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Philosophy as Awareness of Fundamental Problems, or Leo Strauss’s Debt to Heidegger’s Aristotle

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Abstract: Leo Strauss has been understood as one of the foremost critics of Heidegger, and as having provided an alternative to his thought: against Heidegger’s Destruktion of Plato and Aristotle, Strauss enacted a recovery; against Heidegger’s “historicist turn,” Strauss rediscovered a superior alternative in the “Socratic turn.” This paper argues that, rather than opposing or superseding Heidegger, Strauss engaged Heidegger dialectically. On fundamental philosophical problems, Strauss both critiqued Heidegger and retrieved the kernel of truth contained in Heidegger’s position. This method is based on Strauss’s zetetic conception of philosophy, which has deep roots in Heidegger’s 1922 reading of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.

I understood something on one occasion: when he interpreted the beginning of the Metaphysics.

—Leo Strauss¹

Wir setzen uns zusammen ins Kolleg zu Aristoteles; nur dafür Sorge tragen, dass wir ihn nicht missverstehen.

—Martin Heidegger²

I wish to thank Tim Burns, Pierpaolo Ciccarelli, and Hannes Kerber for helpful comments and suggestions.


That Leo Strauss’s thought is, in key respects, a response to Martin Heidegger is now a well-established fact. Whereas it was long believed that Strauss regarded Heidegger as the main obstacle to the recovery of classical political philosophy, recent scholarship has shown that Strauss incurred a positive debt. Perhaps the strongest version of this view is that Strauss’s Socratic political philosophy “belongs in the succession to Heidegger’s approach to the question of Being.”

Understanding Strauss, it seems, is impossible without understanding his debt to Heidegger. This is an enormous challenge, which would require becoming familiar with each man’s entire work. But a more limited approach is possible—one that remains fundamental to understanding Strauss.

Strauss claimed that Heidegger’s most important contribution was to have shown, without intending it, that a return to classical philosophy is possible. Specifically, Heidegger showed that “Plato and Aristotle have not been understood by the modern philosophers.” Strauss implied that Heidegger, by contrast, did at least begin to understand the classics: he read with “the necessary zeal to know what Plato and Aristotle really meant.”

This article returns to the source of Strauss’s assessment: Heidegger’s 1922 lecture on the beginning of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. I argue that this lecture, published in 2005, is a key source of Strauss’s understanding of philosophy as “genuine awareness of the problems, i.e., of the fundamental and comprehensive problems.” Heidegger’s aim in 1922 was to recover the “natural consciousness of life” as it was first articulated by Aristotle. The “natural consciousness” of prescientific experience, Heidegger argued, is the source of philosophy and its nourishing ground. In a deceptively simple way, Heidegger suggested that philosophy is the articulation of life and the

college. Just make sure that we do not misunderstand him.”


5 Leo Strauss, “An Unspoken Prologue to a Public Lecture at St. John’s College in Honor of Jacob Klein,” in JPCM, 450.


7 Ibid.


9 GA 62:305 (“natürlichen Lebensbewuβtseins”).
“fundamental problems” (Grundprobleme) it contains. The main problem Heidegger addressed in the lecture concerns the meaning of science or philosophy as a human possibility. What does it mean to say that “all human beings by nature desire to know”? What is “by nature” human? And how does the “seeing” of science relate to our prescientific understanding of the world?

Strauss suggested that Heidegger ultimately failed in his attempt to retrieve the “natural consciousness” he first sought in Aristotle, and therefore the truly fundamental problems. In particular, Heidegger failed to grasp the centrality of divine law or nomos, understood as a binding order of life that unites religion, politics, and morality, in the ancient Greek self-understanding. More deeply, by failing to grasp that any human self-understanding is initially tied to a given law, or way of life, he also missed the essential conflict that separates the philosophic life from the prescientific understanding of political life. And yet, I shall argue, Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle still provides an indispensable beginning for Strauss’s political philosophy.

The key premise that unites Strauss with Heidegger (and his Aristotle) concerns philosophical anthropology. The nature of man can be understood only in light of our openness to the whole of Being. In contrast to modern thought, where the most primitive notion of self-awareness is the experience of desire or pure thought (e.g., in Hegel and Descartes, respectively), for Aristotle to live is to perceive. Prior to thinking or desiring, we have already “seen” or become aware of a world that is open to human intelligibility. Philosophy and science are throughout dependent on this primary awareness:

10 GA 62:10, 348–49.
there is no possible knowledge that does not depend on our prescientific awareness of the world. This means, however, that philosophy and science rest on indemonstrable premises—on the phenomenological datum of the world (in Heidegger and his Aristotle) or in our openness to a mysterious whole (in Strauss). The ground of philosophy shifts as it becomes zetetic: there is an element of thought—namely, our awareness of Being—that we can neither master nor radically doubt.

In what follows, I begin by discussing Heidegger’s 1922 reading of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. I then turn to the fundamental problems Heidegger addressed. The first problem is the meaning of science presupposed in Aristotle’s quest for “the science called wisdom,” later known as “metaphysics.” The second problem concerns access: with what does science begin? The third and final problem is the subject matter of philosophy or science—in particular, Aristotle’s understanding of nature.

Strauss’s work has largely been understood as a recovery of what Heidegger neglected, or missed, in his “deconstructive” reading of the ancients. It will be the burden of this article to begin to show that this is only partially true: Strauss often appears as the white-on-black negative of Heidegger only because both begin from shared problems. For every Heideggerian thesis, Strauss may suggest the opposite, but this does not mean that the underlying problem has been settled: the fundamental problems were unsolvable even for Aristotle.

**The Opening of the *Metaphysics* or the Beginning of Wisdom**

Western science may be said to begin with Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, where Aristotle for the first time defines the philosophic-scientific quest as a “theoretical” search for “universal” principles. It is also in the *Metaphysics* that the primary quest of occidental rationalism—in Socrates’s words, “to know the causes of everything, why each thing comes into being and why it perishes and why it exists”—finds its most consequential answer: to know something is to know its cause or principle. The principle could be (say)

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21 Aristotle, *Met. 981b20; Posterior Analytics 71b10–14*.
Philosophy as Awareness of Fundamental Problems

physical, mathematical, or theological. Of decisive importance alone is that there are principles that make things intelligible; that they can be known; and that there is a universal principle that explains Being in its totality. Heidegger sought to dismantle this structure of science by retrieving the questions or problems it raises. Before considering Heidegger’s reading, it is necessary first to briefly recall Aristotle’s quest.

Following a Platonic inquiry, Aristotle sets out in the Metaphysics to find the science most worthy of the name of wisdom. This most important science remains, according to Aristotle, without a name and without a place. It is, and continues to be, as Leibniz called it, the “desired” or “sought-after” science. Aristotle begins with an account of where we stand prior to it: “All human beings by nature desire to know.” A sign of this is the delight we take in the senses, particularly the sense of sight. While other animals are also born with the power of sensation, and some form memories which allow them to partake in experience, human beings in addition live by art and judgment. We learn an art “when from many notions gained by experience one universal judgment about similar objects is produced”—for instance, when we learn that a certain treatment benefited “all persons of a certain constitution, marked off in one class [or kind: eidos].” And we believe that those who have mastered such an art (in this case the art of medicine) are wiser than those who are merely experienced in curing ailments. While the latter know “that the thing is so,” or that a certain treatment benefited Socrates, the former also know why the treatment worked. Wisest of all, however, are those who know the causes and principles of all things, or the “first causes and principles.” Aristotle describes this stage of knowledge, which most closely approximates wisdom, in terms of six characteristics. The “supreme science” is the most universal, the hardest, the most accurate, the most capable of

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22 Aristotle does not specify this principle, but suggests that it could be “God” (the Prime Mover), or the “what” of every being, namely, “substance,” or the good (i.e., the end for which each being exists). For the historical debate on this question, see Grondin, Introduction to Metaphysics, 64, 91, 94–98, 102–6.


24 Grondin, Introduction to Metaphysics, 126.


26 Met. 981 a5–10. Common translations of eidos include “species,” “form,” “kind,” “class,” “shape,” and “look.” Here I follow W. D. Ross’s translation; I shall also use “species-form” to distinguish the Aristotelian understanding of eidos from the Platonic “forms.”

27 Met. 981a27.

28 Met. 982b2.
teaching, the freest, and the most fit to rule. Partly for these reasons, Aristotle
describes the science of wisdom as divine, or as “theology.”

Aristotle’s quest for the subject of the first philosophy was inconclusive.
Yet his tentative answers became the building blocks on which Western
philosophy and theology were established. The “first” or ground-laying phi-
losophy remained a central desideratum for virtually every major thinker,
from Plotinus, through Descartes and Hobbes, to Husserl. If we could find a
“substance” underlying all things, or a “God” that moves them, or a “subject”
or mind that can represent the whole, then we could begin to build a univer-
sal science which would give rise to a universal culture.

THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS: TO SEE IS TO HAVE SEEN

Heidegger began by questioning this goal. The opening of the Metaphysics,
he suggested, has not been understood. The locus classicus—“all human
beings by nature desire to know”—is not the most “pure,” “earnest,” and
“sublime” recommendation of knowledge ever written, as Werner Jaeger
claimed. Theoretical studies are not the “fulfillment of man’s higher nature”
and “the summit of culture.” The beginning of the Metaphysics does not
really recommend anything. It is, rather, a phenomenological description or
a “laying out” of the “natural consciousness of life.” Indeed, Aristotle was the
first philosopher—and the last—to attempt such an interpretation. What
he began to see is the existential meaning of science, that is, how science
grows out of our “natural” everyday understanding (which gives it meaning),
while also requiring a specific praxis or engagement (which makes science
an “existential” possibility). Contrary to the traditional Aristotelian under-
standing of “natural” as teleological, Heidegger also underscored that the
alleged givenness of the “natural” is full of riddles.

The first riddle is access. Where does the knowledge that “all men by
nature desire” begin? “All men by nature desire to know,” literally translated,
means that all men by nature desire to see and to “have seen” (eidenai).

29 Met. 1026a19, 1064a35.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948), 68.
32 GA 62:305.
33 GA 62:280.
34 GA 62:17. Cf. Claudia Baracchi’s translation in Aristotle’s Ethics as First Philosophy (Cambridge:
this desire is “by nature” does not mean that it is the natural end of the human species. From a phenomenological standpoint, according to Heidegger, a life dedicated to contemplation is simply a possibility of the human way of being-open-to-the-world. Prior to knowing things in a scientific or technical way, we have already “seen” them in the most general sense, that is, we have had a sighting or vision of what we seek.\(^\text{35}\) Thus, that “all men by nature desire to know” does not mean that humans have an urge to see and understand the world, as we may also desire, for example, recognition. Rather than being a self-generated movement, the desire to know is a stretching out towards the visible that is generated by the world itself, or by our openness to it. As beings-in-the-world, we do not decide to know or to see, nor are we moved (as Nietzsche would have it) by a will to know: we come already equipped with an original sight and fore-sight.\(^\text{36}\)

Heidegger’s aim was to redefine knowledge, and thus philosophy or science, on the basis of this new reading of Aristotle. The key was to recover Aristotle’s answer to a Hegelian problem, namely, “With what must the beginning of science be made?”\(^\text{37}\) Rather than beginning with an examination of our capacity to know (epistemology) or with knowledge as it appears through historical experience (Hegelian phenomenology), Heidegger begins with every human action or comportment that illuminates or discloses the world. If to live is indeed to perceive, as Aristotle suggests, then science must begin at birth—the moment the world begins to in-form us, or (closer to Heidegger’s account) the moment we begin to see and to disclose the world through action and speech.

This grounding of philosophy in our openness to the world dissolves the modern problem of skepticism (that is, our purported incapacity to prove that our thoughts correspond to an “external reality”).\(^\text{38}\) However, it also implies

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a break with philosophical knowledge as originally understood, namely, as knowledge of intelligible necessity.\footnote{Cf. Leo Strauss, “An Untitled Lecture on Plato’s Euthyphron,” Interpretation 24, no. 1 (1996): 17.}

Let us examine more closely how Heidegger finds this problem prefigured in Aristotle. The new grounding is expressed in the translation of “to know” as “to see.” This original seeing refers not only to sense perception but also to the activity of bringing the world to light in various ways, including meaningful speech as well as the “foresight” that guides our actions.\footnote{Cf. Dodd, “Aristotle and Phenomenology,” 193–96.} Crucially, knowledge is possible—if understood as insight into the permanent structure or essence of phenomena. Thus, on Heidegger’s reading, Aristotle’s doctor (the standard example of an expert who has transcended mere experience and skill) can “see” what others cannot: he can see the “form” or “look” of an illness (its \textit{eidos}). Yet his insight is never final—and this for two reasons. First, it depends on a sight or awareness that is gained through changing practice. Second, the “object” of science—the “nature” of health in this case—is ultimately inscrutable.

\textit{“What Is, Is More than It Is”}

In the traditional reading of Aristotle, the human soul is open to species-forms (\textit{eidê}), understood as suprasensible, yet intelligible, substances, which act as generative principles that explain why things are as they are.\footnote{Jacob Klein, “Aristotle: An Introduction,” in Lectures and Essays, ed. Robert B. Williamson and Elliott Zuckerman (Annapolis: St. John’s College Press, 1985), 184.} Species-forms may be said to exist both in nature and in the human soul, which is the greatest (potential) repository of intelligible forms. It achieves this potential by becoming literally in-formed, or by apprehending the entirety of natural species.\footnote{Jonathan Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 134.}

In his earliest writings and lectures, Heidegger had understood Aristotle along these lines. Aristotelian \textit{eidê}, he claimed, have “metaphysical significance as a forming principle of psychical, physical, and metaphysical reality.” But if that is true—if species-forms are “entities,” which are “supposed to be that which constitutes an entity as an entity”—then, Heidegger notes, “there is an infinite regress.”\footnote{Martin Heidegger, \textit{Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus}, in Gesamtausgabe, vol. 1, \textit{Frühe Schriften} (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1978), 221.} One contemporary answer to this problem was to interpret Aristotelian \textit{eidê} (say, “cat” or “humanity” or “health”) not as...
entities but as concepts formed by the understanding. This was, in effect, to dissolve Aristotle into Kant.

Heidegger avoided both extremes. Aristotelian forms, he argued, are neither entities nor concepts but the “look” or the outward appearance of things. These “looks” are the principles of intelligibility from which any investigation into being must begin. More precisely, Heidegger argued that science or philosophy must begin from the prescientific understanding that constitutes the essential “soil” or “ground” of any scientific investigation. Without that soil—without, say, a prescientific interest in the look of health—science cannot get off the ground. The challenge is to begin from such looks while also striving to “see more” or “more truly” (malista eidenai).

To continue with Aristotle’s account: whereas other animals “have but a small share of experience”—in Heidegger’s translation, of a “know-how in dealings”48—“the human race lives also by art and reasoning,” that is, according to Heidegger, by “deliberation” and “something like a capacity for setting into work.”49 Craft knowledge comes into being, according to Aristotle, “when from many notions gained by experience one universal judgment about similar objects is produced.”50 Translating the Greek hupolēpsis (“judgment”) more literally as “belief,” Heidegger reads Aristotle as saying that different beliefs about things, or (still more literally) different ways of “taking [things] up” as this or that, will reveal different aspects of them.51 Craft knowledge, then, comes into being when, out of the many forms of know-how that are effective in our everyday dealings with the world, one of them becomes predominant, thus “taking up” or lifting up what shows up “in every case.”52

45 GA 62:22, 315, 318–19 (“Aussehen”); eidos is also rendered as Gestalt (83, 92). Heidegger denies that, as a principle of change, the Aristotelian eidos is also the “ethical” goal of a thing: eidos, he claims, is “nichts ethisches” (318–19).
46 The key lecture on recovering the prescientific ground/soil (Boden) of science is from 1924, transcribed in part by Jacob Klein: Martin Heidegger, Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie, vol. 18 of Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2002).
47 This is the term Aristotle uses throughout Metaphysics A to characterize the wise who “see more,” i.e., who see (for example) “kinds” (eide) that remain invisible to most of us. See notes 70 and 72 below.
49 GA 62:21; Aristotle, Met. 980b25.
50 Aristotle, Met. 981a7–8.
51 GA 62:58, 315.
52 GA 62:22 (“in jedem Fall”), or “as a whole” (“im Ganzen”)—not, as the traditional translation suggests, “universally.”
Thus Heidegger’s translation suggested that, far from being grounded in judgments, which connote mental activities, every science is grounded in an approach or take on the world formed out of repeated encounters with things. For example, Aristotle argues that out of a doctor’s repeated treatment of patients, an intuition may light up that a certain treatment benefited all persons of a certain kind (eidos).\(^{53}\) Whereas neo-Kantians understood kinds as concepts,\(^{54}\) Heidegger insisted that the term eidos refers to the “look” that may “light up” or be thrown into relief through repeated dealings. Doctor and healer, for example, perceive the same patient, but the doctor “sees” what the healer cannot: she sees the patient (say) as “bilious” or “phlegmatic.”

The problem of knowledge at this stage can be described as follows. We see eídē or intelligible forms all the time. A doctor today may see a person not as “phlegmatic” but probably as “hypertense.” And all of us see eídē whenever we see things that have a body and color and weight, or when we see a circle in a round thing-shape, or a smooth surface as even.\(^{55}\) The world does not show up as a formless mass but as an articulated whole. This makes it possible for the inquiring mind to gain more and more insight into any given thing—seemingly without end. To use Aristotle’s terms to make a Heideggerian point, the hypothesis that a certain treatment benefited persons of a certain “kind” (eidos) brings out the “nature” of that kind,\(^{56}\) but it does not exhaust it: what is, is always more than it is.\(^{57}\)

\(^{53}\) Aristotle, Met. 981a10.


\(^{55}\) The “being” of the forms (eídē) has, of course, been disputed since Plato and Aristotle. Heidegger draws on Husserl, who uses the term “essence” (Wesen) or “eidos” to refer to the universal and invariant structure of any given entity—a structure that is neither empirically given through “sense data” nor a conceptual construct (the latter being merely empirically universal, and thus subject to change as new discoveries are made—e.g., concepts such as “sodium” or “virus”). Husserlian essences are “seen” or intuited with the mind’s eye (e.g., a triangle, or a dance) and are not subject to revision in light of new experiences. Heidegger shares Husserl’s view that essences are, literally, nothing—i.e., they are not any kind of entity—but he questions the Husserlian claim that we “see” essences primarily through theoretical intuition, as well as the view that no experience will change an eidos once it has been discovered. See Robert Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditations: How Words Present Things (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1989), 59–74. For a thorough account of the meaning of eidos in Plato, Aristotle, and Husserl, see Burt Hopkins, The Philosophy of Husserl (Durham, NC: Acumen, 2011).

\(^{56}\) See Aristotle, Physics 193a30–31, trans. Joe Sachs (London: Rutgers, 2004), 50: Nature is “the form, or the look [eidos] that is disclosed in speech.”

\(^{57}\) According to Heidegger, possibility is not governed (or exhausted) by actuality, in this case, by the full actualization of forms or eídē understood as generative principles. Thus, as discussed below, beings are “always [potentially] more than whatever we take them to be.” See Iain Macdonald, “‘What Is More than It Is’: Adorno and Heidegger on the Priority of Possibility,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19, no. 1 (2011): 57. On the nature of health as unrepresentable as a stable appearance or
The problem is that for Aristotle, what strictly speaking “is,” cannot be more that it is. A being is in the highest sense insofar as it has fully actualized its kind (eidos). This points to a crucial ambiguity in Aristotle’s understanding of being. Eidos names both the “look” of any given being and the invisible principle that presides over its generation. (In the example above, the eidos that is sighted by the doctor refers both to an intelligible appearance and, ultimately, to the principle that generates it.)

To state more precisely why this is problematic, it will help to consider how far Heidegger goes along with Aristotle and where he departs from him. Heidegger agrees with Aristotle that the genesis of knowledge is necessarily phenomenological and “practical.” This means that the “look” of a thing is the proper beginning of cognition. How things appear is not simply up to us. To take a famous example, a cube with six equal sides is not only invisible but also inconceivable. However much we may flip around a cube, we will never see six equal sides. But beyond this, such a cube is also inconceivable because it is of the essence of a cube, qua object, or Gegenstand—literally, that which “stands over against” us—that it can only appear perspectivally.

The Aristotelian example of an illness is analogous. An illness remains invisible until it is seen by the trained eye of a person who has mastered the art of healing. Here it is out of the question for a doctor to conceptually grasp or “construct” the object of her patient as (say) bilious. This is so because it is of the essence of an illness that it will manifest itself differently in different patients. The doctor must “draw out” the symptoms as they manifest themselves in each patient—notably by using the pressure of the hand to confirm or elicit a patient’s experience of pain. Thus, one could say that illness and health are like a cube with six equal sides. They are not conceptual constructions but objects of experience with an essential form. As objects, which, as such, are other than ourselves, “at a distance” from us, their form (or eidos)

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is never fully present to our minds—and yet it “is.” The question, of course, remains the precise manner of being of such forms. Suffice it here to restate what the *eidos* of an illness suggests. An Aristotelian form is neither a metaphysical entity nor a conceptual construction; it is an intelligible appearance. Thus, it is *not* the case, contra Kant, that “reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own design.”63 Rather, reason has insight into essential forms, and ultimately into “nature” or “Being.”64

Such insight is not only phenomenological but also “practical.” All knowledge presupposes practical know-how. Indeed, a doctor who does *not* have this know-how, but simply “applies” scientific knowledge by imposing standard values of health on a patient, will likely make the patient sick.65 Science, that is, grows out of practical engagement (indeed, *care*) and art. It does not prescribe nature its laws but lets nature show itself—in the case of health, restore itself.

Heidegger breaks with Aristotle, or at least Aristotelianism, at the following point. No amount of engagement or “seeing” will ever “abstract” the “intelligible species” of anything.66 In the example above, while health is both “by nature” and (partially) intelligible to humans, no one will ever “intelect” the *eidos* (“man” or “humanity”) that presumably generates it. One reason for this is that the *eidē*, on Heidegger’s reading, are simply not generative principles that could be grasped. The deeper reason is that what does generate kinds or forms understood as intelligible appearances (to the extent that it can be known), namely *phusis*, is essentially movement or “movedness” that eludes our grasp.

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64 According to Heidegger, in the beginning of Western philosophy “Being” was the word for “nature” (Heidegger, “On the Essence and Concept of *Phusis*,” 229). On insight into “nature,” see 197: insight into health is insight into its principle, namely, *phusis*, but this insight can never be final—for health, like justice or beauty, is a way of being we participate in rather than produce. *Phusis* cannot be said to “cause” health; the relation between principles (or the “first things”) and appearances remains an insurmountable problem. Cf. Figal, *Objectivity*, 114.


What Is Nature?

In Heidegger’s translation *phusis* is rendered as “how-being” or “way of being” (*Wiessein*).67 The term helps to convey Aristotle’s understanding of nature as movement,68 and it is also closer to commonsense and prephilosophic speech. Thus, to recall the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, no philosophy is needed to confirm that to the human way of being belongs a desire to see, as well as openness to the world. And yet, knowing in the strict sense—or “know[ing] the explanation [or cause] because of which the thing is so…and knowing that it does not admit of being otherwise”69—seems hardly “natural.” In Heidegger’s view, only one civilization, the ancient Greek (and within it, only a few men) desired to know in this sense. What is natural, and what we seek to know “by nature,” remains a puzzle.

Rather than positing a (presumably) “natural” object of wisdom, such as the good or the divine, Aristotle follows the self-interpretation of life, and specifically what people say or believe about wisdom. In the everyday speech Aristotle follows, the quest for wisdom is understood in comparative terms as a striving towards “seeing more.”70 Thus, art “sees” what mere experience cannot. And even though (to continue with the case of medicine) a doctor could be less effective in curing a patient than a nurse—since “men of experience [succeed] more than those who have theory without experience”—nevertheless “we suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience.”71 This indicates that “wisdom depends in all cases…on knowledge” (rather than experience), or, literally translated, it depends on the wise person’s capacity for “seeing more” (*eidēnai mallon*).72 For artists “know the cause but [men of experience] do not.”73 There is thus a hierarchy of forms of insight in Aristotle’s inquiry into the nature of wisdom. This hierarchy begins with sensations, grows through experience to craft knowledge, thence to science, and finally to the supreme science which (approximating wisdom) seeks to know “the good” or final cause, namely, “that for the sake of which” each thing must be done.74

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67 GA 62:17, 19.
68 Or “movedness” (*kinēsis*), described by Heidegger in the 1930s as “emerging into presencing” or “self-unfolding emergence” (“On the Essence and Concept of Phusis,” 191, 195).
71 *Met.* 981a15.
73 *Met.* 981a25.
74 *Met.* 982b5ff.
On the basis of Aristotle’s phenomenological account of the movement of life, Heidegger suggests that, by nature, the human is a being that is open to the world, and that—because of that constitutive openness—has an essential stake in knowing or seeing. In the words of Werner Bröcker, who attended the lecture together with Strauss, “it is of the essence of the human to strive for insight”; gaining insight is “what it comes down to for man as man.”

In a highly idiosyncratic but revealing translation, Heidegger suggests that this striving, which becomes manifest in Aristotle’s insistence on “more” and “more” seeing, expresses the ancient Greek understanding of life as moved by the quest for aretē. Indeed, life, Heidegger suggests, just is this striving to become what we are—more precisely, to become (ever) “more” of what we are, qua open-ended possibility—such that aretē is constitutive of the “ontological structure of being human.” Yet what we are is always also a movement, a “to be”—a movement that stretches out to see the world. Hence the possibility of understanding human nature depends on the capacity to grasp the peculiar fusion of being and becoming contained in Aristotle’s understanding of phusis as kinetic. To do this, Heidegger suggests that phusis be translated as a way of being for which something is at stake in its own being. “What it comes down to” for natural beings is their own being; this is “the good…, the meaningful.”

Drawing on an Aristotle neglected by the tradition—but well understood by Martin Luther—Heidegger continues as follows. The movement of life responds to a constitutive lack, what Aristotle called “a factor in becoming.”
namely, *sterēsis*: a “lack of form” known to Luther as *privatio*, and described by Heidegger as the “not yet”—‘not quite’” of life.\(^80\)

This is arguably the culminating point in the interpretation where Heidegger seeks to overturn the Western philosophical tradition on its own hidden premises. He draws on a subterranean stream—including, notably, Luther and Hobbes—that is harshly critical of Aristotle while nevertheless relying heavily on Aristotle’s human or political philosophy. In simple terms, the simultaneous *Destruktion* and retrieval of Aristotle consists in this. Whereas for the tradition from Parmenides to Hegel, Being in the “highest” and ground-laying sense is universal, permanent, intelligible, and “present” to the mind, Aristotle understands that Being is *also* particular, temporal, mysterious, and suffused with an “absence” or “lack.”\(^81\) Now, in Heidegger’s reading, these are not just accidental features: they are the essence of what it means to be—as preserved, notably, in Aristotle’s understanding of *phusis*.

There is, indeed, according to Aristotle, something that subsists (and remains eternally the same) in every coming into being, namely the “substrate” and the “species-form” towards which a being tends.\(^82\) Yet Heidegger argues that these features that bestow permanence, stability, self-sameness, and intelligibility to beings are ultimately derived from the ancient Greek onto-theological prejudice, according to which there is a most “beingly being” (*ontōs on*) that is God, or thought thinking itself.\(^83\)

*Phusis* is rather (in Heidegger’s reading) the way of being that is a constant becoming from out of itself, and in particular out of a lack—what it is “‘not yet’ and ‘not quite.’”\(^84\) Thus, Heidegger’s attention to the phenomenon of movement (or *kinēsis*) in Aristotle retrieves a sense of potentiality that is not annulled in actuality but is rather preserved in it. The “complete” human being, for example, is paradoxically such only insofar as he can still be *other*

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\(^84\) GA 62:38, 41 (“‘noch nicht’ und ‘nicht recht’”).
than he is. Without attention to “lack”—or to what is pure possibility—as the key to becoming, we could not understand the emergence of anything really new, such as a great work of art that “gives to things their look and to humanity their outlook.”

Strauss’s Debt to Heidegger Reconsidered

Strauss has long been read as one of the foremost critics of Heidegger and as having provided an alternative to his thought. Against Heidegger’s quest to overcome the philosophic tradition, Strauss recovered its roots. Against Heidegger’s historicist rejection of timeless standards, Strauss restored the horizon of natural right. Whereas for Heidegger access to Being could be gained only through an “analytic of existence,” Strauss found the key to “all things” in the human or political things. Most fundamentally perhaps, whereas Heidegger remained beholden to a Christian-Lutheran “ideal of existence,” Strauss made the philosophical confrontation of every theological or political “ideal” the central theme of his studies. Yet, to conclude, I want to argue that reading Strauss as an alternative to Heidegger—as superseding Heidegger’s thought—is ultimately misleading. It is true that Strauss cancels out, or at least calls into question, key premises of Heidegger’s reading of the ancients sketched above. Thus, Strauss read the ancients in a way that is (largely) immune to Heidegger’s objections. Yet Strauss also made clear that there is no access to Plato and Aristotle that does not go through Heidegger. Indeed, Heidegger’s impact was such that there remains, after him, no philosophic position: if philosophy was to exist again, it would have to respond to the “fundamental problems” Heidegger rediscovered. And that is indeed what we find throughout Strauss’s work. Strauss presents perhaps


88 For the (implied) claim that Strauss supersedes Heidegger by showing that the “Socratic turn” is “superior” to Heidegger’s “historicism turn,” see Arthur M. Melzer, “Esotericism and the Critique of Historicism,” American Political Science Review 100, no. 2 (May 2006): 288. For the view that Strauss’s “recovery” provides a fundamentally different alternative to Heidegger’s Destruktion of the ancients, see Steven B. Smith, “Destruktion or Recovery? Leo Strauss’s Critique of Heidegger,” Review of Metaphysics 51, no. 2 (December 1997): 345–77.


90 Strauss, “An Introduction to Heideggerian Existentialism,” 29: “There is no longer in existence a philosophic position, apart from neo-Thomism and Marxism crude or refined.”
the most formidable challenge to Heidegger’s blindness to human affairs in twentieth-century thought. Yet he also remained forever indebted to the “entirely different plane” on which Heidegger thought—the zetetic plane of the problems he first found in Aristotle.\(^91\)

The first part of Strauss’s response to Heidegger, which calls into question the premises of his reading of the ancients, can be described briefly as follows. Heidegger is a poor guide (to say the least) for understanding the ethical-political horizon of ancient thought. He not only neglected the interhuman or political matrix of human life—particularly, ordinary speech on the just and unjust—as the source of any possible understanding of the right or the good.\(^92\) He also seems to have misunderstood the basic motivation behind the ancient quest for the eternally present, including the eternally right or good. This was not an onto-theological prejudice, but rather a response to the fundamental problem of the origins of all things, including Being and man. Against Heidegger’s claim that Being is abyssal or groundless, hence fundamentally unexplainable, the classical philosophers understood that knowledge in the strict sense presupposes a permanent ground, or the existence of “first things.”\(^93\) Far from blindly affirming such things—that is, divine beings—Plato and Aristotle demanded a demonstration of them.\(^94\) Thus, Strauss made possible a return to ancient thought by, in effect, suspending Heidegger’s most fundamental objection, according to which ancient thought remained dogmatically beholden to an understanding of Being as eternal presence.

Yet the second part of Strauss’s response to Heidegger, which transcends the ethical-political motivations and presuppositions of ancient thought to reach the plane of philosophy understood as knowledge of the whole, proceeds rather differently. Far from attempting to supersede Heidegger’s objections, Strauss directs them against Heidegger himself, in a dialectical

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\(^94\) Strauss, Natural Right and History, 89.
movement of self-critique. Indeed, for every fundamental problem discussed in this article, Strauss provided two answers: the first opposing Heidegger, the second vindicating the kernel of truth contained in Heidegger’s thought.

Consider, first, the problem of access. Prior to knowing beings or phenomena, how do we become aware of them? Strauss and Heidegger share the view that knowledge or understanding presupposes a horizon that first allows us to “see” things, and to make sense of them. For Heidegger, as we saw, that horizon is partly constituted through human action, in particular through world-disclosing practices and speech. In the example above, the doctor immersed in the art of healing suddenly “sees” the “look” of a previously unknown kind of illness (its eidos); that illness henceforth becomes part of the historical “world” that constitutes the horizon for further discoveries in a way that can be compared to a Kuhnian paradigm shift. Strauss’s answer to this historicist approach is the classical view that “all understanding presupposes a fundamental awareness of the whole”—a whole that is natural and “permanently given.” Understanding illness, or lack of health, in particular, would seem to presuppose awareness of the “idea” (eidos) of a healthy or well-ordered soul. A well-ordered soul, in turn, reflects the “eternal order” of the whole: it is a transhistorical phenomenon.

Yet Strauss also affirms, echoing Heidegger, that “the whole is not a whole without man.” In particular, he seems to imply that nature, that is, the natural whole, presupposes man, or that it “is” only insofar as it is “seen” by beings like us. If this is true, then the principle of health could no longer be understood as eternal or permanently given: it could be only as permanent as there are human beings who articulate it. Strauss’s “whole” thus approximates Heidegger’s “Being.” It is a horizon of intelligibility given to man as man, yet it somehow needs man in order to “be.”

On the second problem discussed in this paper—What is access into? or, What is the subject matter of philosophical insight?—Heidegger holds that philosophy seeks to know “the essence” of things, and ultimately “the whole

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95 This thesis is shared both by “radical historicism” (i.e., Heidegger) and Socratic political philosophy. See Strauss, Natural Right and History, 26–27 and 125.
96 Strauss, Natural Right and History, 125; Leo Strauss, “On the Interpretation of Genesis,” in JPCM, 361.
with regard to its origins.” These are also Strauss’s terms, but the phenomena they point to seem starkly different. Heidegger describes the essence of phenomena—for example, “house-ness, tree-ness, bird-ness, humanness”—as that “which we know and yet do not know” about them. Essence (Wesen) is a way of being, originally a verb (wesen), that escapes modern categories of subject and object: it is that which “concerns and moves us”; and yet it is also an aspect of beings of a certain “character” that, once “seen,” may become binding for generations. (Consider the Aristotelian determination of man as rational animal.) As to “the whole with regard to its origins,” it is revealed to us only as an awe-inspiring experience and a question. What this experience points to is addressed variously in Heidegger’s thought as “Being,” “phusis,” “the clearing,” “Ereignis,” and the “it” that “gives” and withdraws in a manner reminiscent of the biblical god. From Strauss’s classical perspective, by contrast, strictly philosophical insight is into nature understood as “unchangeable and knowable necessity.” Philosophy begins, as in Aristotle and Heidegger, from the eident, understood as the “look” or the “surface of things.” But eidos, in Strauss’s reading, is not simply an intelligible appearance; it is the “goal of aspiration” towards which a natural being always tends—indeed erotically longs—as well as the “power or the…nature” that moves it.

Yet again, Strauss casts doubt on this classical answer. If “the whole is not a whole without man” and man is not eternal, the quest for intelligible necessity, or for eternal causes, becomes radically questionable. Similar considerations famously led Heidegger to abandon the principle of reason (namely, that no being emerges without a cause). Perhaps unsurprisingly, in light of the rea-
soning sketched above, Strauss regarded Heidegger’s conclusion that there is no possible proof of the principle of reason as “sensible.” That principle is a presupposition of philosophy in the strict sense, but that does not mean that it can be proved.

Finally, on the question of human nature, Heidegger holds out the hope that an opening to the mystery of Being will change the human essence in unforeseeable ways. Rather than understanding man as, say, rational animal or fallen creature or free agent, Heidegger famously transcends the framework of anthropology to “set free” what he calls “the Dasein in man,” that is, our finitude and openness to the whole of Being. Strauss, by contrast, affirms the classical view that there is a universally valid (and unchanging) hierarchy of human ends or ways of life. Contra Heidegger, possibility is not higher than actuality: there are “unchangeable standards founded in the nature of man and the nature of things.”

As the discussion above suggests, however, Strauss understood the “nature of man” as unintelligible apart from the human openness to the whole of Being. This is not to deny that Strauss’s understanding of man is, in perhaps the decisive respect, the polar opposite to Heidegger’s—namely, insofar as for Strauss “man as man” is unthinkable “as a being that lacks awareness of sacred restraints.” Yet Strauss seems to call even this view before “the tribunal of human life,” as he calls it, as “it is known prior to philosophy.” For one cannot dogmatically exclude the possibility that our only human need or obligation, as Strauss seems to have learned from Heidegger and his Aristotle, is “to philosophize, to see.”

Klostermann, 1957).

109 Strauss, Natural Right and History, 162–63.
111 Strauss, On Tyranny, 192.
112 Leo Strauss, note from March 27, 1946, cited in Minkov, Leo Strauss on Science, 154.
Why a World State Is Unnecessary: The Continuing Debate on World Government

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Abstract: The discussion of the possibility of world government has been revived since the end of the Cold War and particularly after the turn of the millennium. It has engaged many authors. In this article, I provide a survey of the continuing debate on world government. I explore the leading question of the debate, whether the conditions of insecurity in which states are placed and other global problems that face contemporary humanity require the creation of a global authority, and consequently, the establishment of a world state. After a careful analysis I suggest that a world state is neither necessary nor inevitable nor desirable. I argue that the plurality of nation-states that form an international society has a great advantage over a world state. It supports the diversity of character and culture, and sustains the continuous progress of humankind.

Where there are more states, there are more able men.

—Niccolò Machiavelli

The plurality of sovereign states is a disturbing puzzle for a political philosopher. As individual human beings, we are members of different political communities and enjoy the security they can provide. Yet, since these communities are organized as sovereign states that lack a common authority above them, at the same time we live in a sort of Hobbesian “state of nature”—a condition that puts all states in a constant disposition to war.
This reflection about the conflicting character of our international environment can lead us to the conclusion that the solution of many world problems and, above all, of insecurity, can be provided only by bringing international anarchy to an end. We start to believe that “the predicament of vulnerability of nation-states calls for a global authority with sufficient power to redress or prevent attacks on themselves.”1 We come to think that “like the United Nations itself, global governance is a bridge between the old and the as yet unborn…a world federal government, an idea that is both necessary and possible.”2 We become convinced that a world state is “inevitable” and “democratically necessary.” Thus, we come to the conclusion that “whether by a social contract among the nations or by conquest, whether gradually or at once, whether by a frontal assault on national sovereignty or a silent undermining of its foundations,”5 the anarchic system of sovereign states is to be finally replaced by a universal world state.

In this article, I provide a survey of the continuing debate on world government.6 I explore the leading question of the debate: whether the conditions of insecurity in which states are placed, and other global problems that face contemporary humanity, require the creation of a global authority and consequently, the establishment of a world state. Discussing the views of such authors as Campbell Creig, Daniel Deudney, Luis Cabrera, Thomas Magnell, and Alexander Wendt, I come to the conclusion that a world state is neither necessary nor inevitable, nor even desirable, at least at this stage of human development. I argue that the plurality of nation-states that form an international society has a considerable advantage over a world state. It supports the diversity of character and culture and sustains the continuous progress of humankind.

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A World State and the Domestic Analogy

The argument that to save the world from war and provide peace and security, it is necessary to employ a kind of social contract transferring sovereignty of individual states to a global authority rests on an analogy with domestic societies. Relations among states in the anarchic international system are compared to those among individuals in a Hobbesian state of nature. The conditions of an orderly social life are believed to be the same among states as among individuals; thus they require that domestic institutions be reproduced on a global scale. It was indeed Thomas Hobbes who identified the absence of a ruler, literally anarchy, with the state of conflict and argued that without a central authority with sufficient power to keep humans in awe, the war “of every man against every man” would be the universal condition of humankind. If we accept his assumptions, particularly the conflictual and power-driven character of human beings, then, on the basis of the analogy between individual persons and individual states, it would be logical to conclude that peace among nations could be secured only by ending the “anarchy” and establishing a universal world state comprising all nations of the earth.

Although a world state would find support in writings of many intellectuals, especially those of the early post–World War II period, who thought that it would spare humanity from a nuclear threat, this is not a position taken by Hobbes himself. He does not propose that a social contract between nations be implemented to bring international anarchy to an end. This is because, as Hedley Bull notes, the condition of insecurity in which states are placed does not necessarily lead to insecurity for individuals. As long as an armed conflict between countries, whether involving nuclear or conventional weapons, does not actually break out, individuals living within them can feel relatively secure. After comparing sovereign states to gladiators prepared for combat, Hobbes goes on to say that “because they uphold thereby the industry of their subjects, there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the misery of individual men.” In other words, although states may regard each other with suspicion and be ready for war, the lives of the people who live in them are not necessarily “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”

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8 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. E. Curley (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994), chap. 13 [9].
10 Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 12 [8].
11 Ibid., chap. 13 [12].
Three Paradigms of International Relations

Political philosophy offers two standard paradigms of international relations. On one hand, in the tradition of realism associated with Machiavelli and Hobbes, sovereign states are in the anarchic state of nature, unrestrained by legal or moral rules in their relations with one another. Viewed from this perspective, the international environment is characterized by lawlessness and ongoing active or passive conflict. Placed in a situation of anarchy, with no ruler above them, states are caught in a continuous struggle for power and survival. On the other hand, in counterpoint to this tradition, a reflection on the conflictual character of interstate relations can also lead us to the conclusion that peace among nations should be secured by bringing international anarchy to an end. Thus, in a second paradigm, whose elements can be traced to ancient Chinese and Indian as well as Greco-Roman thought, and which was clearly expressed as early as the mid-thirteenth century by Dante Alighieri in his *De Monarchia*, states can escape the conditions of anarchy by being subject to the despotism or overarching authority of a universal empire. Advocates of this solution to the problem of interstate insecurity attempt a radical transformation of the existing international system. They believe that what is needed to ensure lasting peace is the transfer of the sovereignty of individual nation-states to a central authority, one that would be sovereign over individual nations in the same way that such nations are sovereign over their respective territories. Under the ensuing world government, all humankind would then be united.

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12 My discussion of three paradigms is indebted to Hedley Bull’s “Society and Anarchy in International Relations” and his three doctrines of international relations: the first describing them in terms of a Hobbesian state of nature; the second, of which Kant is a representative, which brings international anarchy to an end; and the third based on the conception of international society (78–79). Bull follows the distinction drawn by Martin Wight between realism (or Machiavellism), rationalism (or Grotianism), and revolutionism (or Kantianism) (Robert Jackson, “The Political Theory of International Society,” in *International Relations Theory Today*, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith [Cambridge: Polity, 1995], 114). However, in my view, at least in *Perpetual Peace*, Kant is clearly a supporter of international society rather than of world society, and thus he belongs to rationalism and to my third paradigm together with Grotius.

13 In realism, the conflict-oriented paradigm of international relations, the key actors are states, power and security are the main issues, and there is little place for morality (W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, “Political Realism in International Relations,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Summer 2017 ed., ed. E. N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/realism-intl-relations/).


15 “By the temporal government of the world or universal empire, we mean a single government over all peoples in time” (Dante Alighieri, *On World-Government or De Monarchia*, trans. H. W. Schneider [Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1949], 4).
There is, however, another paradigm that is often overlooked or even misunderstood by many of today’s writers who discuss the question of world government. It is an alternative to both lawlessness and despotism, and is offered in the writings of Hugo Grotius and Immanuel Kant, both of whom can in my view be associated with international society.

To begin with the former, in his great treatise *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (*On the Law of War and Peace*), first published in 1625, Grotius neither approves of lawlessness in interstate relations nor is attracted by the idea of replacing individual sovereign states with a universal empire, about which he says that its “advantages are counterbalanced by still greater disadvantages.” Instead, he proposes the third paradigm: international society, according to which states in their dealings with one another are linked by mutual obligations, and thus form a society with one another, “a society without a government.” Grotius’s assumption, like that of Hedley Bull and other theorists of the English school, is that sovereign states, like individuals, can be subject to legal rules and, by sharing some common norms and values, they can recognize the common bonds of their society. This does not mean that they lose their sovereignty, which can still be preserved even when they voluntarily choose to become members of international organizations. Also, this does not mean that they free themselves from the demands of power politics and

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16 Because of this misunderstanding, Hugo Grotius is sometimes associated with the idea of world government rather than with that of international society (see Campbell Craig, “The Resurgent Idea of World Government,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 22, no. 2 [2008]: 133–42), whereas Immanuel Kant is associated with a cosmopolitan world society and the belief in human progress (Bull, “Society and Anarchy,” 79).


18 Bull, “Society and Anarchy,” 89–90. In addition, a fourth paradigm of international relations can be mentioned. It is idealism, a theoretical perspective that has many similarities with the international-society approach and emphasizes international norms, interdependence among states, and international cooperation.

19 The English school (international-society approach), founded in the mid-twentieth century by Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, emphasizes both systemic and normative constraints on the behavior of states. Referring to the classical view of the human being as an individual that is basically social and rational, capable of cooperating and learning from past experiences, these theorists emphasize that states, like individuals, have legitimate interests that others can recognize and respect, and that they can recognize the general advantages of observing a principle of reciprocity in their mutual relations (Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, eds., *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003], 167).

20 Robert Jackson emphasizes that international society involves mutual obligations between states, and “the degree of society can be conceived as a continuum, from mere awareness and very limited contact, at one extreme, to extensive and continuous interaction through a highly developed institutional framework” (Jackson, “Political Theory of International Society,” 111).
great-powers rule. As Bull notes, the society that they form can be understood in terms of its unique institutions: “international law, diplomacy and the system of balance of power.” Moreover, in subjecting international relations to the rule of law, Grotius does not maintain that this is true only with respect to a certain class of states, such as the Western or “civilized” states. He regards the formal equality of all states as a fundamental principle of international law. In his *Mare Liberum*, he regards Asian rulers as sovereigns capable of entering into diplomatic and treaty relations with European powers. Arguing against the dominant imperialist theories of his time, he denies that some peoples can be subjected to conquest because of their religion or their alleged cultural and intellectual inferiority. Since he grounds international rules in natural law, his international society is global and all-inclusive in its scope. It is applicable to all nations. The practical expression of the Grotian global order, which is based on the rule of law in international relations, is the United Nations Organization, whose member states are equal before the law and preserve their sovereignty; it is not a world state.

An argument against a world state is also offered by Immanuel Kant. While arguing against the views of those of his contemporaries who wanted to eradicate nations and promote internationalism, Kant, in his 1795 essay *Perpetual Peace*, says that the existence of many separate states is “rationally preferable to their being overrun by a superior power that melts them into a universal monarchy.” As “laws invariably lose their impact with the extension of the domain of governance,” Kant apparently fears that upon the transformation of the existing international system based on individual states into a world state, the latter would be unable to keep dissenting groups within the bounds of law. Since nature has prevented people from intermingling with each other by differences in language and religion, he suggests, they cannot be artificially united by a supranational structure imposed from above. Hence, unable to attract common loyalties and turning into a “soulless despotism,” which maintains peace solely by force, a world state would lead to endemic secessionist conflict, and would finally collapse and disintegrate into anarchy. It is not then a world state, but a league of nations, which is a “federation of nations, but it must be a state consisting of nations,” as well


24 Ibid.
as “the growth of culture and men’s gradual progress toward greater agree-
ment regarding their principles,” that can lead human beings to mutual
understanding and peace.\textsuperscript{25} As the father of democratic-peace theory, Kant
convincingly argues that a peaceful world order is guaranteed by liberal
republics, which, when established and brought together to form a league
of peace (\textit{foedus pacificum}), will progressively lead to cooperative relations
among themselves “to end all wars forever.”\textsuperscript{26} Another element in building
peace is cosmopolitan right—the right of an alien not to be treated as an
enemy—which is reinforced by the spirit of trade. Hence, in Kant’s view, the
negative effects of international anarchy can be tamed not by the installa-
tion of a world government, but by the development of a global cosmopolitan
culture and by the relations among states of a similarly liberal character that
are joined into a federation of free states, which is the league of peace. As he
asserts in his earlier work \textit{Idea of a Universal History on a Cosmopolitan Plan}
(1784), the development of a global culture may eventually lead humankind
to the perfect civic union.\textsuperscript{27} However, such a union, even if we assume that it
is no longer a federal league of nations or a global cultural association, but a
world state, is the result of long-term natural growth, of progressive human
moral and intellectual evolution, rather than of any artificial imposition here
and now.

\textbf{Postwar Support for and Opposition to World Government}

The idea of a global authority was strongly advocated during the late 1940s,
from roughly 1944 to 1950. Under the impact of the Second World War,
prospects for a third, and continuing international tensions stimulated by
ideological differences between the United States and the USSR, the pro-
paganda for a world state reached large audiences and imparted to them
a sense of urgency.\textsuperscript{28} Many intellectuals called for the establishment of an

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 115, 125.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 117.
\textsuperscript{27} Immanuel Kant, \textit{Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim}, in \textit{Toward Perpetual Peace
and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History}, trans. D. L. Colclasure (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2006), 14. Kant’s ideas about cosmopolitanism have led some scholars to believe that
whatever reservations Kant had about world government, his ideas related to human progress and
the cosmopolitan world society lead him in the direction of an eventual world state in the form of the
perfect civil union. This could be the reason why both Wight and Bull have attributed to Kant a dif-
ferent theoretical perspective from that of Grotius. However, as Howard Williams rightly points out,
for Kant the idea of a world government is not to be implemented here and now, but “only after a long
process of political and legal integration through federation” (Williams, \textit{Kant and the End of War: A
\textsuperscript{28} H. C. Usborne, \textit{Towards World Government: The Role of Britain}, Peace Aims Pamphlet 39 (London:
overarching global authority capable of sparing humanity from a nuclear war. These included Nobel-laureate novelist Thomas Mann, Albert Camus, and Jean-Paul Sartre, who were supported by thousands of street demonstrators.29 Most notably, Albert Einstein and his colleagues from the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists lobbied for world government and global control of nuclear weapons.30 Numerous resolutions were also introduced into the US Congress that would support the creation of a world federation or the transformation of the United Nations along world government lines. However, these initiatives faded quickly with the intensification of the Cold War. The outbreak of war in Korea in 1950 replaced the dream for a universal republic with suspicion and fear. Although the world government was still advocated by some scholars, for example by Bertrand Russell, who supported it in his 1959 book *Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare*, it would lose its importance in IR theory. It is often observed that two prominent political realists of that era, Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau, entertained the idea of a world state; however, it is less commonly noted that they were both aware of and critical of its weaknesses.

In “The Illusion of World Government,” published in 1949 in *Foreign Affairs*, Niebuhr summarized what he deemed to be the fallacy of world government. His argument refers to the domestic analogy and resembles the Kantian critique. The advocates of world government, Niebuhr claims, labor under a misconception about the nature of governmental authority. The notion of the social contract led them to believe that authority rests on the government’s monopoly of law and lawful force. They base their advocacy of world government on the analogy of the social contract, by which individuals living in a Hobbesian state of nature, where there is no ruler and no one is secure, surrender their individual sovereignty to an authority in exchange for security and protection. However, as Niebuhr suggests, Hobbes’s ideas are fundamentally mistaken. The “authority of government is not primarily the authority of law nor the authority of force [as Hobbes believes], but the authority of community itself. Laws are obeyed because the community

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accepts them as corresponding, on the whole, to its conception of justice.” 31 Thus, Hobbes’s belief in the desire for power as a motivating force of human action has led him and his realist followers to an unqualified endorsement of coercive state power. But this is because, Niebuhr thinks, they were not realistic enough. In the world of pure realism, in which, as the realist E. H. Carr asserts, even values are made relative to interests, “life turns into nothing more than a power game and is unbearable.” 32 What Hobbes did not understand when formulating a realist worldview based on the idea of power and coercion was that although the government is indispensable for maintenance of domestic peace, it cannot rely on power alone. To inspire obedience by the fear of sanctions is not enough; the government also needs the citizens’ willing identification with its policies. This is, according to Niebuhr, the greatest omission in Hobbesian political philosophy. Analogously, without commanding the willing obedience of individuals, a world state, created by social contract, whereby individual nations transfer their powers and relinquish significant elements of their sovereignty to a central authority, cannot perform its task of maintaining global peace.

A similar objection is made by Hans Morgenthau, best known for his book *Politics among Nations*, first published in 1948, when the Cold War had just started. The argument for world government, he claims, which rests on the domestic analogy, involves two premises. First, world government will provide security. Second, security is the primary need of individuals and states, so their liberty should, if necessary, be sacrificed to it. However, Morgenthau believes that neither the first nor the second premise is true. In the chapter of his book devoted to a world state, he writes: “The peace of society whose intergroup conflicts are no longer limited, restrained, and neutralized by overriding loyalties, [and] whose processes of social change no longer sustain expectations of justice in all the major groups…cannot be saved by the state, however strong.” 33 Hence, to begin with the first premise, for any state, including a world state, Morgenthau argues, keeping individuals in awe by overwhelming force is an essential, but not sufficient condition for peace and an orderly social life. To remain in peace, individuals must be able to expect from society at least an approximation of their conception of what is just and proper. They must also feel loyalties to society as a whole, as

32 Korab-Karpowicz, “Political Realism in International Relations.”
a political and cultural group, that would surpass their loyalties to any one part of it. Without these loyalties and identities related to them, the power of an authority, “as great as it would be,” is alone not sufficient to keep peace and this is proved by the experience of civil wars.\textsuperscript{34} In the research of Quincy Wright, to which Morgenthau refers, it is shown that between 1480 and 1941, 28 percent of the total 278 wars were civil wars.\textsuperscript{35} They were costlier in both losses of lives and economic losses than contemporary international wars. The frequency and destructiveness of such civil wars demonstrate that, as long as humanity does not share fundamental common values and is culturally divided, the establishment of a world state does not give any assurance of security and peace.

Both Niebuhr and Morgenthau try to demonstrate that the state is not merely an artificial creation of a constitutional convention, or a mere result of its controlling power on the legitimate means of violence, but a diverse product of a community from which it springs. As Morgenthau convincingly argues, what is missing from the theory of world state formation is thus an account of people’s loyalties and identities. It assumes that individuals are merely rational, self-interested utility maximizers. It does not take into consideration that their cultural (particularly religious and ethnic) identities, when suppressed, can lead to conflicts. The forces of destruction in the form of class, racial, religious, regional, or purely political struggles erupt in revolutions and civil wars.\textsuperscript{36} This shows that the second premise is also not true. Motivated by vital issues, individuals and nations can enter into conflict and forsake their security. Hence, as the cases of the partition of India in 1947, the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East show, the existence of a plurality of sovereign states may often be less dangerous than an attempt to hold potentially hostile religious and ethnic groups within the framework of a single state. If we believe that a world state should be implemented in order to save us from nuclear and terrorist threats\textsuperscript{37} and to solve some urgent transnational problems, such as climate

\textsuperscript{34} Morgenthau links loyalties to identities. According to him a citizen can identify with a plurality of different social groupings (political, economic, religious, ethnic) within society, and is therefore not fully identified with any of them and does not give any of them his undivided loyalty. The overlapping of identities of different members of society tend to neutralize their conflicts. Thus, to maintain social peace citizens, in spite of their differences, must have something in common. They must be united by some common values and interests, or as Morgenthau says, by moral standards and political action (ibid., 470–71, 489).

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 476.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 476–77.

\textsuperscript{37} Amitai Etzioni, \textit{From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations} (New
change, migration, financial instability, and pandemics, which require action at a global level,\(^{38}\) to obtain success we need first to create a supportive world community sharing common values and guided by the same vision. Morgenthau himself feared that without the moral support of a world community, a world state would be “a totalitarian monster resting on feet of clay” and torn apart by revolutions and civil wars.\(^{39}\)

For Morgenthau, the value of UNESCO and other agencies of the United Nations lay not in themselves, but in what he believed to be their final cause, a world state. He saw in them a means to create a world community, which he defined as “a community of moral standards and political action,”\(^{40}\) which he realistically thought was necessary to sustain a world state. Like Niebuhr, he did not question the analogy with domestic societies on which the argument for a world state rested but denied that any state that was expected to endure could be created artificially by way of a social contract. He believed that just as the community of the American people antedated the American state, so also a world community of the people sharing the same moral and political values must antedate a world state.

However, if it is the case, as Morgenthau believed, that through the work of international organizations, common global values can be introduced and the interests of all nations gradually integrated, then the domestic analogy on which he bases his argument no longer holds. Anarchy, which is the central fact of international relations, cannot then be identified with the imaginary Hobbesian state of nature,\(^{41}\) which is the state of war. It can then be peaceful.

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\(^{39}\) Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 482.

\(^{40}\) Ibid., 489.

\(^{41}\) The Hobbesian state of nature can be described as imaginary because it is a theoretical concept used to justify Hobbes’s political theory. The real question is whether it has never existed. Violence exists in plenty in pre-state, primitive societies, but it is largely intergroup rather than intragroup, and thus a precursor to war between states rather than a war of all against all. Modeling international relations on a dystopia that only ever existed in the imaginations of thinkers seems the exact opposite of a true political realism. When we observe actual stateless societies, their problem is not incessant
and tolerable to a degree to which anarchy among individual human beings
is not. This is the fundamental claim of the thinkers representing the English
school: there can exist in anarchy a society of sovereign states, “a society with-
out a government.” Consequently, as there is no simple similarity between
nation-states and individuals concerning their security, there may be no need
to bring international anarchy to an end by establishing a world government.
The real alternative to Hobbesian anarchy, where no one is secure, is thus
not a potentially unstable and despotic world state, but a strong international
society, based on the UN.

It was indeed the accomplishment of Hedley Bull and of other members
of the English school to show that international anarchy was unique and
could not be compared with Hobbesian anarchy. As an alternative to both
sovereign states, unrestrained by any rules in their relations with others, and
a world state, in the third paradigm of international relations, which is inter-
national society, states could be linked to one another by mutual obligations.
They can thus form a great society of nations, the fullest practical expression
of which is today the United Nations, which is an organization of free, sover-
eign states and not a world state. Further, the UN need not be seen merely as
a step toward a world government, as Morgenthau envisioned, but instead as
the final and proper organizational body of the international system. It can
be looked at as the Kantian league of peace, a voluntary federation of states,
designed to progressively put an end to all wars. Since we are now living
within a more sophisticated global environment than that which obtained at
the time of the UN’s founding, the activities of the UN can be supported by
the work of other intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations,
and by formal and informal agreements among states and various public-
private partnerships. They all can contribute to building global governance,
which, however, needs to be clearly distinguished from world government.
“Global governance’ refers to collective efforts to identify, understand, or
address worldwide problems that go beyond the capacities of individual
states to solve.” World government eradicates state sovereignty, whereas dif-
ferent models of global governance can preserve this sovereignty and engage

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43 Recent years have brought a revival of interest in Hedley Bull and the English School. For an
extensive biography of the English school provided by Bary Buzan, see http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/
englishschool/.
states and nonstate entities in cooperation to maintain international peace and security, and to solve global problems.

**New Trends towards World Government**

The discussion of the possibility of world government has been revived since the end of the Cold War and particularly after the turn of the millennium. It is distinct in character from the debate of the 1940s. The prominent advocates of global authority were then scientists and authors whose core field often lay outside the realm of international relations, but who were driven by a sense of urgency to argue that the nuclear threat must be controlled, and who were supported by large numbers of ordinary citizens. Today’s discussion is more dispassionate and is a product primarily of social scientists. It is also more systematic in its approach and more sophisticated in its argument. The issues discussed range from the traditional issues of security to global poverty, economic integration, environmental issues, and core social, political, and economic rights. Some authors express optimistic beliefs about world government. They tend to think that technological advances will further shrink the globe to the extent that within one hundred years or so, all states should recognize a single global authority. They believe that the political center of gravity will move upwards. National governments will not disappear altogether, but “their powers would be severely circumscribed by supranational legislative, executive and judicial authorities.” The model for this transition to a comprehensive global authority is for many writers the European Union, which advances intergovernmental economic agreements, including a single currency, and continues to expand its global political role. As their critics have observed, such writers frequently regard the European Union “as if it were an utterly unproblematic model for the world.” The recent decision of the UK to leave the EU may serve, however,

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47 Rodrik, “How Far Will Economic Integration Go?,” 182.
49 Timothy Burns, “What’s Wrong with a World State,” in *Sojourns in the Western Twilight: Essays in*
as a warning that there are limits to integration imposed by bureaucratic regulations. Another model is the United States. Some commentators suggest that a new world order is already emerging under the US hegemony.\(^{50}\)

I shall now critically examine arguments for world government offered by a few contemporary authors.

During the Cold War the potential for mutual assured destruction by the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union placed the world under a much graver threat than today’s risks of terrorist attacks. The logic of that threat, however, shaped by the worldview of modernity,\(^{51}\) was rational and predictable. Both superpowers played the nuclear game in strict adherence to diplomatic conduct and the rules of deterrence. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have changed this security environment. They provided a model for security threats for the twenty-first century. As the terrorists were prepared to die for their cause and did not express any concerns about the death of civilians, who were in fact their main target, the age of predictability, deterrence, and diplomacy was over. Hence, the current age of globalization and postmodernity has witnessed the emergence of nonstate actors who are deterrent-proof.\(^{52}\) The terrorist groups no longer follow the modernist, rationalist logic, and their irrational behavior affects the behavior of states. This has led some writers, in particular Thomas Magnell and Daniel Deudney, to conclude that in this unpredictable environment we are now subject to “equality or near equality of vulnerability” and that “new technologies of violence have rendered all persons potentially vulnerable to destruction.”\(^{53}\) To overcome this dangerous environment, Magnell argues that the United States, the relatively successful melting pot of nations, could serve as the paradigm for a world state, which can be created “here and now”

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\(^{51}\) Modernity is typically defined as a historical period beginning around the seventeenth century. It is also a period during which the West, through scientific and technological advances, has achieved an unprecedented domination over the rest of the world. More importantly, however, modernity signifies a set of ideas and attitudes towards the world. It is an ideological formation that can be characterized by several concepts. Its defining ideas include rationality, national unity, and state sovereignty. Today we live already in the postmodern environment, in which rationality, national unity, and state sovereignty have all been eroded and whose key characteristics are cultural relativism and globalization.


in the form of a global federation. Deudney suggests, then, that world government would not represent a radical change of the international system but would rather be a long-expected result of the steady movement toward the continual abridgement of anarchy. Unified by a common interest in avoiding nuclear annihilation and other threats, states can come together in much the same way tribes have in the past.

However, the positions outlined above are difficult to defend. The history of state formation is not the history of warring groups with different cultures coming together under a larger entity, but rather the history of cultural imposition. One of the warring groups would acquire domination over the rest by war and impose its culture or civilization on them. Historically, empires were thus the result of political, economic, and cultural domination, not merely of military conquests. Another possibility of state formation is that culturally similar people would come together to form a state because of some common interest, for example in security and defense. As Morgenthau argues in *Politics among Nations*, giving the United States as an example, any state that is expected to endure must be founded on common values and common interests. The individual states that united in the federation that became the United States of America were sovereign in name rather than in actuality. By declaring their independence from Britain in 1776 and then establishing the United States, they merely exchanged one sovereign power for another. More importantly, however, they were bound by the same language, the same religion, the same national heritage, and the same moral convictions that were tested during the American War of Independence. Reflection on these historical facts reveals that “there can be no world state without a world community willing and able to support it” and at the global level

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57 “The United States proves only the dependence upon a pre-existing moral and political community of any state that can be expected to endure….The community of the American people antedated the American state, as a world community must antedate a world state” (*Politics among Nations*, 484–85).
58 As John Jay wrote in the *Federalist*, No. 2, Providence gave the United States “to one united people; a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established their general liberty and independence” (*The Federalist Papers*, ed. Clinton Rossiter [New York: Penguin Random House, 2003], 32).
such a community of similar cultural values currently does not exist. Even if united by popular culture and linked by processes of globalization, humanity is divided as ever by immense religious, moral, and economic differences. Therefore, it is impossible to peacefully transform the present anarchic international system into a world state under the social and political conditions now prevailing in the world. As if in anticipation of this impossibility, Deudney concludes his investigation with an admission that the “actual launch of a world state could require a cataclysmic war of the kind that led to the formation of the League of Nations after World War I, and the formation of the United Nations after World War II.”60 But if another world war with unimaginable catastrophic consequences would impose a world state on an otherwise unwilling humanity, it would not be a long-lasting enterprise. It would not protect us from further violent conflicts.

While David Deudney and Thomas Magnell argue that establishing world government is a result of prudential choice and is necessary because the world has become too unpredictable and too dangerous, Alexander Wendt adopts a different argumentative strategy. Employing the teleological model of explanation and the Hegelian concept of the struggle for recognition which takes place among individuals and groups, and referring to advancements in technology, he argues that “with these material [or technological] changes the struggle for recognition among states undermines their self-sufficiency and makes a world state inevitable.”61 He compares the international system to a plant, which grows to its end-state, and he associates this end-state with a world state. He argues that in times of globalization weaker states will face a choice between subjugation to powerful states and globalized economic forces, on one hand, and participation in a world government, on the other. The logic of globalization, Wendt believes, would drive them to a world state, which should permit their local cultures and traditions to flourish.62 However, since he admits that a world state contains within itself sources of instability and does not need to survive forever, he opens his own argument to doubt. He suggests that the struggle for recognition, an open-ended struggle involving individuals, groups, and communities, would not cease within the structure of a world state. Such a state would then be unable to solve the fundamental problem of human conflict and violence. It can indeed employ social engineering and powerful means of coercion, but, as Wendt


himself observes, such means have not prevented earlier empires, such as the Soviet Union, from breaking down.

Another argument in favor of world government is that it can ensure popular control over decision making, and thus promote global democracy. The processes of globalization that weaken the nation-state lead to a democracy deficit. Individuals are affected by decisions of global institutions, such as WTO and IMF, over which they have no control. To solve the problem, and to provide citizen participation at a global level, some writers propose to institute a world parliament, while others go further, arguing for a federalist world state. The question is whether a democratic global majority rule could enhance the autonomy of minorities and whether this global democracy project would not in the end turn self-defeating.

As a solution Luis Cabrera proposes “an alternative, rights-based approach” to global democracy. He identifies the idea of democracy with democratic inclusion and stresses the importance of global equal opportunities, including much freer movement of persons in an integrated world system. In the postmodernist fashion, he puts less emphasis on national loyalties and identities and more to individual rights understood in a novel way as the rights of the “other.” The postmodernists seek the revenge of the marginalized “other” against the Lockean rational individual and regard human rights as the expression of neither universal truth nor objective reality but only as arbitrary social constructs and “moves in a game the subject enters when formulating his/her relationship to power in the language of fundamental rights.” But should we agree to understand individual rights that way and include among them the right to freely cross state borders? What we can currently observe is the turbulence that uncontrolled flow of migrants representing different religious and moral values has already caused in Europe. Should we then not learn from this, and rather than considering

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global mobility rights, return to the nation-state as the primary provider of its citizens’ security? The Kantian cosmopolitan right is the right of an alien who comes to our country not to be treated as an enemy, so long as he behaves peacefully. Yet, it is not the right to become a permanent visitor. For this “a special charitable agreement to make him a fellow inhabitant for a certain period” would be required. Hence Kant, while advocating cosmopolitan right as an important component of peace among people, would not approve the right to freely cross borders and uncontrolled migration.

Is World Government Necessary?

One can argue that we are entering now into a new era, one in which nation-states cannot offer the protection from aggression that they once seemed to provide. Under new technological conditions, even large states, facing state-sponsored or individual terrorist activities, are no longer able to guarantee security to their citizens and have become as vulnerable to violence as individuals in the state of nature. Hence, one can argue that just as in the logic of Hobbesian social contract, the fear of violent death made it necessary for individuals to submit to a common power, so also the changes in the forces of destruction make it necessary for states to enter into such a contract. The fact that nuclear weapons are possessed by relatively few states limits the force of this argument today, but it would become more powerful if nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction were to spread. Do we need a global authority in today’s postmodern world, in which irrationality has largely replaced reason and weapons of mass destruction have become cheaper and more readily available?

Because of the changes in military technology, it seems indeed useful for security to be organized on a global scale. However, this does not mean that it has to take the form of a world government. The collective security of nations is a security system in which security becomes a concern of all member states, and therefore each state commits to a collective response to a threat posed by any state, including a member state, to peace and security. It has often been regarded as a principle of the United Nations and before that of the League of Nations. In the UN the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security is conferred on the Security Council (Art. 24, UN Charter). The Security Council is entitled to undertake

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67 Kant, Perpetual Peace, 118.
certain measures that vary from economic sanctions to military interventions, in the event that it has established a threat to peace, a breach of peace, or an act of aggression (Art. 39, UN Charter). In accordance with special agreements, it can ask member states of the UN to provide armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage (Art. 43, UN Charter).

The logic of collective security is flawless, provided that all nations subordinate whatever conflicting interests they may have to the common good defined in terms of the maintenance of international peace and security, and the collective defense of all member states.\(^68\) In practice, however, the security system of the UN can function only when it is supported by the major world powers and where there is a consensus among these major powers in the Security Council. As a matter of fact, for most of the history of the UN, the principal member states of the Security Council did not share a consensus. Nevertheless, what this proves is not a failure of the United Nations Organization but rather the existence of ideological and cultural differences between nations. There is thus much room for improvement, which can come from prudent diplomacy based on common interests, of which the most basic is global peace as opposed to total destruction. The evidence for the possibility of such improvement is the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the ideological division between East and West that in the end led to a closer cooperation among the permanent members of the Security Council.\(^69\) But this trend is unfortunately now over, and the primary reason for this is, as I will show, the adoption by the United States, as well by other countries, of unilateral actions that are contrary to the spirit of the UN.

Article 2 of the UN Chapter says: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state,” but “this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” Thus, the members of the UN system of collective security must refrain from taking any unilateral action without the authorization of the UN Security Council, unless the action is related to the basic right of self-defense, and as Article 24 clearly says, should “confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” In spite of this, the challenge to the UN collective security system came from powerful states, particularly from the United States after the September

\(^{68}\) Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 389.

11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The school of Republican intellectuals—including former deputy secretary of state Paul Wolfowitz and former chairman of the Defense Policy Board Richard Perle—believed that the events of 9/11 proved the need for the United States to assume the duties of an international Leviathan without much respect for the United Nations. They called for the US government to take on an imperial role and act decisively to counter terrorism and reinforce Western values all over the world. Prepared in September 2002, the National Security Strategy, known as the “Bush Doctrine,” called for pre-emptive action against hostile states and terror groups, and it declared that the United States would not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise its right of self-defense. The consequence of this line of thinking was American interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), the legality of both of which has been questioned. They were justified by the United States as acts of self-defense, but there were no immediate and explicit threats posed against it by these countries and the military actions were not authorized by the UN Security Council. Moreover, they resulted in the devastation of both countries and in a large number of civilian deaths.

As Lorenzo the Magnificent once said, “What the lord does, the many do after him.” The US example has led other countries to join operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in 2011 some NATO members intervened in Libya, with the aim of regime change, which is illegal and contrary to the spirit of the UN charter. The military action in the form of bombing Libyan cities by France, the United States, and the UK was not authorized by any Security Council resolution. While Russia has referred to several legal arguments to

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71 As Rasmussen convincingly argues, following the end of the Cold War, the West has come to define itself in terms of globalization, the civilizing process, by which the values of democracy, market economy, and civil society are promoted. “The perception of the threat of terrorism fed on the West’s construction of its own future in terms of a powerful process of globalization. As the dark side of globalization, terrorism had a power equal to the bright side of globalization” (Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, “A Parallel Globalization of Terror: 9-11, Security and Globalization,” Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic Studies Association 37, no. 3 [2002]: 333).


Why a World State Is Unnecessary

justify its 2014 military intervention in and annexation of Crimea, its action was not authorized by the Security Council and it violated norms of international law.\(^74\) Similarly unauthorized are the military actions (bombing, arming opposition groups) undertaken currently by the United States, Turkey, France, and Israel in civil-war-torn Syria. However, the fact that, because of the 2002 National Security Strategy and subsequent doctrines,\(^75\) all nations have now become subject to military incursion by the United States, proves neither any abridgment of the concept of national sovereignty nor a need for a world government. On the contrary, by developing strategies that violate the accepted norms of international society based on the UN, the United States has affirmed its sovereignty over and against other states. It has brought international relations back to what is described by Kant as “savage lawlessness” rather than promoting lawful constraint of civilized people based on commonly accepted rules and norms.

Hence, rather than dream about a world state as an instrument to build international peace and security, one should reverse the current trend to unilateralism, which is in a sense a trend toward unlawful human relations based on might alone, and reaffirm the spirit of lawfulness that was introduced by the UN. The precondition for this is to understand that the United Nations Organization is potentially the best international institution for maintaining peace and security and for solving global problems, but its work depends on its members’ acceptance of its principles and of legal constraints that it imposes on their behavior. Perhaps the greatest problem with the idea of a world state and the corresponding idea of a global democracy is that the UN represents something imperfect and yet real, something that can be improved by prudent diplomacy, while the former represent wishful thinking that tends to diminish real solutions to today’s world problems. Supporters of global governance, an important component of which is the UN, argue that the problems of globalization do not necessitate the creation of world government but can be solved by strengthening existing international institutions and organizations.\(^76\) They can be effectively dealt by the UN and the WTO,

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whose work can be supported by nongovernmental organizations, such as Greenpeace or Doctors Without Borders. Therefore, nations should not, as Wendt urges, force history along toward a world state, so as to “get the best deal” they can in the emerging global constitution,” nor should they “spearhead the foundation of the new international order” that would lead us to world government. Such government will not solve the current problems of humankind. That a world state is really needed to solve global problems—political, economic, environmental, and demographic—and to contribute to human welfare and the protection of individual rights is highly questionable. One can argue that this work can be done within the framework of the existing organizations, particularly by means of the global institution, which is the UN. It should be supported by prudent and far-sighted diplomacy, as well as by vigorous, prudent, and courageous states that to the best of their ability oppose illegal and unjust acts, and may even be willing to employ force in defense of the rights and the well-being of their citizens, as well as of international order. To provide the United Nations with sympathetic and robust support, to understand its idea as a federation of free states, whose basic goal is to maintain the security of each individual state and of other states in league with it, to appreciate its civilizational role in promoting lawful constraint against savage lawlessness, and hence to strengthen it as an organization rather than undermine its authority, and thus to make its work more effective, could help to maintain international peace and to solve many of our current global problems.

The Importance of Nations

Since the UN is a league of nations, an organization of distinct sovereign states, and not their amalgamation in a world state, it is worth stressing, in conclusion, the importance of nations. While there are now many advocates of globalization and of postnational governance, it is important to understand that the nation-state is in fact the oldest political organization of humankind, since its tradition goes back to the Sumerian and Greek city-states, and even earlier to independent tribes. As John Stuart Mill convincingly argued in his essay On Liberty, as diverse cultural communities, European nation-states have been the greatest source of progress for humanity. “What has made the European family of nations an improving, instead of a stationary portion of
mankind? Not any superior excellence in them, which, when it exists, exists as the effect, not as the cause; but their remarkable diversity of character and culture.” Mill rightly noted that in addition to the lust for power and wealth, which is so evident in European history, we can also find in the West the transforming intellectual and moral dynamics that have contributed to a progressive social and technological change in the world. The foundation of the progressive development of humankind is the remarkable diversity of character and culture, the condition for which is freedom.

Continuous human progress, that is, our further moral and intellectual evolution, and particularly the power of intellect that, as our wonderful scientific and technological achievements show, has increased in humanity as a whole, and which Dante thought requires peace, is worth defending. Yet its two basic conditions, freedom and diversity, are likely to be missing under a world state. Indeed, we need political and cultural diversity of nation-states for human creativity and progress. They cannot be turned to cosmopolitan entities, such as today’s European Union, in which there is confusion about values and consequently a loss of European heritage, or be replaced by a world state. Hence, the point is not to lose national diversity and freedom, but to peacefully build on it. One can build on fairness and lawful civility. These can lead us to a sense of oneness as an international community, and in the end produce common cultural and particularly moral values, on which any good political order must be founded. Therefore, the UN, particularly the UN Security Council, must represent universal interests of all peoples, namely, prosperity and freedom, not merely narrow interests of selected great powers, and should not be challenged by unilateral actions of its members. And there is a chance that such a vision of the UN will succeed because it is based on the correct recognition of what human beings really desire: peace and security, insofar as these, along with prosperity and freedom, are basic conditions of their development and happiness.

Conclusion

A world state is neither necessary nor inevitable nor even desirable. As we have shown by considering the immense cultural differences and various interests that divide humankind, it will not solve the problem of violence and conflict. Because of its centralization and its size, and the resultant potential ineffectiveness, it is questionable whether it could solve global problems.

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A real alternative to it is provided by an international society based on the UN and other intergovernmental organizations. A sophisticated international society, with its diverse institutions adjusted to the emerging needs of humanity, creates a world order, but it is not a legal order alone. It embraces vigorous, wise, prudent, and courageous states that use far-sighted and prudent diplomacy, and sometimes even force, to oppose illegal and unjust acts, and support the existing world order rather than destroy it. It receives support from a network of nongovernmental organizations. It builds a strong international community and contributes to a sense of oneness of the whole of humanity. With adequate support, it can thus meet current global challenges, save us from war, and contribute to the moral and intellectual evolution of humankind.

A world state is another one of humanity’s false dreams. The dream is that one can dispense entirely with the past and establish a society based on reason alone in which all human conflict and suffering will disappear once and for all. However, if it is artificially imposed on humankind, and not a result of its long development—particularly of moral improvement—egoism and the struggle for power would continue within it, perhaps with even greater intensity, since a world state, like today’s EU, would try to impose a despotic, bureaucratic uniformity on humanity, and against this uniformity people would certainly revolt. It would be likely to become a despotism that brings human beings to a standstill. Even if a world state were not centralized but built on principles of subsidiarity, as a collective identity, it would tend to make everyone alike and subject to the same regulations. Even if it were endowed with democratic institutions, a world state, by dint of its sheer size, would replace freedom to participate in political life with passive obedience. It would lead humanity to uniformity rather than diversity, and thus it would prove to be an obstacle to the development of the human race.
Reading Benardete: A New Parmenides

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The rewards of reading Seth Benardete keep growing. His intricate and demanding writings afford access to the early history of political philosophy that is available nowhere else. In this article I concentrate on the four and a half compacted pages that end his late essay “Plato’s Parmenides: A Sketch.” Its particular reward is access to a hitherto unsuspected yet wholly persuasive understanding of an especially resistant Platonic dialogue. That gain opens a window on two further rewards: Parmenides, the author of the philosophic poem that exists for us only in fragments, takes on a depth and shape that befit the singular praise Socrates lavished on him at the end of his life; and the whole history of philosophy back to Homer begins to show itself as genuinely philosophic in the radicality of its discoveries and in the restrictions it placed on sharing them. Without ever explicitly saying so, Benardete shows how hidden Greek wisdom believed it had to be in order to maintain a presence in the world and sustain its future, how inaccessible to all but the most driven, most gifted “lucky hits,” as Nietzsche called them. And he shows primarily what that hidden wisdom was, genuine knowledge of the human and through the human of the world.

I am grateful to Interpretation’s three readers for significant improvements to my essay.

1 Seth Benardete, “Plato’s Parmenides: A Sketch,” in The Archaeology of the Soul: Platonic Readings of Ancient Poetry and Philosophy, ed. Ronna Burger and Michael Davis (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s, 2012), 229–43. In the list of works the editors append to this collection, the Parmenides essay seems to be the last one Benardete completed before his death on November 14, 2001; see also their preface, 1n1. References to Benardete’s essay will be to paragraph numbers in the text.
The part of Benardete’s essay that I treat concerns the daunting “gymnastic” that constitutes the last two-thirds of Plato’s *Parmenides*, the eight-part exercise in reasoning about the being and nonbeing of unity or the one that old Parmenides conducts with young Aristoteles. Benardete regards the gymnastic as “performed” for Socrates, the nineteen-year-old Socrates who had just demonstrated to Parmenides and Zeno, visitors to Athens during the Great Panathenaea of 450, the brilliance of his mind and the beauty and divinity of his zeal for philosophy (135d). For while young Socrates was presenting his new view of the forms that he was sure refuted their view of the one and the many, they kept looking at each other and smiling whereas Pythodorus, their Athenian host and future general, thought the impudent swagger of his young countryman would anger them (130a). As they continue to observe him while Parmenides crushes his new view with irrefutable arguments, they see another admirable feature: a willingness to accept immediately and in good grace the rational refutation of the view of which he had been so proud—an eagerness to be taught.

Benardete indicated early in his essay the significance of the gymnastic. He calls Parmenides the “philosopher who first thought through the question of being…. Socrates was the second, as far as we know, to take over the question and make it his own in the form of ‘What is?’… The very form of [Socrates’s] question indicates that we are to replace the dogmatic Socrates who has an art with the skeptical Socrates who embodies erōs” (2). So a “Who is?” lies embedded in the “What is?” question as Benardete framed it: Who is Socrates? Is he the dogmatic practitioner of the maieutic art? Benardete stated in his first paragraph that the Parmenidean Eleatic Stranger had refuted that art as fruitless. Is he then the skeptical embodiment of what he reported himself learning in the *Symposium*? Benardete just says it: “we are to replace” the former with the latter—that is who the practitioner of the maieutic art really is. It is not surprising that an inquiry into who Socrates is would replace the more public Socrates with a less accessible one: the *Parmenides* itself shows Socrates being taught in his youth by Parmenides and Zeno the necessity that a philosopher guard his public speech as they did theirs, that he shelter what a philosopher is as a radical inquirer into nature and human nature who uncovers the unsettling truth.

In his third paragraph Benardete notes how the *Parmenides* is unique among the reports on the young Socrates: only there “do we catch Socrates before he became Socrates, without the framing Socrates himself gives to his younger self.” Socrates’s framing of his younger self in the *Phaedo* describes
“his turn away from teleological cosmology,” while his framing in the Symposium “recapitulates his instruction into the mysteries of erōs and puts into a single speech a series of lessons that Diotima gave him.” As for the Parmenides, it gives “a report that links in a symbolic way the Anaxagorean mind from which Socrates started to the erotic soul whose wisdom finds its greatest competitors to be the poets.” What Benardete then says presents his view of just how the Parmenides fits into Plato’s scattered presentation of the young Socrates becoming himself in these three dialogues. While it may be “at first surprising” that “Parmenides should prepare the ground for Diotima’s instruction,” the Symposium helps make it not a surprise: “if one realizes that the gods inhabit the core of human opinion and Socrates believed erōs was a great god, and [if one realizes that] Diotima in her demotion of erōs established the possibility of a between that could not be understood to be either any less original than the divine things or merely one of the human things without any connection with the divine.” Wise, demythologizing Diotima showed young Socrates that eros is not a god and replaced that notion with the possibility of a between: she led him to understand eros as in fact more original than the gods and not simply a human passion or human opinion or any other merely human thing. As Benardete will suggest in this essay, eros is the fundamental element of the “ontological psychology” toward which Parmenides guided Socrates. Still, even that elevated role for Parmenides in Socrates’s becoming would leave the Parmenides “no more than preparatory to the Symposium” whereas, what “I propose to show it is,” Benardete declares, is “the setting forth of the task of Socrates’ philosophic life and the challenge to enter his thing.”

While the first part of the Parmenides, the destruction of the view of forms that young Socrates had put forward, is indispensable to that setting forth and that challenge, just what they are can be found in the gymnastic.

This account of the relation of the Parmenides to the Phaedo and Symposium complements what Benardete said seven years earlier in “On Plato’s

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2 Plato gave the Parmenides a frame Benardete does not discuss, a frame that shows why direct access to the young Socrates exists at all: Certain men of Clazomenae, “quite the philosophers” (126b), heard that a second-hand report might still exist of the speeches young Socrates had with Zeno and Parmenides. On the basis of that rumor they were willing to sail across the Aegean Sea to Athens in the hope of hearing those speeches, not even knowing if that person could still recall them after many years had passed. Plato’s framing suggests that Cephalus’s narration of the whole of the Parmenides is for such persons only.

3 Socrates’s “thing” apparently translates pragma, the word Socrates used when he imagined being asked in court, “Well, Socrates, what is your pragma?” (Apology 20c). He took the question to be asking what he does to cause the charges to be raised against him and answers with his story of the Delphic oracle and his consequent “turn” to examine human wisdom. In the Crito the laws say that Socrates’s pragma is bound to appear unseemly (53d).
Symposium.” There, Diotima’s instruction “constitutes the last of three stages of Socrates’ philosophic education….The first stage Socrates gives in the Phaedo…the second phase is in the first half of the Parmenides, where Parmenides proves the impossibility of his ideas. According to Parmenides, the most telling objection to them is that even if they exist they cannot be known by us, for there must be a complete separation between divine and human knowledge.” Diotima’s “notion of the in-between or the demonic” offers Socrates “a way out of the impasse Parmenides left him in.” Diotima replaced “complete separation” with a between no less original than the divine and not merely a human thing. Benardete’s Parmenides essay remedies his silence seven years earlier on the role of the second half of the Parmenides, the gymnastic, in Socrates’s philosophic education.

After destroying Socrates’s proposal about forms (eidê) Parmenides told him that ideas (ideai) in some sense must nevertheless be recognized for any understanding of things to be possible at all—a fact he credited young Socrates with knowing (135a–c). “What then will you do about philosophy? Where will you turn if all this is unknown?” (135d). The gymnastic is the indispensable training to which Socrates must turn to discover the truth about knowing and eventually about being. “What is the manner of this gymnastic?” Socrates asked, and in response Parmenides set out an eightfold plan to be followed in examining any hypothesis (136a), the eightfold plan Parmenides himself followed for the eight hypotheses of the gymnastic. His initial outline of that plan (136a–c) in its complexity and brevity left Socrates baffled: “It’s quite an impossible task…and I don’t really understand it” (136c). The gymnastic exists because baffled Socrates asked Parmenides to “hypothesize something and go through it for me” and because Zeno and the rest of the company joined him in urging Parmenides to comply. Benardete does not mention that eightfold plan, passing up the opportunity to prepare his own account with that synoptic guide to its steps. But he does discuss the poem Parmenides introduced as a likeness for the challenge he faced in presenting the gymnastic, a likeness Benardete employs to look ahead to what Socrates actually achieved in the Phaedrus, Symposium, and Republic. And that look ahead provides him with his own concise introduction to the gymnastic, his opening two sentences of paragraph 16. For “if the first part of the Parmenides foreshadows Socrates’ later development” in ways that he


5 Socrates had consistently used eidos (form) whereas Parmenides uses idea in here telling Socrates what is necessary; he had used idea earlier at 132a3, c4, 133c11, and 134c1.
Paragraph 16. In treating the gymnastic, Benardete spends no time whatever testing the validity of any of Parmenides’s arguments, the natural preoccupation of virtually all other modern commentators on the Parmenides. He focuses instead on the implications of their conclusions and of the relations among their conclusions: he focuses on the action of the argument. He finds the first two of the eight hypotheses definitive in “forcing Socrates to face the either/or of his ideas.” These hypotheses are two of the four that hypothesize that one is, the two that examine the results of that hypothesis for the one itself. The first finds negative results for the one and concludes that neither of the contraries forming the ten categories that Parmenides examines (neither part nor whole, neither beginning nor end, etc.) holds for any single idea; the second finds positive results for the one, concluding that both of the contraries hold for any single idea. “The first declares that nothing can be thought or said about an idea.” The second declares “that whatever holds for visible things…equally holds for any idea.” Benardete concludes: “Hypothesis I and II divide between them incommunicable separation and indistinguishable communion.” The either/or Socrates must confront at the start is that the forms as he conceived them either totally transcend any thinkability or are totally immersed in the flow of particulars. Socrates is to infer from the results of the first and second hypotheses that rational examination of the forms as he conceived them uncovers paired impossibilities: a transcendence that cannot be thought and a participation that dissolves the difference of the form.

Paragraph 17. Benardete’s second paragraph on the gymnastic focuses on “Parmenides’ way.” While presenting itself as “didactic,” as starting from principles, his way is in fact “latently zetetic” because it “indicates that one is to go to the principles and not start from them.” This “doubleness of the way”—present in Parmenides’s poem as in the gymnastic of Plato’s Parmenides—reduces in the actual procedure followed “to only one way, the way of inquiry.” Showing then how the actual procedure of the gymnastic “infers” or “goes to” the categories it employs, Benardete isolates “an hypothesis behind the hypotheses,” namely, “to be is to be measurable.” He confirms that this is the unstated fundamental hypothesis by analyzing Parmenides’s procedure in the first two hypotheses: Parmenides seems to assume that

has just shown, then “the second part,” the gymnastic, “seems all the more superfluous. It is not.” Showing that it is not and how it is not is Benardete’s purpose in treating the gymnastic: the guidance the gymnastic gives leads to a rational understanding of the fundamental truths of human knowing and of the true grounds of the ideas.
anything that is like or unlike is thereby either equal or unequal and that does not follow “unless it is further assumed that likeness necessarily is a matter of measurable degree.” Parmenides’s one, fully demythologized, stripped of all features but its most fundamental hypothesis, thus becomes the hypothesis that to be is to be measurable, the hypothesis of the rationality of the whole. Benardete concludes his paragraph by noting that in the positive hypotheses generally, this homogeneity of measurable degree “operates…in the form of its scientific counterparts, arithmetic and geometry.”

Paragraph 18. After drawing his conclusions about the first two positive hypotheses, positive in that they hypothesize that one is, Benardete moves to one of the negative hypotheses. In the negative hypotheses Parmenides does what he earlier singled out as what Socrates had to do in addition to hypothesizing that an idea is, “hypothesize that this same thing is not” (135e). Benardete turns to a negative hypothesis saying that “it is accordingly not surprising that when the being of one is canceled in the negative hypotheses, the soul and its experiences come to light.”6 This is not surprising because in our experience ones are inexorably present and the question must arise, How is this possible if one is not? That necessary question dictates a turn to the human, to the soul, and to one negative hypothesis in particular, “the only hypothesis that is not an hypothesis…the seventh.” The reason it is not a hypothesis is that there “Parmenides gives two examples—dreaming and shadow-painting—and thus grants that one may be or not, but there is still dreaming and shadow-painting where one is not.”7 Benardete states the extent of dreaming and shadow-painting in his next sentence: “Neither the absence nor the presence of the one alters appearance and illusion”—human experience as such is experience of appearance and illusion. For this reason he can say that “everything…turns on the seventh hypothesis.” He explains what turns on means with a metaphor that is typically effective and at first confounding: the seventh hypothesis “is the enfolding of the unfolding of all the other hypotheses.” This states exactly what Benardete does from this

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6 The four negative hypotheses examine the results of “one is not” for the one itself and for the different things.

7 The seventh hypothesis treats the results for the different things if one is not where the results are all positive for the sole reason that we can speak of them: the different things are, are different from one another, have mass and number, are odd and even, etc. In an essay on Parmenides’s poem that is in many ways a companion to this one, “Night and Day,…”: Parmenides,” published a few years earlier (1998), Benardete gave a similar account of the seventh hypothesis but at that time he called it the “eighth,” probably because he treated what Parmenides labeled the “third” as a separate, additional hypothesis (Archeology of the Soul, 202). The description of the seventh hypothesis that he gave there is a useful supplement to the one he gives here.
point on: first, having found out what Parmenides folded into the unique seventh hypothesis, he uses that as the key with which to unfold what he folded into all the others: to see the uniqueness of the seventh hypothesis is to see its uniformly applicable key to all the others. This insight into the activity of folding and unfolding grounds the permanent importance of Benardete’s essay for understanding Plato’s *Parmenides*: what Benardete discovers in the seventh hypothesis is what Parmenides intended the young Socrates to discover if he was able; it is what Cephalus’s narration makes it possible for every future auditor of it to discover. Parmenides constructed his gymnastic to have a key whose natural or systemic place falls just after the impasse of the first two hypotheses and provides the only possible entry into an understanding of these two and of all the others.

So what did Parmenides enfold into the seventh? The inexorable power of human experience to mask the whole while making the whole seem to lie before us unmasked, the whole that is only dreamt and shadow-painted while certifying itself as demonstrably, securely true: “I refute it thus,” said Samuel Johnson of Berkeley’s view of ideas and kicked a large stone. All the other hypotheses “assume their proper proportions once they are traced back to the indisputable character of appearance and opinion”—once human experience is understood to be the dreaming and shadow-painting of the soul in all its perceiving and conceiving the other hypotheses submit to being unfolded and measured in light of that fundamental insight.

“Socrates is told that this is where he must start.” Socrates is *told* nothing at all in the gymnastic in any literal way. Nor does Parmenides “arm” Socrates (20) as Benardete says he does, or “suggest” to him (20), or “ask” (21) or “tell” (23) him anything. Socrates sits silent through the whole of Parmenides’s gymnastic with Aristoteles. Pythodorus, the future general who was there, will memorize the exchange and pass it on hoping to secure its transmission. Socrates, eager to learn from the one who stripped him of his forms, will memorize the exchange as an exercise of the mind addressed directly to him; by testing it, interrogating it, following its foldings, he will be granting his guide the authority due him. And his guide will tell him and arm him and ask him as the pathway unfolds. By treating the gymnastic dialectically Socrates will make it the guide to his new way of solving the problems of being and knowing.8

8 The “Sketch” of Benardete’s title is especially fitting for both his account of the gymnastic and Parmenides’s gymnastic itself: both consist of a series of strokes which must be filled in, painted in, to be understood; the full portrait of “is” and “is not” can come into view only by following the path and
“Socrates is told that this is where he must start.” Hypothesis seven tells him that he must start with a turn that recognizes human experience to be immersion in inescapable dreaming and shadow-painting. Socrates had started with forms as transcendent realities, an advance in the sense that it did not stay confined to the puzzles of perception, but an impossible way out of those puzzles because it viewed perception naively as a window on being. A “simple consideration,” Benardete says, shows that Socrates had not started properly and for that consideration he looks to Socrates’s final proposal about the forms (132d) as “paradigms in nature” while what participates in them “are their images [eikasthēnai] that look like them [eikenai], and are their likenesses [homoiōmata].” Benardete takes Parmenides’s shadow-painting example to be a response to Socrates’s claim of likeness: his example implies that Socrates did not distinguish, as Parmenides does, between “the eikastic art of geometry” that deals with likenesses or images of things and “the phantastic art of shadow-painting” that deals with the products of the necessary structuring by human fancy. Because Socrates failed to make that distinction, Parmenides implies, he “did not put to himself the question whether speeches” —the logoi— “were necessarily phantastic and never eikastic,” always articulations of human-based fancy, never likenesses of what is. Plato, the author of all the dialogues, has thus made it clear that Parmenides caught Socrates just after his initial step as he reported it in the Phaedo on the last day of his life: he began correctly by turning to the logoi but his examination of the logoi mistook them for likenesses representing the true; he did not ask himself if the speeches could necessarily be only misrepresentations of what is, only phantasy presentations despite their stability and regularity. By making it possible for Socrates to see his misstep, Parmenides makes it possible for him to correct it—he “sets Socrates on the way” (2).

What would Socrates have to have already done to ensure himself that it is true that the soul’s experiences are necessarily phantastic and never eikastic? “He would have had to have mastered an ontological psychology were he to be sure that whatever showed up in speech had not first shown up in soul” (18). In speech—Socrates’s turn to the logoi should have led him to ask: Are the logoi what they are because the soul is what it is? Parmenides turns

securing the implications of the linked series of gymnastic exercises.

Socrates toward an ontological psychology; he tells him, “know thyself,” and in knowing yourself come to know that the soul, the seat of human experience, necessarily generates the form of all experience and so of all speech and thus blocks any means of accessing being directly. An ontological psychology begins by pursuing a knowledge of the self that aims to understand the human way of “knowing”; it thereby provides the necessary prolegomena to any future understanding of being that could claim to be rational. Without a genuine ontological psychology there is no way to be sure if there is any escape from experience-based phantasy. An ontological psychology would also have to pursue a psychology in the more customary sense, the attempt to understand the drives and goals of the soul, and this understanding could lead to a rationally defensible inference about beings as a whole.10

Early in paragraph 18 Benardete referred to the “imperialistic impulse” of the one, its drive to absorb and rule everything, to rule out “many.” That imperialism “is stopped dead in its tracks” by the recognition of dreaming and shadow-painting: “neither the absence nor the presence of the one alters appearance and illusion.” But speech recognized as phantastic can itself exercise imperial rule: at the end of paragraph 18, having unfolded what Parmenides folded into the seventh hypothesis, Benardete pictures a “latent art of phantastic speech [that] threatens to be as imperialistic as the Parmenidean one.” If that latent art became “successful in absorbing everything into itself, it would be a psychology without an ontology.” Absorption into the unbreakable sway of the generative phantasies of human experience could result in an account of the soul’s ways that denied any possible route to an understanding of the beings for it would be blocked in principle by its theory of imperial phantasy. That art of phantastic speech gone imperial is the art of Protagoras, the sophistic art that accompanies the inquiry into the logoi as an always threatening possibility; it is an epistemological skepticism that is a counterfeit of genuine philosophy. Plato therefore showed that from the beginning of his public career in the Protagoras to its end in his cell where he dictated the Theaetetus to Euclides, Socrates worked to counter Protagoras on behalf of philosophy with its openness to a genuine ontological psychology.11

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10 The need for an “ontological psychology” implicitly arose in the transition from the first part of the dialogue to the second where eros appeared as a theme of the poem by Ibycus that Parmenides introduced. Benardete there made the Symposium the culmination of Socrates’s inquiry into what Parmenides “urged [him] to acquire[.] the erotic art” (15).

11 Parmenides had earlier warned Socrates about Protagorean skepticism by describing “someone” who denies “that there are forms of the beings” and does not “distinguish a certain form of each single thing:” he will “understand nothing” and “entirely destroy the power of dialectic” (135b).
Benardete’s account of the seventh hypothesis makes it clearer why Parmenides gave the label *gymnastic training* to what Socrates had to do in hypothesizing is and is not. The training entails gaining complete familiarity with all eight hypotheses and constant exercise in comparing them and treating them dialectically, interrogating them all for their mutual implications. Only such rigorous exercise could lead to the insight that hypothesis seven differs from the rest and in its difference illuminates all the others, demanding that each be interrogated again to see what the inescapability of dreaming and shadow-painting might imply for it. The silent presence of significance yields its content only to the unfolding that the seventh hypothesis makes possible; and the galvanizing effect of the unfoldings confirms that *this* is the way, the way. The inquirer thus gains a confident stance toward the whole of Parmenides’s exercise: each hypothesis bristles with significance because each can now be viewed as an aspect of the soul’s experiences; the task now is to unfold each in order to discover its particular link in the full understanding of understanding. What Benardete has done with the gymnastic gives a different formulation to what he had already said in his conclusion about the way in his essay “‘Night and Day,...’: Parmenides”: the gymnastic brings one “to an understanding of the true perplexity, knowledge of ignorance. This is to be on the way of the man who knows.” Knowledge of ignorance is knowledge of the soul in its way of “knowing.”

Paragraph 19. Benardete’s way through the hypotheses—Socrates’s way, the way through the hypotheses—takes him from the revelatory seventh back to the positive hypotheses, to an unfolding of the second that will in turn touch the first. “If there is at least a partial phantastics”—a nonimperial understanding of the soul’s constructs of experience—“the second hypothesis is an eikastic fragment of it, for everything that seems to hold if there is one does hold in the realm of appearance” (19). An eikastics of a partial, nonimperial phantastics is highly significant: it would discern the stable likenesses that structure fancy-generated appearance; it would study the *logoi* and the whole of appearance as a science of appearance on the model of arithmetic and geometry; as a genuine science of the stable structures of mere appearance, it would be a knowing of “knowing.” It would recognize its limitation to the realm of appearance, while not peremptorily, imperially closing off the possibility of a rational move to what is blocked by appearance; it would be an ontological psychology open to ontology simply, an account of the beings that could defend itself as true.

12 *Archaeology of the Soul*, 227.
Benardete calls attention to Parmenides’s introduction of “the sudden” at the end of the long examination of the second hypothesis (156d–e). Parmenides did this “in order to gain a between that sets out of time the transition of all becomings and passings-away that are in time.” The “between” avoids the logical contradiction entailed in becoming, in the transition from being at rest to being in motion or vice versa. The posited “between” is not in time but between times, enabling all change from one state to another state (157a–b). The function of the sudden is to put together the mutually contradictory first and second hypotheses: the sudden “is the utopia where the separated idea of the first can be.” Utopia, no place/perfect place, is Benardete’s variant for Parmenides’s actual word: “Parmenides calls the sudden atopon, strange and placeless.” Benardete can then state more explicitly just what this operation with the positive hypotheses is: “The first two hypotheses, then, with their specious reconciliation in the third. . .”—emphasis added. The third hypothesis examines the results for the different things of hypothesizing “one is” and its arguments conclude that all the categories are true for the different things. The reconciliation is specious but the conclusion is not: for the different things of experience all the categories hold. The nonspurious way to that conclusion is achieved through the key operation: All three hypotheses “are to be enfolds into VII. All of them are really out of place.” Putting the first three hypotheses into their proper place via the seventh means that they “assume their proper proportions once they are traced back to the indisputable character of appearance and opinion” which the unique seventh hypothesis makes visible. To place the first three hypotheses properly within dreaming and shadow-painting is to unfold their enfolds into the seventh. Parmenides’s way leads to a genuine science of experience that secures its fixity; it nevertheless relativizes experience, makes it human, while remaining open to the whole; driven to understand the whole, it partially succeeds while continuing to seek a way through the actually knowable to the ever unknowable. In his next two paragraphs Benardete shows how the two focuses of Socratic practice can be folded out of Parmenides’s argument; the action of Parmenides’s argument includes an invitation to Socrates to investigate the nature of human experience through two distinct means.

Paragraph 20. Benardete signals a special importance for paragraph 20 by two unusual interventions: he uncharacteristically inserts himself and uncharacteristically moves from what Parmenides offered Socrates to what Plato found important in it. Benardete gives dramatic force to Parmenides’s act of guidance here by his description of what Parmenides does: he “arms Socrates,” equips him with a “defense” against a possibility bound to arise
for him as he pursues Parmenides’s way from the seventh hypothesis back through the rest. Arming Socrates is not only a defensive measure for in this step, the unfolding of the third hypothesis with the key of the seventh, Parmenides guides Socrates to the most important of all philosophic gains.

The seventh hypothesis is nonhypothetical because it implicitly proves that the soul “resists the homogenization of being,” absorption into an all-encompassing one. But it is still a hypothesis and as such it opens the way to the opposite extreme: “it threatens to cancel homogeneity altogether in favor of infinite heterogeneity or individuality.” Is the whole an infinite flux of manynesses in which every seeming one dissolves into a many? It is against this version of the irrationality of the whole that Parmenides arms Socrates, the version argued by Protagoras and the sophists he generated; against this natural upshot of the rational investigation of experience, Socrates, or philosophy as such, must do continuous battle. Benardete sets out two ways in which Parmenides arms Socrates, “the first way is the third hypothesis.” Benardete’s sequential march through the hypotheses after locating the key that unfolds them thus continues. With the third hypothesis “for the first and only time Parmenides offers a version of what a whole is that is not reducible to a sum.” A whole that is not reducible to a sum points to a nonmathematical understanding of wholes that would allow a partial phantastics or a limit on heterogeneity. Parmenides “calls a whole an idea,” a word that Socrates will take over as a name for wholes. In his examination of the third hypothesis Parmenides speaks of pieces generally and isolates that piece that is “not a piece of the many nor of all things, but of one certain idea, a certain one which we call whole” (157d7–e1). As Benardete says, Parmenides uses idea in “accordance with his usual practice, he uncovers wholes with their proper parts (moria) before he reveals the unlimited behind them.” Out of the unlimited, Parmenides isolates ideas in a sense that he must view as immune to the kind of attacks he marshaled against what Socrates called forms. Ideas in Parmenides’s sense must therefore do what he told Socrates he could learn that ideas do: capture “the certain kind [genos] and beinghood [ousia], in itself” that things have (135a). That would make Parmenides himself the

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13 Benardete’s footnote to Parmenides’s use of idea at 157d7–e2 also refers to Theaetetus 203e2–5 and 184d1–5 where the old Socrates in his cell reports to Euclides, who writes it down, his passing on to Theaetetus this way of understanding idea—the transmission in writing of what Parmenides guided him to concerns Socrates to the end. Benardete translates idea in the Theaetetus passages as the “single look” a single species of things has, while at 203e he translates eidos as “species”; he uses the same translations of these two basic words elsewhere, e.g., The Tragedy and Comedy of Life: Plato’s Philebus, trans. with commentary by Seth Benardete (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 117, 122–23.
“naturally gifted man” who discovered that and it would make him as well that “still more wondrous person” able to “teach someone else” (135b)—he teaches Socrates, guides him to discover through his own working out of the gymnastic how to conceive of wholes or kinds in the proper way, without calling in his irrational forms. While “uncover[ing] wholes” or ideas out of the unlimited, Parmenides uncovers too “their proper parts,” the two-word translation of moria that Benardete consistently uses in his description of the appropriate use of idea in understanding appearance.

Benardete inserts himself into a sentence that says how Parmenides arms Socrates: “He thus suggests to Socrates that the first defense against either homogeneity or heterogeneity is what I call eidetic analysis.”14 He then gives a three-sentence definition of eidetic analysis using a principle and an “example” that is more than an example: “Eidetic analysis always begins with the one of the unlimited, what Parmenides calls ‘the other nature of the eidos’ [158c], the stream of articulate sound, for example, prior to the discovery of vowels, consonants, and semi-vowels.” The stream of articulate sound is a phrase for the logoi, a differentiable part of the undifferentiated whole. Eidetic analysis begins with that stream and isolates “kinds,” the fitting limited sortings within articulate sound, aiming to isolate the elements of speech, down through words and syllables to the letters of syllables that sort themselves into the classes vowels, consonants, and semivowels, the most elemental.15 “These kinds establish a number between one and many”—a finitude within the two opposite and imperial infinities of homogeneity and heterogeneity—“and do not betray”—do not do an injustice to—“the simultaneous copresence of one and many that Socrates found in himself”—as he said when first arguing for his own notion of forms (129c–d). “There is now…”—in this last sentence of his definition Benardete seems quite pointedly to use one of the poles of the is/is not hypotheses in order to attach a temporal modifier to it: There is—now—what there had not been before the eidetic analysis, “a stable number of proper parts whose whole consists of a single grammatical art,” an art of the logoi whose proper parts expand out into numerous kinds and kinds of kinds from the simple parts of sound that are vowels, consonants, and semivowels.


15 Benardete’s commentary on the Theaetetus passage to which he here refers—203e2–5—falls in the subsection entitled “XV. Letters” (Being of the Beautiful, 1.169–75).
Benardete’s definition of eidetic analysis, beginning with the “example” that is a turn to the logoi, ends on the word “art.” The art or science of human language seems to be the indispensable tool whereby a human being can begin a proper study of the experiences of the soul aiming ultimately at a psychology, a knowledge of human being, that could open onto an ontology. Starting here with the “single grammatical art,” Benardete will show in the next paragraph that Parmenides makes the arts a necessary study for a philosopher, for Socrates, arts being fundamental to the human way of being in the world, an active and reactive way of constructing or making. Analysis of the arts is therefore the other way—eidetic analysis being “the first way”—that Parmenides arms Socrates to resist the attraction of infinite heterogeneity. “On method” would be a fitting title for the twentieth paragraph; but then “On method” would be a fitting title for the whole of the gymnastic.

Benardete moves from his own term for Parmenides’s guidance to Plato himself: “One cannot stress too much the importance of this for Plato: he discerned among its proper parts a kind that constitutes sound but can never be sounded by itself.” This and its seem to refer to the “single grammatical art” of “eidetic analysis” that begins with the stream of articulate sound, the logoi humans use to structure the nonlinguistic stream in which we are immersed. And the kind “that constitutes sound but can never be sounded by itself”?—that seems to be, judging from Benardete’s analysis of the Theaetetus passage to which he referred (see note 15 above), the consonants and semiconsonants that constitute sound but can never be sounded by themselves without being joined together with vowels to form syllables. The next sentence, the end of the paragraph, generalizes from this kind: “The idea, one might say, always shows itself as other than it is.” Ideas as such show themselves only in the stream of articulate sound but show themselves as if they could be sounded apart from the stream. The ideas are, through eidetic analysis, the inlet into the nature of appearance in whose stream kinds are embedded. What Plato shows Parmenides doing for the young Socrates is how to succeed in what he aimed at by turning to the logoi: subject the logoi to eidetic analysis, which begins with language and its way of structuring the whole and grounds a rational science of experience. Eidetic analysis is one of the active ingredients in an ontological psychology, analyzing the experiences of the soul with a view to understanding the being of beings; the other, an investigation of the arts, Benardete takes up next.

Paragraph 21. From the third hypothesis, which he now makes simply “the outline of eidetic analysis,” Benardete moves to the fourth, the last of the
hypotheses that posit “one is.” Here too he establishes the genuine action of the argument just as he did in paragraphs 19 and 20, for here he puts the fourth hypothesis into its proper place by unfolding it in light of the seventh. With the fourth hypothesis “Socrates is asked to reflect on the arts if number were to withdraw from them,” arts that rely simply on experience. Benardete’s footnote on the arts apart from number refers to Plato’s Philebus where Socrates describes the arts of experience as “a kind of knack, using the powers of guesswork.” What Parmenides asked Socrates to do, Benardete says, is “to consider the worthless things, what blacksmiths and shoemakers deal with.” Worthless repeats Socrates’s apparent judgment on these arts in the Philebus, “virtually worthless,” which Protarchus strengthened to “really worthless” (55e). As Benardete notes, what blacksmiths and shoemakers deal with is judged worthless by Alcibiades too in the Symposium; he believes wrongly that they are only “the laughable exterior of Socratic speeches.”

With the third and fourth hypotheses, “Parmenides rehearses in the small the tension between heterogeneity and homogeneity”—the many and the one—“and how they can be discerned and understood in the human things.” And here Benardete almost repeats his earlier statement of “the specious reconciliation” of the first two hypotheses in the third in a statement of what the argument has made possible: “The spurious collapse of the first two hypotheses into the third and their genuine reattachment to the seventh hypothesis opens the way for eidetic analysis and its necessary adjunct, the exemplary character of the arts.” Socrates did what Parmenides asked: he “always starts” with “the exemplary character of the arts whether it be on the track of justice or persuasion.”

Justice and persuasion are not just two among many possible tracks; they are the basic two. The first leads to understanding morality, to knowledge of good and evil, and the second leads to understanding language as the human means of organizing experience and ultimately of rule. Had Socrates not done what Parmenides asked, had he not “taken his bearings by the arts in their infinite divisibility, on the one hand, and the wholeness of the soul, on

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16 The fourth hypothesis also examines the results for the different things if one is but its arguments draw negative conclusions for all of Parmenides’s categories.

17 Plato, Philebus 55e1–56a2, Benardete trans.

18 Plato, Symposium 221e; Alcibiades gives four examples of the arts Socrates considered: “pack- asses, blacksmiths, shoemakers, and tanners.” Socrates’s examples in the Philebus are flute playing, all of music, medicine, farming, piloting, and generalship (Phlb. 56a–b); he contrasts such arts with those in which what Benardete calls “the application of number to knowledge” is basic, Socrates’s model for these arts being carpentry.
the other,” this many and that one, he could not have followed the track of the arts to understand “the nonreducibility of the dyadic nature of justice.” That seems to be what Benardete calls “a precise and an ordinary sense” of justice, the ordinary being the citizen’s justice and the precise being the philosopher’s. Nor could he have understood that persuasion or “rhetoric is the flattering disguise of the desire to punish and looks like the unintended justice of inducing perplexity.” So the two basic tracks to understanding through the arts are intimately entwined: rhetoric masks the actual core of citizen’s justice, the desire to punish. The other and irreducible form of justice, the “unintended justice” of the philosopher, is a rhetoric that does good to friends who are good without harming anyone, in particular not harming citizen’s justice but speaking in a way that does not overtly call it into question. And unintended? Benardete’s word points to the genuine ground of doing good to friends who are good: not justice, morality, but a more profound drive, eros. The Parmenidean way combining eidetic analysis with an understanding of the arts makes philosophy possible: “Socrates’ use of the arts [serves] the purpose of discovering kinds and their proper and improper parts.” An improper part here seems to be the sophist, an improper part of the kind philosopher because the sophist’s analysis of language stops at an imperialism of infinite heterogeneity and his use of language is less careful about exposing the roots of justice.

Paragraph 22. Continuing his sequential move through the eight hypotheses, unfolding them through their key, their being enfolded into the seventh, Benardete turns to the four that hypothesize one is not. The conclusions he draws are as radical and as illuminating as those he drew about the four that hypothesize one is. He first draws a general conclusion about all four negative

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19 Benardete, Socrates’ Second Sailing, 83, 88–89.
20 As Benardete’s analysis of Socrates’s story of Leontius in the Republic shows (Socrates’ Second Sailing, 100–102). In “Night and Day,…”: Parmenides” (221–22), Benardete shows that Parmenides argued that this view of justice is built in to the human way of experiencing existence: existence is deserved punishment. Benardete judges six lines of the longest fragment of Parmenides’s poem (frag. 8.13–18) to be “superfluous” to the argument to which they are appended, the goddess’s argument for the impossibility that being comes from nonbeing. Those six lines put being on trial with Justice presiding; the judgment is that “being is a punishment for a crime that being must commit. Its fate is to be guilty.” The apparent absurdity of this disappears, Benardete says, “if the goddess first presents being as mortals primarily experience it, and not as it is in itself.” When the goddess later presents what being is in itself, “Necessity replaces Right.” Benardete shows that among the lessons Odysseus learns on his way to philosophy is “the great strain the will is under to reinterpret necessity as right” (The Bow and the Lyre: A Platonic Reading of the “Odyssey” [Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997], 75). The Bow and the Lyre is perhaps the most valuable and certainly the most far-reaching of Benardete’s investigations of Greek philosophy before Socrates: Homeric poetry contains the paradigmatic odyssey to philosophy and political philosophy.
hypotheses based on the disappearance in them of words for fixity:21 that absence signals the obliteration of the present, what is, but leaves intact was and will be. This opens the way to Timaeus’s cosmology, Benardete claims, a cosmology that “makes it possible to get rid of being in becoming”—a cosmology of flux where “is not” is literally true because of the sovereignty of becoming; Plato’s Parmenides embraces the universality of flux but as a process in which “ones” or kinds of relative permanence are generated and extinguished.22

Moving to the individual hypotheses of “is not,” Benardete sees a reversal in the expected order of the first two, five and six, reinforcing that the two “belong together.”23 The fifth “looks at opinion and…establishes that its premise is that to be is to be possible and nothing is necessary,” just as Parmenides’s poem did. The premise of opinion that nothing is necessary is illuminated by the conclusion Benardete drew earlier, from Parmenides’s final argument against Socrates’s view of forms (15). There, Parmenides’s coordination of knowledge and rule implied that “whatever we do not rule by our knowledge looks to us [humans] like chance and our opinion [human opinion] assigns the mastery of chance to the gods.” But the hypothesis that lies behind the eight hypotheses, “that to be is to be measurable” (17), depends upon unbreakable necessity and that carries an implication for the gods that Benardete will state in his next paragraph. Here he draws a different conclusion from the reversed order: putting the fifth hypothesis “up against” the fourth brings out “the second component that Socrates will need for his analysis of the city.” The first component was the theme of hypothesis four: “The true city is the city of arts, in which everyone who enters it comes equipped with some part of knowledge.” In the Republic Socrates had to supplant that “true city” of arts and knowledge at Glaucon’s insistence: he judged it a “city of pigs” (372d), he demanded the amenities to which he is accustomed. The true city is therefore supplanted by “the city whose spurious unity is grounded in the education in opinion of its warrior-defenders.” By bringing the fifth hypothesis up against the fourth, Parmenides set Socrates on the way to a proper, twofold analysis of the city, of the political: understanding the arts as parts of knowledge and

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21 Benardete lists seven such words: “time, place, figure, nature, kind, whole, and proper part.”

22 Benardete notes here that the fragments of Parmenides’s poem that survive do not permit a definitive judgment on whether “the goddess’s speech on opinion” already indicated this “get[ting] rid of being in becoming” that Plato’s Parmenides indicates.

23 The fifth hypothesis examines the results of “is not” for the different things whereas the expected order would have examined the results for “the nonbeing of one in relation to itself,” the topic of the sixth.
understanding the city's opinions as stamped-in education. The city's always spurious unity, grounded in that education, is always vulnerable to exposé by ambitious rhetoricians like Thrasymachus while also being susceptible to alteration and reform by a ruler who knows the art of rule as Socrates does.

Paragraph 23. The sixth hypothesis “discusses the nonbeing of one in relation to itself.” Benardete observes that Aristoteles asks no questions as Parmenides’s arguments serially conclude that one is not and he takes Aristoteles’s failure to ask a question as an invitation to ask two of his own. But first he says that Aristoteles’s “silence” makes him “the boy of Parmenides’ poem who listens in silence to the goddess’s speech and does not question his own nonbeing”—the boy fails to object even where he obviously should. Aristoteles’s silence is the device, Benardete says, by which “Parmenides tells Socrates” why he failed to understand his poem—which can be true only if Parmenides so controlled the conversation that he could cause Aristoteles’s silence. What Parmenides “tells” Socrates here is “that he failed to understand his poem because he was unaware that he too practiced an ontological psychology”—Parmenides taught in a way that demands that its way be recognized: Socrates “took straight a teaching that was essentially dialectical.” Parmenides’s teaching depends on interrogating its claims and discovering the answers he left implicit; its giving depends on active taking. As with Parmenides’s poem, so with Parmenides’s gymnastic: do not be a boy listening silently to some god—the gymnastic was intended to lead Socrates to question it, here to pose the “crucial question” about the nonbeing of one. Benardete poses that question twice and answers with assertions twice. His questions ask “is not?” His assertions state “is not.”

Benardete’s first formulation of the crucial question runs: “Is there not a difference between the conclusion that something is not and the way to that conclusion?” His second rewords it with terms from the gymnastic: “Is there not a difference between the examination of opinions that the fifth hypothesis proposes and the discovery implied in the sixth?” This second asking restores the proper order of the elements “the way” and “the conclusion” that his first asking had reversed: the restoration shows that Parmenides’s reversal of the fifth and sixth hypotheses was proper. The way puts the fifth first as the examination of opinions that arrives at understanding them as constructs of the human way of being and that conclusion is the indispensable way to the conclusion of the sixth or rather to the discovery implied in the sixth, an ontological discovery about the nonbeing of one in relation to itself, a discovery Parmenides did not voice because it states the ontological atheism that
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Benardete’s first sentence following his two questions contains two assertions of “is not,” each answering one of the questions. The first runs: “The temporal order of discovery is not the same as the order of the parts”—the temporal order makes discoveries through an ontological psychology that uncovers an order of parts among the beings as a hierarchy in which opinion’s highest being is not the actual highest being because he not even is. Its second runs: “just as the enfolding of the hypotheses as a whole is not the same as their enfolding into the seventh.” Parmenides’s way is an order of enfolded hypotheses whose temporal unfolding requires that the questioner first discover the difference of the seventh, its not being a hypothesis at all. The truth discoverable in that difference—human opinion is inescapable dreaming and shadow-painting that structures all of human experience—can unfold all the other enfolded hypotheses as a proper ordering of parts in a teaching on the truth about the beings: begin with human being and its way of being and move to the other beings as they appear to the human, ending with the truth about the highest being. Benardete’s second sentence, the final sentence of the paragraph, applies what he just said about Parmenides’s way to Plato’s _Parmenides_: “It was just such a difference that dictated the narration of the first part of the _Parmenides_ and the atemporal pattern of the second.”

Plato’s way in his _Parmenides_ makes the first part a narration in which the young Socrates undergoes a temporal process of discovering his need to learn and makes the second part Parmenides’s performance of an atemporal gymnastic that Socrates is to learn. Plato learned from Socrates who learned from Parmenides. To learn from Plato is to see the difference between the way and what it is the way to.

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24 Benardete’s way of wording the conclusion mirrors the is/is not hypotheses of the _Parmenides_ but by putting it in quotation marks he may suggest Aristophanes’s wording too when he had Pheidippides speak the unspeakable to his father, Strepsiades: Pheidippides asks whether Zeus is; Strepsiades answers, “Is”; Pheidippides responds “Is not” (_Clouds_ 1465–70).

25 This observation nine lines from the end of the essay was first made in the second line of the essay.

26 In light of Benardete’s view that the _Parmenides_ of Plato’s _Parmenides_ teaches a skepticism that knows the limits of skepticism and the route to knowledge, it is illuminating to study the second paragraph of “‘Night and Day, . . .’ Parmenides.” It begins with three things Benardete finds surprising for their absence and a fourth he finds surprising for its presence: “the goddess never ascribes eternity (aiei) to being, or falsehood (pseudos) to nonbeing; nonbeing disappears as soon as the goddess turns to Opinion, even though ‘to be not’ is as much a mortal name as ‘to be’ (8.40),” and fourth, “the goddess promises that Parmenides will know (eisē eidēseis [10.1, 5]) and learn (mathēseai [8.31]) mortal opinions, but she herself never uses such verbs about Truth” (200–201).
Paragraph 24. Benardete’s final paragraph treats the final, eighth hypothesis which “puts the question whether there would be nothing if there were not soul and its experiences.” In his final sentence he says question two more times, “This question is one of the deepest questions of Platonic metaphysics,” and ends by putting the question in Platonic terms and adding his own nice wording: “whether the idea of the good, if it is to be the single cause of the being of the beings and of the beings being known, does not entail for all time if not for all times that some rational animal be.” That one of all times that is our time wants to answer this Platonic question with what Nietzsche held, that the goodness of the whole, its being open to rational investigation, does not entail that such a creating and sustaining being be. Is our answer the true answer? Or is the true answer what Plato made it seem was his answer in the passage in the Republic that Benardete calls to mind? But Plato made it clear that what seemed his answer was the answer his brothers needed: he suggested thereby that Socrates did not need it but knew their need and his need to meet it.

And Benardete? By ending on “be,” a continuous form of is, he ends on the fitting word for an essay examining the is/is not questions of the gymnastic in the Parmenides. But the truly fitting word for ending the part of his essay that treats the “is not” hypotheses would be the negation of be. The final twist of Benardete’s essay could be that his own way of answering the question he ends on is what his final clause literally says when not read as part of a question: Plato’s metaphysics “does not entail for all time if not for all times that some rational animal be.” What does entail that is Plato’s political philosophy. Benardete’s treatment of the eighth hypothesis would then mirror what he discovered to be dialectically present in the other hypothesis of is not that draws a negative conclusion, the sixth, the conclusion that “Zeus not even is”: an ontology that recognizes the sovereignty of becoming that the hypotheses of is not suggest concludes that no such animal can continuously be as the cause of the beings and of their being known. By ending as he did, making it seem that some such rational animal may have to be for all time, Benardete aligns himself with the way of Plato, the way of Parmenides and Socrates. And, although it is not widely credited, that is Nietzsche’s way too, for as Leo Strauss said, Nietzsche “had doubts whether there could be a world, any world whose center is not God.”27 Being a philosopher and therefore in the tradition of Parmenides and Plato at least in this respect, Nietzsche looked

to the return of gods at the end of the modern age, to Dionysos and Ariadne who not even are as the necessary highest beings for a future, communally lived affirmation of what is.

I want to end on an additional puzzle that Plato built in to the _Parmenides_, one that Benardete touched on in paragraph 2: “in the _Phaedo_… Socrates reverts to an apparently identical view of the ideas that Parmenides had disposed of fifty years before.” Why would Plato have Socrates on the last day of his life employ a view of the ideas for the last argument of his life that Parmenides showed him fifty years earlier to be logically indefensible? The puzzle yields to the chronological solution that Benardete set out in “On Plato’s _Symposium_”: Plato presented Socrates’s becoming as a three-stage event of maturing that he scattered across the _Phaedo, Parmenides_, and _Symposium_. But that solution requires a further conclusion that Benardete did not emphasize; it was recognized by the young Nietzsche, that close student of the history of Greek philosophy and complete skeptic about Plato: he called the ideas “decorative” while holding decoration to be foundational to culture which can flourish only within fictions revered as truths.28 What Plato seems to suggest by this particular puzzle of the _Parmenides_ is that the mature Socrates carried on his Parmenides-guided inquiry into the being of beings behind the protective security of edifying decoration, permanent ideas of the beautiful, just, and good. These fictions serve as safe stopping points for a Cebes or a Glaucon while the puzzling _Parmenides_ can serve as an invitation to who knows who?—some unknown auditor in some unknown Clazomenae who will undertake the voyage to understand what this puzzle can lead to while also working to understand the true, Parmenidean sense of idea.

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28 See Friedrich Nietzsche, _Kritische Studienausgabe_, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyer, 1999), vol. 7 29 [171], Summer–Fall 1873; vol. 8 30 [14], Summer 1875.
An Exchange


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Michael Gillespie has obviously spent a good many years thinking about Nietzsche and reflecting on the seductiveness of his works as well as what makes that seductiveness so dangerous. As goes without saying, this book exhibits the same clarity, thoughtfulness, and wide learning that are on display in Gillespie’s previous books.

One way of formulating Gillespie’s thesis is to say that he wants to rebut, once and for all, the endless claims by late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century postmodernists that Nietzsche’s thought is limited to the celebration of difference and hyperpluralism—playful deconstructions of, or genealogical unmaskings of, all foregoing metaphysics. Yes, Nietzsche’s thought is antimetaphysical, insofar as pre-Nietzschean metaphysics is shaped by post-Platonic rationalism; yet the mature Nietzsche has his own quite definite metaphysics. This is what Gillespie calls “Nietzsche’s (anti)metaphysics,” meaning that his thought is antimetaphysical in relation to the pre-Nietzschean tradition of philosophy but prometaphysical in relation to Nietzsche’s own philosophy. Gillespie is right to situate the thought of the eternal recurrence of the same at the heart of this distinctive Nietzschean metaphysics.
Moreover, it is a metaphysics that Nietzsche thinks will ultimately reshape, root and branch, the cultural, political, and spiritual foundations of the existing Western dispensation (hence Nietzsche’s promise of a thoroughgoing “revaluation of all values”). That is, Nietzsche offers a new dispensation—that is why he calls himself a “destiny” in *Ecce Homo*—even if it might take centuries before this new dispensation comes to fruition. Socrates was a turning point in the history of the West. So was St. Paul. So was Luther. And so Nietzsche himself will prove to be, or at least that is what he believes: that he himself has a world-historical significance comparable to Socrates, St. Paul, and Luther. Is Nietzsche’s thought disqualified by this on-the-brink-of-insanity hubris? No, not necessarily. In fact, Gillespie not unreasonably points out that “later thinkers have treated his thought as the end of modernity (or even Western metaphysics) or the beginning of the postmodern age. In this respect he does apparently mark the boundary between two world ages” (233n2).

To his credit, Gillespie is determined to do his utmost to take seriously the philosophy that Nietzsche developed in the 1880s, and to encourage his readers to do likewise. Certainly, he is fully aware of the dire hazards that accompany Nietzsche’s final teaching. He is certainly not to be counted among the (numberless) Nietzsche apologists. Gillespie knows that Nietzschean *amor fati* involves not just a Stoic resignation towards the bloody wars of the past but a cheerful and even festive embrace of the far more destructive wars (centuries of war!) that Nietzsche sees on the horizon. Gillespie rightly highlights Nietzsche’s enthusiasm for “the heroes of the Norse sagas, whom he praises for their hard-heartedness” (172, citing *Beyond Good and Evil*, §260). We decadent moderns are meant to measure ourselves by “the soul of a proud Viking,” embodying a culture that proves its genuine nobility precisely insofar as it is committed to the honoring of “all forms of severity and harshness.” In a similar vein, Nietzsche, in a letter to Peter Gast dated May 31, 1888, informs Gast that Scandinavians are showing superior receptivity to his teaching of master morality on account of their familiarity with “the Icelandic sagas.” Embracing the final teaching is like diving through a ring of fire while the reward promised by Nietzsche at the other end for those who survive it—a higher existence for the lucky few—may (i.e., almost certainly will) turn out to be pure fantasy on the part of Nietzsche. And Gillespie is

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undoubtedly right to warn that “it is not as easy as one might imagine to make use of Nietzsche without being made use of in return” (231n3; cf. 198).2

Still, Gillespie is a bit easier on Nietzsche than he might have been, or so it seems to me. Let me cite three aspects of Gillespie’s presentation that strike me as Gillespie pulling his punches somewhat. First, in common with many Nietzsche scholars, he puts much of the blame for the Nazi reception of Nietzsche on Nietzsche’s sister (e.g., xiii, 17, 188, 207n25, 223n34, 231n2; cf. 213n27 and 217n16). Very relevant here is a revisionist argument laid out in another fine work of Nietzsche scholarship published by Robert C. Holub a year before Gillespie’s. Holub’s book demonstrates convincingly that Elisabeth (however odious a human being she may have been) has been unjustly scapegoated by the many admirers of Nietzsche seeking to diminish the burden of culpability resting directly on him.3 The truth is that twentieth-century Fascists (including the Nazis), as Gillespie knows, could find plenty in Nietzsche’s texts that was very much to their liking, with or without the assistance of Elisabeth.

Second, consider Gillespie’s treatment of what is of much greater philosophical moment: Nietzsche’s proclamation of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same. Here again, Gillespie seems to me to be pulling his punches, in order to give his readers as much reason as possible to take Nietzsche’s philosophy seriously. Gillespie acknowledges that Nietzsche lacked the intellectual equipment to give this privileged pillar of his late philosophy the philosophical and scientific grounding that Nietzsche wanted it to have. He mentions that Nietzsche seriously considered undertaking further studies of the natural sciences in order to bolster the doctrine’s inadequate foundations (183).4 Yet Gillespie is reluctant to say definitively that one can rule out the truth of the eternal recurrence of the same as Nietzsche conceptualized and then mythicized it. (See 184: “while Nietzsche was unable to complete his task, he might have been able to do so if he had had more time

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4 Cf. Lou Salomé, Nietzsche, ed. Siegfried Mandel (Redding Ridge, CT: Black Swan Books, 1988), 131. Salomé reports that Nietzsche, who confided the doctrine to her in person, anticipated its “inevitable fulfillment and validation” (130), and even believed that “it would be possible to win for it an indisputable basis through physics experiments” (131). If Nietzsche actually said these things to her, it is hard not to dismiss this as delusion or folly.
to obtain the training he knew that he needed”; and 195: “While Nietzsche’s attempts to explain the doctrine scientifically are . . . naïve, we cannot simply say that the theory is wrong or impossible.”) This seems generous, to put it mildly. Georg Simmel, in his 1907 book *Schopenhauer and Nietzsche*, had little trouble proving that the Nietzschean doctrine is a nonstarter. Nietzsche was wrong to presume that an assumption of “finite elements in infinite time” sufficed to generate the conclusion “that any configuration of elements must be repeated at any time or even in infinite time.” Moreover, eternal recurrence of the same only has the existential implications that Nietzsche attached to this doctrine if one can postulate a “persistence of the ego” (i.e., a commonality of consciousness) between the self who experiences the total state of the universe at moment A and the self who experiences the “same” state of the universe on the next go-round, and there is no reason to believe that that premise makes any sense.

Fine, that was in 1907; but how was Nietzsche supposed to know that in the 1880s? Well, actually, the conceptual weakness of the doctrine was already apparent to Nietzsche’s friend Paul Deussen, who came up with a simpler version of what was basically the same argument as that later constructed by Simmel: “three billiard balls, each with its surface made up of an infinite number of points, never exactly reproduce the same mutual positions.” Suppose Nietzsche jettisoned the hope of supplying his notion with valid scientific-philosophical credentials and simply posited it as an existence-defining “religious” creed. Would it have the desired existential effects (of supremely invigorating the potentially superhuman elite and fatally demoralizing the herd)? Gillespie’s verdict: “unlikely” (196). Again, if anything, this seems to err on the side of generosity. One suspects that Nietzsche with his revaluation-inducing doctrine could found a new civilization only if his *Zarathustra* came to command a scriptural authority comparable to that exercised by the Bible within the preceding civilization, and how would it do that unless the adherents of the new Nietzschean religion actually believed that there was a real god named Dionysus and that Nietzsche was his intended prophet? Do

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6 Ibid., 173.

Nietzsche’s writings concerning religion encourage anyone to believe in the extrahuman origins of religion?

Third, consider another very important theme of Gillespie’s book: Nietzsche and music. Gillespie devotes two important chapters of the book to interpreting two of the books that Nietzsche “composed” in 1888 (Twilight of the Idols and Ecce Homo) as modeled on sonatas. Gillespie’s suggestion is that Nietzsche was thereby attempting to replace conventional philosophical logic with a new and more compelling “musical logic.” I would readily grant that real insights are available into Nietzsche’s project by deepening one’s appreciation of the musical dimension of his final teaching. But I do worry that Gillespie, in treating this notion of musical logic as seriously as he does, concedes too much ground to Nietzsche. A reversion to “musical logic” cannot in principle carry the intellectual burden that the philosophical tradition as a whole rightly ascribes to rational argument. The philosophical tradition founded by Socrates was erected on the foundation of discursive reason. It is a noble tradition; those shaped and nurtured by this tradition should not be intimidated by the anti-Socratic rhetoric deployed by Nietzsche that seeks to impugn dialectic as a plebeian art driven by revenge against more noble souls. Iris Murdoch firmly and admirably pushed back against late Heidegger’s suggestion (this “terrible wish!”) “that now the language of philosophy, if it is to tell the truth, must be poeticised and become a new sort of prose-poetry.”8 The same applies to Nietzsche and his musical logic. Philosophy from Socrates onward has taken its stand on the basis of discursive rationality (logos). Why is it perilous to attempt to appeal to poetry and music as supposedly more primordial modes of pursuing the philosophical enterprise? We get a sufficient answer to this question, I believe, precisely in the endeavors by Nietzsche and Heidegger to turn philosophy as it had been practiced throughout the grand tradition of Western rationalism into exercises in heroic prophecy and myth-making.

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8 Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (New York: Allen Lane, 1993), 51. One should also take very seriously Murdoch’s claim that Nietzsche and Heidegger are “essentially demonic” (456).
“I obviously do everything to be ‘hard to understand,’ myself!” taunted Friedrich Nietzsche in 1886,1 clairvoyantly challenging the legions of future scholars he knew would one day make their careers trying to understand him and to make him understandable. *Nietzsche’s Final Teaching*, by Michael Gillespie—a seasoned veteran in these legions—stands as a daring new attempt to meet Nietzsche’s challenge. Gillespie seeks to demonstrate which of Nietzsche’s core philosophical ideas functions as the true foundation of his philosophy as a whole. Not the *Übermensch*, not the “death of God,” not even the “will to power,” but—holds Gillespie—the “eternal recurrence of the same” fits this bill. Anyone who has studied Nietzsche and sensed what it would take to succeed in Gillespie’s undertaking will be impressed by his ambition. As Gillespie shows, Nietzsche himself, in his later, post-*Gay Science* writings, came increasingly to dwell on his own works as a topic worthy of philosophical inquiry. Whether Nietzsche in the end (i.e., before his descent into madness) believed he had understood the ultimate meaning of his own philosophy, and whether a genuinely systematic understanding of that philosophy is possible, are the long-debated questions Gillespie tries to put to rest.

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Methodologically, *Nietzsche’s Final Teaching* charts a course between contextualism and the careful attempt—associated with Leo Strauss and his students—to understand the great author’s intent (on the assumption that great authors are capable of transcending time and place). Gillespie aptly characterizes his own interpretive approach as “cultivat[ing] a practical sensibility in synthesizing the different elements that impact individual thinkers” (8).² In practice, this approach eschews many of the annoyances that encumber the two aforementioned interpretive approaches. While insisting, for example, that Nietzsche was a capacious thinker whose thought is of enduring relevance, Gillespie draws heavily on historical and biographical anecdote in attempting to resolve interpretive puzzles. He places particular emphasis, for example, on the moment when the idea of the eternal recurrence reportedly first occurred to Nietzsche, on the shores of Lake Silvaplana, in August 1881. More importantly, however, Gillespie makes no bones about criticizing Nietzsche as a thinker when he thinks criticism is warranted—particularly in regard to Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the “last man” and the death of God.

For Gillespie, who on this point follows Heidegger,³ the core of Nietzsche’s philosophy is his comprehensive theoretical rejection of all previous Western metaphysics—a rejection which nonetheless “depends in its fundamental structures upon traditional metaphysics” (13). Gillespie in his introductory chapter refers to his rejection theory as “Nietzsche’s (anti)metaphysics.” As Gillespie explains, through recourse to an Aristotelian-Thomistic framework, “Nietzsche’s (anti)metaphysics” consists of two categories and five subcategories. These are a new *metaphysica generalis*—ontology and logic—and *metaphysica specialis*—theology, cosmology, and anthropology. Gillespie’s position, as he articulates it in his introduction, is that “from Nietzsche’s point of view, European metaphysics”—based on the biblical and Greco-Roman outlooks—“had become unbelievable” (17). In response, Nietzsche sought to develop, as an “alternative” to all of the metaphysical conceptions that had previously been proposed to satisfy these subcategories, five new subcategories. Thus, on the basis of Gillespie’s proposed framework, Nietzsche’s new ontology is the “eternal recurrence”; his new logic, perspectivism and “musical logic”; his new theology, the “death of God” and the rebirth of Dionysus; his new cosmology, the “will to power”; and his new anthropology, the “last man” and the *Übermensch*.

² Parenthetical page references are to the book here under review.

In proposing to conceptualize Nietzsche’s final teaching by means of a new theory—namely the “(anti)metaphysics,” which Nietzsche never develops himself—Gillespie indicates the scope of his ambitions. Indeed, he could well be interpreted as attempting to move beyond Nietzsche in a certain respect, insofar as the “(anti)metaphysics” which he purports to uncover would provide a conceptual unity for Nietzsche’s thought which Nietzsche himself was evidently unable to articulate before his death. As Gillespie puts it, “Nietzsche had his own vision for what his completed final teaching would look like, in part visible in his existing works, and in part drawn from his notes and letters” (188). To this end, Gillespie puts great stock in Nietzsche’s Nachlass. In these, Gillespie believes, he can discern the architecture of Nietzsche’s incomplete magnum opus, which he believes would have centered on the “eternal recurrence.” He thus bravely does battle with Heidegger. Like Gillespie, Heidegger purported to have espied in Nietzsche’s unpublished manuscripts—which, following Nietzsche’s sister, Heidegger refers to as The Will to Power—the essential structures of Nietzsche’s uncompleted final teaching. Gillespie rightly faults Heidegger and other contemporary scholars for putting too much stock in this “work,” which, as Gillespie persuasively contends, is not so much a work as a heap of notes for a projected work: Nietzsche “was unable to finish even a draft of the great final work in which he intended to announce to the world in the clearest terms the doctrine of the eternal recurrence” (21). Much more imagination than has previously been exerted is therefore required, argues Gillespie, in order to glimpse that connective tissue—namely, the eternal recurrence “doctrine”—which holds the Nachlass and Nietzsche’s later published works together.

Notwithstanding the initial emphasis Gillespie places on his original theory of the “(anti)metaphysics,” we soon learn that Gillespie understands the main contribution of his book rather to be his thesis that the “(anti)metaphysics was given unity by the doctrine of the eternal recurrence” (13; emphasis added). Gillespie thus seeks to ground his own (re)formulation of “Nietzsche’s final teaching”—the “(anti)metaphysics”—on a basis which Nietzsche himself provides. The eternal recurrence, argues Gillespie, should be understood as the foundation of Nietzsche’s final teaching, and for two reasons. As the “ontology” of Nietzsche’s metophysica generalis, the eternal recurrence is presupposed if the rest of his “(anti)metaphysics” is to be understood. Regardless of what Nietzsche himself says, in other words, the eternal recurrence is the concept in light of which all of Nietzsche’s other concepts make the most sense; it is therefore reasonable to construe Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole in light of it. Second, Nietzsche himself indicated the special place which the
eternal recurrence occupies in his thought—a point Gillespie emphasizes in discussing Nietzsche’s autobiographical description of the moment when the thought of the eternal recurrence, which Gillespie styles “Nietzsche’s deepest thought,” came to him, in August 1881.

Gillespie thus seemingly promises to execute—in eight subsequent chapters, grouped into three parts—the weighty task of explicating Nietzsche’s account of the eternal recurrence, and then demonstrating how the other four subcategories of his *metaphysica generalis-specialis* flow from it. It is, consequently, with considerable disappointment that in turning to the body of Gillespie’s book the reader finds not an orderly, synoptic, systematic examination of the five parts of Nietzsche’s new *metaphysica generalis-specialis*—which his introductory chapter unabashedly promises—but instead, eight separate essays whose relation and relevance to this opening set of ideas turn out, on the whole, to be rather hard to discern.

Gillespie chooses to begin his book not with an account of how Nietzsche understood the eternal recurrence—we have to wait until chapters 2 and 3 for such an account—but with a two-part discussion of Nietzsche’s “anthropology.” Gillespie grounds this discussion in specific passages from *Zarathustra*, arguing that Nietzsche there erects the framework within which to make sense of his broader account of human nature. Central to Gillespie’s discussion of *Zarathustra* are the poetic images that Nietzsche employs, which Gillespie persuasively interprets. “Human being is a rope stretched between beast and *Übermensch*, a being whose being consists in being pulled in opposite directions, indeed, a being that only remains in being as a result of the tension generated by these two conflicting directions” (29). For Nietzsche, there is a continuum between man and beast; yet by the same token, man is also ultimately animal, rooted in and, in a sense, limited by a network of mutually conflicting animal passions. Whether man becomes more *man* (*Übermensch*) or more *beast* (“last man”) depends, paradoxically, on how powerfully he is pulled out and away from his animal existence, while remaining nonetheless firmly planted in that existence. On this score, Gillespie’s analysis of the tightrope walker is of particular interest. Like modern man, who faces the death of God and a prospect of vanished ideals (a “twilight of the idols”), the tightrope walker in Nietzsche’s presentation faces only grave choices. He cannot relax the rope, and if he hurries toward his goal, he might fall. It takes dauntless *Übermensch*-aspirants to try to cross the rope, yet even for these, there is no guarantee of a successful crossing; they, too, could come to nihilistic ruin in the form of—to use Gillespie’s own formula—“murder, madness, and suicide” (xi, 149, 154). Yet, Gillespie also points out, the intrepidity of
such men—their very willingness to cross, despite an uncertain outcome—is itself a sign of what Nietzsche would call their higher “rank.”

The concept of rank Gillespie argues to be central to Nietzsche’s thought, claiming that it constitutes the link between Nietzsche’s “anthropology” and his “ontology” (48, 131). Men of low rank, or “slaves,” develop resentment, or the “spirit of revenge,” toward the world because, feeling themselves to be weak and exposed, they wish the world to be other than it is. Men of high rank, by contrast, are those capable of “willing everything” (154), that is, embracing all that comes to be without regret or resentment. The “thought” or “doctrine” that accompanies this latter view of the world is that of the eternal recurrence, which entails affirming the necessity of all that happens. Or, to use Gillespie’s own formulae, the eternal recurrence is “a manifestation of the will to power; it is the assertion of an Übermensch” (19).

In the course of part 2, “Nietzsche as Teacher of the Eternal Recurrence,” Gillespie jumps abruptly from Nietzsche’s “anthropology” to an interpretation of his 1886 “Prefaces,” then to an account of the role of music in Nietzsche’s thought. We infer—because we are not told—that Gillespie here wishes to replicate his process in part 1: to establish a connection between the eternal recurrence (Nietzsche’s new “ontology”) and another subcategory of Nietzsche’s metaphysica specialis, this time his new “logic”: perspectivism and “musical logic.” On this score, Gillespie’s discussion of perspectivism constitutes his book’s strongest argument while his discussion of music constitutes its weakest. With simplicity and elegance, Gillespie unpacks and summarizes Nietzsche’s powerful, perhaps irrefutable critique of the idea of a “true” perspective of the world. Every human perspective, Nietzsche maintains, is the outcome of the animal passions driving the individual, and therefore just as determined to be what it is, just as “necessary,” as all other perspectives. The world for each of us, according to Nietzsche, therefore cannot be other than what our own passions compel us to think it is. What each of us perceives of and thinks about the world thus cannot be evaluated on the basis of how accurately we grasp intelligible objects separate from ourselves. Rather, for Nietzsche, the only solid basis of evaluation is the inner organization or rank of our passions, out of which emerges our own perspective of the world. Whether our perspective is a master’s or a slave’s—that of a joyous Übermensch or a retributive “last man”—depends on the “rank” or “hierarchy” of our passions: which passion masters which. Yet how, in Nietzsche’s view, one might establish whether precisely this determination is not made perspectively—and hence without any real ground—is a question Gillespie does not take up.
Sensibly following Nietzsche’s cue in *Beyond Good and Evil* (“By means of music, the very passions enjoy themselves” [§106]), Gillespie next turns from Nietzsche’s account of the passions to his account—insofar as he has one—of music. If, according to Nietzsche, the world makes sense to us as a result of our passions, then music—which stirs our passions perhaps unlike anything else—has a rightful claim as a kind of reasoning: hence, Gillespie’s view that Nietzsche found in music a new “logic.” Regrettably, Gillespie spends less time explaining what this implausible view might mean and more time advancing the frankly odd suggestion that two of Nietzsche’s books, *Twilight of the Idols* and *Ecce Homo*, are structured in sonata form. Though Gillespie marshals considerable evidence to this end, the interpretive effort seems hardly worthwhile. Setting aside the fact that the sonata form could easily be “discovered in” (read: attributed to) the structure of any number of books, we must ask: How, if true, would such a discovery in Nietzsche’s books help us better understand the staggering claim by Nietzsche that music is a kind of logic that makes deeper sense of the world than does actual logic? How—to put it more pointedly—would such a discovery amount to anything more than a trite literary parlor trick?

The final section of *Nietzsche’s Final Teaching* compares Nietzsche with Dostoyevsky and Plato. It contains many fascinating observations, and evidences great learning. Most of the terrain it covers is well trodden, however, and contributes nothing to Gillespie’s “(anti)metaphysics” thesis. (Incidentally, Gillespie makes no mention of this thesis in all of section 1 [chapters 2–4] nor most of section 2 [chapters 6 and 7] nor in all of section 3 [chapters 8 and 9].) Dostoyevsky, argues Gillespie, traveled down the same nihilistic path as did Nietzsche, yet saw redemption through Christ—as opposed to the eternal recurrence—as the way to overcome true nihilism. Plato, similarly, agreed with Nietzsche to the extent that he recognized the need for a “warrior aristocracy” in the best political order. Yet, whereas for Plato that order can be glimpsed only through a full investigation of human reason, for Nietzsche, that political order over which the *Übermensch* of the future will (after years of cataclysmic war) reign will stand as the ultimate enfranchisement of the masterly, tyrannical, antirational passions.

As this summary suggests, section 3 crystallizes Gillespie’s tendency—one he evinces throughout *Nietzsche’s Final Teaching*—to smooth over the rough edges of Nietzsche’s endlessly intricate writings. Yet as the quote with which we opened this review makes clear, the rough edges of Nietzsche’s work are not imperfections, but part of his artistry. As a result of his tendency
to (over)polish, Gillespie in the aggregate obscures the most philosophically interesting paradoxes in Nietzsche’s thought. It is in precisely these paradoxes, however, that we find Nietzsche’s philosophical depth; with them, other first-rate thinkers—such as Dostoyevsky and Plato—would take issue. Is it true, Dostoyevsky and Plato might have rejoined, that that which raises man above the animals is his own will—and not, instead, a natural erotic desire for the noble, which exists in tension with the equally natural desire for the truth? Or (alternatively) a desire for eternal life with God? What is Nietzsche’s evidence that man is—to quote Gillespie’s summary from his chapter on Dostoevsky—“a willing being, not a mind or a soul but a self or body consisting of a multiplicity of conflicting passions” (171)? That Gillespie believes Nietzsche has no compelling evidence, or that the evidence Nietzsche marshals is so uncompelling as to be unworthy of serious consideration, he would seem to suggest in two ways. Early on, Gillespie quite surprisingly asserts that “any doctrine that makes a claim about the whole cannot in principle be known or demonstrated by experience or by any kind of rational proof” (19). Much later, in his chapter on Dostoevsky, he states similarly that “the idea of the eternal recurrence is just an idea, a possibility that may or may not be true…. As an account of the whole, it can have no demonstration” (156; emphasis added). It is difficult to read such dogmatic statements about the limits of philosophy without wondering what importance Gillespie actually sees in the study of Nietzsche’s philosophy, beyond some kind of rhetorical training. Gillespie himself seems to have wondered this, asserting rather implausibly in his semiautobiographical preface that “Nietzsche’s goal is not to persuade, but to enthuse, entrance, and overpower” (vii). Is this all Nietzsche intended? Are the thousands upon thousands of pages that make up Nietzsche’s Gesamtausgabe—notes, correspondences, researches, and published writings—really just behind-the-scenes preparations of a rhetorical impresario?

This substantive weakness in Gillespie’s treatment of Nietzsche—a reluctance to pursue to their respective ends the various lines of inquiry that emerge in the course of attentive reading—I believe to be connected to the structural weakness in his monograph that I discussed above. The chapters of Nietzsche’s Final Teaching do not build on each other; they do not issue in a powerful, coherent argument about the eternal recurrence and its place in Nietzsche’s “final teaching.” Rather, they read as distinct works, each

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4 Additionally, Plato might point out that eros is peculiar to us as human beings, and raises us above animals, even if it does not belong to the rational life (consider Symposium 207a–c).
conceived as a treatment of a specific puzzle within a specific text and each, consequently, pursuing its own line of inquiry. To be sure, Gillespie from time to time tries to tie them back in to his initial theme ("As we have seen..."), but such attempts at imposing coherence read as just that: impositions.

It is to Gillespie’s credit that, in his preface, he refers to his book as consisting of “essays.” Nevertheless, there is no indication in the book’s definitive-sounding title, or on its title page, that *Nietzsche’s Final Teaching* is anything less than a cohesive, coherent, unified account of precisely that. What is more, Gillespie’s compelling introductory chapter—which takes aim at such venerable authorities as Löwith and Heidegger, as well as at the renowned Nietzsche commentator Laurence Lampert—presents itself as introducing a work that will finally put the nail in the coffin of the question whether Nietzsche’s thought has a unifying ontology at all. Perhaps, one might reasonably retort, this criticism concerns the author’s publisher, rather than the author himself. That it *does* concern the author becomes obvious once one realizes that the unifying themes that Gillespie proposes to treat in his preface and introductory chapter he almost entirely drops in the body of the book itself. As noted above, the core theme of Gillespie’s undertaking—the eternal recurrence—is discussed in detail briefly (less than four pages, total) in chapters 2 and 3. What is more, and to repeat: Apart from a few briefs mentions in chapter 4 and in his conclusion, Gillespie simply abandons the theory of Nietzsche’s “(anti)metaphysics” after his introductory chapter. Perhaps anticipating the reactions of readers—such as the present one—who looked forward to a fully developed account of this theory, Gillespie concedes in his concluding chapter that Nietzsche’s final teaching constitutes merely “something like an (anti)metaphysics” (188; emphasis added). Such a concession might well have been made up front, rather than at the book’s end.

All of this is by no means to say that the essays that constitute Gillespie’s book are not themselves worthwhile writings. Far from it. It is simply to point out the following consideration, which might be of use to potential readers: Gillespie’s book is considerably marred by the disjunction between its self-presentation as a systematic—indeed, *definitive*—treatment of a topic that has long befuddled scholars, and what it is in reality, namely, a collection of highly learned, thought-provoking essays that were, nevertheless, quite obviously conceived as separate writings. Subsequent editions of *Nietzsche’s Final Teaching*—which Gillespie’s monograph duly merits—would therefore do well to correct its erroneous current self-presentation.
Interpretation is central to the scholarly enterprise. Interpretation, however, depends upon the acceptance of certain hermeneutic principles. Most scholars imagine that a text is a form of communication and that understanding the meaning of a text thus entails not just understanding the words on the page but also the author's intentions. This, however, is not always the case. For those concerned with holy scriptures the human author is nothing more than the conduit for a divine logos whose intention is beyond our ken. For radical deconstructionists, by contrast, the intention of the author is irrelevant, since the text is merely a worldly object whose meaning we constantly invent and reinvent as we will. For those who do imagine that the composition of texts is intended to convey meaning across space and time, there are still a number of hermeneutic questions that have to be answered. How do we determine an individual author's intentions? Are these a reflection of the author's character and life experience? And if so, how are these to be determined? What role does the author's historical context play in helping us to understand his or her intentions? And how do we determine what this context is? Is the author, for example, as many in the Cambridge School imagine, strictly circumscribed by his immediate historical circumstances, or does he, as many of the followers of Leo Strauss imagine, rise above his time to address perennial questions, conversing not only with his lesser contemporaries but with the great minds of ages past and ages to come? And since even the most brilliant authors live in specific times surrounded by those who subscribe knowingly or unknowingly to traditional values, how can we know whether or to what extent an author speaks openly or esoterically?
The hermeneutic path that I have sought to follow, as Zug recognizes, falls between the Cambridge and the Straussian schools. I am convinced that few great thinkers are completely constrained by their immediate circumstances, but I also do not believe that they can ever entirely transcend these circumstances. And even if they are able to rise above the perspectives and prejudices of their age, they are still ultimately constrained by the conceptual vocabulary available to them. What they intend is thus not something we can know a priori nor is it something that can be understood merely by an examination of their historical circumstances. Interpretation thus requires an examination not merely of their published works, but also of their letters, their Nachlass, the accounts of friends, and so forth, as well as a general and at times comprehensive knowledge of their times and the dominant questions of the intellectual traditions within which they worked. Interpretation also requires that a scholar accept nothing at face value, always cultivating a healthy hermeneutic suspicion, yet also always seeking to piece together the various bits of information to form some vision of what an author intended. It is not an easy task and perhaps the most we can ask is an honest effort to do one’s best in the recognition that one’s best may still not be enough. And what a scholar should hope for from his fellow scholars is a similar honest effort to assist in making his interpretation clearer and more accurate. I am thus especially grateful to both of my reviewers for their candid and helpful critiques of my book. Scholarship at its best is not an individual but a collective enterprise, and both Zug and Beiner exemplify a generosity of spirit in their reviews that reflects their dedication to our common endeavor.

Interpreting the work of Friedrich Nietzsche is difficult for many of the reasons stated above, but the difficulty is exacerbated by three additional factors. First, his texts were altered and his biography distorted by his anti-Semitic sister in ways that fundamentally misrepresented his intentions. Second, these distortions played an important role in the initial interpretations of his thought and in the use made of his thought by National Socialism. And third, in reacting against these early textual distortions when the truth eventually came out, later scholars often careened in an opposite direction, portraying Nietzsche as a thinker of democracy and radical liberation. This problematic reception of Nietzsche’s thought has in my view led many scholars to treat the secondary elements of Nietzsche’s thought as essential and to overlook and neglect what he himself considered to be his deepest and most fundamental thought. Both Zug and Beiner take seriously my efforts to discover the genuine Nietzsche long hidden under the accretions of past scholarship and
ideology, although they remain skeptical about whether I have proven my case, and whether I have been sufficiently critical of Nietzsche.

Zug applauds my efforts to provide a comprehensive interpretation of Nietzsche’s late thought as an (anti-)metaphysics in the initial chapter of the book, but he is disappointed with my failure to lay out this interpretation systematically in the remaining chapters, leading him to conclude that my title is misleading and that the book is more a collection of essays than a comprehensive account of Nietzsche’s final teaching. He is correct that the book is a collection of essays, as I note (and as he notices) in my preface. That said, I think the essays do present an argument about Nietzsche’s final teaching as a whole. I take his real complaint to be that I should have written a different book that fulfilled the promise of the title and first chapter more systematically. That is fair enough, and it is clear to me from his comments that I should have explained more fully and clearly why I did not do this, and why I have come to believe that such an account cannot succeed.

At the core of my book is an attempt to reconstruct from both Nietzsche’s published works and his notes and letters, the remarks of his friends, and so forth a great project that he did not and perhaps could not complete, but a project that guided almost everything he did over the last seven years of his productive life. That my account of what Nietzsche intended may be more systematic than he was ever able to achieve or that he ever even wanted to achieve, as Zug suggests, may also be the case. But it is sometimes the task of the scholar to see the whole of a thinker’s life work in ways that the thinker himself in the throes of passion and continuing thought could not see so clearly himself. Could I have done a better and more systematic job in laying out all of the nuances of Nietzsche’s final teaching? Perhaps, although I am not sure that it would have been true to Nietzsche. It is important to remember that while I sketch out the project that he imagined he would complete, he never did actually complete it. Consequently, the attempt to be more systematic in my analysis that Zug would like to see, would not only have overtaxed what Nietzsche actually did do but may also have even further concealed the fascinating perplexities and paradoxes of Nietzsche’s thought that Zug worries I have already obscured.

My book could have been more systematic if I had confined myself to Nietzsche’s published works, but such a book in my view would have been redundant, since Laurence Lampert long ago completed this task in a way that I believe is unlikely ever to be equaled. I hoped instead to make clear the hitherto unrecognized philosophical and moral meaning of the titanic
thought that lies at the center of Nietzsche’s final teaching, the thought of the eternal recurrence of the same. Some readers will certainly conclude that I dwell too often on this doctrine, since it comes to the fore in one way or the other in each of the essays in the book, but over time I have come to believe that it is not only Nietzsche’s most important thought but also one of the most important thoughts for us as well, since it encapsulates the cataclysmic conclusion to the modern project.

Zug and Beiner would also like a more systematic account not just of Nietzsche’s late work but of the eternal recurrence in particular, one that delineates its nature, its consequences, and its deficiencies. I sympathize with their dissatisfaction on this point. I can say in my defense only that having read almost everything Nietzsche wrote about the doctrine and a great deal of what scholars have written about it, I am not convinced that a comprehensive account is possible or even desirable. It was certainly not something that Nietzsche ever worked out to his own satisfaction.

I do want to disagree with Beiner’s suggestion that the idea itself is thoroughly implausible if not manifestly wrong. He suggests that this doctrine was already refuted by Nietzsche’s friend Deussen and more fully in the early twentieth century by Georg Simmel. For a long time I accepted their arguments as definitive, and I thus should have been more forthcoming in explaining why I now do not take them to be pertinent, let alone dispositive. These arguments and most other purported disproofs of the doctrine rely on mathematical notions of infinity, claiming that Nietzsche is wrong to assume that, in a universe of finite matter/energy and infinite time, repetition is inevitable; they adduce cases of the motion of multiple related objects moving at differential speeds that will never return to their mutual starting position. While these arguments are correct mathematically, they do not demonstrate that Nietzsche’s doctrine is incorrect. There may be no end to the sequence of the integers, for example, but the integers are ultimately only symbols that are dependent on the existence of the matter/energy states within which they are constructed, and should these matter/energy states cease to be, the integers would cease to be as well. The real question is then whether the number of possible matter/energy states in our universe is finite or infinite. Contemporary cosmologists differ on the answer to this question and it is not one that I or, I suspect, Zug or Beiner is qualified to answer. Therefore, I am no longer convinced that the mathematical disproofs of the doctrine alone can be dispositive.
Moreover, for Nietzsche—and I would argue for us as well—it is not essential that there be an actual eternal recurrence for the idea to be of utmost importance. The modern world rests on two great pillars, the belief that every event is determined by an antecedent cause and that humans are free beings who do not merely behave but who act freely and are thus morally responsible. As Kant pointed out in his discussion of the antinomies, however, these two assumptions are contradictory. Many of the greatest nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers (beginning with Kant) sought to resolve this contradiction. The inadequacy of their solutions has repeatedly led to the denial of one or the other of the sides of the contradiction from thinkers such as Fichte or Sartre, who sought to show that the supposed necessity of nature is derivative from freedom, to Schopenhauer and contemporary materialists, who argue that human freedom is merely an illusion. Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal recurrence examines what it would mean to assert the truth of both freedom and necessity, or to put it another way, how alone it would be possible for human beings to act as if they were free in the face of the necessity that science sees determining the motion of everything in our universe.

In Nietzsche's view, the acceptance of the assertion that a universal natural causality controls all human and nonhuman motion leads to fatalism and despair, paralyzing the will of those who can comprehend it and engendering in them a nihilistic recognition that their lives have no meaning, purpose, or goal. Ordinary humans may live blissfully unaware of this fact but as a result will be spiritually impoverished “last men,” to use Nietzsche’s terminology. To overcome this nihilism and free oneself from despair it is necessary for the best to will the eternal recurrence, which means to will everything good and evil that ever has or ever will occur. This is Nietzsche’s deepest and most horrifying thought. In this way, though, it is possible for the will to free itself from fatalism and nihilism and become capable of action. The actual recurrence of all things and the persistence of the ego that Beiner (following Simmel) points to is thus not essential to the existential and psychological liberation that Nietzsche believes the doctrine makes possible.

Nietzsche is convinced that only this great act of will can redeem humanity from a yawning spiritual abyss and, as I have tried to show, all of his other key concepts—the Übermensch, the will to power, the necessity of cataclysmic wars, the inevitable destruction of European values, and a monstrous logic of terror—all follow from this abysmal idea. Thus, unless one recognizes the centrality of this idea, one cannot understand Nietzsche’s late thought. But while I believe that the consequences Nietzsche sees following
from this doctrine are possible, I do not believe that they are necessary or even probable. What he imagines to be inevitable in fact rests on a very narrow understanding of human nature that I call into question in my comparison of Nietzsche to Dostoevsky and Plato. Here I agree with Beiner, for example, that Nietzsche too easily believed that a new Dionysian religion could come into being and reshape humanity in the same way Christianity had in the Roman world. That said, I must admit that I am struck by the rise of powerful political religions in the first half of the twentieth century and the rise of much more bellicose forms of existing religions in the second half of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries, which are shockingly reminiscent of Nietzsche.

Zug and Beiner also do not believe that I am sufficiently critical of Nietzsche’s apparent effort to replace rationalist logic with music and poetry, and they do not think I am tough enough on Nietzsche for his contributions to Fascism and National Socialism. Let me take these objections in that order.

Nietzsche was certainly not the first to criticize European rationalism, which had been under assault since at least the thirteenth century and had been driven by critique to move from a defense of substantial forms, to mathematical laws of nature, to dialectical reason, to analytic philosophy, and finally to a pragmatic syncretism. All have failed to eliminate skepticism. That does not mean that rationalism should not be defended, but simply that Nietzsche’s making of an attempt to find another foundation for reasoning is far from new or unique. Moreover, as I tried to make clear, although obviously insufficiently, Nietzsche’s goal from the time of the Birth of Tragedy was not to eliminate discursive reason but to combine it with music. Here he imagines as his hero a “Socrates who practices music.” In this sense he should not be counted as defending poetry or music against philosophy, nor as a “friend of Homer” or, for that matter, of Wagner, but as someone who tried to combine the logic of music with that of philosophy.

In this context, his use of musical forms, and of the sonata form in particular, is of real importance. Here I have to disagree with Zug that many works could be interpreted as employing sonata form. The sonata has a very specific form and structure. Nor would I agree with either Zug or Beiner that Nietzsche’s turn to music is merely a rhetorical ploy or a literary parlor trick. Western music developed a logic of its own that is related to the logic of words but is still quite different, aimed less at moving the mind than at moving the passions, which Nietzsche believes are finally more fundamental than reason. He has no problem with rational demonstration and indeed his texts are
filled with arguments that aim at just that, but he also wants to enthuse and inspire his readers. But from both reviewers’ remarks, I have to conclude that I did not sufficiently demonstrate the connection of Nietzsche’s musical and discursive logic. Here I have perhaps spent too much time in the company of musicologists and did not give a clear enough explanation for those not immersed in the technical aspects of music. More is clearly needed.

Second, both Zug and Beiner suggest that I do not adequately condemn Nietzsche for providing Fascism and National Socialism with intellectual fodder for their rapacious ideologies. This is a more complicated issue. Nietzsche in my view was thoroughly opposed to both the anti-Semitism and the spirit of revenge that permeated, and in a sense defined, National Socialism. Contrary to Holub and Beiner, I am thus unwilling to let Nietzsche’s sister off the hook. I am convinced that Nietzsche’s attacks on anti-Semitism and his friendship with numerous well-known Jews would have made him anathema to the National Socialists if his sister had not concealed these facts and portrayed him as an anti-Semite. But, of course, on such a point there is obviously room for disagreement.

That said, I do not mean to exonerate Nietzsche for his promotion of violence. He was certainly no pacifist or liberal. In fact, he foresaw wars that were at least as violent as those of the twentieth century, and he was convinced that such wars were the inevitable consequence of the collapse of European/Christian morality. Moreover, he believed that such wars were necessary to create a new race of hardened Übermensch to revitalize European civilization. I clearly do not believe that on this point he was correct and I am convinced that the outcome he envisaged might well have been worse than what did in fact occur, but I do not believe it would have been either Fascism or National Socialism.

My goal in the end was not to defend Nietzsche nor for that matter to condemn him but to present him as he intended to appear and to suggest that while we may learn a great deal from him, we need to be vigilant that we are not carried away by his seductive ideas and rhetoric. When Yeats first encountered Nietzsche in English translation, he spent two years reading everything he could get his hands on, enthusiastically characterizing him as “the Enchanter.” A century filled with horrors later, we need to be a bit more circumspect in confronting his thought. My sincere thanks to both of my reviewers.
I warmly thank Professor Michael Gillespie for his charitable reading of my review and for his thought-provoking response to it. I would also like to thank Professor and Editor-in-Chief Timothy Burns and Professor Ronald Beiner for making possible this enlightening and engaging symposium, from which I have profited immensely and from which I hope many other students of Nietzsche will, too.

Nietzsche’s understanding of music is arguably the most puzzling dimension of what Professor Gillespie, in Nietzsche’s Final Teaching, has shown to be an already deeply enigmatic, seemingly unsystematic, body of thought. Gillespie therefore merits praise for the hard work he has put into trying to solve this puzzle. Ultimately, notwithstanding his thoughtful and charitable response to my critique of his proposed solution, I retain the reservations I originally expressed about his solution; my reasons are twofold.

The first reason is interpretive: while Gillespie does present an intriguing—and, in places, an impressively detailed (see especially 92)—structural interpretation of two of Nietzsche’s works (Twilight of the Idols and Ecce Homo), it remains opaque to me how, precisely, Gillespie has decided to make the structural divisions in these books that he does, with the result that he ends up discovering the sonata form in them. I am by no means closed to the possibility that he has made this discovery; I would simply need to see more evidence, presented in a more systematic way.
My second, and more substantive, reason concerns the theoretical purchase that such a structural discovery would have for understanding Nietzsche’s philosophy, even if it were presented in the most persuasive way possible. Would uncovering a hidden sonata structure in Nietzsche’s works shed hermeneutical light on Nietzsche’s philosophy? Or theoretical light on the nature of the sonata form? Or both? Gillespie, for his part, seems to prefer the former, arguing that his musical reading of the books aids exegesis of those texts. But I wonder if it might be more profitable to investigate the alternative, by using Nietzsche’s philosophy to explore the nature of musical form—a topic which Nietzsche himself thought to be highly relevant to his own philosophy, as *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music*, together with his two late books on Wagner, confirm.

On this score, Gillespie’s discussion of the sonata form and its relevance to Nietzsche studies seems like a promising avenue for further research in Nietzsche’s broader understanding of music. Thus, my critique of this aspect of Gillespie’s book is not that the music question is the wrong one, but that Gillespie might have attempted to answer this question in a slightly different way. Let me briefly attempt to explain this. Whereas Gillespie sees the sonata form as providing a kind of metaphorical structure to some of Nietzsche’s own writings, it seems to me that Gillespie might have gone about this the other way around, namely, by showing that the basic architecture of the sonata form itself can be profitably understood through a Nietzschean lens.

For a very long time, scholars have shared a cross-field consensus that the sonata form, with its emphasis on balance and dialogical development, embodied the values and aspirations of Enlightenment rationalism. As I understand it, the locus classicus of this view is Charles Rosen’s *The Classical Style: Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven*; it has also been developed by Wilfrid Mellers. In contrast with this view, Gillespie has, in using the sonata form as a lens through which to understand Nietzsche’s books, accordingly suggested that the seemingly “rational” sonata form can also shed light on the philosophy of the great antirationalist. Gillespie’s intriguing suggestion would, if fleshed out, advance a radically alternative interpretation of the sonata form, namely, that what have hitherto been understood as the rationalistic

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1. In 1887, Nietzsche altered its title to *The Birth of Tragedy, or Hellenism and Pessimism*.
components of the form are just as well, or perhaps better, understood as bearing an antirational, Dionysian significance.

A sensible yet thought-provoking articulation of this alternative could, I think, be sustained, and along lines which Gillespie has already sketched in his introduction to *Nietzsche’s Final Teaching*. Cosmologically speaking, Nietzsche sees human life and activity as emerging from generative tensions between irresolvable, disharmonic elements in a nonteleological natural world. Past scholars, following Rosen, have interpreted the sonata form as a symbolic representation of harmony and order—Newtonian physics made musical. In contrast, a Nietzschean view might interpret the sonata form’s competing themes—especially their being broken down and worked out in the “development” section and then recapitulated, at the end, in a metamorphosed version—as symbolizing the willful disciplining of natural, undirected chaos by a life-affirming master.

The possibility of a Nietzschean interpretation of the sonata form deserves in my view to be developed further, mostly because it promises to illuminate a hitherto unlighted cavern in Nietzsche’s thought, but also because, if persuasively argued, it would cause many scholars in multiple fields—philosophy, aesthetics, musicology, and history (among others)—to rethink reigning scholarly paradigms about the sonata form, and about the human and philosophical significance of music, in general: what it is, and what it means culturally, historically, and theoretically.

Professor Gillespie has done Nietzsche studies the great service of highlighting, from the standpoint of political theory, areas in Nietzsche’s thought which are ripe for further scholarly inquiry and development. One of these areas, as I have tried to suggest, is Nietzsche’s understanding of music; and as Gillespie has helpfully indicated, drawing on his own capacious understanding of European cultural history, music theory, and the history of ideas, any single dimension of Nietzsche’s thought can serve as an avenue for deeper insights into Nietzsche’s greater—perhaps final—teaching.
In 1942, under the shadow of World War II and the distressing situation of a divided and occupied France, Jacques Maritain wrote a small book which he described as “an essay in political philosophy.”¹ The author felt that not only civilization was at stake, but the need to win the peace after winning the war. This required a political philosophy able to keep totalitarianism at bay. Maritain was among the most famous French neo-Thomist philosophers, having written extensively about Aquinas’s metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of nature, and ethics, but his own contribution to political matters had hitherto been scarce. It would probably have remained in the background had it not been for his active involvement in the UNESCO commission that debated the philosophical basis of the yet unborn Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The book-essay, entitled Les droits de l’homme et la loi naturelle, starts from the relations between person and society and argues that the recognition of the dignity of the human person had its apex in “Christian philosophy,” notwithstanding the acknowledgment of other contributions.

The fundamental thesis of the book is that while the human person is by nature political and human society is a requirement of man’s nature, the individual person matters. Political philosophy, “under penalty of denaturalizing itself, implies the acknowledgment of the fundamental rights of the person” — including the aspiration to liberty. “Natural Law and the light of conscience do not merely prescribe what to do, or not to do, but acknowledge rights, in particular the rights tied to the very nature of man.”

To sum up, Natural Law leads to the recognition of the rights of man as its corollary.

Pierre Manent, Raymond Aron’s faithful assistant at the Collège de France, who nevertheless has declared himself in recent interviews to be intellectually closer to Leo Strauss than to Aron, has just published a small book with a title that seems to pay homage to Maritain’s essay. The title, however, inverts the expressions and it reads instead La loi naturelle et les droits de l’homme. The book, while also concerned with a theme that both authors call the naturalization and denaturalization of man, reverses not only the title but Maritain’s fundamental thesis, despite Manent sharing with him a Thomism of sorts (through Louis Jugnet).

According to Manent, the language of human rights is in opposition to Natural Law, which, he argues, has been radically discredited by modern philosophy and despised by enlightened opinion, owing either to its archaism or to its opposition to the recognition and enforcement of human rights. To sum up, the rights of man necessarily result in the concealment of Natural Law.

Manent’s recent book seems particularly harsh on the philosophy of human rights, often making sweeping statements (most of which the author of this review is in agreement with), and is always interesting and insightful. The book is probably the most important and ambitious work by Manent to date. Human rights theories are re-chartering all social life, and Manent aims at questioning and re-chartering the field of “human rights” theories, providing an original account of the modern state. We are in need of a map. This review essay’s focus is on situating the work in the landscape of studies of human rights and, more closely, in the author’s intellectual itinerary, while...
marking the divergences and convergences between him and the philosophers that most influenced him: Aron and Strauss.

I

The book was published a few weeks ago by the Presses Universitaires de France and is based on the six lectures given in the context of the Étienne Gilson Chair of Metaphysics, created in 1995 at the School of Philosophy of the Institut Catholique de Paris. The chair is generally awarded to a single holder by invitation, taking into consideration his reputation in historical or speculative research in the field of metaphysics, and involves delivering a lecture series in French. (Manent curiously mentions the word “metaphysics” only a couple of times, and as a close synonym of “chimera.”)

The book opens provocatively with a “great contradiction” or an indestructible knot. Following in Strauss’s footsteps in Natural Right and History, Manent argues that the notion of natural law, which in the past was at the center of political debate, is now forgotten, though not completely dishonored, since it is maintained within a certain Catholic tradition.

The impossibility of undoing the knot reveals itself in our present situation, which the author seeks to describe in a somewhat cavalier but not inaccurate survey (2). There is an undeniable duality of criteria between the West (ici) and the Rest (ailleurs). We live here. “We” are the citizens of modern democracies who adhere to the idea of justice that the Enlightenment has validated. In the West, the most venerable institutions are now subject to an unrestricted criticism that evaluates and reforms everything according to the standard of human rights. One sign of the severity of this evaluation, and of its dogmatism, is the request for public recognition for LGBT lifestyles and the enforcement of this criterion “without precaution or reservation” (5). The new discourse implies a metaphysical claim, which shouts: There is no Natural Law (18). Manent asks himself why so many citizens embrace these ideas as such evident and salutary truths that they call for the intervention of the secular arm of positive law. Later in the book he explains how destructive of social ties the philosophy of human rights is for society, to the extent that they involve the consideration of abortion, divorce, and euthanasia as human rights (as opposed, say, to lesser evils).

Here (ici) in the West, then, a desire to severely judge and to reform everything prevails. When, on the other hand, we speak of what goes on outside the West, abroad (ailleurs), it is our duty to avoid any evaluation, to
“neutrally” contemplate all mores and traditions, the exotic, even the most barbaric, as an ethnologist or a tourist would contemplate them. The clearest sign of this “schizophrenia” is the attitude towards Islam: rights are universal, but cultures are all of equal value and we must refrain from all indignation (4).

The duality of criteria, which seems to us to be in need of nuance, is certainly one that invites reflection. How convincing really is the argument that this reveals “a sickness of judgment” (7)? Not very.

On the contrary, it seems reasonable to defend such duality between “thick” or maximalist moral arguments “at home” and “thin” or minimalist moral arguments “abroad,” for purely prudential reasons. Even in Manent’s own terms, within the framework of the Greek city, or of the modern nation—that is, according to him, the two most important political forms, which are the result of two “revolutions” in the dynamics of the West (94)—we can, and the philosopher should, certainly judge the “soul” of these regimes. Within a familiar culture, we can devise a republic in words that are the yardstick for evaluating extant regimes. Abroad, and just as we enter new territory and move away from what is familiar to us in time or space, some cautious abstention from “strong” evaluations may be preferable, at least before we are able to understand others as they understand themselves. Moreover, the social scientist studying different civilizations and “tribes” does not wish to remain enmeshed in a learned parochialism.

More promising is the idea that such “division and re-composition” between the “at home” and “abroad” has now become more complex with the arrival of those who come from outside and live among us. The clash between the various cultures and tribes has been what in the past triggered an inquiry into the nature of things and made us question the equation of the ancestral with the good, the natural with the manmade or conventional, the divine with the human.

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6 Charles Taylor, *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). Even if we do not embrace this “division of the self” in the terms in which Taylor defends it, a duality of sorts seems to us unavoidable.

7 See also Pierre Manent, *La raison des nations: Enquête sur la souveraineté nationale et les fondements de la démocratie* (Paris: Gallimard, 2006), 1: “Une forme politique—la nation, la cité—ce n’est pas un léger vêtement que l’on peut prendre et déposséder à volonté en restant ce que l’on est. Elle est ce Tout dans lequel tous les éléments de notre vie se rassemblent et prennent sens.”

8 See Leo Strauss, “The Frame of Reference in the Social Sciences,” Leo Strauss Papers, box 14, folder 10, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.
Even if we were able to discard entirely the duality of criteria that Manent calls the “great contradiction,” his instincts about our current predicament are surely right. Even those who, like him, defend the rights of nation-states to control immigration often resort to a rationale about human rights that can lead to the type of infinite extension of these rights that Manent fears.9

Successive waves or generations of “new rights” thus aim to eliminate all obstacles to individual freedom. The right to a universal income, for example, reveals according to Manent a profound trend in our society (91–92).

II

Manent thinks that the authority of human rights derives from their presumed universality. This assertion, made in passing (5), requires an important qualification: if this certainly applies to the rights theories within modern philosophy generally, it is more problematic as regards the current version of those theories, at least since 1948. We now know better the intricacies involved in the Universal Declaration drafting process, since sources such as memoirs and the personal correspondence of its main protagonists have come to light.10 Most such “narratives” obviously have, in tone if not in every detail, the character of a celebration, but most scholars agree that the problem of the universality of the new declaration cast a long shadow over the work of the UN human rights commission in charge of drafting the declaration. As soon as the plan was announced, the American Anthropological Association advised that the document should not be “conceived only in terms of the prevalent values in the countries of Western Europe and America.”11

9 Although motivated by the same gut feeling as Manent as regards immigration, David Miller, for example, re-examines how the possibility of recognizing human rights is ascertained. The possible criteria he addresses are three: a specific right is necessary to fulfill an essential human need (direct argument); a right that is a means to realizing other, directly grounded rights (instrumental argument); and the rights recognized by a process known as “cantilever,” that is, levered or anchored in existing rights, because of the similarity with other rights already included in extant charters, which would make the rejection of new rights inconsistent. See David Miller, Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016). See however Joseph H. Carens, The Ethics of Immigration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 245: “cantilever argument is only as strong as the foundation on which it rests.”


document that all the represented nations would accept. The framers of the declaration were more aware of the rupture with the past they were aiming at than the more recent defenders of human rights.

Let us briefly recall some details in the drafting of the UniversalDeclaration. Among the delegates to the San Francisco conference that established the United Nations was a young Lebanese philosopher, Charles Malik, a Greek-Orthodox Arab who had completed his PhD at Harvard on “The Metaphysics of Time in the Philosophies of Whitehead and Heidegger.” Upon arriving, he noted that many delegates from small countries, especially from Latin America, were disappointed with the agenda of the major powers. Malik also questioned the idea that it would be possible to maintain peace without addressing the underlying causes of conflicts. Eleanor Roosevelt, presiding over the drafting committee, later on declared: “Many of us thought that lack of standards for human rights the world over was one of the greatest causes of friction among the nations, and that recognition of human rights might become one of the cornerstones upon which peace could eventually be based.” The Chinese nationalist delegate Peng-Chun Chang was the vice president of the commission, and Charles Malik was responsible for preparing the official reports of the group. Chang was educated in the 1920s under John Dewey at Columbia University and his frequent quotes from Confucius were often merely pragmatic suggestions for compromise.

“Universality” was wishful thinking. Julian Huxley, the UNESCO director, upon hearing about the project created his own commission to investigate the potential for agreement among cultures. This other commission was presided over by the Marxist historian E. H. Carr and included Richard McKeon, a philosopher from the University of Chicago, and the neo-Thomist philosopher Jacques Maritain, who would become one of its most active members. The UNESCO commission sent questions to statesmen and academics around the world, including such figures as Mahatma Gandhi, Benedetto Croce, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and Aldous Huxley. To the commission’s surprise the lists of basic rights coming from the four corners of the globe

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12 Indeed, the document to be drafted had to be vetted by delegates representing four-fifths of the world’s population. Of the original members of the UN, six belonged to the Soviet bloc, eleven were of Islamic culture; four had a large Buddhist population and thirty-seven were marked by Judeo-Christian culture and the Enlightenment.


were roughly similar. The McKeon report concluded that it would be possible to reach agreement across cultures on certain rights which “may be viewed as implicit in the individual and individual nature of society.”15 This optimism was not confirmed in the course of the drafting process, nor is “consensual” the right word to describe the final declaration, which is at best a problematic “compromise.” The illusion of consistency is the work of another dominant figure in the commission: the French jurist René Cassin. He was commissioned to give order to documents already prepared by John Humphrey, a Canadian academic and diplomat. Cassin was a secular Jew who had been a legal adviser to Charles de Gaulle. Thanks to Cassin, the document that emerged from the working group was an instance of continental codification in the Napoleonic tradition.

Approval of the final document was far from secure throughout the process.16 Surprisingly, and although the debates dragged on for months, in the evening of December 4 the committee sent the document to the General Assembly for final approval. It was approved without any vote against and only eight (but significant) abstentions: the Saudis did not approve of marriage and divorce “by choice,” the South Africans did not approve of “nondiscrimination,” and some communists rejected “individualistic” political rights. Roosevelt, Malik, Maritain, McKeon, Cassin, Chang, and their colleagues had succeeded while remaining aware of the fragility of the document and the problems in its implementation. There was almost never universal agreement, and often not even a universal compromise.17

The framers of the contemporary Declaration of Human Rights were aware of its “novelty.” Malik’s presentation speech, on December 8, emphasized that, contrary to previous statements of rights, which had roots in particular cultures, this new Universal Declaration broke new ground, for it was “a composite synthesis of all these outlooks and movements and of much Oriental and Latin American wisdom.”18 Malik’s own philosophy had been challenged

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16 On the contrary, at the time, each delay made the prospects darker with the onset of the Cold War and the problem of Palestine and the new State of Israel dividing the commission itself. See Humphrey, Human Rights and the United Nations, 63.
17 The statement is nonetheless undoubtedly a monument, like the Justinian Corpus Juris Civilis, the Napoleonic Code, or the Constitution of the United States. See Mary Ann Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 218.
both by the Soviet bloc, eager to subordinate the person to the state, and by
the “individualists” of the West, but Malik’s existential personalism, backed
by Chang and the Latin Americans, left its mark in the document nonetheless.
*But any position on the ultimate nature of reality was excluded.*

To sum up, the agreement was not profound. Maritain related the famous
story of the man who expressed surprise at the agreement between so many
different ideologies, to whom the answer would have been: “Yes, we agree on
the rights, but on condition no one asks us why.” Indeed, if we ask “why?” it
becomes clear that no core values are shared, and not even an “overlapping con-
sensus” is revealed. Universality was largely rhetorical, and for a long time its
proponents did not consider such a composite to be philosophically interesting.
Almost no one claims for it perfect consistency. It was not truly universal, but
it was “new.” Raymond Aron, Manent’s mentor, stressed that despite apparent
continuities, the new charter, making demands on the state, was essentially dif-
ferent from the French Declaration, which put individual rights in opposition
to the state (or political authority). Inconsistent, without “whys,” the statement
was “universal” only in the sense that the extent of its endorsement and its
ambition was wide, not that it was the fruit of universal agreement.

III

The so-called human rights philosophy trying to “make sense” of these
rights addresses a wide range of questions about not only their content,
justification, legal status, and universality, but also about the *very existence*
of human rights. Claims in the name of human rights gather strength, as
Manent asserts, because they are assumed to be independent of cultural and
legal traditions and justified by higher or universal standards. Such allega-
tions have often caused doubt, leading some (such as Alasdair MacIntyre) to
to say that “there are no such rights, and belief in them is one with belief
in witches and in unicorns,” and some (such as Richard Rorty) to say that
no justification is necessary, only a sentimental education, since “Serbian
murderers and rapists…are not being inhuman, but rather are discrimina-
ting between true humans and pseudo-humans.” But the new language is

and ff.
22 Richard Rorty, “Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality,” in *Philosophical Papers*, vol. 3,
pervasive, and it shows the remarkable success of the Universal Declaration. Whether to preserve their own power or provide security to those they lead, dictators, military factions, and elected officials resort to such means as arbitrary detention, torture, murder of political enemies, and even genocide of entire populations. Such cases are now described as “human rights violations” and no longer as immoral, unjust, or even “barbarous” acts (which ultimately means strangers to our culture, without implying a hierarchy, as Manent notes).  

Behind the popularity of this “rights talk” is often the assumption (or the illusion) that debates about the rationale of universal human rights in a world of very diverse beliefs and practices will soon be an obsolete discussion. This seems plausible, considering that in recent decades there has been a growing acceptance of rights in new parts of the world. Most countries have ratified some of the main human rights treaties and are participating in regional conventions with international tribunals.

We may doubt the sincerity of some ratifications, such as that of the USSR in Helsinki, which may be merely the hypocritical homage that vice pays to virtue, to paraphrase La Rochefoucauld. The declarations are obviously not always enforced by their signatories. A rule may even be formulated: the more a country violates human rights, the more treaties it subscribes to. Since such violations are less frequent in more democratic countries, the benignity of the accumulation of treaties can be and has been questioned. But this expansion has a simple explanation: many countries use similar political institutions (that is, laws, courts, parliaments, executives, regular armies, bureaucracies, police, prisons, taxes, and public schools), which are now widespread throughout the world. “Globalization” has already reduced the differences between peoples, and eventually will make these differences negligible, or at least some dream in this way of a world beyond politics. In short, although some advocates of the rights talk, such as Ronald Dworkin and Jeremy Waldron, have come to the fore, there is no lack of skeptics of various genres and species about human rights philosophy, going back to Bentham, who described them as “nonsense on stilts.”

Manent is among the skeptics. Assistant to Raymond Aron at the Collège de France, friend of Allan Bloom, critical admirer of Leo Strauss—he

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23 See Manent, La loi naturelle, 6–8 with James W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, xi.

never understood the figure of the philosopher and is highly critical of what he calls Strauss’s “naturalism” or “éléatisme.” Manent already wrote his own “narrative” of the emergence of human rights in his 2004 book *Cours familier de philosophie politique.* He there asserts that “the notion of human rights is today the common political and moral reference point in the West” and that “every political party, school, and ‘sensibility’ appeals to it,” and he emphasizes that such unanimity is extremely rare. He suggests that it would even be necessary to go back to the fourteenth century to find a similar consensus. The “unanimity” to which he refers is what others have called “rights talk.” It is manifest in the fact that even to celebrate “difference,” we claim the universal right to difference, conflating two distinct concepts. Yet difference can in fact alternatively be supported by a duty: the Muslim difference can be framed by the duty to be a Muslim.

In 2004 Manent acknowledged that such unanimity is a recent phenomenon. Although taking root in the charters drafted after the French and American Revolutions, it was only in the 1970s and 1980s that it became an uncontested reference point in the West. Communist dissidents did not invoke an alternative regime, but instead demanded respect for human rights, that is, for certain elementary principles which the communist governments had vowed to respect by signing the Helsinki Accords, including its provision about the free movement of people.

The novelty of the recent human rights movement lies in its *apolitical* nature. Human rights language was not often used in “civic discourse” before the 1970s. The 1789 declaration was a declaration of the rights of man and citizen. As Aron and Arendt stated, human rights make little sense without citizenship. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there was a recurrent tendency to inscribe charters of human rights (and sometimes duties) in political constitutions, which is why John Humphrey was able to put together a volume comprising what the UN proclaimed to be “the most extensive documentation on the subject of human rights ever assembled.” But the framework, as Manent remarks, was that of the nation-state. The situation

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28 Ibid.

29 Human Rights Commission, Third Session (E/CN.4/SR.64, pp. 5–6).
has changed: “The insistence on human rights today has an undeniably anti-political flavor.”30 Military service and even voting are held to be cumbersome, if not synonymous with coercion—something that for Manent is equivalent to the dismantling of the republic.

Manent’s précis historique did not ignore the opposition to human rights by the church, which changed only in 1965, with the Declaration on Religious Liberty. This marked the end of the opposition of the rights of God and the rights of truth to the rights of man, despite the church, even today, fighting against the current on issues such as abortion, sexuality, and marriage. The other source of opposition to the language of rights that Manent points to was “Burkean.”31 It came from the opposition to a “metaphysical” idea which asserted that man was born without ties or chains.32 Marx curiously sided with the conservatives and was among those who opposed human rights as illusory, and Manent pays homage to Marx’s insight about the link between “individuality” and selfishness.33

Taken at face value, Manent’s survey of human-rights critics is a warning against the tendency towards “taking human rights for granted.”34 But he immediately adds that the very idea is “problematic.” We do not even have a clear notion of what human rights are, except perhaps that we live in a democracy whose purpose is to protect them. He points to an interesting study to be done, about the history of our institutions and how they were shaped by the declarations, but he puts this aside and diverts his attention to its “fundamental spiritual meaning.”35 Simply put, before 1789 the framework in which man lived was not of human creation; man lived sub lege Dei. But henceforth the revelation of the Law of God was replaced by the “Rights of Man” (in uppercase). Man reached his maturity with the Enlightenment, adopting Kant’s motto: Sapere aude. Man has gone from heteronomy to autonomy. Obviously, free and equal birth is not a biological birth, but the “abandonment of the state of nature.”36

31 Ibid., 100.
32 Ibid., 101.
33 Ibid., 104–5.
34 Ibid., 101.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., 103.
Only those who have been inattentive to Manent’s earlier thought will be surprised to find him among the human-rights discontents. But why exactly does Manent oppose human rights? There are evidently many species of skepticism, which Beitz, in a recent book, catalogs properly: those who question their feasibility, those who question their universality, those who question the very concept as vacuous, and so forth. Manent’s antagonism is not like that of Aron, who judged “rights talk” to be inconsistent, ineffective, and utopian, or that of Strauss which stressed their low, dogmatic, and incoherent character. Manent considers them to be extremely consistent and very effective. Harking back to his first work on Tocqueville, Manent distinguishes the art of democracy from the nature of democracy, noting that “individualism” is recent. Individualism is not eternal “selfishness”: it is a feature of the man who isolates himself in a democracy, which fatally “dries up the public virtues.”

Manent comments extensively on the passage in which Tocqueville describes the transition from aristocracy to democracy. In aristocracy, man was always attached to something outside himself, to the point of self-forgetfulness, while in democracies human bonds are both extended and loosened. But Manent seems even more dismayed than Tocqueville about the trade-off presented by the new situation: In aristocracies “one hardly thinks of dedicating oneself to the cause of humanity” because the notion of human nature is “obscured.” Democracy, on the other hand, follows a trend towards the denunciation of the “imposture of human bonds,” a denunciation that is implicit in what it is “to become an individual.” (Aron, by contrast, attached great importance to aristocratic “obscurity,” and never abandoned the aspiration, looming on a distant horizon, to the difficult recognition of the humanity of the “other.”)

For Manent, the main problem, what makes him skeptical, is that the idea of “humanity” is as empty of content as the man from Mesopotamia in Ortega y Gasset’s tale about Victor Hugo. Hugo, unable to recall anything significant about its people, greets the ambassador of Mesopotamia as the representative of “humanity.” For Manent, the feeling of humanity does not evoke any truly human figure, and this “void” gives rise to a new religion: the

38 But see Manent, La loi naturelle, 124.
39 Manent, A World beyond Politics?, 111.
religion of humanity based on the spiritual power of the scientists. This faint copy of Catholicism seems today a bit ridiculous, or would seem so, had it not been very much alive in the efforts to secularize Western society. Nietzsche was therefore right about the despicable platitude of the last man and his “invention of happiness,” which is a mere contentment. But Nietzsche’s alternative was to create new values: the idea of nature was almost forgotten.

The historical panorama, which is sometimes painted by Manent with broad strokes, has an undeniable vigor and accuracy. The novelty of human rights born after 1948 and expanding in the 1970s and 1980s, which some historians relate to the failure of all previous utopias, seems nevertheless forgotten in La loi naturelle et les droits de l’homme. The new book focuses instead on the project Manent put on the back burner but announced in his previous book: showing how our institutions have been shaped by human rights declarations. While seeking for the philosophical view behind the present declarations (plural—they multiplied), it might at first glance be thought that their “novelty” should be sought in the more recent “wave of modernity” that arises from Nietzsche and is shaped by Heidegger. (Heidegger’s and Whitehead’s historicism certainly inspired Malik, one of the framers of the 1948 declaration.)

But that is not the route that Manent follows. Instead, he now looks into contemporary human rights and what he sees at their core is a Hobbesian world, built on “les conseils de la peur” and disfiguring the idea of Natural Law. That is, he looks into the “first wave” of modernity and into the city tanquam dissolutio to explain the current success of the philosophy of human rights.

To be clearer, Manent flattens out what Strauss calls the various waves of modernity. Manent moves easily between the work of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau, but ignores Nietzsche’s value creation and the wholly arbitrary dependence on the “spirit of the time” that Heidegger upholds and of which Charles Malik became a spokesman in the drafting—all of which seem to belong to Leo Strauss’s third wave of modernity. (It is true that even for

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41 Manent, A World beyond Politics?, 127.
42 Ibid., 128, 130.
Strauss the germs of Heidegger are in Hobbes: we are all alone. We therefore have no duties. We are alone because we die alone. Anxiety is the deepest feeling. And feeling—passion—is deeper than reason. We may think, however, that Manent’s earlier intuition was well founded. During the drafting of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the use of expressions found in the American Declaration of Independence (namely, to redact Article 1 as follows: “Created in the image and likeness of God, [men] are endowed with reason and conscience”), as well as a tribute to Locke and a possible reference to Natural Law, were discussed. The final wording resulted in what one scholar describes as “a bargain about God and nature.” Despite the profound influence of Christianity and other religions that resonates in expressions such as “shame” and “human dignity,” any references to God, nature, or reason were avoided. The document assumes that moral and political agreement can stand on its own without reference to any religion or philosophy. This type of moral-nonreligious theory is recent.

We must perhaps move away from the idea that human rights are the result of a long and uninterrupted history and pay careful attention to the most recent changes in the understanding and advocacy of them. Although cultural changes are often difficult to date (the more so since they create their own prehistory), in other cases the breakdown is so overwhelming that it does not seem difficult to choose a moment. It seems to us that human rights as we conceive them in the international sphere are indeed very recent, and began in 1948 with the Universal Declaration.

The main change from modern natural law from 1948 to the present is that by default we are all historicists: we have difficulty imagining that every thought is not a function of time and place. Liberals used to be universalists, but today they prefer to appeal to liberalism’s “tradition” of human rights than to “natural rights.” Historicism is the basic presumption common to today’s democracy. We also assume that all philosophy is essentially historical, that is, that it is the expression of the spirit, “soul,” or situation of the time, and the (immutable) biological nature of man consists in his historical being.

46 Because widespread disbelief in God is so recent, “Non-Religious Ethics is at a very early stage” (Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons [Oxford: Clarendon, 1984], 454).
IV

Whatever the case, Manent’s new book will stir some waves on an otherwise quiet lake. On the seventieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration’s approval, Manent appears as the uninvited guest disturbing the celebration. The notion of natural law, he claims, has become unintelligible and at the same time scandalous: according to prevailing opinion, natural law subjects human life to a dogmatic truth about man and ignores what is more proper to man, his original freedom, which makes him the sovereign author of the human world. But, Manent points out, this makes us slaves of a necessarily false or mutilated idea of ourselves. At the same time, our societies are subject to an ever more radical idea of human rights, on behalf of which the most venerable rules and institutions of civilization are reconstituted.

The book has the important virtue of clarifying why the considered idea of a universal human nature, or of “humanity as such,” is empty. The philosophy of human rights (in modernity, we add) was born against the idea of natural law in the Christian context, with recourse to the idea of a fictitious state of nature. A beginning in freedom replaces the biblical idea of a humanity under the law. Obviously, a reference to nature cannot be entirely avoided, and indeed the idea of the doctrine of human rights is based on a certain idea of nature, but its holder is the individual, separated from others, made concrete by his biological nature as a living being and only afterwards enriched by all social determinations (9). To mention “biological nature” is, however, somewhat inaccurate: “the biological nature, being alive, is based on the sexual difference, which is the principle of reproduction and, therefore, the difference of generations. Now the nature that keeps men apart and free is the nature emptied of all ties, indifferent to the differences of sex, age or ability, the same for the members of the species. Nature devoid of inner complexity and depth, which teaches us nothing about what it is to be human, because a liberation from all ties, devoid of natural motives—desires, inclinations, ideals—is not human” (10).

Nature in modern philosophy is a raw fact that we can construct and deconstruct at will, like “Meccano.” It does not include any relation to “dispositions, purposes or institutions proper to human beings” (11) and with its silence affirms that there is nothing natural beyond the individual. The authority of nature has not really been abolished, but it is not a “culture,” it does not imply a good society (13). The power of nature henceforth “translates” into the thirst for a permanent effort to rebuild the human world artificially (13), while reversing the rules of the public and the private. By this Manent means that human “identity” is for the moderns a choice, entirely denaturalized in
the name of human rights (15). Henceforth, what before was private is now a public matter: prevailing opinion turns sex into gender and turns homosexual deviance contrary to physical nature into a chosen orientation, and the desire of male and female for each other is but a social construction (16).

In short, Manent contends, human nature is never naked; it is only our cultural relativism that validates almost all the rules followed in other cultures, at the same time as it judges and wants to reform all the rules followed here. Manent suggests the rationale behind such an idea of nature is an idea so poor that it would be compatible with all cultures. From this he goes on to argue that human nature cannot remain poor and naked.

The presumed “evidence” of the endorsement of enlightened opinion leads the author to a retrospective of the origin of modern natural law, which forms the center of the small book, going back to Hobbes (and from Hobbes to Machiavelli), Rousseau, Luther, and so on. It is difficult to describe the depth of the intuitions that pervade the book, if not only because many theses may surprise the reader. To mention just a few insights: Machiavelli, who does not deal thematically with natural law (32), proves in fact that imaginary men are the real ones, because Machiavelli’s starting point is the “tanto discosto” (the great distance) between real and imaginary men (29), but it would not be possible to define a practical policy arising from Machiavelli’s words (37); Luther recognizes as equals the just and the sinner (45); the difficulty with Hobbes’s thought is not his unrealism, but his meaninglessness (53) because in the state of nature there are no rights, which cannot exist or can make no sense in a lawless world (56).

This latter idea is Manent’s point of support for the narrative of the construction of the modern state, which is inconceivable without the philosophical elaboration that accompanies or guides its formation (93). The state is the apparatus that irresistibly produces the obedience of its “shareholders” (sociétaires) but it has a reverse: the state that claims obedience does not command or “order” the human world, or at least it ignores the principles of its order and lacks purpose. The modern state imposes peace within its borders, but it ignores the kind of peace it imposes because it lacks the inner sense that gives meaning to the external order of the human world (71). Moreover, in representative regimes the citizen does not obey; he consents. The archē of the polity is dismembered.

Manent’s new book is probably his most important and ambitious work, considering both the wide landscape he portrays and its originality.
Moreover, “without vanity” (120), near the end of his essay he advances a “simple” solution to the dilemmas involved in the inference of value statements from statements about facts. These dilemmas tormented important modern philosophers, namely, Hume, Kant and all those in their wake who turned an absurd mouse into a mountain (to paraphrase Horace). Manent has been able to solve it, based on very modest principles (123) whose evaluation he leaves to the reader (113): between the is and the ought there is no abyss or pit, just a gentle slope (pente douce).

Carefully considered, according to Manent, all proper human action implies a balance between three motives, the “agreeable,” the “useful,” and the “honest,” which includes the fair and noble (bonum honestum bonum utile bonum delectabile). No human being is moved by something that does not belong to this trilogy of goods (114). Manent does not define the “scholastic concepts” but they have roots in classical ethics. The good man acts with a view to the noble, but to be happy every man needs external goods (loosely, the useful), goods of the body (the agreeable) as much as he seeks the goods of the soul, which are superior (or in Aquinas the moral good, bonum honestum). According to Manent no one is able to evade the force or power over human action of these three motives, and no one can modify this “rule of action” at will. It is part of our common nature as men. The ideas of the honest or noble have a particular plasticity and vary greatly with time and place, which explain the “infinite diversity of laws and customs” that the social sciences discover and that might, in ignorance of this plasticity, seem incompatible with the stability and constancy of human nature.

Manent judges that the phenomenology of this diversity does not affect the practical man, who is always moved by the same three motives (115, 119), which are found everywhere (like fire in Persia and Greece, we assume). They are the source of the rules of justice accepted by all; they provide the criteria

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47 Manent reverses the famous saying: “parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus” (the mountains are in labor, [and] an absurd mouse will be born) (Horace, Ars poetica, 136–39).

48 Aquinas, Summa theologiae II-II q. 145, a. 3; Cicero, De invent. rhet. 2.53. See, on this terminology, Stephen F. Brown, Thomas Dewender, and Theo Kobusch, eds., Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 169ff.

49 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.1.1120a20–25, etc.

50 But if Manent is looking for perennial “motives” (as opposed to “goods”) of the action, he does not really evade controversy, considering that per Hume, Christian virtues such as “celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues” are neither agreeable nor useful. On the contrary they “stupefy the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper” (David Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals [Oxford: Clarendon, 2006]).
for the rules of human action. Such rules of action are the essence of Natural Law, but they cannot be isolated from a culture or particular “city.”

Moreover, these rules do not apply only to man in isolation—to a Robinson Crusoe on an island—but make it possible to evaluate “a society, a regime, an institution that does not make enough room for the three main ‘motives’ and therefore to evaluate whether such a society, regime or institution is against Natural Law” (120). Manent at this point offers his most unfortunate example: communist regimes (like all regimes) can be assessed by the importance they attach to the three human goods. Communist regimes showcase themselves to the most naive of travelers as regimes not providing enough room to the “useful” and the “agreeable” (122) and thus making it possible to immediately establish that they are not in accordance with Natural Law. Oddly, nothing is said by Manent about police, political prisons, concentration camps, torture, censorship, freedom of thought, oppressive “secular religions,” the Big Lie, or, in general, tyranny in communist regimes.51

Manent seems to think that such a “simple and concrete criterion” (123) as he lays out allows us to judge the adequacy of a regime, but his critique of communism seems superficial. Raymond Aron asserted more clearly than Manent the difference between regimes that have imperfections and the “essential imperfection” of totalitarian regimes. Moreover, the poverty of the evaluation of regimes seems inadequate when compared to Manent’s own criticism of modern representative democracy. With such a “simple and concrete criterion” as Manent gives us, Plato’s presentation of his best city and Aristotle’s dialectical presentation of his politeia would be much abridged.

Manent is of course right to argue that it is appalling to see how easily “eminent modern philosophers” such as Kant accepted without question the Humean dichotomy between means (which we can evaluate on the basis of a “moral arithmetic”) and ends, so freely chosen that it is impossible to rationally evaluate or decide between our goals, be it the destruction of the whole world or the scratching of a finger. However, it seems that Manent’s alternative gentle slope could also lead us to an abyss or a pit. The reader may find himself hesitant to agree with Manent’s modest principles.

V

Let us avoid any ambiguity. We find it sound to recover the idea that natural right is in the first place the natural order of virtues or “the natural perfections of the human soul (cf. Laws 765E–766A), as well as the natural order

51 Cf. Taylor, Thick and Thin, 63–64.
of the other things that are by nature good.” Such an approach is very different from the usual inference of a set rules of natural law with no ifs and buts, derived from an abstract idea of human nature. Strauss, for example, went even further than Manent and stated in a letter to Helmut Khun that if justice is taken as all-inclusive virtue, this (Platonic) doctrine of “the order of the soul and of the order of the virtues is the doctrine of natural right.”

But it was not without reason that Strauss preferred to speak of “natural right” instead of Natural Law, as Manent and Maritain do, and the difference is substantial. This was not only because the conjunction of “nature” and law” is in a way an oxymoron, law being manmade and therefore necessarily nonnatural. Nor was it simply because the idea of Natural Law implies a “legislator,” as in the prephilosophical idea of a divine law common to all peoples, or in a theological context such as we find in Aquinas.

Strauss however expressed his view as follows: “There is a universally valid hierarchy of ends, but there are no universally valid rules of action.” He judged that such hierarchy was insufficient to assess what is right here and now. He moreover deemed that even premodern natural right in the classical tradition of natural right was not of the kind that can be expounded as a scheme independent of all positive law. Premodern natural right was instead, he argued, the framework for all positive law. Manent’s “simple” scheme is, by contrast, a scheme.

Jacques Maritain, from an explicit Christian or theological perspective, devised a gradual continuity between natural law, the “common law” (as manifested in the jus gentium), and positive law (droit positif). That is why he deemed useful a positive “law” stating the rights of man.

Manent therefore deviates from Aron, Strauss, and Maritain, and upholds a strict opposition between natural law and human rights, and in fact recharts the field of human rights philosophy. But we may wonder if such “language” is in fact entirely useless for addressing any and all practical questions, here and now, and for justifying political action at home and abroad.

55 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 162.
56 Maritain, Droits de l’homme, 72–73, 75.
For Humanism is a collection of almost-philosophical texts composed by five distinct “socialist humanists.” The volume launches an assault against currently dominant academic “antihumanist” ideologies, in the name of the usually berated possibility of a humanist ideology capable of doing full justice to the human condition in the very act of redeeming Karl Marx. What is at stake here is the possibility of recovering a yearning or quest for effective, willful transformation of the world we live in, beyond all modes of determinism—not least of them that of radically antiuniversalist “identity politics.”

Our socialist (libertarian or democratic: 156) humanist authors present themselves as offering us a realist diagnosis of the necessities binding us, and an idealist, even utopian (53), emancipating prognosis (responding to our needs) based on an optimistic view of our capacity to overcome necessity, or rather satisfy our needs, via what Sartre calls “culture and reflection” (70). “Culture and reflection” are the tools “the wretched of the earth” (Frantz Fanon) need in order to conceive of, and possibly bring about, a realm of possibilities (a possible état social, or “social conditions”) in which their misery would be relieved. “Culture and reflection,” as opposed to any cultivation of natural yearnings, are what might fulfill our “needs and abilities,” our negativity.1 The socialist humanist cannot rest satisfied with pitting, after Michel

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1 “Needs and abilities” alone do not, of course, tell us what man wants; they say nothing about our natural strivings (as opposed to what some may want on the basis of a “socialist humanist” conviction/ideology). Accordingly, for our authors, what ultimately defines man is not what man is, but
Foucault, what we are not against what others want us to be (positively); the socialist humanist must learn to build the Ought on a Hegelian twofold foundation of 1. negativity and 2. the empty universality (Concept) through which our negativity might be “realized” concretely. Clearly the goal is in the making (in praxis), as opposed to being in a returning to the source of all making.

A veritable battle is waged, as Barbara Epstein stresses poignantly (chap. 1), in the name of “socialist humanism” (embracing Marxist humanism), where “socialism” entails favoring “a society based on cooperation and the common good, rather than competition and profit for the few,” while “humanism” stands for belief in specifically human “needs, abilities, and limits to those abilities” (17–18). More precisely, the “socialist humanist” (an expression appealed to, most notably, in the wake of Erich Fromm) battles for the establishment of a “better society” or “egalitarian communities” in which “collective effort and individual creativity” are best employed. The “better society” would no longer be based, as societies presumably always have been, on “the pursuit of private profit” (18). A revolution would then be required, not merely in economics, but in mentality; and not merely on a national scale, but on a global one (see especially Timothy Brennan’s introduction). Nor would the envisioned revolution be bound to Stalinist-like experiments (read as modes of state-capitalism). Marxism in particular—a benign Marxism relying on philological “learning” in the tradition of Lucretius (15)—is to be cherished altogether beyond the evils of Stalinism (e.g., 23). The “learning” in question would enlighten us above all to the species-bound “practical” character of our knowledge, convincing us that our highest good is a societal common good. Learning, then, rather than any measure of state discipline, would supposedly suffice in order to bridge the gap between 1. human desire for excellence beyond collaboration, and 2. our authors’ “better society.” This historical coincidentia of Subject and Object (to echo Hegel [97, 112]) is pregnant with a strenuous critique of alternative forms of learning, not least of them that of modern natural sciences. These fail to read necessity (the Is) in the broader context of freedom—the context of “why and how” that self-critical humanities cherish over and above the (mathematical) “what” studied by “the sciences” (10).

what man might be—not our actuality, but possibilities we may be able to conceive (significant, in this respect, is Kevin Anderson’s appeal to Sartre in chap. 2).

2 In chap. 3 (“Postcolonialism Is a Humanism”), Robert Spencer appeals to human rights proclaimed by the United Nations as vindicating a dictum by Terence, now mistakenly attributed to Seneca (150, 156).
Perhaps it would be fairer to say that the natural sciences do speak to us of “hows,” albeit not as our “humanists” would like. The doctrine of “natural selection” (offshoot of the Darwinian determinism Brennan rejects in passing) is exemplary. Our authors would critique the doctrine, not on the grounds that it cannot be somehow true, but that it must be species-bound, since all we can possibly know is supposed to be relative to our species, as merely one way, if only the human way, among others, of interpreting phenomena (this notably Hobbesian view Brennan attributes especially to Vico, who, however, never espoused it). But is our natural science disturbed in any serious way by our humanists’ critique? After all, our humanists have accepted the natural scientist’s un-self-critical authority over the Is—if only as the Christian concedes to Caesar what is Caesar’s. If we are condemned to see reality strictly from our own perspective (as Leibnizian “window-less” monads), then in practical terms it matters not whether the doctrine of natural selection is not metaphysically universal: it can be valid for the human being as such; hence the muteness of our humanists’ general objection to “science’s” crude materialism, that is, to its incapacity to think the irreducibility of (human) free agency. The objection rejects the only (metaphysical) grounds for any possible successful or effective critique or disproving of crude materialism. What is more, as a Hegelian, our socialist humanist defines the human not in terms of freedom proper (whatever that may be), but in terms of an absolute Logic that is no less intrinsically mechanical than the Cartesian mechanisms our authors abhor.

The inadequacy of our humanists’ reasoning against antihumanist determinism is further highlighted by the objection that, if our humanists are right about the limits of our knowledge, then their moral knowledge in particular must be (at best) species-bound. But what knowledge would tell us that our species is not evolving, and with it our moral knowledge? As Leo Strauss argued, “historical knowledge” necessarily presupposes a consummate “absolute moment in History,” and therewith knowledge, or belief therein, beyond any and all evolving species. Understandably, our humanists reject the radical view that all features of the human being are evolving: some must be permanent (certainly, if socialist humanism is to stand). Yet, again, strictly speaking, what is unchanging is nothing substantive, but a possibility to envision a “better society”—notably based on “love and solidarity” (27)—and a corollary possibility to work towards the overcoming of the necessities

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3 The reason why these “ideals” are not (supposed to be) subject to being historically superseded by any competing one is that they are (supposed to be) rooted in the self-consciousness that their espousers more or less implicitly claim to have attained.
currently preventing us from entering Marx’s “realm of freedom” (“Marx’s splendid phrase” [219]). The contents of the “freedom” aimed at are far from clear (for instance, no mention is ever made of virtue or of any excellence of capacities essential to the human being as such). They seem to amount, as David Alderson stresses (apparently from the perspective of an economically relatively successful “gay man from a working class background” [200]), in agreement with his coauthors, to the (necessarily) partial “satisfaction” of our needs (not least of them, our physically erotic ones) via the reappropriation of social constructs (64, 112–13, 163–64). What we seem to “need” finally amounts to a “total liberation” (invoked after Trotsky’s secretary, Dunayevskaya) entailing absolute self-consciousness, the approximation of which would allow us “to establish,” in Sartre’s invoked terms, “a human kingdom as a pattern of values in distinction from the material world” (150). What is aimed at is the envisioning or construction—well beyond the Nietzschean antihumanism of the likes of Michel Foucault—of a global morality, a necessarily abstract code of conduct valid for all human beings and capable of guiding them towards the ideal of collective self-satisfaction (curiously, Kant is never addressed). We are thus faced with a “dialectical” argument, whereby consciousness and its visions complement or improve each other. Key to the argument is a practice of learning to appropriate objective visions (social constructs) as fuel for the rise of a self-consciousness that, in turn, fosters ever “better” visions.

A difficulty arises here insofar as the liberation invoked is supposed to be that which we need the most (it coincides, after all, with the satisfaction of our needs): the invoked “realm of freedom” turns out to be a function of natural necessity. Even if necessity, as what we need, does not define the possible society in which we may satisfy our needs; even if our utopias are sheer possibilities that we are capable of envisioning (i.e., that we expose ourselves to imaginatively) via the attainment of self-consciousness; our socialist humanists face the objection that the learned self-consciousness constituting the condition of possibility of utopian socialist visions is the result of necessity. In short, our authors leave their reflective, critical reader wondering “how and why” the freedom they appeal to might be irreducible to natural necessity.

* In the very act of invoking radical possibilities, as well as the likelihood of our being wrong about what really matters (62–63), our authors reject the very possibility of transcending the limits of human praxis as altogether antihumanist (1, 11). Whence Brennan’s especially firm rejection of Heidegger, insofar as the German had sought a Being transcending the boundaries of ethical universals. For our humanists, humanism’s universals are to be cherished as providing a framework for a revolutionary, international vindication of the vernacular vis-à-vis any loftier standpoint (5, 157).

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It would be hard to read Waller R. Newell’s latest book, *Tyrants: A History of Power, Injustice, and Terror*, and not think that its publication, on the eve of the election of Donald J. Trump to the most powerful position in the free world, was nothing less than fortuitous—a case of providential scholarship if there ever was one. After all, since Trump became president, our more progressive politicians, pundits, and public intellectuals, shocked at the apparent return of atavism to our enlightened liberal shores, have warned us of an impending tyranny. Newell’s political analysis of tyranny and its manifestations over nearly three millennia appears most timely for our troubled democratic times; it promises to help us navigate the dangers of our brave new world.

But if one takes a closer look at the impulses underlying the progressive hysteria surrounding Trump, one will discover that they are inspired as much by a commitment to dogmatic ideology and partisanship as they are informed by an understanding of the dynamics of a free society and the genuine threats posed to it. Such impulses are every bit as vulnerable to the temptations of tyranny as the president they criticize. This insight, that tyranny is a political possibility for both the political Right and Left, is the central insight of Newell’s latest book. Indeed, according to Newell’s analysis, tyranny is a permanent aspect of political life because it reflects a permanent temptation of the human condition, one manifested chiefly in the
overwhelming desire to secure justice and order in a world that seems to do everything to obstruct both. Our world may not be so new after all.

And yet it is part of the brilliance of Newell’s book to recognize not only the common strands underlying tyranny wherever it may arise, but those distinctive methods and goals that constitute a typology of tyranny. Tyranny may be coeval with political life, but the forms it takes, the ends it pursues, and the instruments it employs differ in ways that are important for all lovers of liberty who would protect democratic regimes from its dangers. *Tyrants* thus makes a case for the perduring challenges that tyranny poses through a brilliant, witty, dense, and deeply learned account of the political, social, and historical conditions that give shape and direction to the forms tyranny has assumed all over the world.

After a brief introduction, in which our author outlines the challenges posed by tyranny today, Newell divides his work into three parts, each devoted to exploring the causes, character, and problems facing a distinct form of tyranny: the “garden-variety” tyrant, the tyrant as reforming state-builder, and millenarian tyranny. In each case, Newell joins to his broader theoretical reflections a case study of those individuals who best illuminate the particular category. Newell concludes his work by recommending a “homeopathic cure,” one where defenders of liberal democracy learn to identify and get inoculated against the temptations to tyranny by reading those accounts of tyranny found in the texts that form the backbone of a genuinely liberal education.

According to Newell, “the garden-variety tyrant” is the “oldest and still the most familiar from our own world” (3). He is the man who clubs and connives his way into power so that he, like Muhammad Ali looming over a dazed Sonny Liston, can force his inferiors to acknowledge his own greatness. Newell claims that such tyrants are inclined to “dispose of an entire country and society as if it were their personal property, exploiting it for their own pleasure and profit, and to advance their own clan and cronies” (3). While examples of this kind of tyrant can be found virtually anywhere (Nero, Caligula; Hussein, Qaddafi), it is in the “rage of Achilles” that this tyrant’s political psychology comes to life in an unparalleled way. According to Newell, Homer’s portrait of Achilles “offered a more dangerous and subversive alternative—an ambition for supreme glory, wealth, pleasure, and immortal fame through victorious conquest, a great adventure in which bold young men could throw off the shackles of their tired elders and set the world ablaze in comradely might” (69).
For political communities, Achilles’s tyrannical longing for glory points to an imperial rule of truly global reach here on earth, while apotheosis awaits the man who would create such a universal monarchy. Naturally, both the men and the states moved by this desire for glory can be rather nasty—“notorious for their cruelty, gargantuan pleasures, and suspicion of potential competitors” (38). But for Newell, the logic implicit in Achilles’s lust for glory finds its greatest manifestation not in the Caligulas of antiquity, as one might expect, but in the Roman emperor Augustus Caesar, who established Rome as a “permanent world-state disguised as a republic, ruled by a Hellenistic monarch disguised as merely the ‘first citizen’ of that republic” (61). Augustus represents a peak of classical tyranny because his example draws together the earlier emperor-gods of the East and the later Greek and Roman dedication to an ordered liberty grounded in a reasoned grasp of human nature.

If the prospect of creating a “rational universal monarchy,” one that combines liberty and stability with attention to the rights of citizens, does not sound entirely awful, that is because it is not. The numerous achievements of men like Augustus show that not all tyrants are bad and that tyranny can be desirable for securing the political good, especially when current regimes are corrupt, vulgar, or ineffective. Newell thus courageously captures the ambiguity surrounding tyranny, an ambiguity preserved by the architects of classical political thought. Newell’s treatment reminds us of Thucydides’s famous praise of the Pesistratid tyranny’s moderation and virtue, a praise that should compel any thoughtful reader to re-evaluate the motives of the so-called Athenian tyrannicides Harmodious and Aristogeiton, who initiated its demise. Unfortunately, Newell does not exploit this opportunity. This is a shame insofar as reflection on the digression about Harmodious and Aristogeiton, in the context of Thucydides’s narrative of the Sicilian campaign, sheds light on the tyrannical potential within Athenian democracy.

While partisans of Athenian democracy liked to claim these men as their founders, Thucydides indicates that this pair of lovers was in fact driven by something other than public-spiritedness. Instead of civic virtue, these men were moved to attack the regime in power by personal sleights and the private desire to enjoy erotic satisfaction in a world free from all interference. Given such concerns, it should come as no surprise that a democracy inspired by these “defenders of freedom” should also pursue the conquest of Sicily in a bid to become the imperial overlord of the Greek Mediterranean. Thus when Newell writes of Achilles that “his unbridled selfishness, passion, and craving for honor make him very capable of tyrannical behavior. Everything is
personal, everything is about him” (49), he could just as easily be referring to the lovers who died opposing tyranny as to his model of tyranny; Thucydides’s narrative effectively curbs his readers’ prejudice against moderate forms of tyranny by showing how dangerous—even tyrannical—opposition to tyranny in all its forms can become.

Newell’s complex appreciation of tyranny deepens when he turns to the tyrant as reforming state-builder. Like their “garden-variety” brethren, these men (and women) “seek eternal fame,” but they seek it as a reward for imposing “order on a chaotic world for the benefit of mankind” (4). While their tyrannical predecessors often used power to satisfy their lusts and benefit their friends, the modern reforming state-builders “are often ascetic or at least restrained, employ violence for concrete aims rather than whimsical cruelty, and are willing to endure the same hardships as their soldiers” (4). Among the ranks of such tyrants, Newell counts Henry VIII and Elizabeth I of England, France’s Louis XIV, Frederick the Great of Prussia, and Peter the Great of Russia. Of course, such individuals do not meet the criteria for this category in all particulars (Henry VIII was hardly ascetic). But as architects of some of today’s most powerful, most prosperous, and freest states, their examples show how “the aggressive, ambitious, and willful qualities of tyrants can shade into those of great statesmen to the point where it’s difficult to tell them apart” (94). By capturing such “shades,” Newell’s portraiture complicates our view of these men, preventing us from rejecting their example tout court out of knee-jerk recourse to the pieties of democratic progressivism. Newell’s brief political histories of these tyrants and their careers make for fascinating reading from which every student of power will benefit. But Newell’s gift for political history is outdone by his trenchant political analysis, especially his ratiocination of modern tyranny’s deepest causes.

Newell deftly locates the conditions for the emergence of the “reforming tyrants” in the unique interplay between the Protestant Reformation and the Renaissance, movements that were themselves shaped by historical developments within the Catholic papacy and the widespread influence of Niccolò Machiavelli’s political thought. The weakening of the political authority of the Catholic Church and the rebirth of republican liberty and self-government effected by this combination called forth a new kind of prince, a “scientist of power” capable of “rebuilding society methodically for the sake of maximizing everyone’s security and well-being” (100). As Newell points out, this required “not moral education but a disciplined method for the application of force to achieve power, and that means that princes must employ force and
violence with a cool head” (100). The tyrannical students of these princely lessons possessed “the domineering strength of will to shape human nature and external circumstances” (119), allowing them to modernize their countries from above, often with total disregard for conventional and legal restraints.

Newell’s treatment of Machiavelli’s enormous influence, especially his teaching’s effective transfer of “God’s power to a secular human ruler” (101), is one of the highlights of this tremendous book. But Newell is also careful to note that Machiavelli was no advocate of the kind of tyranny witnessed over the last two hundred years. It is true, as Newell notes, that Machiavelli’s “expansion of tyrannical political power” also made it possible for man “to tyrannize over nature and the world itself” (101). Properly understood, however, The Prince instructs its most ambitious readers to found new modes and orders that will benefit their people, saving them from the pious cruelties of regimes haunted by superstition and religious dogma. By contrast, the “millenarian blueprint” to create a society in which “all privilege and alienation will forever be eradicated” (4), the kind of society we have seen attempted with disastrous results in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, belongs to the French Revolution and the theoretical work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Karl Marx.

Of course, while Machiavelli would not endorse the terror and tyranny of Lenin and Stalin, or Hitler and Islamic jihadists, he also is not entirely free of blame for the “modern radical extremism” behind such terror. According to Newell, it was the Enlightenment as engendered by the Florentine philosopher that fostered the tendency “to be skeptical about absolutes, about traditions of deference and restraint,” which over time “fed an atmosphere that undermined all authority, even that of democracy and rights, and instead worshipped sheer instinctive force of will” (172). And in this atmosphere of skepticism towards all standards, Newell writes, quoting a passage by Hermann Rauschning that should make most English and history departments blush: “reason itself is robbed of force. The anti-intellectual intellectual attitude of ‘dynamism’ is not mere chance but the necessary outcome of an entire absence of standards” (172). Under the illusion that all standards have been destroyed, millenarian tyrants, with their “passion for justice born of righteous anger” and their “call for the wholesale destruction and reconstruction of existence” (10), pursue with clear consciences utopian goals to transform an unjust and vulgar society into “a spiritually pure, selfless” community of the future (144).

This last section constitutes the peak of Newell’s work: his analysis of the murderous secular ideologies of the twentieth century and his persuasive
linking of contemporary Islamic terrorism to the outlooks and aims driving both the Bolsheviks in Russia and the Far East and the National Socialists in Germany. According to Newell, such disparate groups commonly demonize those identified as class or race enemies as “the necessary precursor to their violent extinction at the hands of those who would purify the world of their alleged filth”; they resort to a scale of violence never seen before on behalf of their genocidal aims; and they seek an “absolute, overnight equality of condition to be imposed by revolutionary force through the leveling of all wealth, talent and status, maintained by a totalitarian state” (145). This treatment of the links between groups that at first glance appear so different allows the reader to detect the ideological tectonics whose almost imperceptible motions and frictions caused every major political cataclysm of the modern world; *Tyrants* affords a geology of politics that calls to mind the brilliant work of French political theorists Raymond Aron, Pierre Manent, and Alain Besançon. As with the other two categories, Newell rounds out his treatment of millenarian tyranny with snapshots of its emblematic individuals: Robespierre, Stalin, Hitler, and Islamic jihadists, among others.

Newell’s penetrating analysis is likely to appeal to lovers of liberty as much as to specialists in history, politics, and literature, because it is deep, gracefully written, and, at times, startlingly funny. Plato’s *Republic* is “a parents’ guide to preventing your troubled teens from turning out like” Achilles (8). Henry VIII (that “monster of gluttony”), as famously captured by Holbein, is a “veritable dirigible of jewels and velvet” (102). He calls Peter the Great, “with a head too small for his giant” frame, “a pinhead and a weirdo,” effecting a combination of a “large guileless boy and tech nerd” (122). Referring to England’s fear of “Spain with its inquisition,” Newell writes that it “was a bogeyman that in today’s terms combined Mordor, Darth Vader, and Voldemort” (113). And (my personal favorite) he likens art sponsored by communist regimes to “something from the subconscious mind of Ayn Rand on sodium pentathol” (186).

But the humor and obvious intelligence at work in *Tyrants* should not distract one from the limited, but real, problems with Newell’s book. In the first place, Newell effects an uneven treatment of the influence of religion on tyranny. For while he is not afraid to find fault with Christianity or the Catholic Church, he appears all too interested in offering an apology for Islam. Newell correctly stresses the distinctly modern, ideological strains at work in today’s Islamic jihadism, something that is almost entirely forgotten by contemporary analysts of American foreign policy. But uncovering such strains
does not exonerate Islam from the violence frequently performed in its name by its most immoderate adherents. Nor does it justify Newell’s equivocation of the calls to violence found in Herbraic and Christian scriptures, which are extremely conditional, and Islamic texts, which often are not so qualified. Indeed, anyone who takes the dewy-eyed “critic” Reza Aslan as the authority on all things Islamic has some serious explaining to do. At other times, Newell downplays the Bolshevism of the Bolsheviks and instead grants disproportionate influence to the “god-destroyers” of the nineteenth century. Again, Newell is right to call attention to this long-neglected influence on communism in Russia. But his treatment has the effect of downplaying the real culprit behind the crimes of communism, namely, Karl Marx’s teaching that terror, torture, and tyranny can positively transform the human condition and bring about the end of history. Finally, those familiar with texts of classical Greek philosophy and history may find Newell’s presentation of ancient tyranny uneven. Achilles’s longing for glory, for instance, may well be tyrannical, but can a man perhaps best known for his withdrawal from political action truly embody the soul of the tyrant? And they will want Newell to address more completely than he does the political psychology behind democratic imperialism, a political psychology whose enduring concern for justice and desire to control the world will surely hit home with some of his modern readers.

Despite these shortcomings, Newell’s work deserves a wide audience for its attack on the conceit of modern political and social science that tyranny is a barbaric relic effectively replaced, or soon to be replaced, by the halcyon days of liberal humanitarianism. Of course, Newell’s work will not change the world; it will, he acknowledges, remain “what it was before” (4). But if we learn from Newell’s book, then we will see the world “differently, without the distorting lens of the modern social sciences and their inability to grasp tyranny as a permanent alternative…. It’s the same world but our understanding of it will change considerably” (14). According to Newell, this “will involve teaching our young that real and aspiring tyrants exist, just as they always have, and that it is important to learn what motivates them” (14). Such a lesson may disturb and unsettle those who would like to believe that the successes of the modern liberal project have discredited tyranny as a political alternative, that progress and the spread of human rights have consigned it to the “ash heap of history,” and that we no longer need to take tyranny seriously. But it is precisely such unsettling experiences that initiate the political education which so many of democracy’s contemporary defenders most need.

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James Madison is perhaps the most complex of the American Founders, at least when one views his thought over time. In the midst of a particular debate he could offer a clear and often compelling argument, but continuity of principles from one phase of his career to the next is difficult to discern. The Madison of the Constitutional Convention is a committed nationalist, while the Madison responding to the Alien and Sedition Acts emphasizes states’ rights. The Madison of *The Federalist* defends constitutional veneration, while the Madison of 1800 helps secure a political revolution. Representative Madison of the 1790s leads congressional opposition of the First National Bank while President Madison of the 1810s signs into law a more ambitious Second National Bank. How can Madison be explained?

One is faced with two temptations when looking at Madison’s entire corpus: to read him as a philosopher attempting to moderate American politics with prudential statesmanship, and to think of him as a shifty politician with a wet finger in the air to gauge the political breezes that necessarily shift and change under popular rule. Neither option is particularly satisfying, in large part because both lead to the conclusion that we should take Madison’s particular arguments less seriously as works of political thought. If his inconsistencies are explained as a philosophical attempt to moderate American politics, then his arguments in *The Federalist* and elsewhere speak to the needs of the moment rather than the nature of constitutional government in
the United States, and therefore make sense only in light of their historical context. As that context has passed, why bother teaching them to students today? The same conclusion arises if one thinks of Madison as an unprincipled politician eager for success and willing to make whatever argument he thinks will win the day. Such a position undermines the important and often influential arguments he makes throughout his career in defense of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, national powers, states’ rights, and much else. It is not entirely clear whether Madison’s thought taken as a whole can avoid either of these conclusions.

Jeremy Bailey’s recent *James Madison and Constitutional Imperfection* is among those books that have accepted the challenge of explaining the apparent contradictory nature of Madison’s arguments over time. As the title suggests, Bailey argues that Madison’s career, at least after the Constitutional Convention, is best understood as a variety of attempts to deal with the imperfections of the Constitution. These imperfections differ in kind, and therefore require different and even contradictory solutions ranging from formal constitutional amendments to extraconstitutional appeals to the people. Bailey argues that when we look at the facts from this vantage point, Madison’s political thought is more consistent than it appears on the surface, and that Madison himself is much closer to Jefferson than is usually thought in his openness to popular opinion as a means of correcting perceived faults in the frame of government.

In other words, Bailey believes that Madison is less concerned with the stability of constitutional forms than with ameliorating the imperfections that came out of the Philadelphia convention hall in 1787. The composition of the Senate, the Electoral College, and a general dissatisfaction with the deliberative process under the Constitution led Madison, in Bailey’s view, to seek means of correcting the shortcomings of the document he had helped to craft, and the difficulty of succeeding through the formal amendment process made the Jeffersonian impulse to turn to public opinion an attractive option for Madison. But if Bailey is right, then the author of *Federalist* No. 49 is far less committed to protecting constitutional stability than is often assumed, making *Federalist* No. 37 a better place to go to understand the doctrines of Madison’s political thought, for it is in that paper that he admits to the Constitution’s imperfection and discusses the importance of balancing stability with such things as republican liberty and accountability.

Not surprisingly, then, *Federalist* No. 37 receives more attention from Bailey than all the others. Essays 10 and 49 are the closest rivals, but here
the discussion often involves a comparison to No. 37. For example, Bailey points out on several occasions that the flip-side of the extended republic defended in No. 10 is that it is extremely difficult to craft a constitution when so many factions have to be taken into consideration—a point made most plainly in No. 37. A multiplicity of factions may be a benefit under the ordinary legislative process, but it presents a nearly unsurmountable obstacle to constitutional reform. In this light, Bailey argues that the rhetoric of No. 49 is meant not to discourage frequent conventions in principle as disruptive to the veneration needed for stability, but rather to convince moderates in Virginia like Edmund Randolph to reject Anti-Federalist calls for a new convention at the present moment. Madison’s real fear was that the large republic made real deliberation over a new constitution impracticable, and that the better option was to rest content with the document as written and to find alternative means of rectifying its faults.

Further evidence presented by Bailey that Madison was not as concerned about stability as we usually imagine comes from the removal debates, where Madison makes the compelling case that a unitary executive does not need the permission of the Senate to remove political appointees from office. Bailey argues that Madison’s objective in this debate was not so much to defend the integrity of the executive branch as to prevent the Senate from thwarting changes in administration that would better reflect public opinion. Bailey reminds us that Hamilton defended senatorial removals in *Federalist* No. 77 and desired a professional cadre of administrators—not apolitical experts in the Progressive sense, but public-spirited department heads that could expect to survive several changes in the presidency—to lend stability to the executive branch. Madison disliked such an arrangement and instead defended the president’s ability to remove at pleasure, arguing that the chief executive was responsible to the people for the soundness of the administration and that institutional impediments to the executive’s changes violated republican principles.

Among the scholarly virtues of Bailey’s book is its attention to other arguments made about Madison. Bailey’s accounts of other academics are fairly rendered and well explained, always making clear where his own assessment of the facts agrees with and where it diverges from those of others. While this makes the book less readable to the general public, it is useful to scholars engaged in the hard work of trying to figure out the political thought of one of our most respected and complex Founders. Furthermore, Bailey encourages readers to reconsider the more well-known of Madison’s essays, such as *Federalist* No. 37, and those who read the book carefully will learn about several
more obscure sources that contain important clues to Madison’s ideas, all of which Bailey explains with helpful insight. Anyone interested in Madison’s thought would do well to read James Madison and Constitutional Imperfection. But whether Bailey will convince his audience that he has discovered the best way of measuring Madison over time is a difficult question to answer.

In the end, what holds Madison’s various public writings together may matter less than the principles, logic, and persuasiveness of each particular argument on its own. As Hamilton says of his own essays in Federalist No. 1, “My motives must remain in the depository of my own breast: my arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by all.” The rule should apply equally to Madison, and other political thinkers for that matter. Whatever Madison’s motives in Federalist No. 10, Federalist No. 49, the Helvidius Letters, the Virginia Resolutions, or any of his other public documents, the arguments in each case speak for themselves, and can be evaluated and judged accordingly. If Hamilton is correct, having a coherent Madison may be less important than is often assumed.

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Levi Gersonides (1288–1344) is not an obvious choice for a book in ethics. “Ethics” and “morality,” for example, do not appear in his *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* entry, let alone receive anything approaching substantial treatment. We should be especially grateful to Alexander Green, therefore, for his patient and carefully researched *The Virtue Ethics of Levi Gersonides*.

Green frames his study, originally a dissertation project directed by David Novak at the University of Toronto, with reference to the contemporary revival of philosophical “virtue ethics.” Quoting Alasdair MacIntyre on the need for adherents of the Jewish tradition to speak on behalf of the tradition of Jewish ethics, he proposes here a study of the distinctly Jewish Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics, a tradition that include Moses Maimonides (1138–1204), Gersonides, and Isaac ‘Arama (1420–1494). “This book,” he concludes, aims to “trace the first step in the development of a tradition of Jewish Aristotelian virtue ethics by asking how Gersonides challenged the Maimonidean model while still remaining within it” (x).

Maimonides sought to restructure the Jewish tradition in light of Aristotelian philosophical concepts, especially Aristotle’s model of the human soul and its powers and virtues. Gersonides appropriates much of Maimonides’s synthesis, but adds two new categories of individualistic virtues: the virtues of self-preservation and the virtues of altruism. These categories structure Green’s study, and the four core chapters (setting aside the introduction and conclusion) focus on the virtues of physical self-preservation, the virtues of
altruism, the skill necessary to negotiate conflicts between these virtues, and the political implications of all this for kings, priests, and prophets.

Green gathers the scattered bits and pieces of Gersonides’s mature ethical thought from across his corpus, but most especially from his late biblical commentaries. Gersonides, Green argues, was convinced of the centrality of narrative, and therefore that “practical matters are more effectively discussed through examples of the lives and actions of individuals in a narrative form than in a scientific commentary or through the commandments of the law” (4). Stories appeal best to the moral imagination, offering models for imitation and expressing the variability and contingency of the moral life. “In fact, one can take Gersonides’ reading a step further and intimate that, according to him, ethics should be presented in a narrative like the Hebrew Bible over reading a treatise such as the *Nicomachean Ethics* because its stories successfully present characters that exemplify in their actions the outcome of the cultivation of moral virtues” (5).

Whereas for Aristotle (and with certain qualifications Maimonides) the purpose of practical wisdom is moral virtue and *eudaimonia* in the fullest sense, for Gersonides “the goal of practical wisdom is no longer merely deliberation to attain different and sometimes conflicting ends, but a rising in priority of physical preservation from a basic prerequisite to the central goal of the practical intellect” (27). Because of this, physical self-preservation is a key motivation for human action, and a test of practical wisdom. In commenting on the story of the Tower of Babel, Gersonides says that the people built it thinking it will protect them so that they will not go spread out throughout the world in search of suitable places to live and [go find] plants necessary for man because they will see this building from afar, because of its height, and it will protect them so they will not move a far distance away from it. Because of this, their efforts will be repaid in that everyone will be gathered in one place in the land. In addition, in building this city, it will always increase their numbers. And God already saw that gathering men in one place in the world is not fitting for the existence of the human species….If the entire human species is in one place, they could all be lost if everything is destroyed in that one part of the world. This is why it is necessary for man to be spread out throughout the world, so that if there is a catastrophe in one part, the species will be preserved in the rest. (31–32)
The people built the tower for the sake of self-preservation, and God destroyed it because of His deeper understanding of self-preservation. Even more, those who successfully develop their practical reason exhibit three key materialistic virtues: endeavor, diligence, and cunning (33). As the names of these virtues might suggest, “one of Gersonides’ lessons for action is to use whatever means are necessary to achieve the desired result” (38).

This raises a question that Aristotle and Maimonides did not face: “Should one use whatever means are necessary to achieve success? Are there any limits?” (48). The most important limitation involves Gersonides’s second new category of virtues: the virtues of altruism and beneficence. Green argues that “Gersonides makes the God of the Hebrew Bible a direct model for imitation, where God’s different character traits and positive actions represent his various intellectual virtues that human beings must imitate. As a form of imitatio dei, God’s attributes and actions are outcomes of His essence and His relationship to the world” (72–73). The self-preserving virtues of endeavor, diligence, and cunning are balanced by the divine “altruistic attributes of loving kindness, grace, and beneficence” (73).

But “pure altruism” is exemplified by God alone. All of His creatures must balance the demands of altruism with the demands of self-preservation. Green addresses the delicate balance between justice and the practical wisdom of the individual by developing Gersonides’s understanding of individual deliberation between competing goods, most especially the private goods of self-preservation, the public goods of society (including goods of self-preservation and goods of other-regarding beneficence), and the goods commanded by the divine law. (It is hard to see how self-preservation and altruism track this threefold division of goods in Green’s analysis; at least loosely speaking, private goods and some public goods involve self-preservation, whereas some public goods and some [perhaps all?] divinely commanded goods involve altruism.)

In Gersonides’ model of deliberation and choice, there are three conflicting goods: human physical needs such as family and property; peace and the cessation of conflict; and obeying God’s commands. However, as Gersonides argues, choosing between these three alternatives is not a tragic dilemma with no rational method of deciding. Gersonides does not envision choice in moral conflicts in this light, but suggests that one can resolve such moral conflicts based on a hierarchy of goods. All three goals are important, but when in conflict, certain goods take priority over others depending on which two are in conflict. Human physical needs such as family and property take priority over God’s commands, since the need for physical preservation is
a prerequisite for fulfilling those commands. Peace takes priority over the physical desire for property, since although property is a necessary basis for physical preservation, it is not the ultimate end; in fact, peace allows for contemplation more effectively if one has the opportunity for it. Yet, when God’s commandments and the pursuit of peace come into conflict, there are times when one must follow God’s ordinances and other times when one must pursue peace. One must note that these are not strict rules, but are a set of guidelines and recommendations for how to deliberate and choose between competing goods in the majority of cases. (104–5)

For example, “Joseph’s brothers fabricated a story about how their father commanded them to report to Joseph after his death, in order to forgive them for their sins. Gersonides states that in this case it is ‘appropriate for man to endeavor to achieve peace as far as possible’ and that it is ‘inappropriate that the desire to stay far away from lies be able to thwart the noble goal of peace’” (113).

All of this has immense political implications. Whereas the philosopher-king is the ideal leader for Maimonides, according to Gersonides the philosopher-king Moses was a failure (his slowness of speech, for example, indicated the impossibility of combining the isolation and focus of divine contemplation with the political activity of the other powers of his soul and led to serious failures in leadership). Indeed, “the ethical repercussions are such that the ethics and virtues of self-preservation are not directly related to the altruistic virtues that lead one to contemplation and imitate [sic] the divine nature. This separation…has political ramifications as well, magnifying this distinction on a collective scale, as the practical realm is managed by kings and the theoretical realm is in the hands of priests” (132).

Like Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, Gersonides responded to an earlier tendency towards ethical unity by emphasizing the divisions between kinds of goods, the consequent divisions in our soul that respond to these different types of goods, and the necessarily divided political powers responsible for each respective type of good. Green suggests that Gersonides, like his Christian counterparts, foreshadows modern politics and thus offers us a distinctive and still-vital Jewish voice “that continues to nurture as well as to challenge thinkers of all stripes to the present day” (167).

This is surely true, but the drive for theoretical unity expressed by Plato and Aristotle, Maimonides and Aquinas, and Alasdair MacIntyre today might not require us to ignore the real divisions between goods, or even to
combine the role of philosopher (or priest) with king. When Gersonides’s con-
temporary Nachmanides (1194–1270) argues that Abraham sinned greatly in
urging Sarah to identify as his sister in Egypt (whereas Gersonides praises
Abraham’s “diligence”), or that Abraham and Sarah also sinned greatly in
their treatment of Hagar (whereas Gersonides praises Abraham’s pursuit of
peace), how are we to decide between them (162–63)?

I fear that Gersonides’s position leaves us without a rational criterion to
decide between the demands of self-preservation and the demands of altrui-
sm, despite Green’s arguments to the contrary. As Henry Sidgwick concluded
with obvious melancholy at the end of the nineteenth century (and at the
end of five hundred pages of reflection) when he found himself unable theo-
retically to unify egoism and altruism: “Practical reason would still impel us
decisively to the performance of duty in the more ordinary cases in which
what is recognized as duty is in harmony with self-interest properly under-
stood. But in the rarer cases of a recognized conflict between self-interest
and duty, practical reason, being divided against itself, would cease to be a
motive on either side; the conflict would have to be decided by the compara-
tive preponderance of one or other of two groups of non-rational impulses”
(The Methods of Ethics, book 4, chap. 6, §5).

But this objection in no way diminishes Green’s achievement in The Vir-
tue Ethics of Levi Gersonides. Indeed, it is thanks to his work that we can
now begin to situate Gersonides in the larger debate over the tension (real or
imagined) between egoism and altruism in recent moral philosophy, a debate
that Green is well aware of (see, e.g., 63–66) and that I for one hope he con-
tinues to address.

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Michael Desch and a bevy of distinguished scholars have given us an engaging and useful volume on public intellectuals in a global context. Unlike similar works, the volume takes an international approach to its subject, and a reader benefits greatly from the tandem comparison of similar figures in widely different circumstances. The collection ranges from dissidents in China to novelists in Latin America to economists in the United States, and a reader gains a new perspective from seeing the same subject in so many milieux. The volume’s contributions are often entertaining to read (as Andrew Bacevich on the early Cold War) and highly informative (as Gilles Andreani on French diplomats). Some delve into subjects of geopolitical significance (as Ahmad Moussalli on Arab intellectuals), and some cast old favorites in new lights (as Desch’s exploration of Max Weber). Others (such as Patrick Deneen on the decline of universities) burn with righteous indignation, and a few (like Willy Lam’s concise, sweeping tableau of public intellectuals in China) are sparkling gems of research and synthesis.

The first half offers a comparative treatment of public intellectuals. Jeremi Suri and Andrew Bacevich begin with American figures, emphasizing in particular intellectuals active during the Cold War. Willy Lam, Enrique Krauze, and Ahmad Moussalli follow with exhaustive, in-depth studies of intellectuals in China, Latin America, and the Arab world. The value of these three chapters is particularly high. The contrast with the Western experience
shows a reader what he might take for granted: I had not known that the PRC grooms “strategic intellectuals” (114) to influence its public, nor the extent to which many intellectuals were “stakeholders” in the communist system (100); our American intellectuals are usually critics of the party line, not bulwarks. On a more mundane level, all three summarize their subjects tersely and effectively for an ignorant reader. Thus, they not only help illuminate the American experience but also serve as useful introductions to those of other countries. Parts of these chapters are very encouraging—Krauze’s analysis shows how, despite the great follies of Latin American intellectuals, a few brilliant minds can cast long shadows over politics—yet on the whole I was unpersuaded by the optimism of either Moussalli or Lam: it is not clear to me how intellectuals in China or the Arab world will ever have the platform to reshape those regions for the better.

The next quarter of the volume studies intellectuals across different disciplines and media. Patrick Baert examines the decline of philosophers as our leading intellectuals, and Bradford DeLong explains their replacement by economists. Kenneth Miller gives an idealized vision of the role popular scientists might play in our society, and Gilles Andréani studies the possibilities and limits of diplomats in the public sphere. Between these chapters, Paul Horwitz offers a searching meditation on how the medium shapes the message, especially the effects of blogging and the Internet on public discourse. His chapter is stimulating and enlightening, and it ends on a convincing insight:

I wonder whether the experience of public intellectuals in the blogosphere does not ultimately say more about the virtues—but more especially, about the flaws—of public intellectualism itself…. [It] may give us less reason to worry about public intellectual blogging as such—and more reason to doubt the public intellectual enterprise as a whole…. The most successful public intellectuals are often the cleverest or most enjoyable writers and speakers. Whether they are accurate and whether their insights are meaningful and not just glib are incidental questions. (239)

The last quarter of the collection begins with Mark Lilla’s reflections on his earlier work, The Reckless Mind. He steps away from his previous fierceness, and he ends with a lament for the decline of public intellectuals. In conversation with Lilla’s piece, Michael Zuckert takes the opportunity to set the concept of public intellectual into a much larger historical context than any previous contributor; while sensitive to the great harm done by intellectuals in the twentieth century, he also forcefully argues for their continued
importance. Next is a contribution by Patrick Deneen, who pulls no punches in a strident critique of the modern university and its descent from coherent universals to a disparate multiverse. Still, Deneen comes not only to disparage: throughout his essay, he paints an inspiring portrait of the ideal public intellectual, someone like a professor to the people, a person whose broad learning and skills at communication make him accessible beyond the college classroom. Deneen thus confronts the decline of public intellectuals head-on, and he attributes their looming extinction to one cause: “‘There is no high-level generalism.’…The result of the transformation of the university is the loss of both ‘public intellectuals’ and a ‘public’ who cares about intellectual questions” (343, quoting Allan Bloom).

Michael Desch concludes the section with a plea to scholars to rejoin the public discourse. To help them do so, he offers a thorough and highly engaging account of Max Weber—this chapter quintupled my knowledge of the man and his political activities—all while drawing lessons for the modern academic. These last few chapters, while among the briefest in the book, are also among the most stimulating. I do not believe they can be read without raising the reader’s interest or, at the least, his blood pressure.

The volume brings together scholars of diverse and fervent opinions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is plenty of disagreement across the book’s four hundred pages. In fact, the contributors do not seem to agree on the meaning of “public intellectual,” especially what constitutes the public. (A variety of definitions are offered, e.g., on 4, 91, 130, 217, 321, 333.) In his concluding piece, Vittorio Hösle clarifies the concept through a series of succinct illustrations (387–89), insisting that a public intellectual must “write both on public issues and for the public…[and] must succeed during his lifetime in garnering public attention” (389). Hösle’s standard seems straightforward enough, but it is not clear how many people could meet it, especially in modern America. Consequently, other contributors define the word differently. For Krauze, public intellectuals speak to elites about matters of public interest (130); for Horwitz, they address “a general and educated audience” (217, emphasis added), and Zuckert seems to agree (321). Other contributors’ definitions fall somewhere in between.

Alongside these definitions, the volume offers a cornucopia of paradigmatic public intellectuals: Cicero, Kant, Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, Edmund Burke, Cardinal Newman, George Orwell, Keynes, Friedrich Hayek, Reinhold Niebuhr, Raymond Aron, Paul Krugman, Noam Chomsky, Thomas Sowell, David Brooks, John Mearsheimer, and Cornel West, to name
a few. And here arises a problem. I consider myself a well-informed citizen, reasonably well-read and reasonably up-to-date on the current fashions of our discourse. But before attending Princeton, I had never heard of Cornel West. I still have to google his name to ensure I have spelled it correctly. If he is among our leading public intellectuals, then we have expanded our definition of “public” rather widely. I would be shocked if even two percent of the American people know his name. It was not always so: most Romans knew Cicero, and all Americans knew Jefferson. To add my own example: when Fulton Sheen spoke on religion, patriotism, or communism, he reached over thirty million souls. But who commands such a public now?

I think these broad definitions betray a blind spot common to academics: we forget that the public is not like us. (How many academics go to monster truck rallies?) We think we reach more than we do. The most striking example in the text is entirely unconscious: justifying George Kennan’s place as an exemplary public intellectual, Jeremi Suri observes that American Diplomacy “sold better than anything else he ever wrote.’ It became his ‘long telegram’ to the American academy” (50). And there’s the rub. How many Americans read Kennan? I do not know the number. Perhaps a great many; perhaps very few. What I do know is that being popular in the academy does not make you a public intellectual. If every academic knows your name, but you have never reached an American without a college degree, then really—how public are you? So, while I sympathize with the various authors’ tweaks to the definition, I think Hölsle has the right of it. Better to acknowledge the problem, the decline of intellectuals, than to redefine the word. Doing the latter only hides the malaise.

So, across the volume’s contributors there is little agreement on the public part of “public intellectual.” In the rest of this review, though, I want to expose a deeper quandary. Setting aside what we mean by “public,” what do we mean by “intellectual”?

I could not help noticing that the book fails to address its subtitle’s question: professors or pundits? In fact, I believe the word “pundit” does not appear after the title page. The oversight is a shame, as the question underpins themes running throughout the essays by Desch, Suri, Baert, Horwitz, Zuckert, and Deneen: What does an intellectual offer that is valuable, and that is more valuable than mere expert advice? Let me put it another way: though disputed across the authors, each has a pretty settled idea of when an intellectual ceases to be public; but when does a public commentator cease to be an intellectual? Or, as Hölsle asks (379), when does an intellectual become “a media minion
with show business talent—that is, a postmodern equivalent of the sophist?” I cannot find anywhere that the volume addresses that challenge.

A pundit, after all, is not a public intellectual, in much the same way that a Yorkshire Terrier is not an Irish Wolfhound: at some point they might have shared a common pedigree, but no matter how much the one yammers during dinner, it’s the other who commands our attention. We all hear the talking heads on television. Modern man cannot help walking past them at the airport or on his way to a sandwich shop. But that is just it: we walk past them. We do not heed them. We might read or listen to a few favorite commentators, people who share our views and have done us the service of predigesting our news, but they do not enlarge our minds nor, if we are honest, do they enlarge our understanding. A pundit is an ideologue, and as such, he is predictable. You can guess most anything he will say before he opens his mouth. In fact, in this age, you do not even need to know who is speaking: it will suffice to know which network is paying him.

A public intellectual should not be predictable. He should surprise his audience. He should broaden their minds with insights that provoke thinking and rethinking an issue. He commands our attention precisely because we expect to hear from him something we do not already know: in some ways, Solzhenitsyn might have been predictable, but when he stood before a sea of Harvard graduates he shocked them all. In this collection, I think Michael Zuckert comes closest to addressing the challenge: he suggests there is a continuum stretching from public to intellectual (234), so that the more you speak to the public, the less intellectual you tend to become. In light of the book’s titular question, we might replace his scale with one from pundit to professor. As an added benefit, this scale dramatizes the gap between the ideal intellectual and our contemporary public sophists.

So, to collapse public intellectuals into pundits will not do. Indeed, a pundit seems the very kind of chattering expert the book’s contributors deplore. Suri taps into this theme: when discussing Niebuhr, he praises the need “for a deep historical discussion about policy purposes that escaped the false simplicities of standard historical narratives. The role of the public intellectual, as exemplified by Niebuhr, was to encourage more complex and relevant historical debates, inspiring the critical thinking of citizens and policymakers” (46). Well then. Who today could fit Suri’s description? Is Paul Krugman a pundit or a public intellectual? I think an honest assessment must conclude that he is the former: his competence is very limited, and to the extent that he offers sound advice, it derives purely from his expertise; no
one, to my knowledge, looks to Paul Krugman to learn wisdom, let alone something about the good life. He brings no humanistic vision, let alone any historical vision, to his analysis.

This wider vision is precisely the generality Patrick Deneen longs for. In fact, I dare say Deneen would argue that the Krugmans and the Mearsheimers are not even intellectuals, at least not in any healthy sense of the word (340): their narrowness has made them merely experts. But our problem is more than a lack of generality; after all, there are some liberal minds still among the commentariat (such as David Brooks). The problem must run deeper. Deneen pins the blame on universities, whose narrowness has shriveled the audience that might listen to public intellectuals (344). Yet there were public intellectuals long before higher education was widespread. Therefore, I think Horwitz’s diagnosis rings truer: “The blogosphere is no place for an idle or contemplative writer” (224)—nor, we might add, is cable news. There are some genuine minds among the jabbering geese on CNN, Fox, and MSNBC, but setting a few intellects among pundits will not dignify the pundits any more than taking your cats to the zoo will make them a pride of lions.

I want to end this review on a point raised throughout the volume. Either implicitly or explicitly, most of the contributors seem to agree that public intellectuals are a product of the Enlightenment; only Zuckert (321) and possibly Desch (5) dissent. Much like prophets and priests, a public intellectual is trying to provide a historical narrative, a vision uniting the present with the past and giving them both a purpose. Before the Enlightenment, a shared religion provided this vision; afterward, suggest the contributors, we turned to philosophy and ideology. Thus, Miller stresses the need for natural scientists “to spread the culture and the values of science” (259), and DeLong stresses the inescapable need to listen to economists (209). Even realists, whom we might expect to resist the lure of historical narrative still command attention based on “the ability of [their] narrative to explain contemporary affairs” (52). Both Lilla and Zuckert wonder, “is it really a bad thing that liberalism does not have a grand historical narrative?” (327)—and yet both ultimately desire just that, or, at the least, a set of ideas that can make sense of past, present, and future (307, 328–29). And so do most Americans: is it any wonder that so many of us, from presidents to journalists, all reach for the trite refrain: “the arc of history is long, but it bends toward justice?” Human beings seem to need this sort of narrative, and this need has become only more pronounced, as Desch notes, with the obvious failure of science to answer the question, “How shall we live?” (353). Public intellectuals are the only sorts of people,
argue most of the contributors, who can fulfill this role—who can fit together the past and the present to make sense of both. They alone can offer this sort of unifying narrative, or coherent vision, for modern society. Perhaps. But if it was in fact the transition from medieval Christendom to Enlightenment that gave us public intellectuals, then we might wish to bear in mind that a professor is a very poor substitute for a saint.

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The protagonists in David Adams Richards’s novels experience hardship in almost every way: financially, physically, politically, and at the hands of those they ought to be able to trust. Their lives seem impossible. Thus critics and readers have often taken the world Richards creates to be bounded by an inexorable fate. Sara MacDonald and Barry Craig counter this notion in their book *Fate and Freedom in the Novels of David Adams Richards*. They write that “like the well-meaning social support workers who often appear in Richards’s novels, many readers believe that, without proper intervention, his characters embody a futile servility to their circumstances” (xv). MacDonald and Craig reject this description, and in fact contend that the novels are all about freedom. They admit that to view the characters in the novels of Richards as free “might require a dramatic shift” in how most readers understand freedom. To accomplish this dramatic shift sounds like a hefty task, but the authors come closer to doing so than one might expect inasmuch as they rely on Richards’s stories as they attempt it, thus providing one of the first serious accounts of this deserving modern novelist.

MacDonald and Craig contend specifically that the view of freedom presented by Richards is Christian and Augustinian. They preface the book with a reading of the *Confessions*, focusing on Augustine’s attempt to find the cause of evil in the world. They emphasize Augustine’s movement from an attachment to Manichean dualism (which “presents matter as the cause of evil and absolves human beings of individual moral responsibility”) to his
final position that “evil is simply a disordering of the proper relation of the
created order, having its source in the human will” (xiii). From this position,
the authors suggest, both Augustine and Richards understand all human evil
to be the result, not of physics or matter, but of free will. They go on to argue
that this account of freedom is ultimately Platonic as well, because Socrates in
the Republic and Augustine in the Confessions both make the same claim: that
natural, physical, material, and sensual things, once properly understood, all
indicate the existence of the Good since (unlike evil, which comes from the
will) they are all participants in the Good, and thus all have some good in
them. They conclude that the argument presented in the Confessions “demo-
onstrates the compatibility” (xii) of Augustinian Christianity and Platonism.

The authors go on to deal with the later novels of Richards by proceeding
in the order in which they were written, beginning with Friends of Meager
Fortune. Friends invites obvious comparisons to Greek literature, in its story
of the epic struggle of two strong brothers to establish a lumber empire.
The prophecy of a Micmac card-reader, presaging initial success and then
great failure for the ostensible protagonist Owen Jameson, stands in for an
oracle. Fate seems to control the lives of the characters in that Owen’s bold-
ness, assisted by the power with which rumor takes up and elaborates upon
his mistake of kissing a married woman, brings about the fulfillment of the
prophecy surrounding his life. The authors argue that Richards presents the
comparison to Greek tragedy to show that the Greek world view is vainglori-
ous and insufficient. Because these characters view the world as the pagan
Greeks do, they cannot find what they seek, including a fulfilled and recip-
rocated human love. The most Christian character, Meager Fortune, on the
other hand, is at peace in his own life despite its great hardships.

The second chapter goes on to deal with Mercy among the Children, a
novel which has some of Richards’s most appealing characters endure some
of his greatest tragedies. Their account of this novel is, in my view, the stron-
gest part of their argument. The work is narrated by Lyle Henderson and is
his account of the great sorrows that have come to his family and of his father
Sydney’s vow of nonviolence, which has kept Sydney from attempting to
avenge these injuries. Sydney’s vow is made to God; Lyle, on the other hand,
mentally struggles against his father and against the idea of God. The authors
bring together the complex events of this novel compellingly, and they argue
that Richards presents Sydney’s strength as an ultimate freedom, although
it keeps him from violent action, and Lyle’s attempt at independence as an
ultimate failure. They point out that only when Lyle lets go of his need to be in control of events does he seem to be able to acquire any comfort or peace.

In the subsequent chapter, MacDonald and Craig deal with *The Lost Highway*, which returns to a secular protagonist. They argue that Richards presents Alex Chapman as an “inverted image of Sydney Henderson” (73). Like Sydney, Alex seeks in books a world outside his own, but unlike Sydney he finds in them a source for extreme skepticism and becomes a stoic humanist. Alex seeks freedom through complete independence and reliance on his own rationality, but he gains it instead by loving someone and becoming, in this way, dependent. The authors suggest that this fact of Alex’s life points him, and others, to a need for infinite love as the means to human freedom. Thus “Richards suggests that the truth manifest in Christianity is eternally true” (101). The need of love points to a God who is love—to the Christian God.

In their final full chapter, the authors turn to *Crimes against My Brother*. Here they understand Richards to complete the argument he has developed through the series of novels, that “the love of self must be converted in the love of others and the love of God” (125). Three boys, aware of Sydney Henderson’s pact of nonviolence and faith, make an opposing pact to rely only on each other and neither to believe in nor to depend on God. Although they start out as firm friends, they become bitterly divided as they grow older. MacDonald and Craig argue that the betrayals that destroy their friendships and their lives are instances of overweening attempts at autonomy, and also that the love that is revived between at least two of these friends by the end of the novel, as well as the love felt by others around them, show where the real power of the human soul is found.

The authors make it clear that love is powerful and salutary in the novels, and this helps to establish one branch of their argument, namely, that Richards exposes a certain kind of human freedom—the freedom his characters have, not entirely to choose whom to love or whether to love, but rather to love no matter what others think of them or do to them. The less convincing branch of their argument is that which presents these characters as emblems of Christian, Augustinian, and Platonic doctrine.

One problem with this latter argument is that it relies so much on the doctrines of the characters that each one is often presented as fully governed by his ideas rather than by the various events that have formed and deformed him. Thus, for example, the authors portray Sydney Henderson as a successful proponent of his vow, whereas one might argue his vow has gravely
injured his family. His greatness may lie in his having made not the right choice, but rather the best choice available to a man injured by his father, his priest, and his circumstances. Similarly, the authors seem to me to understate Lyle's good qualities, even to the point of textual mistakes. For example, they discuss Percy's selfless thoughts about Lyle before his death without noting that these thoughts are not really Percy's (since his thoughts could not be known by anyone) but are attributed to Percy by Lyle, presumably out of his own guilt but also his own humility. Similarly, they depict Ian's development as a movement towards Christian humility, but there are suggestions in the text that his tragic fault has little to do with atheism.

Moreover, while MacDonald and Craig are at pains throughout to ground the controversial view of freedom they defend in a solid philosophical tradition, they occasionally oversimplify Richards's world by tying it all to this tradition as they see it. Their own brief account of Augustine and even briefer account of Plato leave more questions than they answer. Even if one accepts that the ends of human life sought by Christian and Platonic traditions may be compatible, one might still contend that the two traditions discover and resolve the complexities of human life in different or even opposing ways, and even that the means by which they discover those complexities, more than the ends discovered, are the subject of the novelist. To fully accept the argument of the book, one would have to evaluate Richards on his ability to convince readers to agree on the ends of human life, but readers may instead be looking for his insights into the means by which human beings reach out into the unsoundable world.

Nonetheless, in attending to the way love is treated by Richards the authors make a compelling case that his characters benefit when they let go—when they put themselves aside. This is not easy for these characters, and it is not easy for the reader, because Richards gives us stories in which a reasonable person might feel hopelessly unable to reconcile what is manifestly desirable with what is possible or with what one owes to someone else. The interpretation provided combats this feeling. Most notably, the book successfully pulls together the elements of Lyle's various thoughts at the end of *Mercy*. Lyle's grief and pain is the kind that very little can resolve, and it appears from his story as if faith might be the only thing that can assuage that pain. They make the subtle point, for instance, that Sydney is not necessarily better than Jay Beard because he is nonviolent. Rather, if Sydney is better, it is because he shows an outstanding strength in his ability to submit his will to something outside of himself, and moreover this strength seems to shine out
to people around him (including even his raging son) and to manifest itself in warmth, in love, and in integrity. A similar care and subtlety also appear in their accounts of Camellia’s relationships with Reggie and with Owen in *Friends of Meager Fortune*, of Alex Chapman’s sacrifice in *The Lost Highway*, and of Lonnie Sullivan’s special kind of evil in *Crimes against My Brother*.

As MacDonald and Craig state, many critics find the stories of Richards to be “stories of violence, darkness, and despair” (xi). Their analysis of the books responds to these critics; but more importantly, they offer a plausible account that might give some comfort and motivation to the ordinary reader who finds himself staggering under the harsher blows experienced in Richards’s formidable works.

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It is typically thought that Schelling is not a political thinker, a position which stems from the fact that Schelling very rarely discussed political themes. Consequently, readers may find Ryan Scheerlinck’s 450-page study of Schelling’s Political Philosophy¹ puzzling, especially once one discovers that the theme of politics is seemingly treated explicitly only in the fifth and final chapter. Scheerlinck’s book, rather than a systematic treatment of Schelling’s political thought, instead appears to be but a commentary on Schelling’s 60-page Philosophy and Religion. The title of Scheerlinck’s book thus contains a riddle, especially since the concept announced therein, Political Philosophy, is mentioned only twelve times in his text. Nevertheless, a precise account of Political Philosophy, which is carefully demarcated from political theory, emerges. More pressing than a theory of political issues is the problem of how (not) to communicate certain philosophic truths to the right audience. Accordingly, the problem of Darstellung, of the presentation or exhibition of truth, is extensively treated in the first chapter. This problem proves fundamental not only for understanding Philosophy and Religion, but, as Scheerlinck demonstrates, for understanding all of Schelling’s writings.

¹ Scheerlinck capitalizes “Political Philosophy” as a technical term in order to demarcate it from political philosophy or political theory. While all nouns, e.g., “Philosophie,” are capitalized in German, adjectives, e.g., “politische,” are not, which shows that Scheerlinck intends “Politische Philosophie” as a technical term.

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Political Philosophy, as we will see, consists in the delineation of an *aporia* rather than in the explication of a solution, as solutions to political problems are to be found elsewhere than in politics, specifically, in religion. Political Philosophy’s principal object, then, will prove to be the relation between philosophy and religion, as the title of Scheerlinck’s book aptly indicates. Thus, in the second chapter, Scheerlinck begins by showing how Schelling’s text is a response to Adolph Karl August Eschenmayer’s 1803 *Die Philosophie in ihrem Übergang zur Nicht-Philosophie* (Philosophy in its transition to nonphilosophy). By nonphilosophy, Eschenmayer primarily means religion and theology, and by philosophy, epistemology or philosophy within the bounds of reason and the understanding, that is, within Kantian strictures. In Schelling’s *Philosophy and Religion*, then, religion occupies the place of nonphilosophy, which means, against Kant, it is not to be conceived within the limits of reason alone. On the side of philosophy, Scheerlinck argues, one finds, as a subdomain of practical philosophy, the political. Accordingly, Scheerlinck notes that Schelling “distinguishes at least three addressees: philosophers…potential philosophers…the organs of the time” (64). Eschenmayer is thought to fall within the second category.

Per Schelling, the proper object of philosophy is “Idea of the Absolute,” that is, how to conceive the original unity (*Indifferenz*) between subjectivity and objectivity. The specific object, that is, the charge, of *Philosophy and Religion* is to account for the “departure of finite things from the Absolute” (28). Schelling’s short answer to this charge is termed “Fall,” though Scheerlinck rightly perceives that the concept this term indicates—the descent of finitude/individuality from the Absolute—is already present in Schelling’s *Identitätsphilosophie*, in *Bruno* (1802). What Schelling holds to be original is that “the presentation of his system continues into the field of practical philosophy, since the question of finitude,” that is, the account of its emergence from the Absolute, “can find its complete solution first and only in this domain” (144). Scheerlinck shows that, for Schelling, the *actuality* of the Fall is accounted for only by an act of ego, hence the recourse to practical philosophy. Scheerlinck patiently explains how this position is not original to Schelling but draws from Fichte’s notion of *Thathandlung*, the deed that results in the fact of the unity of consciousness, that is, a preconscious act that does not presuppose conscious identity but produces it. Nevertheless, Scheerlinck also notes that Schelling distances himself from Fichte insofar as “Schelling describes egoity…as ‘the universal principle of finitude’” (187). Egoity is a principle of individuation, a principle of self-determination, but it is a *universal* principle. The departure from Fichte is that it is not that only
full-fledged egoity, that is, consciousness, exists, but that everything, even the nonconscious, operates according to a principle of egoity. Nothing is inert; everything, even the nonconscious, contains a principle of self-determination, that is, a subjective principle. Egoity/subjectivity is thus not an exclusive property of consciousness because while everything is subjective, not everything is conscious. Individuality is the condition of consciousness rather than the inverse. In sum, the Fall, “the figurative expression for individuation” (252), is explained not by what egoity can do, but by what it actually does do. The whole account is thus based in practical philosophy (which, in conjunction with the aforementioned emphasis on presentation [Darstellung], gives credence to Scheerlinck’s claim that there is a continuity between Philosophy and Religion [1804] and Schelling’s renowned Freedom Essay [1809]).

Given this ontological basis, Scheerlinck, in the fifth and final chapter, is able to make Schelling’s notion of Political Philosophy clear. Philosophy and Religion’s appendix begins with the book’s first and only explicit discussion of a political matter: the State. Scheerlinck deftly shows how Schelling here rehearses an argument made in Neue Deduction des Naturrechts (New Deduction of Natural Right) (1796), Schelling’s only text exclusively dedicated to a political theme. Scheerlinck will conclude, “The alleged ‘turn’ to religion grows out of [Schelling’s] critique of the State, since the problem of politics, as Schelling’s New Deduction of Natural Right argued, does not get solved with political means, but, if at all, only through religion” (340).

Scheerlinck observes that, for Schelling, practical philosophy is divided according to morality (die Moral), ethics, and natural right (341). Morality is “self-determination, that is, to act in accord with one’s own nature” (342). Ethics and the science of natural right (politics) are both subordinate to morality, which is aimed at the highest good. Ethics is “a system of duties,” of obligations to others. Ethics, unlike morality, is not about how to achieve identity with the Absolute, but how to will in harmony with a “general will,” thus harking back not only to Kant’s conviction that individual will must be sacrificed to universal will, but, I would add, also to Rousseau’s notion of the general will, which cannot will anything against the good of the universal body, the Sovereign. Ethics is thus based on a respect for the other in general, but not, as Kierkegaard might lament, in her singularity. Finally, in the political sphere, “the question as to which rights will has in general arises, independent from whether will is directed through reason” or not “so that will can affirm itself in its mere individuality” (346). Scheerlinck, following Schelling, concludes, “According to this, I also have a right to actions that can
be the object neither of morality nor of ethics” (347). Consequently, political theories concern only the justification of individual, that is, personal, rights, and neither that which is universally good nor the highest good. Political freedom concerns what is permissible by right, but not necessarily what is edifying or good.

Political Philosophy’s task, then, is to expose the aporia of political theory, particularly the deduction of natural right. Schelling had derived three rights—the right to moral freedom (without prescribing what would achieve it), the right to formal equality (which does not preclude material inequality) and the right to things and objects, that is, property (347–48)—but these rights are only formal, without material prescription. Moreover, this is not, Scheerlinck informs us, what Schelling regards as “his original achievement,” which is rather the discovery of the aporia of politics itself, which stems from the fact that “a right that does not simultaneously have the power to be enforced against others remains an empty assertion and cancels itself” (350). Any person or State is thus “entitled to everything for which it is also capable insofar as it has the means at its disposal to assert itself” (351). No State is more legitimate than any other. In Scheerlinck’s words, “no exclusive, positive ordering of right can any longer be legitimated by natural right” (351), unless the State should prescribe an ethic, but then it would not be protective of individual or private freedoms, and rather insist upon the universal. It would no longer be politics but ethics. Scheerlinck incisively glosses: “The ‘solution’ is obviously aporetic, since the means (law, compulsion) contradicts the end (the securing of freedom for all). The freedom of all can be secured only by forcing all or by preventing all from the misuse of their freedom, i.e., by robbing freedom of a portion of its rights” (353). This has been, I would insist, already demonstrated by Hobbes, namely, that individual freedoms are secured only at the cost of the same. Scheerlinck is thus right to note that Schelling rejects every form of contractarianism.

It is not just contractarianism, however, that ends in aporia, but political theory, the theory of right and State, as such. As Scheerlinck infers, “No form of the State is able to solve the aporia of natural law” (362n44), and “the problem, for which natural right was thought as the solution, is not able to be solved with its aid, but is compelled to pass over into another science” (354). Invoking the three possible addressees mentioned in the first chapter (philosophers, potential philosophers, organs of the time), Scheerlinck here remarks that this other “science” should be able to explain how nonphilosophers or “the organs of the time,” who are not even necessarily potential philosophers,
can will in accord with reason and the general body, yet without recourse to ethics and/or morality. This, however, is precisely that of which the State is incapable. Scheerlinck comments, "The merely negative character of the State results from this: it can only prevent the misuse of freedom, but it cannot motivate positive actions" (359). It cannot motivate free rather than unfree action. Even an “ethical” State, so-called, could only prevent unethical actions, but it would not thereby be aimed at the good. Political theories aim only at the preservation of individual, that is, idiosyncratic, actions: one can do what one wants; one can say what one wants, do with one’s body as one wishes, act out self-interest, and so forth. This means—as Marx too perceived, in “On the Jewish Question”—that there can be liberal virtues only of private life. This relegation to the private, however, is detrimental to the State, as the corresponding reaction will always incline toward libertarianism or Thoreauianism, the drive for minimal government or for no government.

Schelling’s Political Philosophy is a critique of political theory. If politics ends in an *aporia* it cannot solve, then for Schelling it is religion, a “new mythology,” that offers escape from this impasse. Only this can bring about noncoerced actions from a nonphilosophical and not properly free populace that correspond to reason without being willed out of reason. Only this could bring about an organic State rather than the machine attacked by Thoreau. If, as Schelling suggested, “the State must cease,” it is not in order to be replaced by anarchy or individual reactions against Statism, but because means must yield to ends, yet an end achieved otherwise than by means of the right political form, that is, by means of a theory of right and of the State, an end only religion can introduce. A “new mythology,” however, like all mythology, cannot be instituted through conscious human invention; it is produced in consciousness unconsciously. The actual content of Schelling’s new mythology thus remains as absent as his political theory. Scheerlinck thus concludes, “What looks like an avoidance and thereby a further indication of failure, must be brought to bear through the insight that mythology, as a naturally occurring product of human consciousness, is not ‘made’” (429). Political Philosophy is not about the conscious institution of new conventions. Just as there is no conscious constitution of mythology, only a philosophy of mythology, so there is no institution of a political theory, only a critique of political theory, an exhibition or presentation of its limits, of its aporetic nature. There is “not a solution of the political problem, but a fathoming in thought of the conditions under which it is to be solved” (430), but these conditions point beyond politics to religion and mythology. There is indeed no political theory in Schelling, only Political Philosophy, a critique of politics and the
delimitation of its domain. Schelling is, then, indeed a political philosopher, an insight which, so far as I know, only Sean McGrath (see his forthcoming *The Late Schelling and the End of Christianity* [Edinburgh University Press]) makes as acutely as Scheerlinck.

As a Schelling expert, I can state without hesitation that no better book on Schelling’s political philosophy exists, a feat ironically rendered more rather than less impressive by the fact that it is the *only* book currently devoted to this topic. Scheerlinck has overturned the canon, and that in a way that contributes to the traditional thematic of faith and reason in terms of the relation of philosophy to nonphilosophy, Political Philosophy to religion. The main pitfall of Scheerlinck’s book is that it was written in German and so will not garner the readership it merits until it is translated.
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Submissions must be under 8,000 words, including notes and bibliographic references, and must be accompanied by an abstract of no more than 150 words. Because Interpretation is a double-blind peer-reviewed journal, all author identification and all references that would identify an author’s own publications must be removed from the document. A separate title page, with the author’s affiliation and contact information (including address, postal code, email address, and phone number) must be included with your MS.

Contributors should follow The Chicago Manual of Style (16th edition). The Chicago Manual of Style offers publications the choice between sentence-style capitalization in titles of books or articles and headline-style. Interpretation uses the headline style. Parenthetical references no longer use “p.” or “pp.” Interpretation has reverted to the traditional form of citation and no longer uses the author/date form. Please double space the entire text. Footnotes, rather than endnotes, are preferred.

Words from languages not rooted in Latin should be transliterated to English. Foreign expressions that have not become part of English should be accompanied by translation into English.

The editors of Interpretation are committed to a timely appraisal of all manuscripts, and expect to be able to have a decision on submissions within four to six weeks.