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# SCIENCE, MORALITY, AND TRANSNATIONALISM

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Historians have for centuries debated with one another over the purpose of historical inquiry. Some agree the study of history should focus on objective reality; its aim should be to report what happened to people, institutions, and material factors in the life of a group or society. Others insist that historians must address the life of the mind, what people believed, thought, and felt and how this influenced the social forces and human tendencies at work in civilization. One guide in distinguishing between historical approaches is to compare historical writing and the philosophy of history. Historians generally seek to report and describe past events. Philosophers of history ordinarily undertake one additional task: they ask *why* events took place as they did, attempting to fathom their meaning and to formulate principles of history. It is not always possible to draw a sharp line between the two approaches, but the standards of an historian are unlikely to correspond at all points with those of a philosopher. Although both Thucydides and Augustine formulated principles of history, only the former wrote narrative history. The historian is judged by the accuracy with which he portrays the past; the philosopher will be judged by the value and significance of his world view for understanding the present.

## Religious Universalism

Augustine of Hippo wrote as a philosopher of history and religious thinker of the age that still bears his name. According to the historian Christopher Dawson, "he was, to a far greater degree than any emperor or general or barbarian war-lord, a maker of history and a builder of the bridge which was to lead him from the old world to the new." (Quoted in St. Augustine, *City of God,* edited with an Introduction by Vernon J. Bourke, Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1958, p. 1.) He was born to a Christian mother and a pagan father in a Roman province in North Africa in 354. For nine years a follower of Manicheanism, he became a Catholic and was consecrated Bishop of Hippo, North Africa, in 395. He wrote 118 treatises including the most celebrated spiritual autobiography of all times, *The Confessions,* depicting his personal and religious struggles. His most comprehensive work, *City of God,* was a profound account of the life, thought, and strivings of ancient and early Christian man.

The world of Augustine was shaken by the invasion of Rome by Alaric the Goth on August 24, 410. For the first time in its long history, Rome was conquered and ravished. There followed a stream of polemics in which pagan

writers charged that the conquest had occurred under a Christian emperor and demonstrated the debilitating effects of Christianity on the security of the empire. Christianity, by propounding an ethic of self-denial and renunciation of worldly concerns, had weakened the citizens' loyalty and commitment to the state. Also, Rome had once seen its destiny as bound up with the worship of pagan gods. When Christianity supplanted paganism, the latter's gods prophesied vengeance. The disaster that befell the empire was due to the enfeeblement by Christianity of the civic spirit and the angering of the pagan gods.

Augustine answered one of his critics, Volusianus, by pointing out that the pagans had taught the same virtues, such as not repaying injury with injury, for which Christians were being condemned. Moreover, Christian citizen-soldiers were not enjoined to lay down their arms or to refuse service to the state. It was not the Christianity of the emperors but internal decay that brought ruin to the empire. Pagan writers, including Sallust and Juvenal, had themselves written of the far-reaching effects on society of immorality and its other vices. The task confronting Rome was to arrest its internal corruption and instill in its citizens a regard for virtue. Augustine did not deny the existence of a once-prosperous though pagan Rome, but saw its achievements as reflecting God's providential plan. Because of the civic virtues of the pagans, Rome attained a certain temporal efficiency. On a broader canvas, Augustine wrote about the history of the two cities: the City of God and the city of this world. His classic work details the two histories and the tension existing between them. The whole world from its beginnings has as its unique end a holy society for which everything has been made and from which the smallest event and humblest individual take meaning and intelligibility. The City of God is ruled by love of God, the city of men by a distorted love of self:

There are two loves, the one of which is holy, the other unholy; one social, the other individualist; one takes heed of the common utility because of the heavenly society, the other reduces even the commonweal to its own ends, because of a proud lust of domination; the one is subject to God, the other sets itself up as a rival to God; the one is serene, the other tempestuous; the one peaceful, the other quarrelsome; the one prefers truthfulness to deceitful praises, the other is avid of praise: the one is friendly, the other jealous; the one desires for its neighbor what it would for itself, the other is desirous of lording it over its neighbor; the one directs its effort to the neighbor's good, the other to its own. (Quoted from *De genesi ad litteram* 11.15, by Étienne Gilson in Foreword to Augustine, *City of God, op. cit.*, p. 27.)

If love was the law of the City of God, however, that of the republic was justice. However, "there could be no city of injustice if there were no City of true justice. Every society worthy of the name is, therefore, either the City of God or defined in relation to the City of God" (*ibid.*, p. 24). Illustrating the inescapable tension between the two cities, Augustine wrote in *City of God* 2.21: "Rome never was a republic because true justice never had a place in it. . . But accepting the more probable definition of a republic, I admit there was a republic of a kind . ." (*ibid.*, p. 23).

It was the question of Rome's status as a city, a republic, and an authentic society that preoccupied Augustine. Primitive religion had dominated not a potential earthly universal society but the family and the ancient city. The family was founded on the religious worship of the hearth (the household fire), and each family was a spiritually closed society. Brotherhood was not extended to strangers who did not worship at the same sacred fire nor honor the same dead ancestors. Families were united by more than necessity, security, or affection; a man loved his home as he now loves his church. To move toward a universal society, it was necessary to overcome the separation of families, first through grouping them into *gentes* or associations, then into tribes, and lastly into cities. Other gods such as Zeus and Heracles appeared in the hierarchy of gods reigning above household gods. Societies came into being and developed as religion expanded its sphere. A universal society and true unity existed only in the City of God and on earth when there was only a single God-created man. Physically all men who have sprung from this single ancestor are related; morally all men recognize their common origins and membership in one family. "None of the faithful," Professor Gilson writes, "could doubt that all men, regardless of race, color or appearance, have their origin in the first man created by God and that this first man was alone of his kind. There was no doubt in St. Augustine's mind that God himself had created the human race      so that men might understand how pleasing unity, even in diversity, was to God; nor could they doubt that their unity was a family unity." (Quoted *ibid.*, p. 25.)

Such unity embraced all men, even the pygmies (although Augustine speculated about their existence), the Sciopodes who protected themselves from the rays of the sun by the shadow of one foot, and the Cynocephali who had heads like dogs and barked. God, Augustine explained, beautified the world through many diverse mortal beings all descended from the stock of Adam. Augustine's universalism rested on Christian brotherhood born of a common ancestor, but realized ultimately not in a world society but in the City of God. Or in Gilson's words: "St. Augustine did not bequeath to his successors the ideal of a universal human city united in view of purely temporal ends" (*ibid.*, p. 32). The City of God existed to inspire men with an unquenchable desire to organize the earth into a single society made in the image and likeness of a heavenly city. It mattered less that man's feeble attempts to build a universal society were frustrated. The light of universal brotherhood and of a perfect city would continue to illuminate man's search for concord, justice, and virtue.

### Scientific Transnationalism

To reread and reflect on Augustine's classic writings is to understand the difference between his time and ours in the quest for morality. In place of Augustine's universalism based on religion, large regions of the world have turned instead to science. They have answered yes to the question of whether science can save us. Men are engaged in a conscious revolt against the historic

restraints religion and society have imposed on free inquiry. They see in the physical sciences the sole possibility for progress and growth. In the modern era, until quite recently at least, we have heard more about "scientific break-throughs" than about "imitations of Christ." From the industrial revolution to the present, societies have tended to pursue the good life through material advances made possible by science and technology. Equal opportunity for all peoples is linked with material advancement, as evidenced by economists' telling us that higher incomes and increased employment for women will draw them into the labor market, assure greater equality, and thus lower the birth rate in an overpopulated world. Even critics of science acknowledge, for example, that the strident debate between the spokesmen for extreme free enterprise and extreme collectivism can be moderated only through "the resources of an induc-tive rather than a deductive social science." (Reinhold Niebuhr, *Christian Real-ism and Political Problems,* New York: Scribner's, 1953, p. 3.) By means of such inquiries, important policy decisions by competing social and economic systems can be continuously reviewed and amended in the light of new evi-dence.

Yet science, particularly in its application to human and especially moral problems, is plagued by persistent illusions and misconceptions. The first illu-sion is the myth of the existence of a true science of human behavior free of all presuppositions. Objective social science today is given the wholly imaginary character of an approach to autonomous, incontrovertible, and self-evident facts. In practice, responsible and open-minded scholars have learned the im-possibility of giving any form or meaning to social research without some sort of framework or rough outline for organizing their research. Ironically enough, certain underlying assumptions such as the possibility of progress or the per-fectibility of man determine the focus of scientific inquiry and shape its con-clusions.

A second illusion results from the concealment of the failure of all those conclusions to conform to the facts. Modern culture, despite all its scientific progress, is caught up in egregious miscalculations. The brave new world of the twentieth century, which rationalists of the eighteenth century proudly predicted if men would only disavow all their other worldly illusions, scarcely resembles utopia. Such contradictions and errors inherent in a rationalist and scientific approach probably stem from the dual meaning of "scientific." On the one hand, science as empiricism means humility before the facts; on the other hand, science as rationalism means the invoking of logical coherence as the test of truth. The two connotations may be in conflict because the test of rational coherence prompts men to deny obvious facts if they fall outside of a coherent scheme.

Another fallacy of present-day social science results from the position of the observer who is a participant as well. The natural scientist in his laboratory has no mission save uncovering the truth about his work. The vision of the

social scientist, however, is beclouded by ideological taint, national loyalty, and his own individual social and economic status. He cannot be fully objective, for he grounds his observations on his place in history and his own individual membership in a given society and group. Not a detached mind, but the self with all its passions, interests, and endless capacity for rationalization is the agent of the social-scientific method.

A fourth illusion arises from modern concepts of causation and prediction that misunderstand the complexity of causation and the play of contingent forces. Prediction is possible in terms of rough probabilities, but as Niebuhr has argued: "In both nature and history each new thing is only one of an infinite number of possibilities which might have emerged at that particular juncture. It is for this reason that, though we can trace a series of causes in retrospect, we can never predict the future with accuracy." (*Christianity and Society*, vol. 10, no. 2, Spring 1945, p. 4.) History has its recurrences and cyclical trends, but a particular leader, the effects of bad weather, an accident, or an unforeseen event may channel history in unexpected ways.

Finally, the most persistent illusion holds that science is the profoundest fruit of culture because it is culture's latest expression. Auguste Comte's conception of history as moving from a religious to a metaphysical to a scientific age is partly true insofar as it describes an historical trend. The value judgment that the latest attainments of the culture are wisest and best, however, is of doubtful validity, and particularly its corollary that the human situation is ambiguous merely because of a scientific lag or a residual ignorance that science has not yet corrected. What may indeed be required is a movement from science to philosophy to correct the movement from philosophy to science, or a recovery of the wisdom of philosophy and the humility and magnanimity that in religion's finest hours has accompanied transcendent religion.

Science suffers most, however, from its curious mixture of a fatuous optimism about the future and lack of concern for the urgencies of the day not yet susceptible to the scientific method. About the latter, Niebuhr once prophesied that if we should ever fall into the abyss of an atomic war, we could be quite certain that on the eve of the conflict some psychological association would bestow a medal upon an outstanding scientist for having found the key to the problem of eliminating aggression from human life. (Niebuhr, "The Blind Leaders," *Christianity and Society*, vol. 14, Spring 1949, p. 6.) Regarding science's optimism, Niebuhr expressed grave doubts that statesmen who were scientific could consider such problems as the control of atomic energy from the standpoint of a universal mind freed of all national bias. Statesmen pay heed to the national interest more consistently than do scientists not because they are less intelligent, but because they carry certain political and constitutional responsibilities to the public they serve.

Yet science, whatever its illusions, its false optimism, and its unconcern for immediate problems that lie beyond scientific control, has transformed the

globe and man's understanding of it. Thanks to science, we live in a shrinking world. Worldwide revolutions in transportation, communications, and war have depended on science. Presidents and secretaries of state on global missions conduct diplomacy in successive foreign capitals not because they are wiser or more resourceful, but because jet airplane travel has made nations close neighbors. Early-warning and peace enforcement systems rest on science. Science is the catalyst for bringing one world into being—a world united not by moral consensus or a universal sense of brotherhood or an awareness of man's common origins (as discussed by St. Augustine), but by an extensive network of interdependent relationships around the world. More than that, science that is rational and objective offers a firmer basis for universalism than does morality, which is dominated by subjectivity and emotions. Even moral principles will eventually be brought under scientific control, for values to the scientist in the postbehavioral era of social sciences constitute nothing more than special kinds of facts. American social scientists proceed not on the basis of hunches or intuition, but through methodologies and paraphernalia of scientific investigation that provide "powerful insights" that earlier studies and writings had lacked. Present-day scholars are not armchair thinkers, but are men and women who refuse to accept what cannot be tested and proven in the laboratory of life. Science, according to this viewpoint, has brought about a transvaluation of values from superstition and myth to facts and proven realities and truth.

### Transnationalism Reconsidered

Leading American scholars explain transnational relations by saying that the world of foreign policy has been transformed by "frontier crossers," whether diplomats or tourists, financiers or multinational corporation executives, airline pilots or students. While the numbers of frontier crossers merely illustrate what is happening to change the world, their increase is quantifiable and measurable by scientific techniques. Interdependence need no longer be based on speculative thought, but can be tested by the number of telephone calls or letters passing between Great Britain and Poland or Nigeria and Ghana. The explosion of worldwide communications testifies, social scientists tell us, to the lessening importance of the nation-state—if not its demise. Moreover, transnational associations, which are for the most part nongovernmental international bodies, are bringing about the erosion of national loyalties. Citizens who formerly thought of themselves as Englishmen or Nigerians now see themselves as part of a worldwide community of interlocking groups and peoples. In the educational world, from student life with holiday study programs in foreign countries to professors intermingling in conferences with other professors one year in Boston, the next in Tokyo, and thereafter in Nairobi, Santiago, or Montreal, the flow of ideas has become worldwide. Finally, foreign policy problems that once could be considered wholly within a national or regional context now

present themselves everywhere around the globe. Secretaries of state describe this phenomenon by noting that issues on the periphery of a nation's sphere of interest have a way of moving to the center; they cite the examples of Korea, Vietnam, and Iran. It is apparently no longer possible to think strategically in the language of vital interests when the threat to international security crops up everywhere in the world, given the realities of the cold war. Problems are interconnected and linkages are required if lasting solutions are to be found. Transnationalism, not rationalism, has come to dominate foreign policy concerns.

The critics of this all-pervasive and controlling viewpoint of international relations question all three of the premises and assumptions of the transnational approach. First, they ask whether the hunger for measurement of the quantifiers and their conclusions about the facts of international contacts are not quite obviously self-evident and visible on the surface, and whether through indifference to meanings less subject to quantification some scientific interpretations may not be more misleading than helpful. No one can doubt that certain peoples in a growing number of countries have more contact with one another than they did fifty or one hundred years ago. The factors responsible are increasing population, greater incomes and wealth, and undoubted improvements in the technical means of sending communications. Quantifiers who tend to see what is important as what can be counted and measured, point to such technical and material changes and their immediate consequences without examining nonmaterial and intangible attachments to persistent national loyalties and the intensity of parochial values and beliefs. Because more Canadians and Americans in business and education talk more often by phone hardly proves that anti-Americanism is dead in Canada, or that Americans as a whole are any less suspicious of their neighbors to the north than in the past. If interdependence is to be viewed realistically, the political and foreign policy context within which communications take place ought not be ignored. It is possible to demonstrate that contacts oftentimes increase during periods of the most intense national rivalry; for example, communications between Soviet and American leaders by "hot line" increase at moments of deepening crisis. Transnationalism is not always a concomitant of peace and order; it generates conflict as often as harmony.

Critics of transnationalism further note that the debate over the decline of nationalism is a repetition of an historic controversy, and raises issues that were fought out in the first three decades of the twentieth century by opposing schools of thought in the liberal democratic world. The new social scientists, with their undisguised contempt for history, ignore the fact that certain transnational practices were if anything more in evidence before 1914. During the Napoleonic Wars, British scientists such as Michael Faraday attended international congresses in Paris, the capital of the enemy. Travel by train without passports or visas was possible anywhere in Europe, except in the Ottoman

Empire. European diplomats served the foreign offices of successive European countries, and Swiss mercenaries fought for various national armies. A plethora of books and studies written in the period between the two world wars were intended to show that nationalism was on the wane, prompting Hitler to write, "Other people's illusions about power were my great opportunity." The academician's illusion then and now rests in part on the belief that a few limited and segmental relations between specialized national groups across national boundaries is representative of political and social relations as a whole.

Yet the majority of the world's peoples do not partake in such relations. They live out their lives not only within nation-states but also in tribal and village groups. Frequently their mindset is shaped by such a factor as the limitation of reading material; for example, 95 percent of the Chinese people were restricted to a daily reading diet of the writings of Chairman Mao until Mao's death. Within such a state mental restrictions increased and were rarely diminished. Similar mental prohibitions exist throughout the world communist movement, and communist leaders in countries such as Italy probably support NATO only because they fear for their security with the passing of Tito in neighboring Yugoslavia. The communist international, which is a long-standing example of transnationalism, has lost much of its force because men such as Tito and Ceausescu depend for their power more on national constituencies than on ideological unity with Moscow. The world's crises, moreover, in problem areas in which interdependence matters most, are triggered not by the multinational corporations that symbolize transnationalism but by national governments. The global oil crisis beginning in 1973 was brought about by the demands of the oil-producing nations, working through intergovernmental bodies such as OPEC, for higher rates of return on the sale of national resources to the industrial countries. Consumer states have tried to counter these demands through opposing intergovernmental coalitions except when countries such as France, Japan, and England have decided to go it alone. National policies by national governments motivated by national reasons on both the consumer and producer sides have constituted the main source of the energy problem. (See the writings of scholars such as F S. Northedge of the London School of Economics in the *Journal of International Studies*.) Multinational corporations have been thrust aside when vital national interests were involved.

Finally, critics ask whether the most costly blunders in foreign policy have not occurred when national interests have been subordinated and pushed into the background as the basis of foreign policy decisions. America may have suffered its greatest defeat in Vietnam because it imagined that the Indochina problem could be explained as an international conspiracy controlled by Moscow or Peking rather than as a long-standing nationalist conflict and a revolt against all foreign domination. Hanoi enjoyed military and material assistance from both of its communist allies at the same time as it played them off against one another with consummate skill. Transnationalism and the ending of national

rivalries, some European commentators say, have affected American thought in the mid-twentieth century much as the hope of the Second Coming affected medieval Europe. Woodrow Wilson went empty-handed to the Paris Peace Conference, having no well-thought-out plan to protect American national interests, leading Lloyd George to say that Wilson "tried to apply the straight footrule of his ideals to the gnarled and knotty trunks of European nationalism." As World War II came to an end, American leaders believed that a new international organization in which all the nations would cooperate would assure that traditional means such as the balance of power of controlling national expansionism were no longer required. Such failures of the transnational outlook to provide guidance for wise foreign policy decisions should at least give prophets and pundits pause when they invoke transnationalism as a guarantee of the end of national rivalries.

The fatal flaw of transnationalism as a guide to immediate policy choices, ironically enough given its scientific pretensions, is its profound disregard of facts and realities. Riding what they consider the wave of the future, the transnational social scientists apparently feel no need to attend to visible and stubborn facts. I. L. Claude of the University of Virginia, reviewing one of the innumerable publications of the Council on Foreign Relations in its multimillion dollar, foundation-financed project on the 1980s, observes, "The author, starting from the premise that international relations have been fundamentally transformed, makes no effort to balance his analysis by considering continuities along with changes; one is simply invited to assume the overpowering significance of the latter." (Review of *Modernization and Transformation in International Relations* by Edward L. Morse by I. L. Claude, *Political Science Quarterly,* vol. 92, no. 4, Winter 1977–78, p. 716.) The commonsense knowledge that force has not been eradicated, say, in wars of national liberation is conveniently overlooked, and the stigma of being out-of-date is imputed to those who analyze national rivalries by characterizing their approach as Westphalian thinking. Apparently it is better—and more scientific—to count letters and weigh parcels passing between any two countries than to analyze political relationships.

The concealing or obscuring of the facts is nowhere more conspicuous than in discussions of transnational groupings or political and economic communities of nation-states. Integration theory in world politics, which has a strong social-scientific bias, has demonstrated a surprising disregard for facts. What remains a genuine puzzle both to integrationists and their critics is how theories can be constructed when the viable examples are so sparse. When integration is approached as a fact rather than an aspiration, case studies dwindle to the one significant if quite limited example of the European community. Integration in Eastern Europe hardly corresponds to the model of free and voluntary associations; it would appear in practice merely to be another name for Soviet imperialism. Even within Western Europe, given the slow pace and stubborn roadblocks

thrown up by the founding states (France is but one example), true integration remains a hope for the future more than a present, all-determining reality. Outside Europe, nationalism in Africa and Asia, which lead to the multiplication of so many new states that the world's number has tripled since 1945, points to the very opposite conclusion of that propounded by the integrationists. Nationhood there, long delayed by the dominance of the colonial powers, has assumed a more passionate and emotional character than in most other parts of the world, as those who have sought to establish cooperative relations are only too well aware. Nor are there any significant signs of the waning of nationalism. In the early 1950s those of us from America, Britain, and Canada who participated in institution building in higher education in Africa and Asia were comparatively free to function out front, visible as educational advisers and even as heads of departments or deans of important faculties. Today the most experienced educationists from the developed countries have found they can be effective only by working behind the scene, making themselves available for counsel and advice but rarely occupying official positions. What is true of higher education is true *a fortiori* in agriculture and in population and environmental assistance. Outsiders at best, in the favorite words of the public administrators, must remain on tap, not on top.

Given the persistence of extreme nationalism, it is difficult to understand the stubborn resistance of transnational thinkers to the facts. One explanation may be that the study of international politics has proceeded by starts and stops from one approach to another, each designed to hold out fresh hope for the grim and conflict-ridden world. The harsh and bitter struggles of nations-in-arms have so appalled and revolted men of conscience that they have joined in a headlong rush to substitute a more peaceful international order. In recent years scientists, remembering their role in discovering the know-how for producing weapons of mutual annihilation, have felt a particular responsibility. Those physical scientists who have turned from the slow and painful discipline of their laboratories have infused efforts to understand the word *politics* with a frenzied reformist zeal. Social scientists, intrigued by the power of science to propel men to the moon, have joined the crusade, adopting techniques they believed were responsible for physical science's success stories. Along the way they have lost sight of realities that commonsense observation should have taught them were problems to be faced. The immense prestige of the physical sciences coupled with the march of self-conscious social science reformers have prevented their seeing the world as it is. Transnationalism is a premature form of universalism because the prevailing forces of international politics are still moving along other pathways and patterns.

### The Moral Problem

The search for viable concepts of morality and foreign policy, therefore, has not ended with the scientific revolution nor the first faint signs of a trans-

national community. The task of the moralist has become if anything more perplexing, given the state of world politics. Gone are the moral certainties about which St. Augustine wrote and ancient convictions about universal brotherhood. Roscoe Pound wrote: "We are told that observation shows us social interdependence through similarity of interest and through division of labor as the central fact in human existence." (Roscoe Pound, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law,* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1922, p. 23.) It was philosophy for Pound, however, and not science that promised new theories and conceptions for understanding interdependence and its application and meaning for discrete areas of the law. A similar note has been struck in more recent times by the Indonesian cultural historian and diplomat, Soedjatmoko. To an Asian, what stands out as missing from most present-day American debates about morality and foreign policy is concern with a philosophy of history or the destination of mankind. Every previous historical era had such perspectives, but for our times all controlling world views have been shattered. Not only the millenial ideas of Christianity have come under question, but the promised communist utopia has also been replaced by Soviet and Chinese authoritarianism and oppression. Man's loss of faith and his growing incapacity for deeply rooted beliefs have some connection with his passion to crowd as much as possible into the present. We live within shifting time frames; when one can no longer accept the hope of life after death, the time frame of peace and justice changes.

If there is a way back to a more coherent and defensible view of morality, it is through awareness that the present world scene has elements of both continuity and change. We remain perilously suspended between a once-healthy but forgotten religious universalism and a too-pretentious definition of the unities of modern-day transnationalism. Whether we like it or not, morality continues to work itself out in a world populated by nation-states whose urgent needs require an unending search for recognition of the needs of others. A too-narrow nationalism imperils civilization as it has in the past, but exhortations and scientific declarations show little prospect of bringing about its demise. One of the most poignant examples of the moral predicament we face in moving from nationalism to universalism is the present position of UNESCO. That international (transnational) organization founded on the assumed universalism of scientific humanism has become a fierce battleground in the struggle between developed and underdeveloped nation-states. Basically, the problem of transnationalism is rooted in differences in perception of the role and character of the nation-state. To scientists, whether natural or behavioral social scientists, and no less to the great corporations, the present-day nation-state is outmoded. The logic of the situation in the developed world requires that men transcend national loyalties. In the third world, the problem is almost the direct opposite. There the nation-state has emerged as a necessary instrument for the development of particular freedoms, social justice, and national unity. It is also the negotiating unit for the attainment of a better world. This negotiating

process goes on day after day even within so-called transnational organizations.

It will not do, therefore, to claim that the "blind groping" and endless process of adapting moral principles to complex and intractable realities is an ancient task from which science and transnationalism have liberated us. The demands for political and moral wisdom are larger than ever before. Man needs all the resources at his command: wise statecraft, diplomatic insight, moral maxims, moral reasoning, technical understanding, science, and practical morality. It would be a counsel of perfection to claim that all these taken together would solve the moral problem. It is nothing short of a crippling illusion to believe science alone has all the answers.