

interpretation

A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

September 1981

Volume 9 Numbers 2 & 3

- 141 Larry Arnhart The Rationality of Political Speech:
An Interpretation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*
- 155 Jan H. Blits Manliness and Friendship
in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*
- 169 Mary Nichols *The Winter's Tale*:
The Triumph of Comedy over Tragedy
- 191 Jerry Weinberger On Bacon's *Advertisement Touching A Holy War*
- 207 John Parsons, Jr. On Sir William Temple's
Political and Philosophical Teaching
- 229 Susan Power John Locke:
Revolution, Resistance, or Opposition?
- 245 Barry Cooper The Politics of Performance: An Interpretation
of Bolingbroke's Political Theory
- 263 Philip J. Kain Labor, the State, and Aesthetic Theory in the
Writings of Schiller
- 279 Michael H. Mitias Law as the Basis of the State: Hegel
- 301 Stanley Corngold Dilthey's Essay *The Poetic Imagination*:
A Poetics of Force
- 339 Kent A. Kirwan Historicism and Statesmanship
in the Reform Argument of Woodrow Wilson
- 353 Richard Velkley Gadamer and Kant: The Critique of Modern
Aesthetic Consciousness in *Truth and Method*
- 365 Robert C. Grady Bertrand de Jouvenel:
Order, Legitimacy, and the Model of Rousseau
- 385 William R. Marty Rawls and the Harried Mother
- 397 Jürgen Gebhardt Ideology and Reality:
The Ideologue's Persuasion in Modern Politics
- 415 Kenneth W. Thompson Science, Morality, and Transnationalism
- Discussion*
- 427 Peter T. Manicas The Crisis of Contemporary Political Theory:
on Jacobson's *Pride and Solace*
- Book Reviews*
- 437 Patrick Coby *The Spirit of Liberalism*,
by Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr.
- 439 Will Morrisey *Political Parties in the Eighties*,
edited by Robert A. Goldwin

interpretation

Volume 9 numbers 2 & 3

Editor-in-Chief Hilail Gildin

Editors Seth G. Benardete • Hilail Gildin • Robert Horwitz
• Howard B. White (d.1974)

Consulting Editors John Hallowell • Wilhelm Hennis • Erich Hula •
Arnaldo Momigliano • Michael Oakeshott • Ellis
Sandoz • Leo Strauss (d.1973) • Kenneth W.
Thompson

Associate Editors Larry Arnhart • Patrick Coby • Christopher A. Colmo
• Maureen Feder • Joseph E. Goldberg • Pamela
Jensen • Will Morrisey

Assistant Editor Marianne C. Grey

Production Manager Martyn Hitchcock

Authors submitting manuscripts for publication in INTERPRETATION are requested to follow the *MLA Style Sheet* and to send clear and readable copies of their work. All manuscripts and editorial correspondence should be addressed to INTERPRETATION, Building G Room 101, Queens College, Flushing, N.Y. 11367, U.S.A.

Copyright 1982 • Interpretation

ON BACON'S ADVERTISEMENT TOUCHING A HOLY WAR

J. WEINBERGER
Michigan State University

As I have argued elsewhere, the fragment *Advertisement Touching A Holy War* is the formal catalyst that unifies Bacon's *Great Instauration*.¹ Bacon's remark in the Epistle Dedicatory about the completeness of the division of the sciences provides the clue to the completeness of his scientific project as a whole.² While the noblest part of the new physics, medicine, remained incomplete, Bacon presented his complete teaching about the virtues and risks of scientific conquest in his secret and retired political science, which is introduced in the *New Atlantis*. The *New Atlantis* is apparently incomplete because it presents a pattern of scientific perfection that lacks an open account of political science. But the *New Atlantis* is complete because it includes a teaching about government that is indirect and secret because it is dangerous and problematic. The *New Atlantis* is complete beneath the surface only because as such it opens to the full teaching about the soul—its virtues and its parts—contained in the whole of Bacon's corpus. Bacon's writing has three rather than two dimensions because each text always has two surfaces plus what is beneath them. Each text is open to what is beneath it as a text and then again is open to the project described in the *Great Instauration* and what is beneath that description.

The *Advertisement* at once catalyzes the parts of Bacon's corpus into a completed whole and also participates in that whole. Its surface as a text opens fully to what is beneath it only as it is tied to the *New Atlantis* as one part to another. Its surface consists in the dialogue as such and in the scientific fortune promised in the *Great Instauration* and introduced in the *New Atlantis*. If the *Advertisement* treats a mix of "religious and civil considerations" in a mixed "contemplative and active way,"³ then it also treats civil and ecclesiastical policy as means to man's scientific fortune. In the *New Atlantis*, the provisional teaching about politics appears as the provisional secrecy which is a means of science to its end and which is abolished by the revelation of Bensalemite science to the rest of the world. The final teaching appears as the final secrecy required by the problematic end of science, and this secrecy is not abolished by the revelation of Bensalem to the world.⁴ As the *Advertisement* is tied to the *New*

¹For the details of the following argument see J. Weinberger, "Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia: An Introduction to the Reading of the *New Atlantis*," *American Political Science Review*, 70 (September 1976), 866-72.

²*The Works of Francis Bacon*, ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, 14 vols. (London: Longman and Co., etc., 1857-74), hereafter BW, VII, 13-14.

³*Advertisement*, BW VII, 15.

⁴Weinberger, pp. 880-85.

Atlantis, so is it analogous to the *New Atlantis* in regard to formal incompleteness and posthumous publication.⁵ We must expect that the *Advertisement* likewise treats problems of civil and ecclesiastical policy both as to the means to scientific conquest and as to the final offspring of man's scientific fortune.

Bacon describes the characters of the dialogue, but he does not explain the meanings of their names. Eusebius, the moderate divine, has a name meaning "pious" or "reverent", and he is the namesake of Eusebius, the Bishop of Caesarea, who is noted for his *Ecclesiastical History* and for his lost epitome of universal history. Gamaliel, the Protestant zealot, has a name meaning "God's reward." Zebedaeus, the Roman Catholic zealot, has a name meaning "my gift is God." Martius, the military man, has a name of obvious meaning; it means "sacred to Mars" the god of war. Eupolis, the politiquer, has a name meaning "good city" and is the namesake of Eupolis the comic poet, contemporary of Aristophanes, and reputed victim of Alcibiades. Finally, Pollio, the courtier, has a name meaning "one who polishes or adorns" and suggesting "to bear rule"; he is the namesake of Pollio the Roman politician and writer of history, tragedy, and erotic poems.

The dialogue opens when Pollio interrupts Martius' complaint against armed Christendom, which is part of a discussion being held at Eupolis' house. Pollio wittily remarks that the persons who meet in the house of the "good city" make a good world. Eusebius, Gamaliel, Zebedaeus and Martius differ and yet are friends, like the four elements, and Eupolis, because he is temperate and without passion, is the fifth essence, the substance of the heavenly cosmos that vaults the whole and unites its parts. Eupolis retorts that if they five make up the macrocosm, Pollio is the microcosm because he refers all things to himself both in speech and deed. Pollio does not deny this characterization; rather, he asks about those who act like him but are not frank. Eupolis replies that they are weaker but more dangerous than Pollio, and he invites Pollio to join their discussion of Christendom, for they welcome his opinion. Pollio professes the need to be stirred from his post-travelling, afternoon drowsiness by their speeches, but then he offers to wake the speeches when *they* sleep. Eupolis acknowledges this favor and opines that Pollio will think their discourses to be dreams, being good wishes without power to effect. But Martius' interrupted speech will affect Pollio's drowsiness because it was the "trumpet of war." Eupolis bids Martius to begin again, and Martius repeats his complaint against armed Christendom.

In contrast to the unarmed Christian soldiers and the armed merchants; the armed Christian princes and potentates have been loath to propagate the faith by their arms. Martius mentions three exceptions to this. The first, the noble battle of Lepanto, contrasts with the far less noble adventures of Sabastian of

⁵See *De Augmentis*, BW V, 79. cf. Weinberger, p. 871.

Portugal and Sigismund the Transylvanian, but Martius lists them as equals. To aid Martius' memory, Pollio interrupts to mention the example of the extirpation of the Valencian Moors. Martius has nothing to say about this example and is silent, but Pollio's second interruption triggers a sectarian exchange between Gamaliel and Zebedaeus. Gamaliel approves of Martius' omission because he did not approve the action against the Moors. Zebedaeus, of course, approved it. In accordance with his politique nature, Eupolis moderates this sectarian quarrel by directing the subject back to Martius' military speech. Eupolis justifies his suggested return to Martius' subject by saying that Martius' subject and speech have nothing to do with the extirpation of the Moors because, being directed at subjects, it cannot be sorted "aptly with the actions of war."

Martius continues to exhort his listeners to support religious war by arguing that a war against the infidels is also not to be equalled for secular greatness and terrene honor. Such a war is not impossible, and to prove his point, he offers the examples of the Castilians who conquered the West Indies and the navigation and conquest of Emmanuel of Portugal. Martius asserts that these two feats were not motivated by the propagation of the Christian faith, but that they have enriched Christendom and have enlarged the boundaries of Spanish estate, and that in these feats the spiritual and temporal honor and good have been conjoined.

At this point Pollio interrupts Martius a third time to remind him of the difference between kinds of infidels: those who are like the brutes, "the property of which passeth with the possession and goeth to the occupant," and those who are civil people, where such possibility of possession does not obtain. Martius answers that he knows of no such difference "amongst reasonable souls" and argues that however civil a people is, whatever is in order for the greatest good of a people is enough to justify any action taken against them. Martius emphasizes his point by doubting that the people of Peru or Mexico were brute savages at all; these peoples were justly subdued, and yet it is possible to contrast the political and religious sophistication of the victims of the Spaniards with the barbarous, cruel tyranny of the Turkish empire.

Pollio interrupts Martius a fourth time to remind him of the distinction between idolaters and the Turks who "do acknowledge God the Father." Again Martius has nothing to say, but Zebedaeus interjects a reprehensive, stern warning to Pollio not to fall into heresy. As with his second interruption, Pollio makes no further comment or rebuttal. He is silent while Martius confesses his zeal for the cause of a war against the Turks over any other both in point of religion and honor. But Martius admits to mistrusting his own judgment because of its weakness and his zeal, and so he requests the others who are various interpreters of the divine law to speak about the lawfulness of such a war. The moderate politique Eupolis compliments Martius for his moderation and announces his intention to distribute the parts of the ensuing conference.

Eupolis' distribution is as follows: Zebedaeus will treat whether war for

propagation of the faith alone is lawful, and in what cases it is lawful; Gamaliel will treat whether such a war is obligatory for Christian princes and states; Eusebius will treat the comparative: whether such a war is to be preferred over extirpation of heretics, reconciliation of schisms, pursuit of lawful temporal rights and quarrels, and how far such a war should either wait upon these matters, be mingled with them, or pass them by and give law to them as inferior to itself; Pollio will submit the argument to the test of possibility; Eupolis will prove the enterprise of a holy war to be possible; and Martius will then resume his speech that will persuade and touch “means and preparations.” The discussants agree to this division and distribution, and they agree to stop and to continue the discussion the next day. But the supposedly drowsy Pollio interrupts the adjournment.

Pollio’s final interruption disturbs the order of speeches determined by Eupolis. Pollio acknowledges Eupolis to be correct in thinking him a skeptic, for he believes that unless Christendom is ground and molded into a new paste, a holy war is impossible. But Pollio professes his willingness to concur with the hope of the five discussants—with the good world, as it were—and to assert that Athens is mad and only Democritus is sober.⁶ To demonstrate his willingness to comply with the positive consideration, he will “frankly contribute to the business.” He advises that if they would have a holy war, they must choose a pope of “fresh years,” between fifty and sixty, and must have him called Urban. Eupolis says that Pollio speaks well, but he asks that Pollio be a little more serious. Bacon then informs us that the discussants met the following day as they had agreed. Pollio made some sporting speeches, which are not presented, to the effect that the holy war had already begun because he dreamt of Janissaries, Tartars, and Sultans. We reenter the dialogue as Martius begins the reported speeches by warning of a possible flaw in Eupolis’ distribution of the speeches. Martius objects to the placing of the parts. His speech about means and preparations is to follow Pollio’s and Eupolis’ debate about the possibility of a holy war. Since this order is not necessarily best because consideration of means often affects opinions concerning possibility, Martius warns Pollio and Eupolis not to speak peremptorily or conclusively until they have heard his discussion of means, and he asks them to be prepared to reply to his speech.

Bacon tells us that all commend Martius for his caution, and Eupolis, following Martius’ example, refines his distribution to account for an omission. Into the question of lawfulness (distributed to Zebedaeus), Eupolis inserts the following question: whether holy war is to be pursued to the displanting and extermination of peoples and whether it is to enforce belief and punish infidelity or only to subdue peoples so as to open forcefully the door for the “spiritual sword,” i.e., for persuasion and instruction and what is fitting for souls and consciences. Having made this amendment, Eupolis explains that it will be a

⁶*Advertisement*, BW VII, 25, n. 1.

part of Zebedaeus' speech and hands the discourse to Zebedaeus, whose speech is the final speech and is as long as the preceding parts of the dialogue combined.

Zebedaeus announces a sixfold plan for his speech, which is dictated by his intention first of all to "distinguish the cases" of lawfulness. First will be the question of whether it is lawful for Christian princes to wage unprovoked war for the propagation of the faith. Second will be the question of whether it is lawful to restore once Christian countries to the Christian faith, if this question is a part of the case of a holy war. Third will be the question of whether it is lawful to free Christians from servitude to infidels in non-Christian countries, again if this question is a part of the case of a holy war. Fourth will be the question of whether it is lawful to make war to purge and recover holy places. Fifth will be the question of whether it is lawful to make war to revenge blasphemy and cruelty or bloodshed inflicted on Christians. Sixth will be the question of whether holy war may be pursued to the expulsion of people or enforcements of conscience, and how it is to be moderated so that Christians do not "forget that others are men." To this sixfold plan of questions, Zebedaeus adds a seventh consideration. It is not a question, but it "precedes" all the questions and "in a manner" discharges them. In this last consideration, which was suggested by what Zebedaeus considers Martius' true charges against the Turks, Zebedaeus will present his opinion that a "war to suppress the [Turkish] empire, though we set aside the cause of religion, were a just war."

Zebedaeus pauses and then proceeds to his speech. After an introductory warning against making an idol or moloch of Jesus by sacrificing men's blood in an unjust war, Zebedaeus discusses the natural justice of a war against the Turks. He opines that a war against the Turks is lawful according to the laws of nature, nations, and the divine law. The justice of such a war will consist in the merit of the cause, the warrant of the jurisdiction, and the form of prosecution. He will ignore the civil and positive law of the Romans because they are feeble "engines," and so he will ignore the opinions and writings of many of the late Schoolmen. Zebedaeus then treats the evidence of the law of nature. His presentation of the law of nature consists solely of a defense of Aristotle's principle of the natural right to govern, which is that some creatures are born to rule and others are born to obey. Zebedaeus takes this as a truth "as Aristotle limiteth it": If there can be found such inequality between man and man as exists between man and beast or between body and soul, such inequality will invest a right of government. The whole of Zebedaeus' speech is a proof that although this proportion seems an impossible case for men, the judgment is true "and the case possible, and such as hath had and hath a being, both in particular men and nations."

Zebedaeus acknowledges that determination of the proposition is difficult because beyond Aristotle's simple standard of intelligence, courage, honesty, and probity of will are required for government, and men never agree as to who

is most worthy and so most fit to rule. Therefore, Zebedaeus accepts Aristotle's view not "in the comparative" but rather "in the privative." Thus he concludes that "where there is a heap of people (even though called a people or a state) that is altogether unable or indign to govern, it is just for a civil people to subdue them." Before arguing the case in its particulars, Zebedaeus adds that he does not refer to the role of a personal tyranny but rather to cases where the laws of a state are against the laws of nature and nations.

Zebedaeus divides his discussion of the existence of such cases into three parts. Firstly he will consider whether there are such nations that can be subdued. Secondly he will consider the breaches of the laws of nature and nations that divest a nation of all right to government. Finally he will consider whether these breaches exist in any government, namely, in the Ottoman Empire.

With respect to the first point, Zebedaeus asserts that there are nations that have no right to govern and that ought to be subdued. The determination of these nations is based on the original donation of government. The foundation of dominion is man's being the image of God, that is, his possession of natural reason. Only if this image is totally or mostly defaced is the right to govern divested. Original sin does not subvert the right to rule as some fanatics and the poor men of Lyons have argued. Zebedaeus quotes God's words to Noah and his sons to prove his point, and he quotes the prophet Hosea to show that there are governments that God does not avow by His revealed will, even though they are ordained by secret providence. Zebedaeus argues that the prophet's words do not refer to evil governors or tyrants but rather to perverse and defective nations. Furthermore, the words do not refer to *all* idolatrous nations, "for the idolatry of the Jews then, and the idolatry of the Heathen then and now, are sins of a far differing nature, in regard of the special covenant and clear manifestations wherein God did contract and exhibit himself to that nation."⁷ The Israelites differed from the Canaanites, then, just as they differed from contemporary idolatrous peoples, who are among the nations in name which are no nations and which are outlawed and proscribed by the law of nature and nations, or the immediate commandment of God.

Zebedaeus gives seven examples of such nations: (1) pirates, who are the common enemies of man and against whom there is a natural, tacit confederation of all men, (2) rovers by land, (3) the Assassins, (4) the Anabaptists of Munster, even if they had done no actual mischief, and peoples who hold all things to be lawful according to "the secret and variable motions and instincts of the spirit," (5) instances like the fictional Amazons where all government is in the hands of women, (6) the Sultany of the Mamelukes and like instances that are perversions of the laws of nature and nations, and (7) the people of the West Indies. In all of these cases, any nation, however far off, may destroy

⁷*Ibid.*, 30–31. Zebedaeus' Biblical quotes are: Genesis 1:26; Genesis 9:2; Hosea 8:4; Deut. 32:21.

them. Regarding the last example, Zebedaeus remarks to Martius that the West Indians were properly subdued by the Spaniards even if the question of the propagation of the faith is set aside. This latter point is true because the West Indian practices of human sacrifice and cannibalism, which are breaches of nature's law, caused the West Indians to forfeit their territory. Zebedaeus adds at this point, however, that he is loath to justify "the cruelties which were first used toward" the West Indians. Zebedaeus ends his list of examples of nations that are no nations with a general example. He argues that the example of Hercules' labors shows the consent of all nations and ages for the "extirpation and debellating of giants, monsters, and foreign tyrants."

Zebedaeus next sets down arguments, rather than examples, to prove that there are states that are no states, which must be subdued by civil nations. First, men are bound to such subduing action by implicit confederations and bounds. Examples of such confederations and bounds are: colonial ties to mother nations, the unity of common language, the sharing of fundamental laws and customs, and, finally, common humanity. Zebedaeus refuses to speak of the tie of common false worship, but he says that Christians more than others must acknowledge "that no nations are wholly aliens and strangers to one another" and that Christians must not be less charitable "than the person introduced by the comic poet: *Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto.*"⁸ Zebedaeus asserts that such tacit confederations are active and against "such routs and shoals of people as have utterly degenerated from the laws of nature." All nations must suppress such peoples, and this is to be measured not by juridical principle. Rather, it is to be measured by the law of love (New Law), the law of love of one's neighbor, and the law of the common origin of mankind. Zebedaeus says that to deny his argument is almost to be a schismatic, and with his bellicose final remark, the dialogue ends abruptly.

Like the *New Atlantis*, the most obtrusive feature of the *Advertisement Touching A Holy War* is its apparent incompleteness. The *Advertisement* is doubly indirect because it is an incomplete dialogue. As a dialogue we can penetrate the *Advertisement* only by discerning a whole made up of parts that are not Bacon's words or views simply. Although Bacon causes the characters to speak, their speech is not Bacon's speech to the extent that they speak from their characters or natures. But the whole woven out of the separate parts represents Bacon's teaching about the highest matters. The characters make up an image of the cosmic whole, as we are told by the witty Pollio, and the speeches treat a mix of the universal and the particular—religion and policy—as Bacon tells us in the Epistle Dedicatory. The whole of Bacon's view is fashioned from two parts: the action of the dialogue and the possible completeness of the apparently incomplete work.

⁸*Advertisement*, BW VII, 35. The quote is from Terence, *The Self-Tormentor*, 1.77.

A survey of the dialogue's plan shows it to be more complete than first meets the eye. Eupolis distributes the speeches of the discussion to the participants, and of the six speeches proposed, only two are provided: Zebedaeus' long but apparently truncated speech and Pollio's speech, which is out of place and very brief. But Eupolis' distribution of subjects is not left untreated in the same proportion as is his distribution of speeches. Of seven distributed subjects, all but one are mentioned and answered by the two speeches provided. The question of lawfulness is covered in its entirety by Zebedaeus' speech. The question of a war against the Turks discharges "in a manner" the six particulars adumbrated by Zebedaeus, even though it is not strictly concerned with the "cause of religion." And such a war against the Turks is consistent with natural law. Zebedaeus' speech assimilates and discharges the obligation of Gamaliel, for Zebedaeus argues that war against the Turks is binding because of implicit confederations. Pollio's speech testing the possibility of a holy war and Eupolis' task of proving holy war to be possible are discharged by Pollio's summary speech and Martius' examples of holy war. Pollio's brief speech proceeds beyond its appointed task to assimilate Martius' final obligation. Not only does Pollio acknowledge possibility by his participation in the positive consideration, but he provides the fundamental means and preparations. These consist of the recommendations that Christendom be "ground and molded into a new paste" and that a new pope named Urban must embody the principle of freshness or youth, for a pope between fifty and sixty years of age does not represent youth strictly understood. Thus Pollio's suggestion is that Christendom must be completely changed and led by the principle of youthful urbanity.

How, then, is the distribution of subjects and speeches still incomplete? The only subject not discussed is "the comparative," assigned to the only character who does not speak, Eusebius, the nonsectarian, moderate divine who is pious and who is named for the writer of ecclesiastical and universal history. The incompleteness of subject matter matches the incompleteness of speeches and speakers. As it stands, the *Advertisement* presents an argument about holy war that covers the questions of lawfulness—including whether legality extends to displanting and exterminating peoples—obligatoriness, possibility, and means and preparations. It presents this argument by means of the speeches of Pollio, Martius, and Zebedaeus that assimilate the subjects and speeches of Gamaliel and Eupolis and exclude the subject and speech of Eusebius.

Eusebius' subject treats the mix of civil and religious considerations. It treats the relative importance of holy war with respect to immediate and urgent matters of civil and ecclesiastical policy. Eusebius' subject matches his name and namesake. The writer of ecclesiastical and universal history is to treat the distribution of civil and ecclesiastical duty with respect to men's obligations to a universal cause. Formally, the thematic center of the dialogue is missing, and so whatever fills the gap left by Eusebius' absence constitutes the positive teaching of the dialogue.

The action of the dialogue opens with Pollio joining a conference of men of eminent quality and interrupting a speech in favor of a holy war being delivered by Martius. We do not know the immediate reason for the conference, nor do we know why Pollio joined them from court. Including the initial interruption, we witness five interruptions by Pollio that lead up to and surround Eupolis' distribution of the speeches. Pollio's second interruption comes early in the dialogue when he breaks into Martius' exhortation to holy or pious warfare and reminds Martius of the "extirpation of the Moors of Valencia." The result of Pollio's interruption is a sectarian squabble and the moderation of that squabble by the moderate politique Eupolis. Eupolis' moderating returns the focus of the discussion back to Martius' invective against the Turks. Eupolis speaks for Martius, filling the gap left by Martius' silence at Pollio's remark, and explains Martius' silence by referring to his martial nature and the nature of martial affairs, which proscribe actions against unarmed civilians.

The first action of the dialogue produces an alliance between the moderate politique and the fervent soldier. But this alliance does not directly answer Pollio's question, as we learn in the sequel. Immediately following Martius' mention of the savage Spanish conquest of the West Indies, Pollio again interrupts to remind Martius of the kinds of infidels. Some infidels are civil and some are not different from the brutes. Not only does Pollio's suggestion condone the inhuman treatment of the less than human humans, but Martius' reply subverts even the humane alternative implicit in Pollio's suggested distinction. Whatever may have been the reason for Martius' silence at Pollio's mention of the Moors of Valencia, it was not from a squeamishly narrow understanding of what aptly sorts with the actions of war.

Pollio's second and third interruptions exacerbate Martius' pious blood-lust, and the alliance between Martius and Eupolis, while moderating a sectarian dispute, does not moderate Martius' martial zeal. Martius approves of the bloody Spanish conquests of the West Indies, which are described as barbarous even by the zealous Zebedaeus. The first and second actions of the dialogue are interruptions by Pollio that pose questions of extreme modes and methods. These questions are answered indirectly in favor of extreme modes and methods, and in part they are so answered by means of a link between moderation and military zeal. This link is never broken, and it points to the assimilation of moderation to zeal. After the forging of their alliance, Eupolis the moderate politique makes no protest of moderation against Martius' extremism or lack of moderation. Eupolis' first defense of Martius is an inadequate defense of Martius' nonexistent moderation, and Eupolis' silence after Pollio's third interruption implies that whatever was done to the victims of the Spaniards can be done to the Turks, who are worse than the civilized brutes of the Indies.

Pollio's fourth interruption again raises Zebedaeus' sectarian passions. When Martius has no answer for Pollio's suggested distinction between true monotheists and idolaters, Zebedaeus warns Pollio of the danger of heresy. The

time and location of the dialogue—Paris in 1621⁹—underscores the unsaid threat of Zebedaeus' warning. There is no discussion or resolution of this theological problem; rather, Pollio is silent while Martius admits his zeal for a war against the Turks and asks for help in determining the lawfulness of the action from men who are well versed in the divine law. In concert with their alliance, Eupolis comes to Martius' aid and makes the central distribution of the speeches.

The structure and movement of the dialogue consist of the mix of Eupolis' distribution of speeches and Pollio's and Martius' interruptions. Pollio's fourth interruption spurs the movement of the dialogue to its climax, for he raises the question of the Turks' difference from idolaters, which causes Martius to mention lawfulness and Eupolis to distribute the speeches regarding lawfulness. And Martius' interruption the following day reminds the speakers about how seriously the matter of means must be considered, which then prompts Eupolis to expand Zebedaeus' speech to include the limits of methods and means. The structure and movement of the dialogue are such that Eusebius is expelled from the dialogue. Pollio's final interruption, which occurs after Eupolis' distribution, gives the answer to Martius' subject of means and shows how Eusebius' expulsion must be understood. Pollio thinks that the Christian universality promised by a holy war is, along with philosopher's stone, the "*rendez-vous* of cracked brains."¹⁰ Bacon tells us why the alchemist's dream and the hope for a holy war are alike as such a meeting place. They are alike because "in their propositions the description of the means is ever more monstrous than the pretence or end," which end is nevertheless noble.¹¹ But in the case of the religious and civil universality of Christianity, which would be Eusebius' subject (ecclesiastical and universal history), the true means are inseparable from the possible truth of the end, and there can be no true means. Eusebius' absence from the dialogue is consistent with Bacon's teaching about ecclesiastical and universal history in the *Advancement of Learning*. Because no miracle can ever be trusted, including the miracle of revelation itself, completed or perfected modern history will replace the sacred history in dividing times and declaring the end of days, and the true universal history must be the story of man's scientific fortune, which is man's voyage to Bensalem and the conquest of God's hegemony.¹² The means to the noble end of alchemy and universal history can be mended only if the end of God's providence is replaced by the perfection of science and man's consequent liberation from God's rule. In the light of Eusebius' absence, Pollio's suggested reformation of Christendom must

⁹The Battle of Lepanto is the earliest military adventure mentioned by Martius, *Advertisement*, BW VII, 35. The Battle of Lepanto was fought in 1571, fifty years before the time of the dialogue according to Martius.

¹⁰*Advertisement*, BW VII, 24.

¹¹*Advancement of Learning*, BW III, 362, 289.

¹²Weinberger, pp. 876–78.

consist in a new Catholicism or universality led by a new principle of youth. This universality is none other than the universal claim of science to save and preserve the corruptible things. The universal principle of man's scientific fortune governs the pursuit and evaluation of civil and ecclesiastical policy, and these matters are tacitly assimilated to the speeches of Martius, Pollio and Zebedaeus by means of Eupolis' revision of his distribution. Together their speeches treat the means to the new universal human fortune. Special treatment of "the comparative" is obviated by the supreme urgency of the scientific project. Whatever the civil or ecclesiastical matter, the measure of policy is clear: It consists in the methods and means necessary for mankind's voyage to Bensalem.

Eusebius' expulsion and tacit replacement by Eupolis, Martius, Pollio, and Zebedaeus signifies more than the replacement of divine providence and grace by man's scientific fortune. It also signifies the expulsion of moderation from the dialogue, for although Eupolis is described as a politique, his moderation is allied to Martius' zeal, and only Eusebius is explicitly identified by Bacon as a moderate man. Pollio's sporting characterization of Eupolis as "temperate and without passion" must be seen in the light of the whole fashioned from Eupolis' distribution and Pollio's and Martius' guiding of the action of the dialogue. Given Eusebius' expulsion from the dialogue, Eupolis' politique moderation must be problematic, and we must wonder at the law that governs the practice of the new holy war.

Without rejecting the barbarism Martius so easily accepts, Pollio assimilates and answers the question of means and preparations distributed to Martius. The unity of the dialogue is fashioned by Bacon's weaving of a unity of immoderate natures by means of the moderate politique and the lubricious courtier. For it is Eupolis, the moderate politique, who connects the opposing characters by the distribution of tasks and who makes the explicit addition of the question of the limits of methods and means, and it is Pollio, the smooth and jocular courtier, who prompts the distribution, gives it meaning by his final interruption, and, along with Martius, guides the dialogue as a whole toward the problem of immoderate methods and means. The movement of the dialogue discloses the moderation of sectarian passion for the sake of a new holy war, and the aim of this holy war is such that the end justifies the means. The *Advertisement* is a set of speeches governed by the principle of moderation, but as such it argues for the abandonment of moderation as the principle governing the means to mankind's true universal fortune. It comes as no surprise that the discussion of the law governing means and methods is treated in its entirety by the immoderate divine Zebedaeus.

Although Pollio's speech assimilates Martius' subject of means and preparations and in fact determines what their end must be, Zebedaeus' speech treats the law that would govern the instances, application, and limits of means. It is to Zebedaeus that Eupolis distributes the fundamental question concerning

means, i.e., the question of limits and degrees, in this case, whether holy war is to proceed to the extermination of peoples. Zebedaeus' speech culminates the speeches and action of the dialogue, and so it completes the reconstruction of the good world required by Eusebius' expulsion. His speech imitates the structure of the dialogue, for Zebedaeus' speech is presented by a part of an articulated whole. The general question and the six particulars are subsumed by the secular question of a war against the Turks that can be justified by the laws of nature and nations rather than by the divine law. And the dialogue ends before Zebedaeus discusses the war against the Turks from the perspective of the divine law. As Bacon weaves it into the dialogue, Zebedaeus' speech assimilates the divine to the secular. It repeats the movement and consequence of the dialogue as a whole; it expels the divine and obliterates the distinction between moderation and immoderation with respect to means. Like the whole of the dialogue, Zebedaeus' outward moderation—his subtle change of Eupolis' concern about extermination and expulsion to expulsion or enforcements of conscience, his warning against making a moloch of Jesus, and his disapproval of Spanish barbarity—veils the subversion of moderation implicit in his speech.

The omission of the divine law is unsurprising in the light of the dialogue as a whole. Serious consideration of such law is incompatible with the replacement of divine fortune with scientific fortune. But although Zebedaeus proposes to treat the law of nature and the law of nations, and although he suggests separate treatments of them by beginning his speech with "as for the law of nature," he speaks of them together without articulating a distinction between them. His argument justifying a war against the Turks begins by referring only to the law of nature, but when he limits the cases so as to exclude "personal tyranny," he speaks of cases where "the constitution, customs, and laws of a state are against the laws of nature and nations." Finally, when he lists the examples of nations in name that are no nations, he speaks of them as nations outlawed and proscribed by the laws of nature and nations.

Zebedaeus' indifference to the difference between the laws of nature and nations should come as no surprise, for at the outset of his speech he informs the reader that he will ignore the evidence of Roman law and so the writings of the Schoolmen. It was on the basis of the Roman law that the distinction between the laws of nature and nations was understood to rest. According to the prince of the Schoolmen, the difference between the laws of nature and nations consists in the difference between man and the brutes. Aquinas argues that the law of nature applies to all animals, while the law of nations applies only to man, and the evidence he gives to reflect this essential difference is the evidence of the Roman "jurist."¹³ In the absence of any discussion of the eternal or divine positive law, Zebedaeus' speech suggests that the law governing methods and means abstracts from the moral distinction between man and the brutes;

¹³*Summa Theologica*, II-II, Q.57, A, 3. Aquinas refers to Ulpian, *Digest*, I, i, 1.

it must not be forgotten that the sixth particular encompassed by his deliberation about a war against the Turks treats the question of extraordinary methods and means.

Zebedaeus' argument in the sequel confirms his immoderate intention. His argument consists of a subtle but crucial modification of Aristotle's discussion of slavery.¹⁴ It is of course astonishing that Zebedaeus presents Aristotle's argument about slavery (part of the discussion of the household) as the argument for the natural right to govern regarding men and nations without mentioning the distinction between natural and conventional slavery and without mentioning the kinds of rule. But the subtle change is just as important. Aristotle asserts that where a man differs from other men to the same degree that man differs from the brutes or the soul differs from the body, such a man must be taken to be a slave. But whereas Aristotle argues in a hypothetical mode and never asserts that there are such men, Zebedaeus argues clearly that there are such men. Thus whereas Aristotle asserts that the slave must apprehend reason in other men and so suggests an immeasurable difference between man and the brutes, Zebedaeus makes no such assertion.¹⁵ On the contrary, for Zebedaeus, if men's natural reason is only *mostly* defaced, they may nevertheless be treated as if they have no rational souls.¹⁶ According to Zebedaeus' argument from the law of nature, the principle of holy war is unencumbered by the moral distinction between man and the brutes. It would appear that Zebedaeus subverts his own warning that it not be forgotten that men are men.

It could be said that our case is overstated because Zebedaeus presents his argument to be "understood in the comparative" rather than as a universally applicable argument for the natural right to rule. Thus he presents his argument as the basis of a principle that applies only where people are like brutes, i.e., only in the simple, extreme, and rare cases where a people is "but a heap" and "altogether unable or indign to govern." Zebedaeus admits that the question of the natural right to rule is complex, difficult, and easy only in the extreme cases, and he limits the possible easy cases by excluding the rule of personal tyranny. But the remainder of Zebedaeus' speech demonstrates the actual existence of such easy cases, and although the seven examples conform to his claim that the simple cases are rare, the last, general example subverts his claim to rarity and his exclusion of personal tyranny.

The last example is a general example used to demonstrate the existence of nations which are no nations and which have no right to govern because of their defilement of the original donation of government, natural reason, and which are, therefore, morally indistinguishable from the brutes. This last example

¹⁴Aristotle, *Politics* 1252b 1–5, 1253b–1256a.

¹⁵When Aristotle concludes that there are some natural slaves, he draws his conclusion from a statement of the characteristics that would determine a man to be a natural slave. Of course the statement does not prove that such men exist, and Aristotle's conclusion does not follow.

¹⁶Cf. pp. 195–96, above; *Advertisement*, BW VII, 30.

demonstrates that the seven examples are to be included in the general categories of giants, monsters, and *foreign tyrants*. The general example blurs the distinction between personal tyrants and peoples governed by personal tyrants. Zebedaeus agrees with Martius' "true charge" against the Turks, which is grounded on the tyranny of the Ottomans and the subjugation of their people rather than on breaches of nature's law as Zebedaeus presents it. Zebedaeus' argument is directed against those who are "utterly degenerated from the laws of nature," but he includes among such "routs and shoals of peoples" the Turks, who are honorable foes according to Martius.¹⁷

In the light of the tension between Zebedaeus' last, general example and his moderate limitation of possible cases, we must conclude that at the least those men who may be considered and treated as brutes may well be many indeed. As a speech about the law governing extraordinary methods and means, Zebedaeus' speech repeats and justifies Martius' licentious bloodlust. Zebedaeus joins the sanguinary alliance between Martius and Eupolis regarding the kinds of infidels. His reading of the prophets shows him to be one of the "reasonable souls" who see no relevant degrees of idolatry. For Zebedaeus, the only relevant difference is between the Jews "then" and the idolatry of the heathen "then and now." Zebedaeus' argument against the Turks includes and enlarges the scope of Martius' possible enemies.

Zebedaeus of course can give no contemporary example of God's immediate commandment against a particular people that is no people. The only Biblical evidence that would fit any people in 1621 must be the evidence for the original donation of government coupled with the determination that in fact a people is no people and is, rather, a "rout and shoal" indistinguishable from a herd of brutes. Over the animals men shall have dominion, but in quoting God's words to Noah, Zebedaeus modestly omits what follows. The animal realm over which Noah's offspring rule is mankind's larder.¹⁸

Zebedaeus' speech completes the fabric woven by Bacon from the speeches of Zebedaeus, Martius, Pollio and Eupolis. As the central part of this fabric, Zebedaeus' speech characterizes the limits governing the extraordinary methods and means to be used in the replacement of the divine promise with the promise of science. Bacon's subtle art tells us what he, rather than Zebedaeus, means by the "manner" in which Zebedaeus' speech discharges the questions of the divine lawfulness of holy war. The holy war of Christendom against the Turks represents the war of the new catholicism of science against nature's corruptibility.¹⁹ But at the same time, it represents the British policy that is to

¹⁷Cf. *Advertisement*, BW VII, 20, 22, 23, 28, 32-36.

¹⁸Genesis 9:3-5.

¹⁹It should be noted that Gamaliel, the Protestant zealot, makes but one short speech and that he plays no part in the whole constructed of the speeches of Eupolis, Martius, Pollio, and Zebedaeus. Although Gamaliel is not expelled from the dialogue as is Eusebius, he almost disappears. We might wonder if he appears only because of his zeal and if Bacon thought Catholicism could teach better lessons about universal conquest than could Protestantism.

conquer the world for science. The *Advertisement* teaches that civil and ecclesiastical policy must be pursued and evaluated as means to man's scientific fortune and that the limit of these means can include indifference to the moral distinction between man and the brutes. The pursuit and capture of man's scientific fortune depends on proper civil and ecclesiastical policy, and the structure, movement, and content of the dialogue disclose the complex or problematic moderation necessary for the new policy of the new universal warfare. The moderation of the new holy warriors must always be open to and prepared for the opposite of moderation.

The *Advertisement* is the mediate work that functions as a key to Bacon's comprehensive teaching about science and man, and its teaching is mediate as well. It answers the most general and important question touching the nature of means. The moderate partisan of man's scientific fortune must be prepared to embrace the possibility that the end justifies the means and that proper means may be incompatible with moderation. As was noted, the teaching of the *Advertisement* must be seen in the light of the *New Atlantis*, and so viewed it illuminates the means whereby the revelation of Bensalem becomes "the good of other nations."²⁰ Evaluation of the moral teaching about means depends on the good promised by Bensalem, man's scientific fortune. But the *Advertisement* does not only teach about the means to a new world, for we also see a change of worlds from old to new.

The whole playfully dubbed by Pollio as the "good world" is the old world united by Eupolis, the temperate, passionless, good city and comic poet. The city in this old world is formed by unreformed Christianity. This is why the good city in the old world is exclusive as defended by the conventional propriety of the comic poet and yet is passionlessly temperate and so able to unify or embrace a world. The old world has a place for Zebedaeus, the harsh zealot who favors a universal Christian kingdom. Bacon changes the old world by the action of Pollio on Eupolis' city. Although Eupolis thinks of Pollio as the individual man opposed to the cosmic whole, Pollio, the spokesman for the new science of nature, replaces Eupolis, the fifth essence, as the unifying principle of the new world. As Pollio represents the promise of science and alone speaks of possibility, he represents the final and efficient cause of the new whole of which Eupolis has become a separate part. The new good world is unified by the one who refers and professes that he refers all things to himself. Pollio's selfish cosmopolitanism composed of history, eros, and tragedy subsumes the Christian city that combines the exclusive, conventional propriety of the comic poet and the soft inclusiveness of the claim to universal rule.

But Pollio's playfulness shows that although he may refer all things to himself, he does not always so profess. Bacon of course causes and shares Pollio's lack of candor. He informs us of his presence by narrating the dia-

²⁰*New Atlantis*, BW III, 166.

logue, and he hides Pollio's unreported speeches from us. As Pollio is less than frank, so he is more dangerous. The parts of the old world molded into the new world by Bacon and then held together by Pollio are religious and martial zeal and the passionless temperance of the Christian city. As the Christian city replaces the ancient city as the horizon for viewing the whole and man's place in the whole, so the Christian city must give way to the city as determined by the new science of nature. But then the city's moderation is problematic—it must be open to its opposite. The locus of comedy is no longer the city: Bensalem's outward moderation is grimly serious, and Pollio wears the guise of the comic, which we never see worn by Eupolis, who is named for the comic poet. The new universal whole united by the principle of humanism is open to immoderation, eros, and tragedy, and we see this through Pollio's playful comedy. Zebedaeus' reference to Chremes' famous comic dictum causes us to wonder about what experiences are to be included among human affairs in the new world. In Terence's comedy the slave returns to his place, the debts owed to the courtesan are paid, and the conventional virtue of the family is reaffirmed as befits the justice of the city. In the new world comedy does not ground tragedy, and so become superior to it, by revealing the grounds for the pious, conventional propriety of the city. Nor does comedy become independent from tragedy as pure playfulness in itself, like the rhyming puns of the Platonic dialogue. Rather, Pollio and Zebedaeus present comedy in the service of man's universal scientific fortune. Since the gods no longer rule in Bensalem, and since wisdom there has nothing of free playfulness about it, we can understand Bensalem's scientific promise only by understanding Bacon's implicit argument that comedy and tragedy are the same because together they disclose the full possibilities of perfected human desire.