

Interpretation

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Essays in Honor of Christopher Kelly

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Interpretation

A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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Inquiries ***Interpretation, A Journal of Political Philosophy***

Department of Political Science

Baylor University

1 Bear Place, 97276

Waco, TX 76798

email interpretation@baylor.edu

Pascal and Rousseau

PIERRE MANENT

ÉCOLE DES HAUTES ÉTUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES (EMERITUS)

pierre.manent@ehess.fr

In a wide-ranging and precise study, Christopher Kelly asks himself whether, and in what sense, the sentiment of injustice can be said to be natural according to Rousseau.¹ The experience of the unjust accusation for the “broken comb” as it is narrated in the *Confessions*, Emile’s indignation faced with his uprooted beans in book 2 of *Emile*, and finally the observation reported in book 1 of an “inconvenient crier” made furious by his nurse’s “rather light blow” lead the reader to think that in Rousseau’s eyes the sentiment of the just and the unjust takes root naturally and immediately from the experience of an injustice one has suffered. Now, right after having stressed that the example of the infant struck by his nurse would have sufficed to convince him of the character, “innate to the heart of man,” of the “sentiment of the just and the unjust,” Rousseau speaks of “this disposition of children to rage, vexation, and anger” which is “very different,” says Kelly, from the sentiment of the just and the unjust. If the latter seems truly “innate,” it also seems “malleable,” a second character which casts an incertitude, a haziness over the former. In any case, the sentiment of the just and the unjust “takes the form more of indignation against injustice than of a love for justice.”²

Christopher Kelly then remarks that Rousseau, according to context, proposes “different theoretical explanations” of this moral phenomenon. The point is evidently a capital one. It is a particularly significant fact, however, that in the *Second Discourse*, precisely his most “theoretical” work, one finds no specific reference to the sentiment of the just and the unjust. Rousseau

¹ See Christopher Kelly, “Du caractère naturel du sentiment de l’injustice,” in *Penser l’homme: Treize études sur Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, ed. Claude Habib and Pierre Manent (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2013), 155–66.

² *Ibid.*, 157.

stresses there that natural men, having among themselves no kind of commerce and therefore no idea of justice, are unaware of the sentiment, or the resentment, of injury. He therefore blames the “philosophers” who make of savage man a “philosopher himself, discovering alone the most sublime truths, making for himself, by trains of very abstract reasoning, maxims of justice and reason drawn from the love of order in general, or from the known will of his creator.” Christopher Kelly does not fail to note that, in the Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar, this “love of order” is said to belong, as one of its principles, to the “nature of man.”

I would like to pose a question regarding the troubling distance that Christopher Kelly points out between the descriptions or evocations of the moral experience of the just and the unjust, and the theoretical or scientific propositions which bear on the nature of man in Rousseau’s work. To do this, I will consider the text in which Rousseau boasts with the greatest abandon about the explicatory power of his “theory of man” as he sets it against, to say the least in his view, the disappointing pretensions of the doctrine of original sin that the archbishop of Paris raises against him in an argument clearly inspired by Pascal. Before reading the *Letter to Christophe de Beaumont*, however, it is indispensable for us to recall summarily the terms of the Pascalian analysis of human injustice.

The most significant fragment is no doubt the following:

The nature of *amour-propre* and of this human *I* is to love nothing but oneself and to consider nothing but oneself. But what will it do? It cannot prevent that this object which it loves is full of defects and misery; it wants to be great, and it sees itself small; it wants to be happy, and it sees itself miserable; it wants to be perfect, and it sees itself full of imperfections; it wants to be the object of men’s love and esteem, and it sees that its defects deserve nothing but their aversion and scorn. This predicament in which it finds itself produces in it the most unjust and criminal passion that it is possible to imagine; for it conceives a mortal hatred for this truth which corrects him and convicts him of his defects....

There are different degrees of this aversion for the truth; but one can say that it is in everyone to some degree, because it is inseparable from *amour-propre*.³

Pascal does not contest that human beings are unequally courageous, just, temperate, prudent, and so forth. He does not contest that some distinguish

³ Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*, folio classique, ed. Michel Le Guern (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), fr. 758, p. 499, 501.

themselves by their virtues and good dispositions, and others by contrary dispositions. Nevertheless, beneath the infinite diversity and inequality of moral characters, there are as many *selves* which, certainly to different degrees, experience an insurmountable “aversion” for the truth which concerns them. There are the good or bad actions or dispositions of the moral agent, and there are, beneath this moral agent, *selves*, if not equally, at least similarly, prisoners of their *amour-propre*. Pascal wants to emphasize that the human will is not only a faculty which can take opposite directions, good or bad—a faculty flexible toward the good and the bad—it is also a *condition* which is essentially unjust, and that the human agent cannot rectify by himself. In this sense, the will, the organ of free choice, is at the same time the organ or the scene of a singular slavery from which man cannot free himself by his own forces. The organ of liberty is at the same time the root of a strange slavery.

Now this fundamental characteristic of the human condition which the slavery of the will constitutes has escaped philosophies as it has pagan religions:

Whoever does not hate in himself his *amour-propre*, and this instinct which prompts him to make himself God, is indeed blinded. Who does not see that nothing is more opposed to justice and to truth? For it is false that we deserve this, and it is unjust and impossible to succeed at it, since all demand the same thing. It is thus a manifest injustice in which we are born, of which we cannot rid ourselves and of which we must rid ourselves.

Yet no religion has noticed that it was a sin, nor that we were born in it, nor that we were obliged to resist it, nor thought to give us remedies for it.⁴

And again:

No religion but ours has taught that man is born in sin, no sect of philosophers has said it, none has therefore told the truth.⁵

Hence, for Pascal, Christian revelation distinguishes itself first by the fact that it reveals man to himself, or more precisely, that it uncovers for him, at the same time as an enslavement which was until then ignored, a Liberator who was until then inconceivable. Here is how he indicates the order to be followed regarding this matter:

Order.

⁴ Ibid., fr. 524, p. 359.

⁵ Ibid., fr. 397, pp. 252–53.

Men have contempt for Religion. They have hatred for it and are afraid it be true; in order to cure this, one must begin by showing that Religion is not contrary to reason, venerable, give it respect.

Then make it lovable, make the good wish that it be true and then show them that it is true.

Venerable because it understood man well.

Lovable because it promises the true good.⁶

“It understood man well.” This argument is powerful, and probably decisive, if it is verified. But how to verify it? How to assure oneself that one is not turning around in a circle? How does Pascal resolve this difficulty?

One is at first tempted to say that he treats religion—and therefore Christianity—as a scientific hypothesis: certain singular features—certain “contradictions”—of the human condition having to be explained, the propositions of the Christian religion furnish the sole explanation that is both available and satisfying. Voltaire, one remembers, rejects this “way of reasoning”⁷ which he attributes to Pascal. The analogy, however, is not exactly pertinent. In effect, the instance that one would want to put here in the position of hypothesis—namely, the “mysteries of Christianity,” especially the mystery of original sin—is characterized by a specific obscurity, whereas the scientific hypothesis distinguishes itself by its clarity to the eyes of reason. The hypothesis of atmospheric pressure, which Pascal verified in several famous “experiments,”⁸ is incomparably clearer than the thesis, received for a long time, according to which “nature has a horror of vacuum.” Now, what constitutes the “explicatory” validity of Christian dogma in Pascal’s eyes is, paradoxically, the contrast between its intrinsic obscurity and its power to enlighten. One remembers these winged words:

Certainly, nothing so rudely shocks us than this doctrine [of original sin], and yet without this mystery, the most incomprehensible one of all, we are incomprehensible to ourselves. The central knot of our condition takes its coils and its twists in this abyss. Such that man is more inconceivable without this mystery than this mystery is inconceivable to man.⁹

⁶ Ibid., fr. 10, p. 69.

⁷ “This manner of reasoning appears false and dangerous: for the fable of Prometheus and Pandora, Plato’s androgynes and the dogmas of the Siamese, would give as good an account of these apparent contradictions.” *Lettres philosophiques* (Paris: GF Flammarion, 1964), XXV, 161.

⁸ See Blaise Pascal, “Expériences nouvelles touchant le vide,” in *Œuvres complètes*, ed. Henri Gouhier and Louis Lafuma (Paris: du Seuil, 1963), 194–263.

⁹ *Pensées*, fr. 122, p. 115.

We are not here in the circumstances of the experiment of the “equilibrium of liquids.” The purpose of Christian dogma is not a theoretical proposition which leaves, or rather reinforces, reason, from now on enlightened, in its seat; it is on the contrary a certain abandonment of reason, or more precisely, of the pretension of reason to furnish the highest rule of our lives: “it is not by the superb agitations of our reason, but by the simple submission of reason, that we can truly know ourselves.”¹⁰

However this may be, in his critique of Christian dogmas in the name of his “theory of man,” Rousseau sets the clarity and completeness of his hypothesis of the natural goodness of man against the obscurity and narrowness of the “doctrine of original sin” which Christophe de Beaumont invokes against the theses of *Emile*.¹¹ The archbishop of Paris’s argument in effect takes up again that of Pascal, or is inspired by it.¹² And Rousseau, if he responds in these circumstances to the prelate, makes the most of it to develop a complete argument against Pascal. The following lines summarize the critical moment of that argument:

Original sin explains everything except its own principle, and it is this principle which has to be explained.... Man is created good; we agree on this, I believe, both of us. But you say that he is evil because he has been evil; and me, I show how he has been evil. Which of us, do you think, has most successfully ascended to the principle?¹³

Rousseau here puts his finger on what separates his approach from the one he attributes to Pascal: for his part, he *explains how* man has become evil, while the dogma of original sin provides only a tautological explanation. One conceives the victorious jubilation with which Rousseau recapitulates his great scientific effort, and stresses how this sheds light on the sadly familiar experience of evil among men—the experience which substantiates in the eyes of many the most intimidating dogma of Christianity. Even if one admits that the Christian religion has “understood man well” and that this dogma “explains” the constant virulence of wickedness in human life, how much more clearly, how much more completely explanatory the “theory of man”

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ “Your unique proof against me is to put forward original sin.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Lettre à Christophe de Beaumont*, in *Œuvres complètes*, ed. Bernard Gagenbin and Marcel Raymond, 5 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1969–1995), 4:937. Subsequent references to the *Œuvres complètes* (OC) are by volume and page number.

¹² “I will not say if (as you boast) you clarify by this system the mystery of our heart, but I see that you greatly obscure the justice and goodness of the supreme Being” (OC 4:938).

¹³ OC 4:939–940.

as Rousseau methodically deploys it appears, on the basis of the principle of the original goodness of man in *Emile*, and already, in a more compact form, in the *Second Discourse*!¹⁴ Nevertheless, do not this sentiment of victory and this tone of triumph rest on a misunderstanding? As I said, Pascal does not, properly speaking, propose a hypothesis. He is not a candidate in the scientific competition which Rousseau claims to have won hands down. It is certainly not he who would boast about “showing how” man has become evil. He stresses, on the contrary, the obscure, impenetrable character of the dogma. He even emphasizes his distance in relation to the attempts, as ingenious as they are eloquent, of Augustine to make the dogma humanly plausible by imagining what may have happened between Adam and Eve, Satan and God in the garden, for it is doubtless the great saint and doctor who is aimed at when Pascal writes:

We conceive neither the glorious state of Adam, nor the nature of his sin, nor the transmission which was made of it in us. These are things which happened in the state of a nature altogether different from ours and which go beyond the state of our present capacity.¹⁵

Where the theological tradition, including the most orthodox and accredited, mobilizes all the resources of reason and of the imagination in order to try to conceive how these great things could have happened, Pascal takes literally the mysterious character of the dogma, judging that all these conjectures are useless for the only thing that matters, to be delivered from the slavery of sin:

All of this would be useless to know in order to leave it; and all that matters to us is to know that we are miserable, corrupt, separated from God, but redeemed by Jesus Christ; and it is that of which we have admirable proofs *on earth*.¹⁶

It is in the encounter between the most common human experience and the obscurity of the most impenetrable dogma that the light which sets in motion the becoming-Christian appears. Nevertheless, the dogma does not so much explain a wickedness that we already know in another way as it does a wickedness of which we were unaware—a wickedness, an injustice of

¹⁴ In this latter work, Rousseau already presents his doctrine as a scientific hypothesis: “One must not take the research into which one can enter on this subject [the state of nature and the origin of society and inequality], for historical truths, but only for hypothetical and conditional reasonings...similar to those made every day by our physicists about the formation of the world” (OC 3:132–33).

¹⁵ *Pensées*, fr. 402, p. 264.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* Emphasis mine.

whose depth we would forever remain unaware if the dogma of the Fall and of redemption, received in faith, did not give it to us to know. The dogma explains less than it warns us and opens to us another path:

Whoever does not hate in himself his *amour-propre*, and this instinct which prompts him to make himself God, is indeed blinded. Who does not see that nothing is more opposed to justice and truth? For it is false that we deserve that, and it is unjust and impossible to succeed at it, since all demand the same thing. It is thus a manifest injustice in which we are born, of which we cannot rid ourselves and of which we must rid ourselves.

Yet no religion [save the Christian one] has noticed that it was a sin, nor that we were born in it, nor that we were obliged to resist it, nor thought to give us remedies for it.¹⁷

I have already cited these decisive lines from Pascal. Let us place beside them these no less decisive lines from Rousseau:

I showed that the unique passion which is born with man, namely self-love, is a passion indifferent in itself to good and bad; that it becomes good or bad only by accident and according to the circumstances by which it develops. I showed that all the vices which are imputed to the human heart are not natural to it; I told the manner in which they are born, I followed, so to speak, their genealogy, and I showed how, by the successive alteration of our original goodness, men finally become what they are.¹⁸

Rousseau and Pascal both invoke evidence, but it is not the same evidence. Where Pascal asks, “Who does not see...?” Rousseau affirms, “I showed...” Pascal appeals to each one’s intimate experience, to the experience of the moral agent within each of us; Rousseau proclaims the perfectly and exhaustively demonstrative character of his theory of man. While Pascal urges the moral agent that we are to be thoroughly warned of the injustice of his *amour-propre* and of the obligation to cure oneself of it in practice, Rousseau draws us back well short of our practical condition since what he shows us is the “genealogy” of the moral agent within us, or how the human being passed from a condition of indifference to good and evil to a condition oriented or ordered according to this opposition. While Christian dogma absolutely rejects all pretension to know here below what it aims at, the theory of man proclaims an integral knowledge of everything that is to be known. While Christian dogma warns us to become Christian, encourages

¹⁷ *Pensées*, fr. 524, p. 359.

¹⁸ *Lettre à Christophe de Beaumont*, in *OC* 4:936.

us to do so, and provides us with the means, the theory of man declares that knowledge of man's becoming is complete without the least reference being first made to eventual practical consequences.

Some of these consequences, it is true, are not difficult to perceive. Doubtless the most important is that we ought in the end to consider human vices as superficial modalities of our being. How otherwise to see them developing themselves starting from a psychic condition or substance in which they were before absent? How otherwise to be capable of discovering and explaining when and how they "entered"?¹⁹ Evil, conceived as an accidental or circumstantial modality of an original passion that is fundamentally indifferent to good and evil, could not be profoundly rooted in us. That does not rule out that it is very virulent and very inconvenient, but it does rule out that it is profoundly attached to our nature. Hence Pascal and Rousseau, contrary to what this latter affirms, do not give different explanations of a same human phenomenon, of the same wickedness, but they orient us toward two very different phenomena, toward two opposed moral perceptions. While Pascal affirms that "we are born unjust,"²⁰ Rousseau affirms that "man is born good," not only because he has demonstrated it but because he has "the happiness to feel it."²¹ From these opposed diagnoses flow opposite practical consequences. While Pascal sends everyone, and first of all himself, back to penitence, Rousseau directs the accusation against the others' gaze²² or, in abstract terms, against "society" and "inequality."



Let us try to collect the terms of the debate between Rousseau and Pascal. For the latter, the original phenomenon, upon which all depends, is the disposition of the will with which we are born, this essentially unjust disposition which makes it so that every *self* ceaselessly demands that the world be at its service, demands to be loved, esteemed, preferred. Rousseau shares up to a certain point this clinical description of *amour-propre*, underlining in particular—as does Pascal—this madness of *amour-propre* which makes it so

¹⁹ "Let us set down as an incontestable maxim that the first movements of nature are always right: there is no original perversity in the human heart. There is not a single vice in it about which we cannot say how and where it entered" (*Émile*, book 2, in *OC* 4:322).

²⁰ *Pensées*, fr. 397, p. 252.

²¹ See the "note for philosophers" in the "Last response" to the critics of the *Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts*, in *OC* 3:80.

²² See in the *Confessions* how he extenuates his misdeed in the affair of Marion's ribbon, and regarding the abandonment of his children.

that each *self* demands of other *selves* that they prefer it to themselves. But for Rousseau this madness flows from a train of accidents and of circumstances, from a history which has turned self-love inside out, a disposition which has in itself nothing evil, into a vicious *amour-propre*. This *amour-propre*, virulent as it may be, must be seen as a superficial modality of our being since it is something *which has happened* to self-love, and which therefore does not essentially belong to our being.

The “theory of man” is the theory of self-love. The decisive “technical” element of the latter is that self-love is “the unique passion which is born with man” and that this passion is “in itself indifferent to good and evil.” Thus Rousseau does not say that man is born “just” or with a “good will.” He avoids the ground upon which Christian dogma finds its foothold and its meaning, that of the will. Self-love cannot be said to be good or bad because it is not a matter of the will. As a passion, therefore as passivity, it is necessarily indifferent to good and evil, the choice of good or evil presupposing the active intervention of the will. It is plausible that every human being finds in himself self-love as the first or essential passion, and an innocent passion as long as it does not motivate an unjust action toward other human beings, an unjust action which would demand the intervention of the will. Each one, originally and naturally, prefers himself, but this preference would not become unjust, or would not really become preference, until it becomes active and motivates an unjust action. In any case, in setting down that self-love is in itself indifferent to good and evil, Rousseau deprives Christian dogma of its foothold in common experience. By placing at the center or at the root of human being a perfectly “neutral” power, he gives his theory an advantageously scientific turn, and opens a vast career for the ingenuity of the theoretician. What ancient or modern author was more cleverly persuasive than the author of *Emile*? Conversely, to start from the thesis that man is born unjust, or then that he is born just, severely circumscribes the theoretician’s scope. Christian dogma sets down these two claims *together*, the first man’s sin having lodged in injustice a being created in justice.

How does one pass from a neutral power, indifferent to good or evil, to a psychological and moral faculty which confronts the alternative of good or evil? Rousseau assures that this is the work, or rather the effect, of “circumstances.” One must then admit that the will, which is present but dormant, was progressively awakened by the shock of accidents from the exterior. Thus a will which was at first entirely passive or morally indifferent, a will with neither direction nor any tendency whatever, actualizes itself by becoming a

vicious will, depraved preference, crazed *amour-propre*. If that is the case, the will as a capacity for good and evil does not properly belong to the nature of man. For the theory of man, one might say, man has—properly speaking—no will, save when it is bad. The disagreement between Rousseau and Christophe de Beaumont or Pascal does not revolve around the orientation of the human will, but on its reality. While Rousseau stresses its secondary and accidental character, Christian dogma brings out its power and its ambiguity: after the Fall, the human will remains flexible to good and evil, while at the same time being from then on the slave of a radically unjust disposition of which it cannot be cured, except through grace.

As I said, Rousseau turns to best advantage the ostensibly scientific character of a morally neutral self-love. At the same time, he derives advantage from the familiarity and obviousness with which this notion is invested in our eyes. Self-love—who would find it difficult to give a pregnant meaning to this notion? Nevertheless, this notion, as I have also stressed, entails an abyss of obscurity, insofar as from this passion, which is indifferent to good and evil, must arise a will able to choose between good and evil, or rather a principally bad will, since it is animated by *amour-propre*.

One could object that I have simplified, not to say distorted, the “theory of man” by not distinguishing from self-love, which is indifferent to good or evil, the original goodness which seems necessarily to entail a certain orientation toward the good. Rousseau in fact expresses himself in this way:

The fundamental principle of all morality, on which I have reasoned in all my writings, and which I developed in this latest one [the *Emile*] with all the clarity of which I am capable, is that man is a naturally good being, loving justice and order; that there is no original perversity in the human heart, and that the first movements of nature are always right....

I also explained what I understood by this natural goodness, which does not seem to be deduced from the indifference to good and evil which is natural to self-love.²³

These propositions seem to imply that natural goodness includes a primitive orientation of the will in the direction of good. In the subsequent lines, Rousseau complicates his analysis by bringing in the duality of the human being divided between the soul and the body, and what he calls “love of order” which is proper to the soul. He takes up again the dualist theses of the Vicar without taking up again the description that the latter gives of moral

²³ *Lettre à Christophe de Beaumont*, OC 3:935–936.

experience, and which is close to Christian spirituality.²⁴ He distinguishes three stages: the first is that of natural man who has no conscience because he has “compared nothing” and, “limited to physical instinct alone,” is “null” and “stupid”; the last is described thus:

When finally all the agitated particular interests clash, when self-love beginning to ferment becomes *amour-propre*, when opinion, making the entire universe necessary to each man, causes them all to become born enemies of one another and makes it so that none finds his own good except in the ill of another, then the conscience, weaker than the exalted passions, is stifled by them, and no longer remains in men’s mouths except as a word made to deceive each other mutually. Each one then feigns that he wants to sacrifice his interests to those of the public, and they all lie.²⁵

This final stage is characterized by a specific moral orientation, but this one is entirely bad. If the moral ambiguity, the flexibility, of the human will must appear, it seems that it must be in the second stage of the development of *amour-propre*, the intermediary stage. It is the stage during which men “begin to cast a glance at their similars...to acquire ideas of propriety, of justice and order,” and the “morally beautiful begins to become perceptible to them, and the conscience acts.”²⁶ The distinction between virtues and vices appears, but it strangely rests on a device in which the will does not intervene:

Then they have virtues, and if they also have vices, it is because their interests clash, and their ambition awakens in measure as their enlightenment extends. But as long as there is less opposition of interests than there is agreement in knowledge, men are essentially good.²⁷

It will be admitted that the theoretician here has trouble hiding his embarrassment. Thus, it is the interplay of “interests” and “knowledge” which determines men’s moral state, this latter never taking root in an ambiguous disposition of the will. It must, besides, be observed that Rousseau brings in the will in the description of *none* of the three stages of development of *amour-propre*; it is neither mentioned nor evoked in *any* of the three stages. This confirms, and to a certain degree explains, the distance brought out by Christopher Kelly between the descriptions Rousseau gives of the sentiment

²⁴ The Vicar says: “Feeling myself dragged along, combated by these two contrary movements, I said to myself: no, man is not one; I want and I do not want, I feel myself at the same time slave and free; I see the good, I love it, and I do the bad” (*Émile*, in OC 4:583).

²⁵ *Lettre à Christophe de Beaumont*, in OC 4:937.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 936.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 936–37.

of the just and the unjust, and the diverse theoretical explanations he gives of it. The theory of man is determined all the way through by an absence, the absence of the will. A sentence of the *Letter* brings out how much of a stranger Rousseau is to this principle of Christian, as well as pagan, ethics, according to which to regulate one's life is to regulate one's will:

The theory of man is not a vain speculation, when it founds itself upon nature, when it proceeds with the support of facts through well-connected consequences and when, in bringing us to the source of the passions, it teaches us to regulate their course.²⁸

What does Rousseau mean by the “source of the passions”? It is this primitive passion indifferent to good and evil that is self-love, and it is also the disequilibrium which will transform this indifference into a division between good and evil, but a division which does not have a properly moral character, the disequilibrium being between the opposition of interests and the extent or agreement of knowledge. In such a way that, properly speaking, the sentiment of the distance or the opposition between the just and the unjust remains unexplained in the “theory” of Rousseau, contrary to his ringing claims in the *Letter to Christophe de Beaumont*. In Pascal's perspective, even if the Christian religion has “understood man well,” Christian mysteries cannot further “explain” moral experience since they forbid any access to the “great things”—and first of all the Fall—to which they refer. Conversely, they preserve this moral experience and consolidate it by stressing, intensifying, engraving its characters: Christian life is only a constant effort to measure and to correct, with the help of God, the essential injustice of the *self*. If men knew why their will is divided, why they want the good which they do not do, and do the evil they do not want, they would not have this moral experience. If they knew how to explain why their will is enslaved, it would no longer be so.

²⁸ Ibid., 941.

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSIONS

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Submissions must be under 8,000 words, including notes and bibliographic references, and must be accompanied by an abstract of no more than 150 words. Because *Interpretation* is a double-blind peer-reviewed journal, all author identification and all references that would identify an author's own publications must be removed from the document. A separate title page, with the author's affiliation and contact information (including address, postal code, email address, and phone number) must be included with your MS.

Contributors should follow *The Chicago Manual of Style* (16th edition). *The Chicago Manual of Style* offers publications the choice between sentence-style capitalization in titles of books or articles and headline-style. *Interpretation* uses the headline style. Parenthetical references no longer use "p." or "pp." *Interpretation* has reverted to the traditional form of citation and no longer uses the author/date form. Please double space the entire text. Footnotes, rather than endnotes, are preferred.

Words from languages not rooted in Latin should be transliterated to English. Foreign expressions that have not become part of English should be accompanied by translation into English.

The editors of *Interpretation* are committed to a timely appraisal of all manuscripts, and expect to be able to have a decision on submissions within four to six weeks.