

Interpretation

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Inquiries ***Interpretation, A Journal of Political Philosophy***

Department of Political Science

Baylor University

1 Bear Place, 97276

Waco, TX 76798

email interpretation@baylor.edu

Reading Benardete: A New *Parmenides*

LAURENCE LAMPERT

INDIANA UNIVERSITY–PURDUE UNIVERSITY INDIANAPOLIS (EMERITUS)

laurencealampert@gmail.com

The rewards of reading Seth Benardete keep growing. His intricate and demanding writings afford access to the early history of political philosophy that is available nowhere else. In this article I concentrate on the four and a half compacted pages that end his late essay “Plato’s *Parmenides*: A Sketch.”¹ Its particular reward is access to a hitherto unsuspected yet wholly persuasive understanding of an especially resistant Platonic dialogue. That gain opens a window on two further rewards: *Parmenides*, the author of the philosophic poem that exists for us only in fragments, takes on a depth and shape that befit the singular praise Socrates lavished on him at the end of his life; and the whole history of philosophy back to Homer begins to show itself as genuinely philosophic in the radicality of its discoveries and in the restrictions it placed on sharing them. Without ever explicitly saying so, Benardete shows how hidden Greek wisdom believed it had to be in order to maintain a presence in the world and sustain its future, how inaccessible to all but the most driven, most gifted “lucky hits,” as Nietzsche called them. And he shows primarily what that hidden wisdom was, genuine knowledge of the human and through the human of the world.

I am grateful to *Interpretation*’s three readers for significant improvements to my essay.

¹ Seth Benardete, “Plato’s *Parmenides*: A Sketch,” in *The Archaeology of the Soul: Platonic Readings of Ancient Poetry and Philosophy*, ed. Ronna Burger and Michael Davis (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s, 2012), 229–43. In the list of works the editors append to this collection, the *Parmenides* essay seems to be the last one Benardete completed before his death on November 14, 2001; see also their preface, 1n1. References to Benardete’s essay will be to paragraph numbers in the text.

The part of Benardete's essay that I treat concerns the daunting "gymnastic" that constitutes the last two-thirds of Plato's *Parmenides*, the eight-part exercise in reasoning about the being and nonbeing of unity or the one that old Parmenides conducts with young Aristoteles. Benardete regards the gymnastic as "performed" for Socrates, the nineteen-year-old Socrates who had just demonstrated to Parmenides and Zeno, visitors to Athens during the Great Panathenaea of 450, the brilliance of his mind and the beauty and divinity of his zeal for philosophy (135d). For while young Socrates was presenting his new view of the forms that he was sure refuted their view of the one and the many, they kept looking at each other and smiling whereas Pythodorus, their Athenian host and future general, thought the impudent swagger of his young countryman would anger them (130a). As they continue to observe him while Parmenides crushes his new view with irrefutable arguments, they see another admirable feature: a willingness to accept immediately and in good grace the rational refutation of the view of which he had been so proud—an eagerness to be taught.

Benardete indicated early in his essay the significance of the gymnastic. He calls Parmenides the "philosopher who first thought through the question of being.... Socrates was the second, as far as we know, to take over the question and make it his own in the form of 'What is?'... The very form of [Socrates's] question indicates that we are to replace the dogmatic Socrates who has an art with the skeptical Socrates who embodies *erōs*" (2). So a "Who is?" lies embedded in the "What is?" question as Benardete framed it: Who is Socrates? Is he the dogmatic practitioner of the maieutic art? Benardete stated in his first paragraph that the Parmenidean Eleatic Stranger had refuted that art as fruitless. Is he then the skeptical embodiment of what he reported himself learning in the *Symposium*? Benardete just says it: "we are to replace" the former with the latter—that is who the practitioner of the maieutic art really is. It is not surprising that an inquiry into who Socrates is would replace the more public Socrates with a less accessible one: the *Parmenides* itself shows Socrates being taught in his youth by Parmenides and Zeno the necessity that a philosopher guard his public speech as they did theirs, that he shelter what a philosopher is as a radical inquirer into nature and human nature who uncovers the unsettling truth.

In his third paragraph Benardete notes how the *Parmenides* is unique among the reports on the young Socrates: only there "do we catch Socrates before he became Socrates, without the framing Socrates himself gives to his younger self." Socrates's framing of his younger self in the *Phaedo* describes

“his turn away from teleological cosmology,” while his framing in the *Symposium* “recapitulates his instruction into the mysteries of *erōs* and puts into a single speech a series of lessons that Diotima gave him.” As for the *Parmenides*, it gives “a report that links in a symbolic way the Anaxagorean mind from which Socrates started to the erotic soul whose wisdom finds its greatest competitors to be the poets.”² What Benardete then says presents his view of just how the *Parmenides* fits into Plato’s scattered presentation of the young Socrates becoming himself in these three dialogues. While it may be “at first surprising” that “*Parmenides* should prepare the ground for Diotima’s instruction,” the *Symposium* helps make it not a surprise: “if one realizes that the gods inhabit the core of human opinion and Socrates believed *erōs* was a great god, and [if one realizes that] Diotima in her demotion of *erōs* established the possibility of a between that could not be understood to be either any less original than the divine things or merely one of the human things without any connection with the divine.” Wise, demythologizing Diotima showed young Socrates that *eros* is not a god and replaced that notion with the possibility of a between: she led him to understand *eros* as in fact more original than the gods and not simply a human passion or human opinion or any other merely human thing. As Benardete will suggest in this essay, *eros* is the fundamental element of the “ontological psychology” toward which *Parmenides* guided Socrates. Still, even that elevated role for *Parmenides* in Socrates’s becoming would leave the *Parmenides* “no more than preparatory to the *Symposium*” whereas, what “I propose to show it is,” Benardete declares, is “the setting forth of the task of Socrates’ philosophic life and the challenge to enter his thing.”³ While the first part of the *Parmenides*, the destruction of the view of forms that young Socrates had put forward, is indispensable to that setting forth and that challenge, just what they are can be found in the gymnastic.

This account of the relation of the *Parmenides* to the *Phaedo* and *Symposium* complements what Benardete said seven years earlier in “On Plato’s

² Plato gave the *Parmenides* a frame Benardete does not discuss, a frame that shows why direct access to the young Socrates exists at all: Certain men of Clazomenae, “quite the philosophers” (126b), heard that a second-hand report might still exist of the speeches young Socrates had with Zeno and Parmenides. On the basis of that rumor they were willing to sail across the Aegean Sea to Athens in the hope of hearing those speeches, not even knowing if that person could still recall them after many years had passed. Plato’s framing suggests that Cephalus’s narration of the whole of the *Parmenides* is for such persons only.

³ Socrates’s “thing” apparently translates *pragma*, the word Socrates used when he imagined being asked in court, “Well, Socrates, what is your *pragma*?” (*Apology* 20c). He took the question to be asking what he does to cause the charges to be raised against him and answers with his story of the Delphic oracle and his consequent “turn” to examine human wisdom. In the *Crito* the laws say that Socrates’s *pragma* is bound to appear unseemly (53d).

Symposium.⁴ There, Diotima's instruction "constitutes the last of three stages of Socrates' philosophic education.... The first stage Socrates gives in the *Phaedo*... the second phase is in the first half of the *Parmenides*, where Parmenides proves the impossibility of his ideas. According to Parmenides, the most telling objection to them is that even if they exist they cannot be known by us, for there must be a complete separation between divine and human knowledge." Diotima's "notion of the in-between or the demonic" offers Socrates "a way out of the impasse Parmenides left him in." Diotima replaced "complete separation" with a between no less original than the divine and not merely a human thing. Benardete's *Parmenides* essay remedies his silence seven years earlier on the role of the second half of the *Parmenides*, the gymnastic, in Socrates's philosophic education.

After destroying Socrates's proposal about forms (*eidē*) Parmenides told him that ideas (*ideai*) in some sense must nevertheless be recognized for any understanding of things to be possible at all—a fact he credited young Socrates with knowing (135a–c).⁵ "What then will you do about philosophy? Where will you turn if all this is unknown?" (135d). The gymnastic is the indispensable training to which Socrates must turn to discover the truth about knowing and eventually about being. "What is the manner of this gymnastic?" Socrates asked, and in response Parmenides set out an eightfold plan to be followed in examining any hypothesis (136a), the eightfold plan Parmenides himself followed for the eight hypotheses of the gymnastic. His initial outline of that plan (136a–c) in its complexity and brevity left Socrates baffled: "It's quite an impossible task...and I don't really understand it" (136c). The gymnastic exists because baffled Socrates asked Parmenides to "hypothesize something and go through it for me" and because Zeno and the rest of the company joined him in urging Parmenides to comply. Benardete does not mention that eightfold plan, passing up the opportunity to prepare his own account with that synoptic guide to its steps. But he does discuss the poem Parmenides introduced as a likeness for the challenge he faced in presenting the gymnastic, a likeness Benardete employs to look ahead to what Socrates actually achieved in the *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, and *Republic*. And that look ahead provides him with his own concise introduction to the gymnastic, his opening two sentences of paragraph 16. For "if the first part of the *Parmenides* foreshadows Socrates' later development" in ways that he

⁴ Seth Benardete, *On Plato's "Symposium" / Über Platons "Symposion"* (Munich: Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung, 1994), 69, 71.

⁵ Socrates had consistently used *eidos* (form) whereas Parmenides uses *idea* in here telling Socrates what is necessary; he had used *idea* earlier at 132a3, c4, 133c11, and 134c1.

has just shown, then “the second part,” the gymnastic, “seems all the more superfluous. It is not.” Showing *that* it is not and *how* it is not is Benardete’s purpose in treating the gymnastic: the guidance the gymnastic gives leads to a rational understanding of the fundamental truths of human knowing and of the true grounds of the ideas.

Paragraph 16. In treating the gymnastic, Benardete spends no time whatever testing the validity of any of Parmenides’s arguments, the natural preoccupation of virtually all other modern commentators on the *Parmenides*. He focuses instead on the implications of their conclusions and of the relations among their conclusions: he focuses on the action of the argument. He finds the first two of the eight hypotheses definitive in “forcing Socrates to face the either/or of his ideas.” These hypotheses are two of the four that hypothesize that one is, the two that examine the results of that hypothesis for the one itself. The first finds negative results for the one and concludes that *neither* of the contraries forming the ten categories that Parmenides examines (neither part nor whole, neither beginning nor end, etc.) holds for any single idea; the second finds positive results for the one, concluding that *both* of the contraries hold for any single idea. “The first declares that nothing can be thought or said about an idea.” The second declares “that whatever holds for visible things...equally holds for any idea.” Benardete concludes: “Hypothesis I and II divide between them incommunicable separation and indistinguishable communion.” The either/or Socrates must confront at the start is that the forms as he conceived them either totally transcend any thinkability or are totally immersed in the flow of particulars. Socrates is to infer from the results of the first and second hypotheses that rational examination of the forms as he conceived them uncovers paired impossibilities: a transcendence that cannot be thought and a participation that dissolves the difference of the form.

Paragraph 17. Benardete’s second paragraph on the gymnastic focuses on “Parmenides’ way.” While presenting itself as “didactic,” as starting from principles, his way is in fact “latently zetetic” because it “indicates that one is to go to the principles and not start from them.” This “doubleness of the way”—present in Parmenides’s poem as in the gymnastic of Plato’s *Parmenides*—reduces in the actual procedure followed “to only one way, the way of inquiry.” Showing then how the actual procedure of the gymnastic “infers” or “goes to” the categories it employs, Benardete isolates “an hypothesis behind the hypotheses,” namely, “to be is to be measurable.” He confirms that this is the unstated fundamental hypothesis by analyzing Parmenides’s procedure in the first two hypotheses: Parmenides seems to assume that

anything that is like or unlike is thereby either equal or unequal and that does not follow “unless it is further assumed that likeness necessarily is a matter of measurable degree.” Parmenides’s one, fully demythologized, stripped of all features but its most fundamental hypothesis, thus becomes the hypothesis that to be is to be measurable, the hypothesis of the rationality of the whole. Benardete concludes his paragraph by noting that in the positive hypotheses generally, this homogeneity of measurable degree “operates...in the form of its scientific counterparts, arithmetic and geometry.”

Paragraph 18. After drawing his conclusions about the first two positive hypotheses, *positive* in that they hypothesize that one is, Benardete moves to one of the negative hypotheses. In the negative hypotheses Parmenides does what he earlier singled out as what Socrates had to do in addition to hypothesizing that an idea is, “hypothesize that this same thing is not” (135e). Benardete turns to a negative hypothesis saying that “it is accordingly not surprising that when the being of one is canceled in the negative hypotheses, the soul and its experiences come to light.”⁶ This is not surprising because in our experience ones are inexorably present and the question must arise, How is this possible if one is not? That necessary question dictates a turn to the human, to the soul, and to one negative hypothesis in particular, “the only hypothesis that is not an hypothesis...the seventh.” The reason it is not a hypothesis is that there “Parmenides gives two examples—dreaming and shadow-painting—and thus grants that one may be or not, but there is still dreaming and shadow-painting where one is not.”⁷ Benardete states the *extent* of dreaming and shadow-painting in his next sentence: “Neither the absence nor the presence of the one alters appearance and illusion”—human experience as such is experience of appearance and illusion. For this reason he can say that “everything...turns on the seventh hypothesis.” He explains what *turns on* means with a metaphor that is typically effective and at first confounding: the seventh hypothesis “is the enfolding of the unfolding of all the other hypotheses.” This states exactly what Benardete does from this

⁶ The four negative hypotheses examine the results of “one is not” for the one itself and for the different things.

⁷ The seventh hypothesis treats the results for the different things if one is not where the results are all positive for the sole reason that we can speak of them: the different things are, are different from one another, have mass and number, are odd and even, etc. In an essay on Parmenides’s poem that is in many ways a companion to this one, “Night and Day,...’: Parmenides,” published a few years earlier (1998), Benardete gave a similar account of the seventh hypothesis but at that time he called it the “eighth,” probably because he treated what Parmenides labeled the “third” as a separate, additional hypothesis (*Archeology of the Soul*, 202). The description of the seventh hypothesis that he gave there is a useful supplement to the one he gives here.

point on: first, having found out what Parmenides folded into the unique seventh hypothesis, he uses that as the key with which to unfold what he folded into all the others: to see the uniqueness of the seventh hypothesis is to see its uniformly applicable key to all the others. This insight into the activity of folding and unfolding grounds the permanent importance of Benardete's essay for understanding Plato's *Parmenides*: what Benardete discovers in the seventh hypothesis is what Parmenides intended the young Socrates to discover if he was able; it is what Cephalus's narration makes it possible for every future auditor of it to discover. Parmenides constructed his gymnastic to have a key whose natural or systemic place falls just after the impasse of the first two hypotheses and provides the only possible entry into an understanding of these two and of all the others.

So what did Parmenides enfold into the seventh? The inexorable power of human experience to mask the whole while making the whole seem to lie before us unmasked, the whole that is only dreamt and shadow-painted while certifying itself as demonstrably, securely true: "I refute it thus," said Samuel Johnson of Berkeley's view of ideas and kicked a large stone. All the other hypotheses "assume their proper proportions once they are traced back to the indisputable character of appearance and opinion"—once human experience is understood to be the dreaming and shadow-painting of the soul in all its perceiving and conceiving the other hypotheses submit to being unfolded and measured in light of that fundamental insight.

"Socrates is told that this is where he must start." Socrates is *told* nothing at all in the gymnastic in any literal way. Nor does Parmenides "arm" Socrates (20) as Benardete says he does, or "suggest" to him (20), or "ask" (21) or "tell" (23) him anything. Socrates sits silent through the whole of Parmenides's gymnastic with Aristoteles. Pythodorus, the future general who was there, will memorize the exchange and pass it on hoping to secure its transmission. Socrates, eager to learn from the one who stripped him of his forms, will memorize the exchange as an exercise of the mind addressed directly to him; by testing it, interrogating it, following its foldings, he will be granting his guide the authority due him. And his guide will tell him and arm him and ask him as the pathway unfolds. By treating the gymnastic dialectically Socrates will make it the guide to his new way of solving the problems of being and knowing.⁸

⁸ The "Sketch" of Benardete's title is especially fitting for both his account of the gymnastic and Parmenides's gymnastic itself: both consist of a series of strokes which must be filled in, painted in, to be understood; the full portrait of "is" and "is not" can come into view only by following the path and

“Socrates is told that this is where he must start.” Hypothesis seven tells him that he must start with a turn that recognizes human experience to be immersion in inescapable dreaming and shadow-painting. Socrates had started with forms as transcendent realities, an advance in the sense that it did not stay confined to the puzzles of perception, but an impossible way out of those puzzles because it viewed perception naively as a window on being. A “simple consideration,” Benardete says, shows that Socrates had not started properly and for that consideration he looks to Socrates’s final proposal about the forms (132d) as “paradigms in nature” while what participates in them “are their images [*eikasthēnai*] that look like them [*eoikenai*], and are their likenesses [*homoiōmata*].” Benardete takes Parmenides’s shadow-painting example to be a response to Socrates’s claim of likeness: his example implies that Socrates did not distinguish, as Parmenides does, between “the eikastic art of geometry” that deals with likenesses or images of things and “the phantastic art of shadow-painting” that deals with the products of the necessary structuring by human fancy.⁹ Because Socrates failed to make that distinction, Parmenides implies, he “did not put to himself the question whether speeches”—the *logoi*—“were necessarily phantastic and never eikastic,” always articulations of human-based fancy, never likenesses of what is. Plato, the author of all the dialogues, has thus made it clear that Parmenides caught Socrates just after his initial step as he reported it in the *Phaedo* on the last day of his life: he began correctly by turning to the *logoi* but his examination of the *logoi* mistook them for likenesses representing the true; he did not ask himself if the speeches could necessarily be only *misrepresentations* of what is, only phantasy presentations despite their stability and regularity. By making it possible for Socrates to see his misstep, Parmenides makes it possible for him to correct it—he “sets Socrates on the way” (2).

What would Socrates have to have already done to ensure himself that it is true that the soul’s experiences are necessarily phantastic and never eikastic? “He would have had to have mastered an ontological psychology were he to be sure that whatever showed up in speech had not first shown up in soul” (18). In *speech*—Socrates’s turn to the *logoi* should have led him to ask: Are the *logoi* what they are because the soul is what it is? Parmenides turns

securing the implications of the linked series of gymnastic exercises.

⁹ “This problem...is the burden of the *Sophist*,” as Benardete briefly explains. In his 1984 commentary on the *Sophist* Benardete discusses “the two kinds of mimetics” or image making, *eikastics* and *phantastics*, that the Eleatic Stranger set out for Theaetetus (*The Being of the Beautiful: Plato’s “Theaetetus,” “Sophist,” and “Statesman,”* trans. with commentary by Seth Benardete [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984], II.109–12).

Socrates toward an ontological psychology; he tells him, “know thyself,” and in knowing yourself come to know that the soul, the seat of human experience, necessarily generates the form of all experience and so of all speech and thus blocks any means of accessing being directly. An ontological psychology begins by pursuing a knowledge of the self that aims to understand the human way of “knowing”; it thereby provides the necessary prolegomena to any future understanding of being that could claim to be rational. Without a genuine ontological psychology there is no way to be sure if there is any escape from experience-based phantasy. An ontological psychology would also have to pursue a psychology in the more customary sense, the attempt to understand the drives and goals of the soul, and *this* understanding could lead to a rationally defensible inference about beings as a whole.¹⁰

Early in paragraph 18 Benardete referred to the “imperialistic impulse” of the one, its drive to absorb and rule everything, to rule out “many.” That imperialism “is stopped dead in its tracks” by the recognition of dreaming and shadow-painting: “neither the absence nor the presence of the one alters appearance and illusion.” But speech recognized as phantastic can itself exercise imperial rule: at the end of paragraph 18, having unfolded what Parmenides folded into the seventh hypothesis, Benardete pictures a “latent art of phantastic speech [that] threatens to be as imperialistic as the Parmenidean one.” If that latent art became “successful in absorbing everything into itself, it would be a psychology without an ontology.” Absorption into the unbreakable sway of the generative phantasies of human experience could result in an account of the soul’s ways that denied any possible route to an understanding of the beings for it would be blocked in principle by its theory of imperial phantasy. That art of phantastic speech gone imperial is the art of Protagoras, the sophistic art that accompanies the inquiry into the *logoi* as an always threatening possibility; it is an epistemological skepticism that is a counterfeit of genuine philosophy. Plato therefore showed that from the beginning of his public career in the *Protagoras* to its end in his cell where he dictated the *Theaetetus* to Euclides, Socrates worked to counter Protagoras on behalf of philosophy with its openness to a genuine ontological psychology.¹¹

¹⁰ The need for an “ontological psychology” implicitly arose in the transition from the first part of the dialogue to the second where *eros* appeared as a theme of the poem by Ibycus that Parmenides introduced. Benardete there made the *Symposium* the culmination of Socrates’s inquiry into what Parmenides “urged [him] to acquire[:] the erotic art” (15).

¹¹ Parmenides had earlier warned Socrates about Protagorean skepticism by describing “someone” who denies “that there are forms of the beings” and does not “distinguish a certain form of each single thing:” he will “understand nothing” and “entirely destroy the power of dialectic” (135b).

Benardete's account of the seventh hypothesis makes it clearer why Parmenides gave the label *gymnastic training* to what Socrates had to do in hypothesizing is and is not. The training entails gaining complete familiarity with all eight hypotheses and constant exercise in comparing them and treating them dialectically, interrogating them all for their mutual implications. Only such rigorous exercise could lead to the insight that hypothesis seven differs from the rest and in its difference illuminates all the others, demanding that each be interrogated again to see what the inescapability of dreaming and shadow-painting might imply for it. The silent presence of significance yields its content only to the unfolding that the seventh hypothesis makes possible; and the galvanizing effect of the unfoldings confirms that *this* is the way, *the* way. The inquirer thus gains a confident stance toward the whole of Parmenides's exercise: each hypothesis bristles with significance because each can now be viewed as an aspect of the soul's experiences; the task now is to unfold each in order to discover its particular link in the full understanding of understanding. What Benardete has done with the gymnastic gives a different formulation to what he had already said in his conclusion about the way in his essay "Night and Day...": Parmenides": the gymnastic brings one "to an understanding of the true perplexity, knowledge of ignorance. This is to be on the way of the man who knows."¹² Knowledge of ignorance is knowledge of the soul in its way of "knowing."

Paragraph 19. Benardete's way through the hypotheses—*Socrates's* way, *the* way through the hypotheses—takes him from the revelatory seventh back to the positive hypotheses, to an unfolding of the second that will in turn touch the first. "If there is at least a partial phantastics"—a nonimperial understanding of the soul's constructs of experience—"the second hypothesis is an eikastic fragment of it, for everything that seems to hold if there is one does hold in the realm of appearance" (19). An eikastics of a partial, nonimperial phantastics is highly significant: it would discern the stable likenesses that structure fancy-generated appearance; it would study the *logoi* and the whole of appearance as a science of appearance on the model of arithmetic and geometry; as a genuine science of the stable structures of mere appearance, it would be a knowing of "knowing." It would recognize its limitation to the realm of appearance, while not preemptorily, imperially closing off the possibility of a rational move to what is blocked by appearance; it would be an ontological psychology open to ontology simply, an account of the beings that could defend itself as true.

¹² *Archaeology of the Soul*, 227.

Benardete calls attention to Parmenides's introduction of "the sudden" at the end of the long examination of the second hypothesis (156d–e). Parmenides did this "in order to gain a between that sets out of time the transition of all becomings and passings-away that are in time." The "between" avoids the logical contradiction entailed in becoming, in the transition from being at rest to being in motion or vice versa. The posited "between" is not in time but between times, enabling all change from one state to another state (157a–b). The function of the sudden is to put together the mutually contradictory first and second hypotheses: the sudden "is the utopia where the separated idea of the first can be." *Utopia*, noplacel/perfect place, is Benardete's variant for Parmenides's actual word: "Parmenides calls the sudden *atopon*, strange and placeless." Benardete can then state more explicitly just what this operation with the positive hypotheses is: "The first two hypotheses, then, with their *specious* reconciliation in the third. . ."—emphasis added. The third hypothesis examines the results for the different things of hypothesizing "one is" and its arguments conclude that all the categories are true for the different things. The reconciliation is *specious* but the conclusion is not: for the different things of experience all the categories hold. The nonspurious way to that conclusion is achieved through the key operation: All three hypotheses "are to be enfolded into VII. All of them are really out of place." Putting the first three hypotheses into their proper place via the seventh means that they "assume their proper proportions once they are traced back to the indisputable character of appearance and opinion" which the unique seventh hypothesis makes visible. To place the first three hypotheses properly within dreaming and shadow-painting is to unfold their enfoldedness into the seventh. Parmenides's way leads to a genuine science of experience that secures its fixity; it nevertheless relativizes experience, makes it human, while remaining open to the whole; driven to understand the whole, it partially succeeds while continuing to seek a way through the actually knowable to the ever unknowable. In his next two paragraphs Benardete shows how the two focuses of Socratic practice can be folded out of Parmenides's argument; the action of Parmenides's argument includes an invitation to Socrates to investigate the nature of human experience through two distinct means.

Paragraph 20. Benardete signals a special importance for paragraph 20 by two unusual interventions: he uncharacteristically inserts himself and uncharacteristically moves from what Parmenides offered Socrates to what *Plato* found important in it. Benardete gives dramatic force to Parmenides's act of guidance here by his description of what Parmenides does: he "arms Socrates," equips him with a "defense" against a possibility bound to arise

for him as he pursues Parmenides's way from the seventh hypothesis back through the rest. Arming Socrates is not only a defensive measure for in this step, the unfolding of the third hypothesis with the key of the seventh, Parmenides guides Socrates to the most important of all philosophic gains.

The seventh hypothesis is nonhypothetical because it implicitly proves that the soul "resists the homogenization of being," absorption into an all-encompassing one. But it is still a hypothesis and as such it opens the way to the opposite extreme: "it threatens to cancel homogeneity altogether in favor of infinite heterogeneity or individuality." Is the whole an infinite flux of manynesses in which every seeming one dissolves into a many? It is against this version of the irrationality of the whole that Parmenides arms Socrates, the version argued by Protagoras and the sophists he generated; against this natural upshot of the rational investigation of experience, Socrates, or philosophy as such, must do continuous battle. Benardete sets out two ways in which Parmenides arms Socrates, "the first way is the third hypothesis." Benardete's sequential march through the hypotheses after locating the key that unfolds them thus continues. With the third hypothesis "for the first and only time Parmenides offers a version of what a whole is that is not reducible to a sum." A whole that is not reducible to a sum points to a nonmathematical understanding of wholes that would allow a partial phantastics or a limit on heterogeneity. Parmenides "calls a whole an *idea*," a word that Socrates will take over as a name for wholes. In his examination of the third hypothesis Parmenides speaks of *pieces* generally and isolates that piece that is "not a piece of the many nor of all things, but of one certain idea, a certain one which we call whole" (157d7–e1). As Benardete says, Parmenides uses *idea* in "accordance with his usual practice, he uncovers wholes with their proper parts (*moria*) before he reveals the unlimited behind them."¹³ Out of the unlimited, Parmenides isolates ideas in a sense that he must view as immune to the kind of attacks he marshaled against what Socrates called forms. Ideas in Parmenides's sense must therefore do what he told Socrates he could learn that ideas do: capture "the certain kind [*genos*] and beinghood [*ousia*], in itself" that things have (135a). That would make Parmenides himself the

¹³ Benardete's footnote to Parmenides's use of *idea* at 157d7–e2 also refers to *Theaetetus* 203e2–5 and 184d1–5 where the old Socrates in his cell reports to Euclides, who writes it down, his passing on to Theaetetus this way of understanding *idea*—the transmission in writing of what Parmenides guided him to concerns Socrates to the end. Benardete translates *idea* in the *Theaetetus* passages as the "single look" a single species of things has, while at 203e he translates *eidos* as "species"; he uses the same translations of these two basic words elsewhere, e.g., *The Tragedy and Comedy of Life: Plato's "Philebus,"* trans. with commentary by Seth Benardete (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 117, 122–23.

“naturally gifted man” who discovered that and it would make him as well that “still more wondrous person” able to “teach someone else” (135b)—he teaches Socrates, guides him to discover through his own working out of the gymnastic how to conceive of wholes or kinds in the proper way, without calling in his irrational forms. While “uncover[ing] wholes” or ideas out of the unlimited, Parmenides uncovers too “their proper parts,” the two-word translation of *moria* that Benardete consistently uses in his description of the appropriate use of *idea* in understanding appearance.

Benardete inserts himself into a sentence that says how Parmenides arms Socrates: “He thus suggests to Socrates that the first defense against either homogeneity or heterogeneity is what I call eidetic analysis.”¹⁴ He then gives a three-sentence definition of eidetic analysis using a principle and an “example” that is more than an example: “Eidetic analysis always begins with the one of the unlimited, what Parmenides calls ‘the other nature of the *eidōs*’ [158c], the stream of articulate sound, for example, prior to the discovery of vowels, consonants, and semi-vowels.” The stream of articulate sound is a phrase for the *logoi*, a differentiable part of the undifferentiated whole. Eidetic analysis begins with that stream and isolates “kinds,” the fitting limited sortings within articulate sound, aiming to isolate the elements of speech, down through words and syllables to the letters of syllables that sort themselves into the classes vowels, consonants, and semivowels, the most elemental.¹⁵ “These kinds establish a number between one and many”—a finitude within the two opposite and imperial infinitudes of homogeneity and heterogeneity—“and do not betray”—do not do an injustice to—“the simultaneous copresence of one and many that Socrates found in himself”—as he said when first arguing for his own notion of forms (129c–d). “There is now...”—in this last sentence of his definition Benardete seems quite pointedly to use one of the poles of the *is/is not* hypotheses in order to attach a temporal modifier to it: There *is—now*—what there had not been before the eidetic analysis, “a stable number of proper parts whose whole consists of a single grammatical art,” an art of the *logoi* whose proper parts expand out into numerous kinds and kinds of kinds from the simple parts of sound that are vowels, consonants, and semivowels.

¹⁴ Cf. “I call this procedure eidetic analysis”: Seth Benardete, *Socrates’ Second Sailing: On Plato’s “Republic”* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 4; see also 4–5, 100, 137, and *Tragedy and Comedy of Life*, 227–29, 236–42. In “On the *Timaeus*,” Benardete distinguished eidetic analysis from “genetic analysis” as present in both the *Timaeus* and the *Republic* (Seth Benardete, *The Argument of the Action: Essays on Greek Poetry and Philosophy*, ed. Ronna Burger and Michael Davis [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000], 379–80).

¹⁵ Benardete’s commentary on the *Theaetetus* passage to which he here refers—203e2–5—falls in the subsection entitled “XV. Letters” (*Being of the Beautiful*, I.169–75).

Benardete's definition of eidetic analysis, beginning with the "example" that is a turn to the *logoi*, ends on the word "art." The art or science of human language seems to be the indispensable tool whereby a human being can begin a proper study of the experiences of the soul aiming ultimately at a psychology, a knowledge of human being, that could open onto an ontology. Starting here with the "single grammatical art," Benardete will show in the next paragraph that Parmenides makes the arts a necessary study for a philosopher, for Socrates, *arts* being fundamental to the human way of being in the world, an active and reactive way of constructing or making. Analysis of the arts is therefore the other way—eidetic analysis being "the first way"—that Parmenides arms Socrates to resist the attraction of infinite heterogeneity. "On method" would be a fitting title for the twentieth paragraph; but then "On method" would be a fitting title for the whole of the gymnastic.

Benardete moves from his own term for Parmenides's guidance to Plato himself: "One cannot stress too much the importance of this for Plato: he discerned among its proper parts a kind that constitutes sound but can never be sounded by itself." *This* and *its* seem to refer to the "single grammatical art" of "eidetic analysis" that begins with the stream of articulate sound, the *logoi* humans use to structure the nonlinguistic stream in which we are immersed. And the *kind* "that constitutes sound but can never be sounded by itself"?—that seems to be, judging from Benardete's analysis of the *Theaetetus* passage to which he referred (see note 15 above), the consonants and semiconsonants that constitute sound but can never be sounded by themselves without being joined together with vowels to form syllables. The next sentence, the end of the paragraph, generalizes from this kind: "The idea, one might say, always shows itself as other than it is." Ideas as such show themselves only in the stream of articulate sound but show themselves as if they could be sounded apart from the stream. The ideas are, through eidetic analysis, the inlet into the nature of appearance in whose stream kinds are embedded. What Plato shows Parmenides doing for the young Socrates is how to succeed in what he aimed at by turning to the *logoi*: subject the *logoi* to eidetic analysis, which begins with language and its way of structuring the whole and grounds a rational science of experience. Eidetic analysis is one of the active ingredients in an ontological psychology, analyzing the experiences of the soul with a view to understanding the being of beings; the other, an investigation of the arts, Benardete takes up next.

Paragraph 21. From the third hypothesis, which he now makes simply "the outline of eidetic analysis," Benardete moves to the fourth, the last of the

hypotheses that posit “one is.”¹⁶ Here too he establishes the genuine action of the argument just as he did in paragraphs 19 and 20, for here he puts the fourth hypothesis into its proper place by unfolding it in light of the seventh. With the fourth hypothesis “Socrates is asked to reflect on the arts if number were to withdraw from them,” arts that rely simply on experience. Benardete’s footnote on the arts apart from number refers to Plato’s *Philebus* where Socrates describes the arts of experience as “a kind of knack, using the powers of guesswork.”¹⁷ What Parmenides asked Socrates to do, Benardete says, is “to consider the worthless things, what blacksmiths and shoemakers deal with.” *Worthless* repeats Socrates’s apparent judgment on these arts in the *Philebus*, “virtually worthless,” which Protarchus strengthened to “really worthless” (55e). As Benardete notes, what blacksmiths and shoemakers deal with is judged worthless by Alcibiades too in the *Symposium*; he believes wrongly that they are only “the laughable exterior of Socratic speeches.”¹⁸ With the third and fourth hypotheses, “Parmenides rehearses in the small the tension between heterogeneity and homogeneity”—the many and the one—“and how they can be discerned and understood in the human things.” And here Benardete almost repeats his earlier statement of “the specious reconciliation” of the first two hypotheses in the third in a statement of what the argument has made possible: “The spurious collapse of the first two hypotheses into the third and their genuine reattachment to the seventh hypothesis opens the way for eidetic analysis and its necessary adjunct, the exemplary character of the arts.” Socrates did what Parmenides asked: he “always starts” with “the exemplary character of the arts whether it be on the track of justice or persuasion.”

Justice and persuasion are not just two among many possible tracks; they are the basic two. The first leads to understanding morality, to knowledge of good and evil, and the second leads to understanding language as the human means of organizing experience and ultimately of rule. Had Socrates not done what Parmenides asked, had he not “taken his bearings by the arts in their infinite divisibility, on the one hand, and the wholeness of the soul, on

¹⁶ The fourth hypothesis also examines the results for the different things if one is but its arguments draw negative conclusions for all of Parmenides’s categories.

¹⁷ Plato, *Philebus* 55e1–56a2, Benardete trans.

¹⁸ Plato, *Symposium* 221e; Alcibiades gives four examples of the arts Socrates considered: “pack-asses, blacksmiths, shoemakers, and tanners.” Socrates’s examples in the *Philebus* are flute playing, all of music, medicine, farming, piloting, and generalship (*Phlb.* 56a–b); he contrasts such arts with those in which what Benardete calls “the application of number to knowledge” is basic, Socrates’s model for these arts being carpentry.

the other,” this many and that one, he could not have followed the track of the arts to understand “the nonreducibility of the dyadic nature of justice.” That seems to be what Benardete calls “a precise and an ordinary sense” of justice, the ordinary being the citizen’s justice and the precise being the philosopher’s.¹⁹ Nor could he have understood that persuasion or “rhetoric is the flattering disguise of the desire to punish and looks like the unintended justice of inducing perplexity.” So the two basic tracks to understanding through the arts are intimately entwined: rhetoric masks the actual core of citizen’s justice, the desire to punish.²⁰ The other and irreducible form of justice, the “unintended justice” of the philosopher, is a rhetoric that does good to friends who are good without harming anyone, in particular not harming citizen’s justice but speaking in a way that does not overtly call it into question. And *unintended*? Benardete’s word points to the genuine ground of doing good to friends who are good: not justice, morality, but a more profound drive, eros. The Parmenidean way combining eidetic analysis with an understanding of the arts makes *philosophy* possible: “Socrates’ use of the arts [serves] the purpose of discovering kinds and their proper and improper parts.” An improper part here seems to be the sophist, an improper part of the kind *philosopher* because the sophist’s analysis of language stops at an imperialism of infinite heterogeneity and his use of language is less careful about exposing the roots of justice.

Paragraph 22. Continuing his sequential move through the eight hypotheses, unfolding them through their key, their being enfolded into the seventh, Benardete turns to the four that hypothesize one is not. The conclusions he draws are as radical and as illuminating as those he drew about the four that hypothesize one is. He first draws a general conclusion about all four negative

¹⁹ Benardete, *Socrates’ Second Sailing*, 83, 88–89.

²⁰ As Benardete’s analysis of Socrates’s story of Leontius in the *Republic* shows (*Socrates’ Second Sailing*, 100–102). In “‘Night and Day, . . .’: Parmenides” (221–22), Benardete shows that Parmenides argued that this view of justice is built in to the human way of experiencing existence: existence is deserved punishment. Benardete judges six lines of the longest fragment of Parmenides’s poem (frag. 8.13–18) to be “superfluous” to the argument to which they are appended, the goddess’s argument for the impossibility that being comes from nonbeing. Those six lines put being on trial with Justice presiding; the judgment is that “being is a punishment for a crime that being must commit. Its fate is to be guilty.” The apparent absurdity of this disappears, Benardete says, “if the goddess first presents being as mortals primarily experience it, and not as it is in itself.” When the goddess later presents what being is in itself, “Necessity replaces Right.” Benardete shows that among the lessons Odysseus learns on his way to philosophy is “the great strain the will is under to reinterpret necessity as right” (*The Bow and the Lyre: A Platonic Reading of the “Odyssey”* [Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997], 75). *The Bow and the Lyre* is perhaps the most valuable and certainly the most far-reaching of Benardete’s investigations of Greek philosophy before Socrates: Homeric poetry contains the paradigmatic odyssey to philosophy and political philosophy.

hypotheses based on the disappearance in them of words for fixity:²¹ that absence signals the obliteration of the present, what *is*, but leaves intact *was* and *will be*. This opens the way to Timaeus's cosmology, Benardete claims, a cosmology that "makes it possible to get rid of being in becoming"—a cosmology of flux where "is not" is literally true because of the sovereignty of becoming; Plato's Parmenides embraces the universality of flux but as a process in which "ones" or kinds of relative permanence are generated and extinguished.²²

Moving to the individual hypotheses of "is not," Benardete sees a reversal in the expected order of the first two, five and six, reinforcing that the two "belong together."²³ The fifth "looks at opinion and...establishes that its premise is that to be is to be possible and nothing is necessary," just as Parmenides's poem did. The premise of opinion that nothing is necessary is illuminated by the conclusion Benardete drew earlier, from Parmenides's final argument against Socrates's view of forms (15). There, Parmenides's coordination of knowledge and rule implied that "whatever we do not rule by our knowledge looks to us [humans] like chance and our opinion [human opinion] assigns the mastery of chance to the gods." But the hypothesis that lies behind the eight hypotheses, "that to be is to be measurable" (17), depends upon unbreakable necessity and that carries an implication for the gods that Benardete will state in his next paragraph. Here he draws a different conclusion from the reversed order: putting the fifth hypothesis "up against" the fourth brings out "the second component that Socrates will need for his analysis of the city." The first component was the theme of hypothesis four: "The true city is the city of arts, in which everyone who enters it comes equipped with some part of knowledge." In the *Republic* Socrates had to supplant that "true city" of arts and knowledge at Glaucon's insistence: he judged it a "city of pigs" (372d), he demanded the amenities to which he is accustomed. The true city is therefore supplanted by "the city whose spurious unity is grounded in the education in opinion of its warrior-defenders." By bringing the fifth hypothesis up against the fourth, Parmenides set Socrates on the way to a proper, twofold analysis of the city, of the political: understanding the arts as parts of knowledge and

²¹ Benardete lists seven such words: "time, place, figure, nature, kind, whole, and proper part."

²² Benardete notes here that the fragments of Parmenides's poem that survive do not permit a definitive judgment on whether "the goddess's speech on opinion" already indicated this "get[ting] rid of being in becoming" that Plato's *Parmenides* indicates.

²³ The fifth hypothesis examines the results of "is not" for the different things whereas the expected order would have examined the results for "the nonbeing of one in relation to itself," the topic of the sixth.

understanding the city's opinions as stamped-in education. The city's always spurious unity, grounded in that education, is always vulnerable to exposé by ambitious rhetoricians like Thrasymachus while also being susceptible to alteration and reform by a ruler who knows the art of rule as Socrates does.

Paragraph 23. The sixth hypothesis “discusses the nonbeing of one in relation to itself.” Benardete observes that Aristoteles asks no questions as Parmenides's arguments serially conclude that one is not and he takes Aristoteles's failure to ask a question as an invitation to ask two of his own. But first he says that Aristoteles's “silence” makes him “the boy of Parmenides' poem who listens in silence to the goddess's speech and does not question his own nonbeing”—the boy fails to object even where he obviously should. Aristoteles's silence is the device, Benardete says, by which “Parmenides tells Socrates” why he failed to understand his poem—which can be true only if Parmenides so controlled the conversation that he could cause Aristoteles's silence. What Parmenides “tells” Socrates here is “that he failed to understand his poem because he was unaware that he too practiced an ontological psychology”—Parmenides taught in a way that demands that its *way* be recognized: Socrates “took straight a teaching that was essentially dialectical.” Parmenides's teaching depends on interrogating its claims and discovering the answers he left implicit; its giving depends on active taking. As with Parmenides's poem, so with Parmenides's gymnastic: do not be a boy listening silently to some god—the gymnastic was intended to lead Socrates to question it, here to pose the “crucial question” about the nonbeing of one. Benardete poses that question twice and answers with assertions twice. His questions ask “is not?” His assertions state “is not.”

Benardete's first formulation of the crucial question runs: “Is there not a difference between the conclusion that something is not and the way to that conclusion?” His second rewords it with terms from the gymnastic: “Is there not a difference between the examination of opinions that the fifth hypothesis proposes and the discovery implied in the sixth?” This second asking restores the proper order of the elements “the way” and “the conclusion” that his first asking had reversed: the restoration shows that Parmenides's reversal of the fifth and sixth hypotheses was proper. The *way* puts the fifth first as the examination of opinions that arrives at understanding them as constructs of the human way of being and that conclusion is the indispensable way to the conclusion of the sixth or rather to the discovery implied in the sixth, an ontological discovery about the nonbeing of one in relation to itself, a discovery Parmenides did not voice because it states the ontological atheism that

is not to be spoken. Benardete speaks it, if in a question, the discovery “that ‘Zeus not even is?’”²⁴

Benardete’s first sentence following his two questions contains two assertions of “is not,” each answering one of the questions. The first runs: “The temporal order of discovery is not the same as the order of the parts”—the temporal order makes discoveries through an ontological psychology that uncovers an order of parts among the beings as a hierarchy in which opinion’s highest being is not the actual highest being because he not even is. Its second runs: “just as the enfolding of the hypotheses as a whole is not the same as their enfolding into the seventh.” Parmenides’s way is an order of enfolded hypotheses whose temporal unfolding requires that the questioner first discover the difference of the seventh, its not being a hypothesis at all. The truth discoverable in that difference—human opinion is inescapable dreaming and shadow-painting that structures all of human experience—can unfold all the other enfolded hypotheses as a proper ordering of parts in a teaching on the truth about the beings: begin with human being and its way of being and move to the other beings as they appear to the human, ending with the truth about the highest being. Benardete’s second sentence, the final sentence of the paragraph, applies what he just said about Parmenides’s way to Plato’s *Parmenides*: “It was just such a difference that dictated the narration of the first part of the *Parmenides* and the atemporal pattern of the second.”²⁵ Plato’s way in his *Parmenides* makes the first part a narration in which the young Socrates undergoes a temporal process of discovering his need to learn and makes the second part Parmenides’s performance of an atemporal gymnastic that Socrates is to learn. Plato learned from Socrates who learned from Parmenides. To learn from Plato is to see the difference between the way and what it is the way to.²⁶

²⁴ Benardete’s way of wording the conclusion mirrors the is/is not hypotheses of the *Parmenides* but by putting it in quotation marks he may suggest Aristophanes’s wording too when he had Pheidippides speak the unspeakable to his father, Strepsiades: Pheidippides asks whether Zeus is; Strepsiades answers, “Is”; Pheidippides responds “Is not” (*Clouds* 1465–70).

²⁵ This observation nine lines from the end of the essay was first made in the second line of the essay.

²⁶ In light of Benardete’s view that the Parmenides of Plato’s *Parmenides* teaches a skepticism that knows the limits of skepticism and the route to knowledge, it is illuminating to study the second paragraph of “Night and Day, . . . : Parmenides.” It begins with three things Benardete finds surprising for their absence and a fourth he finds surprising for its presence: “the goddess never ascribes eternity (*aiei*) to being, or falsehood (*pseudos*) to nonbeing; nonbeing disappears as soon as the goddess turns to Opinion, even though ‘to be not’ is as much a mortal name as ‘to be’ (8.40),” and fourth, “the goddess promises that Parmenides will know (*eisēi eidēseis* [10.1, 5]) and learn (*mathēseai* [8.31]) mortal opinions, but she herself never uses such verbs about Truth” (200–201).

Paragraph 24. Benardete's final paragraph treats the final, eighth hypothesis which "puts the question whether there would be nothing if there were not soul and its experiences." In his final sentence he says *question* two more times, "This question is one of the deepest questions of Platonic metaphysics," and ends by putting the question in Platonic terms and adding his own nice wording: "whether the idea of the good, if it is to be the single cause of the being of the beings and of the beings being known, does not entail for all time if not for all times that some rational animal be." That one of all times that is our time wants to answer this Platonic question with what Nietzsche held, that the goodness of the whole, its being open to rational investigation, does not entail that such a creating and sustaining being be. Is our answer the true answer? Or is the true answer what Plato made it seem was his answer in the passage in the *Republic* that Benardete calls to mind? But Plato made it clear that what seemed his answer was the answer his brothers needed: he suggested thereby that Socrates did not need it but knew their need and his need to meet it.

And Benardete? By ending on "be," a continuous form of *is*, he ends on the fitting word for an essay examining the *is/is not* questions of the gymnastic in the *Parmenides*. But the truly fitting word for ending the part of his essay that treats the "is not" hypotheses would be the negation of *be*. The final twist of Benardete's essay could be that his own way of answering the question he ends on is what his final clause literally says when not read as part of a question: Plato's metaphysics "does not entail for all time if not for all times that some rational animal be." What does entail that is Plato's political philosophy. Benardete's treatment of the eighth hypothesis would then mirror what he discovered to be dialectically present in the other hypothesis of *is not* that draws a negative conclusion, the sixth, the conclusion that "Zeus not even is": an ontology that recognizes the sovereignty of becoming that the hypotheses of *is not* suggest concludes that no such animal can continuously be as the cause of the beings and of their being known. By ending as he did, making it seem that some such rational animal may have to be for all time, Benardete aligns himself with the way of Plato, the way of Parmenides and Socrates. And, although it is not widely credited, that is Nietzsche's way too, for as Leo Strauss said, Nietzsche "had doubts whether there could be a world, any world whose center is not God."²⁷ Being a philosopher and therefore in the tradition of Parmenides and Plato at least in this respect, Nietzsche looked

²⁷ Leo Strauss, "Note on the Plan of Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil*," in *Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy*, ed. Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 181.

to the return of gods at the end of the modern age, to Dionysos and Ariadne who not even are as the necessary highest beings for a future, communally lived affirmation of what is.

I want to end on an additional puzzle that Plato built in to the *Parmenides*, one that Benardete touched on in paragraph 2: “in the *Phaedo*... Socrates reverts to an apparently identical view of the ideas that Parmenides had disposed of fifty years before.” Why would Plato have Socrates on the last day of his life employ a view of the ideas for the last argument of his life that Parmenides showed him fifty years earlier to be logically indefensible? The puzzle yields to the chronological solution that Benardete set out in “On Plato’s *Symposium*”: Plato presented Socrates’s becoming as a three-stage event of maturing that he scattered across the *Phaedo*, *Parmenides*, and *Symposium*. But that solution requires a further conclusion that Benardete did not emphasize; it was recognized by the young Nietzsche, that close student of the history of Greek philosophy and complete skeptic about Plato: he called the ideas “decorative” while holding decoration to be foundational to culture which can flourish only within fictions revered as truths.²⁸ What Plato seems to suggest by this particular puzzle of the *Parmenides* is that the mature Socrates carried on his Parmenides-guided inquiry into the being of beings behind the protective security of edifying decoration, permanent ideas of the beautiful, just, and good. These fictions serve as safe stopping points for a Cebes or a Glaucon while the puzzling *Parmenides* can serve as an invitation to who knows who?—some unknown auditor in some unknown Clazomenae who will undertake the voyage to understand what this puzzle can lead to while also working to understand the true, Parmenidean sense of idea.

²⁸ See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999), vol. 7 29 [171], Summer–Fall 1873; vol. 8 30 [14], Summer 1875.