

Interpretation

A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Fall 2021

Volume 48 Issue 1

- 3 Iraj Azarfaza Overcoming the Powerful Prejudice against Xenophon:
A Debate between Leo Strauss and Friedrich Schleiermacher
- 27 John F. Cornell *Sanza Mezzo: A Reading of Dante's Paradiso Cantos 5-7*
- 51 Thomas L. Pangle The Unfolding Plan of "Maxims and Arrows" in
Nietzsche's *Twilight of the Idols*
- Book Reviews**
- 71 Francis J. Beckwith *Crisis of the Two Constitutions* by Charles R. Kesler
- 77 Shilo Brooks *Warspeak: Nietzsche's Victory over Nihilism* by Lise van Boxel
- 85 Steven H. Frankel *Founding God's Nation: Reading Exodus* by Leon R. Kass
- 97 Eli Friedland *De Anima (On Soul)* by Aristotle, Translated by David Bolotin
- 103 Christopher Kelly *Hypocrisy and the Philosophical Intentions of Rousseau*
by Matthew D. Mendham
- 109 Marco Menon *Una filosofia in esilio* by Carlo Altini
- 115 Miguel Morgado *A Political Philosophy of Conservatism* by Ferenc Hörcher
- 121 Travis Mulroy *The Music of Reason* by Michael Davis
- 127 April Dawn Olsen *Reason and Character* by Lorraine Smith Pangle
- 133 Joshua Parens *Nature, Law, and the Sacred* by Evanthia Speliotis
- 137 Oliver Precht *Theory and Practice* by Jacques Derrida
- 143 Charles T. Rubin *Learning One's Native Tongue* by Tracy B. Strong
- 151 David Lewis Schaefer *Montaigne and the Tolerance of Politics* by Douglas I. Thompson
- 159 Thomas E. Schneider *Property and the Pursuit of Happiness* by Edward J. Erler and
An Anti-Federalist Constitution by Michael J. Faber
- 165 Lee Ward *America's Revolutionary Mind* by C. Bradley Thompson
- 171 Jacob C. J. Wolf *Recovering the Liberal Spirit* by Steven F. Pittz

Interpretation

A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

- Editor-in-Chief* Timothy W. Burns, Baylor University
- General Editors* Charles E. Butterworth • Timothy W. Burns
- General Editors (Late)* Howard B. White (d. 1974) • Robert Horwitz (d. 1987)
Seth G. Benardete (d. 2001) • Leonard Grey (d. 2009) •
Hilail Gildin (d. 2015)
- Consulting Editors* David Lowenthal • Harvey C. Mansfield • Thomas L.
Pangle • Ellis Sandoz • Kenneth W. Thompson
- Consulting Editors (Late)* Leo Strauss (d. 1973) • Arnaldo Momigliano (d. 1987) •
Michael Oakeshott (d. 1990) • John Hallowell (d. 1992)
• Ernest L. Fortin (d. 2002) • Muhsin Mahdi (d. 2007) •
Joseph Cropsey (d. 2012) • Harry V. Jaffa (d. 2015)
- International Editors* Terence E. Marshall • Heinrich Meier
- Editors* Peter Ahrens Dorf • Wayne Ambler • Marco Andreacchio •
Maurice Auerbach • Robert Bartlett • Fred Baumann • Eric
Buzzetti • Susan Collins • Patrick Coby • Erik Dempsey •
Elizabeth C'de Baca Eastman • Edward J. Erler • Maureen
Feder-Marcus • Robert Goldberg • L. Joseph Hebert •
Pamela K. Jensen • Hannes Kerber • Mark J. Lutz • Daniel
Ian Mark • Ken Masugi • Carol L. McNamara • Will
Morrisey • Amy Nendza • Lorraine Pangle • Charles T.
Rubin • Leslie G. Rubin • Thomas Schneider • Susan Meld
Shell • Geoffrey T. Sigalet • Nicholas Starr • Devin Stauffer
• Bradford P. Wilson • Cameron Wybrow • Martin D. Yaffe
• Catherine H. Zuckert • Michael P. Zuckert
- Copy Editor* Les Harris
- Designer* Sarah Teutschel
- Inquiries* ***Interpretation, A Journal of Political Philosophy***
Department of Political Science
Baylor University
1 Bear Place, 97276
Waco, TX 76798
- email* interpretation@baylor.edu

The Unfolding Plan of “Maxims and Arrows” in Nietzsche’s *Twilight of the Idols**

THOMAS L. PANGLE

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

tpangle@austin.utexas.edu

Abstract: The first section of the last work whose publication Nietzsche himself supervised is often referenced, and a few of its individual items quoted and interpreted; but its overall intended *plan*, and thus its unfolding teaching, have not received adequate exegesis. I show that the ordered sequence which comes to light from such an exegesis provides a vividly illuminating foretaste of some of the most important dimensions of Nietzsche’s “transvaluation of all values,” viewed here from the more contemplatively playful, “philosophic,” perspective that Nietzsche assumed as he took a kind of holiday from the “serious” grandiosity of his *Antichrist* and *Ecce Homo*.

Twilight-of-Idols or *How One with the Hammer Philosophizes (Götzen-Dämmerung oder Wie man mit dem Hammer philosophiert—henceforth TI)*,¹ begins by confronting the reader with a set of 44 very brief and rather pucky utterances whose order or underlying plan is enigmatic. A challenge is thereby issued to the reader.² Entitled “Maxims and Arrows” (*Sprüche und*

*I thank *Interpretation*’s three anonymous reviewers for helpful suggestions, corrections, and challenges.

¹ “The work that” has “received the least interpretation within Nietzsche-forschung. . . . Let us draw attention to this interpretative shortage.” Jorge Luiz Viesentiner, “Nietzsche’s *Götzen-Dämmerung*: An Interpretative Horizon,” in *Les Hétérodoxies de Nietzsche: Lectures du “Crépuscule des idoles,”* ed. Céline Denat and Patrick Wotling (Reims: Presses Universitaires de Reims, 2014), 243, 246; see also 260.

² Babette Babich has stressed the need, in interpreting each of Nietzsche’s aphorisms, for a “musical sense” by which “one keeps both its subject matter and its development as part of a whole. Thus positions, statements at variance with one another are not simple contradictions but *contrapuntal*.” Babich, *Words in Blood, Like Flowers* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 109. Duncan Large recognizes that the first section of *TI* is “not so much unsystematic as studiously *anti-systematic*” and “systematicity and coherence are two different things.” Large, introduction to *Twilight of the Idols* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), xiii. See similarly Tracy Strong, “Hammers, Idleness, and Psychologists,” introduction to *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. Richard Polt (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997), xi. In Daniel W. Conway, *Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game: Philosophy in the Twilight of the Idols*

Pfeile), this collection is reminiscent of the “fourth chapter” of *Beyond Good and Evil* (henceforth *BGE*), which comprises a similarly enigmatic and puckish collection, of 125 such brief utterances³—and which opens with a reflection on what it means to be a teacher. But as the title of this latter collection indicates (“Maxims and *Interludes*”), in *BGE* we are thus challenged by a sort of intermezzo in a book of chapters comprising longer aphorisms. In *TI*, in contrast, Nietzsche as teacher greets his reader-students at the start in this provocatively challenging spirit.

We learn from Nietzsche’s autobiography *Ecce Homo* (written a bit later) that “without losing even one day” after the completion of *TI*, Nietzsche “attacked the tremendous task of the *Transvaluation*”⁴—the first volume of which was completed as *The Antichrist*. Then, Nietzsche tells us, he went back and wrote the “Foreword” (*Vorwort*) to *TI*, “on the day” (as he says at the end of that Foreword) “when the first book of the *Transvaluation of All Values* came to an end.”

THE FOREWORD

Nietzsche introduces *TI* by declaring it a “recreational recuperation” (*Erholung*), from the “immeasurable responsibility,” of the “destiny of a task,” which “compels one at every moment” to “run into the sun to shake off the weighty, all-too-weighty seriousness.” *TI* is not, then, *merely* a recreational recovery. It expresses a constant dialectical necessity of Nietzsche’s mature project as a whole: for “no thing succeeds, in which high spirits [Übermut] have no share”—especially the high spirits of *war*, which has “always been the great shrewdness [*Klugheit*] of all spirits who have become too inward,

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), the first section does not receive much attention. Andreas Urs Sommer, *Kommentar zu Nietzsches Der Fall Wagner, Götzen-Dämmerung* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), is preoccupied with tracing the *Nachlasse* precursors, and finding external sources, for Nietzsche’s published writing, and does not attempt to discern any order in the first section. Nor is any such attempt made in *Les Hétérodoxies de Nietzsche*; or in Pietro Gori and Chiara Piazzesi, *Crepuscolo degli idoli: Introduzione, traduzione e commento* (Rome: Carocci, 2012), 134–49. Brian Leiter, “Friedrich Nietzsche’s *Twilight of the Idols*,” *Topoi* 33, no. 2 (2014): 549–55, passes over what he terms “the suggestive, albeit brief aphorisms gathered under the heading ‘Maxims and Arrows,’” and goes so far as to demote this section from being a “chapter” of the work, turning the second section into “The first chapter of *Twilight*—‘The Problem of Socrates.’”

³ “Sie ist die kürzeste Form des Aphorismus, unter Nietzsches Formen philosophischer Schriftstellerie die am stärksten verdichtete, am schwierigsten aufzulösende und darum vielleicht die philosophisch interessanteste.” Werner Stegmaier, “Grenzen der philosophischen Erkenntnis im Nihilismus und Nietzsches Kunst der Sentenz (Thesen),” in *Les Hétérodoxies de Nietzsche*, 365.

⁴ *Umwertung*—a coinage of Nietzsche’s (who spelled it the older way, *Umwerthung*): for an instructive “philological analysis” and guide to the literature, see Duncan Large, “A Note on the Term ‘Umwerthung,’” *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 39 (2010): 5–11.

too deep.” Nietzsche proceeds to reveal a Latin “maxim” (*ein Spruch*) that has for a long time been his previously undisclosed “motto” (*Wahlspruch*): “the spirits increase, manly virtue [*virtus*] grows green [*virescit*], by wounding.” Then, in a buffo tone, Nietzsche proclaims that *TI* “is a great Declaration of War”—but, unlike in the grimly serious *Antichrist*, we have here a more light-hearted declaration, of a more cheerful sort of war (the “hammer” turns out to be used “like a *Stimmgabel*,” a sort of diagnostic tool or tuning fork).⁵ This will be a war that “is delightful” for “me, old psychologist and pied piper.” This will be a war initiated by “sounding out idols”—and “this time not idols of an age, but *eternal* idols,”⁶ than which there are “none older, none more convincing, none more inflated”; and “also none more hollow,” which “does not prevent their being the most believed in.”

Nietzsche’s employment of the term “eternal” may well be sarcastic; but it may also point to the question whether some of these idols may not survive even after being “sounded out” by Nietzsche. Are these “*eternal*” idols not rooted in, and thus revealing of, what previous thinkers would call human nature—or at least, what has in and through history become truly embedded in humanity? The word *Dämmerung* refers to both dusk and pre-dawn:⁷ might not the *twilight* of the “eternal” idols be followed by the *dawn* of these “eternal” idols, in some form? Does not “Transvaluation” entail the sublation (*Aufhebung*), rather than the extinction, of some of the Great Tradition’s values?

PLACING THE “MAXIMS AND ARROWS” IN THE ORDER OF THE *TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS* AS A WHOLE

TI is divided into eleven unnumbered sections. The longest by far is the ninth, entitled “Skirmishes/Raids [*Streifzüge*] of One Who Is Untimely.” This title

⁵ Strong very helpfully suggests (“Hammers, Idleness, and Psychologists,” ix–x) that we “note that when a tuning fork is used to strike a hollow object there is resonance from both the object and the fork”—the latter “sounding a true note.” See similarly Sommer, *Kommentar*, 222; and Peter Georgsson, “Nietzsche’s Hammer Again,” *Nietzsche-Studien* 33 (2004): 342–50—responding to David S. Thatcher, “A Diagnosis of Idols: Percussions and Repercussions of a Distant Hammer,” *Nietzsche-Studien* 14 (1985): 250–68 and Thomas H. Brobjer, “To Philosophize with a Hammer: An Interpretation,” *Nietzsche-Studien* 28 (1999): 38–41. See also Mazzino Montinari, “Nietzsche lesen: Die Götzen-Dämmerung,” *Nietzsche-Studien* 13 (1984): 70, and Andrea Spreafico, “Immaginario bellico e strategia letteraria,” in *Les Hétérodoxies de Nietzsche*, 298 and 316, as well as Sommer, “Der Kommentar zu Nietzsches *Götzen-Dämmerung*,” in *Hétérodoxies de Nietzsche*, 383–84.

⁶ In *Ecce Homo*, discussing *TI*, Nietzsche clarifies: “not simply the *eternal* idols, also the youngest of all, and accordingly the weakest by age. The ‘modern ideas’ for example.”

⁷ As highlighted by Peter Putz, “Nachwort” to *Der Fall Wagner, Götzen-Dämmerung, Nietzsche contra Wagner* (Munich: Goldmann, 1988), 184; see also Strong, “Hammers, Idleness, and Psychologists,” x.

befits the Foreword's announcement of the polemical character of this writing. Similarly befitting is the second half of the title of the opening section, "Maxims and *Arrows*." As previously indicated, this opening section comes to sight as the least grave, the most hit-and-run, of the eleven sections. But as such, the opening section is "contrapuntal" when viewed, or "heard," in relation to the final and shortest section.⁸ For this latter is the most grave of the eleven sections, thus manifesting the greatest contrast, in spirit and tone, to the opening—and thereby illuminating how very different is the spirit of the opening section. The last section is a reproduction of the penultimate (29th) of Zarathustra's long series of speeches entitled "On Old and New Tablets," which is the most explicitly and emphatically legislative-political part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (henceforth *Z*). The ending of *TI* thus takes us back to Zarathustra's unrealized prophetic-political aspiration to become a new Moses—an aspiration that Nietzsche himself is now apparently fulfilling through his "destiny of a task," the *Transvaluation of All Values* (*The Antichrist* is the most emphatically and doctrinally political of all Nietzsche's writings).⁹ And as placed here, at the end of *TI*, this speech of Zarathustra's is assigned a new title, not found in *Z*: "The Hammer Speaks." So: at the close of *TI*, "The Hammer" declares its independence from its previous usage as a tool for an explicitly "philosophic" sounding of idols; "The Hammer" merges or ascends into Zarathustrian world-historical creative legislation (the terms "philosophy, philosopher, philosophizing," which appear not only in the subtitle of *TI* but over twenty times in the text, never once appear in *Z*; nor then, of course, in the final section of *TI*).¹⁰ Addressing his "brothers," Zarathustra (now = "The Hammer," which is no longer sounding like a mere tuning fork) asks:

And if you do not want to be destinies and inexorable ones: how can you one day with me—triumph?

And if your hardness does not wish to flash and cut and cut through: how can you one day with me—create?

For all creators are hard. And blessedness must it seem to you to impress your hand on millennia as on wax,—

⁸ See again the passage quoted from Babich, above. As Martin Heidegger remarks of another section of *TI* ("How the 'True World' Finally Became a Fable"): "die Form, in der Nietzsche diese Geschichte darstellt, leicht dazu verleiten könnte, sie für einen blossen Scherz zu nehmen, während doch anderes auf dem Spiel steht" ("Nietzsches Umdrehung des Platonismus," in *Nietzsche*, 2 vols. [Pfullingen: Neske, 1961], 1:235).

⁹ Contrast Conway, *Nietzsche's Dangerous Game*, esp. chap. 6.

¹⁰ Viesenteiner, "Nietzsche's *Götzen-Dämmerung*: An Interpretative Horizon," 242.

—Blessedness, on the will of millennia to write, as on bronze,—harder than bronze, nobler [edler] than bronze. Altogether hard is only the noblest [Edelste].

The peak ontological¹¹ section of *TI*, entitled “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable,” concludes: “INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.” This echoes the final aphorism (#342) of the fourth book and first edition of *The Gay Science* (henceforth *GS*) which begins: “*Incipit tragoedia.*—”; and which then reproduces what will be the opening of *Z*. But: here in “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable,” this world-historical moment of the entrance of Zarathustra—the historical moment at which Zarathustra’s tragedy is poised to commence—is called “moment of the briefest shadow, end of the longest error; highpoint of humanity” (i.e., *not* the highpoint of the future, *super*-humanity—see *GS*, #382 end—but of the human, all-too-human); this moment, of the entrance of Zarathustra, is the moment of greatest *illumination*; from here on, into the future, the shadows lengthen again. Humanity achieves its peak in being more enlightened, more perspicacious and clear-sighted, than will be creative *super*-humanity, or than will be “the philosophy of the future” (*BGE*). In the Foreword to *TI*, Nietzsche says that his great task “casts shadows on the one who undertakes it—such a destiny of a task compels one to run into the sunlight every moment” and *TI* is the peak expression of this constant running back out into the sunlight, into bright illumination from the inevitable obtenebration inherent in legislative creativity.¹² I suggest that the opening section is the sunniest section of the book: the most clear-sighted, the most free-spirited, the most “philosophic.” In it alone do we find Nietzsche engaging in some severe, self-critical self-questioning; and reporting his indulgence in good-natured laughter, not least at himself.¹³

The second section of *TI* explicitly returns to the attack Nietzsche initiated in his first published philosophic work, *The Birth of Tragedy*—with Socrates now seen as exemplifying the looming eternal idol of “the greatest sages,” in their decadent life-denial. The tenth or penultimate section, entitled “What I Owe to the Ancients,” again explicitly returns to *The Birth of Tragedy*, now to its positive teaching, the resurrection of the Dionysian. So, we have a kind

¹¹ See Heidegger, “Nietzsches Umdrehung des Platonismus,” 231–42.

¹² See *TI*, “The Problem of Socrates,” #10 end and #11: “the daylight of reason...the most glaring [grelleste] daylight.”

¹³ Gori and Piazzesi, *Crepuscolo degli idol*, 134: the “Maxims and Arrows” serve to “creare l’atmosfera ludico-ironica contrapposte al tono polemico della vera e propria ‘guerra’ nietzscheana.”

of mirroring structure:¹⁴ it is as if Nietzsche says, “I foreground my debunking of Socrates and what he represents; and yet, after all, I conclude with an expression of my debt to the ancients”—meaning specifically, Nietzsche explains, Romans more than Greeks, and Thucydides and the Dionysian over and against Plato and Socrates. This penultimate section begins with the words “in conclusion” (*Zum Schlusse*): so this tenth section is the completion of “how one philosophizes with a hammer.” The eleventh section, the speech of Zarathustra, is on another plane. *TI* as philosophizing with a hammer would then appear to trace a rather winding, overall ascent from the problem that Socrates embodies to a renewed, Roman-Thucydidean-Dionysian, anti-Platonic appreciation of the ancients as the prelude to or even the launching pad for Zarathustrian lawgiving. The first section precedes that ascent. Before tackling “the problem of Socrates,” Nietzsche steps back to a more comprehensive outlook. The “Maxims and Arrows” is the least seriously polemical, the most “prankish” (*übermutlich*), the most “idle” section of the book—and thus, I submit, the most revealing of Nietzsche’s own, personal, virtues as a philosophic teacher.

INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES AND VICES

Nietzsche begins quite reasonably, by speaking of beginning (#1). He told us in the Foreword that “this writing is above all a sideways leap into the idleness of a psychologist” (he originally intended to entitle the *TI* “Idleness of a Psychologist”);¹⁵ now he spotlights the fact that “idleness is the beginning of all psychology”—which makes psychology, he confesses, something that is morally very questionable: “What? Would psychology be—a vice?” Tested by, and testing of, the standards set by some eternal idols, the answer would seem to be emphatically in the affirmative. In the classical republican tradition, ancient and modern, “every useless citizen can be regarded as a pernicious human being.”¹⁶ In the Christian tradition, “sloth” is the central

¹⁴ This observation is stressed in a different way by Michael Gillespie, “Nietzsche’s Musical Politics,” in *Nietzsche’s New Seas*, ed. Michael Gillespie and Tracy Strong (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 117–49.

¹⁵ For this and other circumstances of the writing and publication of *TI*, see Julian Young, *Friedrich Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 497ff. and Sommer, *Kommentar*, 197–214, as well as Heinrich Meier, *Nietzsches Vermächtnis: Zwei Bücher über Natur und Politik* (Munich: Beck, 2019), 311–18.

¹⁶ Rousseau’s *First Discourse*, in *Œuvres complètes*, ed. B. Gagnebin and M. Raymond, 5 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1958–95), 3:18 and context; see also Montesquieu, *Spirit of the Laws* 4.8 (and context), and above all Plato’s *Laws* 807ff. Large (introduction to *Twilight of the Idols*, xx) goes astray in claiming that Nietzsche is suggesting “a virtue” of leisure with “a long pedigree stretching back to Aristotle and Cicero.” Translations such as his of *Müssiggang*—“leisure,” “leisurely stroll”—obscure the moral

deadly sin (see above all Dante). There is a German proverb, “Müssiggang ist allen Laster Anfang” (idleness is the beginning of all vice). But, Nietzsche insists, the traditional civic and religious vice of idleness is the essential source of the good *intellectual* work of “us psychologists” (cf. #35).

The tracing of “our” intellectual virtue as psychologists to what is traditional moral-civic “vice” is immediately qualified, however, by the second “arrow.” For this shot targets “us”—in our imperfect struggle to try to realize “our virtue” (see *BGE*, #227). The traditional virtue of *courage* (*Mut*) remains essential as an aspiration for “us,” in the form of the all-too-rare *intellectual* courage that “even the most courageous among us only rarely has”:¹⁷ “we” still have trouble summoning the courage, the probity, to confront what is deeply unnerving about what we “really *know*.”

After these first two incisive glimpses of his revalued intellectual virtue, as it applies rather widely (to “us,” even in our deficiency), Nietzsche suddenly ascends to the “*philosopher*” (#3). He does so by taking explicit issue with the political philosopher Aristotle’s teaching in his *Politics* 1253a27–30. (Or is not Nietzsche ripping the veil off the political philosopher’s consciously constructed self-idolization?) The truth, according to Nietzsche (and according to Aristotle’s esoteric teaching?—see *Nic. Ethics* 1145a2–11, 1177b26–78a3)¹⁸ is that the philosopher lives “alone” (*allein*), in spiritual solitude, being at once beast and god, subhuman and superhuman (for “the *human* is by nature a *political* animal”—*Politics* 1253a2–3, 1278b19). The divine solitude of the philosopher obviously goes with an extreme version of the moral-civic vice of “idleness.”

gauntlet Nietzsche is laying down at the outset: see similarly Adrian Del Caro et al., ed. and trans., *The Case of Wagner, Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, Ecce Homo, Dionysus Dithyrambs, Nietzsche Contra Wagner* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2021), 43–45; Scarlett Marton, “Les notions de vie et de valeur chez Nietzsche,” in *Les Hétérodoxies de Nietzsche*, 323–24; Stegmaier, “Grenzen der philosophischen Erkenntnis,” 366–67. As Meier correctly puts it (*Nietzsches Vermächtnis*, 319), this arrow targets “den Einwand des Volkes und der Politik, der Vita Activa.”

¹⁷ For Nietzsche’s own struggles in this regard, see the quotations from letters assembled by Stegmaier, “Grenzen der philosophischen Erkenntnis,” 367–68. But by employing the first person *plural* here, Nietzsche makes it clear that he is *not* speaking *only* of himself or *only* of the philosopher, in Nietzsche’s elevated sense (as Meier, *Nietzsches Vermächtnis*, 319, mistakenly claims), but that he is speaking of a more widely dispersed intellectual virtue, applying even to nonphilosophers.

¹⁸ See also Plato, *Sophist* 216b–c; Nietzsche in his lecture on Socrates in his course on the pre-Platonic philosophers took this passage to show that Socrates identified the philosopher as a god (Nietzsche, *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, ed. and trans. Greg Whitlock [Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006], 147).

From this unmasking of the truth about the philosopher as eternal idol we descend, in the fourth or central of the first seven items, to a critical appreciation of the eternal idol truth, in general, vs. lie. Nietzsche quotes a proverb: “all truth is simple/one-fold” (*einfach*);¹⁹ Nietzsche retorts: “Is that not a lie doubly” (*zwiefach*)? What Nietzsche has in mind as the first of the two dimensions of the lie, or of the truth that the quoted proverb falsifies, seems plain: Nietzsche implies that “all truth is *not* simple/one-fold.” But what is the *second* dimension of the quote’s lie, the second level of truth that the quote falsifies, according to Nietzsche? This is obviously the puzzle with which he teases us (Sommer, *Kommentar* ad loc.). We must resist the temptation to suppose that he means that “there is *no* truth,” or “no knowable truth,”²⁰ for in that case there could be no (knowable) lie; and besides, such a statement is self-refuting or logically absurd. Could Nietzsche mean, as the second dimension of truth here: *no* truth is *simple*?²¹ But that is itself a simple truth-assertion, and thus, again, absurdly self-refuting. Besides, the truth Nietzsche implies, that “not all truth is simple,” would seem a simple truth statement. And does not this book teach other important simple truths? For example, the “very simple” truth, about truth, that Nietzsche pronounces in his discussion of *TI* in *Ecce Homo*: “That, which is called on the title-page *Idol*, is, very simply [*ganz einfach*] that, which hitherto was named truth.” On the other hand, Nietzsche could mean (see the *Nachlasse* “Maxims of a Hyperborean,” quoted by Sommer, *Kommentar* ad loc.), “what is true, is neither one [*Eins*], nor again reducible to one [*Eins*].” However that may be, I suggest that by setting his readers this little logical gymnastic riddle Nietzsche intends to bring home his unwavering attachment to the intellectual virtue of logic, despite his famous strictures on reason or rationalism. As he will put it in his attack on German education (*TI*, “What the Germans Lack,” #7): “even in the universities, even among the authentic scholars of philosophy, logic as theory, as practice, as *craft*, has begun to die out.” Let “one read German books: there is no more the remotest conception in them, that thinking requires a technique,

¹⁹ There is a Latin proverb: “simplex sigillum veri” (simplicity/straightforwardness/ oneness is the seal/sign of true). Schopenhauer invoked this proverb more than once, notably in *Parerga* 2.15, “On Religion,” #175, and in his critique of Kant (*Über die Grundlage der Moral*, part 2, chap. 6 beg.). In classical Latin, *simplex*, meaning “oneness” (like the German *einfach*), can be opposed to *duplex* (like the German *zwiefach*)—as in Terence’s *Heautotimorumenos*, line 6. The same holds, as Nietzsche would know well, for the Attic Greek *haploos*: see, e.g., Aeschylus frag. 176, “simple are the words of the truth”; also Plato, *Cratylus* 405c.

²⁰ Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 27; cf. Conway, *Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game*, 224–25.

²¹ This would be in agreement with Oscar Wilde’s silly figure Algernon, in the first act of *The Importance of Being Earnest, A Trivial Comedy for Serious People*.

a curriculum, a will to mastery—that thinking needs to be learned like dancing needs to be learned, *as* an art of dancing.”

From truth vs. lie, or the virtue of logical thinking, Nietzsche ascends to “wisdom” (*Weisheit*, #5), on a very personal note and in a way that highlights the great difference between wisdom and the eternal idol knowledge, a difference in rank and in rule. Employing the first person singular for the first time, Nietzsche identifies himself as one who keenly appreciates that “Wisdom sets also for knowledge limits.” “Many” truths are dangerous, destructive—even or primarily for one such as Nietzsche himself. (This teaching is not a manifestation of any lack of the virtue of intellectual courage as indicated in #2; it is a further delineation of that virtue.)

A major source of the limits that wisdom sets is spotlighted by the next maxim and arrow (#6), which introduces “nature.” (The word will reappear many times in this work, starting with the section entitled “Morality as Anti-Nature”; see above all “Skirmishes,” #48–49—“I too speak of ‘Return to Nature.’” The word occurs only once in *Z*, in a disparaging quote of the poets, in “On Poets.” Zarathustra’s silence on nature, otherwise, goes with his total silence on philosophy). Nature comes to sight here, at the start of *TI*, as the primitive, carnal individuality that is prior to, and has had to become overlain and disciplined by, one’s individual “spirituality,” which is “un-nature” (cf. *BGE*, #9). The latter’s repressive mastery one needs, from time to time, to escape, to “recuperate” from, by getting back to “one’s wild nature.” Does not the philosopher, as both beast and god, understand this better than us nonphilosophers? We may also surmise that, more generally, a human being’s spirituality must be balanced by an occasional recuperative return to one’s wild carnality in order for the spiritual not to become an idol—an eternal temptation.

Spirituality conceived as un-nature, in need of balance by carnal nature, leads naturally to the most purely spiritual being or idol: God the eternal Creator.²² In #7 Nietzsche anticipates or gives expression to the most important questions that naturally follow upon the teaching about nature in #6, for any free thinker confronting the Bible (a free thinker in Nietzsche’s sense is *ipso facto* not a *doctrinaire* atheist): “What? Is the human being only a mistake of God’s? Or God only a mistake of the human’s?” Here we have the two most fundamental alternatives for understanding our existence and the cosmos, as formulated for us from the perspective of Nietzsche as our philosophic, free

²² Not of course the true god, who is the philosopher, and is simultaneously a beast (see also *BGE*, #294–95 and *The Antichrist*, #39).

thinker, teacher—who, as a good teacher, raises the fundamental questions but does not yet (see #13) give his own answers.

These first seven maxims and arrows—on the psychologist’s idleness as rooted in what is morally and civically questionable, on intellectual courage, on the philosopher, on the logic of truth vs. lie, on wisdom vs. knowledge, on nature vs. spirituality, and on the questions that follow about God the Creator—adumbrate Nietzsche’s new or revalued teaching on the eternal idols that are the intellectual virtues.

SOCIAL VIRTUES AND VICES

In a second recognizably unified set, this time of eleven, Nietzsche turns from and on the foundation laid in treating intellectual virtues, to sound the eternal idols of the virtues of human interrelationship—starting with war and enmity (#8), a relationship that Nietzsche embraced in the Foreword. Speaking again in the first person singular, Nietzsche shares a lesson he has learned “*from the war-school of life*”: “What does not kill me, makes me stronger.” This echoes the maxim that the Foreword disclosed to be Nietzsche’s personal motto, taken now in its passive sense.²³ These two Nietzschean maxims, when followed by the next two (ninth and tenth) maxims and arrows, point us to Nietzsche’s transvaluation of Christ’s commandment, “Love your enemies.” The transvaluation may be formulated as: “Appreciate your enemies, above all because or insofar as their wounding can make you stronger, can make your manly virtue grow.” To intellectual courage is now joined the social courage of the warrior, fighting his enemies, wounding and being wounded, as a cornerstone of Nietzsche’s revalued social virtues. Later in *TI*, in “Morality as Anti-Nature,” #3, Nietzsche will write: “Another triumph is our spiritualization of *enmity*. It consists in one’s deep appreciation of the value of having an enemy.” And “in politics, enmity has now become more spiritualized—much more shrewd, much more reflective, much more *sparing*. Almost every party understands that it is in its self-preserving-interest that the opposed party not lose its strength; the same goes for great politics.” Thus, “something like a new Reich needs enemies more than friends: in opposition it first feels itself necessary, in opposition it first *becomes* necessary.”

This implicit transvaluation of Christ’s commandment concerning enemies is immediately followed by its complement, the transvaluation of the biblical commandment to “neighbor-love” (#9). The transvalued “principle

²³ Tracy Strong, introduction to *Friedrich Nietzsche* (New York: Routledge, 2016), xix.

of neighbor-love” is: “Help thine own self: then thou wilt be helped by everybody” (*jedermann*). Self-help is to be primary, but with a view to its *social* value, for oneself, in being *the* way to draw support from all sorts of others, who will be impressed and attracted by one’s self-sufficiency. We have here the first mention of love, in “Maxims and Arrows”—but is anything left here of love other than self-love?²⁴

The tenth arrow goes still deeper, targeting the heart of Christian moral psychology: “the bite of conscience is indecent [*unanständig*].” The transvalued conscientious imperative is: “that one against one’s own actions perpetrate no cowardliness! That one not leave them in the lurch afterwards [*hinterdrein im Stiche läßt!*]” The traditional pangs of the guilty conscience are a crime of self-betrayal, a cowardly failure to accept the psychological truth about what one truly knows one truly *is*, at present, and what one *had to be* in the past—as revealed not least by one’s base or bad actions. Humans are and do what cannot be otherwise (cf. *TI*, “The Four Great Errors,” #2). To own oneself and one’s own doings is by no means necessarily to admire oneself; it may entail disgust with oneself, it may well be to face with courage the ugly truth about oneself—perhaps in order to strive to change oneself by self-overcoming based on deep self-understanding as well as self-contempt. But, no guilt! No self-ignorant saying to oneself, “but I could have done otherwise.”

From this foretaste of Nietzsche’s transvaluation of the teachings of the Christian man-god, Nietzsche turns back to the true man-god, to “the case of the philosopher” (#11). But here, in this new context of the social virtues, the divine philosopher is revealed as trying to live, in his solitude, a way of life that is in truth comically (not tragically!) untenable, because intolerably burdensome to himself: “can an *ass* be tragic?” The implication would seem to be, that the philosopher must sooner or later abandon, at least for a time, his solitude, must cease to be a divine philosopher in *that* sense, and become a legislator or “philosopher of the future.”²⁵

²⁴ See *TI*, “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man,” #37: “The strong ages, the *noble* cultures see in pity, in ‘neighbor-love,’ in the lack of self and self-assurance, something contemptible.”

²⁵ See the opening of *Z*, and *BGE*, #210–13 as well as “The Hammer Speaks.” Meier (*Nietzsches Vermächtnis*, 319) asserts that “die Nummern 1–11 etwa verhandeln die Tugenden des Philosophen...die ersten elf ‘Pfeile’ beziehen sich hauptsächlich auf den Philosophen”; the most massive of the difficulties with this reading is that it flies in the face of what Meier otherwise stresses: the gulf that Nietzsche indicates in #3 between the divine philosopher and those who are nonphilosophers (like Prof. Meier, and us), who can nonetheless participate in and aspire to the intellectual as well as the social virtues being taught here.

But Nietzsche immediately stresses (#12) that this does not at all point to the terribly mistaken political philosophizing and legislating exhibited by Locke and his followers the utilitarians—who have so deeply corrupted Anglo-Saxon humanity (cf. *BGE*, #228 and the Declaration of Independence). “The human being does *not* pursue happiness; only the Englishman does that.” The human as truly human seeks a higher justifying goal or cause, beyond happiness.

An obvious and massive (and Rousseauian)²⁶ counter to all utilitarianism (and Lockeanism) is romantic love. Accordingly, Nietzsche introduces at this point the eternal idol that will be the target of more of his arrows than any other: “woman” (#13). As idol, woman is a creation of man, Nietzsche asserts—“out of what, then?” (Nietzsche anticipates us asking). His surprising answer: “out of a rib of man’s God—of his ‘ideal.’” The romantic idol “woman” is rooted, Nietzsche asserts, in the biblical God, the supposed purely spiritual Creator. (Consider the order of topics in bks. 4–5 of Rousseau’s *Emile*.) In “What I Owe to the Ancients,” #4, Nietzsche will say: “Christianity first, with its foundational resentment *against* life, has out of sexuality made something impure,” whereas the Greeks, “in the Dionysian mysteries, in the psychology of the Dionysian state,” guaranteed themselves “the eternal return of life,” that is, “the *true* life as the collective-continuation-of-life through procreation, through the mysteries of sexuality.” For the Greeks “all moments in the act of procreation, of pregnancy, of birth awakened the highest and most solemn feelings.” Above all, “in the mystery-doctrine” the “pangs of the woman giving birth hallow pain overall”: “that there may be the eternal joy of creating, that the will to life eternally says yes to itself, there must also be eternally the ‘agony of the woman giving birth’—all this is what the word Dionysian means.”

Before continuing his barrage against woman as idol, Nietzsche abruptly (and at first, puzzlingly) turns—back to himself, in a self-critical question about his own sociality and in particular about his seeking to win adherents (#14). Using the intimate *du*-form, and thus sounding like his conscience speaking, he asks: “What? Thou seekest? Thou wouldst clone thyself tenfold, a hundredfold? Thou seekest adherents (*Anhänger*)?—Seek *none* (Nullen)!—” Nietzsche thus anticipates a critical questioning by an intimate, probing psychologist; Nietzsche shows that he has already inflicted that questioning

²⁶ “Of Rousseau’s writings,” Nietzsche “was most familiar with *Émile*.” Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Nietzsche contra Rousseau* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 20. *Emile* contains the Rousseauian analysis of romantic love.

upon himself, and has answered it; he has, if you will, recognized the temptation of seeking adherents, and has resisted it.

But if he does not seek adherents, he certainly does intend to have enormous posthumous authority, as he immediately reminds us (#15): “Posthumous men—I, for example—are understood worse than the timely, but better *heard*. More precisely: we are never understood—and *hence* our authority...” In effect, Nietzsche is sharing a secret of how to acquire authority for one’s writings *after* one’s own time: write as he is writing now, aiming not to be understood, but to be heard, in dazzling, enigmatic, challenging, enchanting—and sometimes infuriating—elusiveness.

Now back from this curious self-referential interruption to the sounding of the eternal idol woman, or, more precisely, to what Nietzsche thinks women betray about themselves when speaking among themselves: women see “the truth” as a threat because they fear in it a destroyer of their veils of modesty and shame, which are so deeply natural to them, so needed by them in society (#16). From the perspective of the free thinker upholding intellectual probity, this is a very grave defect.

The debunking of the idol woman, and thus of the idol (“ideal”) of romantic love, could well seem to entail a disparagement of the artists, for whom woman and love of woman are such eternal themes and enchantments—what poets themselves (Goethe above all) “call the Eternal-Feminine in us” (see Z, “On Poets”). Nietzsche next (#17) declares his own “love,” for “the artist”—of a certain kind: Nietzsche loves the artist who is “modest in his needs”; Nietzsche loves the artist who wants only his sustenance and his art. Then Nietzsche corrects himself, punning in Latin: at first he seems to be saying, he loves the artist who wants only “*bread and circuses*” (that is, also applause, the want of which is inseparable from the artist’s care for his art); but then on a second reading we see that the phrase is actually “*bread and Circe*”: Circe = art as metaphorically a lovely, dangerously capricious, semidivine sorceress whom the artist will not leave in order to return to his human, all-too-human woman, as did the home-coming Odysseus, who was too deeply captivated/deluded by his own human woman Penelope. In other words: Nietzsche here indicates that he loves the artist who achieves a critical distance on the idol “woman,” by making his art his permanent mistress.

Nietzsche’s loving indulgence toward the creative artist who remains true to his art as enchantress prepares us for the next maxim and arrow (#18), the transvaluation of the virtue of faith. This may be the single most revealing

of all, as regards Nietzsche's conception of human nature and its sociality. It expresses the thought—the simple truth, I am tempted to say—that there are only two alternatives in human life: *either* one is capable of willfully imposing, creating, one's own meaning in things, *or*, if not, then one inexorably, sooner or later, imputes to things a willed meaning as already in them—and one becomes a person of some kind of faith. *Tertium non datur*. This maxim and arrow, with its *either/or*, obviously echoes in some measure #7 with its *either/or*. Putting the two together with #11 one might say: even or especially a philosopher must become an artist in a crucial degree in order not to become a believer (in some other creator's successful artistic creation). The nonartistic or noncreative philosophic life, the life of objective contemplation, is not sustainable; it is at best a necessary, temporary preparation or recuperation for creativity.

NINETEENTH-CENTURY IDOLS

With the nineteenth maxim and arrow Nietzsche descends, steeply at first, from what may be called eternal idols to a series of ten soundings of moral idols of the nineteenth century, starting at or near the bottom, with “anti-semitism” (a sophisticated word invented in the nineteenth century). Nietzsche unmasks the sophisticated Jew-hater as one who exhibits: (a) animating envy of Jews for their frank and successful pursuit of their own (worldly) advantages (*Vorteilen*), while (b) proudly claiming to possess moral virtue (*Tugend*); Nietzsche expostulates, “with virtue one *renounces* ‘advantages.’” Nietzsche certainly does not idolize contemporary secular Jews; but he indicates that their sophisticated haters are animated by gross moral hypocrisy and crude ignorance of what is essential to moral virtue. He here also makes it clear that a renunciation of worldly advantages, uncontaminated by the vices of envy and hypocrisy, remains central to his revalued conception of virtue (recall #12.)

The twentieth maxim and arrow returns to the attack on woman as idol, now in what Nietzsche views as her shriveled nineteenth-century version—woman as literary figure, as public intellectual. He views the so-called “perfect” or “complete” exemplar as never becoming wholly dedicated to her writing, but instead engaging in her writing experimentally, tentatively, because always somewhat ashamedly—and always animated by writer's vanity (see also *TI*, “Skirmishes,” #27).

As a kind of rebound from the previous, Nietzsche has the twenty-first maxim and arrow shoot upward to a peak of possibility for contemporary humanity. Nietzsche issues a call to genuinely dangerous experimentation

with oneself, "to put oneself in honest situations, where one can have no seeming virtues, where instead, like the tightrope walker on his rope, one either stands or falls—or gets away." (Cf. the tightrope walker in "Zarathustra's Prelude" in *Z*.)

At roughly the center of the list of forty-four we are given a somewhat playfully political, (nineteenth-century) moment. Contemporary Russia appears, to respectable European opinion, as "evil"—dangerous, illiberal, reactionary. But wait (Nietzsche impishly asks), what about Russian music (#22)? Could the "evil" Russians, even or precisely by their threat, be somehow promising of a spiritual reinvigoration of Europe?²⁷ For the fact is, the Germans have for eighteen years (i.e., in Bismarck's Reich since the victory in the Franco-Prussian War) been spiritually empty (#23).²⁸ Nietzsche despises Bismarckian German nationalism. But this has been going on for only eighteen years; the spirituality of Germans as a people is not extinguished; there can still be some hope for Germany. The hope cannot rest, however, on historical nostalgia, on a recurrence to "our origins" led by "the historian."²⁹

With the twenty-fifth item, Nietzsche returns to the attack on women, by delivering an especially low blow regarding their vanity in superficial physical appearance and dress. Then in the twenty-seventh item he offers a kind of justification for this, claiming that "woman" is nothing but her superficial appearance, that woman has no depth at all—not even a shallow depth; and this, he claims, is what deceives contemporary men into thinking that, since one cannot ever discern any depths, "one can never fathom the depths" of woman.

But again, as he did in his first foray against woman, Nietzsche interrupts this onset with a maxim and arrow foregrounding himself (#26). He insists that he has no will to a comprehensive philosophic "system" (even as before he interrupted his critique of woman to insist that he was not seeking adherents). "I avoid systematizers; the will to system is a lack of integrity [*Rechtschaffenheit*]." Philosophic integrity requires that one not claim or seek comprehensive explanatory understanding (in the manner of Spinoza,

²⁷ See also *TI*, "Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," #39: "Russia, the *only* power today which has endurance, which can wait, which can still promise something—Russia, the contrary-concept to the wretched European petty-statehood and nervousness that with the founding of the German Reich has entered a critical condition"; and *BGE*, #208 beg. and end.

²⁸ See also *TI*, "What the Germans Lack," #5 and "Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," #39—"the German Reich, *the form of decline of the state*."

²⁹ #24; I believe Nietzsche has in mind especially Sybel and Treitschke: see *BGE*, #251, and *TI*, "Skirmishes," #43.

Leibniz, Hegel, or, one may add, Marx).³⁰ Philosophic integrity requires that one remain keenly conscious of the incompleteness of one's understanding. But: is this not at some tension with Nietzsche's brimming confidence that he fully understands woman, and man's relation to woman? Again Nietzsche shows that he himself has anticipated such suspicious questioning of himself.

By these repeated self-referential interruptions of his salvos against women,³¹ I believe Nietzsche means to indicate, as he does more explicitly and emphatically in *BGE*, #231 end, "how very much these 'truths' about woman are even only—*my* truths.—"

And Nietzsche's final word here on woman (#28) is surprisingly relenting: "when a woman has manly virtues, that provokes running-away; and when she has no manly virtues, that makes her run away [from herself]." So, Nietzsche now concedes, a woman *can* have manly virtues! Indeed, without some, she cannot abide herself. And, to the extent that a woman does have manly virtues, she is no longer so seductive as an idol—she makes men run away. To approach a manly woman, it would seem, men have to overcome in some measure their attraction to woman as traditional and contemporary idol. So: is there perhaps a mean pointed to here?—a woman with enough manliness not to be self-repulsed, and also not to be romantically idolized by men, though without so much manliness as to be unattractive? Does Nietzsche here hint at a possible future transvaluation of the idol woman and of love of woman (consider Zarathustra's speeches on women, child, and marriage in Part One of *Z*)? After all, there cannot be a future, of man or of overman, without women! This simple fact about the future is perhaps the most important reason why woman is such a recurring target throughout Nietzsche's writings. Woman is the potential idol that most obviously and essentially will never go away. Woman is the potential idol with an

³⁰ A Marxist interpreter has reflected intelligently on this item as follows: "Nietzsche's challenge here is of course not so much to religion as such—which is, as it were, put out of court before the argument begins—as to the formal and taken-for-granted atheism of such schools as classical liberalism and classical Marxism. Such atheism, Nietzsche insists, is insufficient. God, for Nietzsche, is rather like the cat who came back, and He is wont to come back in places where common sense would little suspect Him.... If, as Lukács argues in *History and Class Consciousness*, the concept of totality is a central and indispensable category of all Marxian analysis, then Nietzsche's objective anti-Marxism is evident." Carl Freedman, "Nietzsche and Ideology-Critique: A Note on *Twilight of the Idols*," *Rethinking Marxism* 1, no. 2 (1988): 104–5.

³¹ Large, introduction to *Twilight of the Idols*, xiii: "the placement of the remark on philosophical systematists" is "instructive, for it disrupts a short sequence of aphorisms on woman (I 25, 27–8) which might otherwise have formed a thematic unit." But Large does not explain the "instruction."

inextirpable natural basis, in the carnal and not only the spiritual—in life itself, as “eternally recurring.”

DRAWING ON OLD IDOLS IN CONSTRUCTING THE VIRTUES OF THE FUTURE

The twenty-eighth item on woman, thus understood, proves to be a segue to a fourth set of maxims and arrows, in which Nietzsche turns more emphatically to reconstruction. He first recurs to “the bite of the conscience,” the hollowness of whose traditional form he sounded back in #10. Now, however, he concedes that the power and the endurance of that “bite” in the past was a sign of “good teeth,” and he asks “a dentist’s question”: “today, what’s lacking?” Nietzsche as “dentist” ponders how to bring about good teeth again—as “dentist” he wants to reinvigorate the strong bite of conscience as critical self-interrogation and even self-contempt, as essential to self-overcoming.³² In other words, Nietzsche aims not at eliminating the conscience, and the agonizing psychological depth of self examination that Christianity has introduced, but at making the conscience stronger than ever before—now freed from the great psychological untruth, the concept of guilt. Nietzsche thus indicates that biblical psychology and biblical morality furnish some of the important ingredients of his revalued virtues (see *GS*, #335, 344).

Next he warns against rashness (#30)—the great vice to which the warrior ethos that he previously invoked is especially prone, and which typically breeds as a reaction its opposite, excessive caution. So Nietzsche too aims to promote the virtue of courage *as a mean*, and to breed warriors with such a balance; the spirit of Aristotle’s ethics has a role to play in the future. Nietzsche here also signals that now he is proceeding to make plain the balance underlying and limiting his overall aggressiveness.

But this curbing of the warrior spirit, coming on the heels of the resuscitation of the bite of conscience, must not be mistaken for any suggestion that “*humility*” might be an ingredient in the revalued virtue of the future—as Nietzsche rushes to make clear in the next item (#31). Humility, in his estimation, is the cleverness of worms.

This drawing of the line against or within biblical influence continues in #32. There he contrasts what he regards as the noble hatred of lies and dissimulation, arising from pride’s “touchy sense of honor” (*reizbaren*

³² See also *TI*, “Morality as Anti-Nature,” #1: “we no longer admire dentists who *pull out* teeth, so that they will no longer ache.”

Ehrbegriff)—evidently to be a major ingredient in his revalued virtue—with the ignoble version of such “hatred,” arising out of obedience to the eighth of the Ten Commandments of Moses. The revalued virtue of courage dictates that to refrain from something because it is “forbidden by a divine commandment” is a form of “cowardice”—“Too cowardly, to lie.”

The sternness of this conscientious warrior morality needs mitigation, however—by music, if only by bagpipes (#33). “How little is needed for happiness! The sound of a bagpipe.—Without music, life would be an error.” So now the need for happiness returns, as essential to the revalued virtues of the future; but as only a “little” *accompaniment*. Later in *TI*, in “The Problem of Socrates,” #4, Nietzsche will declare the “Socratic equation of reason, virtue, and happiness” to be “the most bizarre of all equations.” Yet Nietzsche will also eventually declare, as an explicit “first example of my ‘revaluing of all values,’” that one’s “virtue is the consequence of one’s happiness” (*TI*, “The Four Great Errors,” #2). This entails that happiness is not only an accompaniment, and is not merely a byproduct, of virtue. Happiness is a cause of true virtue. Here in #33 Nietzsche speaks favorably of the musicality of the Germans: “the German imagines even God singing songs.” This reminds, however, of a great question about music, at least as known heretofore: music implicates God, or gods. If there is to be music, as an essential accompaniment for happiness, will there not inevitably be worship of gods of some kind? Is not music essentially, “eternally,” idolatrous?

Music as essential to happiness; a welcome to singing Germans: these are signs that Nietzsche overcomes nihilism; and next, quoting in French, he sends a very playful arrow into the derriere of the great French psychologist Flaubert (cf. *BGE*, #218): “I Gotcha, Nihilist! Sitzfleisch is the very *sin* against the Holy Ghost” (#34). I believe that the serious meaning behind this jest is: Nietzsche’s transvaluation will not cease to include a worst wrong, the wrong of nihilism, a late-modern idol whose worship is epitomized in Flaubert,³³ one of the greatest of the great French psychologists (who are perhaps to be partially countered by rotund German musicality).

This attack on the psychologist Flaubert leads to an animadversion on all “us psychologists” (#35): “we” tend to be too fearfully obsessed with what “we” see within ourselves—like horses, frightened by “our” own shadows. The intellectual courage invoked at the start is then not sufficient. “The

³³ On Nietzsche’s treatment of Flaubert see Chiara Piazzesi, *Nietzsche: Fisiologia dell’arte e decadenza* (Lecce: Conte, 2003), 35–42.

psychologist must from *himself* look away, to see in general.” Nietzsche thus lets his readers see that he is fully aware of the danger involved in what he will do in the last set³⁴ of maxims and arrows, bringing himself more to the fore as a model or source of inspiration. He must resist the temptation to take his struggles with himself too seriously. Accordingly, he will come to a close with laughter at himself.

NIETZSCHE HIMSELF AS EXEMPLARY

First, he insists, perhaps surprisingly, on “our” sense of civic responsibility (#36). He responds to the charge that “we immoralists are *harming* virtue.” He rejoins that on the contrary, by targeting virtue, in the creative/destructive *way* that “we immoralists” are targeting, and wounding, “we immoralists” will in fact make virtue secure on its throne(s), even as anarchists create a reaction that makes princes more secure in their rule. In other words, “we immoralists” will make more secure virtue’s rule over the world politically, royally. (We are reminded of #8 and of Nietzsche’s motto.) “*Our* immoralism” is so far from being moral and civic nihilism, that it is *the* counter to moral and civic nihilism.³⁵

Next, Nietzsche shares with us four penetrating sorts of questions that he has been asked by his conscience—and that, by implication, he calls on his readers to hear from *their* conscience, insofar as each question fits. He of course employs the intimate *du*-form.

The first question fits Nietzsche and only a few others—those out in front (#37). “Thou runnest *ahead*?—Dost thou do that as a shepherd?” (In other words, do you have the virtue of a true leader?) “Or as exceptional?” (Forerunners do not necessarily have to be leaders.) At the highest level, these might seem to be *the* questions about Nietzsche as a thinker. Here and in the rest of the writings of his third period, he seems to be speaking more as a shepherd-leader. There is also a third possibility, however, that the conscience insists one must face: Maybe one is running away? (Are there not historical moments when that is the honorably authentic choice for some?)

Closely related but more generally applicable is the second sort of question (#38): “Art thou authentic/genuine [*echte*]? Or only an actor? A representative?”

³⁴ Meier, *Nietzsches Vermächtnis*, 319, asserts that “die letzten elf ‘Pfeile’ beziehen sich hauptsächlich auf Nietzsche”; but in #35 and #36 Nietzsche speaks in the first person *plural*, about “us” psychologists and immoralists; and the questions he proceeds to report his conscience having asked him are by no means unique to Nietzsche.

³⁵ Cf. Patrick Wotling, introduction to *Les Hétérodoxies de Nietzsche*, 22–23, and Jaanus Sooväli, “Die Verzauberung der Tugend,” in *ibid.*, 127–29.

Or the represented itself?—In the end, thou art perhaps simply a copy of an actor...” Here we are afforded a glimpse of the rank ordering given by the revealed virtue of authenticity. Being an actor is not the lowest rank; but of more dignity is being a representative, or one of the represented.

As a coda to the preceding, Nietzsche interrupts his report of the questions asked by his conscience to speak as “*the disillusioned one*” (Der Enttäuschte)—who, when he searched for what he hoped might be “great humans,” found “always only the *apes* of their ideals” (#39; cf. *BGE*, #97). The seeker has discovered that those who seem to promise greatness can rank lower than even “a copy of an actor.” But Nietzsche does speak here as a seeker, if a disappointed one, for “great humans.”

“Third” set of questions of conscience: “Art thou one, who looks on? Or who lends a hand?—Or who looks away, and walks off?” (#40). Is not the central the most respectable answer? This “arrow” strikes hard at the solitary life of contemplation. Does not our most basic humanity speak against it?

And accordingly the fourth set of questions of conscience (#41) returns in some sense to the first set of questions of conscience (#37): “Wilt thou accompany? Or go ahead? Or go for thyself?” This, Nietzsche insists, “one must know”: one must *decide between* these three alternatives, at least as to priority.

This necessity for decision is still more heavily stressed in #42: “these were steps for me, I climbed up over them—for that I had to get over, beyond them. But they intended, I should sit myself, in rest, upon them.” Our conscience tends to get us stuck in it. The questions our conscience asks must be *answered*, not *wallowed* in forever: “Formula for my happiness: a yes, a no, a straight line, a *goal*...”³⁶

Nietzsche calls this a formula “for *my* happiness”; and in the penultimate item, Nietzsche once again aims an arrow at himself, for the benefit of the reader: “What does it matter, that *I* remain right! I *have* too much rightness.—And one who today laughs best, also laughs last.” Here at the end, laughter is appropriate: laughter at the “pushiness,” if you will, of the immediately preceding, exemplary self-expressions.

This I take to be a light, jocoserious echo of Zarathustra’s heavier (un-laughing, imploring, loving) refrain: “This—is now my way—where is yours?”

³⁶ #35; as stressed by Marton (“Les notions de vie et de valeur chez Nietzsche,” 341), the same words close section 1 of *The Antichrist*, which was intended to be the first part of Nietzsche’s masterwork, *Transvaluation of All Values*.