

Interpretation

A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Fall 2022

Volume 49 Issue 1

- 3 Richard F. Hassing The Question of Self-Reference in *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 6
- 25 W. B. Allen **Book Reviews**
The Soul of Politics: Harry V. Jaffa and the Fight for America by Glenn Ellmers
- 43 Elizabeth C'de Baca Eastman *Democracy and the History of Political Thought*, edited by Patrick N. Cain, Stephen Patrick Sims, and Stephen A. Block
- 49 Steven H. Frankel *Strauss, Spinoza & Sinai: Orthodox Judaism and Modern Questions of Faith*, edited by Jeffrey Bloom, Alec Goldstein, and Gil Student
- 59 Steven H. Frankel *The Statesman as Thinker: Portraits of Greatness, Courage, and Nobility* by Daniel J. Mahoney
- 69 Christopher Kelly *L'Antiquité politique de Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Entre exemples et modèles* by Flora Champy
- 75 Douglas Kries *Leo Strauss on Political Philosophy: Responding to the Challenge of Positivism and Historicism*, edited by Catherine H. Zuckert
- 81 Miguel Morgado *Democracy and the History of Political Thought*, edited by Patrick N. Cain, Stephen Patrick Sims, and Stephen A. Block
- 87 Will Morrisey *Reason and Politics: The Nature of Political Phenomena* by Mark Blitz
- 111 David Lewis Schaefer *Strauss, Spinoza & Sinai: Orthodox Judaism and Modern Questions of Faith*, edited by Jeffrey Bloom, Alec Goldstein, and Gil Student
- 121 David Lewis Schaefer *Progressivism: The Strange History of a Radical Idea* by Bradley C. S. Watson

Interpretation

A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Editor-in-Chief Timothy W. Burns, Baylor University

General Editors Charles E. Butterworth • Timothy W. Burns

General Editors (Late) Howard B. White (d. 1974) • Robert Horwitz (d. 1987)
Seth G. Benardete (d. 2001) • Leonard Grey (d. 2009) •
Hilail Gildin (d. 2015)

Consulting Editors Harvey C. Mansfield • Thomas L. Pangle • Ellis Sandoz

Consulting Editors (Late) Leo Strauss (d. 1973) • Arnaldo Momigliano (d. 1987) •
Michael Oakeshott (d. 1990) • John Hallowell (d. 1992) •
Ernest L. Fortin (d. 2002) • Muhsin Mahdi (d. 2007) •
Joseph Cropsey (d. 2012) • Kenneth W. Thompson (d. 2013)
• Harry V. Jaffa (d. 2015) • David Lowenthal (d. 2022)

International Editors Terence E. Marshall • Heinrich Meier

Editors Peter Ahrensdorf • Wayne Ambler • Marco Andreacchio •
Maurice Auerbach • Robert Bartlett • Fred Baumann • Eric
Buzzetti • Susan Collins • Patrick Coby • Erik Dempsey •
Elizabeth C'de Baca Eastman • Edward J. Erler • Maureen
Feder-Marcus • Robert Goldberg • L. Joseph Hebert •
Pamela K. Jensen • Hannes Kerber • Mark J. Lutz • Daniel
Ian Mark • Ken Masugi • Carol L. McNamara • Will
Morrisey • Amy Nendza • Lorraine Pangle • Charles T.
Rubin • Leslie G. Rubin • Thomas Schneider • Susan Meld
Shell • Geoffrey T. Sigalet • Nicholas Starr • Devin Stauffer
• Bradford P. Wilson • Cameron Wybrow • Martin D. Yaffe
• Catherine H. Zuckert • Michael P. Zuckert

Copy Editor Les Harris

Designer Sarah Teutschel

Inquiries ***Interpretation, A Journal of Political Philosophy***

Department of Political Science

Baylor University

1 Bear Place, 97276

Waco, TX 76798

email interpretation@baylor.edu

Jeffrey Bloom, Alec Goldstein, and Gil Student, eds., *Strauss, Spinoza & Sinai: Orthodox Judaism and Modern Questions of Faith*. New York: Kodesh, 2022, viii + 343 pp., \$19.95 (paper).

DAVID LEWIS SCHAEFER

COLLEGE OF THE HOLY CROSS

dschaefer@holycross.edu

Leo Strauss, the greatest political philosopher of the twentieth century (and beyond), described what he termed the “theologico-political problem” as the central concern of his many studies in classical, medieval (Jewish and Muslim), and modern thought. While reared in an Orthodox Jewish household (albeit not one, by his account, possessed of much Jewish learning), Strauss never professed in his writings to be a religious believer. Yet he remained a loyal Jew, from the ardent Zionism of his early adulthood in Weimar Germany, through the concern expressed in some of his later essays and talks with the problematic status of Judaism in the late modern world. And his greatest intellectual contribution, from the perspective of orthodoxy, was his refutation of Spinoza’s claim to have disproved the premises of biblical revelation, demonstrating that the Spinozistic (and more generally, Enlightenment) critique of such fundamental tenets of Jewish (and by implication, Christian and Muslim) faith as the belief in divine creation and the existence of miracles consisted rather in mockery than in rational argument.¹

From the standpoint of Jewish Orthodoxy, Strauss’s critique of the Enlightenment project would seem to constitute a great gain, restoring the intellectual respectability of biblical faith. Even more supportive of orthodoxy would appear to have been his challenge to the attempted halfway house

¹ See Leo Strauss, *Philosophy and Law: Contributions to the Understanding of Maimonides and His Predecessors*, trans. Eve Adler (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 29–30. See also “Preface” to *Spinoza’s Critique of Religion*, trans. E. M. Sinclair (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), 28–29.

of liberal Jewish thought since the end of the eighteenth century, resting in part on the so-called “higher” criticism of the Bible that derived from Spinoza. And Jeffrey Bloom, in his introduction to the present volume, describes Strauss’s *Spinoza’s Critique of Religion* (first published in English translation, with a new autobiographical preface, in 1965, though the original had appeared in German in 1930) as having provided a “defense of Orthodox Judaism” so “compelling” that it led him, upon graduating from college, to go to Israel to study in a Yeshiva (v).

Nonetheless, Bloom reports, although Strauss’s preface “broke the spell of secularism,” causing him “to take the claims of Orthodox Judaism seriously,” he “wondered” whether Strauss had provided “an *Orthodox* defense” (v, emphasis in original). And the eighteen contributors to the present volume, all of them learned Orthodox Jews, including numerous rabbis and some accomplished scholars in secular fields, are particularly concerned with Strauss’s assertion in the Spinoza book’s preface that if Judaism “claims to *know* that the Bible is divinely revealed,” along with claiming to know the other tenets of Jewish belief (miracles, etc.), then Spinoza would indeed “have refuted” Orthodoxy. “The case is entirely different,” Strauss added, “if orthodoxy limits itself to asserting that it *believes*” the doctrines of revelation, since all its assertions then “rest on the irrefutable premise that the omnipotent God whose will is unfathomable...may exist,” which in turn entails the possibility of “all Biblical miracles and revelations” (vii, emphases added). Whereas “the genuine refutation of orthodoxy” such as Spinoza professed to achieve would require proving “that the world and human life are perfectly intelligible without the assumption of a mysterious God,” Spinoza fails to provide such a demonstration, leaving the “cognitive status” of his system “fundamentally hypothetical,” a status “not different from that of the orthodox account.”

Granting the possibility of revelation entails “that the philosophic account” of the world “and the philosophic way of life are not necessarily, not evidently the true account and the right way of life.” In consequence, Strauss contends, since the quest for evident and necessary knowledge rests on a *decision*, “the antagonism between Spinoza and Judaism, between unbelief and belief, is ultimately not theoretical but moral.” It reflects Spinoza’s ambition, in common with other Enlightenment thinkers like Machiavelli, Bacon, Hobbes, and Descartes, to make man rather than God the “master”

of his life and of the world (vii–viii, emphasis added).² That aspiration has become problematic in a world shaped by technology and ostensibly value-free science.³

Nearly all the contributors to this volume challenge Strauss’s reduction (from their perspective) of the epistemic status of religious faith, from knowledge to belief. Treating Strauss as if his primary intent with respect to Judaism should have been to provide a “defense of Orthodox Judaism,” rather than simply to clarify the status of philosophy in relation to faith, they adopt various strategies to improve on his enterprise. Rabbi Jack Abramowitz, for one, complains that Strauss’s reduction of Orthodoxy to the status of belief makes it too wishy-washy to inspire emotional attachment, as if the believer were to say that “In the beginning God may or may not have created the Heavens and the Earth; we think that He did” (2). While “many, or most Jews” may rest contented with mere belief, Strauss’s account according to Abramowitz does not describe “Judaism,” which entails pursuing “real knowledge through understanding” (7). Abramowitz does not elaborate how Judaism engages in that pursuit in a way that differentiates it from philosophy.

Rabbi Shalom Carmy, citing Strauss’s 1948 lecture “Reason and Revelation,” notes Strauss’s observation “that ‘philosophy must try to prove that revelation is impossible’” in order to demonstrate its own status as the proper way to truth, but that it can never succeed in that proof, since “it arbitrarily excludes those *aspects* of the whole which can’t be understood clearly, distinctly.” In that context Strauss “rejects the argument that claims to revelation are so improbable that they can be dismissed” as one “‘becoming only for business-men,’” but a “‘disgrace’” for philosophers (9–11, emphasis in original). But Carmy misrepresents Strauss’s argument as a disparagement of businessmen, responding that all human beings (including businessmen) “should want to live their lives in the light of truth, however truth is arrived at,” when all Strauss did was dismiss the claim that the (alleged) improbability of revelation provided sufficient ground for rejecting it.

It is actually Carmy, not Strauss, who maintains that the claim of revelation’s (rational) improbability would suffice to reject it. Disappointingly, Carmy (who teaches philosophy at Yeshiva University) dogmatically dismisses Strauss’s endeavor to recover the wisdom of classical thought as a corrective

² All of the Strauss quotations in the preceding two paragraphs are found on pp. 28–29 of *Spinoza’s Critique of Religion*.

³ See, on this theme, Timothy Burns, *Leo Strauss on Democracy, Technology, and Liberal Education* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2021).

to the problems inherent in modern philosophy as simply “impossible,” a fact that explains “Strauss’s marginality on the contemporary philosophical scene” (10–11). (While Carmy’s bio does not list any of his own contributions to that scene, it is safe to say that it is not a milieu towards which Strauss’s work was directed.)

Carmy proceeds to berate Strauss for failing to provide “an argument for the truth” of revelation, as opposed to a mere “hypothesis.” He then takes Strauss to task for arguing that Judaism, like Islam but unlike Christianity, is a jurisprudential religion rather than a theological one (although he “may be right” in his emphasis), and criticizes Strauss’s “exaggeration of the esoteric strategies of Maimonides and other Jewish thinkers” (of which exaggeration Carmy offers no illustration); as well as for the “incredible,” to Carmy, authority that he grants to philosophy (again, without explanation of this judgment) (11–13).

Along the way, Carmy cites “classical” (not necessarily Jewish) “proofs” of the existence of God as “worthy of consideration,” especially since “many intelligent religious Jews” find them “self-evident” (13).⁴ He does not pause to assess, let alone try to demonstrate, their truth, though he cites the objection that they limit God’s “personal sovereignty” (by limiting His powers to what can be “extracted from rational premises”).⁵ In sum, Carmy does not seem to care what arguments one uses, so long as they persuade someone to adhere to Orthodoxy. (See, likewise, Rabbi Samuel Lebens’s suggestion that even though “Pascal’s Wager” can hardly be said to demonstrate that one should choose Judaism over any other religion, it might legitimately be used in speaking “to certain audiences at certain times,” such as the “Jewish Undecideds” [207]. Lebens, unlike Carmy, is open about his rhetorical goal, though he finds no need to disparage Strauss in order to pursue it.)

Of a different order entirely is Mark Gottlieb’s essay “Leo Strauss and the Lure of Orthodoxy, or, How to ‘Awaken a Prejudice.’” Acknowledging “both Strauss’s reverence for Jewish tradition and his self-aware distance from that tradition,” Gottlieb laments that his respect for Judaism “was not always reciprocated” by Jewish traditionalists (98n). Gottlieb focuses his lengthy

⁴ It is hard to understand what it would mean to understand a proof of God’s existence as self-evidently true, since a self-evident proposition is one that by definition does not require proof.

⁵ Note that the objection that Carmy mentions is essentially the same ground on which Strauss denies the possibility of offering a rational demonstration of the truth of biblical revelation, namely the fact that the Bible presupposes the existence of a deity “whose will is unfathomable” and hence unlimitable.

essay on Strauss's 1935 study of Maimonides, *Philosophy and Law* (the second book he published), in which Strauss professed the aim of “awaken[ing] a prejudice” in favor of the superiority of the Rambam's philosophy to contemporary Jewish thought, in opposition to “the powerful opposing prejudice” that that claim then faced (104–5). (Strauss evidently had in mind, among others, assumptions inspired by the great neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen [49n]). Gottlieb appreciates that this undertaking, far from being merely antiquarian, was meant to demonstrate “that European reservations vis-à-vis the Jewish tradition” were no longer persuasive, opening the possibility that “an unqualified return to Jewish Orthodoxy was...both possible and necessary” (104). Of particular interest is Gottlieb's stress on how Strauss emphasizes “the role of law” in Judaism “as a moralizing institution, far more significant in the civilizing work of religion than philosophical theology” could provide (99). Unlike Carmy, Gottlieb does not object to this emphasis.

Strauss's dissatisfaction with the Enlightenment critique of revelation exemplified by Spinoza led him, as Gottlieb observes, to Maimonides's thought as a truer model of enlightenment, one which, through its emphasis on law (rather than the modern fixation on “autonomy and authenticity”) could ultimately “reconcile classical and biblical worldviews” (121). (It is noteworthy that some other contributors to this volume are so focused on the issue of “proving” the existence of God that they call on Christian theologians like Pascal and Saint Anselm for assistance—thus downplaying the crucial difference already mentioned in the role of belief as distinguished from law in these two biblical faiths.)

Gottlieb concludes his valuable study by speculating on how Strauss might judge three “contemporary trends” in Judaism: altered views regarding the relation between religion and the state; attempted changes in the halachic process; and “the historicization and allegorization of texts and commandments that go against the grain of contemporary culture and morality in the spirit of progressivism” (122). With respect to the first point, Gottlieb sensibly judges that Strauss, in contrast with the “Israeli polymath and gadfly, Yesshahahu Leibowitz,” would have opposed the strict “separation of religion from the existing secular state,” appreciating that “both the biblical and classical political traditions” held that religion and politics shared “a minimally functional, and maximally soul-shaping, purpose” (123): even a liberal regime requires the sort of moral foundation that religion promotes (as George Washington, we recall, observed in his Farewell Address), while religion could hardly flourish in a polity characterized by widespread amorality.

Concerning the halachic process, Gottlieb observes, Strauss “acknowledges that modern Jewry has learned much from European thought over the past 150 years” but would have opposed the Reform effort “to renew Judaism by making it up-to-date,” thereby rendering it “hollow and sentimental.” Hence Strauss would have preferred “a theological-legal hermeneutic that favors authoritative individuals or bodies of received opinion” in the interpretation of the Law, rather than leaving adjudication to “semi-learned laypeople” (127). (However, Gottlieb misreads Strauss as favoring “aristocratic politics” as a matter of practice, when he argued in fact, as Mill had done, for the promotion of an aristocratic *element* in modern democracy through liberal, “Great Books” education.)⁶ Finally, Gottlieb rightly argues that Strauss would have opposed the “historicization” of *halachah*, just as he opposed the historicization of philosophy: Gottlieb alludes here to the recent endeavor by some observant Jews to dismiss halachic passages like the prohibition on homosexual relations by reading them as relics of bygone ages, or to turn them into *choks*, commands without rational ground. Gottlieb notes the kinship between Strauss’s “critique of religious liberalism” in favor of searching for the *reasons* for biblical commandments and the method of “reconstruction” espoused by the founder of Modern Orthodoxy in America, Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik (131).

The most troubling aspect of this volume, on the other hand, is the adoption of a historicist stand towards philosophy by several contributors, in what appears to be a desperate but misguided attempt to undermine its claim to embody objective knowledge, hence supposedly clearing the field for the epistemic supremacy or at least parity of religious belief. Simi Peters, for one, appeals to the postmodern depiction of the human mind as necessarily “subjective”—in contrast to what she thinks was the “Greek philosophical” assumption of the attainability of “objective proofs,” which she claims was “culturally based”—to conclude that “since all systems of thought, including religions, build on propositions (axioms) that cannot be proven, no single belief system or set of values has a greater truth value than any other.” But this supposed fact does not affect the ground for accepting Jewish faith in her view, since “traditional Jewish thought makes no claim to objectivity,” but

⁶ See Strauss’s lecture “Liberal Education and Responsibility,” in *Liberalism Ancient and Modern* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), including the observation that since the classical thinkers “had no delusions regarding the probability of a genuine [as distinguished from merely conventional] aristocracy’s ever being actual,” “for all practical purposes they were satisfied with a regime in which the gentlemen share power with the people,” a principle that Strauss then connects with the principles underlying modern liberal republicanism (15). See also 17–18 for the connection to Mill.

“starts with the assumption that we must make an *a priori* commitment to a system of belief that defines the arena within which choices will be made.”

While Peters shares with Strauss an emphasis on the primacy of law in Judaism, unlike Strauss (or Soloveitchik) she makes no effort to find a place for objective reasoning within the Jewish faith (220–21). (Strauss, by contrast, foresaw the suicidal effect of this move, noting at the conclusion to the 1965 Preface to *Spinoza’s Critique of Religion* [p. 30] that a “victory” for orthodoxy based on the historicist premise “was not an unmitigated blessing, for it was victory, not of Jewish orthodoxy, but of any orthodoxy,” whereas “Jewish orthodoxy [had] based its claim to superiority to other religions...on its superior rationality” [quoted by Gottlieb, 131, including Strauss’s citation of Deuteronomy 4:6]).

By abandoning the attempt to employ reason in *support* of the truth of Judaism (even though the faith cannot be *proved* to be true), Peters appears to leave us in the dark as to why we should prefer it to any other faith, or to nonbelief. (She evades the difficulty only through verbal manipulation, preferring to “substitute the term ‘evidence’” for truth, while then offering, as others have done, the sheer fact of the survival of Judaism over the millennia as the “strongest evidence” of the validity of Orthodoxy [221, 225].) However plausible one may find that argument, it in no way entails, but is rather weakened by, the historicist premise.

At bottom, the belief of several contributors that the acceptance of Judaism somehow requires not only avowing the strength of their faith, but undermining the very possibility of the philosophic *life*, appears to rest on a misunderstanding of what that life entails. Repeatedly, perhaps under the influence of Spinoza, they identify philosophy—literally, the love or *pursuit* of knowledge of the whole—with the claim to *possess* such knowledge. Most notably, Rabbi Eliezer Zobin, in his essay subtitled “One Needs Belief in Order to Reason, Not Reason to Believe,” justifies that subtitle by referring to the fact that every form of knowledge ultimately depends on assumptions that cannot themselves be proved. For instance (employing the well-known argument of David Hume, though Zobin does not mention him), Zobin observes that the principle of causality, the foundation of all science (that is, the assumption that like causes will always have like effects) cannot itself be demonstrated: How can the scientist know for sure that when he repeats an experiment for 151st time, the laws of nature will compel it to produce the same result? Similarly, Zobin observes, the laws of morality, even at the most basic level (one should not torture a small child), axiomatic though they may

appear, cannot be proved by reason (301, 305–6). But does it follow, therefore, as Zobin concludes, that “science and religion” rest *equally* on faith (311)? (Isn’t there an obvious difference between the universally perceived need to assume, say, that the world exists, and the need felt by many but not necessarily all to believe in a divine lawgiver—let alone the specifically Jewish God?)⁷

It needs to be borne in mind, at this point, that Hume is one of numerous philosophers who indicated (sometimes openly, sometimes covertly) the essentially zetetic, rather than dogmatic, nature of their enterprise. (Zetetic, as distinguished from dogmatic, skepticism, while recognizing the questionableness of all fundamental human opinions, sees that awareness as an incentive to continue seeking wisdom, rather than simply renouncing the quest, as do present-day relativists or postmodernists.)⁸ In Plato’s *Apology of Socrates*, Socrates, having been sentenced to death, tells his judges that *if* death is followed by an entry to Hades, he would devote the rest of his years (that is, eternity) to questioning others in *pursuit* of wisdom. Similarly, in Plato’s *Republic*, Socrates never claims that philosophy can attain the sort of presuppositionless knowledge that he assigns to the highest level of the divided line; nor does his subsequent image of the philosopher who has emerged from the cave, once he has adjusted his eyes to the daylight, demonstrate that the philosopher can literally do the epistemological equivalent of “seeing” the sun (which would immediately blind him). Likewise, when Aristotle describes scientific knowledge (*epistēmē*) in his *Nicomachean Ethics* (VI.3) as something pertaining to things that do not admit of being otherwise, he describes that very belief *as* an assumption or supposition (*hupolēpsis*).

Montaigne, in his *Essays*, portrays the ancient philosophers as a whole as zetetic skeptics, whether openly so, or with an outward mask of dogmatism, concealing their doubts of popular moral and religious beliefs “so as not to

⁷ Additionally, it may be that in Strauss’s view, the interrogation of the beliefs of the pious, if continued to the fullest extent (as modeled in the dialogues of Plato and Xenophon), demonstrates that those beliefs point beyond themselves, to assumptions about the universe that lend themselves to philosophic assessment, even if not to refutation. (Are not all human beings necessarily committed to the employment of reason in their daily lives? And once that fact is appreciated, who knows how far it may lead us?) While philosophy is incapable of refuting revelation, this does not entail that it may not question and correct the views of morality or justice that religious believers (like Cephalus and Polemarchus in Plato’s *Republic*) claim to derive from their faith, by causing the believers to think through their own premises more fully.

⁸ See, on the original meaning of skepticism, Strauss, “Reason and Revelation,” in *Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem*, by Heinrich Meier (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 147–48. See also “Liberal Education and Responsibility,” 14, regarding “the fact that philosophy is more evidently quest for wisdom than possession of wisdom.”

frighten the children,” that is, the nonphilosophic multitude.⁹ (As I point out in *The Political Philosophy of Montaigne*, Montaigne himself, though a precursor of the modern Enlightenment, gives every indication that he too practices such a rhetoric for self-protective reasons, outwardly professing an extreme political conservatism and deference to established theological authorities, even as his overall argument serves to undermine them.)

In sum, though it is quite likely, as Zobin remarks, that in view of the misery and suffering (albeit normally mixed, one must add, with joy) with which life is filled, people need religious faith to give meaning and purpose to their lives (306), this need not be true of *all* individuals. In particular, for those who share Socrates’s belief that the greatest of human goods lies in the pursuit of knowledge, the philosophic life may be more satisfying or complete than that of piety. It is ultimately the *erotic* character of the quest for wisdom (not a Spinozistic/Hobbesean/Nietzschean will to power) that seems to have led Strauss, as it had Socrates and his successors, to choose it. Yet as Strauss’s life, like that of Maimonides, demonstrates, this quest to see beyond the moral and legal boundaries or horizon of one’s fellow citizens is not incompatible with a genuine piety, in the sense of loyalty to, and the endeavor to fortify and improve, the community within which the philosopher lives.¹⁰

The wisest of political philosophers, from Plato and Aristotle, through Maimonides, Tocqueville, and Strauss, shared Zobin’s understanding that for most people, a (enlightened, sober) piety is essential to a purposive and meaningful individual life, as it certainly is (over the long run) to the maintenance of a decent civil and moral order. Hence those thinkers, whatever their private beliefs, were respectful of established religion, even as they attempted to guide it in a reasonable direction (consider Maimonides’s “Letter on Astrology”).

Strauss himself harbored grave doubts about the viability of the modern, secularist project that Spinoza helped to launch.¹¹ And as the more thought-

⁹ Montaigne, *Essais*, in *Œuvres complètes*, ed. Albert Thibaudet and Maurice Rat (Paris: Gallimard, 1962), II.12, 487–93, 527; *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, trans. Donald Frame (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958), II.12, 375–80, 408. See my *The Political Philosophy of Montaigne*, 2nd printing (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019), esp. chap. 1.

¹⁰ See Strauss, “Restatement on Xenophon’s *Hiero*,” in *On Tyranny*, rev. ed., ed. Victor Gourevitch and Michael Roth (New York: Macmillan, 1991), 199–200, on the philosopher’s secondary attachment “to his family and his city,” and his resultant endeavor “to help his fellow man by mitigating, as far as in him lies, the evils which are inseparable from the human condition.”

¹¹ See, for instance, Strauss’s lecture “German Nihilism,” *Interpretation* 26, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 354–78, and Burns, *Leo Strauss*, chap. 3.

ful of the contributors to this volume recognize, the fact that he was not an observant Jew does not mean that Judaism cannot benefit from his wisdom. To assail Strauss for his failure to espouse Orthodoxy, rather than appreciate what Jews (of whatever orientation) along with non-Jews can learn from him, especially in view of the contemporary crisis wrought by both mindless secularism and postmodern relativism, seems shortsighted, to put things mildly.

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSIONS

Interpretation welcomes manuscripts in political philosophy broadly conceived. Submitted articles can be interpretations of treatises of political philosophy as well as literary works, theological works, and writings on jurisprudence that have an important bearing on political philosophy.

All submissions must be in Microsoft Word® and sent, as an email attachment, to interpretation@baylor.edu.

Submissions must be under 8,000 words, including notes and bibliographic references, and must be accompanied by an abstract of no more than 150 words. Because *Interpretation* is a double-blind peer-reviewed journal, all author identification and all references that would identify an author's own publications must be removed from the document. A separate title page, with the author's affiliation and contact information (including address, postal code, email address, and phone number) must be included with your MS.

Contributors should follow *The Chicago Manual of Style* (16th edition). *The Chicago Manual of Style* offers publications the choice between sentence-style capitalization in titles of books or articles and headline-style. *Interpretation* uses the headline style. Parenthetical references no longer use "p." or "pp." *Interpretation* has reverted to the traditional form of citation and no longer uses the author/date form. Please double space the entire text. Footnotes, rather than endnotes, are preferred.

Words from languages not rooted in Latin should be transliterated to English. Foreign expressions that have not become part of English should be accompanied by translation into English.

The editors of *Interpretation* are committed to a timely appraisal of all manuscripts, and expect to be able to have a decision on submissions within four to six weeks.