

Interpretation

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LORDSHIP AND BONDAGE IN LUTHER AND MARX

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Nothing might seem more dubious than the attempt to bring together the rabid foe of the peasants with the evangelist of the proletariat.¹ Their doctrines lay more than three centuries apart, while their goals were literally, worlds apart. The substantive differences between them would fill volumes and we must take these for granted here.

Yet a modicum of detachment from the great struggles in which Luther and Marx were engaged may offer glimmers of a different perspective. Both were outstanding figures in the Western apocalyptic tradition, a tradition that conceives of the world as bearing an overwhelming burden of domination and oppression (however differently defined), and proceeds to offer to the oppressed a vision of perfect community. Luther's kingdom of God—whose presence on earth, Luther felt, could already be discerned—promised a regime with some surprising similarities to Marx' socialism.

But nothing lies further from the aim of this essay than the attempt to turn Luther into a latent communist, nor Marx into a latter-day Christian *malgré lui*. What they do share in common is a rhetorical structure, namely, the characteristic articulation of the apocalyptic tradition that moves step by step in a systematic fashion, from the original condition of domination and oppression to the culmination of perfect community.

Such an intermediate process may not be readily apparent, particularly when abrupt rhetorical leaps are taken by both authors from overwhelming "oppression" to a total "salvation." Nevertheless, certain discrete elements of Lutheran theology that fall into place en route to his kingdom, serve (in a rhetorical vein), as an unexpected road map for Marx' dialectical path to socialism.

Standing as a bridge between Luther and Marx is the towering and enigmatic figure of Hegel. His thought derives from many sources, particularly from the ancient Greeks and from his contemporaries, but the Lutheran strand of his philosophy has largely been overlooked. As a troubled and skeptical graduate of the Lutheran seminary at Tübingen, Hegel was nevertheless able to affirm in later life: "I am a Lutheran and am just as rooted in Lutheranism through philosophy . . . it contains within it a higher Spirit than merely that of human tradition."² He regarded the Protestant Reformation as *Die Haupt-Revolution*, the great revolution³ and its central doctrine of Christian freedom was reechoed in his own philosophy. Christianity, in its Protestant expression, was the truth of the universe and of individual self-consciousness, but was presented, in Hegel's view, in out-

moded forms—in myths, miracles and legends. For the generation of the Enlightenment it was necessary to render “the language of religious myth into that of thought.”⁴

My chief debt in this exploration is to Hegel although I can do little more than acknowledge this debt with occasional references to his work.⁵ The essential premises of this essay are derived in modified form from Hegel’s famous parable on lordship and bondage in the *Phenomenology of Mind*,⁶ but the ramifications of the parable extend beyond our present subject. (Nor is there a semblance of unanimity among the various commentators as to how this parable may be interpreted.)

The modern political interest in lordship (*Herrschaft*) and bondage (*Knechtschaft*) tends to view the meaning of these terms as “domination” and “oppression” respectively, the starting point of the present analysis. The neglected dimension, however, is the underlying religious foundation of Hegel’s thought that recognizes in these terms the “Lord” (*Herr*) and “servant” or “slave” (*Knecht*) of the Bible. Ever since Luther, the terms *Herrschaft* and *Knechtschaft* have been central to German Protestant theology. The German language permits both a political and theological interpretation of these terms and Hegel’s attempt to exploit and to reconcile this very ambiguity is the key to the breadth of his perspective.

The present attempt from a largely Hegelian vantage point, to compare the antecedent Luther with the posthumous Marx, can be viewed as an application of Hegel’s theme of lordship and bondage to the apocalyptic tradition in both religion and politics. The rhetorical properties of our common terms *Herrschaft* and *Knechtschaft* are traced through some of their widely different contexts.

This necessarily involves us at the outset, in a framework that is much older than the three centuries that separate Luther and Marx. Luther adhered scrupulously to his biblical sources, particularly to Paul and in that sense, we may speak of a time span not merely of three centuries but of three millennia of the apocalyptic tradition.

The chief rhetorical mode on which I rely is that of inversion, which is closely related to what is more commonly known as the dialectic. Heidegger drew attention to this Hegelian discovery as a specific and discrete phenomenon of consciousness,⁷ but the present investigation indicates that there is a more extended *system* of inversion at work. Its starting point is invariably the antithesis of lordship and bondage and its conclusion, the characteristic reconciliation of this antithesis in a vision of ideal community. It is this systematic formal pattern which I have termed the *rhetoric of transfiguration*.

The limitations of this endeavor should also be apparent. An analysis of the rhetorical structure in Luther and Marx will have little to add to the

substantive doctrines of either theology or socialism and must bypass the economic, social or theological settings in which these originated. I hope, in turn, that nothing is detracted from these doctrines and I have attempted to avoid any suggestion of reductionism. The exalted expressions of the human mind stand on their own merit, and, as Hegel warned (in a slightly different context), are uncompromised by an analysis of the “medium” of articulation.⁸

Lordship and bondage are reciprocal or complementary terms, not unlike teacher/student, or doctor/patient. The existence of one term implies the existence of the second term of the pair. Lordship and bondage may exist in some more or less benign relationship of mutual dependence (such as in the greater part of the feudal period). It is necessary, however, to posit these two terms in some form of opposition—what Luther, Hegel and Marx called an antithesis—for the systematic process of inversion to begin.

This process of inversion never occurs in the abstract form outlined here but is deeply embedded in the theological, social and political circumstances of the particular periods we are considering. These serve to “mediate” the process. The elements I shall subsequently identify moreover, are scattered throughout the writings of Luther and Marx and form a systematic structure when viewed from an analytic perspective of which these authors were only partly conscious.

In its pristine form, the rhetoric of transfiguration comes to us in the Old and New Testament. Some brief illustrations will be cited from both to establish our basic rhetorical structure.

In the Old Testament, the Covenant at Sinai stands as the central moment and has its rhetorical origin in the oppressive bondage to Pharaoh in Egypt. The rhetoric is explicit: “Then thou shalt say unto thy son, we were slaves unto Pharaoh in Egypt” (Deuteronomy 6:21). Yahweh conquers Pharaoh and replaces a tyrannical and evil lordship with an exalted lordship of justice and righteousness. The Jews in turn are transformed from oppressed slaves to Pharaoh to exalted slaves to Yahweh as in God’s statement: “For unto me the children of Israel are slaves, they are my slaves . . .” (*avadei*; Leviticus 25:55). While the same Hebrew word *eved* is retained to connote slavery to Pharaoh as well as slavery to Yahweh, its significance has been completely inverted. In the first instance it connotes bitter, overwhelming oppression; in the second instance total salvation, man’s highest and most exalted vocation.

The New Testament brings with it a reiteration of the same basic form, but a shift in the definition of bondage. Instead of the bondage to Pharaoh, the Christian is in bondage to the body, sin and death. The Greek *doulos*

or slave is inverted in precisely the same way as the Hebrew *eved*. Hence the “slaves (*douloi*) . . . of sin unto death” (Romans 6:16) become “slaves of Christ” (*douloi Christou*, Ephesians 6:6). The same word “slave” is retained, but a transfiguration has occurred once more to a “bondage” that is man’s highest vocation. I call this an *inversion of substance* where the identical term has, so to speak, been turned “inside-out.”

A second and different mode of inversion now follows. The exalted “slaves” become “lords” in their own right. This is an *inversion of form* or a turning, so to speak, “right-side-up.” In the Old Testament the Jews, as slaves of Yahweh become the “chosen” (i.e. blessed) people, “called by the name of the Lord”: “And the Lord shall make thee the head, and not the tail; and thou shalt be above only, and thou shalt not be beneath” (Deuteronomy 28:10, 13). In the New Testament, Christians as slaves of Christ become correspondingly “joint-heirs with Christ” (Romans 8:17) and “sharers of Christ” (Hebrews 3:14); the Christian becomes “lord of all” (*kyrios panton*, Galatians 4:1). This is closely modeled on the Old Testament: “But ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, an holy nation, a peculiar people [i.e. a people for His possession]” (I Peter 2:9).

A broadly similar process of inversion occurs with the “upper” term of the pair, lordship. The original tyrannical lordship is vanquished or destroyed by an exalted, righteous Lord. Just as Yahweh defeats Pharaoh (Deuteronomy 29:2), Christ abolishes death which is “swallowed up in victory” (I Corinthians 15:54). Domination is inverted in both cases: state slavery in Egypt is followed by freedom in the promised land; Christ’s victory over death brings “immortality to light through the gospel” (II Timothy 1:10).

The former slaves who are now transfigured as “lords,” join with the exalted Lord to create a new vision of “community”: a “kingdom of priests and an holy nation” (Exodus 19:6) of the Old Testament or the kingdom of God in the New Testament whose inhabitants are “fellow-citizens with the saints and of the household of God” (Ephesians 2:19).

There are two important political characteristics of this community: a total identity of goals is posited between the new lords and the supreme Lord; secondly, the lords are explicitly declared to be powerless and all power is said to reside in the supreme Lord. Briefly, in the Old Testament “. . . if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me above all people: for all the earth is mine” (Exodus 19:5). In the New Testament, “ye are complete in him, which is the head of all principality and power” (Colossians 2:10). In the Kingdom, “he shall have put down all rule and all authority and power” (I Corinthians 15:24). With this vision of perfect community, the original antithesis of lordship and bondage is completely resolved.

Speaking therefore only of the structure of the rhetoric, the perfect community results from a systematic process of inversion of both terms of the initial antithesis of lordship and bondage, however differently these terms are defined in each case. Allowing for some important qualifications and differences, such a schema forms a vital component of the rhetorical structure of the Old Testament, the New Testament, Luther, Hegel, and Marx.

LUTHER

Luther's theology is an epic structure of paradox. The key to its paradoxical character is generally antithesis and inversion.

Luther explored and elaborated on the structure of Pauline theology and commented on it in various ways. "*Antithesin facit Apostolus*"—"the Apostle creates an antithesis," Luther stated of one of the passages in Paul's Epistle to the Romans.⁹ He was fully aware of the role that antithesis played in the New Testament and followed this consistently in his own work. In his debate with Erasmus on the bondage of the will, Luther reiterates that "Scripture speaks through antithesis" and that everything that is opposed to Christ reigns in him.¹⁰ This notion was to emerge once more (rhetorically) in the antithesis (*Gegensatz*) of Hegelian philosophy and later again in Marx.

Following Paul, the spiritual and the carnal natures of man are in an antithetical or contradictory relationship: according to his spiritual nature he is an "inner or new man"; according to his bodily nature he is an "outward or old man." We find that "these two men in the same man contradict each other." This contradiction is based on Galatians 5:17—"for the desires of the flesh are against the Spirit, and the desires of the Spirit are against the flesh."¹¹

Hence the "oppression" under which we live is that of the body (rendered by Luther as *leyplichen unterdrückung*).¹² Death, suffering, the lusts of the flesh, sin and the transiency of this earthly existence, all are interconnected features of bodily existence and the elements of the Christian's oppression or slavery.

There is also a vital institutional component to this oppression. Luther reiterates Paul's injunctions against the law. Paul had in mind the structure of Jewish religion, the Mosaic code, and offered salvation through the church. But it was the Catholic church of his day that Luther added to his compendium of oppressive bondage, the "popes, bishops and lords" who exhibit:

so great a display of power and so terrible a tyranny that no heathen empire

or other earthly power can be compared with it, just as if laymen were not also Christians. Through this perversion the knowledge of Christian grace, faith, liberty, and of Christ himself has altogether perished, and its place has been taken by an unbearable bondage of human works and laws until we have become, as the Lamentations of Jeremiah say, servants (*knecht*) of the vilest men on earth who abuse our misfortune to serve only their base and shameless will.¹³

The notion that righteousness may be sought through good works is a “perverse notion,” a “leviathan.” Luther says that “in truth they [works] are not good. They deceive men and lead them to deceive one another like ravening wolves in sheep’s clothing.”¹⁴

The response to this array of oppressive bondage—the body, the Church and works—is twofold: the Christian as servant and the Christian as lord. The major essay, “On the Freedom of a Christian” (1520), states that:

A Christian is a perfectly free lord of all (*freyer herr über alle ding*) subject to none.

A Christian is a perfectly dutiful servant of all (*dienstpar knecht aller ding*) subject to all.¹⁵

The resolution of this paradox—how a Christian may be simultaneously a lord and a servant, and yet at all times free—goes to the heart of the theme of lordship and bondage. Through the process of inversion we have outlined, the basic antithesis is resolved and a characteristic vision of perfect community follows the outcome of such a resolution.

As a servant, the Christian is enjoined to follow in Christ’s path:

Although the Christian is thus free from all works, he ought in this liberty to empty himself, take upon himself the form of a servant, be made in the likeness of men, be found in human form, and to serve, help and in every way deal with his neighbour as he sees that God through Christ has dealt and still deals with him. This he should do freely, having regard for nothing but divine approval.¹⁶

The operative phrase is that the Christian “ought in this liberty to empty himself,” but this official translation is elliptic. The original Latin text of the essay (*rursus se exinanire*) conveys the sense of reverting to, or coming back again to empty himself by undertaking “works” intended to serve his neighbour.¹⁷ Thus the Christian turns, so to speak, his oppressive bondage inside out, i.e., he inverts it by voluntarily becoming a servant to his neighbor.

There is an inversion of status once again as the Christian servant acquires the powers of a lord. The Christian, Luther states, is “lord over sin, death and hell,” and he is “free from all things and over all things so that he needs no works to make him righteous.”¹⁸ This lord, moreover, has no need, spiritually, for kings or priests or the oppressive church hierarchy, but through his “priestly glory” and his “royal power,” the Christian lord rules over life, death and sin.¹⁹

How does this take place? Luther’s answer is through faith:

every Christian is by faith so exalted (*erhaben*) above all things that by virtue of a spiritual power, he is lord (*eyn herr wirt geystlich*) of all things without exception, so that nothing can do him any harm.²⁰

Binding together his two vocations within this inner freedom, the Christian as lord and the Christian as servant are united. In brief, Christians are “servants of our neighbours, and yet lords of all” and are “Christ’s one to another and do to our neighbours as Christ does to us.”²¹ As Luther summed up the matter at a different point: “In Christ, the lord and servant are one” (*Das ynn Christo, herr und knecht eyn ding sey*).²² This offers the resolution of Luther’s paradox of Christian freedom through the two modes of inversion specified previously.

Echoing the contradiction of man’s two natures, there emerges Luther’s portrait of a bifurcated world, one segment of which is inner and spiritual (*yinnerlich, geystlich*) and the other, outer or bodily (*eusserlich, leylich*). The most important political expression of this duality is Luther’s doctrine of the two kingdoms:

God has ordained two governments: the spiritual, (*das geystliche*), by which the Holy Spirit produces Christians and righteous people under Christ; and the temporal, (*das weltliche*), which restrains the un-Christian and wicked so that—no thanks to them—they are obliged to keep still and to maintain an outward peace.²³

Christ’s kingdom is hidden to the eyes and senses but “already exists in this world”²⁴ and rules side by side with the temporal world until all those who belong in the spiritual kingdom have entered. Thereupon Christ “will destroy everything (*alles . . . auff heben*) at one time and lay about Him.”²⁵ This will occur on the last day, when Christ’s kingdom of faith is handed over to God “so that we will behold Him most clearly without veil and obscure words.” It will be a transformation from “hidden essence” (*verborgen wesen*), to “manifest being” (*offentlichen wesens*).²⁶ At that point “God Himself will be Lord alone (*allein Herr sein*) and rule alone in us, His children.”²⁷

In the spiritual kingdom, there is to be a perfect correspondence between individual and community. When God alone rules in each citizen of the kingdom and invests him with the Holy Spirit, the citizen can only want and do what the Holy Spirit requires that he want and do. Luther calls this condition “spontaneous” (*das da heisse Spontaneus*), that is, where “willing, desire and love is to obey and be subject to this Lord without hypocrisy . . . to be upright and obedient gladly and voluntarily.”²⁸ “They thus conform themselves purely to the will of God,” Luther states, and man thus “wills what God wills.”²⁹

Further, all institutional structures of power will be abolished “making us all equal and erasing every distinction among emperor, kings, nobility, burghers and peasants. God alone will be everything.”³⁰

Luther’s spiritual kingdom exhibits the characteristic qualities to which we have pointed in the resolution of the basic antithesis of lordship and bondage: the total identity of goals between the individual as lord and the supreme Lord, and the absence of power and conflict. These are the essential elements that reiterate in Luther the entire system of the rhetoric of transfiguration.

The spiritual kingdom is not a regime that will be confined to heaven for “we shall be wherever we wish, in heaven, on earth, above or below as we please.” It will be an answer to Adam’s fall and “the restoration and renewal of the creation and for the liberty of the children of God.”³¹

To lead the attack on the Catholic Church, particularly on the practice of indulgences, Luther elaborated his theology of the cross. It was to be reiterated (to a different purpose) in Hegel and subsequently in a more indirect rhetorical form in Marx.

As early as 1518, Luther refers in the Heidelberg Disputation to true theology as the theology of the cross (*theologia crucis*) standing in sharp opposition to the theology of glory (*theologia gloriae*) ascribed to the Catholic church. In the theology of glory, God is known from his works, his glory and his power. But according to the theology of the cross, God wishes to be known by a standard that is the precise opposite, namely by his suffering and his weakness. “*CRUX sola est nostra Theologia*,” “the cross alone is our theology,” states Luther.³²

The theology of the cross had its basis in Christ’s two-fold work, a work that is “characteristic” and a work that is “alien” (*proprium et alienum*).³³ The “characteristic” work includes “grace, righteousness, truth, patience and gentleness. . . .” The “alien” work includes “the cross, labor, all kinds of punishment, finally death and hell in the flesh. . . .”³⁴ Luther states that it is to Christ’s *alien* image that we must be conformed: “Just so must we be conformed to the image of the Son of God.”³⁵ This forms the basis of

Luther's attack on the indulgences: "Whoever does not take up his own cross and follow him, is not worthy of him, even if he were filled with all kinds of indulgences."³⁶

Luther's complaint against the Catholic church was summed up in a characteristic and oft-repeated metaphor: "the theology of the cross has been abrogated, and everything has been completely turned up-side down" (*evacuata est Theologia crucis suntque omnia plane perversa*).³⁷

Pursued to its furthest extreme, the theology of the cross offers a view of God's power as the *negativa essentia*, the negative essence.³⁸ Luther means "the negation of all things which can be felt, held and comprehended . . .," or alternatively that God "cannot be possessed or touched except by the negation of all our affirmatives."³⁹ Luther bases his theology on Paul:

For everything in us is weak and worthless: but in that nothingness and worthlessness, so to speak, God shows His strength, according to the saying (II Corinthians 12:9) "My power is made perfect in weakness."⁴⁰

For Luther, it is this very annihilation to nothingness that is the prelude to being born anew. In his essay "On the Bondage of the Will," the path for the elect (*electos*) is "that being humbled and brought back to nothingness by this means they may be saved."⁴¹

God's power of negation, the *negativa essentia* corresponds to what I have termed here the power of inversion. A leading Lutheran scholar, Paul Althaus sums up Luther's Divinity as the power of inversion (*Umkehrung*) as follows:

(God) is the power that creates out of nothing or out of its opposite. It is manifested by the inversion of all earthly standards and relationships.⁴²

Stated succinctly, Luther's prescription for man was as follows: "*nos ipsos deserere et exinanire, nihil de nostro sensu retinendo, sed totum abnegando. . .*"—"to forsake and empty ourselves, keeping nothing of our senses, but negating everything. . ."⁴³

It is precisely from this point of departure in Lutheran theology, man's own "emptying" of himself and negating everything, that Hegel takes up the matter and develops his thesis on man's work and activity in the world. Hegel brings to bear the same mode of rhetoric and much of the same vocabulary, although his purposes were often different from Luther's. A few brief clues must suffice.

There was a Lutheran resonance in the very title of Hegel's chapter on lordship and bondage: "*Die Wahrheit der Gewissheit seiner selbst*"

(“The Truth Which Conscious Certainty of Self Realizes”). It has the ring of an oft-quoted Lutheran expression: “*deyner warheit gewiszheyt macht mich, das ichs festlich glewb*” (“the certainty of your truthfulness . . . leads me to believe this firmly”).⁴⁴ But the difference in emphasis of these two expressions was also reflected in Hegel’s shift of the Christian truth to the self-consciousness of the individual. Hegel maintains:

This is the Lutheran faith . . . God is thus in spirit alone, He is not a beyond but the truest reality of the individual.⁴⁵

Luther’s theology was preserved in Hegel’s new “scientific” language of the Enlightenment, even while its religious representation (*Vorstellung*) was annulled. In Hegel’s famous parable of lordship and bondage, the heart of the *Phenomenology of Mind*, the prototypical slave appears “in the form or shape of thinghood” (*Gestalt der Dingheit*),⁴⁶ a slavery reminiscent of Paul’s (and Luther’s) “bondage under the elements of the world” (Galatians 4:3). Man’s bondage lay in his finitude (*Endlichkeit*).⁴⁷ He was hemmed in by an “inverted world” (*verkehrte Welt*), the world of sensuous perception in both its immediate and universal aspects.⁴⁸

The power of the mysterious “lord” in the parable, is “*die reine negative Macht, der das Ding nichts ist*”; “the negative power without qualification, a power to which the thing is naught.”⁴⁹ In Hegel’s more succinct expression, *negatives Wesen*, the negative essence, we recognize the exact translation of Luther’s *negativa essentia*.

In another designation, Hegel refers to Spirit explicitly as “this process of inversion,” *dieser Umkehrung*.⁵⁰ This knowledge of Spirit is prefigured for mankind in Christ’s Passion, itself an inversion (*Umkehrung*)⁵¹ and a paradigm for all men.

Hence, “bondage will, when completed, pass into the opposite of what it immediately is . . . and change round into real and true independence.”⁵² Full self-consciousness will be realized in dialectical fashion, in the inward retreat, the self-differentiation from the finite world.⁵³

We cannot pursue further the details of Hegel’s general resolution of his parable of lordship and bondage. The end result however was a “complete and thoroughgoing fusion and identification” or as stated differently, the “reflexion into unity.”⁵⁴

Much of this was reminiscent of Luther’s never-ending preoccupation with the two opposite natures of Christ (his Lordship and Bondage). Within Christ, Luther maintained, “two extreme opposites are contending” (*duo extreme contraria concurrant*).⁵⁵ Yet His two natures were “inseparable” as if they were “intertwined and unified.”⁵⁶ This problem was, for Luther, ultimately “inscrutable” and “foolish reason” would not help. Only the

regulae dialecticae he maintained, the rules of dialectics, offered a clue to the resolution.⁵⁷

For Hegel, the task of Spirit in history was to acquire knowledge of itself, in part, through penetrating the inner meaning of these forms of religious expression and thus to “gain freedom and independence.” This was achieved through “the portentous power of the negative.”⁵⁸ The encounter of Spirit with the finite or “inverted world” was designated as the “negative of the negative,”⁵⁹ a phrase that was subsequently echoed in Marx’ movement toward communism.

As Spirit is incarnated or embodied in history it unites “the kingdom of God and the socially moral world as one Idea.”⁶⁰ In the ideal state which Hegel conceives, there is the same identity of goals to which we pointed in Luther’s spiritual kingdom: “the private interest of its citizens is one with the common interest of the State.”⁶¹

History culminates in the ideal Protestant state:

In the Protestant state, the constitution and the code, as well as their several applications, embody the principle and the development of the moral life, which proceeds and can only proceed from the truth of religion . . . and in that way . . . first become actual.⁶²

This was an ideal conception of the state as embodied perfect community—Hegel’s testament to the promise of the emerging liberal society. The significance of the events to which he was witness “is known through the Spirit, for the Spirit is revealed in this history . . . world-history has in it found its end.”⁶³

MARX

Marx carried on an endless diatribe against theology and religion with occasional grudging praise and perceptive insight. We cannot enter into the main points of his discussion here. But in his debate with Max Stirner, Marx put his finger on the nub of his argument, namely, that Christianity had focussed on the wrong definition of domination, that is on man’s mortal existence:

The only reason why Christianity wanted to free us from the domination of the flesh (*Herrschaft des Fleisches*) . . . was because it regarded our flesh, our desires as something foreign to us; it wanted to free us from determination by nature only because it regarded our own nature as not belonging to us.⁶⁴

While declaring his opposition to the “Christian dialectic” which re-

garded man's natural existence as an external, alien force, Marx understood that it had issued from "an inverted world" (*eine verkehrte Welt*) and was thus "an inverted world-consciousness" (*ein verkehrtes Weltbewusstsein*).⁶⁵

The contradictions of capitalism as well, were typically designated by Marx as phenomena of inversion. "Everything," he stated, "appears upside down in competition."⁶⁶ These phenomena were now found to be present in history and society rather than in "pure consciousness" as Hegel would have it with his "dialectic of negativity," or in the power of God as Luther maintained.

The root of the problem, as Marx perceived it, was the social and economic order under which man lived, not man's mortality. His definition of "bondage" shifted drastically once more from that of his predecessors; nevertheless the rhetorical structure of their argument left its mark on his own view of history. Inversion and reinversion became the key to the articulation of man's oppression and of his liberation.

We turn our attention to Marx' treatment of the theme of lordship and bondage. *Herrschaft* is now defined as domination by changing forms of private property and *Knechtschaft* is the bondage of different forms of alienated labour, *entäusserte[n] Arbeit*.⁶⁷ In a few elliptic notes at the end of the second manuscript of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (E.P.M.), Marx outlines the process relating capital and labor as *Herr* and *Knecht*. They develop first reciprocally even though separated and estranged and "promote each other as positive conditions." They then develop in opposition (*Gegensatz*).⁶⁸ The motive force of change is not the benign or complementary side of this reciprocal relationship but their antagonism, "the antithesis of labour and capital" (*der Gegensatz der Arbeit und des Kapitals*).⁶⁹ This antithesis, he stated in the E.P.M., is a "dynamic relationship moving to its resolution."⁷⁰ Such an inner dynamic of lordship and bondage was restated in more elaborate fashion in the *Grundrisse* and referred to again in *Capital*.⁷¹

In a strictly rhetorical sense, "antithesis" plays the same role for Marx that it plays in Paul's designation of man's two opposing natures, and in Luther's elaboration of Pauline theology. Once again, it proves to be the starting point for the unfolding of the rhetoric of transfiguration moving to its apocalyptic climax.

Beginning with the "inverted world" of capitalism, a systematic reinversion of man and society is outlined. Its rhetorical elements in brief are as follows. The proletariat (Marx' *Knecht*), moves from its own "complete loss of humanity and can only redeem itself through the total redemption of humanity"; the German text contrasts *völlige[r] Verlust*—complete loss, and *völlige Wiedergewinnung*—complete redemption.⁷² A dehumanized and enslaved proletariat becomes a redeemed and free proletariat. This is the

movement of the "slave" from an oppressed to an exalted status—the inversion of substance referred to earlier.

But now the second inversion makes its appearance—the inversion of form—and the exalted bondage turns into lordship. In Germany, Marx foresaw a partial or political revolution where the working class would emancipate itself and achieve universal dominance (*allgemeinen Herrschaft*).⁷³ He adds: "Only in the name of the universal rights of society can a particular class lay claim to universal dominance."⁷⁴ Marx refers several times in the Communist Manifesto to this "lordship" of the proletariat, i.e., their "supremacy" (*Herrschaft*). His graphic instruction reads: "the first step in the revolution by the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class. . . ."⁷⁵ It is reminiscent, rhetorically, of Moses' promise to the Jews:

And the Lord shall make thee the head, and not the tail; and thou shalt be above only, and thou shalt not be beneath (Deuteronomy 28:13).

Similarly for Paul, the Christian was to become "lord of all" (Galatians 4:1) and for Luther he was to acquire "royal power" and rule over life, death and sin.

Thus we have the rhetorical parallel of Marx' *Knecht* to Luther's *Knecht* moving from oppressive to exalted bondage and then the further inversion to the status of ruler or "lord."

The rhetorical process is reiterated as well in regard to the second term of the pair, the original (tyrannical) lordship of private property. Recall that for Paul, death's domination was inverted, to bring eternal life to Christians. For Luther, Christ would, on the last day, destroy the temporal kingdom to hand over the spiritual kingdom to God (*alles . . . auff heben*).

For Marx, the movement towards socialism occurs in two institutional stages. The first is crude communism, "the first positive annulment (*positive Aufhebung*) of private property."⁷⁶ This forms the basis, in its positive expression, for the notion of communism: "*communism* is the positive expression of annulled private property—at first as *universal* private property."⁷⁷

This negation by itself, is only partial since it is merely private property made "universal." There is a more basic need yet to be fulfilled—"the need for society,"⁷⁸ that is, a complete and total negation of private property. Marx' aim is to put an end to man's historical alienation, "the destruction of the alien relation between men and what they themselves produce."⁷⁹

It is to the resolution of this overall historical problem of "society," to which the final stage, socialism is directed. Man, in this community, is to become the "totality of human manifestations of life."⁸⁰ This formulation from the E.P.M. is reiterated in the *Grundrisse*. Marx invokes "the absolute

working-out of his [man's] creative potentialities . . . the development of all human powers as such." This is "the end in itself . . ." that "produces his [man's] totality."⁸¹

It is this sense of "ideal totality"—"*die ideale Totalität*"⁸²—which characterizes Marx' solution totally integrating man and society. The active agent is "the proletariat organized as the ruling class" (*als herrschende Klasse*) i.e. as the State.⁸³ In this vision, the proletariat "associates, fuses (*zusammenfließt*) and identifies itself with society (*mit ihr verwechselt*) in general, and is felt and recognized to be society's general representative . . ."⁸⁴ The identity of its goals with those of society as a whole becomes complete.

When the proletariat (as the State) is thoroughly fused and identified with society as a whole, its "dominance," becomes short-lived. The final stage of our schema is recapitulated in Marx in the explicit abolition of power. Political power, Marx claims, is merely the result of class antagonisms and with the abolition of classes, a society will evolve where "there will be no further political power as such."⁸⁵ In a well-known passage from the Communist Manifesto, he reiterates this notion:

When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances to organize itself as a class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms, and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class.⁸⁶

The German text of this last clause reads: "*hebt . . . damit seine eigene Herrschaft als Klasse auf.*"⁸⁷ Compare this with Paul's prescription for the kingdom of God when Christ "shall have put down all rule and all authority and power" (I Corinthians 15:24). In Luther's translation (1546): "*Wenn er aufheben wird alle Herrschaft, und alle Oberkeit und Gewalt.*"

This comparison reveals the common culmination of the apocalyptic vision. In its rhetorical structure, Marx' socialism is as comprehensive and all-embracing a vision of community as the "holy nation" of the Old Testament, as the *totus Christus* of the New Testament, as Luther's kingdom of God or Hegel's ideal Protestant state.

In this schematic outline of Marx' rhetorical structure, we have hardly

been able to touch on the vast and complex network of social and economic development which forms the substantive basis of his work. This is not however, the immediate subject of this paper. We confine ourselves merely to pointing to a few instances where the rhetoric of this schema of economic development is animated by the same mode of inversion to which we have drawn the reader's attention.

Some idea of this process is provided by Marx' discussion of money in the E.P.M. Money is the motive force that dominates man and creates the oppressed and alienated society. It derives its special power because it holds captive "men's estranged, alienating and self-disposing species nature. Money is the alienated ability of mankind."⁸⁸ Money is designated by Marx as "this overturning power," *diese verkehrende Macht*, and he elaborates on this theme of inversion. Money is "the general overturning (*allgemeine Verkehrung*) of individualities which turns them into their contrary (*in ihr Gegenteil umkehrt*) and adds contradictory attributes to the attributes."⁸⁹

But the rhetoric of inversion was not merely limited to money. In the *Grundrisse*, this theme is pursued further into the realm of the capitalist mode of production. Marx finds that "inversion (*Verkehrung*) is the foundation of the capitalist mode of production, not only of its distribution." He states that "this twisting and inversion (*Verdrehung und Verkehrung*) is a *real* [phenomenon], not a merely *supposed one* existing merely in the imagination of the workers and the capitalists."⁹⁰

As this notion emerges in its fully developed form in *Capital*, Marx maintains that "it is evident that the laws of appropriation or of private property . . . become by their own inner and inexorable dialectic changed into their very opposite."⁹¹ Further, "capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation."⁹²

Summing up the two positions, we see that out of Luther's battle with the Catholic church where, as we recall, "everything has been completely turned up-side-down," there emerged the theology of the cross centered on man's suffering and descent to nothingness. God's power as the *negativa essentia*, the power of inversion, was to bring about man's salvation:

For Christendom must take the same course as the Lord Himself (John 15:20). Christians must bear the brunt of the attack of the devil and the world, must be run over and trampled, so that they may feel it . . . [as Isaiah says]: "But I will see to it that you trample those who trampled you. not merely for a time, as you now must suffer for a time; but you shall trample them forever."⁹³

For Marx, emancipation will come about as the result of

the formation of a class with radical chains . . . a class that is the dissolution of all classes, a sphere of society having a universal character because of its universal suffering . . . because . . . unqualified wrong is perpetrated on it. . .⁹⁴

Marx regarded capitalism as “an enchanted, perverted [read “inverted”], topsy-turvy world” (*die verzauberte, verkehrte und auf den Kopf gestellte Welt*)⁹⁵ but communism “overturns the basis of all earlier relations of production and exchange.”⁹⁶

These rhetorical expressions appear in Luther and Marx, so to speak, back to back or in mirror image. Following Christ’s “alien” path is for Luther, man’s most exalted vocation; for Marx the devaluation of the worker by capital is the source of his most oppressive condition, his “nothingness” or “non-being.”⁹⁷ Nevertheless, this “negativity” is the rhetorical prelude to “salvation” in both cases. Marx envisions the final stage of capitalism as the growth of

the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working-class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organised by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. . . . The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.⁹⁸

Speaking in Christ’s name Luther states:

When you think that you have been devoured and destroyed, I will force My way through and bring it to pass that you rise and reign.⁹⁹

Luther adds that faith “believes that life emerges from death and that perdition ends in salvation.”¹⁰⁰ When God “exalts to heaven he does it by bringing down to hell.”¹⁰¹ “In short,” Luther states, “God cannot be God unless he first becomes a devil. We cannot go to heaven unless we first go to hell.”¹⁰²

Thus Luther’s theology of the cross has its echo, more than three centuries later, in Marx. The advent of both “kingdoms” is heralded by a rhetoric of negative transcendence, whether in theology or in politics.

SEMANTICS

Common semantics were transmitted in the course of time from Luther to Marx, due in part to Luther’s remarkable achievements in the German language. In his translation of the Bible, Luther “created” the past while laying the linguistic foundations of future German culture and philosophy.

Much of this was bound to be reflected in Marx' vocabulary and figures of speech.

In reference to man's alienation from his own labor for example, Marx uses the phrase *fremd[en] und ausser* (alien and external). It is the same phrase (via Luther's translation) as Paul's *fremd und ausser*, his reference to alienation from the commonwealth of Israel.¹⁰³ In more elaborate form, these became the two key words in Marx' exposition of capitalist alienation. In a society dominated by private property, social appropriation appears as estrangement (*Entfremdung*) and as alienation (*Entäusserung*) but these necessarily form the very basis that constitutes this society (*als die wahre Einbürgerung*).¹⁰⁴

Entäussern however, has a more specific and more interesting history rooted semantically, in Christ's Incarnation. In the modern Luther translation of Philippians 2:7, we read (Christ) "emptied himself"—"*entäusserte sich selbst*." When Luther first approached this Philippians passage in 1518, he found no immediate German equivalent to the Greek *heauton ekenosen* nor to the Latin translation *semetipsum exinanivit*. His first solution was simply to add a German suffix to the Latin and he coined a new word: *hat sich exinanirt*.¹⁰⁵ Only in 1522 did Luther begin to use *eussern* as a translation (literally "to outer"), a word which he retained in different forms to the end of his life.¹⁰⁶

Luther's use of *eussern* for Christ's Incarnation is followed by his use of the same term (*geeussert*) for Christ's Crucifixion and exaltation: "*und nun sich ganz geeussert und abgelegt die knechtische gestalt*," "(Jesus) has now completely emptied himself and laid aside his form of a servant."¹⁰⁷

In a third usage, man himself emulates Christ's Incarnation in contrasting fashion, by divesting himself of his human form:

So Christ empties himself (*eussert sich*) of his divine form, and thus he is and assumes the form of a servant which he is not. We however, empty ourselves (*eussern uns*) of the form of a servant, which we are, and take on or are subject to the divine form which we are not.¹⁰⁸

These latter two usages formed the semantic basis of Hegel's thesis on alienation around the word *entäussern*. Hegel states that in Christ, "the essence of man (is) acknowledged to be Spirit, and the fact proclaimed that only by stripping himself of his finiteness and surrendering himself to pure self-consciousness, does he attain the truth." "Stripping himself of his finiteness" is in Hegel's original "*sich seiner Endlichkeit entäussert*."¹⁰⁹

Hegel's intentions however, were quite different from Luther's despite these semantic parallels. Luther had offered his drastic warnings against human "works." But for Hegel, there was a fundamental ambiguity. Man's

self-realization was through his creative activity, his “works,” but this very self-embodiment was, in the end, alienating; it must subsequently be relinquished through a moral or spiritual disengagement from that activity. This ambiguity was built into Hegel’s use of the verb *entäussern*. Hence, despite Hegel’s “detour” from Luther’s condemnation of “works,” his ultimate moral disengagement from “finitude” is consistent with Luther’s theology. Hegel’s thesis on alienation and freedom unfolds in this context of *entäussern*.

This ambiguity was recapitulated in a quite different way in Marx who borrowed the same term *entäussern* from Hegel for his own purposes. Man’s self-realization in the world, his genuine outward expression of himself could be (or should be, as with Hegel) a positive event. Marx gave a positive connotation to *ausser* in words such as *Lebensäusserung*, the positive expression of life. Man exists as a member of a species and asserts that existence directly in his activity and in the objects he creates: “he can only express his life in real, sensuous objects.” The object is the direct embodiment of his individuality.¹¹⁰

Marx restricted his use of the term in its negative connotations, to what was external or foreign to the human condition in a social or institutional sense. Under these social circumstances, such objects became “external” (*ausser*), one of Marx’ consistent complaints. For example, Marx’ complaint about private property is that it is “external to man”—“*ausser dem Menschen*.”¹¹¹

Under capitalism, man was forcibly separated from the objects he produced when they became commodities on the market. This compromised fatefully man’s human existence and self-realization, and it was this connotation of *entäusserung* (alienation) to which Marx returned again and again. Man’s work as the manifestation of his creative life (*Arbeit* . . . [als] *eigne Lebensäusserung*) became subverted as *entfremdete entäusserte Arbeit*, estranged, alienated labour.¹¹² Other expressions of this antithesis were given in the contrast between *Lebensäusserung*,¹¹³ the positive expression or manifestation of life and *Lebentäusserung*,¹¹⁴ the alienation or estrangement of life; between *Wesensäusserung*,¹¹⁵ the expression of essential being, and *Wesentäusserung*,¹¹⁶ the alienation of man’s essence.

Thus we see the context of the dialectical gyrations of the term *entäussern*. Its origins lay, semantically, in Christ’s Incarnation but shifted from Luther’s positive, exalted use of this term (man’s divesting himself of his material embodiment and his “works”), to Hegel’s ambiguous use (man’s coming-to-be within an alienated, objective existence), to Marx’ entirely negative use (man’s forcible separation or dispossession from his own artifacts). The Lutheran and Marxian usage stand once more, back to back or in mirror image.¹¹⁷

A broadly similar history applies to the modern word *aufheben*, meaning on the one hand “abolish,” and, on the other, “raise up” or “preserve,” a word that is crucial to both the Hegelian and Marxian vocabulary. (It is often translated as “supersede” as when one economic class supersedes a second in the Marxian schema.)

Luther used the word unselfconsciously in its two discrete meanings in his translation of the Bible, but these two opposite usages of *aufheben* were fused in the later German. Hegel recognized explicitly in his own usage, that one of the roots of this term, “raise up,” was related to Jesus’ exaltation. Hegel’s use of *aufheben* was a further example of his attempt to extend religious language into the language of philosophy.¹¹⁸

Marx used the term *aufheben* in regard to transcending private property,¹¹⁹ transcending self-estrangement (*selbstentfremdung*),¹²⁰ and transcending alienation (*entäußerung*).¹²¹ The two connotations of “annul” and “preserve” run to the heart of Marx’ conception of the revolutionary process. But the inner significance of *aufheben* is summed up by Marx in a characteristic phrase namely, that it “affirms its opposite” (*sein Gegenteil bestätigt*).¹²² This is entirely consistent with Hegel’s general use of this term. Yet its Hegelian relation to religious expression was lost.

There are other characteristic words in Marx and Luther that capture the abrupt leap or inversion where the underlying contradiction is suspended and transformed into its opposite. For Marx, communism, as man’s total salvation, will happen “‘all at once’ and simultaneously. . . .” (*auf einmal*).¹²³ One of Marx’ favorite words is *Umschlag*, “the turn into its opposite.”¹²⁴ He also refers to “*dieser dialektische Umschlag*,” “the dialectical reversal.”¹²⁵ For Luther, an apposite word to which we have already referred is *umbkeren*—to overturn or invert: “Our Lord God can immediately overturn things despite the Emperor or the Pope.” (*Unser HERR GOTT kans bald umbkeren trotz Keiser, Bapst.*)¹²⁶

CONCLUSION

“Germany’s revolutionary past,” wrote Marx, “is precisely theoretical: it is the Reformation.”¹²⁷ For Engels, Luther had composed “that triumphal hymn which become the *Marseillaise* of the sixteenth century.”¹²⁸ Both commented frequently on their historical kinship with Luther and Hegel despite their unrelenting critique of religion.¹²⁹

But the underlying rhetorical structure which Marx and Luther shared did not, in the last analysis, depend on a common historical tradition, a common linguistic basis nor even on the influential role of the Lutheran Hegel on Marx, however vital and illuminating these influences were. This rhetorical structure can equally well be discerned, as we have noted in

abbreviated form, in the Old and New Testament in their original languages. The rhetoric of transfiguration was carried forward in Western society over three millennia with a powerful inner momentum of its own.

Paul had stated, "we see through a glass darkly. . . ." Faith is "the evidence of things not seen." Marx echoed Paul's notion in a more cumbersome way. Ideology, he claimed, comes to us as if it were filtered through a *camera obscura*, a dark-room, and thus appears upside-down, standing on its head. This is as inherent in the "historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina . . . [in] their physical life-process."¹³⁰

But Luther articulated the rhetoric with pristine clarity: Those things that are to be believed are hidden from us. "It cannot be hidden any more deeply than when it appears to be the exact opposite of what we see, sense, and experience."¹³¹

¹ This paper is a revised and substantially abbreviated version of "The Apocalyptic Tradition: Luther and Marx," a paper presented to the conference "Political Theology in the Canadian Context," at the School of Religious Studies, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, March 9–11, 1977. The proceedings of the conference will be published under the editorship of Professor B. G. Smillie.

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² Letter to Tholuck, 1826. Cited in Heinrich Bornkamm, *Luther im Spiegel der deutschen Geistesgeschichte*, Zweite Auflage, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, p. 235.

Note as well Hegel's statements: "I am a Lutheran and will stay the same," and that in Protestantism, "the subjective religious principle has been separated from Philosophy, and it is only in Philosophy that it has arisen in its true form again." *Hegel's Lectures on The History of Philosophy*, trans. E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simon, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1896; Reprinted 1955. Vol. 1, p. 73, and Vol. 3, p. 152 respectively. This will be referred to subsequently as *Hist. Phil.*

We will also cite the following works by Hegel: *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree, Dover Publications, 1956. This will be referred to subsequently as *Phil. Hist.* *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. B. Baillie, Harper Torchbooks, 1967. This will be referred to subsequently as *Phen.*; the German edition we will cite is *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Suhrkamp Verlag, 3, Frankfurt, 1970. Further references to this edition will be noted as *Phän.* *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, trans. E. B. Speirs and J. B. Sanderson, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, London, 1895. This will be referred to subsequently as *Phil. Rel. Werke* is the abbreviation used here for the second German edition of Hegel's work published by Duncker und Humblot, Berlin 1840–47.

³ *Hist. Phil.*, 3, pp. 146–47. Compare as well: “This is the essence of the Reformation: Man is in his very nature destined to be free.” *Phil. Hist.*, p. 417.

⁴ “*Wir die religiöse Vorstellung in Gedanken fassen.*” *Werke* 9, p. 25; cf. *Phil. Hist.*, p. 20.

⁵ There will be a fuller treatment of the Lutheran Hegel in my forthcoming book tentatively entitled *The Apocalyptic Tradition: Luther, Hegel, Marx*.

⁶ *Phen.*, pp. 229–40, or pp. 218–67 for the more extended version.

⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Hegel's Concept of Experience*, Harper and Row, New York, 1970; cf. pp. 126–29ff.

⁸ *Phen.*, pp. 131ff.

⁹ The German edition of Luther's works used here is *D. Martin Luthers Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, Weimar, 1883—This edition will be cited as W.A. Luther's spelling is retained in the original which often differs significantly from modern German.

The English edition is J. J. Pelikan and H. T. Lehmann, *Luther's Works; American Edition*, St. Louis and Philadelphia, 1955. This edition will be cited subsequently as L.W.

Cf. W.A. 56, p. 366. The comment is on Romans 8:15. Also: “*Observanda autem hic est Antithesis.*” —it should be noted moreover, that here is an antithesis, W.A. 40, II, p. 423; cf. further references to antithesis: *ibid.* pp. 409, 414; p. 374 for “*contradictoribus.*”

¹⁰ “*Si Scripturas per contentionem loqui concedis. . . .*” W.A. 18, p. 779. Cited in H. R. Schmitz, “*Progrès social et changement révolutionnaire, Dialectique et révolution,*” *Revue Thomiste*, 1974. I am substantially indebted to this article devoted to the continuity of the dialectic in Luther, Hegel and Marx. Schmitz discussed at length the work of Enrico de Negri, *La Teologia di Lutero, Revelazione e Dialettica*, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 1967. I have drawn freely on this excellent study which links the Lutheran and Hegelian dialectic.

A leading Lutheran scholar, Gerhard Ebeling puts the matter as follows: “Luther's thought always contains an antithesis, tension between strongly opposed but related polarities.” Gerhard Ebeling, *Luther, An Introduction to his Thought*, trans. R. A. Wilson, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1970, p. 25.

¹¹ L.W. 31, p. 344. Luther also cites Paul's well-known dictum: “Though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day” (II Corinthians 4:16).

¹² W.A. 7, p. 27.

¹³ L.W. 31, p. 356; W.A. 7, p. 29.

¹⁴ L.W. 31, p. 363.

¹⁵ L.W. 31, p. 344; W.A. 7, p. 21.

¹⁶ L.W. 31, pp. 366.

¹⁷ The Latin text reads: *debet tamen rursus se exinanire hac in libertate* (W.A. 7, p. 65). What is missing from the English translation is the adverb *rursus*, derived from *revorsus* or *reversus*, i.e. to turn back or return. This is reiterated by the word *widderumb* in the German version of the essay where the text reads: *Und ob er nu gantz frey ist, sich widderumb williglich eynen diener machen seyнем nehsten zu helffenn* (W.A. 7, p. 35)—“And while he is now entirely free, he willingly makes himself once more into a servant in order to help his neighbour.”

This usage of *rursus* is reiterated in a somewhat similar context in “On the Bondage of the Will.” Luther states: “*Si autem fortior superveniat et illo victo nos rapiat in spoliū suū, rursus per spiritum eius servi et captivi sumus (quae tamen*

regia libertas est.)" (W.A. 18, p. 635). "But if a Stronger One [Christ] comes who overcomes him [Satan] and takes us as His spoil, then through his Spirit we are *again* slaves and captives—though this is royal freedom." E. Gordon Rupp et al. editors and translators, *Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation*, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1969, p. 140, my italics. This edition will be referred to subsequently as "Rupp."

Luther inverts the term for servant and slave, *Knecht*, in precisely the same way as the equivalent *eved* in the Old Testament and *doulos* in the New Testament mentioned earlier. *Knecht* is in fact Luther's translation for both the Hebrew and Greek terms.

¹⁸ L.W. 31, pp. 367, 356.

¹⁹ L.W. 31, p. 355.

²⁰ W.A. 7, p. 27; L.W. 31, p. 354.

²¹ L.W. 31, pp. 367–68.

²² W.A. 18, p. 327.

²³ L.W. 45, p. 91; W.A. 11, p. 251.

²⁴ Cf. L.W. 13, pp. 247–48—the spiritual kingdom "is hidden to eyes and senses." Cf. also L.W. 28, p. 125; L.W. 13, p. 254. "Already exists in this world," see L.W. 12, p. 103; also "extended throughout the world," L.W. 37, p. 282.

²⁵ L.W. 28, p. 129; W.A. 36, p. 575. Here, the original lordship is "vanquished" as cited previously.

²⁶ L.W. 28, p. 125; W.A. 36, pp. 570–71.

²⁷ L.W. 28, p. 124; W.A. 36, p. 568.

²⁸ L.W. 13, p. 287.

²⁹ L.W. 25, p. 381; *Quia vult, quod vult Deus*, W.A. 56, p. 391. Cf. also "so that we readily will and do what he wills," Rupp, p. 140; *ut velimus et faciamus lubentes quae ipse velit*, W.A. 18, p. 635.

³⁰ L.W. 28, p. 128.

³¹ L.W. 12, pp. 120–21.

³² W.A. 5, p. 176.

³³ L.W. 31, p. 224; W.A. 1, p. 612.

³⁴ L.W. 31, pp. 224–25.

³⁵ L.W. 31, p. 225. Cf. also: "For in this way we conform ourselves to God, who does not regard or consider anything in us as good. And in this way we are already good as long as we recognize nothing as good except God's good and our own good as evil. . . ." L.W. 25, p. 383.

³⁶ L.W. 31, p. 225.

³⁷ L.W. 31, p. 225; W.A. 1, p. 613. Luther used a similar metaphor in his quarrel with the Catholic church on the confessional: "*Szo kerestu es umb unnd wilt mich zum knecht machenn . . . Sihe, das ist vorkeret ding*"—thus you turn things upside down and wish to make a slave out of me. . . . See, this is upside down. W.A. 8, p. 157. It was one of Luther's favorite metaphors but it had many variations. In relation to *umbkeren*, to overturn, the editors of Luther's works comment: "*Sehr oft bei Luther*," frequently found in Luther, W.A. 34, II, p. 317, Note 1.

Many of the schisms within the Western apocalyptic tradition (beginning with the New Testament) were articulated around this metaphor and its close variants. Cf. my related article "The World Upside Down," *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*, Spring–Summer 1978, Vol. 2, no. 2.

³⁸ W.A. 36, p. 393.

³⁹ L.W. 25, p. 383; "*nec potest possideri aut attingi nisi negatis omnibus affirmativis nostris*," W.A. 56, p. 393.

⁴⁰ L.W. 5, p. 227; "*in illa . . . nullitate et nihilitudine Deus ostendit suam virtutem*," W.A. 43, p. 585. Cf. also "*in deum . . . in sui nihilum*," W.A. 5, p. 168; "the Lord of all who is the same as nothing, that is, the lowest. . ." L.W. 5, p. 219; the latter in the original is "*Dominum omnium, qui idem et nihili, id est, infimus est*," W.A. 43, p. 579.

⁴¹ Rupp, p. 37; *ut isto modo humiliati et in nihilum redacti, salvi fiant*. W.A. 18, p. 633.

⁴² *Sie ist die Macht, aus dem Nichts, aus dem Gegenteil zu schaffen. Sie erweist sich gerade in der Umkehrung aller irdischen Massstäbe und Verhältnisse.*

Paul Althaus, *Die Theologie Martin Luthers*, Gütersloher Verlagshaus, Gerd Mohn, Gütersloh, 1962, p. 41.

For a general discussion of the theology of the cross on which I have drawn, cf. Paul Althaus, *The Theology of Martin Luther*, trans. R. C. Schultz. Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1966, pp. 25-34.

⁴³ W.A. 1, p. 29.

⁴⁴ W.A. 2, p. 127; L.W. 42, p. 77. These were frequently used Lutheran phrases, cf. for example, "*also mustu gewiss sein bei dir selbst, aussgeschlossen all menschen*," W.A. 10, III, p. 260, So you must be certain within yourself, exclusive of all others.

⁴⁵ *Hist. Phil.* 3, p. 159.

⁴⁶ *Phen.*, p. 234; *Phän.*, p. 150.

⁴⁷ Hegel uses the word "finite" in apposition to the word "evil": "the natural . . . the finite, evil, in fact is destroyed." *Phil. Rel.* 3, p. 96. Cf. as well, finitude (*Endlichkeit*) used synonymously with externality or outwardness (*Äusserlichkeit*); otherness or other-being (*Anderseyn*) and imperfection (*Unvollkommenheit*), (*Werke* 12, p. 330). The imperfection attributed to finitude consists in the fact that man "can exist in a way which is not in conformity with (his) inner substantial nature . . . his inwardness," *Phil. Rel.* 3, p. 123.

In "the language of faith," Hegel's statement on finitude runs as follows: "Christ assumed (human) finitude, finitude (*Endlichkeit*) in all its forms, which is the final tapering point of evil (*das Böse ist. . .*)." *Werke* 12, p. 301, my translation. Cf. *Phil. Rel.* 3, pp. 92-93.

⁴⁸ *Phen.*, p. 203; also p. 207. Cf. H. G. Gadamer, *Hegel's Dialectic, Five Hermeneutical Studies*, trans. P. C. Smith, Yale University Press, 1976, p. 53: "We must now grasp that the 'inverted world' is in fact the real world. . ."

⁴⁹ *Phän.*, p. 152; *Phen.*, p. 236. In other designations Hegel refers to the lord as "absolute universal Being as . . . mere nothingness" (*allgemeine Wesen als der Nichtigkeit*), *Phen.*, p. 263; *Phän.*, p. 173; "the negative essence," (*negatives Wesen*) or simply "nothingness" (*Nichtigkeit*), *Phen.*, p. 225; *Phän.*, p. 143. Cf. also "absolute negativity," *Phen.*, pp. 233, 237; "absolute negation of this existence," *Phen.*, p. 246; "absolute negation," *Phen.*, p. 226.

⁵⁰ *Phil. Rel.* 2, p. 255; *Werke* 12, p. 125.

⁵¹ *Werke* 12, p. 303.

⁵² *Phen.*, p. 237.

⁵³ "The true return (of consciousness) into itself"; "*Seine warhe Ruckkehr . . . in sich selbst*," *Phen.*, p. 251; *Phän.*, p. 163. Cf. also Gadamer, *op. cit.*, p. 67: "Hegel's dialectical analysis . . . seeks out the dialectical reversal within the self-consciousness of the master. . ." (i.e. the lord).

⁵⁴ *Phen.*, pp. 234, 256.

⁵⁵ W.A. 40, I, p. 438.

⁵⁶ W.A. *Tischreden*, 6, pp. 67, 69. This was in the context of Luther's doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum*, the communication of properties. Cf. also W.A. 38, II, p. 98 and L.W. 22, p. 493.

⁵⁷ W.A. 39, II, p. 279.

⁵⁸ *Phen.*, p. 93. Cf. "Die ungeheure Macht des Negativen," *Phän.*, p. 36.

⁵⁹ *Phil. Rel.* 3, p. 91, note 1. Cf. also "Spirit . . . constructs not merely one world, but a twofold world, divided and self-opposed." *Phen.*, p. 510.

⁶⁰ *Phil. Hist.*, p. 380.

⁶¹ *Phil. Hist.*, p. 24.

⁶² *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, trans. W. Wallace, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971, p. 291.

⁶³ *Hist. Phil.*, 3, p. 16.

⁶⁴ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, p. 275. This will be cited subsequently as G. Id. *Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, Bd. 3, p. 237. This edition of Marx' work will be cited subsequently as M.E.W.

⁶⁵ Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'*, ed. J. O'Malley, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, p. 131. This will be cited subsequently as O'Malley. *Karl Marx Frühe Schriften*, ed. H. J. Lieber and P. Furth, Cotta Verlag, Stuttgart, 1962, Bd. I, p. 488. Further references to this edition will be given as *Frühe Schriften* referring to either Vol. I published in 1962 or Vol. II published in 1971.

⁶⁶ Karl Marx, *Capital, A Critique of Political Economy*, trans. S. Moore and E. Aveling, ed. F. Engels, in three volumes, C. H. Kerr, Chicago, 1906. Vol. III, p. 244, italics in the text. This will be referred to subsequently as *Capital*. *Es erscheint also in der Konkurrenz alles verkehrt*, M.E.W. 23, p. 219.

Marx' doctrine on the "fetishism of commodities" (cf. *Capital*, Vol. I, pp. 81–96), is referred to as an "inversion" of the proper relationship that should prevail. Cf. Karl Marx, *Theories of Surplus-Value*, Part I, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1963. The text translates "perversion" on p. 377 and "inversion" on p. 378 for *Verkehrung*. Cf. M.E.W. 26, pp. 365–66. Cf. also Marx' characteristic figure of speech in relation to the fetishism of commodities: "it stands on its head," *Capital* I, p. 82.

⁶⁷ Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, ed. D. J. Struik, trans. Martin Milligan, International Publishers, 1964, p. 118. This will be referred to subsequently as E.P.M. *Frühe Schriften*, I, p. 574.

⁶⁸ E.P.M., p. 126; *Frühe Schriften*, I, p. 584.

⁶⁹ E.P.M., p. 132; *Frühe Schriften*, I, p. 590.

⁷⁰ E.P.M., p. 132. The structure of this antithesis is repeated at greater length in *The Holy Family*. Marx states: "Proletariat and wealth are opposites (*Gegensätze*); as such they form a single whole. . . . The proletariat . . . is compelled as proletariat to abolish itself (*sich selbst aufzuheben*) and thereby its opposite . . . private property. This is the negative side of the contradiction (*Gegensätze*) its restlessness within its very self, dissolved and self-dissolving private property."

"Within this antithesis the private owner is therefore the *conservative* side, the proletarian, the *destructive* side. From the former arises the notion of preserving the antithesis, from the latter that of annihilating it." K. Marx and F. Engels, *The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Critique*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1956, p. 51. The German text in M.E.W., 2, p. 37.

See also "feindlichen Gegensatz von Bourgeoisie und Proletariat," the hostile antithesis between bourgeoisie and proletariat, in the Communist Manifesto, *Frühe Schriften*, II, p. 858.

⁷¹ Karl Marx, *Grundrisse, Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Martin Nicolaus, Vintage Books, New York, 1973. The original German edition is *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (Rohentwurf), Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1953.

The English edition will be cited subsequently as *Grundrisse* and the German edition as *Grundrisse* (G).

In the *Grundrisse*, which laid the basis for *Capital*, Marx sums up by stating that the master-servant relation (*Herrschafts- und Knechtschaftsverhältnis*) is part of a formula that "forms a necessary ferment for the development and the decline and fall of all original relations of property and of production. . ." This formula, he adds, also forms the basis for the dissolution of capital. *Grundrisse*, p. 501; *Grundrisse* (G), p. 400. Cf. also the scheme of economic development set out in the *Grundrisse*, pp. 497-503.

In *Capital*, Marx returns to this theme in historical perspective: "from the moment that men in any way work for one another, their labour assumes a social form." (Vol. I, p. 82) Initially, such as in the feudal period, these social forms are based upon "direct relations of domination and oppression" (*unmittelbaren Herrschafts- und Knechtschaftsverhältnissen*. My translation, cf. *Capital* I, p. 91; M.E.W. 23, p. 93). It is this antithesis which gives rise to further internal forms of differentiation and to the transformation from feudalism into the factors of production, labour and capital in a developed capitalist society.

⁷² O'Malley, pp. 141-42; *Frühe Schriften*, I, pp. 503-04.

⁷³ *Frühe Schriften* I, p. 500. See also note 70 above.

⁷⁴ O'Malley, p. 140; *Frühe Schriften*, I, p. 501.

⁷⁵ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* (in two volumes), Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1958, vol. I, pp. 51, 53. This will be cited subsequently as *Selected Works. Frühe Schriften*, II, pp. 839, 842.

⁷⁶ E.P.M., p. 134; *Frühe Schriften*, I, p. 593.

⁷⁷ E.P.M., p. 132; *Frühe Schriften*, I, p. 590; "Der Kommunismus endlich ist der positive Ausdruck des aufgehobenen Privateigentums, zunächst das *allgemeine* Privateigentum."

⁷⁸ E.P.M., p. 155.

⁷⁹ G. Id., p. 47.

⁸⁰ E.P.M., pp. 138, 144.

⁸¹ *Grundrisse*, p. 488.

⁸² E.P.M., p. 138; *Frühe Schriften*, I, p. 597.

⁸³ *Selected Works*, I, pp. 51, 53; *Frühe Schriften*, II, pp. 839, 842.

⁸⁴ O'Malley, p. 140; *Frühe Schriften*, I, p. 500.

⁸⁵ M.E.W. 4, p. 182; my translation. The passage is from *The Poverty of Philosophy*:

In the course of its development to replace the old bourgeois society, the working class will establish an association that excludes classes and their antagonism (*Gegesantz*), and there will be no further political power as such; since it is political power that is the official expression of class antagonism within the bourgeois society.

Cf. *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, p. 151. Compare also "the communist revolution . . . abolishes the rule (*Herrschaft*) of all classes with the classes themselves. . ." G. Id., p. 85; M.E.W., 3, p. 70.

⁸⁶ *Selected Works*, I, p. 54. A similar passage in Engels' *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific* reads as follows:

The proletariat seizes political power and turns the means of production into state property.

But, in doing this, it abolishes itself as proletariat, abolishes all class distinctions and class antagonisms, abolishes also the state as state. . . . When at last it becomes the real representative of the whole of society, it renders itself unnecessary. (*Selected Works*, II, p. 150)

⁸⁷ *Frühe Schriften*, II, p. 843.

⁸⁸ E.P.M., p. 168.

⁸⁹ E.P.M., p. 169; *Frühe Schriften*, I, p. 635.

⁹⁰ *Grundrisse*, p. 831; *Grundrisse* (G), pp. 715, 716.

⁹¹ *Capital*, I, p. 639.

⁹² *Capital*, I, p. 837.

⁹³ L.W. 13, pp. 260–61, referring to Isaiah 54:11 and 62:4.

⁹⁴ O'Malley, p. 141.

⁹⁵ *Capital*, III, p. 966; M.E.W. 25, p. 838.

⁹⁶ G. Id., p. 86.

⁹⁷ Capital operates in the worker to bring about his nothingness or nonbeing (*ihr eignes Nichtsein*), *Grundrisse*, p. 454; *Grundrisse* (G), p. 358. There are many variations on this theme in the *Grundrisse*. (The English edition will be designated here as Gr. and the German as Gr. G.) Capital as objectified labour is "the worker's non-objectivity" (*Nichtgegenständlichkeit des Arbeiters*, Gr. 512; Gr. G. 412; "the real not-capital is labour," (*das wirkliche Nicht-Kapital ist die Arbeit*) Gr. 274; Gr. G. 185; "labour as not-capital," Gr. 288; labour is "the negation of Capital," Gr. 274; or is "not-property" (*Nicht-Eigentum*), Gr. 498; Gr. G. 398; the worker's non-being, (*Nicht-dem-Arbeiter*), Gr. G. 716; or labour is "not value . . . as a negativity in relation to itself" (*Nicht-Wert . . . sich auf sich beziehende Negativität*), Gr. 296; Gr. G. 203.

⁹⁸ *Capital*, I, pp. 836–37.

⁹⁹ L.W. 5, p. 227. It is a comment on II Corinthians 12:9.

¹⁰⁰ L.W. 13, pp. 22–23.

¹⁰¹ Rupp, p. 138; "*dum in coelum vehit, facit id ad infernum ducendo*," W.A. 18, p. 633.

¹⁰² L.W. 14, 31f., cited in Paul Althaus, *op. cit.*, English edition, p. 30, n. 12.

¹⁰³ Marx refers to "a man alien to labor and standing outside it"—"*fremden und ausser ihr stehenden Menschen zu dieser Arbeit*," E.P.M., p. 116; *Frühe Schriften*, I, p. 571. Paul's alienation is rendered as "aliens from the commonwealth of Israel and strangers from the covenants of promise"—*fremd und ausser der Bürgerschaft Israels und fremd von den Testamenten der Verheissung*, Ephesians 2:12.

This same phrase is reiterated in a close variant in *Capital* referring to the alienating conditions of capitalist production as "*Ausserlichkeit und Entfremdung*" translated as "alienation and expropriation," M.E.W. 25, p. 95; *Capital*, III, p. 102.

¹⁰⁴ E.P.M., p. 119; *Frühe Schriften*, I, p. 574.

¹⁰⁵ W.A. 1, p. 269. He added as synonyms: (*hat sich*) *gantz selber verringert*, Christ diminished or reduced himself, and *er hat abgelegt die gestalt gottes*, he laid aside or took off God's image.

¹⁰⁶ Various synonyms after 1522 included *sich verzichten*, (the modern German is *verzichten*, to renounce or waive—the synonym given in the W.A. for the modern Luther translation, *entäussert*, W.A. 17, II, p. 237, footnote 1); *sich enthalten*, to refrain or abstain from; *sich entledigen, von sich legen, or ablegen*, to lay away from oneself, to take off. Cf. W.A. 17, II, pp. 241–45.

¹⁰⁷ W.A. 17, II, p. 245.

¹⁰⁸ W.A. 17, II, p. 241.

¹⁰⁹ *Phil. Hist.*, p. 328; *Werke* 9, p. 399.

¹¹⁰ E.P.M., p. 181.

¹¹¹ E.P.M., p. 119; *Frühe Schriften*, I, p. 574.

¹¹² *Grundrisse* (G), p. 366 for the first usage and *Frühe Schriften*, I, p. 569, E.P.M., p. 115, for the second.

¹¹³ *Frühe Schriften*, I, pp. 578, 597, 598, 600, 605, 635, 650, 659, 662. cf. *Grundrisse*, p. 462, also p. 470; *Grundrisse* (G), p. 374.

¹¹⁴ *Frühe Schriften* I, pp. 598, 623.

¹¹⁵ E.P.M., pp. 181, 188; *Frühe Schriften*, I, pp. 651, 658.

¹¹⁶ E.P.M., p. 187; *Frühe Schriften*, I, p. 658. Compare the similar usage in: "The less you *are*, the less you express your own life (*du dein Leben äusserst*) the greater is your *alienated* life. . . . (*dein entäussertes Leben*)" E.P.M., p. 150; *Frühe Schriften*, I, p. 612.

¹¹⁷ The blind spot on religion and religious rhetoric among Marxists was virtually total and hence the origin of this term was lost. One of the greatest Marxian scholars, Georg Lukacs in his work on *The Young Hegel*, devotes an entire chapter to the concept of *entäusserung* and offers a myopic conclusion:

In themselves there is nothing novel about the terms *Entäusserung* and *Entfremdung*. They are simply German translations of the English word "alienation." This was used in works on economic theory. . . . Philosophically, the term *Entäusserung* was first used, to the best of my knowledge, by Fichte. . .

Georg Lukacs, *The Young Hegel, Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics*, trans. Rodney Livingstone, Merlin Press, London, 1975, p. 538.

¹¹⁸ For the first meaning, "abolish," we have the example of I Corinthians 15:24. The literal English translation is ". . . whenever he abolishes all rule and all authority and power." Luther renders this as "*Wenn er aufheben wird alle Herrschaft, und alle uberkeit und Gewalt.*" (Luther bible of 1546) "Abolishes" or "*auffheben*" is a translation of the Greek *katargisi*. This usage is reiterated in I Corinthians 15:26, *Der letzte Feind der affgehoben wird, ist der Tod*, the last enemy that is abolished is death. Cf. also the similar usage by Luther in Romans 3:31 and Hebrews 7:18.

The second sense of "raise up" or "preserve" is illustrated in Luther's translation of I Samuel 2:7, 8, "*der Herr . . . nidriget und erhöhet, er hebt auff den dürfftigen aus dem staub und erhöhet den Armen aus dem kot . . .*"—"The Lord . . . bringeth low and lifteth up. He raiseth up the poor out of the dust and lifteth the beggar from the dunghill. " It can be seen that *hebt . . . auff*, is used in apposition to *erhöhet*, lift up. This latter usage is particularly significant, for "*erhöhet*" is the word used by Luther in Philippians 2:9 for Jesus' exaltation after the Resurrection. Luther also uses *erhöhen* in apposition to *erheben* (cf. Isaiah 52:13).

There is a limited interchangeability in German of *erheben*, *erhöhen* and *aufheben*. ". . . *erheben* can easily be substituted for *erhöhen*." (J. and W. Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, S. Hirzel, Leipzig, 1854–1960, 16 vols. in 32; vol. 3, p. 851.) Also: "In its meaning *aufheben* originally corresponds (is identical) to *erheben* . . . but in many cases only one of the two verbs is usual and linguistic usage has undergone diverse changes." (Alfred Götte et al., eds., *Triibners Deutsches Wörterbuch*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1939–1957, vol. 1, p. 145.)

In Hegelian language, Christ's finitude was both annulled and preserved after his exaltation; that is, His finitude is superseded and appears as a "moment" of God in God. The religious basis of Hegel's use of *aufheben* is revealed in the following passage: "*Weiter aber ist das sinnliche Daseyn, worin der Geist ist, nur ein vorüber-*

gehendes Moment. Christus ist gestorben; nur als gestorben ist er aufgehoben gen Himmel und sitzend zur Rechten Gottes, und nur so ist er Geist." *Werke* 9, p. 395—"Moreover the sensuous existence in which Spirit is embodied is only a transitional phase. Christ dies; only as dead, is he exalted to Heaven and sits at the right hand of God; only thus is he Spirit." *Phil. Hist.*, p. 325. A similar usage is reiterated in *Werke* 12, pp. 125, 248 translated in *Phil. Rel.*, 2, p. 255 and *Phil. Rel.*, 3, p. 35 respectively.

The following passage by Hegel uses *aufheben* in its full double meaning and shows his derivation from Christ's exaltation: "*Dieser Tod ist ebenso wie die höchste Verendlichkeit zugleich das Aufheben der natürlichen Endlichkeit, des unmittelbaren Daseyns und der Entäusserung, die Auflösung der Schranke.*" *Werke* 12, p. 302—"This death is thus at once finitude in its most extreme form, and at the same time the abolition and absorption of natural finitude, of immediate existence and estrangement, the cancelling of limits." *Phil. Rel.*, 3, p. 93, my italics.

Marx offers an extended critique of the Hegelian usage in the E.P.M.: "A peculiar role, therefore, is played by the act of superseding (*das Aufheben*) in which denial (*die Verneinung*) and preservation (*die Aufbewahrung*)—denial and affirmation—are bound together," E.P.M., p. 185; *Frühe Schriften*, I, p. 655. *Aufheben*, nevertheless, becomes one of the chief concepts in his own vocabulary. See below.

¹¹⁹ E.P.M., pp. 134, 136; *Frühe Schriften*, I, pp. 593, 595. Cf. also pp. 556, 592.

¹²⁰ *Frühe Schriften*, I, pp. 590, 593.

¹²¹ *Frühe Schriften*, I, pp. 645, 658, 659.

¹²² E.P.M., p. 158; *Frühe Schriften*, I, p. 622.

¹²³ G. Id., p. 47; M.E.W. 3, p. 35.

¹²⁴ *Grundrisse*, p. 674. Cf. Martin Nicolaus' Introduction in the *Grundrisse*, p. 32.

We do not include here the financial or accounting usage of *Umschlag* meaning "turnover" as used in *Capital*.

¹²⁵ M.E.W. 23, p. 610, n. 23; *Capital*, I, p. 640, n. 1.

¹²⁶ W.A. 33, p. 348. See also footnote 37 above.

¹²⁷ O'Malley, pp. 137–38.

¹²⁸ *Selected Works*, II, p. 63.

¹²⁹ Note Marx' and Engels' citation of some references which Hegel makes to Luther in the *History of Philosophy* and in the *Philosophy of Religion*, in G. Id., p. 181.

¹³⁰ G. Id., p. 37.

¹³¹ W.A. 18, p. 633. Cited in Paul Althaus, English edition, *op. cit.*, p. 56.