturity, thereby to prepare the way for a philosophy of the future. Because the new philosophy is to be distinguished from all past philosophy by its liberation from, or mature transcendence of, dogmatism, it is actually the first genuine philosophy. Never before has the authentically philosophic dedication to a comprehensive examination of opinion and faith, i.e., to an openness which admits of an ascent to the realm of the highest problems, been possible.²

This essay examines the nature of the philosophic liberation which Nietzsche seeks and the means by which it is to be attained.³ Nietzsche did not consider himself the first man to seek a state "beyond good and evil" for the sake of wisdom; the "three great religions" also regard such a state as the "liberation from all illusion" (*Gen.*, III. 17). Nietzsche distinguishes himself from his mystic predecessors by insisting upon self-glorification rather than self-effacement as the way to wisdom and by replacing, as the sign of freedom, "the hypnotic

* I wish to thank Joseph Cropsey for his helpful comments on the draft.

¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, Preface, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), p. 2, hereafter cited as *Beyond*. Major divisions of Nietzsche's works are cited by Roman numeral and the aphorisms within them by Arabic numeral.

² Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), III. 10, and *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), V. 343; hereafter cited as *Gen.* and *G.S.*, respectively.

³ I have relied primarily upon *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886) but have made considerable use of *On the Genealogy of Morals* (1887), which Nietzsche prepared as a clarifying supplement to *Beyond Good and Evil*, and of Book V of *The Gay Science* (1882), which Nietzsche added to the original edition in 1887 and to which he refers his readers in the third essay of the *Genealogy*. For the relationship between *Beyond Good and Evil* and the *Genealogy* to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, see Nietzsche's letters to Jakob Burckhardt (1886) and to Karl Knortz (1888) in *Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Christopher Middleton (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 255, 298, and *Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), pp. 310-13; the latter hereafter cited as *E.H.*

muting of the capacity to feel pain" with the intense desire to create, and then to endure, distress.

Nietzsche argues that philosophers have never succeeded in transcending the realm of popular opinion (*Beyond*, I. 2, 16, 19). The philosophic quest has remained imprisoned within the boundaries of political life, which requires belief in unconditional moral opposites or dogma for its maintenance (*G.S.*, III, 116). Nietzsche's criticism is directed toward the more tenacious, because more subtle, forms of dogmatism which remain influential after Christianity has been destroyed "as a dogma" (*Beyond*, Preface; *Gen.*, III. 24, 27; *G.S.*, V. 357, 358). Christian dogma is the exoteric manifestation of the ascetic ideal, which has dominated human life until now (*Gen.*, III. 13, 23, 25, 28). Nietzsche is most concerned, however, with the esoteric aspect of the ascetic ideal, i.e., with platonism in both its original and its modern form, which is equivalent to the hatred not specifically of sensuality, but of spirituality or philosophy (*Gen.*, III. 12, 25, 28). The defeat of religious piety itself brings forth Nietzsche's criticism. The unconditional devotion to truth, upon which contemporary atheism rests, is revealed, in the further development of truthfulness, as itself a kind of piety or dogmatism (*G.S.*, V. 343-44). Behind the theoretical opposition of truth and error or appearance is an unquestioned trust in the moral opposition of good and evil (*Beyond*, I. 2; II. 24, 34).

In *Beyond Good and Evil*, the problems associated with the preparation for a new era in philosophic thinking are resolved almost immediately into problems associated with the cultivation of a new type of philosophic man. The resolution of one type of problem into the other is mediated by a demonstration in Section I of the characteristic inability of philosophers to give an account of themselves and their activity (aphorisms 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11). The accusation that, of all men, philosophers have been "fooled best on earth" is most serious: philosophers have typically founded the belief in their superiority to non-philosophic men precisely upon the claim that they alone could give a clear and comprehensive account of themselves (*Beyond*, I. 5; II. 34).⁴

Philosophers have never really engaged in a proper self-examination; they have not justified their activity. The esoteric form of dogmatism has obstructed the philosophic quest by preventing the fundamental question about philosophy from being raised—the question of the value of the will to truth (*Beyond*, I. 1, 2; *Gen.*, Preface, 3, 6; III. 27). Since philosophers have never raised the most important question about themselves, they have never been able to see themselves clearly. The piety of philosophy has engendered a superficial psychology which praises self-denial as the prerequisite for wisdom (*Gen.*, III. 10). Nietzsche argues, however, that this psychological misperception obstructs cultivation of the genuine philosophic virtues, which depend

⁴ See Plato *Apology* 21d, *Ion* 530c, 538b, *Meno* 96b.

upon self-love. His analysis simultaneously liberates the potentially philosophic man from inhibitive psychological errors and philosophy from its dogmatic assumptions. Exposure of the ingenuous dissembling at the root of past philosophy is the one way to banish the infectious moral taint from the philosophic quest.

Nietzsche's new psychology amounts to an attempt to substitute a tenable hypothesis about the origins of philosophizing for an untenable one. The "typical" moral prejudice of philosophers, belief in the opposition of good and evil, leads them to a misunderstanding about the origin of their desire for truth. It is on the basis of this misunderstanding that philosophers have posited the independence of reason (*Beyond*, I. 2). Although Plato's invention of the pure mind is the original formulation of this error (*Beyond*, Preface), it persists in the modern scientific quest for objectivity⁵ and in any psychology which posits the ego as being (*Beyond*, I. 16, 17).

The judgment that the truth is absolutely good and appearance, error, or ignorance is absolutely evil requires that one believe in the self-subsistent and eternally separate existence of the realm of the true and the realm of the untrue. Philosophers have therefore believed that the desire for truth originates in the wish to be free of any contact with evil. A psychological conviction ensues to the effect that the vehicle for human apprehension of the Good, identified as conscious reason, must itself be entirely independent of and in principle opposed to everything else, everything lesser, in man—specifically, his physical impulses. In so far as the bodily drives obstruct or distort the reasoning activity, they are evil. Further, the presumed harmony between the absolutely true and the independent mind has led the philosopher to believe that through philosophy he can escape the bodily self; he can become good.

This trust in a possible ascent from the realm of the bodily,—specifically, from the decaying,—to the realm of eternal being (*Gen.*, III. 24) has animated the philosopher's judgments. Until now he has accorded them a life of their own and worshiped them as the bridge between his own mortality and the eternal. In the end, according to Nietzsche, all philosophers have submitted themselves to the tyranny of a perspective of their own making: "But this is an ancient, eternal, story: what formerly happened with the Stoics happens today, too, as soon as any philosophy begins to believe in itself" (*Beyond*, I. 9). Nietzsche, for his part, intends to transfigure philosophy's relation to belief and thereby to liberate the philosophic individual. He seeks to cultivate a philosophy that does not believe in itself and a philosophic self that does (*Gen.*, III. 10).

⁵ See Friedrich Nietzsche, "Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben," in *Gesammelte Werke* (Munich: Musarion Verlag, 1920-29), Vol. 6, pp. 273-84; *Beyond*, VI. 207-8; *Gen.*, III. 12, 24.

Nietzsche's understanding of the origins of philosophizing is equivalent to a skepticism about opposites. He utilizes the insight that good and evil things are interconnected and interdependent; most forcefully stated, he believes that "good" impulses are derived from "evil" ones (*Beyond*, I. 23). He doubts that consciousness and instinct are opposed (*Beyond*, I. 3; *Gen.*, III. 7; *G.S.*, IV. 333, V. 372). He studies the structure of the whole self and its mode of assertion, which is in every case some manifestation of the comprehensive life activity, the will to power (*Beyond*, I. 13, II. 36, IX. 259; *Gen.*, II. 12). The psychologist cannot, in fact, accurately distinguish the mental from the bodily—the will describes a series of instinctive processes which are themselves thoughtful (*Beyond*, I. 16, 19; *G.S.*, III. 126)—nor can he distinguish the self from what the self does. The will is active as well as thoughtful; no independent agent is required to do the "willing". Nietzsche's obliteration of the distinction between the self and the assertions of the self is self-affirming. Life as willing means that life is self-assertion (*Gen.*, I. 13). The assertions of the philosophic self originate, according to Nietzsche, in the "evil" lust to rule or to dominate. Philosophy is the prideful attempt to infuse meaning and order into the commotion of human perceptions (*Beyond*, I. 2, 9, VI. 211; *Gen.*, II. 13; *G.S.*, IV. 301).

The self or will is a complex of obeying and commanding instincts or affects and their respective thoughts. Thinking is "merely a relation of these drives to each other" (*Beyond*, II. 36; *G.S.*, IV. 333, V. 352). The affective element in philosophy must be recognized and liberated. Objective or clear-sighted vision into what is (*Beyond*, II. 39) cannot be attained by reason alone; rather, a proper affective basis for theorizing supports the intellect (*Gen.*, III. 12). If it were possible for consciousness to proceed independently of instinct, the naked intellect, its powers only bred into man at a late stage of his development, would be powerless in a confrontation with the instincts, the fundamental animators of the self. The philosophic praise of conscious reason has led philosophers to overestimate the power of conscious thinking in relation to the instincts and thus has made them susceptible to continual deception (*Beyond*, I. 3, 6, 8, 11; *G.S.*, I. 11, V. 354, 357).

The understanding of philosophy as an expression of the will to power destroys the belief in the opposition of instinct and consciousness. Even more fundamentally, however, it weakens the basis for the belief in the opposition of truth and untruth. Philosophy does not eventuate in the discovery of unadorned nature, free of an admixture of the merely human or conventional (*Beyond*, I. 14, 16, 21, 22; *G.S.*, I. 54). The philosophic quest to know, to be objective, is equivalent to the impulse to interpret or *make* known. Philosophic exertions of will are the highest expression of "the active and interpreting forces through which alone seeing becomes seeing *something*" (*Gen.*, III. 12). All knowing, all perception, by dint of its origin in willing, is ultimately inter-

pretive; interpretation is inseparable from evaluation. The philosophic quest for objectivity is, then, moral (*Beyond*, I. 6, 19; *G.S.*, III. 114). The evaluative scheme implied in every philosophic perspective constitutes its most vital element: it expresses the philosopher's own life, what he loves and what he needs. The psychologist addresses himself to the evaluations of the philosopher in order to infer from them what he is (*Beyond*, I. 6, II. 32, VI. 187, IX. 268; *G.S.*, V. 370).

Nietzsche's understanding of the character of philosophy attests to the potency of man, who, for the sake of mastery, engages in interpretive activity. But he seeks to make us aware of man's bondage to himself as well. Man as man is barred from complete union with the text of the world outside himself, with nature (*G.S.*, III. 109, V. 354, 374). He cannot perceive that world as it actually is, undifferentiated and continually shifting. To be sure, the development of science represents for Nietzsche an increasingly successful effort to isolate elements of natural processes which are perceived (*G.S.*, III. 112, V. 355); however, scientific description of processes which exist independently of man is not explanation. The evaluative world, the world of greatest concern to man (*Beyond*, II. 34), appears to possess a different cognitive status: man can apprehend directly that which he makes (*G.S.*, III. 246).

Nietzsche's psychology rests upon the notion of "perspectivity." Philosophy must be understood as both a conditioned and a conditioning activity (*Beyond*, Preface, I. 4, V. 188). Liberation of the human mind apparently requires loving acknowledgment of the dependence of the intellectual upon the passionate; the liberation of philosophy from conventional orthodoxy requires acceptance of philosophy as a conventional structuring of the natural. The foundation of philosophy upon an insight into the fact of human bondage is not, however, an affirmation of convention simply. Just as the species structuring of the outside world is, at any moment in history; elicited by its needs, so the philosophic vision is inevitably compelled to be what it is by nature (*Beyond*, I. 11, 20, 21, VII. 231, IX. 264; *Gen.* I. 13; *G.S.*, V. 347). All theorizing is rooted in the unfathomable particular, the subrational and unique constellation of drives and values represented by the philosopher himself. Philosophizing possesses the character of a spontaneous effusion born of an unperceived inner necessity (*Beyond*, V. 188, 192, VI. 213); the genuine philosophic modality is inspiration, or something closely akin to it.⁶ That theorizing has an identifiable natural or psychological origin suggests that the errors of past philosophy may be overcome by the creation of a new type of philosophic man (*Beyond*, VI. 203; *Gen.*, II. 24). The refutation of a narrow or superficial phi-

⁶ *Beyond*, I. 5, 6, IX. 292; *E.H.*, p. 218, Section III; cf. Plato *Apology* 22c, *Ion* 534a-e, *Meno* 99c-e, 100b.

losophy can occur only by subduing that which is irrefutable in it—the philosopher himself.⁷

The philosophers of the future must, according to Nietzsche, solve the “problem of value”; they must establish a system of ranks and orders through which all things will be understood in terms of their moral relations to other things.⁸ Philosophy rightfully eventuates in the most spiritual exercise of justice and hence in the highest form of command or rule (*Beyond*, VII. 211, 213, 219; *G.S.*, IV. 289). A new psychology is a necessary first step toward genuine philosophizing and is “the path to the fundamental problems” (*Beyond*, I. 23). That psychology will begin by taking the value of philosophy as problematic, and will proceed to liberate the instincts from inhibitive moral judgments (*Beyond*, V. 186; *Gen.*, Preface, 6; *G.S.*, V. 345). Thus it will prepare the philosophic man for his responsibility.

The psychologist can judge the relative value of a philosophic perspective in terms of its apprehension of what is. He makes this judgment, however, by way of an assessment of the philosopher himself: the vitality or health of the philosopher, says Nietzsche, appears to determine the justice of his reflections (*Gen.*, I. 5, 10, II. 11). While liberation of the instincts and, hence, of the will is crucial to the philosophic enterprise, instinctual freedom does not necessarily culminate in health or in philosophy. Nietzsche carefully delineates the meaning of instinctive health and its relationship to the philosophic task; he is not an advocate of instinctive liberation however understood.

The liberation of philosophic willing is an exceptional liberation. Nietzsche must disentangle the proper affective basis for theorizing from what he calls the normal operations of life. The fundamental obstacle to philosophy and the ultimate cause of its continued innocence and narrowness is human life itself. His phrase life as will to power means that intellectual life is the search for that measure of understanding which will increase power or render it secure (*Beyond*, VII. 230). The act of interpreting expresses the desire to overcome the alien or new, which in most cases means the desire to assimilate the new into the old and familiar (*Beyond*, V. 192). The “basic will of the spirit” does not seek the truth; rather, it is satisfied with any interpretation, however superficial, which allows it to flourish. The philosopher’s ignorance of the importance of the instincts in theorizing has inadvertently encouraged man’s natural tendency to surrender to the mere feeling of increased power. Unless the impulse to know itself becomes instinctive—becomes the animating impulse in a human being—it will not be a reliable and resolute check upon the basic will to power (*G.S.*, I. 3, 11, III. 123, 249).

⁷ See both of Nietzsche’s prefaces to “Die Philosophie im Tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen,” in *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. IV, pp. 151–52.

⁸ *Genealogy*, note attached to Essay I; *Gen.*, III. 24.

The affective or passionate origin of all theorizing, from the highest to the lowest variety, deprives reason of its place as the natural ruler of man. However, the affects from which theorizing derives describe a sediment in man which does not normally strive to express anything other than its own settledness (*Beyond*, I. 6, 8, VII. 229, IX. 284). Nietzsche says that "even in the 'simplest' processes of sensation the affects dominate, such as fear, love, hatred, including the passive affects of laziness" (*Beyond*, V. 192). The sheer power of the affects will not assure that the desire for knowledge will overmaster the others, so that some hierarchy of ruling and ruled elements within the self is indispensable to philosophy. Nietzsche argues in general terms that the well-ordered self is the only truly healthy or vitalized self. He defines physio-psychological corruption as "the expression of a threatening anarchy among the instincts and of the fact that the foundation of the affects, which is called 'life,' has been shaken" (*Beyond*, IX. 258).

The well-ordered self is fundamentally aristocratic; while all the instincts are firm or strong, a ruling instinct exists which controls and coordinates the others for its own ends (*Beyond*, V. 190-91; *Gen.*, I. 10). The concept of instinctual vitality is incomprehensible without acknowledgment that the capacity for self-rule, i.e., a kind of moderation, is its basis (*Gen.*, III. 7, 8, 22). The aristocratically organized self is a mark of genuine nobility (*die Vornehmheit*). Nietzsche seeks to cultivate a nobility in whom the philosophic impulse for objectivity or justice has become the fundamental need or predominating instinct. Such a nobility could resist the distortions of the will's desire for power without corroding or repressing that desire (*Gen.*, III. 8, 12).

Nietzsche's attempt to liberate the philosophic impulses cannot simply lead to praise of self-assertion; a doctrine of liberation, which is divorced from the insistence upon self-rule as its precondition, is for Nietzsche a prelude to the most slavish of submissions. The exceptional liberation of the philosophic self deserves to be called the only genuine liberation of the self. Self-assertion typically inclines toward an abject surrender to the self, i.e., to the merely personal. This tendency, which is inherent in man as a willing being, is hostile to philosophy.

The fundamental human strivings for dominion represent to Nietzsche the primacy of the search for individual significance and meaning.⁹ The most powerful human impulses oppose philosophy precisely because they express a pervasive self-interest which distorts or narrows vision. In its normal operation, the will to power allows life to flourish by imprisoning the self within the confines of personal need. All theorizing, as an expression of life, therefore has an essential liability to become the more or less magnificent generalization of idio-

⁹ Plato *Ion* 536b-c; Allan Bloom, "An Interpretation of Plato's *Ion*," *Interpretation* 1 (Summer 1970): 58.

syncratic characteristics (*Beyond*, Preface, I. 5, 6). In Nietzsche's view, intellectual life has heretofore been directed by an unperceived calculus of utility, which has resulted in a clear surrender to the merely personal. Nietzsche seeks the means whereby philosophy can be truly an ascent from the self. The liberation implied in the attainment of philosophic objectivity requires a radical detachment from the self—a detachment that appears as selflessness or humility (*Beyond*, VI. 205, 210, IX. 260; *Gen.*, Preface, i, 2, I. 2, III. 8; *G.S.*, Preface, 2, 3).

The assertions of the will to power which are most common derive from the reactive affects, the most malignant of the self-serving passions (*Gen.*, I. 11, 13, III. 13, 14). Nietzsche's discovery that philosophy has too often been merely a generalization of the personal indicates its reliance upon the reactive affects (*G.S.*, V. 370). The philosophic exercise of moderation aims at mastery of fundamental human strivings; it must, therefore, be specifically directed toward the reactive affects. The most famous such affect discussed by Nietzsche, *ressentiment*, or revenge, is the most inhibitive of clear-sighted vision into what is. *Ressentiment* signifies an inability to transcend an intense preoccupation with oneself, e.g., with one's misery, or one's oppressors, or the correctness of one's own views (*Beyond*, II. 25, IX. 260; *Gen.*, I. 7, 10, 11; *G.S.*, V. 359). Nietzsche calls *ressentiment* typical of men who, because they cannot rule themselves, require formidable rulers. They are insufficiently powerful to release themselves from the bonds which both oppress and preserve them. Their impotence and their "senseless raging" against their rulers mark them as entirely dependent beings (*Gen.*, II. 11). In this light, genuine nobility indicates that degree of vitality which, by enabling man to conquer the reactive affects, also enables him to rise above the merely personal (*Beyond*, IX. 260). The man who is independent of the spontaneous inclinations of the will in this sense, and who is hence master of himself, is capable of objectivity (*Beyond*, II. 39). True objectivity is so extraordinary a phenomenon because of the pervasiveness of enervated rather than healthy or noble life (*Gen.*, I. 11, II. 11); the power of *ressentiment* in human perception or willing expresses the general ignobility of man.

The peculiar physio-psychological deficiency which philosophers have shared in common with "the people" is thus revealed as a lack of independence or autonomy (*Beyond*, V. 199, 202; *Gen.*, I. 9, 16). The ignoble man, according to Nietzsche, is painfully aware of his dependence; he despises himself because of it (*Gen.*, III. 14). Ignoble self-interestedness or self-love is inseparable from self-contempt or shame (*Beyond*, VI. 222; *Gen.*, I. 10, 14, III. 18). The ignoble man cannot revere himself except insofar as he is attached to something more powerful and hence more secure than he is. Dogma is his solace and his weapon against rulers. The Jews' passion for revenge against Rome, for example, culminated, according to Nietzsche, in the development of Christian dogma (*Gen.*, I. 8, III. 11). In both its exoteric

and esoteric forms, dogmatism transforms shame into self-love. The prevalence of dogmatism reveals the power of man's passion for individual significance, a passion which seeks sanctification of individual existence by way of universally applicable and eternally true doctrine (*Gen.*, III. 14, 22). The will to power expresses the human inclination to universalize personal need. Heretofore the assertions of the will originated in the needs of a species which was not yet capable of self-love. Thus Nietzsche interprets the conventional tyranny over man implied in any willing of unconditional morality, including the faith in truth, as an expression of natural necessity with reference to the norm (*Beyond*, V. 188, 199; *Gen.*, II. 7). In the psychological studies of the *Genealogy*, Nietzsche defends ascetic morality as a tyranny which has been inextricably conjoined with the nature of the human species because it has satisfied the passionate human longing for significance (*Gen.*, III, 11, 13, 16-18; *G.S.*, I. 1, III. 117).

Philosophic dogmatism ultimately derives from the character of life. It appears as a form of the distorting egoism of base or dependent men. Its implied piety is vanity; its praise of self-denial or disinterestedness is a subtly disguised expression of the most all-encompassing form of self-preoccupation that exists. As the most subtle form of dogmatism, the philosophic love of truth manifests the most subtle form of revenge; that revenge is, however, directed against life itself (*Gen.*, III. 25). Philosophy, despite its own beliefs, has been intolerant of truth. In order to overcome those human inclinations which have proved stronger than philosophic impulses, it is necessary to overcome man's self-contempt. Nietzsche envisions a genuine self-love which grows out of the capacity for self-rule (*Gen.*, II. 9). Philosophic dogmatism is to be conquered by that noble being who can transcend the merely personal by means of an authentic selfhood. Philosophizing which emanates from a love of what is masterful in oneself will be at once candid and just to life. Moreover, mastery of the basic will to power frees philosophy from its alliance, hitherto unnoticed, with the non-philosophic realm.

The noble man has always been able to effect some measure of independence from the realm of dogma. Nietzsche teaches the potentially philosophic man to adopt the attitude of noble men of past times toward those who are not noble. He reveals the conjunction between noble independence and genuine philosophy by ascribing the character of anti-philosophic movements to historical instances of popular rebellion against a noble ruling class. The original Christian conquest of Rome, the attack upon the Catholic Church by Luther, and the French Revolution are three archetypal expressions of the needs of the people which succeeded at the expense of philosophic characteristics.

Nietzsche argues that "original" Christianity sought to destroy a thriving skepticism and impartiality, the "noble and frivolous toler-

ance" cultivated by the mores of the aristocratic Romans (*Beyond*, III. 46; *Gen.*, I. 10). The sense of independence and pride which informed the aristocracy had enabled it to withstand the seductions of faith: the Romans had overwhelmed seriousness and hence, piety with laughter and arrogant skepticism. Just these characteristics must be recaptured to insure philosophic openness, says Nietzsche. The proud disdain of faith opposes the ingenuousness and superficiality of the common man's mode of self-assertion through dogma (*Beyond*, VIII. 252; *Gen.*, III. 14). Luther, a man of the people, naturally interpreted the effects of nobility on faith, when he found them in the church of his day, as corruption. He "misunderstood the noble skepticism, that luxury of skepticism and tolerance which every triumphant self-assured power permits itself" (*G.S.*, V. 358). Insofar as the pious substitution of revelation for reason eventuates in the creation of nobility, it is not absolutely opposed to philosophy: in fact, the skepticism of the ruling church encouraged a suspicion about man's nature which accommodated psychological realism (*G.S.*, V. 350, 358).

Skepticism regarding faith and the needs that issue in faith is promoted by aristocratically organized ruling structures, among which Nietzsche includes the church as the most noble example (*Beyond*, III. 61; *Gen.*, I. 10, III. 23). The aristocratic regime minimizes the influence of the realm of faith on the higher man. Ultimately, the security of a new nobility depends upon a new aristocratic regime (*Beyond*, III. 61-62, VIII. 251, 256; *G.S.*, IV. 283). Nietzsche's task is, then, inherently political.¹⁰ His consideration of politics is evidently utilitarian: he regards the sovereignty of the individual as the hidden promise or goal of aristocracy, and as the sole justification for aristocracy (*Beyond*, IX. 257; *Gen.*, II. 1, 2; *G.S.*, I. 23). Of all regimes, democracy is the most hostile to philosophy. Nietzsche's analysis is thoroughly anti-democratic because he conceives democracy to be the most powerful form which the non-philosophic realm can take. Considering the species as a whole, democracy may be understood as the most natural regime: it glorifies the assertions of average life. Aristocracy may fulfill the very real need of average men for leaders; democracy satisfies the fundamental desire for individual recognition and significance by its egalitarian animus (*Beyond*, VII. 219, IX. 261; *Gen.*, III. 14). Because it expresses the will to power as that will is expressed in the mass of men, democratic orthodoxy possesses a solid and imposing foundation in the species life. The democratic order manifests the common man's clear-sighted grasp of the conditions which are

¹⁰ Aristocratic regimes are, according to Nietzsche, the effect of dangerous circumstances, a hostile external environment (*Beyond*, IX. 262); democratic regimes are born in generally peaceable circumstances (*Beyond*, V. 201; *Gen.* II. 10). One can infer, therefore, that Nietzsche intended to assist the establishment of that sort of environment which gives rise to aristocracy (*Beyond*, VI. 208).

favorable to his existence, i.e., his innate prudence (*Beyond*, V. 197-99, 201, VII. 221, 228; *Gen.*, II. 15, III. 18; *G.S.*, V. 352).

Democratic orthodoxy sanctifies the submersion into an awe-inspiring collectivity of individual men who could not otherwise respect themselves (*Beyond*, VI. 202-3; *Gen.*, III. 18). Nietzsche regards the goal toward which the modern democratic order is progressing, the "autonomous herd," as the final glorification of democratic organization; it represents a loss of individuality so complete that coercion and hence government is no longer necessary (*Beyond*, V. 202). Democracy aims at nothing other than its own organization. An aristocratic organization of society is itself, however, an exceptional condition. The vitality from which it derives and which it supports, i.e., the will to overcome, supplant, and reconstruct, constantly resists the inhibition implicit in organization (*Beyond*, IX. 259; *Gen.*, II. 11, III. 17-18). Aristocracy tends to foster something greater than itself (*Beyond*, IX. 257, 262; *Gen.*, II. 10). The orthodoxy of aristocratic regimes is more precariously established than democratic orthodoxy (*Beyond*, V. 202). Aristocracies always possess, therefore, at least the potential (which becomes greater as the society approaches maturity) for philosophy.

Aristocratic orthodoxy tends to overcome itself as a necessary result of its attempt to tie man irrevocably to the past and the future (*Gen.*, II. 10, III. 27). Initially, it links past, present, and future together at the expense of individuality. The aristocratic reverence for lineage and tradition makes the establishment of firm institutions and mores possible; the individual is integrated into a whole which is supremely confident of itself, i.e., a culture.¹¹ That culture abhors novelty and strives to preserve its institutions for future generations. Eventually, the pride and self-confidence which have been cultivated by the faith in tradition, especially within the ruling class, will no longer endure the oppressive weight of tradition (*Beyond*, IX. 262; *Gen.*, I. 10); the aristocratic culture matures and the sovereign individual emerges.

The mature aristocratic society, like that of Rome immediately before Christ, is skeptical and, therefore, diverse: the culture gives way to the sect (*G.S.*, III. 149).¹² The individual experiences a tension between the sacred laws of the past and the freedom which might derive from their destruction. His attachment to a glorious tradition has trained him to a self-discipline and a self-love which now stand him in good stead. He is able to help himself; he creates new laws for himself (*Beyond*, IX. 262; *Gen.*, II. 2).

While democratic regimes are founded upon a similar disrespect for tradition, they do not sever man from his past because of a masterful

¹¹ *Beyond*, IX. 263, 265; Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the New Idol," *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1968), p. 160.

¹² See also Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's *Hiero*," in *What Is Political Philosophy?* (New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 114-15.

law-giving or institution-creating power.¹³ They break the spell of custom, but in the face of the openness they have created, they merely waver (*Beyond*, VII. 238-39). Because of its origin in enervated life, Nietzsche regards democracy as infirm, confused, and restless (*Beyond*, VI. 208, VII. 223-24; *G.S.*, V. 356); as such, the democratic order provokes a pervasive doubt and unsureness about life which can be assuaged only by the creation of an all-encompassing political orthodoxy. Democratic orthodoxy owes its immense power and durability precisely to the defects of the democratic order. Men in a democracy are inclined to submit themselves to a political ideology because they dare not recognize what they are. The cult of the state, and, thus, of the masses, necessarily replaces the ordered cultural whole and its successor, the specialized sect. Democratic political orthodoxy is distinguished from the two sorts of organization of belief found in aristocracies because it does not compel men to aspire by teaching them to imitate the old or to create the new. The regime which makes the most vigorous claims on behalf of the individual tends to obliterate individuality; the regime which suppresses the past is compelled to ignore the future.

Only aristocratic regimes cultivate that sort of individuality which admits of a development into philosophy; they establish moral judgments which are not unconditional, but which acknowledge an order of rank among men (*Beyond*, V. 198, VII. 221, 228). The aristocratic apportionment of higher duties and more extensive privileges according to class or rank alone leads to the "craving for an ever-widening of distances within the soul itself, the development of an ever higher, more remote, further-stretching, more comprehensive states" (*Beyond*, IX. 257). Without an acute awareness of one's exceptionality, the desire and need for new problems and tasks, the impetus to extraordinary activity, cannot exist. Neither a skeptical attitude toward orthodoxy nor the sense of autonomy necessary to maintain it is possible without love of oneself as something rare (*G.S.*, V. 351). The pervasive leveling that occurs in democratic society impedes the rare man's confidence in his own exceptionality (*Beyond*, V. 119; *G.S.*, III. 117). For the sake of freeing philosophy from the influence of democratic political life, Nietzsche seeks to instill in the potential philosopher a penetrating awareness of the distance between higher and lower men, what he calls "the pathos of distance" (*Beyond*, II. 30, VI. 212; *Gen.*, I. 2), and a malicious conscience (*Beyond*, II. 32; *G.S.*, I. 2, 3, 19, 55). Nietzsche intends the pathos of distance to eventuate in a passion for solitude or standing alone which requires atheism.¹⁴ The malicious conscience, as a psychologist's weapon, is directed at the tendency of previous theo-

¹³ "On the New Idol," p. 161.

¹⁴ *Beyond*, II. 44, IX. 284; *Gen.*, III. 5, 7; *G.S.*, IV. 285, V. 357, 359, 367, 371; "On the Famous Wise Men," in *Zarathustra*, pp. 214-15.

rising toward dogmatism;¹⁵ as the ability for self-mockery, it is turned against the self (*Beyond*, II. 26). Nietzsche seeks to encourage a critical attitude toward philosophizing, a kind of self-inflicted cruelty which teaches the philosophic man to resist a seductive moralizing (*Beyond*, V. 192, VII. 227, 229–30). These characteristics encourage the philosopher's independence from the people and teach self-control; thus they support the passion for knowledge. Together they comprise free-spiritedness.

The elucidation of free-spirited independence is the theme of Section II of *Beyond Good and Evil*, "The Free Spirit." The preconditions for genuine philosophizing appear to be, on the one hand, a thoroughgoing atheism, and, on the other, the capacity to take lightly all that has hitherto been taken seriously (*Beyond*, II. 27, 28). In this section Nietzsche counsels against "the lures of dependence that lie hidden in honors, or money, or offices, or enthusiasms of the senses," i.e., in the interests of the "great majority" (aphorism 44) and the lures of dependence that lie hidden in the unexamined praise of philosophic pursuits (aphorisms 25, 26, 31, 33, 41, 43). In addition, he emphasizes the differences between the "higher type of man," the "seeker after knowledge in the great and exceptional sense" (aphorism 26), and the rest of men, especially the contemporary variety of "free-thinkers" (aphs., 26, 29, 40–44). As men "without solitude," they are not independent, but rather are continually susceptible to the orthodoxy of democracy; they are the vanguard of the masses, mere levelers (*Gen.*, I. 9).

Nietzsche does not treat his encouragement of philosophic independence from the people, however subtle their influence, as something entirely new. Because of the age in which he lives, he says, he finds it necessary to reaffirm what noble men of the past have known from experience. A serious examination of the preconditions for genuine philosophy cannot ignore the decisive defects of contemporary intellectual life.

Reference to the common piety which informs both philosophic dogmatism in its original formulation and contemporary philosophy does not suffice to give a proper understanding of either mode of reflection. Nietzsche considers the modern faith in truth to be emphatically anti-philosophic (*Beyond*, VI. 204; *Gen.*, III. 24); the original or classical faith in truth, however, more completely accommodated the typical characteristics of genuine philosophy—its openness, its fullness, its height. Nietzsche directs his most vigorous attack in *Beyond Good and Evil* (Section VI) at that dogmatism which is specifically modern.¹⁶ His prelude to a new philosophizing is as much a recovery of something lost, of which Plato is a typical representative (*Beyond*,

¹⁵ *Beyond*, II. 27, 28, 32, 33, 34, 35, 39, VII. 227; *G.S.*, Preface, 3, V. 346.

¹⁶ *E.H.*, p. 310, Section II.

VI. 204, 213), as it is the eradication of the remnants of Plato's influence.

Nietzsche seeks a reaffirmation of the venerable, secret, and exalted character of philosophy (*Beyond*, VI. 213). The true philosophic *eros* is noble; it expresses a desire to be distinguished from other men (*Beyond*, VI. 212, IX. 270-72; *Gen.*, III. 8; *G.S.*, III. 123, 129). Philosophy's abandonment of belief in its exceptional character is sufficient to turn extraordinary men away from it (*Beyond*, VI. 204; *G.S.*, IV. 294).¹⁷ In turn, the presumed accessibility of philosophic reflection to ordinary men necessarily causes philosophy to degenerate into reflections of which ordinary men are capable. This abuse, "the wretchedness of the most recent philosophy itself," leads to a disdain for philosophy in general. The attitude of the modern age toward philosophy cultivates "unbelief in the masterly task and masterfulness of philosophy" (*Beyond*, VI. 204). The noble instinct for the singular and high which Nietzsche seeks to encourage can find its proper satisfaction in philosophy only if philosophy itself can be made worthy again, i.e., can be made the expression of command or rule (*Beyond*, VI. 211).

Genuine philosophy is, in the first place, the legitimate ruler of the sciences. The contemporary age seeks to destroy this order of ruling and ruled by destroying the distinction between scientific men and philosophers. The philosophic exercise of command is ultimately superordinate to a concern with the rank of science; the philosopher "demands of himself a judgement, a Yes or No, not about the sciences but about life and the value of life" (*Beyond*, VI. 205; *G.S.*, V. 381). The comprehensiveness of the philosophic rule over life, however, secures the legitimacy of philosophic rule over scientific pursuits. The scientific man as such cannot approach the fundamental problems of value; he is ignoble (*Beyond*, VI. 206, 207, 211, 213; *G.S.*, V. 373). The philosopher is distinguished from him by nature, "by the height and power of his spirituality" (*Beyond*, VI. 213). Classical philosophy did orient itself around problems of evaluation, and thus it reveals its origins in noble rather than impoverished life (*Beyond*, VI. 212; cf. *Gen.*, III. 25). It began with an intimation about the possibility of human wisdom concerning the eternal natural order or hierarchy. Nietzsche does not deny that philosophy must be based on some insight into the possibility of wisdom, nor does he oppose classical philosophy by suggesting that this insight must be tempered by a sober reflection, derived from experience, about the probability of the attainment of wisdom. A candid and devoted attachment to philosophy as a way of life must rest upon a thoroughly modest claim about its achievements.¹⁸

According to Nietzsche, the philosopher's modesty bespeaks his abil-

¹⁷ See Plato *Republic* 495c.

¹⁸ Strauss, "Restatement," pp. 115-16.

ity to endure the problematic, to desire questions and questionableness more than certainty (*G.S.*, IV. 296, 328, V. 343, 347, 374-75). Nietzsche understands philosophy as the constant, unflinching approach to the greatest questions (*G.S.*, V. 345, 351). Philosophizing requires an exceptional self-sufficiency for which there is no contemporary model. It rightfully proceeds from the noble synthesis of modesty and self-affirming pride. Nietzsche says, "It was *modesty* that invented the word 'philosopher' in Greece and left the magnificent overweening presumption in calling oneself wise to the actors of the spirit—the modesty of such monsters of pride and sovereignty as Pythagoras, as Plato" (*G.S.*, V. 351; cf. *Beyond*, I. 7). Only that theorizing which is founded upon self-rule or autonomy is intrepid and penetrating (*G.S.*, V. 359, 375). The noble man's disdain for the opinions held by lesser men can develop into and sustain a philosophic sense of wonder, "the taste of reverence" for everything that lies beyond the horizons of ordinary men (*G.S.*, V. 373; *Beyond*, IX. 263, 265). Modern dogmatism truncates philosophic inquiry more seriously than classical dogmatism because, as a child of the democratic order, it knows no modesty (*Beyond*, III. 58-59, IX. 263, 272; *Gen.*, I. 9, III. 22; *G.S.*, V. 358).

Modern philosophers, beginning with Kant, have obscured the true meaning of philosophy as the ascent to the task of comprehensive evaluation. The philosophic attachment to truth has undergone an evolution, which Nietzsche considers to have been necessary, from the belief in an eternal hierarchy of evaluations to the absolute rejection of evaluative interpretation. Contemporary philosophy is a form of skepticism which, one way or another, deprives evaluative questions of a philosophic hearing (*Beyond*, III. 54, VI. 204, 207, 208); it is a peculiarly modern synthesis of hubris and shame. Both major trends within contemporary philosophy, as Nietzsche portrays them, (*Beyond*, I. 10) are entirely subject to the realm of orthodoxy because they are themselves manifestations of ignobility.

The "philosophers of reality" or positivists lay claim not to the possibility of wisdom but to its possession, "the maddest and most immodest of all claims" (*G.S.*, V. 359). They believe in the competence of natural science to establish the limits of knowledge: the quest for philosophic wisdom is replaced by mathematical physics. The relative reliability of sense data, when examined in light of philosophic standards of cognitive validity, leads to an unprecedented inflation of the value of a mechanical or conceptual rendering of the operations of nature (*Gen.*, III. 9). Positivism seeks "'a world of truth' that can be mastered completely and forever with the aid of our square little reason" (*G.S.*, V. 373; *Gen.*, III. 23-24). The scientific demand for some measure of certainty represents to Nietzsche the vanity and lack of vitality of modern man. Modern science is ignoble because it cannot tolerate openness (*G.S.*, II. 76, IV. 296, V. 347). There is from the

outset, then, an alliance between modern science and democracy. That alliance is strengthened by the fact that the impulse for certainty will only permit a low order of problems to be revealed. Inquiry is closed before the question of the value of democracy, for instance, is approached. What modern science has ignored will eventually compel it to support the whole closed realm of orthodoxy as opposed to philosophy.

The more radical modern skepticism, which rejects belief in the reliability of sense data, is merely a more extreme version of the modern cowardice about evaluation—a “feast of noble abstinence” for the mind, generated from a mortal fear that the pursuit of knowledge will end in a confrontation with the problems of evaluation (*Beyond*, VI. 208). Radical skepticism cannot dilute the potency of democratic orthodoxy; as an innocently conceived soporific which allays confusion, it inadvertently promotes the continuance of the democratic order. Radical skepticism, like that which it claims to oppose, expresses the lack of vitality of the democratic age, this time, however, in its character as psychic disorder or confusion. It originates in enervated or “less natural” nature; the self is unsure, doubtful, full of “internal mistrust,” and, consequently, feeble. Physiological decay or disorder intensifies a confusion about standards of evaluation which makes man unable to consider real issues. The willingness to judge, and hence a strong will, is indispensable for an illumination of those issues (*Beyond*, VII. 233, 238). The pervasive shame or self-contempt of modern man, which arises from an intimation about the tenuousness of his innermost impulses, precludes resolute inquiry while disguising itself as objectivity.

In Nietzsche’s judgment, modern intellectual life is a denial of truly philosophic impulses which derives from a denial of true sensuality or instinctive health; it is, therefore, ascetic to the highest degree (*Beyond*, III. 49; *Gen.*, II. 23, III. 24–25). Modern asceticism, which conquered Platonic asceticism, now prevents the additional philosophic strength acquired in the fight against Plato’s errors from coming to fruition (*Beyond*, Preface, VI. 209). Both the hubris and the shame of modern asceticism are a permanently attached to Christian-democratic values (*Beyond*, VI. 202–3; *Gen.* II. 24). They can be overcome by a reevaluation of values which is based on an understanding of the significance of classical asceticism for philosophy. The liberation of the philosophic self seems to depend, then, upon a successful struggle against the timeliness (*G.S.*, V. 380).

Nietzsche suggests that the philosopher as such has a necessarily hostile relation to his times: he arises out of decadence in order to combat it. As “the bad conscience of their time,” philosophers see what those around them do not see, i.e., that the honored things, the virtues of their time, have been “outlived” (*Beyond*, VI. 212, IX. 262). Nietzsche’s critique of the timely is exceptional, however, precisely

because it rests upon this new insight into the significance of all philosophy for its time. Thus his prelude to a new philosophy is actuated by an awareness of the unprecedented opportunity for the philosophic man in the contemporary age. The liberation of the philosopher from that which typically resists philosophy in man, or from "modern ideas," is itself a prelude to the cultivation of a radically novel philosophy. The possibility for genuine philosophy is the highest legacy of the latest age. The age must, therefore, contain within itself the potentiality for a transcendence of the limitations of its philosophy. A genuinely philosophic virtue, Nietzsche's "virtue" does exist at the peak of modern intellectual life—*Redlichkeit*, intellectual integrity or candor, i.e., the ruthless scientific conscience (*Beyond*, V. 192, VII. 214, 227). Nietzsche concerns himself primarily with the extension of the scientific conscience into the "unnatural" sciences, psychology and the self-critique of consciousness (*G.S.*, V. 355; *Gen.*, III. 25), which, in contrast to the natural sciences, must be made historical or developmental in order to become profound. The unique characteristics of the new philosophy derive from its basis in historical psychology. The rare but timely scientific conscience must ally itself with the other timely virtue of which Nietzsche speaks in Section VII of *Beyond Good and Evil*, the historical sense (aphorism 224). Nietzsche owes his own insight into the relationship between philosophy and its age to the modern historical consciousness.

The historical sense is necessarily of modern, i.e., decadent, origin. It represents to Nietzsche a "submissive plebeian curiosity" about the new, exotic, and alien, which as such opposes the resolute taste and intolerant conventions of aristocratic cultures (*G.S.*, IV. 337). Nietzsche defines the historical sense as the capacity to psychologize about the past, with particular reference to morality as the vehicle for human development. It is "the capacity for quickly guessing the order of rank of the valuations according to which a people, a society, a human being has lived; the 'divinatory instinct' for the relations of these valuations, for the relation of the authority of values to the authority of active forces" (*Beyond*, VII. 224). Historical psychology reveals the conjunction between morality and life. It regards morality as "a sign language of the affects" (*Beyond*, V. 187), and therefore leads to an analysis of the value of various moralities for various levels of life. A proper developmental psychology reveals the variety of human relations to things and the needs that govern those relations (*Beyond*, V. 186; *Gen.*, Preface, 3-6, I, endnote).

Nietzsche suggests that the absence of a historical awareness, which underlies the quest for nature, has prevented past philosophers from discovering the problem of man and thus from attaining a clear understanding of philosophy's function with regard to human life (*Gen.*, I. 1). Man has not yet been endowed with a nature; he is "the as yet undetermined animal" (*Beyond*, III. 62). That previous moralities

have been overcome or outlived attests to the indeterminacy of the human species, its malleability. Human malleability derives from physio-psychological decay (*Gen.*, I. 5, II. 16-18). Past philosophers discovered neither the extent of man's capacity to change himself nor the inevitability of the changing for an indeterminate or "sick" being (*Gen.*, III. 13). They sought, rather, to disclose man's nature; specifically, they glorified his reason because of a perceived openness of reason to the natural order. Thus, philosophy never seriously addressed itself to the source of man's variability, his instinctual disorder or decay. In Nietzsche's understanding, then, philosophy as a whole has evaded responsibility for man's future, which is, however, its legitimate duty and privilege (*Beyond*, VI. 213).

Because man had no fixed nature, i.e., no sufficiently "calculable, regular and necessary" instinctual core, he could not turn out well, except rarely, by chance.¹⁹ Philosophy has fostered the "gruesome dominion of nonsense and chance" over human life and thereby has assisted the overall degeneration of man (*Beyond*, VI. 203). The higher men have suffered most from philosophy's errors; the exceptionally complex calculus which must precede the establishment of conditions favorable to their existence, in contrast to conditions favorable to average life, has been missing (*Beyond*, IX. 269, 270, 274). "The accidental, the law of absurdity in the whole economy of mankind, manifests itself most horribly in its destructive effects on the higher man" (*Beyond*, VI. 203). Human life, a unique instance of the will to power, expends its energy in pursuit of a goal (*Gen.*, III. 1, 23; *G.S.*, I. 1). That goal or ideal, however primitive, must be posited by morality. Human life needs morality because, in contrast to animal life, it aspires. The low aspirations of ordinary men, because they are far more common, are both more insistent upon satisfaction by evaluations favorable to them and more easily satisfied (*Beyond*, IX. 268). Nietzsche considered himself to be the first philosopher to have discovered the cause of the fragility of human aspiration: the highest human aspirations have been corrupted, i.e., inhibited, by unconditional moral judgments made from the perspective of average life (*Beyond*, VII. 218-19).

The philosophers of the future will accept the responsibility for the overall development of man (*Beyond*, III. 61, VIII. 251). They will make man a determinate being; they will understand that the existence of a human nature is dependent upon human will (*Beyond*, VI. 203, IX. 274). Thus they will be saved from the singular defect of all past philosophy—its ineffectiveness against the assertions of average life to the detriment of extraordinary life. Knowledge of the lawful in

¹⁹ Because of psychology's superficiality, the "original problem regarding man" is, in a more comprehensive form, the modern problem regarding man as well (*Gen.*, II. 1).

human development permits proper attention to be given to the needs of the higher man and thus gives rise to a new prudence (*Beyond*, II. 44; *G.S.*, III. 113, V. 379). The philosophic project of determining nature is equivalent to the attempt to secure aspiration or willing as a fundamental human need and thus to orient man permanently toward the future (*Gen.*, II. 16; *G.S.* 143, V. 365). The philosophic exercise of justice must, therefore, be directed toward the cultivation of vitality or nobility, the source of resolute, far-reaching, and high human willing (*Beyond*, IX. 260, 265; *Gen.*, II. 2). The new philosophy, unlike past philosophy, will not unconsciously strive to make itself unnecessary by its narrowness, i.e., by its inability to comprehend and secure the higher aspirations of man or, conversely, its inability to prevent higher visions than its own from arising.

The philosophic activity envisioned by Nietzsche enhances life itself. Life, understood as will to power, knows nothing higher than its own highest expressions (*Beyond*, VI. 207). The aspiring man cannot be taught to evaluate himself in terms of a naturally ordained hierarchy; such a demand would not only be based on a falsehood but would inhibit or distort willing. Human life can only be evaluated in terms of its own highest acts of will (*Gen.*, III. 14). Philosophy itself is justifiable only as the highest expression of life.

The philosophic responsibility, that compulsion to liberate man from the vulnerability associated with his freedom to become, is fully discharged by the revaluation of values (*Beyond*, VI. 210–11, 213; *G.S.*, I. 44, II. 58). If it is successful, the philosophic project will represent an unprecedented beneficence to life. In its concern for the higher man it will not disdain severity; unlike the Christian expression of love for man, which underlies the modern orthodoxy (*Beyond*, V. 202), it will not refrain from condemning what ought to perish (*Beyond*, III. 62, VII. 238). Still, Nietzsche's project for the future seems to retain a crucial relationship with his own age, i.e., an indebtedness to Christianity and democracy. Human malleability, which has a specific historical origin (*Gen.*, II. 16–19), increases with instinctual decay: a sick organism cannot resist change. Because of the unparalleled degree of instinctual degeneration which modern man represents (*Beyond*, VI. 208), he is particularly ripe for the most comprehensive project of cultivation and education ever devised by man (*Beyond*, III. 61).

The intensity of the modern need heightens the opportunity for the philosophic man but is no guarantee that he will in fact appear (*Beyond*, VI. 203). On the contrary, the philosophic man must, by extending the historical sense, extend the disease of modernity and, in consequence, subject himself continually to his own potential corruption.²⁰ The unique character of the new philosophy presents the most formidable

²⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Case of Wagner*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), Preface.

obstacles to its appearance. The advance of the historical sense precipitates a crisis for man which the modern ignoble orthodoxy resists. The historical sense, like everything that originates in degenerate life, is ineffectual: it can neither devise a remedy for the modern defects nor properly diagnose them because it cannot truly comprehend the past. The feebleness or effeminacy of the historical sense, however, defends the modern age from the most extreme of physio-psychological decay—pessimism or the weariness of life (*Gen.*, I. II, III. 14). Where it appears, the historical sense is most often a restless, dispirited impulse for change which is easily mastered by the coordinate but more massive impulse of the age to remain convinced of the superiority of Christian-democratic values. The advance of the scientific conscience in its historical mode, and thus the advance of modernity toward pessimism (*Gen.*, III. 25), requires an untimeliness which is, in itself, noble.²¹ Noble affects at once permit the invigoration or virilification of the timely virtues and ensure the possibility of their eventual destruction.²²

The noble capacity for self-rule allows man to withstand the power of orthodoxy. The necessity for self-rule is reinforced, however, by the comprehensive nature of the philosopher's candor. Self-rule signifies instinctual health or vitality and, as such, is applicable to all levels of nobility; the philosophic man of the future requires a novel vitality, which Nietzsche calls the "great health" (*Gen.*, II. 24–25). A full confrontation with man's past renders philosophy more precarious than it has ever been. The philosopher must possess the "great health" as a defense against the potentially corrupting influence of truth, i.e., of "that existence which is knowable by *us* (*G.S.*, V. 346). The philosophic exercise of will is threatened by the insights into human life disclosed by historical psychology. Contempt for man's general mendaciousness, evidenced by the power of false moral judgments over his life, and pity for man's tendency toward self-bellittlement may lead the philosopher to turn away from man (*Gen.*, Preface, 6, I. II, 12). Nietzsche never denies that the training or education of the poten-

²¹ While Nietzsche ultimately prefers the aristocratic regime in order to secure human aspiring, in the modern age hatred of the timely, of dissolution, appears to replace the disrespect for tradition which characterizes the late stage of the aristocracy. The modern noble man is described as a being in tension with himself; what is timely within him provides the animus for self-mastery and, thus, for noble action: something formidable exists for him to oppose (*Beyond*, V. 200, VI. 209, VII. 225, VIII. 242; *Gen.*, I. 16).

²² Modern psychology has remained unhistorical and hence superficial because it does not possess the aristocratic reverence for lineage or age upon which the disclosure of origins or history depends (*Beyond*, V. 186; *Gen.* I. 4; *G.S.*, I. 34). As the servant of the democratic order, modern psychology must deceive man, for the sake of his self-love, about the past (*Beyond*, IX. 264; *Gen.*, II. 7). Nietzsche argues, however, that a proper genealogy of man's moral past is not shameful; it reveals the aristocratic origin of moral judgements as such and the activity or potency of man (*Gen.*, I. 2, 4–6, II. 12, III. 4).

tially philosophic man is a dangerous enterprise; its risk to the philosopher is intended to constitute its appeal. Nietzsche's books "call the bravest to *their* courage" (*Beyond*, II. 30). The "great health" signifies the capacity to recover from illness; it therefore encourages a confrontation with illness, i.e., with the corruptibility of man (*G.S.*, V. 382). It allows the passionate seeker after knowledge to tyrannize himself for the sake of his own ideal (*Beyond*, VI. 220; *G.S.*, IV. 290). The self-love which is possible to one who follows his own ideal may preserve the love of man, "of what might yet *be made of man*" (*Beyond*, VI. 203), in the philosopher.

In order to prepare himself for the task of evaluation on behalf of man, the philosopher must become aware of "the whole history of the soul *so far*" (*Beyond*, III. 45), a task which demands that he himself undergo innumerable alterations, that he live through "the range of inner human experience reached so far" (*Beyond*, III. 45; *Gen.*, III. 6). The new philosopher must, therefore, be versatile. He would, by extension, praise versatility. He would "be compelled to find the greatness of man, the concept of 'greatness,' precisely in his range and multiplicity, in his wholeness in manifoldness" (*Beyond*, VI. 212). The prefaces which Nietzsche attached to his published works attest to the extraordinary importance of the philosopher's personal experiences with man. They suggest as well that only a deeply felt sympathy for human life makes an authentic experience of its various forms possible and seduces the philosopher to transform his life into an experimental laboratory where man in his manifoldness can be observed. Nietzsche describes his own life as an experiment devoted to knowledge (*G.S.*, Preface, 3, IV. 324). The principle "*life as a means to knowledge*," is the great "liberator" of man from a blinding interest in himself: the goal is everything. In order to approach this goal, the philosopher-psychologist must constantly risk his own well-being; he must experience the corruption or final illness of all higher men in the past. In order to turn the higher man's inability to find the way to his true needs into a new prudence, the psychologist must at once endanger himself and systematically observe the causes of his own vulnerability (*Beyond*, III. 45). If the truths about human development are to be known at all, they must be borne or suffered by the psychologist. Psychology is, then, equivalent to introspection (*G.S.*, IV. 335, 337). Introspection is the only source of knowledge upon which the highest task of genuine philosophy can establish itself (*Beyond*, VI. 211).

Nietzsche's remarks about the orientation of the psychologist toward the past serve to distinguish the "queen of the sciences" (*Beyond*, I. 23) from genuine philosophy. Previous philosophy saw at least a harmony between psychology, the study of human nature, and the quest for nature simply which does not exist. The historical condition of man, his variability, dictates that psychology must detach itself

from the quest for nature, being merely its precondition (*Beyond*, VI. 211). Nietzsche implies that there is no inherent harmony between psychology, which examines the past and, hence, the dormancy of nature, and the genuinely philosophic quest for nature, which affects the future.²³ Notwithstanding the fact that psychology can never seek the self whose order best reflects the eternal order of nature and is lovable for that reason,²⁴ psychology cannot simply seek the well-ordered self. It cannot, therefore, define man; psychology is compelled to be radically individualistic (*G.S.*, III. 120). Insofar as the fundamental natural phenomenon, i.e., the will to power, is visible to psychology at all, it is fragmented into an infinite variety of particulars. The task of discovery about man is confined to an elucidation of actual selves, the unique and personal natures. The psychologist as such is limited to an authentic experience of historical data; his introspection is circumscribed by the realm of human history (*G.S.*, IV. 337).

Insofar as psychology reveals general necessary relations, e.g., the effect of physiological inhibition upon thinking (*G.S.*, Preface, 2), it studies what is lawful and necessary for the sake of individual potentiality. Psychology is useful to the philosopher because it frees man from that morality which has crushed the will to power by generally praising instinctual repression. It is a "critical science"; it negates (*Beyond*, VI. 210).²⁵ The new psychology counsels men to become what they are, i.e., to aspire or will (*G.S.*, IV. 335). *Amor fati*, which expression Nietzsche associates with the highest act of will,²⁶ can also be understood as the tempting practical dictum of the new psychology, the intention of which is to liberate human willing. Psychology cannot, however, guide or secure human willing; it must condemn evaluation. Since psychology is confined to that which can be known about man, albeit by introspection, it cannot ascend beyond itself. Moreover, the criticism of man's moral past extends the devotion to truth which is the esoteric "kernel" of the ascetic ideal. Psychology, therefore, extends the contempt for man, whose enhancement depends upon philosophic loyalty to something higher than the truth, i.e., upon evaluative interpretation (*Beyond*, VI. 205, VII. 230). Psychology threatens the

²³ Nietzsche does not confine the quest for nature, i.e., the quest to determine nature, to human nature. See Leo Strauss, "Note on the Plan of Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil*," *Interpretation* 2 (Winter 1973: 112-13; Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, trans. David E. Green (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 189ff., and "Nature, History, and Existentialism," *Social Research* 19 (March 1952): 91-92; Martin Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking*, trans. Fred. D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), pp. 78, 91, 104ff., and "Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?," trans. Bernd Magnus, *Review of Metaphysics* 20 (March 1967): 424ff.

²⁴ Strauss, "Restatement," pp. 120-21.

²⁵ See Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), n. 254.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, n. 617; *E.H.*, subtitle, pp. 258, 324; *G.S.*, IV. 276; Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, pp. 192-94.

task of definition and evaluation and is a dangerous necessity to the philosophic man. Psychology opposes philosophy fundamentally because psychology glorifies the love of truth at the expense of the love of man. Psychology can be transcended only by a human being, whose acts of will possess the character of a leap. The only point of contact between the task of legislation, the "closed system of will, goal, and interpretation," which supports and orders human aspiration (*Gen.*, III. 23), and psychology, which simply strives for openness, is in the philosopher himself. He represents the union of universal vision and particular knowledge, which otherwise would remain asunder.

The philosopher of the future must be able to devote himself more entirely to the cause of truth than has ever before been done while overcoming his aversion to untruth. Nietzsche tempts potentially philosophic men to test the possibility that philosophy can become a way of life. Philosophic dogmatism posited a theoretical harmony between life and philosophy. Accordingly, it established the quest for knowledge as a principle of life which directs man toward the Good (*G.S.*, III. 110). Science and philosophy have been promoted under the persistent influence of this erroneous assumption (*Beyond*, II. 24). Heretofore, because of their superficiality, they have, in fact, enhanced life. Nietzsche's psychology, on the other hand, exposes the fundamental divergence of truth and life, i.e., the necessity of narrow perspectives, or evaluations and esteemings, to life. He characterizes the contemporary thinker as "that being in whom the impulse for truth and those life-preserving errors clash for their first fight" (*G.S.*, III. 110). The possibility of a philosophy beyond good and evil depends upon the actualization of a human being who can endure this tension. The potentially philosophic man will not realize his opportunity if he represses the philosophic impulse for truth or if he considers the human need for narrow perspectives to be a sign of the defectiveness of human existence. Rather, he must, by means of a life experiment, test the possibility that the will to truth can itself become a human need or condition of life, and thus a genuine enhancement of life, i.e., protective of the will. The question which Nietzsche raises about the value of the will to truth can only be answered experimentally, through experience. "To what extent can the truth endure incorporation? That is the question; that is the experiment" (*G.S.*, III. 110; *Beyond*, II. 42; *E.H.*, p. 218). The necessity of philosophy to the regeneration of man demands that this experiment be made.

Heretofore, philosophy has fostered the security of human inquiry at the expense of what Nietzsche calls a monstrous injustice to life; since philosophy was rooted in shame, it could affirm itself only by condemning untruth, the sensual, and becoming. Nietzsche asks, in favor of life, whether philosophic impulses can be cultivated without this singular devotion to truth as their basis (*Beyond*, I. 4). The nature of the experimentalism to which he alludes assures that, should a new

philosophy come forth from it, that philosophy would necessarily represent a conquest of the revenge on life which has dominated all philosophizing to date. The new philosophy would be a demonstration that the genuine liberation of the philosophic self had been attained—that liberation depends upon the creation of a human being who loves himself more than his virtues.

The philosopher of the future envisioned by Nietzsche represents the first nobility founded upon candor and suffering rather than upon piety. The decisive characteristic of nobility remains its fundamental certainty about itself: "The noble soul has reverence for itself" (*Beyond*, IX. 287). Heretofore, however, such sublime self-love has been unattainable without piety (*Beyond*, IX. 260, 265; *Gen.*, III. 10). In spite of the tremendous ennoblement or elevation of man for which Nietzsche believes piety in every sense to have been responsible (*Beyond*, III. 59, 60), his ultimate judgment is negative. Piety masks human shame and is, therefore, a disguised intolerance of human sovereignty. The pious man finds the human world lovable only insofar as it admits of contact with a more beautiful realm. Piety, as it has hitherto been understood, is no longer necessary or appropriate for the noble man.

Nietzsche elucidates the meaning of nobility in the last section of *Beyond Good and Evil*, "What Is Noble?" (*Vornehm*). He begins by locating the origins of every aristocratic regime in acts of barbarous domination (aphorism 257) and proceeds to reveal the way in which nobility can be spiritualized, i.e., made philosophic. The transition from the earliest nobility to the new nobility is made by way of a series of aphorisms which allude to the vulnerability of the psychologist who studies higher men (aphorisms 269–82, 289, 290). There is apparently only one sure means by which the philosopher-psychologist can be protected from his peculiar vulnerability. The "great health" includes, as its peak, the capacity for mockery (*G.S.*, V. 382). Mockery signifies that self-love, detached from a reliance upon tradition or piety, actually is the source of action. Further, a philosophic mockery of man must supersede the hatred of the timely out of which the philosophic *eros* develops (*G.S.*, V. 379). Because of its origin in decadence, the philosophic *eros* might culminate in pessimism or some irenic resignation akin to piety; mockery rather than hatred invigorates that *eros* and makes it effective.²⁷ The penultimate aphorism of *Beyond Good and Evil* affirms mockery as an attribute, the divine attribute, of philosophic nobility (295; see 294). Apparently, the philosophic nobility is also pious. Speaking as the "last disciple and initiate of the god Dionysus," Nietzsche reveals, first of all, that Dionysus philosophizes. His intimations about Dionysus are intended to tempt others to follow "the genius of the heart" whom Nietzsche himself has been

²⁷ *Beyond*, VII. 216, 228; *Gen.*, I. 10; *G.S.*, V. 379–80; "On Reading and Writing," *Zarathustra*, p. 153.

tempted to follow. The "daring integrity, truthfulness, and love of wisdom" which characterize the philosopher Dionysus are equivalent to divine mockery. He laughs "in a superhuman and new way" at the expense of all serious things. He deprives of their seriousness the ideals around which human aspiring has been oriented. Dionysus possesses in divine or perfect form all that is potentially philosophic in previous manifestations of nobility: the arrogant skepticism of the Romans; the mocking scorn of the timely to be found in Aristophanes, Petronius, or Machiavelli (*Beyond*, II. 28); the disgust for the vanity of modern science present in Pascal;²⁸ Plato's contempt for "wise" men (*G.S.*, V. 379).²⁹

Nietzsche imitates Dionysus. In Section III of *Beyond Good and Evil* (aphorism 57), he presents a Dionysian speculation about the meaning of human inquiry.³⁰ He suggests that inquiry has value because it makes man profound. The desire to know broadens and deepens the nature of man's concerns: "ever new riddles and images become visible for him." Nietzsche does not despise the human idealization of wisdom; rather, he mocks the seriousness with which the development of human profundity has hitherto been regarded: "Perhaps everything on which the spirit's eye has exercised its acuteness and thoughtfulness was nothing but an occasion for this exercise, a playful matter, something for children and those who are childish." Philosophizing turns man inward and changes him; man cannot, however, escape from himself through philosophy. Dionysus tempts man to apotheosize his introspectiveness and his bondage to himself. Man does not return from him "blessed and oppressed by alien goods" but rather "richer in himself, newer to himself than before" (*Beyond*, IX. 295). Philosophizing, it appears, is to be pursued for its effect upon man: it makes man more interesting (*Gen.*, I. 7). By teaching man a sense of wonder about himself, philosophy instills in him the intrepid will to question ever further.³¹ Philosophizing in this sense establishes a genuine need for the problematic, a need which knows how to

²⁸ Pascal, who typifies the genuine noble religious man, faced the problem of "knowing and conscience." That Nietzsche to a certain extent shared this problem (*G.S.*, V. 382) may indicate why it is the first problem to which he refers in *Beyond Good and Evil* (III. 45) when designating the tasks of the "born psychologist" and why he expresses particular compassion for the sufferings of Pascal.

²⁹ See also Werner J. Dannhauser, *Nietzsche's View of Socrates* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 213ff.

³⁰ This aphorism immediately follows Nietzsche's single allusion in *Beyond Good and Evil* to the doctrine of the eternal return of the same (aphorism 56) and immediately precedes a series of aphorisms (58-61) which associate piety and nobility. Its placement suggests that man as "an eternal child" is to supersede or evolve from the "most world-affirming human being" and that a new innocence which shares something in common with the old innocence or piety is, in the end, the intended result of the liberation from dogmatism. See also *G.S.*, Preface, 4, V. 377.

³¹ *Beyond*, II. 40, 43, VII. 230, IX. 282-89; *Gen.*, III. 9; *G.S.*, Preface 3.

preserve itself. If philosophy can be honored as man's opportunity to make himself profound, i.e., as an opportunity to aspire to profundity, it will have overcome all aspects of its aversion to untruth.

The philosopher of the future is to be a "spirit who plays naively—that is, not deliberately, but from overflowing power and abundance—with all that was hitherto called holy, good, untouchable, divine" (*G.S.*, V. 382; *Beyond*, VII. 223). He must extend his parody of ideals to himself to maintain and test his power and self-confidence (*Beyond*, I. 5, VII. 227; *Gen.*, III. 3; *G.S.*, V. 382). The philosopher who can parody himself is not likely to submit to the personalism which can develop into dogma (*Beyond*, II. 25–26). Most important, however, self-mockery combats the philosophic liability to shame. By means of an iconoclasm distinguished by its comprehensiveness, the philosopher deliberately undermines the foundation for all instinctive health which has hitherto existed, the pious belief in ideals (*G.S.*, IV. 325). Self-mockery generates a feeling of individual irresponsibility in the man with the weightiest responsibility and, thereby, protects self-love. What might otherwise become an overwhelming sense of one's evilness, i.e., guilt, becomes, in the mocking emphasis of one's own unimportance in the whole economy of the species, a joyful affirmation of one's necessity (*G.S.*, I. 1, 4, IV. 311).

Self-mockery is a philosophic impulse which Dionysus possesses because he is free of shame; he does not love his virtues more than himself. Nietzsche imitates Dionysus' self-mockery by parodying the truth. He does not suppose truth to be God, but a woman, who has good reasons to hide herself from man: her seductiveness depends upon her secretiveness (*Beyond*, Preface, VII. 232; *G.S.*, Preface, 4). Nietzsche seems to intend this form of self-mockery to liberate the will to interpret, the affect of command; if the criticism of the will to truth becomes an integral part of the philosopher's life, he may come to revere man as the evaluating being (*G.S.*, II. 107).³² Thus that which maintains itself by parody is capable of becoming something other than parody. The supreme reverence for the self takes man beyond the liberation from dogmatism, beyond free-spiritedness (*Beyond*, IV. 153; *G.S.*, V. 377–78). Sovereign independence, because it rests upon reverence, endows man with a new innocence.

Nietzsche associates innocence and maturity (*Beyond*, IV. 94; *Gen.*, II. 20). In the very aphorism in which he parodies the quest for wisdom, he speaks of man as an "eternal child" who may discover a new playfulness after he has outgrown the toys or ideals of his first childhood. Mature innocence is necessary for the solution of the problem of value; the philosopher must establish a new ideal for man. The clear-sighted quest for uniquely individual introspective wisdom (*Beyond*, II. 43) is neither a denial of the self nor a rejection of life; thus it

³² *G.S.*, II. 107; "On the Thousand and One Goals," *Zarathustra*, p. 171.

commits the philosopher to the future in a way in which the ascetic ideal implied in the quest for wisdom of the whole cannot. The noble philosopher's self-love enables him to approach self-knowledge (*G.S.*, IV. 335) and to determine the future. The genuinely noble man unifies psychology and the quest for nature; he transforms historical psychology into a mode of self-examination and self-transformation which is not merely a study of the past. The genuine philosopher is more than contemplative; he is active (*Gen.*, I. 10). Philosophy becomes beneficent to life. It is, therefore, the singular mode of self-assertion which need not acknowledge anything higher than self-assertion. The philosopher serves life by serving nothing higher than himself.

The noble philosopher experiences no opposition between consciousness and instinct, between freedom and necessity, between truth and untruth. He reveres himself for his mastery of himself and has, therefore, earned the right to heed the demands of his *physis* (*G.S.*, I. 39, IV. 294; *Beyond*, IX. 266). His self-love transfigures itself into projections that seek to characterize the order of things, beginning with the characterization of his way of life, his aspirations, as good (*G.S.*, Preface, 3). He cannot resist self-idealization (*G.S.*, IV. 301, V. 360). He shares, therefore, in the characteristics of all noble authors of morality: "The noble type of man experiences itself as determining values; it does not need approval; it judges, 'What is harmful to me is harmful in itself'; it knows itself to be that which accords honor to things; it is value-creating. Everything it knows as part of itself it honors. Such a morality is self-glorification" (*Beyond*, IX. 260; *Gen.*, I. 5, II. 2). Since human sovereignty must express self-love by the establishment of morality, the philosophic government is founded in nature. Moreover, the foundation for the philosophic legislation of values in the vitalized or liberated self is a sufficient guarantee that it will be secure, perhaps eternal. The assertions of a healthy being are neither arbitrary nor changeable by education or by chance (*Beyond*, VII. 231, 239). Rather, they are imperturbably solid precisely because they are necessary emanations from the self which cannot be transcended.

Nietzsche sought to bring forth on earth a supernal being who would deliver man, newly formed and resplendent, to the future. He envisions the actualization of that which is taught by Plato in the *Republic* to exist only in speech, i.e., the literal rule of philosophy over man (*G.S.*, V. 362, 377). Nietzsche does not advocate the philosophic rule for the sake of non-philosophic men but for the sake of justifying life. Nonetheless, according to both Plato and Nietzsche, the non-philosophic realm does pose a problem for philosophy. It must, without knowing it, be organized in such a way as to support the highest human aspiration; those who serve philosophy require orthodoxy and therefore oppose philosophy (*Beyond*, III. 61). In contrast to Plato, Nietzsche deals with the problem of the political-moral

realm by circumventing that realm. That he can do this at all is evidence that his project is a modern one (*G.S.*, V. 377, 379). Out of a zealous devotion to the needs of the higher man, he shuns the needs of lower men, notwithstanding the fact that he wishes to found philosophy upon a new prudence which is to include a clear and full regard for those forces, both more virulent and lower than philosophy, which threaten to assail or smother it. He considers the political-moral realm thematically only insofar as it serves, by means of a stark contrast, to illumine that which it opposes. His neglect of the regime amplifies the one element of realism he claims to have inherited from religious mysticism: for "the man of knowledge there are no duties" (*Gen.*, III. 17).

Nietzsche writes openly for the noble man, the supra-moral man, the gentleman, "taking this concept in a more spiritual and radical sense than has ever been done" (*E.H.*, p. 310; *Beyond*, VII. 214, 219). One can infer, however, that he intended his books to convey to the non-philosophic reader a respect for that of which he can never have experience and, hence, that which he will never know.³³ Since Nietzsche's writings have often had the opposite effect,³⁴ a question arises as to whether they are entirely faithful to their purpose, and whether the dignity of philosophy might not be better preserved by giving a fuller attention to the demands of the political-moral realm. This question would be no less urgent if one suspected that Nietzsche's victory over the ultimate narrowness of Plato, by means of a candid historical consciousness, was itself a surrender to a new form of narrowness. In that case, the attempt to cultivate a being who could transcend the untoward effects of historicism and rescue philosophy from moribundity by an act of will would be, in some sense, deluded. It would be more than pitiable if Nietzsche himself had obscured his most frequently recurring and perhaps his most instructive lesson, albeit not his most original one, on behalf of the practice of genuine philosophy in the modern age: "In the end it remains as it is and always has been, great things remain for the great, abysses for the profound, nuances and shudders for the refined, and, in brief, all that is rare for the rare" (*Beyond*, II. 43).

³³ *G.S.*, V. 381; see letters 145, 152, and 154 in *Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche*.

³⁴ See Arthur Danto, *Nietzsche as Philosopher* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 74-77, 80, 97; Henry Kariel, "Nietzsche's Preface to Constitutionalism," *Journal of Politics* 25 (May 1963): 211-25.